C01269967 IRAN 1963 Add - Wank 1'0 AMch 52cm mm MW 2000 U THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE FALL 0F IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ AUGUST 1953 ScottA Koch History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC June 1998 CLBY 2176075 CL REASON 1 5031 DECLAS N XLXS DRV FROM 1111 3-82 MET 31-87 c01269967 Table of Contents C01269967 U Source and Classi cation Note 3 U I have also examined relevant records from the Department of State the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency These records were not as plentiful or as helpful as I had hoped was nonetheless able to ll in some gaps with documents from these organizations The vast majority of surviving documents on the operation itself remain with CIA but for the reasons provided below even these are not as numerous as one mioht 5 U Copies of cables 86 dm'ing 15 Operation also were among the es the Division destroyed in its attempt to gain more ling space At the time the capies were already nine years old and no one thought that they were important A record c0py may have remained in the Agency s former Cable Secretariat for some time but such records too have long since disappeared in routine house cleanings An extensive search of ClA's archives has failed to uncover anv surviving copir' IV C012 69967 early 19803 ClA's History Sta ' prepared transcripts of these documents and sent them to the Department of State s Of ce of the Historian then researching a volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series There is every reason to believe that these transcripts produced under the supervision of a professional historian are authentic The matters in the transcripts correspond in sequence and subject with events as we lmow them U The micro lm itself apparently has been destroyed in accordance with National Archives and Records Administration NARA guidelines According to NARA the micro lm had to be kept for 20 years and then could be destroyed The record of destruction had to be kept for ve years at which point it too could be dean-ow I 3 U Some readers may think that this study is over-classi ed but many of the crucial documents are still t0p secret after almost 50 years Since this hand il of documents contains information critical to the story I have decided to use the material they contain even if it means restricting the potential readership Scott A 1 June 1998 C012 69967 Copyright Notice This publication contains copyrighted photographs that may not be reproduced or used further without explicit written permission om the copyright holder - - 4 C012 69967 Chapter 1 U Iran and the United States to 1951 U During the height of the Cold War in the 19505 Washington considered the Middle East in general and Iran in particular to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union It was not always so For almost 175 years American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise U That changed during World War II and the immediate postwar years During the war has was an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Hitler's Wehnnacht Soviet troops remained in northern Iran immediately after the war encouraging pro-Communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish region For a time it appeared to Washington that Moscow would demand the hmi cation of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan but this problem evaporated once Stalin understood that the United States would not permit such an aggressive movel U The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after the end of World War 11 but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment East of Suez created a vacuum that the US felt obligated to ll After London announced that it could no longer supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey President Harry Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that the United States would support 'ce peoples everywhere resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside Eventually almost a quarterofArnexiean aid for the Soviet Union camethrough m Convoys using me uor rern routes lost about 20% of their cargoes to theNazis only 8%of See Gerhardt Weinberg A GlobalHisron d World War Cambridge Cambridge University Press I994 pp 284 404 Sea Daniel Yergin Shattered Peace the Origins d'the Cold War-and rheNaa'anaI Boston Houghtm Mi lin Company 1977 Adam B Uiam Expansion and Coe skneaSoviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 2d ed New York Holt Rinehart andWinstou m 1974 and John Lewis Caddis Uniteds'tam and the Origins cf the Cold War 1941- 1947 New York Columbia University Press 1972 for a discussion of the Azeri crisis in early 1946 C01269967 pm For Itan the Truman Doctrine as this pledge came to be known meant that the El n States was replacing Britain as the main geopoli calcounterweightto the Russians U For the rst three years after President m sdeclamtion the aim States paid relatively little attention to Iran even though that oil-rich country was experiencingse ous economic problems widespread discontent with the government 311d smwinguita m lW deb Iran's Communist Partv I U Even without the most basic intelligence on Iran 'i'wo elements drove American foreign policy in the post-war Persian Gulf region oil and the fear that political instability mightjeopardizevman access to oil Ever since _'Muzz ar aHI'n 3 0 Publich the Presidents asrhe UnitedSIates Harry 5 mm Washington DC mm 0 Indul- C01269967 granted William Knox D'Arcy an oil concession covering three-fourths of Persia as Iran was known until 1935 Iranian oil had helped fuel the British economy in peace and warns The United States was then producing enough oil for its needs but it knew that Western Europe depended on oil exports from the Middle East In January 1951 nine months after Hillenkoetter s letter to Acheson the Central Intelligence Agency's Of ce of National Estimates ONE wrote that the British economy would suffer if it lost Iranian oil The loss of all Middle Eastern oil ONE said would have profound and tin-reaching consequences for the economies of the Western bloc 9 U Political instability in the Middle East and the Golf resinn threatened the r-nntinlrintl mnnlu nF nil 01Before the Cold War the domestic politics of what later came to be called the Third World had made no impact on American foreign policy deeisionmaking During the Cold War Washington could not afford the luxury of indifference because doing so would spur Soviet intrigue Domestic politics almost anywhere abroad and especially in strategically valuable areas became important arenas for the international ideological struggle between East and West Washington was determined to win this struggle through policies promoting long-term democratization The result American of cials hoped would be stability andvictory U Twisting the British Lion s Tail Mohammed Mossadeq ationalizes the Anglo- Iranlan Oil Company U An Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister General All Razmat'a on 7 March 1951 11 Razmat'a's death set in motion a series of events that were to bring American and British of cials face to face with Mohammed Mossadeq one of the most mercurial maddening adroit and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt 12 One of the reasrms the British Govmnnart eventually took over D Arcy's concession when he minto nancialdif cultieswas to ensure a securesupplyofoil forthe Royal Navy See Daniel Yergin HePrke the Epic Quarter - Oil Mound Power NewYork Simon and Schuster 1991 pp 137 14042 151 9 0 Min-r4 a January 1951 Thelmportance dlraniau andedIe am or to Wm Empe Unhere me Conditions pp 1-2 CIA estimatedthat if all Middle Eastern oil were lost the non-Soviet world would have to impose an inunediateand mandatory 10%cutbaekin consumption In an event the United States would have to implement rationing even though Jami-stir maturation in than dam met its own nor-d a 1 -nm-OI-t C01269967 I 3 U Mossadeq's immediate concern was a struggle for control of the Anglo- Imniandl Company AIOC By 1950the British oil concession in hwhich the had renewed in 1949 was a sore point in relations between the two countries In March l951 when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis the hallmParliament he submitted a bill which the Majlis quickly passed nationalizing AIOC He signed the bill into law on 1 May 195 I just three days afterthe F- Jappointed him Prime Minister Nationalization went into effect on 2 May 195 and was made retroactive to 20 March 1951 U nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict with Britain The British government owned halfof stock and did not intend to let Mossadeq nationalize its assets without adequate compensation as required under international law - g-od U Britain Responds to The Antics of Orientals U The two countries tdaito resolve the dispute but differing negotiating styles and the personalities involved hindered these efforts Many Britons found Mossadeq s seemingly impossible demands and unpredictany shii nguumanm inexplicable LP Elwell-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote Really it searedhardly fair-that digni ed and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals 15 U Mossadeq found the British evil not incomprehensible He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their wintry for British ends Many Iranians seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune In 1951Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W Averell Harriman You do not know how ua ythey theBritish are You do not know how evil they are You do not know how they sully everything they touc Han-imam protested that surely the British 93 LP Ewell-Sutton Persian 1er Study i Power Politics London Lawrence and mm us 1955 p 258 4 C012 69967 were like people everywhere some had some good Mossadeq was not persuaded You do not know them he insisted You do not know them 5 U When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of compensating London for AIOC's assets the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control ovei the company They heped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle on British terms If not they were prepared to force him from of ce and replace him with someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC U London rst asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute Mossadeq rejected two British proposals because neither of them addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty over its own oil The British thereafter re ned to deal directly with Mossadeq They used economic weapons and then tried ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken Mossadeq s negotiating position U In September 1951 Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel sugar iron and oil-processing equipment shipments to Iran-mthat is on almost anything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars The AIOC laid off 20 000 oil workers at the port at Abadan and Mossadeq had to put them on the government payroll Gradually the ow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped U A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus and a Royal Navy cruiser and fom destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan The display of British force did not intimidate Mossadeq he announced that the rst shot would start a world war U Britain also considered covert action options while it maneuvered diplomatically and militarily According to CM Woodhouse Chief of Station in Tehran the idea of overthrowing Mossadeq came from the Foreign Of ce not British intelligence Woodhouse himself thought that any move against Mossadeq had to have American support and participation London had neither until the inauguration of President Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953 17 c a II I on 16m Vernon A Walters Silent Missions Garden City N Y Doubleday 1978 pp 24748 17 U CM Woodhouse Something Ventured Inndon Granada 1982 pp 110-1 11 no I I w mm p I w C012 69967 U Mossadeq Challenges the U At the same time that he was quarreling with the British Mossadeq also was struggling against the He insisted that the 1 should reign and not rule To that end he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the 1 3 expense The ash point came in July 1952 when Mossadeq resigned during a dispute over whether the Ior the Prime Minister should appoint the war U During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year vote-tampering by the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the government's survival depended on control of the military On 16 July he demanded the right to appoint himself minister of war The Ii refused and Mossadeq resigned l9 Mossadeq appealed directly to the public and accused the violating the Constitution U Mossadeq s resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that underscored his mastery of Iranian politics and his ability to gauge and exploit public opinion The appointed Ahmad Qavam Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with the Soviet Union in l947 to succeed Mossadeq In reSponse the National Front a broad coalition formed in 1949 organized mass demonstrations in Tehran demanding Mossadeq's return The demonstrations turned violent 69 people died and more than 750 were injured but the lrefused to use the police or the military to restore order Qavam lacked broad support and was unable to organize counter-demonstrations For ve days the National Front controlled the streets of Tehran and other citi On 21 July 1952 the 1bowed to the pressure and replaced Qavam with Mossadeq 20 U Once back in power Mossadeq struck back at the and the military He transferred Reza lands back to the State appointed himself Minister of m forced the twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country and forbade Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats By May M Reza Ghoderan in the Weather Centmy A Political History Boulder C0 Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989 p 186 Mossarleq wrote I cannot continuein of ce without having the responsrbility for the Ministry ofWar and sinceYour Majesty didnot concede to this I feel I do not enjoy the full con dence of the Sovereignand therefore offer my resignation to pave the way for another governmentwhich might be able to carry out Your Majesty s wishes U Sepehr Zabih TheMossadegh Era Chicago Lake View Pram 1982 p 40 2110 1 Ibid p 265 The National Front was a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian a airs The National Front included the le ist anti-Soviet intellectuals of the Iran Party the workers and leftist intellectuals of the Toilers' Party and the workers bazaar merchants and Islamic clergy of the Mn ahedeen-i- Islam Warriors of Islam Party Ayatollah Ahul Qmssan Kashani later instrumental in the coup against Mossadeq was one of the leaders of the Warriors of Islam The ultranationalist Pan-must Ma iliated with the National Front but not a member included many lower class toughs was not amanheroftheNational Frontbut included itself among the parties opposing the government Mark J Gasiorowski lhe 1953 Coup d etat in Iran International Journal at Middle East Studies 19 Aug 1987 262 C012 69967 1953 according to Iranian specialist Ervand Abrahamian the T'Uhad been stripped of all the powers he had fought for and recovered since August 1941 21 U The Prime Minister also seized the opportunity to purge the Iranian of cer corps He forcibly retired many Royalist of cers and cut the military budget 15% To add to the insult Mossadeq transferred 15 000 men from the military to the Gendarmerie the military s bureaucratic rival These acts leled smoldering resentment among the dismissed rst and those few royalists escaping Mossadeq s purge 22 U Mossadeqused his popularity and ability to control the streets of Tehran to good advantage When the British appeared intransigent during the oil negotiations he simply severed diplomatic relations in October 1952 All British personnel left the country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952 23 U Mossadeq s apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour The National Front began tn unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 as the Prime Minister grew increasingly dictatorial By November 1952 Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani a key Islamic cleric in the National Front had turned against Mossadeq and quit the Front as had Mom 'ar Baqai's Toilers' Party Kashani's defection was a particularly hard blow because his group the Warriors of Islam included the bazaar merchants of Tehran and many mullahs Islamic clerics Support from these two groups historically has been critical to Iranian governments U The reasons for the defections were complex Although 30 of the 79 deputies of the 17th Majlis convened in February 1952 belonged to or identi ed with the National Front they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in their opposition to the British In addition nationalization of the area did not produce the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would He began to demand more and more power iron the Majlis and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what amounted to dictatorial powers Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker Toilers' Party leader Moraffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a bulwark U Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq The Iran Party still supported him as did the Third Force a splinter group expelled from the Toilers' Party 26 The Prime Minister also could still count on the backing of the Qashqai Ervand Abrahamiar mu Between mRevqutions Princeton Nh Princeton University Press 1932 pp 272-73 12 0 Ibld p 273 33 U Woodhouseensuredthatall Britishcontacts likethe Rashidian Brothers wouldremain active Roger Goiranhelped him Woodhousep 116 24 U therelationship ofits merchants with the mullahs It the bazaar was a world unto itself irnpregnabletao the army which could not easily enter its labyrinthine alleys The leaders ofthe bmarwae weighty men alliedwith the mollahs andthey could startriots or shut down the bazaar-to instant political Marnmher Farmanfarmaim and Roxane Farmanfarmaian Blood and Oil Memoirs eta Persian Prince New York Random House 1997 p 36 25 0 Abraharnian pp 269 277 Gasiorowsld p 269 35w Abrahamian p 277 Gasiorowski p 26 C012 69967 tribes and more ominously the Tudeh Iran s Communist m As support for Mossadeq narrowed the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the street on his behalf U Ayatollah Kashani's defection and increased squabbling among the deputies effectively paralyzed the Majlis Opposition politicians including former Mossadeq allies like Kashani-blocked the Prime Minister s legislation In early June 1953 st ghts broke out in the Majlis The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when Abdullah Moazemi a Mossadeq supporter succeeded Kashani as speaker in a close Majlis vote 41 to 31 on 1 July 1953 Mossadeq recognized however that the Majlis was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to break the stalemate U Under the Iranian constitution only the l lcould dissolve the Maj lis The government could request him to do so Mossadeq knew the l lwould not agree to such a proposal so he devised a plan to achieve the same end He asked all National Front members and supporters to resign which they did and simultaneously announced the dissolution of the Majlis The Iranian peeple he held could ratify or reject his decision in a referendum on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution Iranian scholar Ervand Abrahamian has noted the irony in Mossadeq s rationale Mossadeq the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the Ii Abrahamian wrote was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will U From 3 to 10August 1953 Iranians voted on Mossadeq's bold and unconstitutional act The results of the rigged election were never in doubt Mossadeq purposely excluded rural areas from the balloting ostensibly because it would take too long to count the votes from remote areas The ballot was not secret and there were separate polling places for yes and In the end Mossadeq claimed victory gaining over 2 043 300 of the 2 044 600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101 396 of the 101 463 ballots cast in the capital U The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian liberals and conservatives alike Jamal Imami a pro-British member of the Majlis warned that Mossadeqwas leading the country toward anarchy Ayatollah Kashani declared the referendum illegal under Islamic religious law At his trial in late 1953 Mossadeq defended his actions on the grounds of popular sovereignty In view of the Royal Court's agrant interference in the electoral process we had to suspend the 27w MarkJ Gasiorowsld U S Foreign Policy and the l m dirua CiientSrare lmaca NY Cornell Universitth 1991 P 75 23w Abrahamian p 274 M Reza Ghods Iran in the CenturyM Poli calmsrory Boulder CO Lynne RiermerPublishers 1989 p 187 29 0 Zabih p 1 1 1 Abrahamian p 274 See also Horns Katouzian Musaddiq and the Snuggle farPower in Inn New York LB Tauris 8 Co Ltd pp 187-88 In an interview in the22August l962issueofDeurrche Mosmdeqadmitted rat he disses-d Maills to amid madma- ww- v-I wnuld have caused his envernment tn C01269967 remainder of the Majlis elections he told the court Whatelse was left to us but consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite 30 U A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum stated that the dissolution of the Majlis will graphically demonstrate trui of Mossadeq s regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted Mossadeq has moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of mobocracy to maintain his hold on power and to eliminate in uence Nonetheless the Embassy thought Mossadeq s continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked any real authoritarian organization aside from armed forces To compensate according to the Embassy he would be forced to rely increasingly on the Tudeh thereby alienating the non-Communist followm of his GovernmentSl U Mossadeq Looks for American Support U Mossadeq hoped for US support in his struggle against the British Like many in the Third World immediately after World War II he saw the United States as an anti- colonial power His hopes were not entirely misplaced the Truman administration saw some merit in his position U Secretary of State Acheson thought that the British were overly preoccupied with their oil interests and that London did not fully understand the broader Communist threat He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of the solution to the problem Soviet in uence in the Middle East In Acheson s view the Iranian Prime Minister would in time become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into hanTo that end Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and promote regional stability - U Other considerations however complicated the Trmnan administration's approach The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain America s closest ally-elsewherein the world The war in Korea was not yet over and the presence of British combat troops was an important symbol of Anglo-American solidarity The North Atlantic Treaty Organimtion NATO created in 1949 was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity 30 0 Ghods p 188 Zabih pp 112-13 For Kashani s views on the Shad'a see Katouzlan Masadqu and tire SmalefarPawer in Iran p 187 anartment ofState Cable 'omTehran to SecretaryofState No 300 12 August 1953 National Archives and RecordsAdministrationRecord Groupa lQ Entry 57 130327 31 0 Adiesoncriticized the unusual andpersistent stupidity of the AngloIranian Oil companymd the British Govet'mnenf'when it cameto Iran mmAdtesonPr-esenfauhe Creation Years In Insane Department New York W W Norton Company lnc 1969 p 501 quoted in Daniel Yergin IMPrize Hit-Epic Questfor 01 Money and Power New Yoda Simonand Schuster 1991 p 453 Richard W Conant Iran the UnitedSraresrA Cold Wan-Case Study Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press 1988 P 102 C01269967 and determination Vigorous American support for Mossadeq would have complicated American foreign policy in other parts of the world as well U President Truman had no patience with those re rsing to view the Anglo Iranian problem in a global context When the US Ambassador to Iran qu Grady wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice the President let him know exactly where he stood Let me tell you something about the Iranian Situation from this end he wrote U we held Cabinetmeetingsonit Jm heldSecurityCouncil meetingonit arrdDearrBobLovett CharlieSawyer Har-rlman and all the seniorsta of the Central Intelligence discussedthat aw rl situation withmetimeandagain We tried togettheblockheaded Britishtohavetheiroil companymakeafairdealwithlran No they couldnotdothat teyknow all abouthowtohandleit we didn't accordingtothem U Wehad Israel Egypt NearEast defense Sudan SouthA 'ica Tunisia the NATO treaties all on the re Britain and the Commonwealth Notions were and are absolutebv essential Where thirth are successful ThenhaveKoreaandIndo-China Iranwas onlyoneincident OfcourSe the lumen ownproblern 33 33w Farhad lea steamed Mossadegh A Political Biography London Croom Helm 1286 pp 131-32 citing papaa of Hem-v Grade ml-thank added I U InFebnrary1921 Persia as Iranwasthen knowrrandthekus sian SovietEeaerated did not existun l December 1921 gned atreaty of 'iendship ArticleVIgavethe sendtroops Russiantroops wouldcross the border onlyifPersiaproved incapableofremovingthe threat itself In an exchangeof explanatorynotes inDecanbtr 1921 the Russians made clearthat the treaty applied onlyto madefora by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown the 'I sarist or by its supporters Leonard Shapiro ed Sonia TreaotSert esM Collection thiloteml Treaties Agreements and Convenstims ta Concluded Between MSaviet Union and Foreign Powers vol 1 191 7-1928 Washington DC The Georgetown University Press 1950 pp 92-94 150- 51 10 C01269967 3 - Although the documents in um's les do not indicate that Smith relayed Lsnger's concerns to he evidently did so because the administration London know that the US Government disapproved of anyn itzy action againstIran At a British c1binet meeting in September 1951 the government of U the USSR could not have invoked ArticleVI if a small British forceoccupichbadsn in 1951 Abadsnis far omthe the British contemplated sending could not have made a considerable and attack upon Soviet forces Nonetheless there is no doubt that the USSR would have found some pretext to occupy nut-dim mnhmi Stalinticilmd If C012 69967 Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this A potential military crisis had passed 39 1 I-LW Brands Inside the Cold War Lay Henderson and the Rise 9 the American Empire 1918-1961 New York Oxford University Press 1991 p 234 40 0 HmryA Byroade Assistant SecretsryofStateforNearEastem SouthAsian and African Affairs John D Jeraegsn Deputy Assistant Secretary' of State foer Eastern South Asian and African A 'sirs CharlesE Bohlen Counselor of the anrunent of State and maniac of the Senior Sts National Seom-ity Catmcil Robert P Joyce Policy Planning Staff inarm'tent of State l0 C012 69967 U As of November Of ce of National Estimates thought that Mossadeq would remain in power for the near lture and that a Tudeh coup was unlikely According to an ONE estimate if the unrest plaguing Iran in 1952 continued through 1953 rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh ONE thought Soviet interVention into Iran was unlikely Wess there is a far more serious deterioration of Iranian internal stability than is foreseen in this estimate However the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference in Ital at any time to the detriment of Us security interests U During the last two months of 1952 both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in Iran and hoped things would not change radically Their hopes were soon dashed U Foggy Bottom s Dlt ferences with Whitehall U As the foregoing indicates Washington and London had fundamentally different perspectives on the events in Iran and on their consequences worldwide These differences complicated the State Department's and Foreign Of ce s search for a common policy At times the problems must have appeared insolvable U InJanuary l952an internal memorandum in the State Department's Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian A 'airs identi ed two areas of disagreement The United States and the United Kingdom had differing views on the strength of nationalism in Iran and therefore on Mossadeq s political strength and on the global consequences of Tehran s failure to reach an oil settlement with London 47 U The State Department recognized that Iranian nationalism was a potent and growing force making an oil settlement on British terms unattainable even if Mossadeq fell In contrast the British disparaged Iranian nationalism as merely a passing storm E l 46 0 cm ofNational Estimates Probable Developments in IranThrough 1953 13 Novunher 1952 47 1 Memorandum Varying British and American Appraisals of the Iranian Situation 14 January 1952 Era of Greek 'I tuirish and Iranian A hirs Department of State RG 59 Recordsoftbe Lot 57 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 1% C01269967 It had no roots and would pass and its leaders fall as soon as it is demonstrated that their policies have brought Iran to the brink of ruin U More speci cally American of cials feared that a British failure to compromise with Mossadeq would enable him to whip up Iran s virulent nationalism further with potentially disastrous results The West might well lose so much of its in uence that it could not stop Tehran from moving the Soviet orbit Or the Iranian political situation could simply descend into chaos in which case the Soviet-backed Tudeh Iran s best organized best nanced and most effective political organization would be ready to ll the vacuum In the StateDepartment s view such developments would jeopardize the security and stability of the entire Middle East would serve notice that the West could not preserve the independence of important Third World states and could deprive the West not only of Iran s oil but ultimately that of its Arab neighbors as well U In contrast the British regarded has as basically a conservative country that would not seek Soviet help nor collapse internally if London held out for the kind of oil settlement it wanted The British also feared that a bad settlement one not on their terms would severely diminish their global political and economic power already starting to decline with the post-World War II emergence of independence movements in much of the British ernpine o U The only suggestion for resolving these differences offered in the State Department's intemal memorandum further consultation to determine the political military economic and effects of the loss of Iran to the west as balanced against the political and economic effects of an agreement with the Iranians on the oil situation which might prejudice other concessions elsewhere and diminish British prestige throughout the world The memorandum concluded thatunless the US and United Kingdom agreed on the importance to the West of an independent Itarrthere was little chance the two would be able to forge a common policy 51 U Eleven months later the National Security Council set forth basic US policy toward Iran NSC 136 1 emphasized that the United States was committed to preventing Iran from falling under communist control and that Iran's strategic position its oil and its vulnerability to Soviet political subversion or military attack made it a tempting target for Soviet expansion If the Tudeh Party seized or attempted to seize control of the Iranian government the document argued the United States should in conjunction with the British be ready to support a non-communist Iranian government militarily economically diplomatically and 4803 mm Ibid The State Department memorandum noted that American in uence was waning daily as more andmore Iranians identi edthe United States with British interests The State Departmait assessed British in uence as negligible 50w lbid Slay mid 52 0 United States Department of State Fourgn Relations of the United States 1952-1954 Vo1 X Iran 1951-1954 Washington DC US Printing Of ce 1989 pp 529-34 id CO 12 69967 UlAmerican Policy Turns Against Mossadeq U Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to 1131 after taking the oath of of ce in January 1953 His campaign pledge to end the Korean war had priority and only weeks after the inaugural festivities Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died The new administration was faced with reevaluating Soviet-American relations Under these circumstances events in Iran receded into the foreign policy background-- temporarily U The British had never given up hope of executing a covert action to remove Mossadeq and continued to test the American response After Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952 the indefatigable Woodhouse met in London with Foreign Of ce of cials including Anthony Eden to consider options available to Britain According to Woodhouse Eden said that no covert Operation would succeed unless it had American support Woodhouse took his words as tantamount to permission to pursue the idea further with the Americans particularly with the This he did arriving in Washington in mid-November 1952 after Dwight Eisenhower's victory 54 530 Brands p 272 54 U Woodhousqpp 116-17 U 11 111 p 119 E C01269967 U President Tmman's and SecretaryAcheson's policy of encouraging the parties to reach an equitable oil settlement had reached a dead end Neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back off from their publicly stated positions which each by this time held with something approaching religious fervor To London s relief the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the Perhaps now the British hoped Washington would nally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue he was Wropriate action omgn rmms Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation Eden found the Americans much more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson The collapse of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the Americans' attitude Washington now considered Mossadeq a source of Witty and feared that his coan gludeh coup l Wm hm suspectea me comets or trying tom the deteriorating situation in km In theUS view Soviet leaders undoubtedly saw Mossadeq s troubles as a diplomatic opening and if he wanted to by to play Moscow againstWashington the Soviets would let him The Kremlin would help him The C01269967 potential bene ts to the Soviets of cum qu mussadeq were great a docile southern neighbor at a minimum and beyond that a chance to draw a strategically important country into the Soviet sphere of in uence 3 w normal-comet negotiations were never held On the day he met with Jernegan Saleh could not know that the Mossadeq government would remain in power I C01269967 only eight more days President Eisenhower apparently had already made the decision to oust the Iranian Prime Minister U Mossadeq s Successor Ayatollah Kashanl or Fazlollah Zahedi U At this point there was no consensus on who should replace Mossadeq US o icialsbriefly considered backing Ayatollah Kashani the former Mossadeq ally who had a large following and mibgme of the Prinrne Mining 3 10 amnion'ngWIy setued on successor Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the If '38 father Rem in 1915 and subsequently rose through the ranks of the Iranian Army In 1942111 British arrestedhlm for his activities under agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine Zahedi worked for the Germans because of his anti-British views he was not generally thoughtto be pro-Nazi The British released him on VE Day in 1945 Zahedi retired from the army in 1949 and subsequently served in a series of mostly honorary posts C01269967 Badman the public scene not noted for honesty consistency reliability and strength of convictions 53 U The State Department recognized that he was not the ideal candidate but was quali ed because he seemed friendly to the United States and Britain and would be acceptable to both Governments 54 Even more importantly he was willing to take the iob I U Whoever succeeded Mossadeq woul be able to count on US support In March 1953 an internal memorandum by the State Department's Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq felL Although American of cials would limit their public pronouncements to expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country privately they would use non-US channels to assure the and new prime minister that Washington was eager to help Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was being turned into a foreign base would preclude ostentatious and immediate American military assistance but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid trucks communication equipment and other items that also had civilian uses would be U Eisenhower Tin-n5 to CIA U President Eisenhower had several options for implementing Mossadeq s removal He could use military force to invade Iran but that was impractical for obvious reasons He could keep hoping that a diplomatic solution would appear That option too was not viable diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Iran was worsening daily Finally he could tum to CIA for a covert political operation the National Security Council had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US phlicy This alternative held the promise of attaining the result the administration C 1 MmsuresWhidr the United States Government Might mm in Support of a Successor Governmentto Mosadeq March 1953 Departmentof State Of ce of Greek 'Iurk'sh and Iranian Isszm RG 59 Lot 5 7 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 67 0 In NSC 10 2 C012 69967 wanted with a minimum of cost and attention If such an operation went sour Washington could disavow any knowledge or connection Available documents do not indicate who authorized cm to begin planning the operation but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation re ected the President's style U Before going intothe operation Ajax had to have the approval ofthe President Eisenhowu'psrticipatedin none of the meetings that setup Ajax he andhe didnotdiscussitwithhis Cabinet or the NSC Establisbinga pattern he would hold to throughouthis Presidency he his distance and left no docmnents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup But in the privacy f the Oval Of ce over cocktails hewas atight control over the activities of the CIA 69 l StephenE Ambrose Eisenhower vol 2 The President New York Simonand Schuster 1984 p 111 Amlxose repeats this paragraph verbatim in attenuator Soldierandl mident Nech Simon and Schuster 1990 P- 333 20 w C012 69967 I I'll C01269967 Chapters i U Planning the Operation I 3 U r KCl' lil Kim Roosevelt grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt was the WDi sion WWw A 1938 Harvard graduate MIMI embarked on a scholatluataer anth n thCalifomi of Strategic Services QS Ldu ng World War 11 aniworked for thuhieiotthaorganization s as 51L Lyl- nuande Was a writer WM C M Woodhouse of MP5 wrote in his moirs that Roosevelt had a natural inclination for bold and imaginative action and also a friendly sympathy with the British 4 4 CM Woodhouse Something Ventral-ed Damion Granach 1982 P 120 C012 69967 C01269967 C012 69967 9 0 Although CIA almost certainly would have hired him no a permanent staff employee Wilber refused and preferred to work under contract He lived in Princeton and did not wish to leave A eonu act enabled him to work at CIA without requiring him to move to Washington Wilber continued his contract relationship with CIA until the 19605 C012 69967 26 C01269967 C01269967 28 -- C012 69967 a U The Americans Review the Prelimier Plan to accurumg to the military attaches it was important to recognize the difference between allegiance and control The enjoyed the allegiance of almost all Iranian Army of cers they had been raised to regard their monarch as a symbol of loyalty and patriotism Whether he wielded any contro was more problematic His failure to assert himself against Mossadeq was causing confusion and consternation as of cers risked their careersby backing him against the Prime Minister The attaches concluded that if the I were to give the word probably more than 99%of the of cers would U I I tram USARMA 'len Department tr me Army Department of the Air Force of the Navy Control ofthe Armed Forces of 12m 1 1 August 1953 National Archives RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 'lhe distribution list shows that CIA received nine copies of the attach s' assessmt C012 69967 comply with his orders with a sense of relief and with the hope of attaining a state of stability U Mossadeq through Army Chief of Staff General Riahi a Mossadeq loyalist actually controlled the Army Iranian of cers considered legal and would obey any order of the Zooming 'om the Chief of Staff The of cer corps considered the silence about the Chief of Staffs actions as implied consent Failure to follow orders even under these conditions was tantamount to treason The American military attaches concluded that if the opposed the Chief of Staff or if the Chief of Staff with the support opposed the Prime Minister Mossadeq's control of the Army would evaporate 29 23 0 Ibid 25W Ibid 30 C01269967 U The First Phase Convincing the C01269967 34 0 Schwarzkopf the lther of the American genera of the same name who led US and Coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq 32 C01269967 33 C01269967 C012 69967 45w Donald N Wilber Adventures in mm East Exam-sinus and Incumim Princeton NJ Darwin Press 1986 189 The Shari'a is Islamic religlous law intended in guide all of social activity See William 0 3mm Patterns of Religion and Economic Developmentln Ban from the Qajar Era in the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 in GobaIEconomics and Religion ed amu n New Brunswick NJ Rutgers University Press 1983 p 78 C01269967 C012 69967 C012 69967 Itw Brands Inside the Cold WantoyHeudmou andthe Rise tithe Amrican Empire 1918-61 New York Oxford University Pleas 1991 p 282 C012 69967 U Final Approval 0 at 011 25 June 1953 senior foreign policymaking of cials met at the State Department to hear Roosevelt outline the nal plan for TPAJAX President Eisenhower did not attend but other top of cials did Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson DCI Allen Dulles Undersecretary of State and former DCI Walter Bedell Smith Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy Robert Bowie head of the State Department's policy planning staff and subsequent CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence in the late 19708 wa Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East and US Ambassador to IrmLoy Henderson 51 U A er Roosevelt's brie ng Secretary of State Dulles polled the meeting Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith were strongly in favor of proceeding the others agreed but were less enthusiastic Henderson did not like covert Operations but thought ha Unit Q11 th had an olsnin- In thie one 62 U Nor did CIA have to notify Congress of its impending operation Allen Dulles may have informally told key Senators like Richard Russell as well as key members of the House of Representatives what the Agency was doing but ClA's les contain nn Mme-rentimo Brands p 281 Eisenhower s absence should not be read as passivity or disinterest The President knew what was going on but preferred to keep himself out of all fonnal deliberations I-Iisordersand brie ngswetegivenorally with norecord kept Mn mt - In Decunber 1974s Hughes-RyanAmendmentrequired a Presidential nding for each court action andPresident Gerald Ford s Executive Order 11095 16 February 1976 required that the Executive Em notify Congress of all Presidential ndings 39 C01269967 C012 69967 Chapter3 U Execution and Initial Failure C01269967 lhe absence of relevant intelligence in Carroll's le is curious Foreign intelligence assets not covert action assets collect the sorts of information Carroll needed Two possible reasons explain the paucity of infomration Either the foreign intelligce assets had not been tasked properly or as is more likely their focus up to this time had been on the Soviet Union and its activitiesrather than on Menac vities The USSR the main target of the American intelligence effort and most if not all of ClA s foreign intelligence assets in Tehran Viere almost certainly trying to collect information on the Soviets m 42 C01269967 45 C01269967 C01269967 U Securing the Fir-man U The rst phase of the operation began on lSJuly 1953 when Asadollah Rashidian went to the French Riviera to meet Princess Asbraf He explained to her that Mossadeq posed a continuing danger for Iran and that she should convince her brother to dismiss him She was tmenthusiastic w a no ancess also was convinced that Mossadeq would do whatever he could to prevent herretm'n Shehad already written to the Prime Minister three times saying - that she wanted to come back to Iran because she could no longer afford to live in Europe When she saw with some prompting that a sin-reptitiousvisitm the 3 might improve her chances of mhome permanently she began to warm to the idea tu r nncess Asnni' arrived remain on July 193 rm met With not brother four days later She was unable to convince him to sign the mtam and left Tehran the following dav 45 C01269967 If 23 0 The arrival of Soviet Ambassador Anaton Invrentiev in Tehran on I August 1953 probably heightened Washington s and Roosevelt s sense of urgency Lavrentievhed been ambassador in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and had been behind the Communist coup tint deposed pro-Western Czech President Benes Lavrentiev replaced Ivan Sadehikov who le Tehran for in July 1953 II 46 C01269967 U Manucher Farmanfannaian a member of the Iranian nobility was present when brought the documents to the and relates in his memoirs the circumstances of this historic event One afternoon the iwas relaxing outside with a circle of friends A butler approached and whispered into the car and the El replied loudly Tell him to come in A man in a dark suitwhom Farmanfarmaian did not recognize appeared from behind some trees and after a few words with the presented him with a document The asked if anyone had a pen armanfarmaian offered his After signing the document the lnoted that the pen would be worth much more now that he d used it to sign the paper fortnne Farmanfarmaian joked Perhaps the monarch replied Perhaps it will bring us all luck as well Farmanfannaian writes that he found out later that the messenger had been sent by Kermit Roosevelt and the document the had signed appointed General Zahedi prime minister 25w Nassiri laterbecame the head In I978 fonnu'Agency of cerMiles Copeland met General Nassiri to discuss Ayatnllah Khomeini and the deteriorating situationin Iran Copeland found Nassiri even stupiderthan Kim Roosevelt said he d ha The General regaled Copeland with fairly bloodthirsty details of how he could have put an end to the demonstrations within a week if only the 11nd given him ee rein Miles Copeland The Game Player the original political operative London Atrium Press 1989 p 251 13 U Mmudrerhm unimand Roxane FammfannaiamBlaad and Oil - Memairs of a Persian Prince New York Random House 1997 p 292 Ways that the signedthe mtan on a Sunday in the secondwedt ofAugust This cannotbe comm forthe rman wasnotsignedlmtil BAugust The secondSundayinAugustwas the ninth andthe third Sundavwas the sixteenth - - C01269967 KmitRoosevelt Countercaup ThaStrugglefor the Carma ofIran New York Macaw-Hill 1979 i 171 C01269967 Ibid 8 Winner s idea of the public probably was narrow Most Americans did not read The New York We and could not have told him whether Iran was In the Middle East SouthAmorlca or North Carglina 49 C012 69967 U the original plan for a military Operation had failed abysmally Upon hearing of Nassiri s arrest the principal anti Mossadeq gures lost their courage For example General Batmangelich who was to have captured Riahi's headquartm's turned back when he saw the troops surrounding the building Batmangelich and Col Akhavi soon found themselves under arrest The CI for his part left the summer palace in the suburbs of Tehran and ew to Baghdad via Ramsar 50 C012 69967 391nhismanoirs the ' flsaid mQuemandIhadle Tehmn before learningof ae revolution's success It had been decided weeks befoaethatifMossadeghshoulduse we would Innporarilyleavetheoam Ihad decideduponthismove becauselbelievedthatitwm d to show their Ieal allegiances and that thereby it would help Persianpublicopix on MohammedRcza Pahlavi Wh r Hutchinson Co 1961 p 104 51 C01269967 U Ambassador Henderson who had left Iran to distance himself from the operation returned to Tehran on 16 August He immediately sought and received an audience with Mossadeq The ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he believed the i' LII-had issued orders dismissing him and appointing Zahedi Mossadeq replied that he had never seen such documents that he would not believe them if he saw them and that in any event the lm powerless to dismiss him According to Mossadeq the 1 could not on his own authority demand a change in the government Notwithstanding the Iranian constitution s provision that the prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch Mossadeq contended that his power came from the peeple rather than the U At noon on Sunday 16 August Mossadeq issued a brief statement over Radio Tehran According to the will of the people expressed by referendum the 17th Majlis is dissolved Elections for the 18th session will be held soon Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoseyn Fatemi held a press conference that afternoon in which be reviewed the events of the coup and announced that the Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassern Amini had been 3 420 KW the Cold WardoyHeudersou and theRise of the American Empire 1918-1961 New York 0mm University m 1991 pp 235 235 5'2 C012 69967 arrested 3 Fatemi made several violent speeches virulently attacking the and ordered the monarch s statutes in Tehran inn-n down C012 69967 C012 69967 Chapter-4 U Victory 3 U Sunday 16 August Roosevelt and the Station Regroup U Roosevelt knew he held at least two powerful cards in the I l s mmns Although Zahedi was hiding from under the Iranian Constitution he was the legal Prime Minister of Iran and was not Roosevelt was convinced that if he could publicize and emphasize that theme Mossadeq could not retain his illegal grip on power for long 1 Love covered the entire crisis for TheNew York Hines His reports made the front pages ofthe newspaper 'om 17-24August 1953 C01269967 C01269967 C01269967 C012 69967 59 C01269967 U TEXT BOX Terrible Terrible Coincidence in Rome U When the arrived inRome on ISAugust CMfaced a potential disaster By coincidence Allen Dulles was there on vacation When the checked into Excelsior Hotel Dulles was standing next to him trying to do the same thing U John Waller remembers that he got a callfrorn Frank Msner between 0200 and 0300 Wisnerwas agitated He sgone to Rome Wisnertold Waller terrible terrible coincidence occurred Canyon guess what it is Wallercould not U Well Wisnercontinued he went to the Excelsior Hotel to book a room with his bride and thepilot there were only three cf them and he was crossing the street on his way into the hotel Guess can you tell me I don 't want tosay it over the shone can you imagine what may have happened Think the worst thing you can think of that happened U Wallersaid He was hit by a cab and killed U No no no no Wisner responded impatiently by this time almost wild with excitement Well John maybe you don t know thatDulles had decided to extend his aacation by going to Rome Now can you imagine what happened U Walleranswered Dulles hit him with his car and killed him U Wisnerdid not think it wasfunny They both showed up at the reception iesk at the Excelsior at the very same moment And Dulles had to say Vl er you your Maia uzs U The meeting between Dulles and the was completelyfortuitous but raught with embarrassmeny'or the US Government and CIA had the news media learned if it They did not so the incidentpassed unnoticed Wisner's reaction strongly suggests hat the meeting was coincidental It was unlikely that he would have called Wallerat l200 in a pan ic and revealed sensitive information over an open telephone line i there gd been a plan for the to meet the I in Rome 3 In writing of this incident in Gentleman Spy 77w life dAllen Dulles Peter Grose says that Of all the conspiracy theories that later swirled around the personage of Allen Dulles none has made a convincing case to accommodate this unfortunate proximity Peter Grose Gentleman Spy the we QfAllen Dulles Boston Honghton Mi lin 1994 P- 367 60 C01269967 61 C01269967 62 C012 69967 U At this paint members of Iranian Zuhrkhaneh exercise clubs weightlifters wrestlers and acrobats appeared at the head of the crowd Their involvement was almost work of the Rashidian brothers and was a brilliant stroke that showed a profound understanding of Iranian U In nidolize acrobats and weigh i ers in the same way that many Americans idolize baseball basketball or football players The sight of these men tumbling or exercising in unison with dumbbells drew a crowd in an astonishingly short time Moreover the country s most famous athlete Shaban Bi Mohk Shaban the Brainless Ja ari was in the lead and began chanting pro-Shah slogans The effect was claw-5M - - 36 U The swelling crowd headed for the of ces of the pro-Mossadeq and anti- American newspaper Bakhtar Ema Security forces watched passively as the crowd demolished the newspaper's of ce By 1000 the crowd was headed for Mossadeq s residence at 109 Kakh Palace m which was ringed with banks and troops loyal to the Prime Minister U The troops guarding the residence were unsure of what was happening When confronted with the large anarycrowd some of the soldiers opened re The ghting escalated as pro-Shah troops returned re Mossadeq climbed over the wall surrounding his house and manned E 63 C01269967 U The size and fervor of the demonstrations were critical in encouraging the military to come down on the side of the L Jand Prime Minister Zahedi Although some members of the of cer corps opposed Roosevelt could not be certain that their units would follow their orders in the absence of evidence that the general population would back them up The Iranian army has a long tradition of waiting to see who controls the streets before it acts 38 3 Ibid pp 1o 39 3 Ibid p 11 40 5 1 an- 12 1 C012 69967 U The broadcast in the a emoon of 19 August was confused and chaotic but there was no doubt that pro-Shah forces had captured and were controlling Radio Tehran The rst indication came when the announcer said The people of Tehran have risen today and occupied all the government of ces and I am able to talkto you all through the help of the armed forces The government of Mossadeq is a government of rebellion and has fallen Seven minutes later amid much con ision and shouting on the air a Col Ali Pahlavon said 11 Oh people of the cities be wide awake The govemmentof Mossadeqha been defeated My dearcompau'iotsJistenI I none of the soldiers and one of the devotees of this country of cers a munbtr oftraitors likeHoseynFatemi wantsto sell the foreigners U My dear compatriots today the Iranianroyalists have which Fatemi was ruling The Iranian nation o icers army and the police have taken the situation in their hands GDPretniet'Zahediwill assumehispost Thereis noplace for anxiety Keep tranquil 42 U The broadcast stopped After seven minutes it continued with a woman shouting U theople foreigners cannot capture this country Iranians love the King Oh tribw of is ruling over your country without your knowlegge sending your country to the govermnent of the hammer and sickle 4 U A major from the Iranian army said that he was an infantry of cer Tetired by Mossadeq the traitor We proved to the world that the Iranian army is the protector of this country and is under the command of the Much confusion followed after which Radio Tehran played the national anthem and then went off the air 4 Intercept nnTehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1200 Records of the Directorate ofOperationsJob 790122821 Box 11 Folder 14 3120 42 0 Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1207 GMT Records ofthe Directorate ofOperations Job 79-01mm Box 11 Folder MARC 4301 Intercept 'orn Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1214 GMT Records ofthc Directorate of Operations Job 79-01mm Box 11 Folder 4 11 Ibid Radio Tehran went 011' the air at 1222 GMT 65 C01269967 3 U Zahedi began broadcasting that he was the legally appointed head of the He also promised to Roochelt's chagrin that he would boost living standards provide free health services to the Door and modernize agriculture 49 43 U According to the State Department the Embassy monitorreported aahedl'sh'ansmission as follows Dear Compatriots Inthename ofAlmighty I addressyou ordctoins Majesty Past govemments have made many promises but have achieved very little Nation must know I am law il Prime Minister on orders Principal points my program are Rule of law raising standard of living freehealth services for all mechanization of agriculture road construction public security individual and social freedom cooperative societies Long live Mohamed Rem _ lPahlcvi Telegram from US Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State No 406 19 August 1953 National Archiv RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 LL C01269967 67 C012 69967 8 C01269967 U the Salem then hacked mnthedoorto allowthe 34-yar-oldEmperortodescmd Thel won the gold-braidedblue gray m fmm of the Air Fame Commanderin Chief thathad beenspecinlly ownto Baghdad xl sretum Hiseyesweremoistand his mouth was setin an effort to control his emotions 58 The Mossadeq era was ova- 59 E b C01269967 TD C01269967 Chapter 5 U Aftermath C01269967 U The different and widely separated home garrisons of the battalions made them unlikely coconspirators against the new regime The chance that any of these battalions would re rse to follow Zahedi's orders was remote U The ve brigades in the Tehran garrison had not covered themselves with glory during the civil unrest ousting Mossadeq and Batmangelich and Zahedi no doubt thought it prudent to have other troops in the capital who probably would not hesitate to crush a Tudeh-led coup attempt Batmangelich clearly intended these forces for more than ceremonial purposes troons do not parade or pass in review with live ammunition - any effective leaderhad to base his program on nationalist aspirations or face political suicide Zahedi therefore was not likely to reverse many of Mossadeq s policies Byroade warned that American policymakers would be unwise to assume Iran will turn a new face toward the West in the immediate future Nonetheless he argued Zahedi merited American support His fall in Byroade s opinion would open the way to chaos and a struggle for power in which only the Tudeh organization would be likely to win 2 U Two complications affected American support for the new mumPrime Minister Zahedi lacked solid political support in his own right He could expect the I Jto thwart his efforts to create a strong government since the distrust15d any strong leader r anyone who might emerge as a strong leader U Zahedi's options were limited He could not become a military dictator as long as the military remained loyal to the nor could he seek broad based civilian support without callan for new Majlis elections The Maj is was notorious in Byroade s words for its destructive criticism and there was no guarantee that a new Majlis would cooperate w th Zahedi In short Byroade wrote there is no cause for jubilation that our problems are ended in Iran 0n the contrary the iture canbe expected to tar remarkable similarity to the recent past 3 It was a sobering antidote to the euphoria at the highest levels of CIA Memorandum from Henry Bymade NBA to Mr Bowie SIP Iran 21 August 1953 RG 59 Records of the State Department Records of the m of Greek Turkish and Iain Af imJ t 51 1 529 30x40 NARA 2 0 Ibid 3 0 Ibid 72 C01269967 73 C012 69967 74 C01269967 C01269967 13iui mid 76 - C01269967 E C01269967 U Until the archives of the former Soviet Union are fully opened it will be impossible for scholars to know the exact reasons why the Tudeh did not not Perhaps Bahrami was right in suggesting that it was only because the Tudeh was unprepared but the reasons are probably more complex Stalinhsd been dead for only ve months and the new leaders were probably mm his policies They almost certainly recognized the importance of Iran to the United States and to the Soviet Union but may have been unsure how much freedom of action they had In any event since the Tudeh was so closely directed from Moscow it is unlikely that the Iranian Communists decided on their own to do unthina C 3 U Whatever ill effects or career damage Lavrentiev suffered from Mossadeq s fall were temporary He eventually returned to his post in Tehran and stayed until May l955 when Moscow recalled him to participate in a commission trying to resolve outstandina harder and nancial disnutes E 73 C012 69967 ecu cw u out uunw um HUI ecu admonition The Secretary was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to home 30 Of cials in CIA's Directorate of Plans had been working since 1952 on schemes to dcpose Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Like Mossadeq Arbenz was willing to turn a blind to Communist machinations in his country Unlike Mossadcq however Arbenz appeared to be a Communist sympathizer Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the IranianPrime Minister was a Communist or a pathizetL '1 Lu maul Roosevelt Counter-coup MSa-uglefor the Control afIran New Yodc MoGraw-Hill 1979 p 210 79 C012 69967 J U Roosevelt s knowledge of the Middle East gave him the con dence to play the situation in Iran by car without much Headquarters involvement His lack of Latin American expertise would have precluded a similar approach in dealing with Guatemala Control from Headquarters would necessarily have been tighter restricting his freedom of movemen - U was another important distinction between Inn and Guatetnala Arbenz controlled a comparatively stable Guatemalan Government Mossadeq presided over a shambles At the startof 1953 aCcording to Iranian specialist Kuross A Samii Iran resembled an old ship swept away by a storm with no one aboard capable of dealing with 1 $0 C01269967 the attendant 'enzy By August Mossadeq was barely holding on to the broken sails of his sinking ship Everything considered whatever might be said of the morality or the legality of American action it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a stable regime in Iran 35 What worked in Iran Roosevelt sensed probably would not work in Guatemala because the circumstances were so diffean 35 1 Knrom A Sarnii Imimuent Invita au American Strategies q Containment in Iran UnivetsityPark PA The State University Press 1987 p 143 35w Roosevelt Comm-coup p 210 31 C01269967 Chapter 6 U During the 1979-81 Iranian hostage crisis a reporter asked President Jimmy Carter whether he thought that it was proper for the United States to restore the the throne in 1953 against the popular will within 1131 Instead of correcting the reporter's loaded question the President replied That s ancient history and I don t think it s appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30 years ago 1 - U Many diplomatic historians intelligence historians and political scientists do not consider TPAJAX ancient history Eighteen years a er President Carter s remark the questions implicit in the reporter s query persist and continue to stir controversy President Jimmy Carter the President s News Conference of February 13 1980 Public Papers tithe Presidents affine United States Jimmy Carter Book I-Janumy to May 23 1980 I Washington DC United States GovernmentPrinting Of ce 1981 p 307 C01269967 policy of the Zahedi Government that the United States obtained at minimal cost2 would last for 26 years Secure in the knowledge that the US would support Iran against the USSR the was able to turn his attention to domestic matters He began a and of far-reaching modernization efforts including land reform and steps toward the emancipation of women U TPAJAX came at a time when the events in pre-war Europe were a fresh memory Americans had seen how and subversion could destroy a country like Czechoslovakia They had seen the consequences of Weakness and appeasement before Nazi and Japanese demands They had suffered the incalculable cost of failing to act when action might have stopped further aggression Many were determined never again to let the appearance of weakness and indecision encourage aggression U Neither the White House nor State Department had the doubt that the Soviets coveted Iran and would do whatever they could short of war to bring that country within the Soviet orbit The Azeri crisis of 1947 showed that unless checked Stalin would continue to test the West's resolve U Stalin s death in March 1953 added a dangerous element of ambiguity to Soviet intentions Who would succeed the late dictator the breaker of nations 3 Would Soviet policy become more or less aggressive Would the Soviets reoccupy Iranian Azerbaijan Would they encourage the Tudeh to topple Mossadeq The White House the State Department and CIA struggled to nd answers to these questions U Sending American troops to Iran was never a practical option for logistics and political reasons An American military occupation almost certainly would have led to war The USSR would have invoked the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Irmand the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and occupied the northern part of the country Iran would have been divided into a Communist north and a free south Fear of partition lay behind Washington s objection to the proposed British occupation of the port city of Abadan early in the oil nationalization crisis U A covert political operation promised to attain American foreign policy and strategic in objectives Iran without the threat of war CIA gave the Eisenhower administration exibility where diplomacy had failed and military action am not practical In addition CIA gave the US plausible deniability Ifa covert action went awry the President could deny American involvement With these considerations in mind and given the widely held Western outlook on the international 3 new tween Conquest's term See Robert Conquest Slater Breaker of Nations New York Viking Press 1991 83 C01269967 situation in general and on Soviet intmtions in particular the Eisenhower administration's decision to act in Iran was reasonable and understandable U A kind of historical hubris results from the acne mat because we know far more about the consequences of past acts than contemporaneous actors could know we are more likely than they are to have a correct interpretation of events and of cause and effect We cannot know the consequences of decisions not made or actions not taken any more than contemporaries did Nevertheless time and knowledge of past events provide the historian with a perspective not available to contemporaries U Some historians argue today that was not in the US national mtamtl Maintaining that American policymakers in the 19503 de ned national security narrowly these historians emphasize that actions intended to enhance American power ultimately have the opposite effect if they violate democratic ideals In this view intervening in domestic political processes in foreign countries inevitably undermines US national security by weakening the values on which US security rests in the long run 3 mane deserves careful attention its more thoughtful and articulate proponents appear to make a persuasive case The did leave Tehran to return only when he was certain Mossadeq was gone and American support for the Peacock Throne assured Mossadeq was popular among some segments of the population Some Iranians were disillusioned with the United States They had hoped that the US as the great postwar anti-colonial power would not intrigue against their country as the British and Russians had done A close examination of the facts however reveals aws in the revisionist critique 4 See Wilbur Crane Evcland Ropes d Smd America s Failure in theMiddIe East New York W W Norton tit Company 1980 Barry Rubin Paved With Grandmas The American Esperience and Iran New York Oxford University Press 1980 James A Bill The Eagle and the Lion The Tragedy q American-Irauian Relations New Haven CT Yale University Press 1988 5 0 C H Woodhouse one of the British principals in the operation deals with this point in his autobiography Someatbtg Ventured He contends use what Britain and the United States saw in in1979 events tnAt ghanlstan from 1973to l980 the nationalist forces whoin uniwouldbeovertakenby inthe SovietArmy CM Woodhouse Somethbig Vende London Granada 1982 p 131 84 C012 69967 C01269967 U Although there is no doubt that Mossal Idleqllcapl 'wmagmsim of segments of Iranian society with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian 11 Company in 1951 his political support dwindled steadily By August 1953 he did not command mass support The Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties willing to supporthim U The pro-Shah sentiments of the Tehran crowds on 19 August 1953 were genuine Although Guthad a'hand in starting the demonstrations they swelled spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the land Communism In marching against the Tudeh Iranians were supporting the 1 Iran expert Donald With-1 s nlan make this choice exoliei had worked U Before reports those from Khonamabad as pmpaganda it must be remembered that CIA was able to in uence directly events only in the capital city and there only barely Kermit Roosevelt had neither the money nor the agents to initiate the kinds of demonstrations that took place in Iran's widely separated cities 36 C01269967 U American University's Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that considers Mossadeq s fall inevitable regardless of Western actions In a foreword to Zablh s meMossadegh Era Roars c he Iranian Revolution Perlmutter writes that role in these climactic events was not very signi cant despite some of the heavily unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt U Toalarge extenttheretum we made possible tar divisions among the political forces of the left and right the le split among nationalists Marxists and Communists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic clergyman and their more liberal emmterparts 8 U Petlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of Mossadeq possible but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will happen CIA's role was signi cant Without Kermit Roosevelt's leadership guidance and ability to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit no one would have moved against Mossadeq Iran had many political factions but few legitimate leaders and even fewer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take r'sks U A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his ability to control the streets Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime Minister the Tudeh by this time Iran s only disciplined political party rallied to him when its aims and Mossadeq's coincided Tudeh demonstrations intimidated the opposition and kept the army on the sidelines Mossadeq's opponents would have been unable to overcome the disadvantages without outside help U The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of Iranian politics No group was able Without help to contest control of the sheets of Tehran with the Tudeh The opposition needed a rallying point and a nigger Rona-wit nmvidml both and gave Tehranians a choice between the and the SepehrZabih mMossadegh Era Roots dine Iranian Revolution Chicago Lake View Pull 1932 p 126 Amos Perhnutter forwardto TiteMossadegh Era Roots dike Iranian Revolution by SepehrZabih Chicago Lake View Press 1982 p q 1 C012 69967 Tudeh Ordinary Iranians were willing to demonstrate their support for the monarch only when they became convinced through the pro-Shah demonstrations in the streets that Oth-F' m-n lining-I the out U Historians arguing that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a critical related question Without US intervention what would have replaced him In August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone else No potential prime minister was strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis or even to form a coalition government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics If Ayatollah Kashani whom the US had brie y considered supporting in mid 1953 had somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq his government might have resembled Ayatollah Khomeini s regime more than Fazlollah Zahedi's 3 E U If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Iran s chaotic politics in August 1953 would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic Revolution 25 years later Asking this question is like asking whether World War would have been fought if Germany had won World War Iand Hitler had remained an obscure corporal We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen but we can engage in informed speculation U Revisionists contend that cut sti ed Iran's drive to democracy and strengthened the rule of the autocratic thereby making Khomeini s revolution all but inevitable Despite its faults in this view Mossadeq s Government represented the popular will His government re ected a vision for Iran's future that the did not share Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into a modem Westernized state his pe0ple preferred a more traditional society U In removing Mossadeq the revisionists continue the United States and Britain effectively strangled traditional Iranian nationalism Frustrated and resent il the people rose 25 years later in rage against the and the United States disparaged as the Great Satan For there can be no doubt that despite years of of cial Amorican and British denials most Iranians have been convinced of the role in Mossadeq's fall C01269967 U A problem with this thesis is that Mossadeq s Iran was not moving toward democracy The Prime Minister's increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of the National Front as- documented above had weakened his position and made him desperate His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and gained him new political enemies Iran was to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii s apt metaphor an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing with the attendant frenzy U In fact Khomeini s revolution was a reaction against secularism modernization and the mismle not a push for a retum to the National Front The streets of Tehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic calls for Mossadeq The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood for The last thing Khomeini wanted was a secular government with multi party participation He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against any government including a National Front 01' Tudeh Governman that promoted modernization the emancipation of women and secularization U Edward Shirley the former GEL DO employee who journeyed through revolutionary argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the clerics played in TPAJAX Without the support of Ayatollahs Kaahani and Behbehani Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded What the ayatollahs did in 1953 with American and British help they might have been able to do later without such help Alternatively given Mossadeq s growing political weakness and isolation from Iranian society the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general elections U In short according to Shirley the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is appealing but is too convenient in its diabolization of the CIA and M16 and too Persian in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure I History cf Iran voL 7 From Nadir to the Islamic Republic New York Cambridge University Press 1991 p 263 1001 Kim A Sarnii Involvement by Invitation American Strategiw q Contaian in Iran University Park PA the State University Press 1987 p 143 1 i U See Peter Wyden Bay cf Pigs the UntoidStoav New York Simon and Schuster 1979 89 C01269967 12 0 Peter Grose Gentleman Spy The Life Dulles Boston Houghton Mi lin 1994 p 384 13 0 mm C01269967 U The Shadow of the Pahlavis 3 U The average Iranian still believes that the British and Americans are ominipotent and that if they removed Mossadeq either or both somehow put the mullahs in power Edward Shirley s Know Thine Enemy A Spy s Journey into Revolutionary Iran recounts several conversations he had with Iranians while traveling through that country One asked Shirley for help U Americansahould helpus Your secretary of state was Spitupon by thandown The youngL' TLheislikehis father acoward AndtheUnited smteswaswsmoney onhim Inmiansdon twantto ght anymore Theyneedasign 'om America C01269967 Another told Shirley it did not matter what Iranians thought It only matters what the Americans and the think They hold the power The have always had the clergy in their pockets 2 2 U Edward Shirley Know MeEmym Spy sJoumg into Revolutionary Inn New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 1997 pp 75 106 3 U See Harold Bloom Sclerch Expedition into the Forces f History New York The Atlantic Press 1995 pp 264-70 SAVAK's successor in the Islamic Republic of unis the Vezarat-eEttela'at va Aminate Keshvar VAVAK known in the AccordingtohistorianCaerege VAVAK ls noted primarily for abroad andhas been doing so since the revolution in 1979 Its rstvictim was the C735 nepheur ShahriarSha q in Paris Dannber1979 but is most famous victimm fonnerprime ministerShapour Bakhtlar asmssinated in August 1991 Carl AnthonyWege Iranianlntelligence Organizations International Journal ofIntelltgence and CounterWngence 10 Fall 1997 289 Heritage Foundation Senior Policy Analyst James Phillips writes that more than a dozen Iranian dissidents have been assassinated in European cities since 1987 VAVAK even struck in the C01269967 United States Iranian political activist Ali A Tabatabai founder of the Ian Freedom meda omin his Bethesda Maryland home in July 1980 James Phillips 'The Gialkmgeof Her-haw Foundation nmminm Rricho 24 29 March 1996 U Iran Internal Security wwl tat-ab u may 199 1 Inc unmuauon In mis report is classi ed'IOP SECRETUMBRA non-03mm title is unclassi ed The report already ve Iran's havenotbeen ascrioustl'lreattoTehran's 1111 for several years No reponing since then has warranted a quali cationor change of that opinion                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu