MINISTRY OF DEFENCE on rams test-Io TEE sis VISIT To LII-urea soreness 1962 Isrss or TALES NUGLEAR PROBLEMS IN EUROPE The President invited the Minister of Dofence to him on September on a visit to the Redctone Laboratories at Huntsville Alabama and to Cape Canaveral in Florida As soon as the 'plane left Washington the Secretary of Defense invited Mr Thorneycroft to outline to the President the British attitude towards French nuclear planning and French German collaboration in the nuclear field 2 hr Thorneycroft thought it was premature to come to any har and fast conclusions about these is use till the outcome of forecast more clearly Meanwhile the fact Lad to be ac opted that France Ens developing a nuclear catacity he are inclined to discount the reports of German ambitions in this direction or of Franco Gennan collaborEJion in this field 3 the Common Harket discussions could 3 The Presid-nt and Mr thamara were resentful and distrustful of both French and German intentions The President said that if the Germans embarked on work in the nuclear sphere which constituted a breach of the 1954 agreement the United States would have to reconsider her own guarantees to station forces in Europe They might even have to haul out Mr McNamara did not consider that it Would be a sufficient safeguard to apply the existing British pattern to France In the case of Britain independent political control coupled with integrated targeting was tolerable to the United States because of basic identity of political outlook and aims and because we understood each other well These could not be tthen for granted by the United States in the case of France 4 The inmediate question for decision one how to respond to Dr Stihker's recent proposals for discussion of nuclear policy within HATO Both sides agreed t at there was anger in these propose and that it Was premature to consider discussion of the strategical and political issues involved Both agreed however that there LES advantage in continuing to educate the IATO Nuclear Committee about the nature and effects of nuclear weapons Mr McNamara remarking that whilst it might have been arguable then the West had had a monopoly TOP SECRET of tactical nuclear weapons that they could be regarded as a substitute for manpower this was no longer valid The Soviets knew how they would respond to Western use of tactical nuclear weapons and they knew how the Americans would appraise that response Dr Adenaucr did not He was looking to the deterrent value of tacticul nucleara not to the fighting 24d operational implicttions 5 The question of M R B M s for HATD was discussed Mr McNamara suggested that there might be a cute for an ad hoc group apart from the NATO Council to discuss the military and technical implications of a thO h R B h force whilst Mr Thorneycroft drew attention to the weakness of the ass for a KATD h R b h force on both military and political grounds as well as the practical and financial difliculties 6 Hr McNamara said that they were developing a new medium range missile which could he launched from the from under the sea or from land The United Statis Joint Chief of Staff had been given definite instructions there was no military advantage in having both a new American force cguipped with this new missile and also EATO force a choice must therefore be made between one or the other politically there might be astntuge in setting up a NATO M E 3 M fore in preference to a new American force there would also be financial advantage for the United States if the new missile were used in this way as the costs would then hove to he shared he agreed that from the purely military point of view the case was weak and that the possibility suggested would not add to the military strength of KATC Politically however there might be a case for a HATO system on the grounds thotit might satisfy some pressures in NATO prompted not only by motives of preStige but by a desire to have a safeguard against the remote risk of America standing aside On the other hand a NATO system which met this demand would have to he a system free from hmorioan vote and a Europewi without n1 Annrican veto might well give rise to different but serious risks in other directions 8 Mr McNamara had serious doubts about the wisdom of a separate IATO nuclear command system to control all nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO ground forces He thought this would have very bad effects on the morale of army Commanders and their troops as they might lack confidence in the weapons being available for use when required if they were under separate command 9 He took a poor View of NATO strategy which he described as airy fairy and irresponsible from the beginning The three elements of policy forces and resources had to be considered together Otherwise a resultant strategy was apt to be nonsense HLTD had never considered all three together This was one of the many things wrong with NATO and it had to TOP SECRET TOP SECRET he put right 10 Apart from this discussion in tho Prcsidcnt's at which Mr Paul Hitzo and Sir Robort Scott wore also proscnt tho of a EurochI nucloor force was brought up at a 1n tho Stste on 13th Sectombsr given by hr Boston for Mr A rocord of this has boon prepared by H H Embassy in Washington Thoro was a discrepancy the cautious approach of tho Prcsidont and Mr McNamara tho views put forward by tho who cnviscgod Eurc oan nuclosr force system of American control MINISTRY OF DEFENCE S W 19th September 1962 TOP SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu