GEEURR T L IIICwSrFrfD it I c O HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR I I c CCt1WI FY 1970 a HISTORICAL SnJDY 00 ill aJ 0 - 1 ' c jc SPECIAL HANDLING REQUlRED tl'OT RELEASABLE TO FORElGN Nt TIONALS - lnl ormation contained in thi i 'lo wncnt 111 not bel dlnclo cd to foralgn nnt10nala 'l'h or their S l rcprcsQnt t1veG 1 1 - ' - o A- c vr-S lll-l l SS f - ' B-E CRM Lr - r For thooe r04dona the tootor recommended by Oon ro l Hol1ovCl1 in 1909 for 1 July 1970 wero lcas pesaim1stic thnn thOA DUgal tod by Oanorol NaZZAro in 1968 ror 1 Ja nunry 1969 'l'ha reviled PLS c v luoo voul be uGed by the JSTPS in the preporat1on 0 8IOP 4 Rov1oion H 1 Jul 1910 22 9 Special JCS Readiness Test C ' J Op 1 In October 1969 the Strategic Air Co nd particlC c patod in n spaoial teat or Unitod States military re ln aa On c- '- 10 OctobQr 1969 tho JCS ChQirrr n Qenernl Earle O Whoelar notified r Oonorn1 Hol1owo y and tho CINCo or soven unified corr 'T' o n s that We havo beon 1reoted b higher uthority to institute Q aer1 oo or nctiono during the period 130000Z - 250000Z Oct to tOBt our m1lit r1 rondinosa in seleotcd nreaa orld-w1de to respond to poasible controntntion by the Soviet Union These actions ohould be d1lalrnibl - ' -_ _-' --' _ ' -- --- -- -- -------t9 tho Soviota 'but not-- threo tening in thems lve8 - '--' Op 3 Subaequent correspondence from the JCS omitted tho ominouo ro GrenQQ to It pos s 1ble confrontation ar orr phaa1 foed tha t tho nct1ono to be taken comprised D test The backgl ound Iintonce then rood H1nher authority haG requested that DC a teat repo t no n toot we take certain notions hich would increase our ro di- nODO nnd h1oh would be disoernible but not repeat not threatening to tho SOVioto 23 1 Cl IlJ ' OP 1 oo ltendqunrtero SAC recoived no furthor infottrat1on onccrninG tho or1ain or purpooQ of the cpecinl rondinG6Q toot Spooulation foousod upon n possible connection wtth the peaoe tnlkl in Pario nnd Prosident Nixon's scheduled addrcos to the nation on tho wnr 1n Viotnam 23 It o s announced qn _13 Oo obcr thnt Pro 1dont Nixon ould delivor nn nddreoG on 3 November on the s1tuntion in Viotnam at that time 233 U ' 11 ' - -- I t'1'ScGp 1 Initln1 publio affniro euidance from the JCS otatod that queries from thQ nowo modio ohou1d bo anoworod 11th the ototcmont tha t Q aro meroly tOD tina ourrant rao d inoDD pooturc 234 This 3S Ghort1y Guporoodod by moro cpaoifio Qnd reatrictivo guidance from the Asaist nt Secrotnry or Dofonao ror Public Afraire ASD PA Included in thio guidance Ina tho atotement that Maximum security lrlUS t be rrAintninoc1 to achieve dos irod raoul ta of this eXQrcise 235 Zne guidance from the ASD PA prohibited any pUQlic Qnnounca ent concerning the JCS-directed toat schedulod to begin on 13 October 1969 and initi llv forbnde reoponae to quories unless specifically authorized by ASD PA Tho only response Which vould then -be permitted 6 r lao We do not ropeo t not OOrMlont on readiness tests 23 -This policy las lnter modified to 0 110' 1 relonoe of the authorized responee c prior to not if1ca tion of the MD PA 237 Op 1 The initial moooago from Oenernl Wheeler lioted a number o nctiono under conoldoro tion ror Q dQ onQtrQtion or increased U S military rondineao POBGibi11tiea included a ntnnd-do n of Cv bQt n rcraft in certain arcno 1ncrenaed surve111nnce or Soviet ohipo en route to North Viotnam o1lonc1na ro dio nn othor corrrnunica tiono in ccrtu in Qrcuu nnd nn incr l _a 0_ th o_ er_ountL -Ql rt nUl tui - ot-SAC - b oerG and t nkQr 238 - B eci io inatructiono to each individual CINC ollo 'od immodintely The JCS directed tho CINCSAC to cenGe tactical flying training and to rGinotate o s Any degraded alert Gort ea no POSBiblo 23 o '1----_ --- - I I I I I I I notione were to be erfective at 0800 local t mQ on 13 Octobor 1969 und erc to bo maintained until further notice by tho JCS Tho JCS sPQciric lly statod thnt Theoe directed nctions should 1n nO ' IllY o rroct Southea ot Acia opera 241 tionG Althouch unmontionod the SAC IC force was also unnffocted Thin clrcumotance 1lluotratos two fundamental racts The SAC missile orce wao nlwo yo malnta1ned 1n n high degree or readiness and manned a rcro ft could more c pp ovrir taly support a shov of torce Thooe Ai 6 P SEC ET --GON FtDENTIA 'C _ ' I t' d J Op I r- -o 'I C fi ' r I J C t ' I 0' C' -I t r- '1 I - r ''' ' I I I I I 1- I I 1 _On 12 October 1969 th 'CINCSAC dlaoomlnntcd euia ncc tor rQinotnting doaradcd nlrcratt alart lortioo in tho continontQl Ut itod SUlton nnd for ouopcndlna routlno combed tdrarQw trtllnln miDsione 242 hQ only SIOP nlrcrntt nlart aortloc not rQinot tQd Qt 0800 local on 13 October vore the 20 d06rnded n-S2 alort sortios at Andaroon AFB Ou m ho Qctunl nlrcrQtt Bround alert forco than InCl' t ood to 141 n-S2s 32 B-S8o o nd 189 KC-135s 43 In cornpnricon nctunl nlert fiGures on 30 Soptember 1969 had boen 79 n-520 31 D- 8o nnd 130 KC-135s 244 There wore nevcr l Qxcoptiona to the pollcy of Guopending combat crew traininG flighta Tho prlnclp l one WQS continuntion of n-52 and KC-135 crew trninins at Castla AFB Rotational ovQmcnts to nnd from Ooooa AB E1elaon AFB TorreJon AB and c tel- lite baseD continued as ochedulod Also unaftected were certn1n teatin programs movements rcl ted to tho conflict in South aGt Au1n and SAC support of TAC dcployrr enta 45 On 16 OctobC r Headquo rtcrs SAC notified its units that the road1noaa test 'Would l Gt for tit least two weaks and accordinBly provided additional instructions for Anag- inc creW reGources nnd fuel ordera during the test At the same time SAC author i zed Fifteenth Air Force to roV1de ref Ol 1 g u _ _ __ _ - laterQl cOtnmJ nde with C tlG tankij ru 2 G - _- - ' U p 1 Meanwhile other teata or u s military rend1neSD world ide Were u d r cono1deration In his initinl mess3Ge to the CINCo General Wheeler had requested thorn to suggest further actions compntible with his guidance nnd ProJect 703 241 On 13 October Gcnernl Holloway replied Decauoe of the limited in 'orrr a tion concerning the nature of the tect the CINCSAC prefaced his reco enda- tiona with the qua lifico tion Within the objClctiveS of this exeroise as understood here o oo 248 Hin most significant proposa l was tor n limitod Gx rciGe of SEAGA with weapono Oenernl Holloway also stated that additional o ircraft above the ay-to-dny SlOP alert force could be placed in the highest stato of rr aintenance readiness to include the load ine of 'capono However 1t would not be reasonable to pla ce these aircraft on actual alert because of the UNCLASSIFIED i 6 SEC RE UNClASSIFfED lQP II C' c_ 1 0 0 'I I c ' - J ' -1 I 4 F 1 'I I 'I I I I -- c ' ' c 154 ECRET s rlouG nhortaGo of aircrowD unlcaD crowo exceea to the 1400 Arc 24 Light nortie rate were roturned from SEA 9 LJ ' Qp 1 On 14 October 1969 General Wh elGr notified Ooneral Hol1o ay nnd the other CINCo that the rOQdineca teat WOUld' last until about OOOlZ on 30 October He alao informed the CIUea thQt their reco endntions had been considered in the preparntion or further teats and that individual instructiono would follow approval by hiGher Quthority 1I 2 50 U p 1 An intentional omission from SACla l at of GUegoctcd actions wao dispersal In fact He3dquorterc SAC strongly rocommended against diapersnl durine the rcadineoc teat b cQu e it vould further reotrict crew scheduling nnd aggravato the problem of crev shortnaeo On 17 Octobor General Holloway cent the rolla ins analy sis of the problem to le JCs 25l A serious shortaao of aircrews c uoeD limitations in SAC's ability to fully implement urther rOQdin aG conditions either for th current teat or for an emergency Our read ncas plano are baaed on the requiremant to full generate and disperae the aircraft force and 0100 fl SEAQA ecause of the cre chortnca we do not hav that full cnpQbility In fact if we were to fully gcnernte the n1rcrcft torce todny there would be about oighty aircraft for Which there vould be no nircrew ava11nble at the 1me thQ lrQr tt became genera ted - ----- If we eenerate aircraft we should implemont dispersal but if we disperse wo reduce our abilit to cycl crews throueh airborne SEAOA ground alert and submarine reaction pOGture In on actual e ereency we would havQ to evaluate the situation and in some unita 3ke Q choice between flying SEAGA and implementing dispersal Alrr ost sirr ultnneouGly and ot the request of the JCS Headquarters SAC did forward a list of selected disporsal actions which would least s ffect the comr Jnd I fJ readineGs in case of an actual emergency 25 2 However the JCS did not puroue tho matter turther CU 'lSQtiGF ftN -Gp 1 Also on 17 Octobar tho JCS disseminated additional inotructions for the military readiness teat In order to prevent the 10SG of critical items of combat crew training the c i 6 g E C E1 UNClASSlfirU j'01 f'BfNTIAl TQ SECRET JCS Quthori ed soloctive f1yina tr inine for tho ook boe1nnine 18 Octobor 2'53 Hendquartero SAC imrne 1io toly not1fio 1 1to un1 to tha t limited and aolectivo flying training 0 0 authorized 1n 254 At C' bomber and to nker unita until the morning of 25 Oatober the sarno time the Air Staft requested SAC to lupport the refuoling roquirementa of TAC'a rQplnce ent pilot trn1n1nB 25S Or_ ISi U618M-QP 3 Another stD nd-down then follo lo 1 t 0800 local time on 25 October Specific instructiono for addit10nal SAC pa rticipation included t o of the Qctiono aUBsoDtod by SAC on 13 October First the JCS directed SAC to plnco Add1tional nircrQft in the highast ctata of maintenance reQ 11noDD vit cQPonl in conJuno lon 1th tho 25 Ootober atnnd-dovn Second tho JCS dirootod Q Sho of Force SEAQA opero tion 1th oo pona on the 2 6 _ Eialaon Eaot orbit only with an 'I-Hour of 26 1913Z Qctobor 1969 - Qp 1 On 23 Octobor Headquarters SAC prov1dod ito unlt3 C U' J with inatructionG for accomplishing AintenAnco Boneration All aircraft units excGpt thooe with primary functions or tr in1ng roconno iocGnce and reconnaissbr ce support 'ere di-rectod to gcnerato category Charlie and Foxtrot sorties for h1oh aircraft wore available Although nircraft vere to be fully EWO conf1gure C Q o vula hot be asoigned to the a1 ft Headqunrtcrs SAC did not eDtnbliS lspeCifiC timing but it directed completion of anerat1on by 0800 local tirr e on 25 October 257 Approxirr tQ1y 65 per cent of SAC non-alert SlOP o 1rcraft were Generated for the JCS teot 2 8 ej Op 1 Headquarte'r s SAC sir tul tancously furn1Dhoc1 planning 1nforrr ation for the SEAOA Show of Force operOot1on on the Eielson Eaot orblt 259 The B-52 unit assigned to that orbit wara the 22d and 92d Wings 260 The 22d possessed two bombOordmont aquo drons ' 30 UE total nnd the 92d ho d ono GO the operation lnvolvod six airborne alert Borties launching daily For the Sho of Force 0t tion fIrst launch times fot' these un1 ts ere a'ppro imn toly 20 hours after I-hour 26 l9l3Z October Therefore the airborne opernt10n actu-- -'-nIly b gnn on 27 October 261 This 'Was the ' first time nuclear veapona - I I I I I TOeB gEe ET 155 lJNCLASSIFlER p 0 I 1 c '1 c c - 1 I '- 1 I I I I I I SE RET were carried on airborne Alert sortiea Dina the - B-52 c ro ah ncQ 1' Thule An in January 1968 UJ ts lfeleMwOp 1 The rQlldinooo teat endGd almoat 0 0 abruptly as it bogan On 28 Ootober tho JOS directed tormination or the t ot and Q roturn to normAl oporntins otatUG at OOOlZ on 30 Ootobor 1969 262 Heo dquo rtora SAC notir1od ita unitQ 263 and Oen rQl Hollo lo y informed hio corr mnndera that he vao very pleaaed 'With tho excollent response and pertor Anoe or the aircrewl support pGraonnel atnffs and commandera throuGhout the current JCS directed readiness teat 264 UJ ZS i1CIORN-Qp 1 Shortly after termination the JCS requestad the c orr Bnders to comment on tha readiness teat- difficulties impact and benet1ts 265 In response Headquartera SAC co ented on the lack or intorrration ooncerning the objectives of the exerciae Probe lema encountered during execution otere minir -lGol The most aienifica n t impnct concerned tho problem of aircrew ehortaGeo As expreaaed by SAC the shortage of co r bnt cre ots reduces the flexibility ooo SAC Once enjoyed and this nt n time when we ara cenrching for additicnlll oPtions 266 There oimply otere not enough creve to upport force dispersnl or a full-scale SEAOA opernt1on he readiness te t 100 aggravated tnep'roblem becauae 01' the curtailment 01' in-unit training for non combnt-ready era ot replncements 267 Ttoininc nnd EValuation Un 1t I' 'O Evuluntlono u Throughout 1' -70 Hco dqua rtcro GAC continued to rely upon the operational readinosa inspection ORI syotem as an effectiVe meano of evaluatinG n taotical unit'o capability to accomplish its primnry misoion under realinticnlly Simulated combo t conditional 'Conducted by nn inopector 8onoral IO team from He dqunrters USAF Headquarters SAC or one of the numbered air force hend uarterD tho ORI otas deSigned to evaluate all operationo l aspects 01' a unit s otcnpon systema as otell as certain miscion support arena An operat10nnl readiness inspec tion test ORIT w as-that portion 01' the ORI - 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