-TOP flECRIOT S E N S I T I V S Q C C l A S S i n C A T T O f i W J O U f T OT INFORMATION ' S E P 1 4 2000 M E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E PR25S1DENT FROM Henry A Kifiiinger SUBJECT Conceptual P l a n for Implementation of O p e r a t i o n D U C K HOOK Operation D U C K H O O K a e r i a l mining of the Haiphong port complex and interdiction or qxiarantine of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville would not be approached a a a p u r e l y m i l i t a r y a c t i o n but i n s t e a d a s a combined m i l i t a r y and diplomatic operation intended to produce both m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t s with m i n i m u m adverae r e a c t i o n s at home and a b r o a d We would c o m m e n c e with a diplomatic move t i m e d to p r e c e d e by seven days the a c t u a l m i l i t a r y s t r i k e against the Ha lphong s e a approaches and the interdiction of Sihanoukville We would c a l l i n A m b a s s a d o r Dobrynin and t e l l h i m In strong t e r m s that our patience with Hanoi had been s t r a i n e d to the b r e a k i n g point not only by i t s Intransigence at P a r i s but equally by i t s a c t i o n s I n South V i e t n a m by overturning the u n d e r s t a n d i n g s conducting a c t s of t e r r o r against the South V i e t n a m e s e c i v i l i a n population violating the 1962 A c c o r d s i n Laos openly conducting a c t s of a g g r e s s i o n with North Vietnamese troops and by infringing on Cambodian n e u t r a l i t y through the overt u s e of Cambodia a s a s a n c t u a r y We would w a r n Dobrynin that u n l e s s Hanoi r e v e r s e d I t s c o u r s e I n a l l these a r e a s In the v e r y n e a r future o a matter of a few d a y s i n fact -- we would be obliged to take some f o r m of a c t i o n to show Hanoi that it could not escape the consequences of i t s b e h a v i o r We would expect a s a n Immediate sign of H a n o i ' s changed intentions a significant constructive move on i t s p a r t i n the P a r t s negotiations edfe azCl l -SENSITIVE 3 C I -BeCltET SENSITIVE - 2i - A l s o A t a point s e v e n d a y s i n advancs of our p r o j e c t e d s t r i k e we would have A m b a s s a d o r Lrodge take the s a m e position with the communists i n P a r i s that we took with Dobrynin i n Washington We would of c o u r s e not specify what we intended to do However by introducing Cambodia and e s p e c i a l l y L a o s into the equation we would leave the door open for a wide range of options e g B 52 r a i d s I n I os r a t h e r than just c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s a g a i n s t North Vietnam I n this way we would p r e s e r v e m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y k ep the Soviets and Hanoi guessing and build up the t h r e a t of a much stronger c a s e before the w o r l d by introducing H a n o i ' s flagrant a g g r e s s i o n i n I aos and Cambodia T h e Sovldts a r e tmdoubtedly v e r y much a w a r e that Souvanna and P r i n c e Sihanouk have both publicly attacked North V i e t n a m for I t s a c t s of a g g r e s s i o n i n their c o u n t r i e s Hopefully the Soviets would then be c o n c e r n e d enough to pat p r e s s u r e on Hanoi to respond to our warnings If Hanoi should not respond wo would p r o c e e d with o ir m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s F o r the Haiphong operation we envisage the m a x i m u m possible effort i n the shortest p e r i o d of t i m e with m a x i m u m s e c u r i t y T h i s would Involve concentrating three attack c a r r i e r s i n the Gulf of Tonkin in a manner w h i c h would s e e m routine We would not send s e a - a i r r e s c u e s h i p s or r a d a r v e s s e l s north of t h e i r n o r m a l stations until the mining a i r c r a f t w e r e about to be laujnched We would not Inform any country f r i e n d or foe until one hour before the a i r c r a f t appear over the Haiphong s e a a p p r o a c h e s so that no s e c u r i t y leak could o c c u r F o r Sihanoukville we would quietly detach the r e q u i s i t e number of i n t e r d i c t i o n ships and titne t h e i r a r r i v a l on station to coincide with the s t r i k e off Haiphong T h e s t r i k e would take plac about 0500 Hanoi t i m e 1800 i n Washington w h i c h would be f i r s t light t h e r e e a r l y evening h e r e One hour before the actual a t t a c k s we would c a l l i n the T C C ' s the N A T O p o w e r s m e m b e r s of the O A S the L a o A m b a s s a d o r and the Cambodian Charge to the Department of State for appropriate advance briefings on the r a t i o n a l e for our m o v e s I would c a l l i n the S o v i e t Ambassador to i n f o r m h i m that we had given f a i r w a r n i n g that we had been compelled to a c t and that he and Hanoi should now know we meanttbb ubdiie s T h i s w a s not anti- Soviet but only a g a i n s t H a n o i T P - S K C R g SSNSITI V E 1 -- iU lattaw OE SgC ET SENSITIVE - 3 - The aarne points would have heen made to Moscow o n e - h a l f hour later by a Molink m e s s a g e F i n a l l y the A m b a s s a d o r s of a l l friendly countries with ships i n or en route to Sihanoukville and the Haiphong complex would be informed by the Department of State and the A m e r i c a n C h a r g e ' i n P h n o m P e n h would inform P r i n c e Sihanouk Meanwhile you would b r i e f the C o n g r e s s i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p and there would be a l o c k e d - d o o r p r e s s bi'iefing C o n c u r r e n t with the s t r i k e you would go on national t e l e v i s i o n and r a d i o and we would s i m u l taneously r e q u e s t a s p e c i a l meeting o i S U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l I anticipate that t h i s meeting would be about two h o u r s latex In - a l l of these a c t i o n s the following points would be s t r e s s e d ' % -5- o No l o s s of life need occur The m i n e s a r e set to a r m t h e m s e l v e s 72 h o u r s after being dropped allowing ample time for a l l shipping to c l e a r port o The a c t s do not constitute a r e s u m p t i o n of the bombing of North V i e t n a m or a n a c t of w a r against C a m b o d i a they a r e in r e s p o n s e to H a n o i ' s own deliberate t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o Our m o v e s demonstrate that we m e a n b u s i n e s s Although we do not contemplate further m e a s u r e s at this t i m e we w i l l judge what further steps m a y b e - n e c e s s a r y I n the light of Hanoi's response o We r e m a i n s i n c e r e l y I n t e r e s t e d i n a peaceful settlement of the w a r i n V i e t n a m and a r e In fact c a l l i n g a s p e c i a l meeting of the P a r i s T a l k s to move i n this d i r e c t i o n Our a c t i o n s a r e not d i r e c t e d against the Soviet Union or C o m m u n i s t C h i n a but only against H a n o i One p r o b l e m about the mining of Haiphong w i l l need to be met the plans c a l l for a seeding of M a r k 36 d e s t r u c t o r s w h i c h a r e set to a r m t h e m s e l v e s 24 h o u r s after being dropped In o r d e r to block sweeping and lightering operations Another s t r i k e a g a i n s t the Haiphong s e a approaches would thus be n e c e s s a r y no e a r l i e r than 48 h o u r s after the f i r s t s t r i k e 1 believe on balance that you should mention t h i s In X O P E C K E I ' SENSITIVE s _ - To MJceinErr SENsiTivE o 4 o your speech so that the two s e p a r a t e s t r i k e s w i l l be r e g a r d e d a s p a r t of one action even though the destructor m i s s i o n s might encounter increased reaction as a result J At this point we would have done a l l we could do to meet the immediate needs of tho situation We would follow through at P a r i s with Hanoi in Moscow and Washington with the S o v i e t s and wherec r e l s e we need to take diplomatic action with r e s p e c t to our f r i e n d s and our opponents We would a s s u m e a heightened P A C O M and S A C a l e r t posture m i l i t a r i l y jj to show our r e s o l v e and to respond to whatever contingencies a r i s e In P a r i s we would encourage a favorable Hanoi r e s p o n s e by r e i t e r a t i n g a l l of our p r e v i o u s c o n c e s s i o n s i n a new and forthcoming package We would not expect h o w e v e r any substantive m o v e m e n t by Hanoi until they had a s s e s s e d t h e i r new p r e d i c a m e n t examined a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of action and c h e c k e d with both the'Soviet Union a n d C h i n a to determine what l e v e l a n d kinds of support they could esqject You w i l l notice that I have not r e c o m m e n d e d any d i r e c t a p p r o a c h to Communist China s u c h a s that made to the Soviet U n i o n I anticipate that our l i m i t e d a c t i o n s would speak for t l i e m s e l v e s a s not being directed toward Peking C h i n a ' s stance throughout tho V i e t n a m w a r has been to s U y i n the background avoiding a d i r e c t confrontation with a s and X b e l i e v e i t would continue a s b e f o r e                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu