Nr 173 Scbret'ben Baker an Kohl F93 Nr 173 Schreiben des AuBenministers Baker an Bundeskanzler Kohl 10 Februar 1990 BK 212 - 3543Mit Bricfkopf The Secretary of State Washington Dear Mr Chancellor l In light of your meeting with President Gorbachev the President wanted me to brief you on the talks I ve had in Moscow 2 These were wide-ranging talks concerning all parts of the US- Soviet agenda I believe we ve made signi cant progress in all parts of that agenda arms control regional issues bilateral questions human rights and transnational matters I ll have Ambassador Walters brief you on the details of our progress and the character of my exten- sive discussions with President Gorbachev and Minister Shevardnadze on the recent Plenum and the course of perestroika For now I want to report to you about our discussions on German unification Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were eager to raise this issue with me I know it won't surprise you that they have concerns While now accepting unification as inevitable they outlined a number of concerns - They feared uni cation could create instability and uncertainty in Europe They wondered about the depth of the German commitment to current borders noting the German court s decision on the border question They evidenced unease over the effect uni cation would have on any German leader- ship saying reassuring statements from FRG leaders in the current setting might mean little in the context of a uni ed Germany They emphasized that uni cation had to be managed and take account of its effects on European security and that the lessons of history required that the Soviet Union not be passive observers of this process I responded that you were sensitive to their concerns but that no one except the Germans could decide the fate of Germany I told them that I agreed that unification was inevitable and that events were moving very rapidly in this regard Indeed that I expected the internal aspects of unification to proceed very quickly after the March 18 elections3 I suggested that the internal elements of unification were strictly a German matter I observ- ed as you have that external aspects of unification were a different matter and that it was important to take into account the security concerns of others To that end I suggested that a framework or mechanism should be developed to address the external aspects of unification I said the Four Powers was an inappropriate mechanism because the Germans could never accept it Similarly CSCE was far too unwieldy and cumbersome to constitute a timely mechanism for addressing the issue CSCE could of course sanction the result of the unification pro- cess but couldn t be a near-term practical mechanism for helping to shape it As a preliminary idea I noted that a Two Plus Four arrangement - tag the two Germanys plus the four powers - might be the most realistic way to proceed I said such a mechanism 1 Botschafter Blech bergab das Schreiben bei Ankunft von Bundeskanzler Kohl in Moskau Kohl Ich wolltc Etnheit 268f vgl Baker Dreijahre die die Welt verinderten 184 2 Au enmtnister Baker hielt sich vom 7 -10 Februar 1990 zu Gespriichen mit Au enminister Schewardnadse in Mos- kau auf zu den Ergebnissen Gcmcinsame amenkanisch-sowictische Erltliirung 10 Februar 1990 in Amerika Dienst Nr 6 14 Februar 1990 6 5 Am Tag seines Aufenthalts traf er mit Generalsekretir Gorbalschow zusammen Baker Dreijahre die die Welt 183 Gorbatschow Erinnerungen 715M 3 Dazu Nr 145 Anm 12 794 I0 Febrnar Baker an Kohl could begin only after the March 18 elections only after the process on the internal aspects of unification has begun and only if the Germans accept it I mentioned that I had discussed this with Genscher 4 and he had said it was worth thinking about I said I had not had a chance to discuss it personally with you but you had been briefed on the idea Gorbachev evidenced some interest in this approach even suggesting that he thought it might be suitable for the situation There was clearly no commitment on his part and he may be inclined to raise either a variant of this idea or an entirely different approach with you Whatever he chooses to do with you I thought it important to outline his response to me There s one other point I raised with him and here again his response was interesting I told him that the leadership was strongly in favor of a unified Germany remaining in NATO and not being neutral I explained that we agreed with this and thought the Soviets should not reject such an outcome In this regard I mentioned that it was unrealistic to as sume that a big economically significant country like Germany could be neutral And then I put the following question to him Would you prefer to see a unified Germany outside of NATO independent and with no US forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options and would be discussing them soon in a kind of seminar He then added Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable By implication NATO in its cur- rent zone might be acceptable In short I believe we had a very interesting exchange and one that suggests Gorbachev at least is not locked-in While he clearly has real concerns about German unification - some of which may be related to the passions this issue evokes in the Soviet Union - he may well be willing to go along with a sensible approach that gives him some cover or explanation for his actions I suspect that the combination of a Two Plus Four mechanism and a broader CSCE framework might do that But it is obviously too early to know and we ll have to see how the Soviet position evolves In any case we will need to coordinate very closely I ll look forward to comparing notes with you after your meeting Sincerely yours Em James A Baker 4 Nr 159 Anm l                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu