2 13mm 1 Authority - TOP March 2 1969 LEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A KISSINGER FROM A1 Haig SUBJECT Memorandum rem Secretary Laird Encloeing Preliminary Draft of Potential Mlitary Actions re Vietnam -- At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Laird enclosing the initial albeit unsanctiened plane prepared by the JCS in response to your request of January 27 for such a scenario At Tab is a proposed reply to Secretary Laird for your signature with some suggestions for modi cations which might be coneidered The JCS plane which have been forwarded are I believe more extensive than the type you and the Preeident visualised as acceptable signals of U S intent to escalate military Operations in Vietnam in the face of cautioned enemy intraneigence in Paris Furthermore any each plane aheuld be forwarded with the views of the Chairman and the Secretary included If imple mented they would require some level o coordinationet State The draft plan in fact recommends Page 6 of the draft JCS memorandum that an appropriate interagency Task Force be formed to refine each of the scenarios which have been developed In brief the plane provide 1 Actual or feigned airborne Iampbibioue Operations against several objectives in NVN Appendix A 2 An actual or feigned airborne lairmobile expedi- tion in force against enemy in Laos and Cambodia Appendix B 3 Actual or feigned renewed and expanded air and naval Operations against NVN Appendix C TOP - Authority WW 41'1ng IE BYMARA Date m xx Mm I TOP SECRETISEWITWE i I 4 Actual m feigned subversion of the population i and preparaticn for active resiatanca by the maple againat the Hanoi regim Amman D i 5 A plan fer actual or feigned technical escalation 3 of war against Narth nuclear Appendix Recomnd - You sign the mamarandum at Tab ta Secretary Laird which -- 1 Eacpreasaa yaur gratituda fair the excellent draft plan 2 Raquaats a ditioml refmement ta include lower level action 3 Raqueatn maubmisaian in nal farm by March 15 1969 -- - nun n- Attachments - - TOP SECRET I SENSITIVE - mm - - 3 i gAuthority g 2582 5 1 4 1 - f 2 ohm THE OF 11- 9 391 MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER At the luncheon in my dining room on Monday January 27 the President General Wheeler you and I discussed the possi- bility of working out a program of potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks I was informed this morning that you would like to review the progress made in the staff work on such a program I am attaching the preliminary papers which have been pre pared in the Joint Staff 1 would like to emphasize that the papers have no status other than as working copy While General Wheeler gave the papers to me he has not had the opportunity nor have the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the proposals in any detail Other members of my staff with whom I shall want to consult before serious consideration is given to such dramatic steps have not seen the papers at all While I wish to be responsive in providing material for some initial consideration I wish to emphasize the preliminary nature of this work 13 the desirability of much more detailed discussions within the Department of Defense before any formal suggestions or recommendations can be made and the necessity which I am sure you recognize for coordination with the State Department and others before we proceed with any such steps as those outlined I must confess to you being more impressed at least initially with the potential disadvantages of the proposals than with the possibility of achieving movement in Paris by such means eas x Attachments uw meadow a ByMAmateZ l e TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 1 To preclude prolonged stalling tactics by the communists in Paris a program of military political and activities can be employed by the United States to create fear in the Hanoi leadership that the United States is preparing to undertake new highly damaging military actions against North Vietnamese NVN territory installations and interests 2 Although implementation of such a program is technically teasible there are also certain disadvagtages associated with it 0 a US actions may result in a serious misjudgment by NVN or other Communist nations b If NVN fails to react and the US then withdraws without any change in the basic situation it may strengthen NVN intransigence c If follow-on events make the US deception apparent subsequent indications of serious US intent would lose their credibility d Adverse criticism may force the US Government to disavow the intent after initiating the deception The net result would be a strengthening of the NVN position 3 These disadvantages not withstanding there may be occasions when some type of deception effort would be desirable The following proposals which could be implemented singly or in varying combinations offer a broad spectrum of possible options TOP SECRET SENSITIVE lull E An un y TOP SECRET SENSITIVE a A combined airborne amphibious operation against several objectives in NVN See Appendix A b Punitive airborne airmobile expeditions against enemy lines of communications 100 and base areas - Laos and Cambodia See Appendix B c Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against NVN to include closure of Haiphong and the blockade of Nv See Appendix C d Subversion of the population and preparation for active resistance by the people against the Hanoi regime See Appendix D a e A technical escalation See Appendix E y 4 Due to the lack of wideSpread disaffection within the population of NVH convincing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam DRY leaders that they are faced with mass uprisings is not presently considered feasible 5 The appendices set forth scenarios for the proposed operations to include the basic concept and general activities involved in each - 6 Guidelines for the execution of scenarios a To present a realistic and credible threat to Hanoi an integrated political diplomatic and military effort must be controlled at the national level Actions by the US negotiating team in Paris and public statements by high US government officials must be coordinated with the picture being painted through the manipulation of military resources 0 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 2 ddsausage 1 -- wares-leisure 3' DECLASSID i 5 Authdrity Date '22 f2 I TOP SECRET SENSITIVE b The threat which is presented to Hanoi in each scenario must be on a significant scale if it is to achieve the desired impact 0 Each scenario must develop over an adequate period of time to permit the indicators to be picked up by the cemmunists transmitted through their intelligence network evaluated and considered by the top leVel leadership in Hanoi d The message being transmitted by each scenario must be clear and credible to Hanoi To the extent that the planned operation will thereby receive domestic or'foreign news media recognition the effect on the American public must be considered a e Provision must be made to permit arresting the development of each scenario at any desired stage without jeopardizing US interests f f Techniques for executing scenarios 1 There are two ways by which the military phases of each scenario can be executed CIRCPAC can be directed to prepare to execute an actual operation at a given future date employing certain designated resources while the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain control of preparation and phased execution of the operation Alternatively a complete deception operation can be conducted under the Joint Chiefs of Staff control The greatest realism can be obtained by the first alternative The number of persons who are aware of the underlying objective of the preparations can be held extremely small lessening the chance of its leakage a 2 Deception operations are considerably less expen sive and easier to control but are much more difficult to pre3ent in a credible fashion Planning must 11 Ln TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 3 extremely detailed and to insure that execution is p fully coordinated a relatively large number of people must inevitably become aware that a deception is being 2 presented i 3 3 In the scenarios presented in the appendices CINCPAC 2 is directed to prepare for actual aI airborne amphibious invasion of NVN punitive expedition 1 into Laos and Cambodia resumption of bombing and institution of a naval blockade and resumption 2 and expansion of subversion operations Howevei each $2 of those scenarios can be converted to a deception i operation it desired In the remaining scenario 2 technical escalation a deception operation appears 1 more feasible 51 Evaluation of Scenarios ' ii a Airborne amphibious operation against HUN 3 1 1This approach mould be the most expensive to 1 execute and presupposes a situation wherein sufficient lg forces to establish a credible threat are deployed from L2 CONUS or withdrawn from cembat during the embarxation 9 and rehearsal phases It would be the most likely to be 21 observed and reported by the press 3E 2 It would require extensiVe time to prepare thus E2 presenting an excellent picture to the enemy of a 21 developing US effort This would provide considerable 32 opportunity for the enemy to evaluate debate and decide 3g whether to change negotiating tactics El 3 A landing targeted at Vinh would be more likely to 23 cause the DRV to reconsider its negotiating tactics than 33 either of the other two lodgements farther south 19 For credibility this scenario must include actions ll pointing toward the resumption of bombing 1g Authority -- DECLASSIFIED huA -M Mw TOP SECRET q TOP SECRET - erasure 1 -- TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE if i b Punitive expedition in Laos and Cambodia Punitive airborne airmobile expeditions against 1m 1 enemy LOCs and base areas in Laos and Cambodia would be 4 _Il L I jnsl unlikely to obtain the desired reaction frOm Hanoi hb'o 4n ii - II because of their limited scope and Ieffect NVN territory 3 a -n is not threatened and feasible alternatives arIe available to the enemy 2 The threat ofI an expeditiOn targeted on Tone-ponea being closest to NVN would be more likely to get the desired reaction than alternatives targeted farther south c Resumption of bombing and or naval blockade yet The resumption of bombing would be the most ilbt credible of all the scenarios sinee bombing was t employed extensively by the United States in the past I Zand the assets for resumption are present in the theater 7 - 2 With the a ssets already present it would be difficultI to p1esent a picture of military preparations I extending over sufficient time to affect a negotiating posture ThisI course would also imply the application is It I 5 1 51emphasis onII pub1 ic statements and Iother activities to develop the picture of a hardening United States Government resolve 3 The naval buildup for a blockade will provide _the IIopportunity to extend military preparations over a substantial period of time thus providing more flexibility to this approach This scenario wouldI be th e easiest to control v 5 a - - and less expensive than that for an amphibious airborne attack on NVN d Subversion of the population 1 Since it is presently considered infeasible convince the DRV leadership that it is faced nith a SENSITIVE 5 a as seas TOP SENSITIVE mass uprising this scenario by itself would not be likely to produce the desired result of persuading a Ei Hanoi to change its negotiating tactics For greatest 3 I effect it should be coupled with other scenarios 1 2 The development of the actions proposed in a Ithis scenario would require considerable time 3 3 e Technical escalationdifficult to evaluate the degree of I credibility which the DRV leadership will attach to 2 this scenario It would depend in great part on their 2 assessment of the resoluteness of the United States leadership considering the then existent attitude of -l3 theIUS population toward the entire SEA effort as well l3 as in their confidence in continued USSR support 3 4 3 Use -of atOmic biolog-ical or lethal chemical lg 1 weapons in Vietnam would excite very stlong opublic lg and congressional reaction ll predictable reaction worldwide particularly pp in Japan and Okinawa upon the surfacing of this lg scenario militate against its employment I 2g If the concept of applying pressure to a change DEV negotiating tactics is apprOVed it is recommended gg that an-- appropriate intera gency task force be formed to refine g each of the attached scenarios and to prepare detailed plans 35 for their imp lamentatioh ro sop passes-1 antenna -- 5 Appendix 0 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 1% APPENDIX SCENARIO Renewed and expanded air and naval operations against CONCEPT IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS COMMENTS US officials indicate increased impatience 1 A high US government official in an exchange ith with communist intransigence and hint that the press hints that a breakdown in the Paris the bombing might be resumed A high level talks could lead to a resumption of the bombing military conference is followed by increased of NVN possibly expanded He also indicates air and naval reconnaissance of NVN dissatisfaction with the slow pace of negotiations Stockpiles of air munitions are built up additional naval units move into the The us negotiator in Paris indicates to the NVN Tonkin Gulf and additional aircraft move and NLF US impatience over communist intransigence onto airfields in Thailand Leaks hint 3 Allied propaganda media increase emphasis on 0f a PeSUmPtion 0 air and naval operations violations of the DMZ Laos and Cambodia against Extensive operam Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN if not already tions indicate increased US determination done and irritation with Hanoi's delays 5 A military conference is conducted at SecDef CJCS CINCPAC CINCSAC COMUSMACV CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACTHAI 6 US officials begin issuing statements designed to prepare the American public for the resumption of bembings enlist-44 - keyed to actions and Paris and elsewhere see J s y72 u20 m- The tone and timing of official and negotiators will be statements by the NVN in 1 i hic 3 in as mmus' 15 Appendix TOP saanT SENSITIVE a SCENARIO Benewed and extanded air and naval Operations against NVN CONCEPT IMPLEMENTING I COMMENTS et 10 surveys of t e coast of NVN - a sv and Thailand 'f Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against forces if 1m CINCPAC is directed by message to-prepare to ren w The blockade and closure bombing of NVN under reduced'restrictions to close of Haiphong may be direct g Haiphong and blockade the coast of NVN as a separate action ffom the bombing resumption CIHCPAC in implementation of the JCS message takes '9 action Increase air reconnaissance over NVN and i Build no stockpiles of air ordnance in r 5 1 c Move additional-carriers and other combat 1 vessels into the Gnif of Tonkin ' 3' d Move or alert for movement additipnal Air i 3 Force Squadrons onto airfields in'Thailand Air Force and Naval Squadrons in the US are alerted for possible movement to the Ear East Renewed and expanded air and naval Operations againSt NVN CONCEPT - 1 IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS COEMENTS %1 The themes in grey and black radio broadcasts and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack o patience with Hanoi's actions TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 122 JGS is notified of a planned resumption of TOP SECRET SENSITIVE bombing and blockade of the north 13 Rumors of a bombing resumption are agread 1 by US airmen to local Vietnamese and Thais 16 u jesv - -II3 1 'Appendix a uni a i713 Ei- TOP SECRET SCENARIO Technical Escalation CONCEPT 3 ACTIONS COMMENTS US government officials indicate increased impatience with commu nist intransigence in Paris and hint atoa possible technical escalation of the war A visit by kechnical experts to the Far East is followed by a high level political military conference US troops in Vietnam commence 0 OER training while an apparent Appendix buildwup of highly classified munitions occurs Radio broad casts and leaflet themes indicate increased US determination and irritation with Hanoi's delays l The US negotiator in Paris indicates to the and NLF negotiators US impatience over communist intransigence This theme of impatience is repeated in a press conference by a high Us of icial in Washington 2 A high US military official in a public-- I statement comments that the Pentagon periodically examines means by which new and more modern weapons could be used in Vietnam if necessarv 3 Allied propaganda media increase emphasis on violations of the DMZ Laos and Cambodia h Leaflet drops are resumed over NVN if not already being done 5 A team of Pentagon technical experts in atomic and chemical warfare makes an extended visit or the Far East stopping off at CINCPAC Okinawa Saigon and Bangkok A summit conference is held in Honolulu 5 involving President Nixon President Thieu and the heads 0 government gash fa Hr 12 - 1in The tone and timing of state ments er US offic statements by the NVN raris and elsewhere 3-1 1- van ahdhl'l m vu TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 20 av - - SCENARIO CONCEPT Technical Escalation 10 ll IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS - a military conference is held at CINCPAC involving Sec ef CJCS CINCPAC COMUSMACV and CINCSAC High security storage areas are established at selected sites in SVN and Thailand A limited number of actual chemical munitions are shipped into SVN and stored at those sites CBR training is conducted for all US troops in to include those in rear area Jobs Inspections are conducted of unit CBR equipment Allied forces in SVN intensify operations against forces and in leaflets dropped on NVN are gradually changed to indicate an increased lack of patience with Hanoi's actions Jenn-Vt - - - - mars-- - 2e w 1-5 9 EYE 23 - 22 2 i DECLASSIFIED I I 2 2 2 523 522 Authonty 5'0 2255 if - 23 2 2 225 2 By NARA 2 '2 I 521%- 3- -er th- z sch 2 W m A Mar-ah a my MEMOWUM ma Hanna-hid Mam I2 2 2222 $922222 me 29222222522 FRQM Hausa -- 955332331 Wanna Fm m mry 3 32 2 rst 31' 22212an 2223mm Adtiam 2 9' de 4' am an pd ibid mm a digging 51mm 2 mdarwm is 223m P112128 is war mind-aimed 3-1223 this mm in their Wamwm dd am pushed mumw ed i and 22212222112de canedm hand-war that 22 222 maiiudd 22 2 my 2211 ng and WW Wanna-2 22 dd 122212 2 22 22 22222222222in 22 2 5 - 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