DECLASSIFIED A ' ' MULTKI 'UTIE w aT NT a IIIIrc O CGOtil CA ON 0o o eo ' 7 -- - Authority IJ JD 9 903 5' RECTIONS M DE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON AlL COPIES _ _ _ _ _- JBEfORE lEGRAM IS OWVlREO TO THE TflEGRAP Of o oo ' biGmNG TELEGRAM INDICATE 0 cou o Departlnent of State SECRET D e_ 0 Classification Amembassy LONDON 3g9'1 ACTION PRIORITY o r o c '6539 ' ' ' ' ' Ikfl9 I f '-ii ' 'L Ii i l 522 l HI '63 ' j' I I EYES ONLY text of FolloWJ ng for jeur information is letter dated May 28 Mini t r hich wai transm1tt '' ' ' hem t be President t Prime throuc White House channels QUOTE uear Friend Thank you for your interim answer to my message about the MLF I have now heard also from Dean Rusk about his in Ottawa conversatiQ s with Alec Home and Peter Thorneycroft We ppreciate the frankness with which they have conveyed some f their prf eccupations with the course we are urgitlg as L vell as thel r recognition of its major political advantages Let me begin by saying that ' I think strictly military preoccupations can and should be dealt with by the technical pe 8ple The military case for the MLF is a good one and can be fairly represented as such he Our own conviction of quality of the surface force is so clear that we expect if this force is agreed on to be able to make substantial WO'- _Kece - - - II REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITF D DECLASSIFIED Authority AJtJD 9790 r - _ _ MULTIGU tt lIT lMATG MAnItA' UHTlD NcaR OO CAR ON C II COMPAN 100oo ECTIONS DE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MAD All COPIES _ _- '''''ORE THE 'TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO THE TELEGRA'IIIIt BRANCH - r uge 2 - _ of telegrnm to_ A mws emlJ Wb au 6'-'6 y -- LOI 6lJNJJDO N -_ _ _ __ SECRET Classification savings in the provision of additional US strategic striking forces which might otherwise be needed to cover the same targets This Government would not consent to the very substantial investment which it is now willing to make for this force except on the basis of a clear conviction of its first- ate quality So we are glad that further arrangements have been made for Admiral Ricketts and his sta f to talk with your people in London Any improvements '--- at 10 '-- L o lrge from these conversations in the basic military design ct iy be of advantage to all of us Meanwhile every day that passesroakes it plainer that a clear move from the United Kingdom toward participation' in the MLF will be a major forward step in our joint effort to bind the alliance safely and strongly together in the face of General de Gaulle's opposite course The Germans are the heart of the problem and I I simply cannot escape the conclusion that of the courses available to us in dealing with them the MLF is the only safe one I If it fails the Germans are bound to move in much more dangerous directions 1 in the long run even toward some partly clandestine arrangement with '-- L e French or if this should not work toward an independent nuclear lOrt in Germany -- not now but in time The more immediate alter- native would be a heavy demand for a new bilateral relation with us 479 -1 ' DECLASSIFIED Authority ' D 9790 S' 0- l - Pag o IIiIUL TIII A '''1 0 M NtINT D Mealt8110 CA ON po CO ' A 'Y o e RECTION ACE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MAO IN ALL COPIES - -----% EfORE Tt-It-TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO THE TELEGM H BRANCH of telegram to ___Am em b_a_s_s y_L_O_NDO __N_ _ __ 3 SECRET Classification -- probably with land-based strategic missiles in Germany and I am sure you will agree that such a bilateral arrangement would be attractive co either of us only by comparison with a Franco German or strictly German effort I see no other course for the Germans if the MLF fails of' ou All axperience with them after both wars m4kes it clear that they lill not accept a permanently and passively subordinate status l '-- n o ms o The nuclear restraint which has been one of Adenauer's - t ersenal contributions will be impossible for a successor faced wil n competing political pressures from men of whom Strauss is only the most notable current example I am sending separately a report of a recent interview by von Hassel which shows how difficult it would be for German politicians to defend a policy of nuclear restraint without the politic l answer of German partnership in the MLF I believe that our two countries must go ahead on this Just the same I recognize that you have a political problem of timing What seems to us essential is that we should go forward in uch a way as to maintain continuous momentum hat It is not critical definite agreements should be announced during my European Lrip L 180 DECLASS FIED MULTIO A H IJ' 'D q AUthonly N _79 3 S- 0 c a ooft eM ON PO'UU COM NY tOon_ RECTIONf ADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MAr 'IN ALL COPIES o BEFORE TI1rfElEGRAM IS DEUVERED TO THE TELEGMfH BRANCH Page HTCMATC UTIl IHTI O T 4 of telegram to Arnembassy LONDON SECRET Classlflcallon but we do think it important to have the work completed in 1963 so that Parliaments and our Congress can act early in the new year In our own case political attention will necessarily begin to turn towara the nominating anventions and the election campaign well before next year and Congressional action should come as early as sumrr r pos ole in next year's session believe that one good way of meeting these goals and taking L C oo 11 ' of your own problem of timing would be to begin the treaty ' - egotiations in a less formal manner than we previously had in mind Instead of setting up now a formal Drafting Group that would doubtless result in some fanfare we and the other interested countries could pursue discussions technical talks and negotiations at this stage b l sing space at NATO headquarters in Paris and using normal dip ' clatic channels as necessary forward tow rd By this process we could move reaching a detailed consensus and reducing it to the written terms appropriate for a treaty Given the necessary energy and political determination a sufficient consensus could in this way probably be developed by August or September to justify convening lltilateral drafting group at that time to put the treaty into 481 ' ' rn - J AU hOrityIJNi - -GO f '--' 9 035 ' ' - - - -' ------ - ION' 'ADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MA ' N ALL COPIES RE Th- rELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO THE TELEG H BRANCH Png e e_5_of telegram to_ Arn em b a s s y LO N D O N _____________ SECRET Classification As I see it the indispensable ingredient of the process 1 have outline is a firm political will to come into it with the object of creating a multilateral MRBM force along the lines we have been discussing and to join and support such an MLF if a satisfactory t aaty emerges I undel stand that your Cabinet will consider the MLF matter ak and I hope that you will decide that this procedure is this 'd th the bounds of your already expressed policy favoring the MLF 'Deci ' ' n by the participants now to join in this next phase will 'pe- final adherence to be reserved until each country has a cl to review the Charter but it will also maintain our momentum tovlard an agreement Vlith warm personal regards Sincerely John F Kennedy UNQUOTE I ncluded as attachment to message to Prime Minister was text crt- interview on May 24 with von Hassel by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei ung which we assume you have or can obtain irom other sources '- SCP-2 RUS i END 1'82 J                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu