deg UNCLASSIFIED February 21 1990 TWO PLUS-FOUR ADVANTAGES POSSIBLE CONCERNS AND REBUTTAL POINTS RELEASED IN FULL A ago German unification threatened to spin out of control and damage important American interests Ing_ l grew out of our need to create an orderly prgcess that would maintain American involvement in and even some control over the unification debate Iwg_2lus_EQnL has improved our position in the following ways I 1 By asserting American_1eadership in getting the six to agree on Two Plus _Four we have both publ_ic1y and privately that America is and will 'remain a European power 2 In working first with the Germans then with the ch and finally with the ngiets we have created a E2991 for continued consultations on the issue Hun-f The Germans have made this point explicitly with us 3 through our brokering we have gotten the Soviets the GDR 1 1s renc om w1 us and the agreeing toh EiEE 55 E55 5551 4 We also have the Four Powers and the GDR gg_ eing with us and the FRG that interna1_aspegts are to be solved a by the Germanys alone I These are notable achievements Both Kohl and ensc rec1a your in bringing a out an agreement thaE'publicly locks- in the Soviets the French and the British on these two critical points I 5 We've deflected calls for Four Power talks or a _Q -Nation Summ1t on German unificaEion Egnr_ gger talks would have created exactly what everyone wanted to avoid a rising tide of German nationalism in response to others trying to determine Germany' 5 fate would be too unwieldy and slow to deal with this fast-moving situation It would also give the Soviets a veto over the process UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY THEODORE SELLIN DATEICASE ID 22 NOV 2002 199504561 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 0 6 In Isn_Elus_Eour I By putting the Two before the Four we solved the Germans' dilemma of wanting to unify without undue interference from the outside 0 By adding the Four to the Two we have gaggpherp and Gorbachev all_gn_bga and involve the Four Powers inx where they belongimplications_of unification Meanwhile each can use the Two Plus if Four race or his or her own intern eds Gor aghev to explain uni 1cation is okay Thatcher an nd to show that they're involved in the game Indeed all_g _them including Gorbachev in his Erag a_interview appear to beitakingecredit for the Two Plus Four idea 0 The Two Plus Four mechanism does not create a veto The unification process will in any 0 orward The Two Plus Four mechanism does provide an orderly means to devolve remaining Four Power rights on a unified Germany a step which will under any circumstance require Soviet acquiescence 0 Two Plus Fourfis g2 an event negotiation Nor 15 iE a replacement for a final 7 German settlement It is simply'a process of Ju' ewwa incremental consultations mime process 'does give us additional support the UK vi and France on keeping a united Germany in NATO 1 I The 're already in -- with troops in the GDR and Four Power oETigaEfonET' InH they're likely to try and move further in by playing on the fears the Poles have of a united Germany 0 The Germans clearly recogniz- the Soviet role Kohl s andmout bout his visit to Moscow rom the Soviets the Germans There is simpIy Soviets out they'll always have the bilateral card'to play I The Soviets will continue to present their needs to the Germans -- who will be under pressure to respond especially with national elections on the horizon 3 UNCLASSIFIED 2 UNCLASSIFIED -3- With Two Plus Four the Soviets can't stop the internal process the Germans will call the shots And on the external they're tied into a process that include _ ermany -- unlike the strict Four Power talks the Soviets wanted just weeks ago But we an them in 22 tent not in one of their own working with the Germans reams Unification is an emotional issue for the Soviets domestically It's highly charged politically and Gorbachev needs to take certain public postures to deal with that a What he needs more than anything is'a process or mechanism menacin- he issue u-oes as Decent-er he had already tries -o Four Power talks and a-BS-Nation Summit If a mechanism doesn't exist he'll create one with the Germans Two Plus Four gives him the explanation he needs domestically In the end he'll need a package to show what he got in part for compensation for the idea of Germany in NATO and in part to meet Soviet security needs While this can't be determined now it might include No NATO forces in the omega Delayed Soviet troop withdrawals from the spam Special provisions for German troops in the No erman possession or production of nuclear biological or chemical Legally binding commitments on borders and_ l Bundeswehr reductions probably in CFE II We expect such a package would include an implicit if not explicit economic component of German economic benefits for the s Right now Gorbachev needs to show he has 744 some control over the process Two Plus Four-gives him that cover with little real control Later he'll need a defensible package to sell to his domestic audiencefar they've avoided taking such a position even though they have had ample opportunity Moreover they've been able to shift other positions no unification without taking undue heat UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED -4- Events and internal unity will force the issue not a process like Two Plus Four The March 18 election will the issue for Gorbachev domestically and he will have to show quickly that he's working on it Two Plus Four provides that necessary safety valve for him He can always say he's working on the issue in the Two Plus Four framework If he really decides to say no to NATO he'll do so with the Germans by probably focusing on specific criteria troop limits no US nuclear capability etc not the generic case of NATO membership Indeed tbs Snxiets will_have more leverage to make this case bilaterally not in Two Plus Four In any case we'll be able to probeBSoviet thinking in the April Ministerial we can and should put off any _ inisterial Two Plus our iscu531ons unti after_ghat mE ting - The_ gttom_nine Events not Two Plus Egpr may force the Soviets to determine a p051tion on NATO membership Two and E em a process Eo aE Ieast manage some events so we don t unnecessarily force the Soviets' hand Because Two Plus Four is a discussion ngt_a_neggtiatign the others can raise what they want to raise We are not committed to responding at all if we don't want to And if we do want to discuss such issues it's better we have the Germans wrapped in the cocoon of Two Plus Four -1 preceded by One Plus Three when such issues are raised That'll force them to be more up front with us Moreover it's best to backstop the Germans with the British the French and us We're all agreed on the key issue Germany in NATO Ibe_ ottgm_nine Two Plus Four only commits us to those things we want to talk about UNCLASSIFIED                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    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