Approved For Release 2001 04l09 Confidential NOFORN Comments an Manufactu ng Technology and Design Features of Selected Soviet Militagx Equipment Confidential SR 77-10006 April 1977 Copy to Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved Release NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sunc um Clonlflud by 004836 Exampl fEmm on ul dociui lca on achoduit my amp on when Auioma zicful iip ind on Data Impcm bin to Dunrmim Approved For Release 2001 04 09 CIA-RDP79800457A0012000900014 25X1A Approved For Release 2001104l gpa NOFORN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence April 1977 Comments on Manufacturing Technology and Design Features of Selected Soviet Military Equipment Summary The Intelligence Community recently had the opportunity to examine several Soviet weapon systems In addition to detailed technical analyses of the wea pons by many elements of the Intelligence Community an analysis of the costs of producing the weapons in the US was Sponsored by the Office of Strategic Research 08R An important by-product of that effort is a compilation of comments by US weapons manufacturers and military weaw pons experts who inspected the Soviet equipment The comments are summarized in this paper The equipment included five major ground force weaw pons two aircraft and four surfaceuto air missile SAM systems Most had been manufactured since 1966 but the dates of initial production ranged from 1958 to 1970 All of the weapons which were examined are of types which are still widely used by the Soviet armed forces Two of the ground force BMP infantry combat vehicle and the antiaircraft gun are 25X1A Comments and queries regarding this ublication are welcome They maybe directed tom of the 1 1 aryw conomi lw 9515 Center ice 0 rategic Research code 143 exten sion 7116 or gray 8319 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2001 04l09 NOFORN representative of relatively complex land warfare systems which the Soviets have designed since the early sixties The other ground force systems and the two aircraft are of earlier less complex designs The four SAMs which were examined showed a general con tinuity in design characteristics over time Since the weapons constitute only a small sample of the systems which the Soviets have designed and manufactured since the late fifties the comments in this paper do not necessarily apply to Soviet military design and production practices in general Several re curring themes however can be gleaned from the remarks The Soviet systems unlike their US counter parts typically were designed to perform only one or two primary functions The design and manufacturing techniques of each weapon apparently have remained basically unchanged for the entire production period w Standardization of components was evident within a given system and among related systems we Except for the BMP the design of the weapons showed little concern for environmental effects Value engineeringuwminimizing production cost through hardware design apparently was not emphasized 2 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 NOFORN Preface The Intelligence Community recently examined several Soviet weapon systems wtwo aircraft four surface to air missile systems and five major items of ground force equipment Most had been manufactured since 1966r but the dates of initial production ranged from 1958 to 1970 Studies of the equipment were undertaken by the Intelligence Community to improve estimates of Soviet weapons performance The Office of Strategic Research 08R in addition viewed the oppor tunity for direct examination as a means to improve its estimates 25X1A of procurement costs for these weapons For this purpose a separate study of the available Soviet equipment was undertaken by OSR in conjunction with 25X1A 25X1A Office of Weapons Intelligence Directorate of Inte licence A byproduct of the cost analysis effort 111 25X1A was a compilation of comments by US weapons manu military weapons experts who inspected the equipment This paper summarizes their observations about Soviet manufacturing technology and weapons design Although the comments are not intelligence assessments based on detailed analysis they do provide important insights into the nature of the Soviet weapon systems which were examined This paper does not present detailed cost analyses of the sys 25X1A tems examined in The cost analyses are still in progress and have been presented in other publications 3 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 9mmp79800457 t0012000900014 Contents Procedure and Scope Exploitation Hardware Examined of Design Features Simplicity of Design Conservative Design Limited Design Modification Standardization of Components and Designs Little Attention to Cosmetics Lagging Deeign Technology Lagging Production Technology Manufacturing Methods Reliability of Equipment and Ease of Maintenance Supporting Comments Simplicity of Doeign Conservative Design Limited Design Modification Standardization of Components and Designs Little Attention to Cosmetics Lagging Design Technology Lagging Production Technology Manufacturing Methods Reliability of Equipment Ease of Maintenance Table Soviet Military Hardware Examined 5 CONFIDENTML Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Page 8-9 Approved For Release NOFORN E333 Annex Reference Guide to Soviet Military Hardware Examined 31 Aircraft Systems 31 Interceptor - I a a 31 Fitter A Fighter 32 Land Arms 33 Armored Personnel Carrier 33 BMP Combat Vehicle 34 Reconnaissance Vehicle 34 Th62 edit-11 Tank Antiaircraft Gun 36 Surfacewto Air Missiles 37 SAhz Mod Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 grocedure and Scepe 25X1A as initiated by the Economic na ysis en er of the Office of Strategic commented on design and manufacturing philosophy and techniques Many elements of the Us intelligence and industrial communities assisted in the project Exploitation from OSR representatives from US weapons manufacturing companies and weapons specialists from the US military were directly involved in examination of the hardware Cost exploitation teams were formed to examine and analyze each piece of hardware The exploita tion was conducted at military installations each item being examined for one or two days The teams prepared cost estimates and comments on the design features as well of the items Of particular interest were_characteristics reflecting standardization quality control and design concept The estimates and comments then were consolidated into intelligence handbooks for the use of in OSR's Military-Economic Analysis Center The information that follows was extracted from those handbooks Hardware Examined 25X1A involved the exploitation of two aircra t our sur ace o air missile SAM systems and five major items of ground force equipment Photographs and descriptive notes are provided in the Annex had been manufactured since 1966 and all are in current use 7 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 05 Soviet Military Hardware Examined Aircraft sttems Fishbed export airframe Avionics Spin Scan airborne intercept radar Communications equip- ment Data link Gunsight engine Fitter A SD-7 airframe Land Arms BTR-SOPB armored per sonnel carrier BMP infantry combat vehicle amphibious re connaissance vehicle Sagger missiles medium tank ONHDENWAL 25x18 Initial production deploxment 1968 1968 Unknown 1963 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1970 1970 1957 1961 1966 1966 1967 1967 1966 1966 1969 1969 1961 1962 8 Approved For Release Approved For Release Initial production gegloggent Landm yms Continued antiaircraft 1965 1965 gun Surface tOUAir Missigeg 1958 1959 Guideline missile 1958 1959 Mod 1 1960 1961 Goa missile Mod 1 1960 1961 Launcher 1960 1961 Guidance control van 1960 1961 Low Blow target 1960 l961 acquisition radar Gainful missile 1969 1970 seeker head Grail missile 1966 1967 Mod 0 25x18 9 Approved For Reiease GQ ExW Bomsmom2000900014 25X1A Approved For Release 2001 04 09 CONFIDENTIAL The systems and components that were available for examination are listed in the table on pages 8 and 9 Some systems were intact but on others were damaged or missing Except for the BMP infantry combat vehicle and the antiaircraft gun the systems in general do not have new design features and most lack the more advanced features characteristic of Soviet land warfare systems designed since the-early sixties The eye tems examined therefore do not represent current Soviet design technology Rather they reflect teohw noloqy that went into the design of several currently deployed systems wand only indirectly reveal technol- ogy that will be incorporated in future systems Assessment of Design Features The findings of the US weapons manufacturers and mili tary weapons experts who participated in are summarized in this section indiVi ua comments are compiled in the Supporting Comments section which follows The features of Soviet weapons design and technology discussed below were identified by the par ticipants as being common to most of the hardware ex amined Not all were found however in the BMP and the ZSU 23 4 the newest of the Soviet weapons examined These comments should not be interpreted as reflec- tions on the effectiveness of these weapon systems They pertain only to differences between US and Soviet weapon design and manufacturing technology Simplicity of Design The feature most frequently mentioned by project participants was design simplicity This attitude or Emgesign complexity of the BMP and and other new Soviet land arms are discussed in detail in Increased Complexity in Soviet Land Arms SR IR 75n15 September 1975 Secret No Foreign Dissem 10 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 philosophy toward product design allows Soviet manu facturers to use standardized components general pur pose machines and conventional assembly operations in the production of weapons- Even the was rela tively simple in actual hardware although it is con sidered innovative in the integration and optimization of components and complex in design concept Only the BMP incorporated new components whose features repre sented significant changes in weapons design An important design criteria therefore seemed to be that the weapon could be produced with existing manufacturing methods Existing manufacturing techw nolcgy is more of a constraint on weapons design in the USSR than in the US Conservative Design A dominant feature of most of the hardware ex amined was the conservative design except for the BMP combat vehicle and the gun system The designers tended to use proven technology or standard components and there was little apparent effort to strive for maximum system performance For example the and airframes as well as the launcher were judged to be bigger and heavier than required for their missions and bigger and heavier than the Us counterparts This practice minimizes potential hardware stress problems but results in sacrifices to performance characteristics such as payload range and speed Limited Design Modification The design reflected in nearly all the hardware examined has remained basically unchanged over long periods of time The and the SAM systems perhaps are most illustrative of this They were designed in the middle fifties and have been produced in several variants since the early sixties The design changes that were incorporated affected only specific systems components and did not reflect a gen eral weapon system redesign In the US design modim fications are made more often and are generally applied to all applicable components of a weapon system 11 Approved For Release 2001104109 Approved For Release 200110410 CONFIDENTIAL Standardization of Components and Standardization of components within a given sys tem and among related systems was evident The guidance and centrol van was a notable example All relays and oil filled capacitors were of three basic types and standardized magnetics vacuum tubes and diode rectifier networks were used Pneumatic actua tors on the surface tOHair missile and the airwtowair missile appeared to be similar Other parts such as clamps brackets and connectors appeared to be of common design and supply It was also evident that existing designs were used in new versions of weapon systems For ex ample the employs some used in earlier ground force antiaircraft artillery systems Little Attention to Cosmetics Highwquality or expensive manufacturing techniques generally were used only where absolutely necessary for system performance By US standards finishes were rough and tolerances were loose on many Soviet weapons components and parts This was especially true of and airframes and engines and the and missiles Lagging Design Technology Soviet design technology for all systems except the BMP combat vehicle was judged to lag that of the US This apparently reflected a true technology gap in certain cases while in others it probably resulted more from a preference for standardization and simplicity than from an inability to incorporate more advanced'technology The leg was particularly evident in electronics and less obvious in mechanical systems The evolutionary nature of design changes and a reluctance to introduce new production processes contribute to the technology lag gagging Production Technology The production techniques required to manufacture these weapons also are outdated by US standards For 12 Approved For Release Approved For Release the engine could have been produced using manu Manufacturing Methods The production techniques_used to fabricate these weapon systems reflects the fact that labor is cheaper relative to capital in the Soviet Union than in the US than plastic or heat shrinkable cable commonly used in Their comments are of interest and are reported on page 28 but are not sufficient for even tentative conclusions Supporting Comments Quotations from the US ex erte who examined the Soviet equipment in are detailed 25X1A below References 1 paren 8313 i entify the pieces of equipment Simplicitz of Design Adequate space was available for all the components of the system making it easily producible No unique manufacturing techniques were in evidence Conventional techniques were utilized throughout the product Consideration for cosmetic appeal appeared to be minimal missile 13 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Machining and tapering for weight reduction are not apparent as on an or leS No use of titanium in place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weight reduction and The machined components appear to be made from forgings or castings with machining limited to such applications as criti cal surface mating none for weight reduction Soviet design does not require threewdimensional or sculptured machining Alloy steel and aluminum no titanium is used for forgings and alumi num and magnesium are used for casting and Examination of the relative complexity and quality of the vehicle as compared to its US equivalent the medium tank indicates to us a lesser level of complexity as well as quality Specifically the vehicle lacks a range finder and has suspen sion powertrain and fire control of simpler less expensive design We have estimated that this vehicle on a per pound basis represents a 20 percent less costly vehicle The above generalizations can be applied to the system as a whole however elements of the system pressure vessels actuators etc reflected a well-developed specialized capabil ity possibly highly The modular makeup of the subject vehicle would permit the use of a large number of 'Spew cialty manufacturers with only the final assembly of the sus tainers being accomplished at an assembly facility The point to be made here is that this vehicle permits more latitude along these lines than any other the writer is aware of missile to simple and straightforward execution of design to permit an equally straightforward execution in prev duction missile The seeker is a functional wellwdesigned infrared seeker missile generally unsophisticated approach to design in considm eration of vibration and shock environment Although no evident failures appeared Although unsophisticated in approach to the problem the use of shock mounts on the equipment main frame at all appeared as a surprise improvement to us Studies by us of earlier vintage hardware had determined that all equipment was hard mounted to the aircraft frame radar Quality had been applied with more discretion discernment than any other in the writer s experience Where precision and care were required to assure function they were readily apparent 14 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001I04109 -1 and where not required little effort was expended This would indicate a very mature and realistic approach to the application and control of quality requirements An element that generally reflected a high level of quality at least visually were the welds Machined parts best demonstrated the overall philosophy Many were very crude by contemporary standards however they too reflected precision where required missile The chem milling of skins removal of metal by etching with an oblating chemical shows rough surfaces undercuts at edges and sharp corners none of which would pass US inspection The Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins a wing surface in which the outer skin and loadwbearing supports ribs are out out of one piece of metal have ribs that are parallel to each other do not follow percent 1ines are not high and thin and are not tapered in thickness Soviet riveting consists of nearly 100 percent driven bucked rivets a rivet that requires two operators for installation -one to hammer the rivet and another to hold the template that fastens it no blind fasteners any one of a number of fasterners such as screws that only require one operator to install are used Extensive use of alloy steel fasteners is made rather than Monel stainless or titanium fasteners There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum MIG 21 and 80 7 Conservative Design Machining chem milling and tapering for weight reduction are not apparent as on an or leS No use of titanium in place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weight reduction and 80w The machined components appear to be made from forgings or castings with machining limited to such applications as critical surface mating none for weight reduction Soviet design does not require threeudimensional or sculptured machining Alloy steel and aluminum no titanium are used for forgings and aluminum and magnesium are used for casting MIGM21 and Weight volume and technological advancement seem to be secondary to continued use of existing equipment communications A percent line is the rate at which the gap between the ribs in an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one edge of the wing to the other To cut the metal from a wing and leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophisti cated machinery than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs 15 Approved For Release 2001I04I09 Approved For Release The overall appearance of the hardware indicated that the major consideration in manufacturing was function with little or no consideration for cosmetic appeal Size and weight do not appear to be significant design criteria missile The Soviet design philosophy appears to be 1 a single purpose simplicity 2 acceptance of a heavier airframe and 3 shorter overall life in terms of environmental influences Good finishes and close tolerances are not the general rule but are very good in the areas where they are really required Corrosion protection such as exterior painting and plating are not equal to US standards SU-T It was observed that the design agency had been Very effec tive in its effort to achieve standardization in component selection and application As we mentioned above all relays were of three basic types and in addition oil filled capaci tors were of three general types of a similar degree of standard ization among magnetics vacuum tubes and diode rectifier net works In addition all chassis mechanical items connector blocks sheet metal and hold down hardware were standardized Offsetting the advantages of standardization however we ob- served numerous instances wherein the standardization effort resulted in either a weight or volume penalty This was espec ially true in certain of the chassis drawers where at times no more than 30 to 40 percent of the total volume was utilized This was apparently the direct result of utilizing standard sheet metal enclosures front panels chassis dimensions etc command and control van is a veritable fortreSSemheavy forgings and castings with all electronics encased in castings and further shielded by steel panels launcher Limited Design Modification Extensive inspection of every solder joint was indicated by a colorucoded varnish dot on each and every connection No changes re works or engineering improvements were indicated by the uniformity of the assembly and the untouched inspection marks radar There were no obvious signs of postnmanufactured change incorporation We term such changes ECPS Engineering Change Proposal and tend to continually update the performance of equipment in the field through modification of circuitry Such 16 Approved For Release Approved For Release modifications are usually obvious since wire types are different components are positioned in nonconforming places and new wires are added outside of original wire bundles The lack of such changes in this hardware indicates that the equipment design maturity is high that upgrading of performance is done by sub stituting completely new suite of equipment that changes are accomplished by rotating equipment back to the factory of origin for rather complete physical rework to incorporate functional changes or some combination of these considerations radar Standardization of Components and Designs Weight volume and technological advancement seem to be secondary to continued use of existing equipment communications It was observed that the design agency had been very effeCw tive in its effort to achieve standardization in component selec tion and application As we mentioned above all relays were of three basic types and in addition oil-filled capacitors were of three general types of a similar degree of standardization among magnetics vacuum tubes and diode rectifier networks In addition all chassis mechanical items connector blocks sheet metal and holdmdown hardware were standardized Offsetting the advantages of standardization however we observed numerous instances where in the standardization effort resulted in either a weight or volume penalty This Was especially true in certain of the chassis drawers where at times no more than 30 to 40 percent of the total volume was utilized This was apparently the direct result of utilizing standard sheet metal enclosures front panels chassis dimensions etc command and control van The writer had the opportunity to review parts of an air to air vehicle from the same builder In comparing the units it has been apparent that a sincere attempt was made to use common hardware across a group of vehicles The case in point revealed actuators pneumatic cylinders that were at least visually common to each vehicle Additionally hardware items clamps brackets connectors appeared to be common design and supply SAM2 and missiles Little Attention to Cosmetigg Adequate space was available for all the components of the system making it easily producible No unique manufacturing 17 Approved For Release Approved For Release techniques were in evidence Conventional techniques were utilized throughout the product Consideration for cosmetic appeal appeared to be minimal missile Quality had been applied with more discretion discernment than any other in the writer's experience Where precision and care were required to assure function they were readily apparent and where not required little effort Was expended This would indicate a very mature and realistic approach to the application and control of quality requirements An element that generally reflected a high level of quality at least visually were the welds Machined parts best demonstrated the overall philosophy Many were very crude by contemporary standards however they too reflected precision where required missile The chemwmilling of skins removal of metal by etching with an oblating chemical shows rough surfaces undercuts at edges and sharp corners none of which would pass US inspection The Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins a wing surface in which the outer skin and load bearing out out of one piece of metal have ribs that are parallel to each other do not follow percent lines are not high and thin and are not tapered in thickness Soviet riveting consists of nearly loo percent driven bucked rivets a rivet that requires two operators for installation one to hammer the rivet and another to hold the template that fastens it no blind fasteners any one of a number of fasteners such as screws that only require one operator to install are used Extensive use of alloy steel fasteners is made rather than Monel stainless or titanium fasteners There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum MIG 21 and The overall appearance of the hardware indicated that the major consideration in manufacturing was function with little or no consideration for cosmetic appeal Size and weight do not appear to be a significant design criteria missile The Soviet design philosophy appears to be 1 a single pur pose simplicity acceptance of a heavier airframe and 3 shorter overall life in terms of environmental influences Good finishes and close tolerances are not the general rule but are A percent line is the rate at which the gap between the ribs in an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one edge of the wing to the other To cut the metal from a wing and leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophisti- cated machinery than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs 18 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 i wsbb45m001200090001 1 Approved For Release 2001104109 very good in the areas where they are really required Corrosion protection such as exterior painting and plating are not equal to Us standards The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of workmanship especially the handwork involved in assembly and wiring The wiring is point to point That is each wire is routed and soldered into place individually All solder joints are of good quality and consistent and wires are evenly stripped and dressed No loose wire strands presume wire is stranded but no check was possible were evident Hardware was not burred during installation radar Machining operations drill punch mill etc are at an absolute minimum Welds are not dressed little or no attempt was made to remove burrs or flockings residue from a coating applied to keep stamping tools clean from stamping operations radar The gyro spin and gimbal bearings appear to be of good quality with regard to the balls and ball grooves Outside finishes are less than instrument bearing quality however giving the impression of a low grade hearing The poor coast- time characteristic of the gyro may be attributed to either an over-oiled condition or excessive preload She seeker head minimal use of anodize finish for corrosion protection however no sign of corrosion radar Lagging Design Technology This equipment with a few minor exceptions could have been designed by us in the 1950 l956 era and fabricated by us in the l952 1967 era radar Cost analysis study of a Soviet gunsight system reveals that the technology involved approximates that of similar US systems designed in the 1958 1960 period A US manufacturer designed a gunsight in 1958 that looked very much like the system It was manufactured in the 19603 gunsight Although the design is crude in some respects note the external push rods to actuate the roll control and the wire holding the booster fins in the folded position it is quite functional in all respects missile 19 Approved For Release 2001104109 Approved For Release heavy highwquality material and workmanship ZSU-23-4 guns turret and electronics The examiners were particularly impressed by the BMP com bat vehicle It shows a degree of sophistication of armored vehicles which the Soviets were not expected to possess The transmission and transfer case arrangement on the vehicle are excellent Seals to assure pressurization are superior to those in the US and it is equipped with automated CBR devices and a 73mm cannon loader that operates with an indexing ammunition basket which is unique and eliminates the need for a second gunner BMP System capabilities concept was quite ambitious for the early 1960s The technology represented is 15-20 years old relative to present state of the art guns turret and electronics The Soviet gunsight system was assembled with ex cellent workmanship particularly in the electronics area There was for example very careful tying of wire bundles indicating that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self aligning and show advanced design techniques considering the time of their manufacture gunsight The equipment and technology are estimated to be approx imately equivalent to our 1955m1960 vintage equipment communications An analysis of the hardware available for observation showed the manufacturing technology to be comparable to that experienced for us missiles produced in the early 19505 These missiles were an air hydraulic system with vacuum tube type of electronics SAHB missile The technology used is not equivalent to the 1970 American technology They have used mostly vacuum tube circuits with very little or no solid state circuitry There were no observ able printed circuit boards but rather mostly hard wire boards with discrete components This system is probably equivalent to a late 1950 or early 1960 American system radar It is a vacuum tube type radar employing no solid state technology Wiring is all by hand no formed cables were in 20 Approved For Release Approved For Release dicated The entire unit is labor intensive that is hand labor was used to an excess in lieu of mechanical automation machine or cost effective aid s in completing any operation Cables are obviously assembled by hande no crimping of wire connectors and laced extensively in fact it looks more like a good sewing stitch on the cable cover rather than a lacing job Cable relief points are manually tied within the wire bundles and each wire end is individually tied to prevent fraying No use of teflon or plastic to protect these wire ends was observed All of the above indicate a high use of manual labor rather than machines or other laborwsaving devices radar large flat rib stiffened casting appears die cast on the antenna of very thin section is pushing and may be beyond our state of the art From appearances it is not acid dipped for thinning It would be studying this in more depth with respect to alloy type and method of fabrication radar The general design period relative to US hardware would appear to be vintage 1942 through 1946 This equipment has a marked similarity to Us world War II equipment in the selec tion and application of components The command and control van is all vacuum tube carbon resistor with all chassis wir ing cabled and laced The only major departure from equipment of this approximate time frame 1942 l946 was the limited use of singlewsided printed circuit boards Such boards were rel atively simple in circuit layout and density and were rigidly mounted and hardwwired to the internal chassis cable command and control van and radar Examination of the relative complexity and quality of the vehicle as compared to its US equivalent the medium tank indicates to us a lesser level of complexity as well as quality Specifically the vehicle lacks a range finder and has suspension powertrain and fire control of simpler less expensive design we have estimated that this vehicle on a per pound basis represents a 20 percent less costly vehicle Tw62 generally unsophisticated approach to design in consid- eration of vibration and shock environment although no evident failures appeared Although unsophisticated in approach to the problem the use of shock mounts on the equipment main frame at all appeared as a surprise improvement to us Studies by us of earlier vintage hardware had determined that all equipment was hardwmounted to the aircraft frame MIG-21 radar 21 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 CIA-RDP79BOO457A0012000900014 CONFIDENTWAL Lagging Production Technology The chem milling of skins removal of metal by etching with an oblating chemical shows rough surfaces undercuts at edges and sharp corners none of which would pass US inspection The Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins a wing surface in which the outer skin and loadubearing supports mribs are out out of one piece of metal have ribs that are parallel to each other do not follow percent lines are not high and thin and are not tapered in thickness Soviet riveting consists of nearly lOprercent drivenebucked rivets a rivet that requires two operators for installation one to hammer the rivet and another to hold the template that fastens it no blind fasteners any one of a number of fasteners such as screws that only require one operator to install are used Extensive use of alloy steel fasteners is made rather than Monel stainless or titanium fasteners There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum MIG 21 and The machined components appear to be made from forgings or castings with machining limited to such applications as critical surface mating none for weight reduction Soviet design does not require threewdimensional or sculptured machining Alloy steel and aluminum no titanium are used for forgings and aluminum and magnesium are used for casting and Machining chem milling and tapering for weight reduction are not apparent titanium in place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weight reduction MIG-21 and The Soviet gunsight system was assembled with ex cellent workmanship particularly in the electronics area There was for example very careful tying of wire bundles indicating that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were selfw aligning and show advanced design techniques considering the time of their manufacture gunsight A percent line is the rate at which the gap between the ribs in an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one edge of the wing to the other To cut the metal from a wing and leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophistica- ted machinery than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs 22 Approved For Release 2001104109 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 heavy highwquality material and workmanship guns turret and electronics Cost analysis study of a Soviet gunsight system reveals that the technology involved approximates that of similar US systems designed in the l958 1960 period A US manufacturer designed a gunsight in 1958 that looked very much like the system It was manufactured in the 19603 gunsight This equipment with a few minor exceptions could have been designed by us in the 1950-1956 era and fabricated by us in the l952 1967 era radar The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of workmanship especially the handwork involved in assembly and wiring The wiring is point to point that is each wire is routed and soldered into place individually All solder joints are of good quality and consistent and wires are evenly stripped and dressed No loose wire strands presume wire is stranded but no check was possible were evident Hardware was not bur red during installation radar Materials used appeared consistent with those of the as did methods of fabrication and use of sheet metal tooling There was a lack of newer style plastics such as ABS nylon but other older types such as Micarta were in evidence radar Electrical components appear to be quite similar to American manufactured components Powdered iron or ferrite cupwcores like we use were in the ADF automatic direction finder electronics The use of double insulated hook up wire with a plastic inner jacket presumably for electrical protection and fabric outer sheath presumably for mechanical protection would indicate a lack of plastic insulation capability either in terms of formulation or production capacity since the technique used required more assembly time radar Radar equipment aside from antenna employs subminiature vacuum tube discrete component pointmtowpoint wiring technology no semiconductors of pwbs guns turret and elec tronics Components for the most part had the appearance of being direct copies from major Us suppliers An interesting 23 Approved For Release 2001 04109 Approved For Release observation was that many components were date stamped with the latest observed date being 196 Two items of component interest in comparison to hardware are the lack of carbon resistors the substitutes appear to be of ceramic composition and conversely the lack of ceramic disc capacitors most are tubular radar Adequate space was available for all the components of the system making it easily producible No unique manufacturing techniques were in evidence Conventional techniques were utilized throughout the product Consideration for cosmetic appeal appeared to be minimal missile minimal amount of special tooling and equipment required to produce Assuming the next vehicle produced in this facility facilities follows the same philosophy it would be reasonable to project a very low cost and speedy rew implementation missile No unique or unknown manufacturing techniques were in evidence Conventional machining and fabrication techniques appear to be utilized throughout the product missile Skills appeared to be commensurate with the requirement Critical components such as gyros showed greater refinement in manufacturing techniques and skills than was evident for circuit board assemblies machined surfaces and exterior finishes missile The vehicle represents a Soviet commitment to engineering and tooling for production not normally to be expected It also reflects a degree of craftmanship never before seen in Soviet produced equipmentwwa craftmanship which is not absolutely necessary incidentally surfaces finished which would not have to be put through the finishing produc- tion step BMP The manufacturing techniques employed were approximately equivalent to those utilized in the US in the late l950 early 1960 time frame These techniques are adequate for this design but could not be utilized for today's sOphisticated missile systems due to cost size and weight missile The hardware available for observation did not appear to show any excessively difficult manufacturing requirements The manufacturing technology employed appeared to be in line with the state of the art of the 19508 missile 24 Approved For Release Approved For Release The packaging design of the hardware requires the use of hand wiring techniques to a significant degree It has been estimated that fully 95 percent of all component and or circuit connections have been made by hand With respect to printed circuitry very little use has been made of this tech nology within the electronics boards while this approach is implemented to only a greater extent within the modules used within the control electronics The overall electronic packaging is reminiscent of techniques utilized in early Mod 24 Redeye and Sidewinder AIM-9B hardware missile Manufacturing quality is good and the internal design is equivalent to us technology of the early 19603 missile Protection plating coating or painting is at an abso- lute minimum Most individual chassis are raw aluminum In areas where the equipment is painted black no preparation of the surface before painting is made In a few areas com ponents were coated but no general attempt was made to en vironmentally protect this equipment MIG-21 radar The production methods techniques employed require the sequential performance of several small increments Operaw tions each one generally requiring the use of a specific piece of universal equipment and frequently only hand or power tools The associated skill levels required have been the semi skilled grades however a high level of dexterity along with a general commitment to performance by the labor elements would be required to assure uniform product quality There was virtually no evidence of the use of automated or highwrate production equipment in features where their use would be visually detectable conversely there was much evidence of manually controlled fabrication and assembly missile The construction of this seeker implies the existence of a facility which has a high quality accurate tooling specif- ically set up for this design The basic cleanliness of the interior of the seeker head further implies a controlled area for assembly and testing where the standards for contamination are very high She seeker head It was noted that electrical wire bundling was largely done manually and that no micro-miniaturization was evident also hydraulic piping and fittings used flared connectors with little evidence of welded connections It is concluded -that in both these areas the Soviets are using techniques a decade or so old by US standards and 26 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001IO4I09 CIA-RDP79800457A0012000900014 Approved For Release 2001104109 EW iWB bmsmom2000900014 This equipment is simple made to minimum standards in a plant with minimum sophistication and a large labor force radar In conclusion it is obvious that many more man hours of labor are being expended on fabrication and assembly compared to US practices There is little evidence that the Soviets are using automated fabrication techniques or advanced assembly methods and The processes used to produce the chassis were old estab lished methods and duplication would require no new or un usual equipment chassis Labor Intensive Manufacturing Methods Inspection was evidently detailed Each electrical con nection point including some that were not wired bore an inspection dye mark In addition to an obvious visual in spection this may also have included a chassis ring out check of circuits for continuity of completed wiring Each piece of hardware nut screw etc also bore a dye mark that probably doubled as an antivibration operation such as our applications of an earlier era is a red liquid chemical that was applied to connectors Upon contact with air it hardens and forms a seal that prevents the con nections from vibrating apart radar The Soviet MIG-21M gunsight system was assembled with ex cellent workmanship particularly in the electronics area There was for example very careful tying of wire bundles indicating that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self aligning and show advanced design techniques considering the time of their manufacture MIG-21 gunsight It is a vacuum tube type radar employing no solid state technology Wiring is all by hand no formed cables were in dicated The entire unit is labor intensive that is hand labor was used to an excess in lieu of mechanical automation machine or cost effective aidis in completing any operation Cables are obviously assembled by hand no crimping of wire connectorsw and laced extensively in fact it looks more like a good sewing stitch on the cable cover rather than a lacing job Cable relief points are manually tied within the wire 26 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001IO4I09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 bundles and each wire and is individually tied to prevent fraying No use of teflon or heat shrinkable plastic to pro tect these wire ends was observed All of the above indicate a high use of manual labor rather than machines or other labore saving devices radar Extensive inspection of every solder joint was indicated by a colorwcoded varnish dot on each and every connection No changes rewworks or engineering improvements were indicated by the uniformity of the assembly and the untouched inspection marks MIGwzl radar The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of workmanship especially the hand work involved in assembly and wiring The wiring is pointwto-point that is each wire is routed and soldered into place individually All solder joints are of good quality and consistent and wires are evenly strip ped and dressed No loose wire strands presume wire is stranw dad but no check was possible were evident Hardware was not burred during installation radar This equipment is simple made to minimum standards in a plant with minimum sophistication and a large labor force radar It was noted that electrical wire bundling was largely done manually and that no micro-miniaturization was evident Also hydraulic piping and fittings used flared connectors with little evidence of welded connections It is concluded that in both these areas the Soviets are using techniques a decade or so old by US standards and In conclusion it is obvious that many more man hours of labor are being expended on fabrication and assembly compared to US practices There is little evidence that the Soviets are using automated fabrication techniques or advanced assem bly methods MIG-21 and 50 7 The printed circuit assembly appeared to be hand soldered with the body of the components held up off of the board during assembly communications lack of large plastic sleeving was apparent The sub stitutes for this lack were protective covers on main cables and the use of hand whipping a tight binding that prevents cable unraveling with string on cable and wire ends radar 27 Approved For Release 2001104109 Approved For Release 20011046 1 The equipment is assembly labor intensive as opposed to utilizing technological advancement to reduce labor communications The packaging design of the hardware requires the use of hand wiring techniques to a significant degree It has been estimated that fully 95 percent of all component and or circuit connections have been made by hand With respect to printed circuitry very little use has been made of this techw nology within the electronics boards while this approach is implemented to only a greater extent within the modules used within the control electronics The overall electronic packaging is reminiscent of techniques utilized in early Mod 24 Redeye and Sidewinder RIM-9B hardware missile Judging from the number of hand soldered connections in the seeker head alone a great deal of time and well thought out planning is required to assemble the hardware and avoid errors seeker head Reliability of Equipment The team was impressed by the total number of control rem lays in the van electronics By actual count 489 relays are utilized including snap cover telephone type hermetically sealed and miniature From the standpoint of reliability this would appear to be a potentially troublesome area command and control van radar The team was equally amazed at the total number of adjust ment potentiometers these allow for screwdriver adjustment to vary the electrical current in a circuit within the system By actual count 776 potentiometers are used throughout and this again should have an additional effect upon system reli ability 3 command and control van radar The forced-air rack cooling system would appear to be inn adequate on several counts namely volume of air handled vs rack dissipation within the van enclosure Even in the somew what mild environment the rack temperature appeared to be very high after a short period of operation command and control van 28 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001104l09 Approved For Release The seeker apparently has low sensitivity in terms of state of the art in CW continuouSHWavel seekers This may be deliber ate in design It is simpler and less expensive to produce target seekers with lower sensitivities which in turn will not undergo as much receiver degradation when committed to field conditions Thus missiles are in a higher state of readiness and will require less field maintenance and read justment seeker The mechanical characteristics of the resistors in use however are certainly less than desirable from a stress stand point When soldered in place these devices can be fairly easily broken with only slight excessive handling of the hard ware missile Ease of Maintenance corollary observation concerns field maintenance Al though estimates of field reliability are beyond the scope of our observations other than to note that this specific suit of hardware bore no signs of field repairs the difficulty of field troubleshooting and repair is inherently obvious As previously mentioned the packed layered construction renders the replacement of parts other than many of the tubes difficult Also there are no service loops in the harness wiring or in the component leads In terms of troubleshooting and fault isolation it would appear that relatively highly skilled technicians are required Presumably there is some kind of special field test equipment to provide assistance in isolating faults to the black box level and possibly some additional equipment to troubleshoot each black box at an intermediate or depot level There are some test points on the front panels of the black boxes But designed in help to the field users practically stops there Wires are not indi vidually marked or even basically color coded to indicate that they carry power signals etc Chassis are minimally marked to indicate the specific component in the circuit that is mounted at that position Although the pins are individually numbered on each terminal board the boards themselves are not individually identified and the individual terminals on large Ihis includes any equipment aid to the field maintenance tech nician such as built in terminals provided exclusively for check ing circuit continuity color coded wiring for easy tracing and identification marks on terminals Later Us equipment has com puter program tapes which when run through a piece of equipment will isolate trouble spots 29 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2001104109 1 components are not identified All of this means that highly experienced electronics technicians working from a combination of schematics wire tabs and pictures or drawings and using basic laboratory test equipment are probably needed to service the hardware radar The packaging concept used does render field changes diffiw cult at best The hardware is densely packaged built in layers and all hard wired There are no replaceable plugwin units that could be easily replaced in the field by improved versions except at the complete black box level MIG-21 radar These features indicate that the first equipment maintenance level is module replacement communications The maintenance of the vehicle can be readily accomplished assuming the availability of a cadre of trained not highly skilled technicians Most elements of the vehicle are easily replaced adjusted and in some cases field repaired Shuz missile Each unit front panel provided numerous test points available to the technician It would appear that all adjustment and trouble shooting was performed by means of the numerous blownufuse indican tors and the several hundred test points as provided The equip ment does not feature a self check capability or anything that would assist in rapid isolation and identification of faulty circuitry command and control van The graduation level electronic packaging design does not lend itself either physically or economically to any series re- work as any efforts to carry out repair work might well create more problems than they could solve control package Should an error or component failure occur the gyro or seeker head is probably discarded because the design does not lend itself to rework or repair seeker head 30 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001104 09 Annex Reference Guide to Soviet Military Hardware Examined manufactured in either the a ies or ear seventies Except for the 8MP infantry combat vehicle and the antiaircraft gun however their basic designs date back to the fifties and early sixties Despite their apparent lack of sophistication signifi cant numbers of the systems are still used by Soviet and Sovietwsupported military forces Aircraft Systems Interceptor The MIG Zle an export version of the Soviet Fishbedijwis primarily an allwweather medium temhigh altitude interceptor with a secondary role of ground support It is capable of Mach 2 0 flight The is similar to the Fishbed except that it is equipped with the older Spin Scan airborne intercept AI radar The Fishbed is equipped with the new Jay Bird AI radar which gives it a better low-altitude intercept capability than the export version The represents a further development of the Fishbed series aircraft initially designed in 1952 by 31 Approved For Release 2001I04I09 Approved For Release the Mikoyan Design Bureau The principal changes are an improved engine and weapons system The aircraft is equipped with the engine which has a maximum engine thrust estimated at 64 500 newtons 14 500 pounds This engine is a direct derivation of the RllF 300 after burning turbojet engine used on some earlier Fishbed models The most significant weapons changes made in the were the internal installation of a 23mm twinwbarrel cannon and the addition of two more wing stations which enables the aircraft to carry four instead of two air to air missiles There is some evidence that a later version of the Fishbed series the Fishbed export has replaced the on the production line and is currently being fielded However the remains the mainstay of the non Soviet Warsaw Pact air forces as well as the air forces of Egypt and Syria fitter A Fighter The 80 Fitter A is the first of three variants of a mediumeweight sweptwing super sonic fighter designed in the early fifties by the Sukhoy Design Bureau Its primary mission is ground support and interdiction but it also has limited capaw bility as a clear weather interceptor Series production of the Fitter A began in about 1957 and the fighter is estimated to have become operational in 3961 When fielded it was equipped with an turbojet engine Its armament consisted Approved For Release 2001104109 Approved For Release of one gun in each wing and a maximum payload of 2 000 kilograms 4 400 pounds Fitter and aircraft later variants of the Fitter produced in the late sixties and early seventies- have variable geometry wings and were modified with an uprated engine avionics and in- creased payload The Fitter A is being replaced_by Fitter and Flogger aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation but there are still some 400 with Soviet units and about 100 with other Warsaw Pact air forces Land Arms BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carrier AFC The 60PB is an amphibious eight wheelwdrive APC It can carry 10 troops and is powered by twin gaSMfueled engines For amphibious operation the vehicle uses a hydrojet propulsion system similar to that found on previous Soviet APCs The BTRH60PB has two machine guns in a small turret and is equipped with overhead armor It entered pro duction in 1966 and is based on the an earlier version that lacked the turret and overhead armor An intermediate version the BTRH60PK had overhead armor but no turret Currently both the and the newer BMP are replacing older APCS in Soviet units The Soviets 33 Approved For Release 2001104109 25X1A Approved For Release probably will continue to produce the and field it throughout their forces in conjunction with the BMP BMP Combat Vehicle The BMP tracked infantry combat vehicle entered service in 1967 Unlike most systems examined the BMP in corporates many a vance eSign The vehicle is similar to the earlier wheeled and tracked APCs in its ability to carry troops but is not limited to this role It is armed with a 73mm smoothw bore gun and the Sagger antitank guided missile older versions of this vehicle were armed only with heavy machine guns In addition the gun system on the BMP unlike those of older Soviet armored vehicles is fed by an automatic loader Other features of the BMP include a central ventiw lation system that provides protection for passengers and crew in a CBR environment provision for venting the fumes from small arms that can be fired from inside the vehicle when it is closed and improved armor engine and track Only the BMP's amphibious prepulsion system is less sophisticated than that of older vehicles The vehicle moves by spinning its tracks while some older vehicles have a hydrojet propulsion system Reconnaissance Vehicle The armored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle first fielded in 1966 is based on a BRDM vehicle produced in the early sixties The was initially armed with two ma chine guns mounted in a small turret but in 1969 was modified to carrv six Sagger antitank guided missiles 34 Approved For Release Approved For Release mounted on a retractable pylon Like earlier versions of the these modified vehicles have fourwwheel drive weigh about 6 800 kilograms 15 000 pOunds and have a top speed of around 95 60 mph They also have four auxiliary wheels for added mobility in poor terrain The has also been modified to serve as a transporter ereotor launcher TEL for the SA-9 surface-towair missile Medium Tank The T-62 medium tank first fielded with Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in 1962 is a 36 000 kilogram 40mton vehicle armed with a smoothbore gun - The tank's gun is the only major improvement over the Tm62's predecessor the which was first produced in 1959 The uses the same engine transmission track and suspension system as the THEE 35 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Reiease 2001 04 09 CIA-RDP79800457A0012000900014 Approved For Release The Soviets began fielding a new medium tank with their ground force units in the early seventies This tankw-the T 72 mincorporates significant improvements over the Tw62 and has been replacing older T-54 and THSS tanks in Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions Nevertheless it appears that the Tw62 will remain in the active inventory for some time Antiaircraft Gun The is a tracked tactical antiaircraft system for defense of combat units against low flying aircraft and helicopters The weapon was first produced in 1965 The most significant advan tage of this gun system over older weapons is the ad dition of an acquisition and tracking radar and a computerized fire control system The fire control system has an analog computer that automatically aims the four 23mm gun barrels and an indicator that enables the system to distinguish between a moving target and background clutter Four are in use in each Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiment These weapons together with the SAM system are replacing the older selprropelled air defense guns in tank regiments and the towed light antiaircraft guns in motorized rifle units 36 Approved For Release Approved For Release Surface to Air Missiles The is a commandwguided SAM system designed to provide defense against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes The original version of this weapon entered the Soviet inventory in 1958 A modified version- the SA-Z Mod l was fielded in 1959 with an improved fire control radar the Fan Song B Since 1959 modifications have been made to improve the low altitude intercept and electronic counter-countermeasures capabilities Although the system is old and is gradually being phased out and replaced by newer systems it is still widely used by Soviet strategic and tactical air defense forces SAHB Mod 1 The is a commandwguided trans portable SAM system designed to provide point and barrier defense against aircraft flying at low altitudes 37 CONFIDENTIAL ApprOVEd For Release 2001104109 Approved For Release 2001I04109 SAJ misxile in launch tube with firing mechanism and battery attached 38 Approved For Release 2001I04I09 CIA-RDP79800457A0012000900014 Approved For Release 2001104109 The system is primarily used to defend fixed tar gets It was initially given to Soviet units in 1961 Modifications to the SA-B have improved the low-altitude intercept and refire capabilities of the system The is a mobile shorterange SAM system intended to provide Soviet field forces with defense against highwperformance aircraft at low and medium altitudes A prototype of this weapon was first seen in the 1967 Moscow parade but it was not fielded until 1970 The system consists of three missiles on a TEL and associated acquisition and fire control radars mounted on separate tracked vehicles The is a man-portable shouldermlaunched infrared guided SAM system developed for tactical defense against subsonic fixedwwing and rotary-wing aircraft flying at low altitudes The original version of this weapon entered the Soviet inventory in 1967 it is similar to the US Redeye A later versionw the Mod l -was first observed with Soviet forces in 1972 This version has improved range and altitude capabilities The Soviets are currently replacing the two rail launcher at some sites with a newer fourwrail launcher This doubles the number of ready missiles for firing from 8 to 16 39 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001 04 09 Approved For Release 2001 04 09 CIA Confidential Confidential Approved For Release 2001 04 09                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu