SE6RE 1613 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT Meeting with Vaclav Havel President of Czechoslovakia U PARTICIPANTS The President Brent Scowcroft Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert L Hutchings Director for European Political Affairs NSC Staff Lisa Valyiova Interpreter Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel President Milan Knazko Presidential Advisor Alexandr Vondra Presidential Advisor Michael Zantovsky Presidential Press Spokesman DATE TIME AND PLACE February 21 1990 2 45 - 3 30 pm The Oval Office The President and President Havel held a follow-up meeting in the Oval Office on February 21 U The President President Havel The President How did your speech at the Congress go It was very well received I had good reports back on it U U U President Havel May I ask whether you were informed of the contents of the speech U The President No I got a summary and would appreciate your impression of the highlights U President Havel I was surprised at the applause at points where I expected boos In my speech I elaborated on some of the points we discussed yesterday I was surprised that some things which were addressed more to our domestic audience were also received well U SEQRfl'f Declassify on OADR SEGREI DECLASSIFIED PER E O 12958 AS AMENDED 6 2-112CCq --nU IJPG-r SE6REI SBC T 2 The President You leave Washington with good feelings for you and your country I want to follow up on our meetings We need to stay in close touch on how you view developments and how we do I meet this weekend with Helmut Kohl It will be a quiet meeting where I hope he tells me what's on his mind concerning German unification and his domestic pressures As you know there are some real concerns in different countries in Europe about what a unified Germany means for Europe's future President Havel With your permission I will make two remarks and pose one question As far as Germany is concerned the problem is that there will be unification at a time when elections are coming in both Germanies My second remark I talked today in Congress more specifically than I have with you about this topic and even more specifically with the House Foreign Affairs Committee I was asked specific questions and had to elaborate more I do not want to take up much of your time but I will inform you if you are interested Now my question In a few days I will go to Moscow What interests me extremely and our country is whether you have a message I could pass on to Moscow This is important not only for our country but also for the whole of Central Europe As I said in Congress the best way the U S can help Gorbachev is to help the Soviet Union on its way to democracy I also said that the withdrawal of troops from our country and others depends on assistance that is easy to provide but which the Soviet Union could never ask us for It is a proud superpower and now more proud because it is crumbling Above all I am thinking about humanitarian assistance -- food stuffs and grain that you have in reserve and which could be used for Armenia to support Gorbachev The Soviets do want to vacate Europe but are still reluctant to do so They are afraid of their own returning armies which they cannot house and feed They have had a very good life in Europe and the Soviet leaders are afraid of a rebellion in the army It shouldn't be too difficult to help them in this and in so doing to help us It will not be easy for me to explain why Soviet troops cannot leave overnight Still withdrawal should not be too difficult There 'are only 73 000 in Czechoslovakia which was the last country they came to And they came to suppress a liberation struggle so there is also a political aspect Nobody perceived them as part of the balance of power but only as occupiers It would help us a lot to have something to offer to help speed up the withdrawal by a few months We shall be there in Moscow on February 26 and on the same day sign an agreement on withdrawal The agreement will specify that the first soldier is to be withdrawn the same day So far the agreement says that the last will leave on the 26th of May next year I would like to shift it so it can be just one year from start to finish but I cannot only demand things from them without offering something in return All we can offer is a kind of special mediating role because of my special role as the only non-communist head of state for now SEGREi oc6REf 6ECRU 3 The President I agree with your assessment of the problems he faces We need to allow him to make withdrawals with a certain sense of pride We don't want to paint adversaries into a corner Our desire is to see problems resolved without rubbing the Soviets' nose in failure We will not conduct ourselves in the wrong way by saying we win you lose Z President Havel It only occurred to me that the problem of pride could be overcome by having the aid private The President That's an important point To the level of several million dollars we're already doing that Considerable aid to Armenian earthquake victims in the form of emergency medical supplies has already been provided through the American private sector The question of food aid is very sensitive right now The Soviets are very proud They have not made a specific request for this kind of support They've made such requests of others -- the Germans for example -- but not of the U S If they came to us and said our people are starving we would of course find a way to help The Soviets also have a distribution problem There was a good crop last year but they can't get the goods to market The system is broken down which makes it harder to help The problem is not food but distribution For that reason we are interested in providing help -- both private and governmental -- for the restructuring of the Soviet economy Our Attorney General was recently there discussing their new legal system as well as their legislative problems Alan Greenspan was there on monetary issues and Carla Hills on trade negotiations I think I mentioned yesterday that they have a long way to go before they understand markets or how a private sector works Z Now back to the question you raised about a message for Gorbachev I would suggest the following tell Gorbachev that you leveled with me about your aspirations for Czechoslovakia and that I asked you to tell Gorbachev that we will not conduct ourselves regarding Czechoslovakia or any other country in a way that would complicate the problems he has so frankly discussed with me Tell him that I told you that we are not only supporting perestroika but the President of the united States also wants President Havel to tell Gorbachev that the President supports him by name That's an important point We don't want to get caught up in internal problems in the Soviet Union but we do see in Gorbachev a man who supports peaceful change in Eastern Europe I'm impressed that he is willing to sit and work out a specific agreement with you on troop withdrawals Perhaps you can use your dramatic background to convince him that nothing in the U S presence in Europe threatens him rather this is a stabilizing force This is a very important point I expect that some citizens in the USSR ask why the U S has to be there any more I need to convince Gorbachev this summer that a continuing U S presence is stabilizing He worries about 5BCRB SE6REi SE6REl 4 SECRE'f Germany and about the Polish border and I'm convinced our presence is stabilizing in those regards That's straight from my heart Also if you could tell him I'm really looking forward to seeing him We had a long phone talk the other day in the best spirit On food aid I would be careful We are blessed in this country but why didn't Gorbachev mention this to the Secretary of State The answer is pride Yet in a human compassionate sense we'd like to help One example when the Berlin Wall first was chipped away there was great joy around the world not just in Germany My political opponents here said the President of the United States was laid back not excited about these events In my mind we're the other superpower I don't want to cause problems for him My actions cost me domestically Gorbachev knows that but you should know as a friend Who would have thought these changes could have come and at a time of great anxiety in the Soviet Union 7 President Havel I would like to say that this explanation has been very important for me I now understand things much better On one thing that you mentioned it is clear that the presence of American troops in Europe is a stabilizing factor and the Soviets themselves know it Again it is a question of prestige This is the reason why I talked about the new European security system without mentioning NATO Because if it grew out of NATO it would have to be named something else if only because of the element of prestige If NATO takes over Germany it will look like defeat one superpower conquering another But if NATO can transform itself -- perhaps in conjunction with the Helsinki process -- it would look like a peaceful process of change not defeat 7 The President We should give serious thought to that -- how to manifest it You raised a good point Our view is that NATO would continue with a new political role and that we would build on the CSCE process We will give thought on how we might proceed 7 President Havel It seems on this kind of understanding it is the best way to end ou'r' discussion I don't want to take up more of your time so I will end on that note You're invited already to Prague I would be glad to welcome you in Czechoslovakia Our offer to host a U S -Soviet summit remains valid I understand that your next meeting is already scheduled but perhaps the one after that could be in Prague The President signal ll President Havel It is an interesting idea and might send a good In the fall Prague is open 7 The President I had been saying before there was no point in such summits without an agreed agenda but I've changed my mind SE6RE r t Lb' t 5 We need to meet The problem is we still have and the media have a summit mentality so that there are always high expectations attached to these meetings I on the other hand sometimes regret that President Havel some politicians have no sense of symbols For example I proposed to meet Gorbachev in Yalta but he didn't understand the symbolism l End of Conversation -- SECRB'f SE6REl                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu