Ca outcome numm De M tme mmohm aplonrramo ed 1713 FIEMH was - Transferred to IMIISIFPC SENT TolAmembassy LOLDON PRIORITY 5245 g with RPT Amembassy OSLO I TOSEC 24 commued a - - ZE ZE Z-sl sg iio EYES FOR THE AMBASSADOR Date Bl za You are requested to deliver the following message to Re gain-1m Minister from the President 0 Ears May a 1961 Mr Prime' inister I I am most grateful for yo'irr thoughtful and helpful letter I of April 28 and the memorandum attached thereto I may shortly end you my thoughts on the several issues which these papers raise There is one question however which WW Mascaras wuss Only Citati n3 Isis- e as I would like to clarify now After careful review of the problem I have come to 1 the conclusion that it would be undesirable to assist France's IN PART I DECLASSIFY Responslva Into efforts to create a nuclear weapons capability I am most gamious that no erroneous impressions get abroad regarding future U S policy in this respect lest they create unwarranted i DELETE Non I 5 iaxmss I 1 French expectations and serious divisions in NATO we were to help France acquire a nuclear mapo Imus-mud Win EUR IBWhite sj 5 9 61 mm EUR - Mr White Mu 4r MLWEW Eattms g l u umuosCLAsin-Y Ca 5 Only 1 FROM THIS - s I- I PEN I El-32 7 so Ll ntlo sw m com snowmen UNLESS uncussmso Dohsive Info 0 xem to Tera-1 Sort coagf - z Carogram at least in the this could not fail to have a major effect on German increased Page 20f telegram tow attitudes The fact that the Germans are not now tempted to join or imitate the French program is due in no small part to 0 3 Opposition to country programs and to the uncertain prospects of the French or any other program in the absence of 0 8 aid If we were now to provide aid to France and thus signify a major reversal in our opposition to country programs the likelihood that the Germans would eventually wish to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would be significantly z Any such German intent uould of course shake RAID to its foundation - not to mention the other serious dangers attendant on proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities The damaging effect of stirring up German interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability would not I believe be offset by a French agreement to consult about use of-French nuclear forces or to commit these forces to RAID in return for our ei - l-believc _efora that we should try to respond to some of 1 the'concerna underlying the French program inatead of helping that program This may tend to reduce the pressures behind the french run Ie uibi strengaben re ner than pbassy LONDON In - fr I Pinyin telegrsm_to__ exam I I I weaken the Chancellor in resisting any pressures in Germany to create a nuclear weapons capability And it will enhance rather than under- mine the cohesion of the Alliance as whole An effort to respond to' underlying French concerns might involve such steps as i - I I l Guaranteeing that the 11 8 will continue to maintain an 2 Sharing information about the extent of that capability the number and the power of the weapons which comprise it in greater degree with our allies particularly the French I i effective nuclear capability in NATO EurOpe for the life of the Treaty 1 3 giving our allies an opportunity to share in the control of this capability to the degree consistent with its military effective- ness The French might be invited to take the lead with our allies in d vising specific prOposals-to this end Such proposals might eventually lead to North Atlantic Comcil agreement both on guidelines concerning use of these weapons and on a political method for concerting about that use in an emergency 4 Committing more 11 8 and 0 x nuclear forces in NATO Europe to NATO command We have in mind emitting a number of 11 8 polaris submarines to NATO I hope that as we do you will be able to give serious consideration to comitting strategia nucgl i'r fforces in -av - 1u as an H ak dumkm i ainmmuc h C Hm ammun sun's-L 4 of Amembassy LONDON the 11 x to NATO I welcome the indication in your memorandum that you increasingly view the British nuclear capability as being designed to make a contribution to the Western deterrent as a whole 5 Giving the French more explicit and high-level assurances such as we have given you concerning the 11 3 intent to consult if tim permits about use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world 6 Perhaps most impertant of all Intimate political consultation with the French consistent with the rights and interests of our other allies in order to make clear our desire to secure French participation the formlation of global policy As you know one of the arguments sometimes given for the bench nuclear program is that only thus can France secure a voice in framing worldwide policies I realize that these measures will not dissuade General de Gaulle from pressing his nuclear program But I am hopeful that they will diminish at least in the post-de Gaulle period the vigor with which France prosecutes that program In the meantime measures such as these will permit us to develop a useful close and constructive partnership with France-in other vital respects and they will offer the best chance of maintaining NATO cohesion over the long- term 1 may send you further thoughts on the useful and interesting C ropoaals in your letter gain Tact ca teal-11 you how' grateful 1 age r m 1 flee Loudest for your vise counse1 Sincernly yours The Right Honorable Hardld Macmillan Primmninter RUWLEF Iandan England UHQTE Original being pouchld - 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