MORI DocID TF- E i Sc CFtE_TAF Y 1482741 OF 0CFE1 4E E WASHING7011 D C 20301 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT SEP 2007 DATE a UCT 1969 BY 0664393 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam e tj ve Backd iround and Nature of Ob j At this stage of developments with Neogitations talks seemingly stalled in Paris with combat activity levels reduced in South Vietnam but with seemingly rising levels of discontent in the United States we should review the over-all situation and determine the course of action best calculated to achieve our objective there As you have stated our objective in South Vietnam is to achieve for the South Vietnamese people an opportunity to determine the political and economic institutions under which they will live Various Arrayed in alternatives to achieve thpt objective 'Eire possible terms of intensity -- and probably duration -- of U S involvement a A rapid U S there are at least four alternative concepts exodus under honorable conditions e g under the umbrella of a cease-fire b accelerated Vietnamization of all levels of activity in South Vietnam c pursuit of the currently programmed Vietnamiozation activity or d escalated U S military activity with an eye towards imposing decisively on North Vietnam's will and capability to pursue the war in South Vietnam This memorandum addresses the last alternative activity Cl i e that dealing with increased U S military Criteria and General Observations In-seeking our objective in South Vietnam we must be alert to some constraints We must for example act in a fashion which will Maintain the support of the American people WW CD 06 oCM v- W W070 Be within tolerable economic limits both for the U S and Soutb Vietnam i e not create undue inflationary or balance of payments pressures on the one hand or exorbitant and self-defeating controls on the other Not destroy the political economic and social 03 C E0 I ca M i W U3o- Cl fabric C 0 of South Vietnam and the other nations of Southeast Asia 4n GROUP--3 intorvals _ T alit 0 mati C J r C7 r '' COPY _ Sec DQf Conti rrxo 0 ' COPIXI Fl A Q ' ' P ee 0i P1 e- oy R- MORI DocID 1482741 t 2 Not disable us from honoring our commitments and protecting our security interests elsewhere in the world Not result in the alienation of our friends and allies elsewhere in the world and Not precipitate a wider more costly and even longer conflict The fundamental question is how to gain our objective within these controlling criteria Would escalated U S military activity do so A total military victory would require the destruction or ejection of NVN forces from South Vietnam and its immediate borders in Cambodia Laos and North Vietnam plus the reduction of VC forces to impotence This course has some rudimentary appeal A number of questions are raised however by the concept of military victory One question is whether the U S people would stand for the concomitant higher casualty levels on both sides A second question is whether the U S economy could sustain without sub- stantial readjustments the burden of increased resources for the war effort A third question assuming the increased military activity would spread throughout Southeast Asia is whether the damage levels inflicted especially in South Vietnam would preclude achievement of a viable South Vietnamese society A fourth question implicit in concentration on military victory concerns our ability to honor our other commitments to prevent alienating our friends and allies and to avoid creating a larger war with more and more dangerous adversaries The answers to most of the key questions involved in a concept of military victory dictate against pursuing such a course But such answers may be somewhat academic for the very reason you have already ruled out the pursuit of military victory The question then is whether there might be some form of escalated_U S military activity which short of military victory could act upon the North Vietnamese will and capability decisively enough to cause them to negotiate a settlement which would allow the U S to achieve its basic objective The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted a proposal to you which purports to achieve that purpose DECLASSIFIED NG-V 9 NOT Authority EQ 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 1482741 3 What the Concept Is The Joint Chiefs of Staff concept proposes a high-intensity air and naval campaign against North Vietnam While the details of the plan are still evolving the following dimensions are clear Surprise and concentration of effort in the Haiphong Hanoi area would be emphasized Phase I would involve those integrated modules designed to a neutralize the NVN air order-of-battle b close key NVN ports and r destroy other high value targets in the Hanoi Haiphong area Phase II would involve additional attack modules designed to a destroy NVN war-supporting facilities particularly again in the Hanoi Haiphong area and b interdict the Northeast rail line The Phase I concept would involve strikes on thirty 30 targets in the Hanoi Haiphong area and mining the approaches to the NVN ports of Haiphong Hon Gui Cam Pha Ben Thuy gong Hoi and Quang Khi More than 3500 sorties would be flown The Chiefs conclude the Phase 1 operations would have a strong psychological and military impact on the North Vietnamese leadership The Phase 11 concept would involve strikes on an added eight 8 targets in the Hanoi Haiphong area The Chiefs conclude the Phase 11 operations would contribute to a reduction of the enemy's ability to carry out its aggression against South Vietnam The Chiefs add however in a significant caveat that it must be_em hasi-r_ed that a significant reduction in the flow of material to their NUN forces in South Vietnam would require a sustained campaign over an extended period of time The implied JCS conclusion is that any decisive impact on the war in South Vietnam and the attainment of the basic U S ' objective there depends on a the North Vietnamese will being so affected by the initial strikes as to cause them to negotiate a favorable settlement to the U S or b the prosecution of a sus- tained and indefinite U S air and sea campaign against North Vietnam Both parts of that implied JCS conclusion involve significant uncertainties risks and costs CIA Evaluation of the JCS Concept The single most instructive evaluation of the type of concept proposed by the JCS is a Central Intelligence Agency CIA memorandum 9 2007 DECLASSIFIED NOV amended Authority E R 12955 as Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 1482741 T 4 written in Play 1968 and updated on October 7 1969 are as follows The CIA conclusions A Mining program would serve as an effective means of interdicting North Vietnam's normal seaborne commerce The disruption to this trade Would be widespread but temporary liven Communist China's cooperation Within a short period two to three months - North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative prrocedureshforo maintaining the flow of essential economic and miIita ry imports The North Vietnamese however could sustain the economy and the war effort at Rresent levels for several months solely by droawirt down present reserves and mainta jnj present in rts overland Shipment of goods from the USSR and Eastern Europe by overland routes would raise costs but constitute a small additional burden on Hanoi's Communist allies There seems _ in brief to be no way of overcoming Hanoi's ability to sustain a continuing_fIow of essen- tial material support from abroad to distribute these 92ods_internall and to forward them to its forces in South Vietnam except in the unlikely event of Chinese intransi once The existing capacities of the railroad y and river connections with Communist China --hiq sonic 16 000 tons a clay o-o- are more than twice the daily volume of North Vietnamese imports A mining-bombing program would carry with it significant liabilities The possibility of damage sinking or entrapment in port of foreign shipping is high This would present the USSR particularly with difficult decisions If and create new risks of a Soviet-US confrontation the mining were effective and forced a shift to alternate overland supply routes it would require more extensive cooperation and assistance on the part of the Chinese This conceivably could result in strengthening Chinese political influence in Hanoi It would also risk a confrontation between US and Red Chinese air and naval forces A mining pro ram would also evoke protest and critical_ reaction from Free World maritime states Almost all world powers would see the program as further intensifi- cation of the war even if the program were to follow a breakdown of the Paris negotiations NOV 1 9 2807 DECLASSIFIED Authority E0 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID z 5 if the negotiations were in process when the rm P-roo ram was started Hanoi would probably break off the talks However any such North Vietnamese decision would probably be based on the total war situation including the status of the fighting in the south and the success of the talks in undermining the position of the Saigon government Added Evaluation of the JCS Concept Plan The CIA evaluation which technically goes into detail to substantiate the conclusions stated above can be reinforced by ' analyzing the specific JCS Concept Plan now being presented The Chiefs' Plan for example is characterized by the following i U S losses in Phase I and Phase II are estimated by the Chiefs to be less than 3 percent of the sorties flown Even based on that loss percentage estimate losses on the first wave of attacks 3799 sorties over five full clays would be in excess of 100 aircraft Given the density of the NVN air defenses in that area and the conr urrency of the strikes i e the fact the NVN a i r order-of-battle is not to be cleared out before the other targets are attacked losses could be much higher Furthermore the loss of major US ships would have to be considered Civilian casualties in North Vietnam would be high Given the location of the targets in densely populated areas and the element of surprise to be utilized the civilian casualties would probably be substantial Charges would be made the U S is killing civilians indiscriminately At risk would be increased NVN attacks through the DMA and accentuated attacks on SVN populated areas While the NVA VC forces have not literally adhered to the November 1 1968 understanding in these areas the violations have been well below their capability The exposure of U S and GVN forces in northern I Corps could lead in particular to an early call by U S Commanders for ground reinforcements The military effectiveness of the plan is cast in doubt L the Task Group notes which have been provided from Saigon That Group indicated inter alia the following problem areas 1 DECLASSIFIED NOV 9 2007 Authority EQ 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS I 1482741 MORI DocID 1482741 6 The existence of sanctuary air bases in Red China This means an air threat could continue indefinitely possibly even with Red Chinese involvement Even with the mining plan NVN could accommodate by expanding their lightering facilities At present the enemy probably has sufficient supplies stockpiled in Cambodia to support his forces in 111 and IV Corps at 1967-68 operating rates for several months Therefore unless the resupply route through Cambodia were sealed the war in SVN could be continued Sealing off Cambodia would require Cambodian tacit agreement Blockade and mining are considered acts of war under- international law Et is not clear such -tacit agreement could be obtained There is an implication that substantially larger requests for both air naval and ground forces and requests for added o eratin9_authorlties would ensuF- Such forces and authorities would be involved in - Quarantining or blockading Cambodia - Flying B-52 raids into NVN - Making ground incursions into Cambodia Laos and NUN No reference is made to costs it is difficult to price out the JCS Concept Plan on the basis of the information provided But a rough estimate would put the incremental annual costs at anywhere from $1 0 billion to $5 0 billion The economic impact of such outlays is not addressed In addition to the implications in the Chiefs' Concept Plan as not constituted there are the following initial considerations If U S casualties should increase either in actions in NVN or resultant actions in SUN the U S public re- action could be devastating It would not suffice to say that in the long--run casualties will be reduced if they increase sharply in the short-run 1 9 DECLASSIFIED i9uV Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS I MORI DocID 1482741 7 Demonstrations would have to be expected both in the U S and at U S Embassies abroad This would be all the more probable without some NUN-provocation for the U S adoption of the Chiefs' Plan Alle ations would be made that the military had taken control in the U S The sum total of the considerations outlined above casts grave doubt on the validity and efficacy of the JCS Concept Plan The Chlefs add another note of doubt by taking note of the questionable weather in NVN during the winter months Their wariness is well taken In November 1966 we were'able to fly only an average of 242 sorties per day and in November 1967 only 239 sorties per day over NVN That is far below the 'sortie level indicated in the JCS Plan which calls for example for 797 sorties on the first full day of operations Succeeding winger months give equally poor flying weather over North Vietnam until about April But weather is a second-order question It is noteworthy the Chiefs while recommending the Plan be approved for continuing planning do not Indicate how the Plan would lead to conclusive or decisive results nor do the Chiefs Contend that the Plan would have decisive results Therefore the Plan would involve the U S in expanded costs and risks with no cleat- resultant military or political benefits Nov 1 9 2007 DECLASSIFIED Authority EC 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 1482741 I PRUNING KNIFE DECLASSIFIED AuthorityChiefic catt t tet sitlcamn Br r t ' ' NOV 1 9 207 amended Dec lass ds GROUP i EXclude tomatic dawnpjading and declass6c2linn MORI DocID WASHINGTON U C 1482742 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT DATE SEP 2007 20301 BY 0664393 JCSM-600-69 1 October 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject Air and Naval Opir alions Against North Vietnam 1 mss you requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff' have developed a concept plan for high i ntensity air and naval operations against North Vietnam Although detailed planning is not yet complete sufficient information is now available to provide you with an overview of the plan and initial c o mments concerning its implementation It should be noted that this report is based on preliminary information and includes some modifications by the Joint Chiefs of ' Staff to information which has been developed by a small planning team in the field Data contained herein will be subject to refi neraent as the plan is completed 2 # WThe concept plan which has been developed empha- sizes the use of surprise and concentration of effort to achieve maximum practicable psychological and military impact This plan is divided into two phases each of which includes various attack modules which are described in the Appendices hereto and each of approximately the same duration Phase I is an integrated package of three attack modules which when implemented as an entity will insure optimum initial effect Phase II consists of those modules which require an effort of greater duration and which will have an additional impact upon the enemy's will and ability to continue the war In preparing these plans note has been taken of the fact that the period from 1 November - 31 March is the period of the Northeast Monsoon It is characterized by low cloud cover over the target areas in North Vietnam Weather conditions suitable for offensive air operations in North Vietnam occur from a level of less than 50% in November to less than 10% in January and February See Appendix G for detailed analysis of NVM weather These weather conditions influence the choice of specific attack options particularly since a primary objective is to provide strong psychological shock to the enemy in the near-term 1 9 2007 DECLASSIFIED NOV Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS Urn r L c' llJ tip pct g ng za 5z Rrm C 11 MORI DocID 1482742 3 q tl Thase I operations consist of three integrated attack modules utilizing concentrated air and naval effort to be conducted on approximately five full strike days not necessarily consecutive See Appendix F for forces available forces required and damage effect criteria These modules are designed to neutralize the North Vietnamese Air Force close the ports through which North Vietnam receives the bulk of its war-supporting materials and destroy various high value economic and war supporting facilities in North Vietnam including initial interdiction efforts against the northeast rail line a Neutralization of the NVN Air Force Air strikes will be conducted against the NVN counter-air capa0i lity to insure the success of the strike effort These attacks will be designed to gain and maintain air superiority over North Vietnam Targets will include active NVN aLrfields aircraft and other air defenses including those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to the strike forces b Closure of NVN Ports Aerial mining operations will be conducted in the approaches to the NVN ports of Haiphong Hon Gai Cam Pha Ben Thuy Dong Hoi and Quang Yhe Where applicable these minefields will be fuzed to activate approximately 72 hours later thus permitting third-country shipping to exit the ports safely upon receipt of notification of the minefields Immediately following initiation of air operations against North Vietnam naval destroyers and cruisers will be deployed into NVN coastal waters to attack lucrative targets such as NVN coastal shipping waterborne logistic craft and transshipment points In addition armed reconnaissance naval gunfire and mine reseeding operations will be employed on a continuing basis to interdict lighterage operations and maintain the minefield c Destruction of High Value Targets Selected industrial installations power plants and communications facilities including marshalling yards and key bridges will be subjected to concentrated attack This module includes key governmental and military control centers and initial attacks against the northeast rail line 4 7 4 - hase I operations will have a severe psychological impact on the North Vietnamese government in that steps are taken to isolate it from outside support Further DECLASSIFIED NOV 9 2007 Authorit r EQ 12959 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS 2 I MORI DocID 1482742 a Destruction of the North Vietnamese air order of battle would have three interrelated functions It would provide maximum protection for the strike force significantly reducing combat losses which otherwise would be anticipated It is essential to the successful attainment of the military objectives associated with this plan Finally the attainment of aerial superiority over North Vietnam should have a strong psychological impact of -its own as the enemy realizes that he has been disarmed in this important self-defense capability b Effective closure of the NVN ports and initial interdiction of ' the northeast rail line would serve notice to the Hanoi leadership and its supporters that they can no longer count on the large quantities of war--supporting materials equipment and supplies which have been imported throughout the course of the conflict c Destruction of high value economic and war-supporting facilities and installations would represent to North Vietnam a significant loss in economic worth These facilities cannot be easily replaced under any conditions Their destruction in combination with the closure of the ports should provide a strong psychological shock to the Hanoi government The shock is further increased by the addition of certain high governmental command and control facilities to this module 5 f067'The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the employment of P-52s in selected areas would provide additional shock effect add to the total weight of effort and enhance roundthe-clock impact 6 A T Probable North Vietnamese and other communist military reactions to Phase I operations are under study 7 gf@srPhase II operations plan include additional attack reduce North Vietnam's military modules will have an additional as developed in the concept modules which will further These and economic resources impact on Hanoi's will and ability to carry on the war They will be executed as an integrated package subject to weather resources and other operational considerations DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 NBD7 Authority E012958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 1482742 a Destruction of War Supporting Facilities Air attacks will be conducted to destroy military logistic facilities supplies vehicles and equipment located primarily within the Hanoi-Haiphong area In addition armed air reconnaissance and naval gunfire attacks will also be conducted against coastal craft and port facilities This action will continue the isolation of North Vietnam from imports by sea b Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line Further - attacks wily be 'conducted to interdict the northeast rail line from Hanoi to Communist China This will complement the closure of the seaports and further impede the import _ R f war-supporting materiel into North Vietnam 8 Boldness of action surprise and mass attack are 741 1_ key elements of the concept plan both for shock effect and _ __ _ f_or _ultimate military' effectiveness If full surprise is achieved it will permit the early neutralization of the North Vietnamese counter-air capability and the rapid completion of attacks against the high value target list This will reduce losses and free aircraft for other tasks thus broadening US options for subsequent action With regard to initial offensive operations maximum _ ___ flexi bility must be _accorded the field commanders to choose the day time and sequence of the initial attack based on short range forecasts of target weather conditions 'The concept also emphasizes concentration of effort 9 _in order to achieve greater psychological impact increased long-term damage to the enemy and reduced friendly losses To this end maximum available force including the CVA presently dedicated to Korean contingencies will be employed for as long as it takes to achieve the desired results 10 IT 'A decision lead time of approximately 72-86 hours will be required depending on force location at the time in order to complete the preparatory actions necessary for initiation of Phase I operations 11 1-79 'The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a The Phase I operations outlined in this plan will have a strong psychological and military impact on the North Vietnamese leadership Essential to the attainment of this 9 2007 DECLASSIFIED NOV amended as Authority E012958 Chief Records Declass Div WHS i MORI DocID 1482742 objective is the gaining of air superiority over North Vietnam the effective closure of the major North Vietnamese ports and the initial interdiction of the northeast rail -line b Phase II operations will contribute to a reduction of the enemy's military and economic resources but it must be emphasized that a significant reduction in the flow of materiel to their forces in South Vietnam would require a sustained campaign Such a campaign is not envisioned in the concept of this plan at this stage The combination of Phase I and Phase II operations will achieve meaningful military as well as psychological impact by 1 reducing the availability of imported materiels into North Vietnam and 2 exacting attrition of North Vietnam's war-making capacity and its ability to support aggression in South Vietnam c The inability to predict operational weather on a long-term basis during the period of the Northeast Monsoon as well as the requirement to maximize the effectiveness of the attacks will necessitate delegation of latitude and flexibility to the operational commanders as to the actual timing and sequence of attacks d Certain Project 703 reductions will have an adverse impact on total force capability and some programming adjustments may be indicated However adequate forces can be made available to execute this plan 12 -4 ' ' The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this concept plan for high intensity air and naval operations against North Vietnam be approved for continuing planning It is further recommended that the knowledge of this plan be restricted to those with an absolute need to know For the Joint Chiefs of Staff 19 2007 DECLASSIFIED NOV amended as Authority Ed 12958 Div WHS Declass Records Chief T H MOORER Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 5 MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX A OUTLINE PLAN FOR ATTACKS AGAINST NVN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE AOB PHASE I PURPOSE To provide an outline plan to maximize the benefits of initial surprise by conducting attacks against the NVN AOB TARGETS Targets will include active NVN airfields aircraft air defenses including associated command and control facilities and those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to the strike forces BACKGROUND The bombing halt which commenced on 1 November 19has permitted North Vietnam to reconstitute and expand her air defense systems and facilities The NVN jet fighters currently based on six airfields and the located SA-2 missile firing positions are priority targets in this air campaign designed to gain and maintain air superiority over North Vietnam This would provide maximum protection for our strike forces as well as enhance effective execution of subsequent strikes against the key targets in other modules TASK ORGANIZATION US forces committed to Southeast Asia and contiguous waters are available for surprise attacks against the enemy AOB known SA-2 missile firing locations and other air defense systems The magnitude of the task requires full use of'all Seventh Air Force Task Force 77 and lst Marine Air Wing operationally capable aircraft against these targets CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS a Strike forces will begin at H-Hour with a coordinated attack exploiting the element of surprise on the six airfields and known active SA-2 missile firing sites A maximum effort will be maintained as weather permits in subsequent follow-on attacks to exploit the disruption and damage resulting from the initial surprise attack The six enemy airfields which will be targeted are DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 2087 Authority E R 12955 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS A-1 Appendix A MORI DocID 1482742 1 Hanoi Gia Lam 2 Phuc Yen 3 Kep 4 Hoa Lac 5 Haiphong Kien An 6 Yen Bai b The weight of effort to destroy the enemy AOB and SAM positions will require the use of all the tactical air resources that are suitable for employment in the Hanoi-Haiphong area TIMING Timing is critical in the execution of this module since it is the key to the implementation of Phase I The limited number of good weather days will require flexibility in the initiation of Phase I and once initiated a maximum sortie effort-in order to achieve the objectives DECLAMFIED I V 9 2007 Authority EC 129 as amen ed Chief Rec ds Declass Div WHS A-2 Appendix A MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX B OUTLINE PLAN FOR CLOSURE OF HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX BEN THUY QUANG KHE- AND DONG HOI PHASE I PURPOSE To provide an outline plan for the offensive aerial mining and destructor seeding of all deep water ports in NVN and-the air and naval gunfire interdiction of NVN coastal shipping and- small craft and port facilities These operations will deny maritime shipping access to port facilities and disrupt attempts to transship cargo by small craft and barges from deep water anchorages MINING PLAN TARGETS Haiphong Port Complex including Haiphong Hon Gai and Cam Pha and the supplemental mine fields at Vinh Quang Khe and Dong Hoi Annex 1 TASK ORGANIZATION a Mining Forces Option Number CVAs ALPHA One - One Large Deck Two 27-Cs ALPHA Two - Three 27-Cs BRAVO One - One Large Deck One 27-C BRAVO Two - Two 27-Cs - One Large Deck CHARLIE b Support Forces 1 Option ALPHA One and Two One ammunition ship --would be located in the Tonkin Gulfto transfer mines to the CVAs DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 2007 Authority 8012958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS B-1 Appendix B _ MORI DocID 1482742 2 Options BRAVO and CHARLIE Mines would be prepositioned on the CVAs No supporting AE required CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS a The plan is segmented into various options dependent upon the number of CVAs available and type of CVA large deck or 27-C class as shown under Task Organization Option ALPHA One is recommended for execution of this plan b There are a total of 15 mine fields destructor fields Nine are primarily deep water bottom mine fields five are pure destructor fields and one is a combined mine and destructor field c The following table shows the weight of effort Option ALPHA One Type Weapon Bottom Mine Number Weapons Mix Destructors MK-36 Number A C Sorties 154 30 604 58 MK-40 ALPHA Two Bottom Mine Mix Destructors MK-36 154 62 604 68 98 612 20 54 MK-40 BRAVO One Bottom'Mine Mix Destructors MK-36 MK-40 BRAVO Two Bottom Mine Mix Destructors MK-36 98 39 440 50 98 20 MK-40 CHARLIE Bottom Mine Mix Destructors MK-36 MK-40 394 29 d Option ALPHA One will require about'88 strike air- craft sorties from three CVAs to deliver 154 sea mines and 604 destructors The operation would be executed in two phases 1 Phase One - laying the sea mines and a portion of the destructors within two hours of initial launch time B-2 Appendix B Nov D ECL ASSIFID O 12958 as amended 1 - Authority Chief Records Declass Div WHS' MORI DocID 1482742 An arming delay of 72 hours on all sea mines is provided to allow third country shipping time to clear the NVN ports after announcement by the'US Government that the mine fields have been planted 2 Phase Two - seeding the remaining destructors in the channels which were left open for the exit of third nation shipping This would be done no sooner than 48 hours after the initial seeding in Phase One since destructors have only a 24-hour arming delay e This plan as a separate operation would effectively impair the logistic support that presently enters via Haiphong By itself-the mining operation would have a high psychological impact on North Vietnam leadership and the third countries now providing support to North Vietnam Further it would face the North Vietnamese with logistics problems of great magnitude in the development of alternative supply routes f The forces assigned to Commander Seventh Fleet are adequate to implement this plan When implementing this and associated plans Commander Seventh Fleet will be released from the CVA requirement in the Sea of Japan TIMING Option Reaction Time ALPHA One 86 ALPHA Two 86 BRAVO One 12 BRAVO Two 12 CHARLIE o 12 a The 86-hour reaction time is a worst case which assumes one of the three CVAs is located in Singapore If a prealert message is received and all three CVAs are in the Tonkin Gulf the reaction time for Option ALPHA would be 14 hours DEGLASSiFIE 1 9 NO Authority EQ 12955 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS B-3 Appendix B MORI DocID 1482742 b The 12-hour reaction time assumes that-the designated CVAs have been preloaded with required mines An early decision is required to load out designated CVAs WEATHER It is desired to execute this plan during daylight hours in weather conditions with a ceiling of at least 1 000 feet and with at least 5 NM visibility Because of the limited number of A-6 aircraft available only the main sea mine fields for Haiphong can be laid at night or in weather conditions less than the recommended minimums Weather predictions indicate that the required minimums will exist during 80 percent of the days from 1 November-31 December SUPPORTING ACTIONS Immediately following initiation of air operations against NVN naval destroyers and cruisers will be deployed into NVN coastal waters to attack lucrative targets such as NVN coastal shipping waterborne logistic craft and transshipment- points Armed reconnaissance and naval gunfire will be employed on a continuing basis to interdict any attempts to transship by NVN small craft from ships anchored outside minefields or from other ports DECLASSIFIED ' NOV 1 9 2007 Authority E R 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS _B-4 Appendix B MORI DocID 1482742 ANNEX 1 SUPPLEMENTAL MINE FIELDS TO APPENDIX B PURPOSE CONCEPT In order to reemphasize and to continue the US intent to enforce the seaborne logistic interdiction and harassment of North Vietnam three supplemental mine plans are provided here EXECUTION A single carrier 27-C or large deck can execute all of the included plans on one launch All-weather execution can be accomplished if A-6 aircraft are available MINE PLANS a Ben_Thuy Port Facility Song Ca River 1 The Song Ca is one of the major inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves the transshipment The mine field consists _ _ __ _ _ areas a ss Qciated with Vinh of 40 DST MARK 36 and 6 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the Song Ca River ' 2 Sortie requirements 3 Field dimensions Length - l-1 4 mile width - - variable to 2 700 feet depth - variable to 24 feet 'b Qua ng Khe Port Facility Song Giang River 1 The Song Giang is one of the major inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves not only the NVN southern panhandle but the Laos infiltration routes as well The mine field consists of 40 DST MARK 36 and 6 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the Song Giang River requirements _ 6 A-11 or 4 A-6 3 Field dimensions Length - 1 mile width variable to 2 600 feet ' depth - variable to 24 feet c Dong Hoi Port Facility Kien Giang River P 4 Jim B-1-1 Annex 1 to Appendix B DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 QOi7 Authority Eo 12958 as amender Chief Records Declass Div V'V'r MORI DocID 1482742 1 The Kien Giang is one of the major southern inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves the The mine field consists of 30 DST MARK 36 DMZ area land 4 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the river 2 Sortie requirements 3 Field dimensions 4 A-4 or 3 A-6 Length -- 1 1 miles width -- variable to 2 100 feet depth - variable to 16-feet DECLASSIFIED Authority E R 129 Xs WeNd Chief Records Declass Div WHS r B--1-2 Annex 1 to Appendix B MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX C OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST HIGH VALUE TARGETS PHASE I PURPOSE To provide an 'outline plan for the conduct of offensive air operations against high value targets in North Vietnam TARGETS a The following list contains high value economic and war supporting facilities to be attacked in Phase I 1 Hanoi TPP 2 Uong Bi TPP 3 Hanoi Transformer Station 4 Hanoi International Radcom Transmitter 5 Hanoi Telephone and Telegraph Office 6 Haiphong Cement Plant 7 Hanoi Machine and Tool 8 Hanoi Railroad Station and Classification Yards 9 Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge 10 Gia Lam Railroad Station Yard o 11 Yen Vien Railroad Yard 12 Hanoi Ministry of Defense 13 Hanoi Senior Party Training Center 14 Hanoi Air Force and Army Air Defense Commands C-1 DECLASSIFIED Appendix C NOV 19 #17 Authority ECG 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 15 1482742 Haiphong Warehouses and Docks 16 Xuan Mai Army Barracks and SA--2 Missile Storage beThis target -l ist is under continuous review and will updated as required Use of all Seventh Fleet 7th Air Force TASK ORGANIZATION aircraft which and lst Marine Air Wing operationally capable enemy AOB or the against attacks the in will not be utilized the mining operation Available strike forces will commence CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS targets cona concentrated attack against these high value and the AOB enemy the currently with the attacks against resources As operations I Phase mining of the ports in the to maintained be will attacks follow-on and weather permit initial the from resulting damage and exploit the disruption surprise attack TIMING A minimum of 72 hours notice would be required prior the to execution to ensure readiness of strike units for Phase I operations NOV 1 9 20 7 DECLASSIFIED as amended Authority EC i 295$ Declass Div WHS Chief Records C-2 Appendix C MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX D OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN WAR SUPPORT FACILITIES PHASE II PURPOSE - To provide an outline plan for the conduct of offensive air operations against NVN war support facilities to include attacks against selected coastal targets and waterborne logistics craft WBLC TARGETS Annex 1 The following targets comprise a listing of high impact war supporting targets a Haiphong Army Barracks and vehicles stored southeast of Haiphong _b Vehicle park at the Cat Bi Airfield e Haiphong POL storage and handling facilities d Haiphong Naval Shipyard l road hi_ghway bridge and__b y-pass f Haiphong southwest highway bridge g Haiphong south--southeast highway bridge h Kien Am bridge i Coastal shipping Combined Seventh Fleet 7th Air Force TASK ORGANIZATION and 1st Marine Air Wing assets which can be made available CONCEPT a The element of surprise will be lost after the first day of operation during which a maximum effort of sorties will be flown against NVN air capabilities and air defenses D-1 - Appendix D DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 227 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div VHS MORI DocID 1482742 The strikes against NVN war supporting facilities would be executed as directed following Phase I b Continuous armed reconnaissance will be conducted along the North Vietnamese Coast using both air and surface elements to complement the mining of Haiphong and insure isolation of North Vietnam from the sea TIMING Upon implementation of Phase II when resources weather and operational conditions permit DECLASSIFIED NOV 9 Zof17 Authority EQ 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS D-2 Appendix D MORI DocID 1482742 ANNEX 1 NAVAT RTTP PAnW nDVDnmornnTn NORTH VIETNAM PHASE II PURPOSE To provide an outline plan for naval surface ship interdiction of North Vietnamese waterborne logistics craft WBLC and destruction of selected military-and logistic targets'by'naval bombardment This operation'wlll ensure the effects of the mining of key ports and significantly degrade the ability of the North Vietnamese to use small craft to shuttle supplies to ships anchored outside the minefields or from other ports TARGETS North Vietnamese WBLCs operating along the inland -- __ _ _ ___and coas La1 waterways of North i et nam and -selected military and logistic targets in North Vietnam TASK ORGANIZATION 1 Cruiser 6 Destroyers CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS a For maximum effectiveness the operation should be continuous until the Vietnam War has been satisfactorily _concl uded however these operations will have a substant3a1 psychological and military impact -if -conducted over -oa short period of time and repeated at random intervals Not knowing when the United States might resume these attacks the North Vietnamese would be inhibited in their plans for coastal logistics operations b The forces listed under Task Organization would be supported with aircraft for spotting target identification 12 sorties per reconnaissance and day Combat Air Patrol Search and'Rescue forces Talos cruisers and PIRAZ ships C The potential threat to the naval gunfire ships are North Vietnamese aircraft PT boats and coastal artillery D-1-1 DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 2007 Authority E R 12958 as emended Chief Redords Declass Div WHS Annex 1 Appendix D MORI DocID 1482742 The risk of significant damage to US warships or spotter aircraft is relatively low The risk would be further minimized by conducting air strikes on the North Vietnamese air and naval bases d This pl an is militarily feasible and can be executed with forces assigned to Commander in Chief Pacific To provide the required number of ships it will be necessary to stand-down the present commitment in the Sea of Japan TF 71 Additionally if this operation continues over 30 days Seventh Fleet must be augmented by 10-12 destroyers and 'one 'cruiser e This interdiction plan can be conducted as a separate operation or integrated with other offensive operations to enhance the overall impact TIMING Reaction time for commencing these operations if no warning orders are issued would be approximately 24 hours after receipt of the execute directive _ WEATHER These operations can be conducted in all weather conditions however low ceilings'ahd reduced visibility would preclude air support for spotting reconnaissance and target identification DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 2'BD7 Authority E R 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS -o D-1-2 Anne x 1 Appendix D MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX E INTERDICTION OF THE NORTHEAST RAIL LINE PHASE II PURPOSE To provi e an outline plan for conducting major s rikes against the North Vietnamese northeast railroad and Highway lA 4 by-passes air TARGETS NVN northeast rail LOC and Highway IA and 4 by-passes BACKGROUND North Vietnam is completely reliant upon outside sources o supply to sustain her ability to conduct military operations in SEA The northeast rail LOC and the Highway 1A 4 by-passes which support and complement it is one of two major transportation arteries the Disruption of this critical artery in other being Haiphong conjunction with the closing of major ports will severely reduce imports and materially impair North Vietnam's capability to support both the North Vietnamese economy and operations in Southeast Asia TASK ORGANIZATION US forces committed to Southeast Asia and con iguou s waters Allocation of strike effort requires full use of all operationally capable aircraft of Seventh Air Force Task Force 77 and First Marine Air Wing CONCEPT Air attacks will commence with the implementation of Phase II The maximum available number of strike aircraft will attack rolling stock as well as create movement stoppages Attacks rail facilities to will continue until the required level of destruction is of NVN air and air defenses will accomplished Suppression be required for these strike waves Follow-on strikes will be conducted as necessary to prevent reconstruction or repair of facilities on the northeast rail LOC and highway by-passes and to impede traffic flow along the LOC TIMING With the implementation of Phase II and when resources wea her and op erati ona l considerations permit DECLASSIFIED NOV 19 N NI Authority E R 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS E-1 Appendix E MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX F SORTIE DATA PHASE I 1 Sorties Available a 7th AF - Thai Based SVN Based w tanker 214 123 augmentation 337 1st Marine Air Wing 60 60 Carrier Task Force 77 - 4 CVAs 400 400 Total 797 b Air Force sorties are based on a 1 0 sortie rate per possessed aircraft Marine sorties are based on estimated number of sorties which can be provided with organic KC-130 tanker support Navy sorties are computed on a basis of 100 sorties per aircraft carrier 63 A C X 1 6 sortie rate 2 Desired Damage Criteria used in computing sortie requirements a Bridges 85% probability of collapsing one span b Railroad Yards 12% damage 50% probability of achieving e POL storage power plants and communication facilities 50% probability of achieving 70% damage d Airfields 50% probability of achieving 30% damage to all structures 75% probability of achieving interdiction to the runways and 91% probability of damaging aircraft sufficiently to prevent takeoff F-1 - - Appendix F DECLASSIFIED mov 1 IMI Authority E R 1 29as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 1482742 e All other facilities 30% damage 50% probability of achieving 3 Estimated number of sorties required for Phase 'I AOB 1 822 Aerial Mining 120 High Value 19857 Total 3 799 4 Application of sorties by module and number of full days 12 000 feet and 5 miles required FULL DAY AOB STK SPT Mining High Value 1 2 3 356 396 326 248 204 292 STK 66 - 22 SPT 16 - 16 STK SPT 36 42 168 420 31 139' 338 33 377 273 797 1594 3188 3799 2391 5 Based on climatological data in Appendix G it is highly improbable that Phase I could be completed in five consecutive days during the Northeast Monsoon For example three consecutive days of favorable weather could be followed by four consecutive days of unfavorable weather before an additional period of favorable weather could be expected Statistically then the elapsed time required to complete Phase I would be at least nine calendar days and could be 21 days Sound operational planning should recognize that a break in sequence of operations will cause a loss of momentum thereby permitting reconstitution of defenses and will as a consequence require added sorties F-2 Appendix F DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 9 200d7 Authority E R 12958 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS MORI DocID 1482742 APPENDIX G WEATHER 1 Mean number of days with the occurre ce of a 6--hour period of ceiling visibility greater than 12 000 eet 5 miles between Q700 H and 1900 H daylight hours Haiphong ' - Tanoi -Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Auk Sep Oct Nov Dec 4 3 3 6 12 13 18 21 15 20 13 q 8 3 3 5 16 19 22 18 18 19 13 10 2 Mean duration of favorable days at the indicated locations _ - Haiphong Hanoi 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 2 3 3 5 3 33 3 2 3 Mean duration of unfavorable days atthe indicated locations --8 - 8 -5 10 4 2 3 2 4 3 12 Hanoi 6 9 10 7 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 DECLASSIFIED NOV 9 2007 Authority ECG 12959 as amended Chief Records Declass Div WHS G R l Appendix G                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    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