UNCLASSIFIED U S De artment Of State Case No DOC No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 I IRELEASEDIN - Koog il i APPEALS PANEL ACTION ADDITIONAL RELEASED 1 4 3 THE FOUR PARTY TALKS ON KOREA BACKGROUND PAPER On April 16 1936 the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Korea proposed Four Party Talks to reduce tensions and initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement on the Korean peninsula We have made it clear -to North_Korea that we are intereSted in a process that could ultimately lead to a replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement and to normal economic political and cultural interchange between North and South and between the -DPRK and the United States This paper provides background and seeks to delineate U S interests in the talks The Four Party Talks are intended to promote stability on the Korean peninsula during a time of rapid change in the relative prosperity and power-of the two sides and 5 uncertainities of the North's decline Ultimately of course both we and the ROK would like to see a peaceful democratic and united Korea The steady decline in the North's economy in particular its inability to feed its people and the ascendance of the South raise the possibility for the first time that the DPRK might collapse with either a dangerous military spasm or a flood of starving refugees or move toward peaceful unificationl we B1 cannot forecast internal events in the North with any level of 14m confidence any more than we can bring about the collapse or ensure the status quo Our approach to the Four Party Talks must therefore be flexible enough to'encompass a' 'wide range of options including a collapse of the North an extended period of muddling through or even although this seems less likely the adoption of meaningful reforms which would give the DPRK regime renewed vitality The talks must help us manage the dynamic events'underway contributing to our ultimate aim of peaceful change at each point along the way - Classification Extended on 03 27 2013 Class SECRET Authority DSCG 11-1 Declassify on 11 30 2022 Despite the passage Of- forty-four years the Kore-an War has not yet formally ended The 1953 Armistice Agreement 'purely military in character by its own definition envisioned a follow on political act that would achieve a final peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula The 1954 Geneva Conference failed to no one's surprise to produce a permanent peace and steps by the two sides in the early 19705 and the mid 19805 to ease tensions also came to naught The North has pressed for over thirty years to replace the Armistice with a new agreement but the U S and South Korea traditionally opposed a change This Opposition resulted from the North's conditions for peace- a treaty with the not the ROK and withdrawal of 0 8 forces which contradicted fundamental U SL policy-in support of a North South peace In 1988 ROK President Bob Tae woo adopted a new approach toward North South ties proposing - - AUTHORITY Charles Lahiguera Senior Reviewed UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 inter Korean talks to lower tensions The North reciprocated Roh's gesture and there followed a series of talks between the Prime Ministers of the two sides leading to signature of a Basic Agreement between them on December 13 1991 The document was formally entitled Agreement on Reconciliation Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North and took effect in February 1992 In the Basic Agreement the two sides pledged to respect each other's political and social systems abjured armed aggression interference sabotage or slander against the other promised to endeavor together to transform the present armistice regime into a firm state of peace while observing it in the meantime and agreed to set up liaison offices at Panmunjom and to c00perate internationally They also announced a group of confidence building measures including notification and control of major military movements and exercises peaceful use of the DMZ exchanges of military personnel and information a telephone hotline and anhased reduction with verification in armaments especially weapons of mass destruction or surprise attack capabilities The document also called for economic cooperatibn cultural exchanges free travel communications links and cooperation on the international stage Implementation of the agreements were to he overseen by subcommittees dealing with military trade and exchange issues The Basic Agreement was fleshed out by a series of protocols in the following months and a Joint Declaration for a NonuNuclear Korean Peninsula agreed to on December 31 1991 and adopted in February 1992 but the entire structure was never completed and was only minimally implemented liaison offices were set up Indeed the process had run its course by the autumn of 1992 amid growing recriminations The agreements nevertheless remain on the table as fundamental documents of North South relations They might well have been revitalized in the summer of 1994 during a North South summit if Kim Il Sung had not died After Kim's death North South relations became increasingly strained Pyongyang was intent on keeping the South out of the nuclear settlement and focused on develoPing bilateral relations with the U S something it knew was unnerving to Seoul Nevertheless the North continued to refer back to the North-South agreements of 1992 as the basis for reengagement with the ROK as part of a larger peace settlement on the Peninsula One of its main goals was not to exclude the South but to ensure that the U S was included in discussion of such a settlementJ I To get North South negotiations back on track and provide some international cover for the DPRK Presidents Clinton and Kim preposed the Four Party Talks between the ROK the China and the U S In the months following the April 1996 proposal China informally agreed to take part North Korea i UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 6 1UNCLASSIFIED us Department of State Case No Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 - 3 delayed its response to the proposall The U S and South Korea countered with an offer of a Jaint B1 Briefing on the Four Party Talks but the North continued-to 'stall and the atmosphere after the September submarine incident made progress impossible- Following the DPRK's December expression of regret agreement was reached to hold the Joint- Briefing and following further delay the briefing occurred on March SL 1997 The ROK and U S presentations were limited to a general outline of our plans and the potential for North 'Korea if talks moved forward and progress made toward a peace settlement Following several weeks of working-level talks on June 30 the North met with the U S and ROK in New York and agreed'to participate in a Four Party preparatory meeting with all four sides in New York on August 5 This meeting would mark China's formal entry into the Four Party process ' Ihe Egpr Parties' Approaches tg the Talks he The United States U-S equities in the Four Party Talks are straightforward r the Talks will provide a mechanism to help manage tensions on the peninsula by engaging the North in dialogue on tundamental issues The process will assist us in shaping events if the North moves toward collapse promoting a soft landing if that appears feasible or if the DPRK proves to have staying power establishing a peace structure that promises greater long term stability-on the peninsula Our role is critical because glwe are the only party with sufficient influence in all capitals to move the process forward At present the North and the South recognize they need us to facilitate a dialogue Although we will neither act as a mediator nor play the central negotiating role our participation remains essential to make the process work We should aim for a leading ROK role to the extent possible and if necessary should make efforts in support of that goal We also need to be involved to protect long term U S equities on the peninsula to maintain our integrity as an ally in the region and the world and to promote our interests throughout the region we will of course continue to provide political and military support to the South in order to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula The United States must also take the lead in coordinating a Supportive international posture for the talks possibly including organization of a group guarantors or friends of other interested powers such as Japan and Russia or at least ensuring they are well briefed as the process moves forward To avoid antagonizing Korean nationalistr sensitivities in both South and North it is critical to make the point repeatedly that the Koreans themselves not outside powers will primarily determine the peninsula s fate The UNCLASSIFIED us Department of State Case No F-2o12-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 4 - outsiders' role is thus to support not to dictate a settlement We may also need to activate the UN Security Council on the issue when appropriate and encourage others to or discourage them from providing aid trade or investment to the DPRK or to meet restructuring costs associated with unification E _ Quth Korea Ir The ROK sees the talks as a means to enhance 3 I Had Kits securithI ih SOutEMEoreansI 1 __Jbe1ieve strongly that core dec1510ns be made only North Korea y After losing the ability to play off its '1 I Itwo-traditional supporters -- the PRC and the USSR in the early 1990's and with the former Soviet Union and East European allies moving from a barter to cash basis for trade in 1991 the North s economy has been in a tailspin and its effort I to secure international support largely unsuccessful The 1 death of Kim Il Sung the slow pace of revamping the regime 1 llnatural disasters and serious food shortages have added to a I nsense of desperation in Pyongyang in a period when the South has been on the rise both politically and 7 I I i I 1 40 It is unclear how far the North is willing to go toward I relaxation of tensions and a genuine peace settlement I I x B1 1 4 0 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 4v US Department of State Case No Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 - - 1 Regardless of the ultimate aims negotiations will be difficult and slow at best The 'experiences 015 0 negotiators demonstrate that A B1 any talks that may get underway will be tedious and subject 1 403UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 I 1 4 0 8 1 0 90 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 7 - - - I Since 1962 promoted a North-South treaty but in 1974 began to argue that a peace agreement could only be signed between the 0 5 and the DPRK since the ROK did not sign the Armistice and-that there were two distinct issues involved and different parties for each- the North and the-v 8 to negotiate on security issues and the North and the South to negotiate on-reunification The Armistice was signed by General Mark Clark as CINCUNC General Peng Teh huai as Commander Chinese People s Volunteers and Kim Il-sung as Supreme Commander of the KPA The RQK's refusal to sign in 1953 is not a valid reason to exclude it because South Korea was an obvious belligerent and participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference By 1984 the North's position began to shift and it again accepted the South's right to participate in talks on security issues Over the next several years the North fleshed out that position and by 1988 _ - Pyongyang proposed bilateral talks on military tension reduction measures DPRK policy since then has consistently recognized the importance of North-South discussions in establishing new peace arrangements In the Basic Agreement the DPRK agreed to UNCLASSIFEED US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 -3- negotiate a replacement for the Armistice with the ROK 0 although the language represented a compromise between the two sides and was sufficiently vague for the North to argue that it had agreed that the South could be a party to such negotiations but not that the North_and theiSouth the sole parties inv9i3 LJ 1 1 4 0 Building Blocks of an Agreement The issues involved in the Four Party Talks can be divided into the legal aspects of a Peace Treaty and the Armistice political agreements military confidence building measures and economic elements The economic issues involve trade investment sanctions and humanitarian and general aid DPRK bilateral issues are also involved to the extent that steps we take in the Agreed Framework context must be coordinated with progress in the Four Party context lifting economic sanctions but we need to keep the two areas clearly separate in order to maintain the integrity of the Agreed Framework increase our own manenverability in the talks and close off the possibility of renegotiating DPRK Agreed Framework commitments in the Four Party talks While the political economic and military elements of the talks are are intertwined the North's continuing military threat to South Korea and its capability to develop weapons of mass destruction makes a concrete reduction of that threat as early as possible critical to U S and South Korean interests 1 DPRK priorities will be to maximize economic assistance and investment Their past proposals for CBMs have 1 ane wheaxik 1 that later can be ignored I a UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 0 0 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No DOC No C05315521 Date 05 25 2017 1 4 8 1 4m B1 US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 1 4 0 B1 '80 0 2 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case NO F-2012-30958 Doc NO C05315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 1 we 1 4 13 1 4 0 B1 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No DOC No C05315521 Date 05 25 2017 2090 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 1 4 3 7 a 77% UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 B1 6 0 90 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 005315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 7 81 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case NO DOC No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 - B1 U S 4 DPRK Bilateral Issues There is no conflict between steps we have taken or are planning to take on U S--DPRK bilateral issues under the Agreed Framework and the Four Party Talks KEDO cooperation with the IAEA on the DPRK nuclear program opening of liaison offices MIA searches missile proliferation discussions relaxation of sanctions etc all can and do help promote the process of easing of tensions and North South reconciliation that we seek for the Korean peninsula And until we see if and how the Four 3 Party Talks proceed we should avoid making linkages between the two processes However it is equally obvious that we must I maintain a carefully nuanced policy that promotes progress in hm Modalities 9f the Talks aw mm-ow UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2012-30958 Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017 16 hmw-m 11 a I iAlthough rotation between the four capitals might increase exposure for the talks and help build public support 1 in Korea that would sustain the process the generous Swiss offer to provide facilities and other support makes the Geneva option the most attractive from a logistical and financial point of View- In addition Geneva was the site of the successful negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994 and of the last international conference to discuss the 5 Korean War Armistice in 1954 negotiating ggatggx Close coordination with the ROK is essential to our overall strategy for the talks and our negotiating plans will need to I be developed in conjunction with the South It is however possible to outline a general approach for discussion with the South that promotes U S goals in the talks l the ROK should take the lead whenever possible 2 our role is to facilitate 1 the talks 14 explain the need for a process to build confidence and cooperation that will I eventually allow the achievement of genuine peace on the peninsula 5 propose modest communication transparency proposals as first step to he followed later by more meaningful agreements on reducing the threat and 6 be prepared for the i long haul and keep expectations low h UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No Doc No 305315521 Date 05 25 2017                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu