Approved For ReleaQe Secret No Foreign Dimm Intelligence Memorandum Cuba 3 US Policy Ready for a Change Secret July 23 1975 No 0743 75 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 N0 Dirge n Abroad Background Use Only Cuntrig'lled Dissent Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved Additional Warning NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 005827 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E 0 11652 exemption category 1 I2 and 3 Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 25X1A93 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No Foreign Dissem July 23 I975 Cuba s US Policy Ready for a Change Precis Fidel Castro wants to negotiate an improvement in relations with the US He has said this publicly some of his top advisers are urging him to do so and Moscow has pressed him in this direction He has made it clear however that 0 he is in no hurry to restore full ties - he will accept no loss of prestige in negotiating an improve- ment 0 his demands will be stiff - he expects the US to make the first formal move Castro resisted Soviet urgings in favor of detente until early last year Brezh- nev s visit to Cuba in January and February seemed to be the turning point Since then the Cuban leader has given signals through a variety of channels that he is ready to talk He has even attempted to plant the idea that he expected talks to begin after the Cuba-US anti-hijacking agreement in February 1973 although the evidence does not bear this out In finally opting for detcnte Castro is clearly in agreement with the pro-Soviet faction in the Cuban leadership and in so doing is continuing his long-standing role of final arbiter of differing viewpoints within the regime Havana however wants to avoid the impression that it is anxious for recon- ciliation Eagerness would imply the existence of an exploitable weakness It would also undercut Cuba s policy of maintaining an aura of confrontation between the US and Latin America and would run counter to Cuban domestic propaganda More- over it might alarm the more nationalistic Cuban leaders who have feared a recrudescence of US in uence in Cuba Castro will therefore do nothing publicly to suggest that he is preparing for talks without a clear signal from Washington that a timetable for discussions could be drawn up He maintains that the US initiated the break in 1961 and must therefore take the initiative for talks to end This face-saving gesture is extremely important to him Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome They may be directed to of the Of ce of Current Intelligence code 143 extension 6228 -1- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 I Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 CLIBAN LEADERSHIP PARTY GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL NATIONAL POLITICAL BUREAU SECRETARIAT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF MINISTERS ASSEMBLY Fidel CASTRO First Secretary - Fidel CASTRO Chairman - - Fidel CASTRO Prime Minister Fidel CASTRO of 70 BE National Agrarian Reform Institute ELECTED lN Raul CASTRO Second Secretary - - Raul CASTRO Deputy Chairman Raul CASTRO First Deputy Prime - Raul CASTRO Munster of Minister Revolutionary Armed Forces 197 Osvaldo oogncos - - Osvaldo DORTICOS - - - Osvaldo DORTICOS President of the OsvuIdo Central Planning Board Sergio DEL VALLE Sergio DE VALLEUntenar Minister Ramiro VALDES - - - IRamiro VALDES Deputy Prime Minister for Construction Juan Delegate in Oriente Pruvrnce IS p Armando HART Party first secretary in Oriente Province GARCIA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guillermo GARCIA Deputy Prime for Transportation and Communication Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZL Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ Deputy anel- -Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ Minister for Foreign Allairs of National Commissron for Economic and Suentific-Technical Cooperationl-l mama 31940 w Blas ROCA law elections Pedro MlRE I heavy industry Fuure Isidore MALMIERCA There are 25 additional posts on the Council of Anronio PEREZ ideology Minisiers carrying the rank of Minister Jorge agriculture livestock Raul GARCIA PELAEZ In ar lndustr 4959 Palitiul Af liation Diodes TORRALBA Daputy Prime ml er ug y CASTILLA Depul Prime Minister for Education Scrence Culture 'Mh' 535 Communist ermine Student Revolutionary Dilemma Flavlo BRAVO Deputy Prime Minister Inr Consumption and Salutes t Unnarhd nlmu Mona to the clitn 565589 75 Joel DOMENECH Deputy Prime MIDISIEI tor Basrc Industry Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECRET N0 Foreign Disscm He apparently believes that US exibility on the Cube Issue will be reduced in 1976 because of the presidential elections He therefore would like to get talks under way this year so Cuba could be taking advantage of the casing of trade restrictions while prolonged negotiations on total normal- ization are taking place He probably believes that once some economic sanctions are lifted US firms will exert enough pressure on the administra- tion to force removal of the rest He would thus achieve a key goal access to US trade and technology without cost to himself Once negotiations started Castro would expect definitive settlement of such problems as the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay and US reconnais- sance flights over Cuban territory before he would consider a resumption of the relations broken in January 1961 He fully expects the US to bring up Havana s Soviet ties compensation for nationalized US properties and Cuban subversion in Latin America and probably has suspicions that the issue of Cuban support for Puerto Rico s independence will be raised Whatever the result of the negotiations Cuba and the US will remain on the opposite sides of many important issues Havana is committed to a long-term policy of promoting the unity of Latin America vis-a-vis the US and will not sacrifice its revolutionary bona fides for the sake of detente The Leadership Debates Detente Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez appears to head the pro-detente forces in Cuba The third-or fourth-ranking official in the Castro regime he is brilliant both as a theoretician and administrator and is responsible for much of the considerable administrative and economic progress Cuba has achieved over the past three years His ties with the Soviet leadership appear to be excellent he established his bona fides with Moscow during two decades of service as a high official of the pre-Castro Cuban Communist party Now Cuba s highest foreign relations official he has assumed a central role in Havana s maneuverings toward detente with the US In pressing for detente Rodriguez is reflecting not only Moscow s interests but his own pragmatic political and economic views as well He is supported by the remnants of Cuba s pre-Castro Communist party the old Communists and apparently by some of those technocrats whose burdens would be lessened somewhat if they had access to US markets and - trade Although this group is small in number its members occupy some significant posts in both the government and the party The group s main strength however lies in its affiliation with Moscow whose goals and policies it espouses The group has been in ascendancy in the field of policy since 1970 when Castro reluctantly acceded to a greater Soviet voice in -3- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 I A a 25X1X Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No Foreign Dissem determining Cuban domestic matters Selecting from among the group s members Rodriguez has reportedly established a small staff to assist him in engineering a normalization of relations Others in the Cuban leadership however fear the ideological impact a restoration of ties with the US or even the initiation of talks would have on the Cuban population A broad campaign to counteract US in uence especially among Cuban youth has been in progress since 1972 Moreover many in the leadership particularly those who fought under Castro as guerrillas remain bitterly anti-US and want no part of a reconciliation Their memories of past US actions aimed at undermining the revolution are vivid they are suspicious of US intentions and fear that materialist and cap- italist in uences could subvert many in the populace Many of these nationalistic officials recognize the advantages of detente however Unlike the old Communists they are uncomfortable with Havana s close ties to Moscow and probably believe that limited rapprochement with the US would increase Cuba s freedom of action They also would like access to US products technology and markets primarily for sugar nickel tobacco shellfish and rum They may believe that access to US markets and technology outweighs the advantages of continued use of the US embargo as a scapegoat for Cuba s limited economic progress They therefore accept compelling reasons for submitting to the urgings of Moscow and its Cuban supporters to move toward gradual detente with Washington They can be expected however to keep a close on the development of US-Cuban ties and to seek to limit US influence in Cuba Responding to both schools of thought Castro desires but would not make major concessions to achieve the economic bene ts of a reconcilia- tion As he and Rodriguez have said Cuba s five-year plan running through -4- N0 Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 N0 Foreign Dissent 1980 was drawn up on the presump- tion that the blockade would not be terminated As for diplomatic ties Rodriguez has suggested pub- licly that relations might be resumed in 1976 but Castro may be thinking in even longer terms and probably does not expect much progress until after the US elections next year In his view the benefits are not so great as to necessitate a vigorous effort to negotiate under the pres- sure of time Neither are the economic advantages so tempting that he would be willing to go decisively against the advice of those in the leadership who are counseling him to proceed slowly Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Castro s View of the Issues Compensation In recognition of the importance of the compensation issue Castro appears ready to counter any demand for indemnification for nationalized properties with his own demand that the US make restitution for the damage its economic denial program has done to the Cuban economy Although this subterfuge would enable him to manufacture a figure for damages far in excess of any US claims he seems to believe this gambit would be too transparent to withstand reasoned argument - 25X1X6 25X1X6 Castro without the pressure of the blockade would be willing to adopt a fall-back position that would permit a negotiated settlement of outstanding US claims Castro himself has apparently implied much the same thing to visitors from the US For obvious reasons Havana would expect to settle for considerably less than the $1 8 billion now given as the total figure for valid claims Special LA STAMPA correspondent Ennio Caretto asked Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez if the resumption of diplomatic relations with Washington was possible and quoted Rodriguez as replying Yes if nothing happens to prevent it In fact the process of international detente grows stronger I even have a date in mind 1976 We no longer feel threatened by the United States We are ready to negotiate and we do not even make it a condition that the United States close down Guantanamo naval base or free Latin America those are things we can will tell you furthermore that so it seems to me 70 percent of the US peeple the Congress and the State Department accept us Burying our hostility will be to the advantage of everyone us and them Dispatch from Ennio Caretto LA STAMPA Turin March 23 1975 p 9 5- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 SECRET No oreigtt Dissem THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITICAL BUREAU Military Department Fidel Secretary Osvaldo Dortlcas Juan Alrneida Osvaldo DORTICOE- Antonio PEREZ Jorge RISQUET Jase ABRANTES Rogelio ACEVEDO Armando ACOSTA o Severo Juan ALMEIDA Jose M ALVAREZ Emilio ARAGONES Jose ARTEAGA Flavlo aRAvo Julio E CAMACHO Lino CARRERAS Ernesto CASILLAS Belarmino CASTILLA Fidel CASTRO Raul CASTRO Angel Joel CHAVECO Faure Osmani Leopoldo CINTRAS Abe-Iardo COLOME Raul CURBELO Sergio DEL VALLE Manuel DIAZ PINAR DEL RIO Julio E CAMACHO Raul Second Secretary Sergio del Valle Guillermo Garcia SECRETARIAT Ramiro Valdes Armando Hart Fldal CASTRO Chalrnlan Raul Deputy Chairman Carlos Isidaro Raul GARCIA Joel Osvaldo DORTICOS Victor E Vilma ESPIN Manuel E I-AJARDO Marcelo FERNANDEZ Oscar FERNANDEZ Harold FERRER Calixto GARCIA Guillermo GARCIA Julia A Pedro M GARCIA Rc ul GARCIA Elena Fabio olzoaAlrt'l' Orestes GUERRA Raul GUERRA Secundino GUERRA Armando HART Joel IGLESIAS Omar H ISER Rienerio JIMENEZ Rolando KINDELAN Jose LLANUSA Antonio E LUSSON Manuel Jose R MACHADO Isidoro Juan Miguel Joaquin MENDEZ Raul MENDENDEZ Arnaldo Carlos MIR Pedro MIRET Jesus MONTANE Jose Arnaldo OCHOA Mario OLIVA OLIVERA Ramon PARDO Antonio PEREZ Faustino PEREZ Wolfredo PEREZ Manuel PINEIRO SIX PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES R MACHADO RIZO American Departmant Mass Organizations Department Revolutionary Orientation Department I Internal Education Department Construction Department Transportation and Communication Department General Foreign Relations Department-X- Educatlon Science Culture Department-X- Juridical and State Organisms Department Organization Department Agriculture and Livestock Department Heavy Industries Department Sugar Department Economy Department Consumption and Services Department Central Organizations Service Department Bias Pedro MIRET Faure Jase Jorge RISOUET Raul ROA Bias Carlos Rafael Roonlouez Orlando RODRIGUEZ Basilio RODRIGUEZ Ursinio Celia SANCHEZ Aldo SANTAMARIA Haydee Rene de Ios SANTOS Clementine Jose SILVA Lionel Julio Diocles TORRALBA Felipe Ramiro VALDES Anibal VELAZ Roberto VIERA Luis A ZAYAS LAs CURBELO HART #9 59 REGIONAL COMMITTEES 4i6 MUNICIPAL AND SECTIONAL COMMITTEES Hull Pic-1959 Poiiticll Allililiittn 'Popuisr Socist Party l 0ld Communist Sit tilt Dinner-II I nlmu him to In Ilitu 16 000 BASE COMMITTEES 80 000-200 000 MEMBERS hut 0d RV 566602 1-75 5 No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved Fer Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 - T00608R000300060023-9 sr fb i i No Foreign Dissent Guantanamo Castro would be less conciliatory in other areas He would expect to get a definite com- mitment by the US to abandon the naval base at Guantanamo Bay His public statements however suggest that he would be content to estab- lish a timetable for US withdrawal rather than press uncompromisingly for immediate and total evacuation He is keeping in close touch with the Panamanians on their canal negotiations with the US and will use these as an indicator of US flexibility He sees Guantanamo as a much less important issue in US eyes than the Panama Canal and he would therefore expect to negotiate a much more rapid withdrawal from me Cas the former Acutely aware of strong resistance in the US to a new Panama canal treaty Castro may try to profit from the Panamanian experience by doing some discreet politicking with Senators and their staff members to smooth the way for a base evacuation agreement and coincidentally to bring domestic pressure on the Executive Branch to reach a solution satisfactory to Cuba He seems convinced that there is considerable sentiment in both public and official circles in the US for the return of the base to Cuban control and he apparently does not see the subject as a major threat to the success of negotiations He would probably be primed to quote chapter and Mexico City 14 February Regarding the possibility of a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States Fidel Castro said We are in no hurry We can wait ten or twenty years Condemnation of the blockade of Cuba is growing and the North Americans are increasingly isolated The blockade is harming us but we can wait Argentina s US companies are willing to sell us automobiles The United States as well as US businesses are facing a dilemma They have to choose between US and Argentine law Buenos Aires press item February 14 1974 Asked about Cuban relations with the US Prime Minister Castro demonstrated a relaxed and - generally favorable attitude toward the US but apparently did not envisage the early resumption of formal US-Cuban ties SECRET -7- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECRE N0 Foreign Dissem verse from statements by a multitude of US political and military leaders as expert testimony to the very limited usefulness of the base to the US He may also be prepared to give some guarantee that the base would not be turned over to the Soviet navy despite the fact that such a pledge would theoretically impinge on Cuban sovereignty The Soviet Connection Castro would reject any attempt by the US to tamper with Cuba s military political or economic relationship with the USSR This point would probably pose the most difficult negotiating problem in that it is an area where Castro has little maneuvering room to accommodate US demands Castro believes that a small nation trying to exist in a superpower environment stands less chance of being smothered if it casts its lot with the more distant superpower If Cuba cannot achieve the ideal t0 be as independent of Moscow as of Washington- dependence on Moscow at least gives it more independence in Castro s eyes than the heavy dependence of previous Cuban governments on the US Moreover Castro cannot dismiss the political and economic ties that bind him so to Moscow By his own choice he has allied himself with the communist countries and adopted socialism as his creed and as an intermediate goal on the road to communism He has destroyed Cuba s pre-revolutionary institutions and replaced them with socialist ones He has accumulated such a monumental debt to the USSR that even in the most favorable circumstances Cuba will be tied to Moscow until well into the next century Even with the economy s upturn in the past year there is no - end in sight to the Castro regime s dependence on Soviet assistance Castro s political path therefore will continue to parallel that of the USSR no A matter what develops in Cuban-US relations Neither does he have much maneuverability with regard to his military ties to Moscow Virtually all of the weapons and military equipment now in use in Cuba originated in the USSR The Cuban military establishment therefore must look to the Soviets for compatible spare parts and replace- ment equipment Given these facts a termination of Cuba s military relation- ship with the USSR would have such far-reaching implications for Havana s defense capabilities that Castro would be obliged to opt for whatever course would guarantee continued Soviet supplies Furthermore Havana allegedly pays nothing for Soviet weapons and would be unlikely to look with favor on a policy shift that would require an expensive outlay for arms formerly obtained free of charge Another aspect of the military relationship that Castro is also ill inclined to terminate concerns Soviet naval visits The presence of Soviet warships in Cuban ports is the only tangible evidence of Moscow s willing- ness to involve its armed forces in Cuba s defense Castro has no illusions about the steadfastness of Moscow s resolve on Havana s behalf in the face of -8- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release No Foreign Dissem a threat of a nuclear holocaust but short of such a threat he probably looks upon his visitors as a modest yet useful and welcome deterrent and about the most that can realistically be expected from a reluctant protector Even if he were disposed to discourage the visits Moscow s wishes would most - likely prevail an indication that this is more a Soviet-US than a Cuba-US problem Overnights Castro would also assume an adamant stance on U-2 and missions He would demand and expect to get a pledge to reSpect Cuba s airspace and end reconnaissance overflights He would argue that the ights are an intolerable affront to Cuban sovereignty and can even be considered unnecessary given the ability of the US to achieve the same ends through more advanced technical means His strong legal position would probably make him impervious to compromise on this point He might even try to make an issue of US peripheral reconnaissance flights but this would be more a harassment tactic than a bona fide item for negotiation Puerto Rico Castro has publicly belittled the bene ts to Cuba of a reconciliation while claiming that the principal advantages would accrue to the US This line is basically a tactic designed to bolster his negotiating position and to support the impression that he is under no pressure to change the status quo He is much more realistic in his private assessment however and may even believe that Cuba has so much more to gain from detente that he needs to manufacture throwaway issues to be discarded during the negotiating process This may be the principal reason for Havana s aggressive effort in recent months to focus world attention on the status of Puerto Rico The Castro regime has 0 improved its ties with the Puerto Rico Communist Party 0 permitted the Puerto Rico Socialist Party formerly the Puerto Rico Pro-Independence Movement to maintain a permanent of ce in Havana 25X1X6 Normalization of relations with the US is a goal shared by Cuban authorities but 25X1X6 one comes away with the feeling that Cuba s asking price will be high Since Cuba s claims for compensation against the United States exceed American claims against Cuba in effect Cuba is asking the US government to compensate Americans who lost their properties in Cuba 25X1X6 -9- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 Approved For Release N0 Foreign Dissent MILE Guantanamo m Havoni lm - Maquly huh I'll Sln uo a-MrPunt 11 1 g 1 J Zaimtmom 1 1 1 1 3 luau-run - 1 r A Egg 111111111'1 11 1 11 I ll u Culcom Point 1 US NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY 1 i 1 11 1 11m n11 f 1 - 11 1 1 if Fllhuman Palm - Iw 1 Windward Point 715-1 I 558223 7-75 -10- No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 No Foreign Dissent - pressed the independence issue in the United Nations and other international forums - promoted international symposia as part of its continuing propa- ganda campaign demanding Puerto Rico s independence - organized a domestic propaganda campaign to keep the issue before the Cuban people Castro may believe that he can agree to barter a more moderate Cuban stand on Puerto Rico in exchange for US concessions during neg tiations He therefore would keep up a high level of publicity until negotiations start He proved his exibility on the issue in late 1972 and early 1973 when the Cuban representative at the United Nations kept an unusually low profile on the subject of Puerto Rico in order to avoid upsetting Cuban-US talks on aerial hijackings 0n the other hand focusing Cuban domestic attention on Puerto Rico suggests that Castro has more in mind than just developing a throwaway negotiating point He would hardly risk raising the public s hopes on a matter linked so closely to Cuba s own history if he did not intend to pursue it Although he is usually well informed he may be misreading the situation in Puerto Rico to the extent that he believes popular sentiment in favor of independence has increased significantly It is most likely that elements of both perspectives are present in Castro s reasoning US as Gendarme Castro would also use as a bargaining point his long-standing demand that the US cease its alleged role as gendarme of the hemisphere This is a broad term derived from the history of US interven- tion in Latin America and intended by Havana as a counterpoint to the US insistence that Cuba cease exporting the revolution It has been used for so long to reinforce Cuba s revolutionary credentials among Latin American leftists that it could hardly be abandoned when Havana comes face-to-face with the US But it' will be one of the easiest issues for Castro to dr0p should the US elect to soft-pedal the issue of Cuban subversion in the hemisphere So far every sign indicates that the Castro regime will refuse to make any public commitment to abjure the support or espousal of violent revolu- tion in Latin America In fact the draft of a new constitution released in Havana in early April specifically acknowledges the right of peoples to reject imperialist violence with revolutionary violence and recognizes the legitimacy of wars of national liberation as well as armed resistance to aggression and conquest and considers its right and its internationalist duty -11- No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECRET No Foreign Dissent Portions of an interview with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez by Kenize Mourad of Nouvel Observateur as published in Mexico City s El Dr'a on January 30 1975 QUESTION At a moment when US-USSR relations seem to be clouded do you think that an improvement in relations between Cuba and Washington is possible ANSWER We do not have an apocalyptic view of what has happened The detente policy is a permanent one it is not based on circumstances or events of the moment the world offers no other choice However should the ultrareactionary forces prevail in the US it could not but re ect on Cuban-US relations QUESTION Last November's OAS meeting in Quito declined to lift the sanctions against Cuba Another OAS meeting slated for April in Washington will reconsider the question Are you optimistic ANSWER I have just been informed that Kissinger has conceded that the vote should be by simple majority not by a two-thirds majority This will allow some countries that still have scruples about establishing relations with Cuba to have them Kissinger s decision would also pave the way for a future agreement with the US once it decides to end the blockade Because as a matter of fact it cannot be ignored that a favorable OAS decision in April does not of necessity mean the end of the blockade This is a matter of domestic policy to North Americans -there is signi cant right wing strength in the Senate QUESTION It would seem that the USSR would be delighted with the resumption of relations between Cuba and the US Is Cuba in favor of such relations above all to lighten the burden carried by the Soviet Union ANSWER Absolutely The improvement of our relations with the US would be written into the detente process The continuation of a source of tension such as Cuba is not encompassed in USSR policy Insofar as the question of the economic burden is concerned they have never brought it up QUESTION After establishing relations with Washington could Cuba make the voice of com- munism be better heard in Latin America ANSWER We do not pose the question in those terms The nal objective of communism of course is the establishment of communism throughout the world It is essential at the current juncture however to safeguard the peace because the alternative is nuclear war I will not refer to the positions of the USSR with regard to Latin America However the Cuban position is as follows Socialism cannot be built in Latin America overnight Objective conditions for socialism do indeed exist in certain countries but there are no immediate possibilities at hand In our view the development of the revolutionary process must rst entail the defense of national interests The Cuban model is not the only one The Peruvian and Panamanian revolutions are led by military groups who have grasped what their country s interests are and are carrying out a nationalist revolution It is this which leads us to c00perate with the Peruvian government as well as with Venezuela which is also undertaking a policy of independence QUESTION The US has spoken about re-establishing relations with Cuba if Cuba renounces the export of the Revolution to Latin America Last February when Brezhnev visited Cuba did he voice his opposition to the export of the revolution ANSWER We have always talked about aiding revolution never about exporting it Cuba shall never renounce its right and its duty to cooperate with those who wish to change society whenever such change is impossible by democratic means and above all whenever such change is deterred by the intervention of the US and the CIA In Paraguay s case for example we can give aid to the revolutionaries without sending armed forces In Chile s case naturally we shall aid the revolutionaries with all out strength to overthrow Pinochet s government -12 No Foreign Dissem SECRET Approved For Release 2001 08 21 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9 Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECRET No Foreign Dissent Statements of Fidel Castro on March 19 1975 at a press conference on the occasion of Canadian Minister of Trade Commerce and Industry Gillespie s visit to Cuba QUESTION Does Cuba want to recognize the United States and what would be the negative effects of that ANSWER The United States is recognized generally speaking and the question is not of us recognizing them but of them recognizing us It is not we that brok'e relations with the United States Neither did we establish an economic blockade against the US It was the US that broke diplomatic relations with us and established the economic blockade of Cuba This was not a Cuban initiative it was theirs We have suffered no inconvenience from having no commerce with the US QUESTION Would you like to have the United States recognize Cuba ANSWER We are not impatient for that not are we very anxious for it We feel it will happen sooner or later When it does happen we will consider it a positive event QUESTION You have said that the first step to resumed relations with the US is the lifting of the embargo ANSWER Yes We maintain a certain position regarding this point and it is that the economic embargo should cease before we can go into negotiations to solve the differences between Cuba and the US because the embargo was a coercive measure a unilateral measure on the part of the US toward Cuba One should not negotiate under conditions of pressure and coercion that is why it is our position that the embargo the economic blockade should cease We have not established any blockade against the US For example they need sugar They have to go out to the different markets to find it and we have sugar We have no law which forbids selling sugar to the US If at any time they should need sugar and want to buy it in Cuba we are ready to supply it Therefore there is not a situation of equal conditions That is why the blockade must cease before any negotiations take place between the US and Cuba QUESTION Do you interpret the visits by American Senators and others as signs that the blockade might be lifted in the near future ANSWER We cannot establish a direct relationship between one thing and another The visits to Cuba have been the result of the Congress Foreign Relations Committee and the interests of US political personalities and not part of the policy of the US government In any case we regard these visits as positive and believe they can contribute to the improvement of relations between the US and Cuba They are also the expression of political trend a trend of public opinion favorable to the lifting of the blockade and the improvement of relations Paris 24 October Fidel Castro reiterated that with regard to bilateral relations there can be no dialog or negotiation with the United States so long as that country does not unconditionally lift the blockade Once that requirement is met there would be many other problems to discuss among them the Cairnanera Guantanamo naval base Later we must see whether the United States tries to impose anything for instance anything that might limit even in the slightest way our country s sovereignty We will not admit any condition For a negotiation to get anywhere for our relations with the United States to improve it is essential for them to start by comprehending that present-day Cuba is not the Cuba of the past that today Cuba is a country that is absolutely free a country that does not and will not accept any condition that might infringe on its dignity and political sovereignty even in the slightest way Havana radio broadcast of October 24 1974 discussing an interview of the same date granted by Castro to Humanire -13- Na Foreign Dissem Approved For Release Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECREI N0 Foreign Disscm to aid the besieged and the peoples who fight for their liberation The draft also codi es the gendarme issue by condemning imperialist intervention direct or indirect in the internal or external affairs of any state by any means Rather than signifying Cuban intransigence however this type of policy de nition suggests that Havana is leaving room for compromise Recognizing that its past policy of exporting the revolution with violence is still a major hurdle the right of peoples to self-determination and self-defense is postulated rather than any Cuban right to sponsor revolution abroad As a confirmed revolutionary Castro will not unequivocally renounce revolutionary violence to do so would compromise his revolution- ary ethics and brand him as a pure opportunist In this light his gendarme demand appears as little more than rhetorical capital generated to counter one unreasonable demand with another with the expectation that a compromise can be reached As a pragmatic politician Castro understands that the US could not renounce the Monroe Doctrine or any of its subsequent corollaries and he does not expect this In reiterating his gendarme demand he does not intend to create an ideological impasse Instead he sees both sides through negotiations subscribing to a statement that would appear to address both demands satisfactorily without requiring either party to abjure publicly the practice of overt or covert intervention in other countries internal affairs This has ample precedent in agreements the Castro regime has signed to restore formal ties with other Latin American governments each signatory agrees to respect the political and territorial integrity of the other Outlook Castro appears to gauge the prospects for improved Cuban-US relations with a mixture of cautious optimism and realism He understands that his maneuvering room is limited especially on several key issues Nevertheless he appears con dent that a restoration of formal ties is merely a matter of time He appears willing to bargain on some points and apparently expects the US to recognize and make allowances for his inability to give ground on others His knowledge of recent US negotiations with other Latin American countries has apparently convinced him that an accommodation is possible This does not mean that Cuba would readily accede where exibility exists in order to reach an agreement On the contrary Havana apparently believes the US is universally on the defensive and prepared to give ground on significant issues The Cubans see the US Executive under strong domes- tic pressure to reach a more satisfactory relationship with Havana and they -14- No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECRET N0 Foreign Dissent apparently expect this pressure to grow as next year s elections draw near They see no reason to soften their position and instead plan to press aggressively to maximize the concessions they believe the US is prepared to grant A restoration of diplomatic relations however would have little impact on Cuba s long-range objectives Havana would still be committed to pro- moting iconoclastic and far-reaching social change in Latin America and elsewhere probably resulting in selective endorsements of violent revolution- ary groups The Castro government can be expected to persist vigorously in its efforts to unite Latin America and to reduce US in uence The Puerto Rico independence movement will continue to receive Cuban sympathy and propaganda support but probably at a reduced level The Castro regime s ties with Moscow will remain strong regardless of the extent of detente with Washington and Cuba s pursuit of socialism will continue unabated Havana hopes to resume trading with the US but will pragmatically look for the best possible deals with little or no regard for political or symbolic arrangements US businessmen hoping to turn a profit would nd the Cubans extremely hardheaded shrewd and capable at the bargaining table At the same time Cuban diplomats resident in the US would presum- ably make the most of their presence to advertise the Cuban Revolution to the US public through academic cultural and social groups and the mass media They would also engage in a broad intelligence collection effort partly in 000peration with the Soviets in response to Moscow s requirements and partly to gather technical data keyed to Cuba s agricultural and indus- trial development needs Havana would continue to reproduce material in US technical journals manuals and books without regard to copyright restric- tions and academic and scienti c exchanges would be actively sought to enable Cuban scholars to pick the brains of US experts To avoid contamina- tion of the Cuban population through exposure to US cultural in uences however the Castro regime would step up its domestic campaign against ideological diversionism and adopt measures to limit the dissemination of US news and cultural publications within Cuba In summing up the detente scenario as it deveIOps therefore more of the chips would appear to be winding up in Havana s corner than the United States Following the termination of the US economic denial program the Cubans would enter into talks with the US that after long hard bargaining would probably result in the resumption of diplomatic relations Cuba would gain a definitive commitment for the return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuban control cessation of reconnaissance overflights termination of the economic denial campaign access to US markets and technology and -15- No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release Approved For Release 2001 08 21 SECRET No Foreign Dissem political respectability Moreover the Castro regime s fundamental policies and international relationships would remain unchanged as would its hostility toward the US For its part the US would gain a nearby source of sugar limited compensation for US claims a modest market for US goods and elimination of the expense of conducting reconnaissance over ights and the economic denial program In addition a major world-wide bene t would accrue to the US upon the elimination of the so-called Cuba question-a long-standing source of irritation particularly within the context of the Organization of American States A Cuban-US reconciliation would be roundly applauded by most Latin American governments which see the Cuba issue as a massive stumbling block in virtually all aspects of relations with the US It would also be well received in countries outside the hemisphere where the legal requirements of the economic denial program frequently generate friction with the US and where the prospect of a superpower engaged in fruitless confrontation with a ministate serves to dilute US prestige At the same time some countries specifically Chile Uruguay Paraguay and Nicara- gua would probably react negatively convinced that the bases for sanctions against Cuba still stand -l6- No Foreign Dissent Approved For Release 2001 08 21                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu