00 Ch 1 1 29 Apri 55 of SECREE 5% DOWNGRADED TO CNO 07 DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 2997 Authority E0 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass DIV WHS CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 21 July 1969 Dear Mel In response to Henry Kissinger's request I have had prepared a detailed plan for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction quarantine of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville The mining plan has three options with response times varying from 12 to 86 hours I recommend option A Viewed solely from a military point of View the interdiction quarantine concept is relatively simple requires few forces with little risk to these forces The other implications of such an operation are of course substantially more complicated I have attached a proposed memo from you to Henry forwarding the plans for the consideration of higher authority With warmest regards Sincerely T H MOORER Admiral U S Navy Honorable Melvin R Laird Secretary of Defense Washington D C 20301 Attachment THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D c 20301 Dear Henry In response to your recent request a detailed plan has been prepared for the mining of Haiphong and the interdiction quarantine of merchant ships carrying military supplies to Sihanoukville Please let me know if I may be of any further assistance Warmest regards Sincerely Dr Henry A Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington D Ce 20500 FEB 0 8 2007 LASSIFIED Eggority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS $155 rs B Omk y DECLAISSIFLIED FEB 0 '8 - Authority EO 12958 as amended I Chief Records Declass DIV WHS f i Hi ii nine non snipnono PORT 1 This paper summarizes a plan for mining the Haiphong Port Complex including Can Phe and Hon Gni 2 In 1968 cargo throughput into Haiphong averaged 4100 tons per-day So far in 1969 this average has increased to 5200 tons per day About 9% percent of all imports vie see into North Vietnam pass through Haiphong USSR provides shout 50 percent of this shipping This cargo is estimated to consist not only of food and petroleum products which contribnte to the prosecution of the war but in addition trucks genera- n tors and other war supporting materials See Tab A The closing of the Haiphong Port Complex will have a major effect on the North Vietnam economy and the capability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in the South HAIPEOKG MIKE PLAR- 3 The mining plan Tab Cl-is designed to stop entry of deep draft shipping into the ports of Haiphong Hon Gai and Cam all in Haiphong Complex ans to disrupt major attempts by the North Vietnnmese to employ lighternge for offloading deep draft shipping which would he forced to anchor to of the minefields 'a 4 Three ontions are specified in the Mining Plan viz A Three 3 Two and C One OVA Option A using 154 mines 605 oestructors provides the most complete and effective mining of the Haiphong Complex and accomplishes the mission in one launch except during brief period when no large CVA is avnilnble Option A has disadvantage of longer reaction time because one of the three CVA's involved may be in port when the plan is initiated See Tab 3 for Reaction Options and C using 98 mines and 460w600 destructors provide effective mining of the deep water channels with much quicher response time Disadvantages inherent in and are less dense minew fields and elimination of certain shallow water destructor fields 1-31-1111 n'ma- i 7 5 Arming delays of 2 hours are set on all mines to for departure of third nation shipping 6 The use of mines is not an offensive act since no nonpons ate specifically directed against any target Any damage which occur- red to either Horth Vietnam or third country shipping would be self inflicteg_resulting_from their decision to penetratewnsterS'm j that have been openly declared unsafe There is no coercion on the part of 4 Wesham - un DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 3 2007 Authority E012958 as amended a Chief Records 4 7 Plans provide for folloewon launches when directed toilay destructor fields These are designed to disrupt lighterage if reconnaissance reveals that Rorth Vietnam is offloading subw stantial amounts of cargo from ships at anchor Destructors will not be delivered earlier than 48 hours after initial mine fields are laid 24 hours is maximum delay which can be set on destructors SAR Search and Rescue ships and PIRAZ Positive Identifi- cation Radar Advisory Zone ships sill-be positioned-to the north to provide necessary support BARCAP Barrier Combat Air Patrol and TARCAP Target Combat Air Patrol will also be provided - 9 Tab A describes North Vietnamese Air Order of Battle which could be encountered - Considering the low level profile of the mission approximately 330' there is little or no danger from either-MIG aircraft or emplacements 'In most cases mine- fields selected are outside the range of although some exits from target area will approach defenses Based on planned aircraft tracks and known locations of Eortb Vietnamese air defenses expected aircraft loss rate will be approximately 3 percent conservative estimate 10 Provisions ere included iu the plan-for follow up-reconnais- sauce to check on effectiveness of fields and reaction of the North Vietnamese Reseeding coerations will be executed as necessary to maintain the integrity of the various minefields 11 For diversionary purposes several weekS prior to execution PIRAZ and SAR-forces-will be relocated to positions in the Tonkin a Gulf which they will occupy during the actual mission After about 12 hours on'statioo they will return to current operating areas This relocation will be repeated at random intervals about every 10 days to inure Earth Vietnamese defenses and en tice them to lower their guard when mission is actually carried out 12 Detailed rules of engagement ace liSted in Tab D Flak sup pression will be required against sites of greatest threat to own forces Tales missiles are authorised over lane against hostile MIG aircraft-which threaten v 3 forces 13 Possible reactions by USSR Communist China ananorth Vietnam have been analyzed and appear in Tab E An interesting conclusion of this analysis is that much of the uneasiness about I Vietnam throughout the world has subsided and that it is likely that the mining of_ ed aip pngm omplex would generally be in terpreted as a show of determination whereas ahyear ago it might have been regarded as recklessness - '2 OF 3 PAGES a meme lemme if Emma'153mg at - Ir Waving Iii 11 75 IS-J 2 5 a emu FEB 0-8 2007 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records peclass Div 14 Third nation shipping_wou1d have ehree options set to enter enter with risk or anehor outside Many Studies show that Sufficient barges seepens end junks are available for lighterieg operations but-this is a very difficult requiring large numbers of people and excessive time It-is particularly difficult during the Nertheest Menseen season September an Further 'while moving free ship to shore lighters are vulnerable i0 ship and aircraft attack without -undue risk to third nation ships end without risk of killing civilians ashore If decision is made to interdict lighters while they are moving free ship to shore surface gunfire as well as eir can be employed - 15 The rules of international law regarding mine 1ayiug heve been reexamined The traditional lees ef ear do not cover mining except inje state of ear The peliticel end techno logical history of the cold eer has rendered laws of war based on the ear or peace dichetomy obsoleie and irrelevant Acts in selfmdeiense are lawful under intereetienel lee Therefore the mining of Haiphong Harbor end its approaches as described in ibis plea is censidered to be a lawful exercise of Seuth Vietnam s end U S right of cellective selfudefense against the aggression-of North Vietnam See Tab F TABS Ietelligence a Execution Timing Mining Plan Cancept' Rules of Eegegement for Mining Plan World Reaction to Legal Rsmificeeien of Mining 4221360 I PAGE 3 0e 3 PAGES lo L3 nemesis 0 33 93 art as ief Iagcords Decla'ss DIV 7 TAB A HAIPHONG 1 -Generel Situation a Air Threat There are eight serviceable-jet airbases in North Vietnam with an estimated 94 jet fighters variety Strip alert is stood at five of the eight bases The NVN GCI coverage of EVN and the Gulf of Tonkin is excellent but the NVN Air Force has only a limited all weather night capability b SAM Threat There are three known active SAM sites which co ld take under fire aircraft over water conducting opera- tions in the proposed minefield area operational effec- tiveness below_1000' is limited due to ground return c Threat There is limited threat from NVN gun over the minefield There is known light effective range 4 NE on Ile de Norway and the heavy in the vicinity of Cat Bi Kien An airfields and Hon Gsi has an effective range of 7 RM to 25 096 feet d NVN Naval Threat Haiphong Area Motor Gunboat PGM 1 1 Hotor Torpedo Boat PT - 9 Subchaser SC 2 Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat PTH 1 The PGM is capable of 43 knots for labour At 20 knots range is 655 NM Armament consists of 2-37ss single a mounts and 2 - 20 MM single mOunts It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD 2 The PT boat is capable of 50 knots for 350 NM At 30 knots for 410 NM Armament consists of 4 12 7 MM guns 2 - 18 torpedoes and 4 depth charges It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD 3 The PTH is estimated capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots Armament is 2 21 torpedoes and two twin 12 7 MM gun mounts It has the POT HEAD surface search radar - PAGE 1 or 3 7'1 - TAB A SSIFIED FEBLO 82007 EEtglo ty EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Decless Div WHS 2 Essex Forces a North Vietsam Naval Forces The Nerth Vietnamese Easy was designed to be a coastal defense force but has proved itself iucapable of performing the task Its P94 Class PT's pose the only threat to large surface craft but NVN tactics and torpedo readiness render this threat almost negligible The Navy's SOul SC have ASW ordnance but crews have not been trained to use it The patrol craft Swatow Class PGM and Shanghai Class_PTF provide 37 EM mobile platforms to supplement shore defenses but have no sig nificant antiuship capability Air Force The Korth Vietnamese Air Force has grown considerably since the beginning of the Vietnam hostilities The HVNAF combat inventory presently includes about 94 fighters and bombers located in North Vietnam 3 Enemy Capabilities a North Vietnam is capable of 1 Attacking with light jet bombers and jet fighters bombers opposing naval forces operating in the Gulf of Tonkin' or the northwestern area of the South China See 2 Conducting limited harassment of opposing naval- units operating in tbe coastal waters 3 Conducting limited defensive minelaying operations - in coastal waters I 4 NVN Maritime Activity 3 The Haiphong port_complex handles some 90 percent of North Vietnamese seahorse war has caused North Vietnam's need for imports particblarly foodstuffs petroleum machinery construction materials trucks earth moving equip ment and generators to grow The principal contribution of the North Vietnamese economy to the_war has been as a manpower source and the maintenance of a logistics system capable of moving men and imported war material to the combat zones b The bulk of military equipment used by the enemy in both North and South Vietnam continues to be imported from Communist countries The value of such aid in 1968 is estimated at $ 66 1 1an uuwu slum miiLtuu Lu in in military imports in 1958 probably reflects reduced needs for air defense weapons particularly ammunition and surface-to air seem PAGE 2 OF 3 pests i 4 TAB A romeo-2n Emma it - '5 Wesson i '9 my mum Egse'mmef Jug 3 when I is - vi - 1 1h 1 FEB 082W Authority E0 12958 as amended - @hiet Recorde Declass DIV WHS missiles since the U S bomoiog cutbacks of 31 March and 31 October 1968 There is evidence that large quantities of arms end smmunition have entered Eorth Vietnam by rail from Com - muoist China Although there is no specific proof that pinm 'points the import of arms into North Vietnam via the see this is still a strong possibility It could be coming by sea and never be detected Regardless of the fact that it cannot be determined what percentage of arms ere coming from which nation and by which route a reduction in food petroleum machinery construction materials trucks and other sar supportisg items will reduce the ear-making potential of Rorth Vietnam and have a direct effect on its ability_to support the war in the South c Haiphong centinues to be important as the port through which the Eorth Vietnamese economy is proppeduup by its coma munist allies shile its manpower is being drained off to the war_ in the south d During 1968 seaborne imports to North Vietnam rose to a new high of 1 960 000 tons 39 percent shove the volume in 1967 and the largest iocreese recorded for any year Imports from Free World countries remained at the some low level as 1967 accountiog for only 2 percent oflthe totsl thus imports from communist'countries provided the total of the increase e More than half of North Vietnam's nearly tee million tons of imports during 1963 comprised of food 790 0 0 tons and '-petroleus 385 039 toes -The USSR supplied 77 percent or the cetroleum some 90 percent of which see motor gasoline sod diesel oil Chiee supplied 18 percent Escorts of general and miscellaneous cargo construction equipment industrial machinery trucks and motor vehicles chemicals cement metal products and waterborne logistics craft increased in 1968 for the fourth consecutive year sod totaled 695 000 tons f Escorts of general and miscellaneous cargo increased from all parts of the communist world except Communist Chins which showed so 11 percent decrease Imports of this category from Chico showed a particularly steep declioe in the second half of l958 Ector vehicle imoorts from Chime for example dropped off from 6 399 toss in the first self of the year to l 9%0 tons in the second half - Tables end 2 provide skis arrivals by Flag to North Vietnam since 1954 secs 3 cs 3 moss 13 g' 5 - fin-6 A '11 Ami-unlaw- udiaum um wg 1 W - - V I Ipuvvl-v t1 ucem n2 Aw-tn pwp- - North Vietnam h- NV 0-2 I EULCLguerdg DuLp Agravaas 1964#68_ DECLASSIFIED ES 0 8 3337 Authority by Flag E0 12958 as amended - Chief Records Declass Div WHS i Com unisf countriee 1178 274 InxigFree Wefld w Fl gh 1964 19653 ' C 0tal - 7580 530 48'79 Eastern Europe 8 50 Albania Bulgariav J - i Czechoslovakia _East Gegmany 'PoIand 6 4 Chinaf 722'61443 reyprugs Denmark 3 -11 Finland 6 -France at Greece '1 lu 35ff 28 Indonesia' Etaly Japan _s37 Kuwait 5 20 9 Liberia '7 1-6 3 Malta - NetherlandsV j- 8 g'q 5 Norway 1 43 _j-29 Panama 12- 1 Singapore 6 ma_ 3 Somalia Ti Sweden 3 United Kingdom 177 9136 West Germany 8 illegal flag '4 5 1966 379 305 122 44 967 386 308 181 29' 1968 - 500 351 216 Wi l m Th J-t A- u-u-u- g-wlu-w-u-w-wn-ma - mu mum-4 gnu-yup Iain-E-Nh'lyI-tlz u-mmg 7 immw- at 2'77 3 62 60626 JAN APR 4 TABLE 2 DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 2007 Authority 50 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS 339$ TU 1969' 169 126 165 593 166 650 175 620 163 560 127 136 196 166 223 325 191 613 232 066 161 050 171 966 60 24 102 343 130 665 19 90 669 116 760 '17 66 266 65 253 21 113 695 160 591 21 97 656 - 122 661 15 65 373 '66 679 6 610 10 130 6 002 10 300 6 603 10 300 17 656 23 100 FEB 32 60 DWT 2 15 771 22 999 4 27 176 39 635 1 6 231 10 560 2 13 564 20 359 1 6 906 10 066 1 9 267 12 607 00666 1- 9 390 12 666 1 9 732 12 666 662 32 66 32 1 1 Pg BULGARIAH 60 067 1 7 962 11 600 2 6 303 - 6 696 1 1 5 920 9 200 061006 6 31 012 66 260 6 39 584 - 57 610 - 15 59 341 65 650 7 - 60 770 66 130 - 4 16 592 22 560 7 26 926 62 360 66 JUN 2' '6 g 66666666 Nm i w Nimii'ime Paris Mamier piggkok Lo' ' Tl 65 0f DREDGE if i 7% 3 3 E 2 and Shippi g Channeis a a 4 OUTER EB AREA Maritime Port Maritlmg Anchorage Other Port Shipping Channel ZERO BUOY I I Pnncupai Waterways THAI BINH v - Ff CANAL DES BAMBDUS- 535 LACH TRAY i a e 0 3- At Haiphong Pier - 2-Maritime Wharf200 17 - Authority E0 12958 as amended - thief Records Declass Div WHS hr 3'43 -I m in y mam @171 371' 40 Wig 8 4 LIGHT JET 73 JET FIGHTER 1 22 59 9 JET FIGHTER JET FIGHTER 6 JET TRAINER 37 TRANSPORT 53 QJiIIna w mm I 33 HIE-21 59 38 HIS-19 4 IL-Imam-15 SAN NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 10 JULY 1969 YUNNANI 4 PHUC YEN 20 VARIOUS HOA LAC HELICOPTER PRIMARILY 33 39 PHUC YFN 545 575ch 'wamuua FRIMARILY HOA LAC 5 THUONG 'u runnf LEUCHOU PROF TRAENER YUNNANT 20 HOA LAC 4 KEP 7 PHUQ YEN 3 1 2 51A LAM 0 KEP 30 YUNNANI TRANSPORT KIEN AN I HOA LAC TRANSPORT - - 22 LANG SON AREA AIRFIELDS LIGHT TRANSPORT AREA AIRFIELDS uimueu L- FMS-13 - - I Ina-15m z 3U l l 39 1 1 eL LIL-28 Ari 53 4 PM mu Wig 552 1 mime-15m 9 a 3 mm 3 1 Hill 1 Imam-15 3 3 5-1 Liv-r i z m -w hw 0 LOCATION JET vim-f Zf j AIRCRAFT fag W mums Ina-15m I22 39 33 - him-19 an gr - @smiciam IE1 HEN may 78 45 If 33 a um x HRS 535- - r 143 I new soasmucnaa a 5 mm m IL-23 a I 4 x f mamas q s 5 I if 10mm AIRCRAFT 254 133 151 --ntins anl - mam I mi ii i DECLASSIFIED FEB 03 2007 I 't as amended Declass DIV WHS - 312 '93 Ar mnca urge-ma man-7mm 1 CHIN A 102 24 APR 69 - SAM ENV ELOPE f POSSIBLE SAM ESTIMATED LOCATION M 4m METER GAUGE - Tami-2cm 25 18d q a i Egg ssamumzsu 20mms Siam mm 19 0 Il W 'mus x - I a - DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 2007 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief - Records DeclassDiv WHS - whim 4253 I l dr vmi R a m u 3 - - mom umm CHINA Fr THAN r-gm y 51155 1 202 5 5 i iyg Wig 55 if 3 1 - WEAPONS 5129 1 mm mm 37-5151 5111 1111135111 1 MEDIUM WEAPONSK If 9' 37mm 57mm 4 792 - 1 5 7 85mm 100mm 337 MONTE-I RPB RP4 121 5 RF GA 121535 TOTAL A 3 1249 458 550 350 93- 1001 509 14229 - 54 33061 135 595 552 5 3 1393 511 354 93 1127 505 11753 DEC 21 54 599 47 59 1179 626 5075 5439 29 10 10 44 119 152 354 51594 560 5115 Jam sax 1232 #929 i JAN cs 1 29 25 102 52 19' 113 my w x 1539 14555 1555 A46 153 1223 570 5041 111 47 117 1111 311 535213125 5372 491 432 154 1192 518 4792 5129 5'75 a 31 MAR 59 2395 10 as 123 120 337 55 3w BASED 0 DATA PASS 102 1A DO H0i FLDO 7 w I 111111111 712151 111 5 1 wag STATUS - 7 40111111111212er 2011 5 i 7 Ljhugr METER GAUGE 5 DUALL GAUGE 1 a 11UNDER OMSTRUCTION J w mm hide 103 - 7 106Authonty 50 12958 as amend Chief Recqr'ds Declass Div WHS as u-Maw avaa 1131' Hm 3n hi ram spit-7134 I 1 D pr Wm TIA 1 Jr 2034 m41z y mrmr 553230 M lom wm nmmom24 OZ mud Hug mom iuom mo mumuukumZx 02 3 80 3 6min Jr YOW Vim 3 5 Arnuunu W2 20m4 Sm42 3 msimoidl nl ml l i1 4 l1 6 a uzcn mzu a ms reia m In FPO A Qmww an r A 7 xmwuuw Efw _ Hozm 0029 willzmoojmw a 21 i mugmzzu w 5 as 530 mo mm m3m ama A 02% m wooam m 085$ 02 215 Ezitr -m l 5321 mg 5 11 Ears-M15 a a new 3 7329 F i is in most distant port -the third OVA to Tonkin Gulf 1 Response time will vary as a result of several factors Location Of CVA's currently assigned mission of location and readiness_of mines and configuration of airs craft The response times in this plan range from 12 hours for options and to 86 hours for option A when one CVA Response for option A could u-zJJ -a an J- Gnu qu DU yLUVAucu 111 Gui-UsitcSSagt 1 c udf d 2 Definition of Execution Terms Mm our DTG of message ordering mining plan implemented A subsequent order is required for launch of mining aircraft unless LmHour is specified in this message L Hour ' Time launch of mining aircraft Commences as ordered by appropriate authoritye L Hour may be prewdesignated when M Hour is signalled or may be ordered separately Dn our Time when all fields are in place for option selected An our Time when all fields are activated 2007 DECLASSsaZ-ii ined Declass Div WHS PAGE 1 on a pines g e - TAB xer Ix draw-1 33 rm trig l' All mines OPTION OPTION OPTION IO 1 All design nateleorces in Tonkin _Gu1f - 68 0 0 CVA from most distant port 2 A11 mines - 74 0 0 - aboard in readiness condition All Surface k 77 - 3 Forcas in launch posi - 1- tion_ All mines 82 8 readied to I 0931611 31011 86 12 lea ed - aircraft ready for launch- Events 3 4 and 5 are proceeding concurrently 4 Time available to higher authcri y to cancel the miaing operation after 1% is Ordered implemented a Unlimited if massage implementing mining plan did_not_ specify'ag Ln our and if no Lm our has been signalled subm saquantly After LmHOur has been specified 0 signalled he mining operation can be cancallad provided the cancallation Order is raceived and un erstood abOard the by 15 minutes 1 I 2 OF 2 OAGES - i w 8 Authority E0 12958 as amended - 7 Chief Records Declass Div WHS gaunt-r Hg 1 13241 r 'l Eur-9m 3 A 5191 ng 9 wee eme I 'i _the complex to be mined and were selected because ever_90 throughou these ports MINE emu COECEPT Al nannAh c m nn- ' nn n 3-1395 uni-3 MW '25 l 7 CV3 aerial mining operations in the Heiphoquert Complex in order to interdict the eeritime logistic support of North Vietnam Heiphong Hen Gel end Cam Pha comprise percent of the maritime sugpert for Earth Vietnam enters a The plan provides three mining options iIeZ ALEA 3 BRAVO 2 eva s and CHARLIE 1 OVA TF 77 can commence miuieg operatioes within 12 to 86 hours after receipt of an execute directive dependent on which op ion is selected b in option she mine fields are armed 72 hours after planting and this ect will be publicly ennouneedov This allees a safe passage period for shipping that desireS to depere the area 26 Mine Fields See Chart a Appendix 7 Haiphong The port of Haiphong is mined with ive fielde Tee fields A and B close the main channel with sea mines Fields 1 and 2 mines ane_deetreeters and are elented adjacent to ehe mein channel Field 3 is a destrueter field which can he laid ever field in oeder to seal ehe main channel to lighterege well as ocean shiepieg NQTE See mine fields are letiered eetrue er fielde are numbegedo See mines arm in 72 hears destructere in 24 hours No destruetore ere pleneed in main channels on the first launch for eptien in erder to ensure a safe den pareere channel during the grace yeriod b Hen Gel a Fields C and are mine fields igeed to block the vessel princieel access route Jeetrueter fields 4 and will block the most seed lighteru age and eneherege areas serving Hen Gal cf Gem Pha Fields F e and are see mine fields designed to prevent to Gem Phe 2 beers after pleetm leg field 6 will interdiet ligheerege eperetiees in the area I 1 ee 5 DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 81200 as amen ed Declass DIV WHS If Eng-sq emf 5mm meg m1 all d Mine Destruciorpallecations - The following quantiu- ties of sea mines listed are required for fields A through I for options indicated n r m i'nm'cs v 1 J - C3 EK 50 0 Ex 52 2 MK 52 3 I MK 55 2 ACOUSTIC MAG IND PRES MAG MAG IND 14 Bestructor fields 1 through' require the following assets ygT 36 DST 40 MK 50u0 MAG MAG ACGUSTIC 564 40 - 30 El 534 d3 20 32' 492 See paragrayh 3a for urine definition of aetione All required for the aheve options are currently aboard 7th Fleet or at the Naval Magazine Subic Bay 3 Forcee a Carrier reqeiremente in Ogiion Al 1 large CV3 and 2 small A2 3 small Bl 1 large EVA and 1 small EVA BE 2 email 1 large CV3 b Other ships The operaiion includes requirements for the following additional ships North S33 2 - Eerth Search and Rescue S ik moniier Plaiz a 1'eie aed'i Strike and Cap Centrol 3 - - PAGE 2 5 PAGES DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 20 A th orit 12958 as amended C ief R cords Declass DIV WHS c lSupporting Aircraft Seaport aircraft required includeH - r- 4 f - v essayBar Cap Tar Cap To protect mining force and carrier force Tankers Refuel fighters or mining aircraft as requiredprovide radar following and to counter missiles and fire control Jr radars IRON surpanssoas To provide mining force protection - RECONHAISSANCE To provide Post-Strike results NYE reaction Operations a Plan Description This is a three option plan presiding a choice of 3 2 or 1 carriers to mine the Haiphong Complex Principal advantages disadvantages of each option are presented in the following - - 3 I Advantages A threelcarrier force provides the max - imam flexibility in strike size and composition In this concept total mine requirements are not stored on the CVA's E Some of the required mines are held aboard an ammunition ship a in the Tonkin Gulf thus allowing CVA's normal ordnance stowage - and operations Provides thegmost complete and effectiveimin ing ovaaiphong Complex Disadvantages Requires mine transfer at sea-with attendant delay in response to execute order Current 9 posture requires two CVA's at Yankee Station Third CVA late arrival could delay execute up to 86 hours - Requires dedication of two to partial mine loadmout thus restrictu ing conventional ordnance stowage and AE deployment Option and We a Advantages Mines-are stored aboard CVA's thus ng response time Deep water fields are still - 1 In A milieu Disadvantages Mines take up come CVA ordnance 1 2 Storage Space - requiring increased replenishment or slight -EJ -lessening of the normal Vietnam in country support capabilityPAGE 3 UPS PAGES v DECLASSIFIED 8 A a TAB - AuthorityzaEO-12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS zwr rr game eh teas-ma gr gr FEW I away-gar 663 a 9 i - b Airerait 3ortie Requirements See Appendices will he noted that second launch or iolloeuon sorties'are included These sorties sank 1WUHLU niches uu ow libiub 3 lb L'uaus erait hat Will not he launched until directed c Reconnaissance and Replenishment 1 Reconnaissance flights operations will he conducted'subsequent to the mine laying operation to de termine EVE Foreign shipping reaction reSpoese to the a mining effort as well as results 2 In order to extend the maximum effectiveness of the fields as planted replenishment operations should commence in about 4 months for sea mines and 2 months for destructors Field attrition resulting from NVN sweeping or miss detonation may require earlier replenishment but no replenishment will take place until directed Mine Logistics - a For option A to ensure mine availability and prepareda Hess tee will be loaded with identical inventories of 101 mines and one iE will always be at Yankee Station I a t b For other ostiOEs carriers will have aboard a preu assigeed mine loadoet and the assisting Mobile Mise issem- hly Teams EOMAT c Subic Bay will support the programmed 4 month mine replenishment requirement and is capable of providing addia tional mine assets will ensure that c Aircraft Lossesa Estimated maximum losses would be or for examele in option AZ-With 3 launches and 5 Sapport aircraft per'launeh included the loss estimate_ is 6 Minimum loss estimate is 3 aircraft on option C 7 Execution If an option is approved for plahning TF 7 carriers sueport vessels will be loaded to supeort the option selected Additionally CTF 77 will randomly move ships into the planned northern position in order to lessen eve initial reaction to support ship positioning when the plan is executed Normal surfaee escort asd sir cover will he provided during these incur sionsPAGE 4 or 5 rises e' SSIFIED 2m 2 E0 1'29EEBasoa8men ed 7 Chief Records Deciass DIV WHS I- nm ar m w mm- grew- gr 1 g 3 t s APPENDICES I Option A1 scrtie Re uix Ii'u Option A2 e enis Ogtion B1 IV a Option Op ion VI a Minefield Cocrdina es VII Chart PAGE 5 a snags 0-48 2007 Authotity EO 12958 as amended NOTE 311 MIN-E CASE NUMBER FIELDS I i I TO TAB MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS OPTION ALEA ONE - LARGE DECK CVA 6T6 77 3 SORTIES FIELD MCNLAA 3 A4 1 52 2 - I-I-A14A6 - 6 6 MK 5243 4 A6 3 20 MK 50 0'- 1 A7 c_ 4 MK 55-2 5 A7 7 MK 5542 14 MK 5242 a 6 MK 5243 - - 2 A7 12 MK 5242 2 A7 12 MK 5242 4 A7 12 MK 52 2 - G34G12 - I I 9 NE 55 2 - 6134621 1 A7 5 MK 5552 2 11-111 4 A6 NOTE 1 3 72 MK 36 DST 2 A6 NOTE 1 6 24 MK 40 DST 2 A7 NOTE 1 6 16 MK 40 DST a 270 OVA CTG 771E SORTIES FIELD MCN 18 1 - 180 MK 36 DST 6 1 30 MK 5027c CVA CTG 77 DST DST 14 NOTE 1 4 140 MK 36 DSTWILL BE LAID NHEN DIRECTED BUT ND SO ELAN 24 LD-LS DEIDE T0 -w THESE FIELDS ARE ASSIGNED TO A6 AIRCRAFT 03 EACH OPTION 0F PLANS A AND IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A NIGHT ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY 0F MINING THE HAIPHONG DEEP WATER CHANNEL IF DIRECTED 7 OF 1 PAGES CLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 2007 -- Eah'ority 12958 as amqnded Chief Reccr ds Declass DIV WHS I 371341-55 35 2 - h w w A 19 32 I Niemgt ' iiw mwa tw '24- 4 MAL r 1 A I A dia-wpqa v Jun- 1L Ex 2 4494 14 NOTE 1 4 4 16 8 A4 7f u 8 NOTE 1 4 14 II MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS QPTION ALFA Two CVA CTG 77 2 33 g LAUNCH FIELB '5me In can u - MLJ- 1 1 1 4 12 MK 52 2 9 MK 55 2 5 MK 55 2 ll MK 52w2 H510 SECOND 2 72 FOLLOW-ON- 4 140 MK 27C OVA CTQ 77 Y LAUNCH 6 MK 5242 6 MK 52m3 20 MK 50 0 100 MK 36 DST 30 MK SOMO yaw SECOND LAUNCH DST 27C CVA ggasr 4 MK 5540 - 14 MK 52 2 A 5 MK 5243 7 ME ESMZ I 1 CF 2 PAGES - 3 314320 Tl T3o - DECLASSIFIED 0 4 8 280 - Authority EO 1 2958ias amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS - I SQRTIES MCN A Mi wk 12 MK 52 2 p- i 12 MK 52-2 31 312 LAUNCH 10 5 100 MK 36 DST 10 NOTE 1 6 40 MK 40 DST 5 NOTE 1 FIELDS 3 4 AED 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DTR ECTED SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO UT NO 1 EASE 2 OF 2 PAGES - A DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 2007 1 amended Chief Records eclass Div WHS- APPENDIX TAB 0- A - - g OPTION BRAVO 0N3 f1 INITIAL LAUNCH 3 LARGE DECK CVA CTG 77 x g -SORTEES FIELE 1 1 A 5 MK 52 2 As a v6 MK 52 3 3 A6 10 MK soro 31 310 3 MK 52 2 311w313 1 A7 4 MK 55 2 01-04 3 12 MK 52 2 31 912 6 MK 52 3 4 MK 55-2 5 319 922 g 1 A7- 6 MK 52MK-sz z - 1 3 MK 55n2 G7-G9 1 1 A7 3 MK 55 23 1 A7 1 52 2 11 DST CTG 77 7 SORTIES MCN 13 A4 1 180 MK 35 DSTsome z -- 4 LAUHCH NOTE 1 VLARGE DECK OVA 3037133 FIELD - MON 357 DST DST I 270 77 7 7 $1 3037135 MON DST E5 3073 I 713133 WILL 33 LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT 30 333333 THAN 24 30335 33103 T0 AMHGUR 7_ PAGE 1 03 1 3 a - FEB-0 8 20 Authorit EO 12958 as amended Chief Rgcords Declass Div WHS APPENDIX IV TO in MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS 633166 s- 1' LAUNCH 336 OVA CTG SORTIES FIE MON 2 A4 3 10 MK 50 o 314316 1 A4 3 3 3114313 - -- 10 A4 12 MK 52 2 D14612 6 MK 52-3 - 4 MK 55 2 319 322 2 A4 6 MK 52 2 3 A4 3 MK 55-2 31433 DST 5 276 OVA CTG 77 2 4 A4 A 5 MK 52-2 AluAs 6 MK 5243 4 A4 0 4 MK 55 2 01 c4 2 A4 6 MK 5242 31436 5 A4 6 MK 5242 - 3 MK 5542 2 A4 I 4 MK 52 2 Il DST 5 OPTIOH BRAVO TWO 5 LAUNCH NOTE 1 276 CVA CTG SORTIES MON 3 A4 1 90 MK 36 DST DST DST 270 77oz 3633133 FIELD DST 3 33 FGLLawmag FEELES WILL BE LAAB BERECTED 33 H0 THAN-24 HGURS PRIOR TO 1 OF 1 riggbcirds Declass Div WHS 1 OCH-403 NOTETAB -INITIAL LAUNCH MINEFIELD LARGE DECK CVA CTG 77 X FIELD A UOUJ mwm' 5 MK 52-2 6 MK 52 33 10 MK some 3 MK 52 2 4 MK 55-2 12 MK 5252-3 55 2g 52-23 52m2E 55a2f 55n25 52-2 OPTIGN CHARLIE 20 MK somd - 7o MK 36 DST LAUNCH NOTE 1 FIE 6501erde 1 FIELDS WILL BE SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PR DST DST DST DST DST DD 1 g e drds Div WHS MCN 31 310 311 313 01ac4 D13SD18 EluE - 11m14 MON LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO 103 TO AMHOUR APPENDIX VI TO TAB MININGAo rEL uu MLLELL31UE 12 miLqu1aim9d LBfILthlal limits for the interdictiqn of ocean traffic in the Haipho Hg Deep Water Compleg will consist of 9 minefields Fr A'maximum i of one mine destructor field and 5 destructor fields are provided to interdiet lighterage contingent upon which option is executed - 3 a Mgnefield Coordinates Use H 0 Chart 3162 5TH ED and H O Chart 3161 7TH ED REV 12 68 a g' 1 Field Coordinates a 20 47 5 x 20 45 8 - 105-52 0 20 45 8 106 51 3 2 Field Coordinates - zou45 2 '106 52 3 so 20u42 6 N- 106 57 3 20 44 85 106-51 5 3 Field Coordinates 20 47 6 107 06 85 E 20 46 9 10 07 2 20m46 9 107n06 85 4 Field Coerdinates 20 48 05 107 08 6 g - 20 48 5 N 107 10 1 3 20 47 5 107 10 5 20 47 1 107 08 8 5 Field Coordinates a 2a 50 15 107 11 4 20 50 15 107 12 5 20-49 107 12 6 i 6 Field NE Cooroinatss 20-50 0 107u13 s 20 50 0 107 14 9 5 _20 49 5 107s15 0 i- 20 49 5 107 13 9 3 t7 Field G Coordinates 20 55 7 107 16 8 a - 20u55 05 107a18 0 - 20 54 2 107m17 25 20m53 4 107 17 2 20 53 4 107E15 2 30 8 Eisid coordinates 20 53 2 107 19 65 i - 29m52 5 10 19 9 7 20 5295 E0 12958615 amended Sane cords Declass DIV WHS PAGE 1 GE 5 PAGES - a hq w 3 9 Fie1d_ I Coordinates 21n05 6 107 30 6uE 21 05 3 107 31 1 21n03 5 107 29 3 I - 21 04 9 I b _Destructor Field Coordinates 1 Field Coordinates a 20 42 1 106-47 8 20m43 8 106 52 3 20 41 7 106 56 0 5 20 39 8 106 49 1 2 Field coordinates a 20-43 8 '106w52 3 t - - - 20 44 7 - 106-54 8 - 20 42 5 lee 58 7 20 41 106 55 0 a 3 Field Coordinates 20n44 7 106m5408 5 - 107-00 6 a Eou42 5 106 58i7-E 4 Field Coordinates 107 01 7 20 53 4 107 06 8 7 20 52 3 107 06 9 20 53 0 107401 5 5 Field n5 Coordinates '1o7vos 8 - -20 55 2 107 09 5 20 55 0 oi 20 52 3 107 06 9 6 Field Coordinates - 20 59 0 107 21 55 20 58 7 '7 20 5 1 107 20 o 3 29 57 4 107M19 2 i o Allocations Option A MK 50 52 2 MK 52n3 MK 55TOTAL TE To 2 2 FIELDS DST E0 MINE 3 i 1 EEXED FIELD PAG 2 0F 5- PAGES 5 Chief Records Declass Div WHS I 51 DESTRUCTOR FIELD DST 36- MINE 2 a mm TOTAL 331 Mine Allocations Option BRAVO 1 MINEFIELDS MK 50 52 2 MK 52-3__ 55 2 M_Kmh_m_TOTAL 1'6 - '12 2 DESTRUCTDR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 1 FIELD DST 36 DST 40 MINE MK 50 0 I EEIXED FIELD-140 TGTAL 333' 38' 23 3 DESTRUCTGR BRAVO 2 FIELD DST 36 DST 40 MINE MK I FIELD 40 TOTAL 2'0 IPA-GE 3 OF 5 PAGES FEB 0 8 200 Authority EO 12958 as amended ChiefiRecor dsi- ag Decl ss Div WHS mm nn'uun I n an-uyzr I I 15 Wm a - if 3 DECLASSIFIED I Mine Allo ations Option CHARLIE - MINEFXELDS MK MK 52-2 EX 52 3 MK 55 TGTAL T6 l 2 DESTRUCTOR FIELDS DST 36 pg 40 MINE EX some TOTAL g a 15 d Mine Descriptions Mina Sane EGO LB acoustic influence mine Mine MK 52 2 1000 LE magnetic induction mine 'Mine EX 52 3 1000 LE pressure magnetic mine Mine EX 55-2 2000 LB magnetic induction mine DST 36 53% LB magnetic influence mine EST 40 1690 LE magnetic influence mine Mina MK 38-3 1609 LB pressure magnetic mine 9 Mine Stocks HAVMAG Mine MK so 148 Mine MK azaz 330 Mine MK 52u3 40 enroute Mine MK ssaz 250 53251339 MK 36w3 - 66 aine $3 35 3 acceptable subsiitute for Elna MK 52-3 f Specific Miaing 1 Mine requirements listed under oytions and C'are considered minimum acceptable number in the mi efields when 77 aSSigns minefield rasponsibility by CTG em arke HGMATS will ensure the mines are lab lad with the pr0 er mina case numbers Field Daliver raga ShQuld ha ma a t9 ylase mines within the buoy d hip channel 078 2007 PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES 59 -1 2958' as am nded Declass DIV WHS mt 3 4 Fields EELTA aad mines gx Ssnz shculd be planted in the deep sections cf the minefield approximately 9 fathoms'or deeper g Repiacement Eines maintain 10 percent in excess of required mines for spares Replacement mines will have opera- tional-adjustments preSEt Spare mines may be substituted with out further-adjuStment for the same MK Mod mine in any field Spare Mine MK 52 2 may substitute_for Mine MK 52n3 in addition tr Mine 331K 23mg 5 633 amags 05 8 2-007 't ED 12958 as amended rhgc tds Declass DIV 51 15% 1 i vaciamen k 1 a A Lrl 25 1 wzzw i xnl- wamumwm 4 an ulil 1 1 lnLn 4 w o 039 k an m 085grates- mtg wmkd'rxg i I Zl m we a 34 1 Authority Chief Reco rds Declass Div WHS 2 I ECLASSIF so FEB _0 8 2007 - TAB cs HAipHose PORT cosPLEx 1 The following rules of engagement are effective for US forces operating in support of the mining plan Definitions a Territorial sees A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth measured from the lee water-mark along the coast -However in the states claiming'tselvewmile territorial seas twelve'siles shall be erved for these rules as if it were the width of their territorial sees following distance presumed to be claimed as a territor sea - The ial North Vietnam 12 miles Presumed ' b Internal eaters Waters to landward of the territorial c Territorial'airfspace tory internal eaters country I space above the land terrim ecd territorial seas of a sovereign d Immediate pursuit Pursuit initiated in reseonse to actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined in these rules of engagement The pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted and may be extended as secessary and feasin ble over territorial internal air space seas as prescribed herein As aircraft identified as nonnUS observed in the act of attacking or indicates with reasonable certaisty iendly forces e Hostile aircraft and noseallied which is acting in a manner which an intent to attack US fr f Hostile vessel surface or subsurface I 1 A vessel which is attacking or acting in'a manner- ehich indicates within teascnable certainty an intent to attack S friesdly forces 3 General Rules erce- ee executing this plan a are authorized to-attack asd destroy any hestile'vessel or aircraft as herein defined Pass 1 0 3 PAGES 12958 as amehded In a I g-w mama Lamar-M 1 1 31 granny qu w mesa 21 torial sees I 1 lies 2 3 eases b Immediate purseitsay be-conducted as necessary_and feasible pursuant to the the following con ditioes and limitations l -In event US forces are attacked by hostile forces in North Vietnam or over international waters US forces may conduct immediate pursuit over internal waters or into terri- 'or air space of Eorth Vietna so pursuit is authorized into Communist Chinese territorial seas or air space 3 US forces which under the limitations of these rules enter_unfriendly territorial land sea or air spaces defense 4 Declaration of aircraft or-vessels as hostile will be tempered with judgment and discretion Cases can occur wherein the destruction of communist-bloc forces would be con trary to US and allied interests All available information and intelligence shall be considered in determining action to be taken in such cases 4 Use of surface to air missiles against hostile aircraft Telos -Terrier end Tartar equipped ships will attack and destroy airessft as feasible which are positively identified as hostile with these rules of engagement a Before firing all indications must eliminate any possibility of firing on friendly aircraft and must indicate the probable presesce of a hostile aircraft The above re- quirements may as satisfied by verifying the identity of air b Authority is granted to fire Talos Tartar or Terrier missiles over the orth Vietnam land mass sissiles will set be fired over territory of Communist China c Missiles will be command destructed five seeonds after' passing the closest point of approach if intercept is not' accomplished 5 Use of SEE SAW is authorized in accordance With 1983912 68 3 207' DECLASSIFIED FE 0 Authority E0 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS 1 weva 151519-433 u meme 6 Nothing in these rules eodifies ih any manner the require ment of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with'all'means at his diSposal In the even of uch attack the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive_ action against the attacking force PEGE 3 OF 3 PAGES TAB I DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 2007 Authority E012958jas amended - Chief Records 8 Declass Dim WHS - - 3 3 TAB WORLD RERCTIOHS TAB -1 This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the U S mining of the Haiphong Port Complex 2 'General Comments Mining of the Haiphong Port Complex would be regarded as an escalation of the war and would be so treated by the Communist world in its propaganda It would be accepted as such by most of the rest of the world as well - particularly the neutrals such as Sweden and India b rMuch of the Vietnam which was important in world affairs appro imately a year ago has now subsided In the present world climate it is likely that this act would be generally interpreted as showing determination whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness It is still possible that charges of recklessness would be directed against the U S Small powers would in general man- ifest more disapproval than large powers who would be more likely to appreciate the dilemma which pushed the U S to this action Large powers would not be likely however to speak out on behalf of the U S c It would be interpreted by all discerning governments as primarily a challenge to the USSR Few would really consider it as sufficient to disturb the peace of the world but many would act as if they so regarded it In recent decades the world are see ma number of examples of the application of force clearly calculated to signal resolve rather than reeklessness The majority of the world's leaders have become inured to the kind of propaganda whichzinevitably follows this use of force In the end those who have no direct interest in the matter take precautions to ensure that they will not become involved Those who have an interest but no capability propagandize Those governments which have both interest and capability are addressed below 3 North Vietnam a NVN has only a limited unsophisticated capability to' counter the mining program Anti mine warfare efforts should not have any appreciable effect on the program overall b EVE has a considerable capability to attempt ciroaavene tion of the mining-program through the-use of small mostly wooden boat and lighters Some 0 these would be lost of course but this would not deter NVN from putting forth a major -effort in this respect Dis-oLAssu Ieo FEB 0 8 ZDUYPAGE 2 or 5 ma Auth ori E0 12958 as amended Chief F gcor ds Declass Div WHS 1 or i c To the extent that the mining'effected the flow of goods into NVN a maximum effort to compensate for the reduction would 3 routes from 3 Communist China d NVN could be eXpected to attack US units engaged in the mining They are not capable of preventing such a US effort but they could attempt harassment of_US ships and aircraft ihe expected e1rcreft loss rate is supercent or less mm e NVH would probably conSider that it was in its interest for a Russien'ship to be sunk or appear tO'heVe been sunk by 9 8 mines To this end we and in this eventuality u EVE sight foster a situatioe'thet would encourage a confrontation over the mining issue Russian failure to stand up to the Amerir cans if that should occur would be unsettling to NVN but it would not drive them into the arse of China 7-13 1 - f To the extent practicable NVN would probably respond to the Has escalation with some escalation of its own elsewhere probably in Leos Fem-w I I a Communist Chine is beginsing to figure less and less' as a factor in NVH policy surrounding this war CHICGMS aret still the most important suppliers of small arms up to the L size of mortars and some rockets and ammunition to NVN but they no longer retain any discernible political influence with Hanoi in return for their arms support 4 Communist China lean b Chinese reaction to the mining is expected to'be neglim gible except in the propaganda areas which should also have negligible impact - rem- 1 c The Chinese might be persuaded by to step up their aid if that is required but Chieese aid and supeort of any kind scald not be likely to compensate EVN for the possible loss of Russian support - Political and support is perhaps as important as material In short 'HVN is not 7 likely'to risk the loss of Russian backing by too ready a m dependence on Communist China At the same time China would be asked to do more of shat she is now doing me e d If the shipments of Russian goods across China sre now encountering difficulties as reports indicate then the act of mining per se soul not be eeoected to affect that situaw g tion Other factors such es the Reesiene hioese border tales would be expected tofbe of much greater direct The cuereot eeooless the Russians and the Chinese are surely bigger then the future of South Vietnam they may even be bigger than the future of Eorth Vieteem DECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 20117 Wuthority E0 129583213 amended 5 PAGE 2 0F 5 PAGES Chief Records Declass DIV 5 IEEVUSSR a great political risk good excuse to put added pressure - to I Authority EO129 Baga nggl ed sh Chief Records Declass Div - WHS egg sseess a If the Russians are'willing to risk some ship-losses in crossing the minefield_in order to demonstrate their reu solve to sooport NVN little will have been the NVN ear RuSsian-U Sd relations will have suffered a set back but even that should not be serious _ The RussisnS'will know that by flaunting the U S minefield they are not running that they'sould primarily be showing only the depth of their own determination They already knos well the depth of the commitment to South Vietnam and while they might be momentarily surprised at our mining de- cision in the light of current U S policy they will soon recover and see it as a challenge thrown down to them to abandon their North VietnameSe ally - b If necessary to prove their commitment to NVN the USSR might cross the minefield At the very least they would pro vide assistance to the NYE in their efforts to circumvent the mining program perhaps even to the extent of dispatching mine sweepers In Russian eyes it would be from a political point of view a BerlinuBlockade in reverse Thus the probability is that no open confrontation between the U S and Russia would result because none would be necessary c -At the same time a once proper allowance has been made for face on both sides the Russians would probably be further disgusted with the whole business of the war which has always been of much less importance to them than to us The net effect could be to prompt the Russians to pet more political pressure on HVN to end the war to accept a political settlement _ They could not force NVN and they certainly would not cut off visible support of but the war in Southeast Asia is becoming an annoyance to-the Russians in their current foreign policy aspirations which primarily seek support against China The mining of Haiphong would provide them with one more on Hanoi for a settlement This pressure would not be visible pressure for the world to see and it would not be likely to be It might not even be decisive but it could be an-important factor at-this time d Russia's most visible reactions would probably occur outside of Southeast Asia and impinge upon the question of USSR relations in general They might for example freeze progress'toward such on-going matters a I 0 mo mn a I a he so solo difficult on mattols havisg do with s lvtioes no cooperation sith the present Administration in an attempt- embarrass it politically 6 U S Counter Actions The 6 8 can blunt the anticipated propaganda 5 PAGE 3 or 5 PAGES egg ng gained as regards m 31- mi- 3 2 51 5 was I - iP SECRET uses Communist explaining at the bomhing halt the withdrawal of combat troops and political -aocommodatioes These attempts have met nothing but iatraosn Asiaa on a Chief Records Declass DIV ime Ithe mining of the Haiphong Complex is announced that the UQS has gone to great to end the war in Vietnam by the igenoe oa'the part of North Vietnam and her allieslt U S patience and understanding have reasonable limits which are now being strained The mining of the Haiphong Complex is a low order response to the complete lack of cooperation by the horth Vietnamese government sad its sllies b If the USSR suffers ship losses in attempting to run the minefield the can express sincere regrets and point out that the loss-was completely unnecessary since the original announcement'hy the U S provided sufficient time for all ship- ping to depart Haiphong safely Point out that the USSR callously sacrified the loss of their men and material in spite of all U S attempts to protect third hatioa'shipping o If the USSR provides minesweepers to North Vietnam or - sweeps the minefield herself this'will be detected by reconnaissance aircraft Upon completion of the sweeping opera tion the oah reseed the field as necessary - d If as is most likely the Soviet ships anchor just to seaward of the minefields and leave the ofinloadihg to the Horth Vietnamese via lighterage the U53 can respond by seeding the lighters3 routes with ER 36 destructoa'eo All of the normal routes will have been seeded in the'initial mine lay Follow on seeding would he needed if the North Vietaamese select alternate' routes e There is little the could-do to prevent the USSR from delaying gel or withdrawing from Midmhast talks In the case of SALT the 3333 might sell decide that her vital interests are at stake in gambling oh-e nuclear arms race and therefore go _ahead with the negotiations If the USSR drops out of the Hide East talks the U03 can express regrets and make plans to continue to seek peace is the MidnEast without Soviet participa- tion f The 0 3 could accept the use of Chinese ports by the USSR and transshipmeat of material by rail from China to North Vietnama Such an arrangement would delay the arrival of materia1 in Haiphong and Hanoi aed could further strain the relations between Commhhist China and the USSR g A Soviet blockade of Berlio should he addressed as a separate issue without relation to U98 action is southeast The Use response would parallel those actions taken in the past to all threats by_the Soviets and East Germany to a closure of accestho Berlin - PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES - TAB free i i re 11ng Fem E strewn grew-Awcould destroy North Vietnamese lighterage with gunfire from US destroyers as the lighters depart the deep water anchorages for the beachr T ere eculo De no threatft0 thir nation shipping ae no Ease of civilian lives 1 Adverse weather conditions particularly during the Northeast Monsoon period from September to May with attendant high sea states would make EVE lighterege operations both dangerous and inefficient In addition both people age re- sources would be diverted from other tasks like fishing and inner harbor transportation if an extensive lighterege opera 'tiOn were attempted This diversion and the delay in the arrival of imports would have a cemulative adverse effect on the Rorth Vietnamese economy and their ability and Willingness to continue the war effort in'the South FEB 0 8 2007 Authority EQ 12958 as amended ease 5 er 5 eases a TAB Chief Reed ds Declass Div Mae 5 c rm' #21 name 4 I um - 53 AuthOrity ing restrictions among others on the use of mine EDLECLASSIFIED FEB 0 8 20 17 E0 12958 as amended TAB l - j I I LEGAL RAEIFICATION 0F OF HAIPHONG HARBOR AKBITS APPRGACHES uoctranesT'paruicuiarl ditied in Hague Convention tee issose the folio warfare 4 w a The use of mines presupposes the existence of a state of'war - The laying of mines with the sole object of intercepts ing commercial shipping is prohibited - c The use of mines in time of peace could be considered an act of war by third countries d Interference by mines with motements'cf international shipping on high seas is prohibited 2 Whatever the historic worth of these prohibitions a modern legal analysis of the use of mines in present day internatiOnal conflict requires an examination of several additional factors The international laws of war have evolved throughout history out of an interaction from disputes between nationsagconilicts between military efficiency and humanitarianism and changing seapons technology ' Since the'end of World War 11 these laws hate been subjected to the unprecedented pressures of cold war international politics and introduction of modern weapons Because of the resulting revolutionary changes the traditional laws of war have been rendered obsolete but no fixed principles have yet been internationally accepted to replace them 3 However the national right of seliadefense which has existed since time immemorial has been recognised in the Charter and strengthened in international practice Also the former simple dichotomy between state of peace and state of war no longer has legal or political validity -Therefore in assessing the legality of an act of coercion the rigid formu las of preaWorld War ll are_irrelevant and new standards for legality must be sought 4 South Vietnam a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right to defend itself against aggression In-the exercise of this right South Vietnam requested U S assistance in repelling the aggression which has been waged by north Vietnam with in creasing terocity for several years Therefore the United States and South Vietnam have the rignt under international law to participate in the collective defense of South Vietnam against armed attack Depertsent of State Eulletin dated arch a 1966 entitled The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of 13 4 - VlQI mam WW PAGE 0F 2 PAGES Chief Records Declass Div WHS principal source of supplies for the continued prosebu tion of that aggression is the_Port of Haiphong The aggres- sion could be greatly reduced by effectively denying to North - Vietnam thesetnecessery supplies As part of its effort therefore South Vietnam and its allies would be justi- fied in employing a reasonable method of denying this flow of supplies The mining Of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches can properly be considered such a method Mine emplacement _shoild extend seaward of Haiphong Harbor only so far as is neoeSsery to halt the entrance of shipping to the harbor Advance ootifioetion must be given to all shipping concerning time of activation of mines laid All shipping entering Haiphong after that time would do so at its own peril 1-5 - rH-nrn 559 4 me A Wow Tm 5 The fundamental test of any act in international law is Nreasonableness The reasonableness of selfndefense actions is gauged by the standards of necessity and proportionality It is clear beyond dispute that South Vietnam is deeply engaged in selfwdefense action against-the overt hostilities of North ietnes Thus the necessity for action is clear asses sing the sroportionslity of the mining of Haiphong the followu ing elements are pertinent yum - I I a Mining is a passive not aggressive measure b Advance notice sill be given to third countries c Mining will be restricted-to the area around Haiphong d Potentially no loss of life or property need be i incurred e This defensive measure will reduce loss ofilife end materiel elsewhere in the zone of hostilities 1 7 In summary the traditional laws of war do not cover mining' M except in a state of war The political and technological 3 history of the cold war has rendered the less of war based on i the ser or peace dichotomy obsolete and irrelevant Acts in selimdeiense are lawful under international law Therefore mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches as described in this plan is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's right of self defense against the aggression of Horth Vietnam zmr'mxw'n a 1 5 -- dam-4 g zu xr'n - moss es 2 eases TAB maf n DECLASSIFIED - FEB 0 8520072 - Autho ty 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu