UNCLASSIFIED US Department Of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc NO 017980019 Date 09 12 2017 Department of State Iii- 9 h EH aaeeNET- ass PAGE 91 151529 I 7 117 I ACIIDN 55 25 iN o- otTaeI sso-ae ECO-GO aae NER DELHI IMMEDIATE-I751 OELRI tease- Exgie sueJEcT 0F 95 IN THE THE FOLLONINQ Is A RERQRT HAVE OECLINEO-IO QELIEF II-DOES COEO IN SOHE RESPECTS HIIH POLICY ESTABLISHED DESPITE PRIOR PRESENTATIDN ey HE-orasoae-OF HEREIN ENUHERATED POINTS AND BECAUSE 3 I BELIEVE viENs ARE SIGNIFICANCE AS SET FORTE REFERENCE AHBIGUITY CONCERNING POSSIBLE us_ HILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AND PROSPECTS IN INOIA AND BANGLE DESH AND Is VIEHED NEKANCE BY COUNTRY ESPECIALLY UNFORTUNATELY THIS AMBIGUITY IS WITHOUT 1 EARLY-5N0 0F TO REDUCE T0 CONTENTIDUS IRRELEVANCY as REGARDS EHERGING REALITIES IN SOUTH ASIA 23 ENDING IN EAST Ia COR T0 EAST - 3 1 NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE HERETORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case NO F-2016-07743 Doc No 017930019 Date 091121 2017 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980019 Date 09 12 2017_ 1' fL Seene NEH-DEIISESS 51529 AND ICI ADVANTAGE AGAINST NEST PAKISTAN as IS ND FEASISLE PROSPECT DUTEOHE ALTHDUDH DURATIDN AND CDULD VARY HILL TD RESIST GOP T0 BUTTRESS TD EXTEND-HOSTILITIES ISENERAL NANEKSHAH NAINTAINS US PDSTURE SOONEST IN EAST DELHI DAD 22181- 4 WEST US MAY BE ABLE IAI TD BEST AND BY MILITARY OUTLOOK AND av PRIVATELY PAKISTAN NAR AND IS To STRENGTHEN GUI NDDERATES av EARLY US REALITIESA AND US RDSITIDN AGAINST TERRI- TORIAL ACDUISITIDNS THIS RESARD IMPACT ON INDIAN HANRS 0F CONTINUING PDSTURE 0F CALCULATED Us SPONSE IS DDTNEIDHED BY IAI INTERESTS IN INDIA DESH IBI RISK OF PROLONGING AND-ENTENDING FEEDING US AN911KI POSSIBLE ANOHCDVER FOR SDVIET IN RESIDN 59 PRIDE MINISTER DDNN AND INCLUDING AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY FIRM INCREASINGEY RESENTHENT USS COULD SUGGEST INDIA ADDRESSDR AND HDULDIHDLD DPEN AND HILTTARY As NELLIAS DIPLOMAT1C SUPPORT JUNCTUREO ENEHIES EBULLIENT IN ANTICIPATIDN OF WHAT ALL INDIA RADIO CHARACTERIZED DECENBER DTE ALIENATIDN DF INDIA-FROM DECADES TD CDNE UNDTE 6 IT TD REPAIR SUI FIRST HE NEED TD ARREST DETERIDRATIDN IF NE ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN NDRKING AGAINST NAR THIS REGARD NE URGEI - IAI FULL SUPPORT IN UNITED BASED DN DESHA DRAFT IUSUN-SDDSI- INHEDIATE STATEMENT REAFFIRHING USG DTE ASSDLUTE NEUTRALITY UNGTE DEFINED TD PBECLUDE SUERDRT IN HUMANITARIAN AS LONG AS HDSTILITIES CONTINUE AND IINCLUDINS OF US NOT TO BE REPRODUCEDWITHOUT THEWRIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017930019 Date 09 12 9017 UNCLASSIFIED S Department of State Case No F2016 07743 Doc No 017980019 Date 09l12lZO17 5 Depm- t zeizf of State EEQEEFRAWE NEH 65 19255' snu i APABTA IN Poleu DEALII END ICI PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS HITH BANGLA DESH AUTHQRITIES FDR 121 T0 SIGNAL us INTENTIONS To GUI ANOTGDP AND 3i To PREPARE FOR MORE 7 IN SUM POLICY ADJUSTMENTS STILL HELP US TO CUT LOSSES ACCOMMODATE REALITIES 0F INDIAN REGIONAL AND BANGLA DESH INDEPENDENCEII In KEATING NOT To -BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE WIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 0 Of UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980019 Date 09 12 2017 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016 07743 Doc No 017980024 Date 0911212017 L VII-1 - Lula-J it - 9 4 giar gim - - De m 3332922 If 59 1 31533 3 - I F 1 '1 uutJJb-u l - 2 1mm 0v IN PART 13g 1 17PAGE a Bakh97 - I i 3 p- BEST COPY 7 5ng 92 AVAILABLE Ra 1-95 ORIGIN ss-as - - an uh INFO xzae 9 Err vii I DRAFTED 5Y1 1 Amman av I cAaeo 4 39 14 SISCOISUBSI w 5 9 VAN HOLLEN rm sauna- 1 ELIOT $932 - cwr-I INFIJ veg-@1522 hugh lulluhu gglinbu- L Ic aSECSTATE HASHDC I MEN ii i STATE may Ii-lfii in NO OUTSIDE 1 If L113 exuzs Fir-2 g ii LYES cuLu FOR AND POLCOUNS 52' 3 Raf I 9255 k 'h 1 4 Vlaws IN REFTEL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLW CDNSIDERED Av sawion LEVEL EFFICERS Iu UEPAQTHEVT Avo DISCUSSED SMALL 0F WHO AQE 3 cgamia 357 suuTH PQLICI- As NOTE In 41's Tn 130 Im 3R5 - I ava- I ArranTHEuI '7 - - Ti f-le FDR 51 3255 5 d ayhih I 10 r55 pgnnemlc' wuuour It 7w t Iij u BB UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980024 Date UNCLASSIFIED Department'of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Aaem run nwunmsur 3 msmu TD emsun IV ablii'usmom HEADQUARTERS omen-14 ISLAHABAD March 21 1973 IN PART 36 Mr William I Cargo Director of Planning and Coordination Room 7246 Department of State Washington D C Dear Mr Cargo In accordance with the procedure cited in the May l972 Department of State Newsletter I wish to record my dissent from the recently announced United States' decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan I understand that U S policy now permits arms sales which fall in any of the following three categories -- Lethal items contracted for under the 1970 one-time exception but not yet delivered -- Spare parts for lethal items previously furnished by the United States and -- Non-lethal new items In my view the lifting of the arms embargo seriously threatens the stability of the subcontinent impairs U S credibility as a peacemaker diminishes Pakistan's economic development and jeopardizes our relations with both India and Bangladesh My analysis appears in a memorandum dated December 7 1972 on Resumption of American Military Supplies to Pakistan copy attached herewith Classi ed Subject to General Declessi cetion Schedule of Executive Order 11653 Automatically downgraded at two yeay intervals and declassi ed on December - - -- UNCLASSIFIED U S Depaltrnent of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09 122017 UNCLAsIs'Itl p'us Department of state Case No F-20'1'e-0774 Doc No 617980036 oatez'09 1'212017 Mr William I Cargo Page 2 Supplementing that memorandum I would further argue as follows I The Lethal-Non-Lethal Distinction Is Spurious In addition to the semantic problem of defining non-lethal end-use items there is another difficulty which is often ignored This is the fact that non-lethal items usually require lethal com- plements Unarmed jeeps carry armed soldiers airplane engines power planes which bomb and strafe Therefore an arms pur- veyor whose-sales make possible a'larger or more destructive military force cannot escape responsibility for the destruction which that force may unleash II It Is Practically lznpossible For The United States To Ensure That Its Military Supplies Will Not Be Used'Against Other Friendly Nations Or Against The Recipient's Own People Regardless of restrictions which the U S may place on the use of items furnished recent history has shown that the arming of two hostile allies leads to the use of these weapons against each other We should avoid being identified with arms and equip- ment which again may wind up on a battlefield with another friendly power In The Militarily Competitive Atmosphere Of The Subcontinent - It Is Unrealistic to Expect That A Renewed Sales Program Will Not Contribute To An Arms Race The U S Government has taken the laudable position that it does not intend to contribute to an arms race But our intentions may be irrelevant in the face of actual arms deliveries I am told that the 300 armed personnel carriers supplied under the decision will create a positive imbalance in Pakistan's favor Who is to say that the Indian military will not feel compelled to regain their ad- vantage Certainly our intention to avoid an arms race could be implemented more effectively by a retention of the embargo UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017930086 Date 09 12 2017 us Department of State Case Doc No 'c1 793'ooss bate 0911212017 I Mr William I Cargo - 1- Page 3 IV In A Poor Country Like Pakistan Military Purchases Com- pete With Economic Development Programs I-Ience The Resumption 0f Military Sales Tends To Thwart Our Aid Ob- jectives Pakistan is a country of scarce resources More guns means less butter The expenditure of $14 million for military supplies deprives the Pakistani people of an equal sum for development programs The new supplies and spare parts will doubtless re- - - quire heavy local cost commit nients' by the Government of Pakistan Military expenditures set into motion their own multiplier effect Pakistan' -s overwhelming debt service problem is another reason to discourage military spending which draws down-foreign 'exchange Moreover the diversion of resources to the military is likely to have an adverse effect on'Pakistan's ability to attract development aid Given the fungibility of foreign exchange the military sales authorized constitute an effective deduction from our current level of commodity assistance $60 million in FY 73 On the basis of the foregoing I respectfully dissent from the de- cision to lift the embargo and recommend that the U 5 arms policy for Pakistan be reconsidered in the near future Sincerelylrours Attachment 3 8 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09 12 2017 Dep'am nt'ofState' Case-No F- 2 013-07723700c No 017930033 Date 09 12 2017 -- I a 05 -W4 Mr Joseph C Wheeler Director December 7 1973 THRU Dr William A Deputy Director Resumption of American Military Supplies to l akistan - Anticipating a GOP request for resumption of American military supplies to Pakistan You asked me to prepare a succinct analysis g for possible consideration by the Oh the basis of stated assumptions I have considered two most plausible alternativecoursos ofaction in light oi U S Lloreign poliCy Pakistan forelgn relations and Pakistan domestic develop - manta n IN Assumptions I As a starting point we assume that the next two years will see I continuation in power of the Bhutto Government at least gradual progress toward an lndo-Pal rapprochement and 3 con- peaceful relations among the great powers We also assume forldiscussion purposes that Congress will make no substantial changes in military sales legislation 1 II Possible Courses of Action - - - The USG Could respond to a GOP request for military supplies in a number of ways depending upon the scope of the request and 2 USG policy decisions Assuming an open-ended request to remove existing restrictions on the supply of military hardware USG policy Options would include the following possible courses of action l Unqualified supply including sophisticated weapons Li Qualified supply if Note that these are all assumptions not predictions um UNCLASSIFIED us Department of State Case No 'Doc No 017930033 Date 09r12x2017 Us Department elf-State Ca'se N'o 'Doc No 017980086 Date 09 12 2017 I - - I - a excluding- sophisticated weapons I nu - b excluding lethal end-use commodities c limlt'ecl to spare parts for previously-furnished USG equipment limited October 1971 - 3 Refi salto 9813 1-6 cantinuotionbf existing policy - 1 These options are not meant to exclude other possibilities Optlons 5- 1 and Z for example could be varied by dollar and time limitations used versus new equipment de nitions of sophisticated e-nd non- lethal and credit or military aid torms The possible limitations listed under option 2 could be lmpossd separately or in various combinations For the sake of analysis however it would seem preferable to concentrate on the two most plausible of the possible courses of action While assessment of plausibility is of course subjective a review of 1 5 arms supply policy in the subcor ipent since 1965 suggests that the era of unqualified sales is over Realistically the policy-makers in Washington will probably choose between continuation of the current embargo option 3 and some form of qualified supply option For clarity and brevity of presentation we will focus more specifically on a choice between no supply NS and supply limited to spare parts SL513 m Between 1954 and 1965 the U S supplied Pakistan with arms worth between $700 and $300 million It sold India a modest amount of military equipment before 1962 and gave India arms worth about $35 million between the 1962 conflict with China and the 1965 war wltli Pakistan William J Barndn India Pakistan and the Great Powers Praeger 1972 at 323 MAP grant aid shipments of material to Pakistan and India terminated in September 1965 Military equipment a I - UNCLASSIFIED U S Depaltment of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09I12I2017 Department of state N'oj F-2o16-o7743'boc No 017980086 Date 09 12 2017 -3 - Footnote 2 - Continued - - was shipped to both countries on a strictly sales basis under military in April'l967 confining shipments to spare parts for equipment supplied under the pro-1965 grant aid programs and to non-lethal end-items ouch on communications equipment cargo vehicles and reneport aircraft On October 1 1970 the USO offered a one-time exception to the prohibition on the sale oil-lethal material of U S origin to Pakistan According to testimony the offer woo limited to four types of items 'into'rc'cp'tor nix-craft eerne'pbeol'ete - light bombers and a few petrol aircraft Quantities were specifi- celly e't t'ed and limited to replacement of similar items lost throogh normal wear out and 'eceident - In April 1971 the USO began to impose more eevore limitetiono on deliveries to Pakistanbegimiing with a prohibition on the in ouenco of new or renewed Munitions List export licensee or ehipmente from militarvdepota and culminating in late October with the cancellation of remaining rolid licengee On December 3 1971 the USS applied a total embargo of military supply deliveriee to India Both countries remain under a total om- harge on military supplies Grant military training is however on- affected by-the current policy For FY 73 the DOD proposed grant training for Pakistan in the amount of $243 000 end for India in the amount of $2 34 000 See testimony of General Seignoue H R Apprepriationo' Committee Hearings April 11 1972 Part I I 759 764 794' Testimony of General Warren H R Appropriations Committee Hearings March 24 1971 Part1 215-UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09 12 2017 UNCLASSIFIED life'oepa'rt'r 'entor'eate 'c'as Nd Feds-6774s Doc N'bfc1'7ssooss Date 09 12 2017 4 a gift-I U S Foreiun'Poiicy A Pakistan Discussion Neither motion will satisfy President Bhutto if he wants to rebuild his armed forces with new equipment rather than simply replace parts Hence the immediate effect of either option'Imsy-he enjoy with the GOP There is little question that the NS policy Wyould be receivedmorc unfavorably thanihs course thst may become more important than the initial impact however A e' succeeding events effected by the policy chosen - - -- I - 3 2 Ecol-saris 0- I I a N5 Policy With refusal to supply arms U S announces commodity and fertiliser loans for FY 73 American image in Pakistan suffers a not setback on arms issue but one of mild in- tensity and short duration Man on the street still remembers President Nixon's support during '71 linden Pal War With gradually improving relations with Indie arms supplies-are regarded as 'de- sirable but not critical President Bhutto is able to channel more funds to development programs on the ground that U S spares are unavailable In effect NS policy of USG becomes in senses scapegoat for Pal Pak military is bitter but Bhutto and Central Ministers are privately pleased with outcome b SLSP Policy The -U S decision to resume the supply of spare parts is accepted in Pakistan as the least they could do There is little appreciation of the decision among the general public but the military desirous of new hardware regard it as a foot in the door They expect that the USG having lost its virginity will be hard put to turn down future requests for new equipment This Scenario and those which follow are simply designed to highlight issues for discussion Like the assumptions above they are not predictions of future eventsbepanment of State Case No Fem-6467743 Doc No- 'c1uissooss' Date 09 12 2017 - semen Us of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No' 017960586 Date' 09I1 12I2017 India - I I - - Dlscussion Continued hide-Pelt tensions make it inevitable that any USO policy decision s ccting arms to Pakistan will elicit a strong reaction in New Delhi Such reactio nwill - likely occur in the midst of Indian efforts to improve relations with - 2v '5cenar10- a N5 Policy USG refusal to supply military hard- ware to Pakistan is witloly heralded in-Indin ss-a'wise decision Elements of the Indian Government who seek rapprochement with the Nixon Administration gnin support for their cause b SLSP Policy The US dd cision in the face of con- tinued arms embargo for India is widely regarded as an affront The In rose blot- 36 distinction hetWeen supply limited to spare parts and unrestricted sales Anti- rnoricsn sentiment rises and rapprochement efforts are at least temporarily suspended At diplomatic ievel GOI ponders countering with similar arms request to Washington IV Bkistan Foreign Relations Ac India Pakistan's improved re remains deep suspicion and distrust be- renewed arms race lurks l lotions with India tween the two nations beneath the surface Discussion there The threat of a 2 Sconerlo a NS Policy Pakistan's inability to buy even spare parts from the US pleases the Indians strengthening the hand of policy makers who desire to reduce India's dependence on the Soviet Union The decision however prompts no lmmedinte change in US i 5 3 1 Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C17980086 Date 09I12I2017 - In-- Oy I u - as the internment stretches whether step in on American rearrnament of Pakistan The public - 'vicns 111 7 111-1113 decision on a breech of the ism-ea spirit - Both hawks and pro- -So_1 v_i_et of omls and 1egis1ators in India - find grist for thein 'rmills' - UNCKASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Fo2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09112001 UNCLASSIFIED use Department of State Cas'e bio 134615677213 'Doenhlo 017980086 snobs 1212012 6- on Pakistan will find other supply sources SLSP Policy indie sees in the' decision a capitti- lation of the Bhutto Government to the generals and a resurgence of Pakistani militarism The limited policy is regarded as only a a China 31 11 53 E olicz In the wake of the American decision Pakistan approaches China for new hardware The Chinese leadeie p1o ese eternal support for the Pakistani douse promise to provide help in the future but procrastinate on the question of deliveries b SLSP Policv China is not approached and exhibits no perticular unhappiness with the U56 decision V Pakistan Domestic 'Develonm ts A Political 1 Discussion in the larger context of Pakistani politics the USO decision-mus way or the other-owould'probably have an insubstantial effect More dramatic scenes occupy the local stage Yet it is imr ortant to consider the effect 0 the two options on Mr Bhutto' 5 position in the countrv the role of the military establish- ment and cential- -province reistlons 2 Scenario NS Policx Outwardly the decision comes as blow to the Bhutto Government which has patiently deferred its arms re- quest until after the American Presidential election With expecta- Will- Pinnin UNCLASSIFIED Ufs DepartmenteiStaie 0010 N's 92010-07740' Doc No 017900006 Date 09 12 2017 6 i I - 110110 of USG support running high Bhutto's prestige suffers-a minor wound in fact it is the 131111 military which loses upoanmerican material is substantial The generals lose is Mr Bhutto's gain The diminishment in the President s public stature is more than offset by his increased internal power vis- n-vis the military establishment Without finds it easier to achieve military manpower cuts Greater emphasis is placed on 1110'0151'1 11 o f Simian- At the same time he has to contend with internal pressures to seek alternative supply sources His response 10' to turn to China the unsatisfying results noted above i 1elly he arranges a meeting with Mrs Gandhi to propose an arms free zone for the subcontinent In Pakistan advocates or increased Provincial autonomy regard a reduction in arms support of the central armed forces as fortuitoue For the Opposition remembering the Decca terror of last year the military is a potential oguprossor b 81 81 101 decision is regarded as a minor victory by some as 11 minor setback by others in either case it scarcely affects Mr Bhutto' poilt 11 01 image at home The military leaders although hoping for more are delighted to see the embargo lifted With spares to put equipment back into service this year they can look to the importation of new commodities from the later on They see the decision as the rst step in the restoration of the US arms ow Internally their hand'is strengthened with the civilian president They feel they can resist his efforts to cut back military personnel on the ground that someone has to operate 1the reactivated equipment Provincial leaders grimoce at the thought of an increasingly mobile central army B Economic 1 Discussion The economic effects of the supply decision are perhaps the most significant of all For in'Pakistan the scarcity of resources makes guns versus butter decision-making a matter of vital concern We should therefore consider the effects of arms surply upon Pakistan's internal economic priorities and her ability to attract foreign assistance - 00 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09 120017 UNCLASSIEIED u e _pepsnmedt6t3tate' Case No 017980086 Date109I1212017_ Scenario Policz With U as spares una'uailnble and the procurement of new equipment elsewhere beyond the nation a financial capacity the Government begins to devote an increasing percentage of its resources to development Holding his military advisers at bay - the President can respond to the rising expectations of his people' a constituency Some of the social programs of the Bhutto Government Foreign aid donors are impressed with Pakistan' 1 efforts and are delighted with the reduction of -'rhilitary ' ertponditures - -- -The country gets 309d marks Bnd higher 31d at the 1973 Consortium meeting Creditor nations take 11' more positive - View of the forthcoming debt rr scheduling in too Pakistan bureaucracy enlightened elements of the planning and development offices are on - couraged in_ their devoIOpment efforts A new spirit of optimism in development circles bogins to emergePolicg The decision arouses anxiety among development-minded Pakistanis andjoroign aid officials Does it mean that Pakistan is opting -or more guns and less butter Is the con- frontation with India policy being reassertcd Some recall the Prosidcnt's ominous reference to revenge in his December Convention speech in Rawalpindi Foreign aid donors look with disfavor on a Plan which relies on external assistance for mor than fifty percent of the development budget There is a tendency among donors to cut back on commodity assistance perhaps the moat fungibie type of aid on the ground that it provides ioroign exchange support for military purchases Pakistani economists and planners are disheartened by the decision and blame the United States for '-'arrns-pushing '1 VI Some Final Comments The above discussion and scenarios suggest that continuation of our present embargo policy is the preferred course On balance the negative effects of a resumption of arms salosn'evon these limited to spare partsg-would appear to outweigh the benefits limited to a short-run political advantage to the U S in Pakistan Before con- cluding however it may be useful to examine brie y some of the conventional wisdom CW on the arms supply issue UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State case No F-I2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09l12l2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department 'or State Doc No 017980086 Date 0911212017__ n 9- CW need to bolster the defensive position of Pakistan against possible attack from outside the subcontinent This may have'hoen the cane during the height of the Cold War But the argument is no longer valid Not only in the danger of d r niti't'a igre e' lesion-in the-sub continent loseimniinent today but hietor y has ehown that the arming of two hostile'allies lc'n'de'to'the were those tiresome-againstcach other - Moneoyon 513 arnds points out the rationale for supplying arms to India an'd' Pakistan lost-its appeal as the Iolitical costs of the policy became too high after the-1965 - cw We haven moral obligation tear-rhea with spare parts the military hardware we pro- vided to Pakistan in past years To speak of a moral obligation in servicing goods is to ignore the larger more question of selling arms to a poor country especially where there is a strong possibility of their being used against another poor count ry Unless sales agreements or treaty obligations 'provid e otherwise the GOP- hes no legal basis to demand spares In inter- national issues such as this rule of the shopkeeper has no place All of this is not to deny either the right or practical necessity of Pakistan to maintain an army in the modern nation- state armies have become a seeming attribute of sovereignty Questions if-military priorities and aunt budgets are for individual governments to decide Yet our policies should be designed to encourage reduction rather than expansion of military forces While armies often perform social and developmental functions in developing countries such is not the case in Pakistan where the constant throat of confrontation with lndla is uppermost Barnde Op Cit at 323 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09 12 2017 refuse to furriish a'rrna thent'eor'n' her country will so As the 'scanarios e'uggest Frost'- dent Bhutto may not be unhappy with an excuao for curtailing the ambition of his gehe tale Even a delay in procurement could ct the develepmegt Pakisten Pakistan like most governments 11 113 its aamsfell as the former But even if Pakistan finds eome ether sour e' identified with arms which again nay Winn up en a battlefield with a'nc'athcr friendly powef I - 'Ijhat mat r or may not cc ARBa ron UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980086 Date 09 12 2017 u s Pepertment of State Case No F-2016-07743 Dec NoiC17980086 Da'te 09 12Iioi7' -- a I 1 a UNCLASSIFIED U S Department Of State Case NO F-2016-07743 DOC NO 317980088 Date 09 12 2017_ I IN PART 36 OFF IC IAL- INFORMAL I 'jh-w H I973 UISSENT CHANNEL 6 BS USAID Mission Islamabad Pakistan Dear Mr Eager As I promised in my letter of March we have pursued the questions on South Asia arms supply that you posed in your dissent channel letter of March 2l 1973 You have raised a number of specific substantive points They are material ones and they deserve an answer I have asked my staff together with other con- cerned persons in the Department to comment On them These comments are enclosed with this letter The main burden of my letter is not however sub- stantive The important point for you to know is that the considerations you have raised have repeatedly 1 occupied attention at the highest levels They have been discussed in National Security Study Memoranda in meetings of the Senior Review Group in discussions with the Secretary and in many other gatherings of persons at all levels who are concerned as you are with the implications of our arms supply policy I am personally convinced that these points have received an extensive and fair hearing and have had an impact on our policy for as the enclosed comments point out we have settled on a policy that is very restrictive and is designed to meet many of the diffiCulties that you raise Obviously these arguments did not carry the day in the sense that we did not impose a total arms - embargo As you are aware there are strong counter- considerations--and indeed I am not sure that the logic of your argumentation necessarily leads to a total embargo I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2018-07743 Doc No 017980088 Date 09I1212017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C17980088 Date 091120017 The dissent channel was created as a further means of ensuring that all points of View are brought forth in the interest of making the best policy choices Your constguctive concern in this policy question is appre- 0 ate Sincerely yours Signed William I Cargo William I Cargo Director Planning and Coordination Staff Enclosure Comments on South Asian Arms Supply Clearance - Mr Bruce Laing iiy UNCLASSIFIED 03 Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980088 Date 0911212017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 09l12l2017 I IN PART 36 - Comments On The Points Raised In Dissent Letter On_ - BB South Asian Arms Supply I General First the points are extremely pertinent and have been- raised repeatedly in the discussions that led up to the arms supply policy decision Second appears to be overinterpreting BS the intent of the policy It is in fact extremely re- strictive -- to a great extent precisely because of the kinds of points thatl A review BB of the 1967 7l arms policy which was very similar to __the present one shows that it resulted in only very small transfers of military supplies There is every reason to assume that the present policy will be inter- preted at least as strictly Third there is an implicit problem in considering arms sales to any other country ' There are strong moral political and often economic arguments advanced not to sell arms at all Yet this is simply unrealistic aste general principle and once this is admitted then it I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 09 12 2017 US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 09 120017 'zis difficult to see shy we'should make a uhique exception for South asia We sleek to apply a rule of reason in all of our arms sale and_ this should also be our guide - ih_South Asia s 11 - Specific Points A The lethal non- lethal distinction I argument is large y valid there is no 35 clear dividing line between the two categories and the marginal cases pose many problems But once the decision has been made to sell some equipmen t there is much to be said for a policy that seeks explicitly to avoid the supply 0f suoh_clearly lethal items as tanks fighter aircraft and artillery ' These'ihdisputably lethal items have been excluded sihce 1965 and-this is - all to the good Conversely there is ho reason to ex elude items_such as radios or early-warning radar 33 setting up the lethalfnon lethal distinction however- imperfecta we have at least excluded the most objectionable items and have decreased the liklehood that we will be_ pressed fer them as would be the case were the policy a - mun ' UNCLASSIFIED 08 Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017930090 Date 09 120017 US Department of State Case No Doc No 017980090 Date 09 2 2017 9 I I eapurely ad hoc 'The distinction also provides an ime portant declaration of intent in passing on requests f9r_purchase_o the marginal items B Question of Again rv is quite correct that we cannot 35 guarantee that our arms will only be used in the context in which they were supplied The argument made above concerning the lethal nonulethal distinction is of some importance here the kinds and quantities of arms involved are designed to minimize possible damage when used out of context The fact remains that modern sovereign nations do have armies and armaments Our reinsal to sell will not change this - 5150 as we will bring out in the next paragraph we believe'that the liklehood of India and Pakistan using weapons against each other has diminished markedly 9 C The Arms Race - a BB Here Lis on the weakest ground First we perceive a genuine change in the power realities of the subcontinent ' We do not believe that Pakistan is likely to engage in an arms race with India any more The I UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 09I12I2017 UNQLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 0911212017 'outlook for peace is better than at any time since 1997 and a very limited arms supply policy is not going to change this - Second a well-executed supply can in fact reduce the_arms race For instance by providing spare parts for older generation aircraft we reduce the liklehood that Pakistan will opt for entirely new more advanced systems that would in-turn encourage indie to obtain still ater g e neiati on aircreft from the Soviet Union Also of course we do not control the pace of the arms race We are by no means the major supplier of armaments to the subcontinent Bv staying in the_gcre in a limited way 'we probably heve a better chance of - idiscouraging other suppliers from providing e - cessive amounts of weaponry There are obviously pitfalls but the narroe intent 3f 1 jof our solicy and the record of implementation between Ci 1907 and 1971 suggests that we should be able to responsibly in meeting these pro oblems D 'Guns vs Butter The point that South Asia needs Lo spend less money UNCLASSIFIED us Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 09 121201 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980090 Date 09I1212017 I I m on arms is irrefutable 'The counter argument is mech' the same one as made in C above -- that we do not control the situation and indeed may be able to retard the arms raoe and hence expenditures he keeping some role for-- ourselves Certainly the equipment that we provide costs Pakistan considerably less than what they have had to spend on the international arms market for comparable items One can also argue that Bhutto s predilecrien is to spend 1053 rather than more on armaments By giving him some sign of cooperation he strengthen his bargaining power against these who want to divert still more resources into armaments tf'l I UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 DOC No 017980090 Date 09 121201