U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 09 12 2017 assassin Maggy Ins a Fun 1 Original in be Filed in Files FILE DESIGNATION sun we MEL cu m 11-23 m I no i fpiif ff' 1 NOTE My furthef biatribug no no T0 Depaf'scment of State Must be Cleared in RS AN J 153 I a FROM AmEmbassy mums mm DATE February 7 1973 us SUBJECT Dissent Message IN PART as fun NAVV 050 REF USIA NSQ CIA DISSENT CHANNEL _Ehi_s_air ram transmits a_dissenting View submitted by the 35 Embassy Political Section We request that this airgram receive the same distribution as the messages it addresses see below 5 15% d I The purpose of this message to record our disagreement with the analysis and recomm nations of Implications for 11 3 Policy of the Somalgl zeat to EthiOpis Addis 182 of T0 act-on Inlo Initials 1 22 73 and A-l Of Janu 2 7 Since erpre_ saw tation of recen eve opmen 5 internal and external differs oeu- from the Country Team's assessments we find the options and am recomendations inappropriate to the situation and counter- productive to 11 3 interests We believe that there is an alternative approach to the current situation 1 - II jg t W While we are not in a position to assess the military significance of the recent arms shipments to Somalia we 5 53 consider that the Country Team's paper exaggerated the Somali threat by not giving proper weight to the following factors the-domestic interests and problems we of the Ethiopian rulin elite the mutual responsibility An-uIITuI-cm for the Ethic Somali ni lict the presence 0 Djibouti in the equation the impact of EthiOpia's current relations with Sudan and Kenya and the role of Israel Dale or Do on Us On' lnitlclu 0 1205423 In On 4 Dtofl'mg D010 Phonu Hm Corner and Clos llccilon ppravc 7 2 6 73 DOM - Parker D Wynan BB 0-1333 1 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No Doc No 017980067 Date 09 12 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 0911212017 Addis Ababa AP23 P- 2 1 internal Situation we believe that the Ethiopian ruling elite's perception of and reaction to the Somali threat has been greatly intensified by domestic stresses and risks to its future survival The Emperor's 80th birthday and continuing uncertainty regarding a successor regime further heightened by the Crown Prince's recent illness have focused attention - on the possibilities of internal chaos and risks to the future position of the present ruling elite Reasons for the establishment's concern and consequent appeals for U S support include serious institutional deficiencies and the prevailing moods of frustration and of absence of effective leadership within the government machine discontent among ethnic groups'and many of the educated class because of the corrupt and repressive system failure of the Amharazation program to cement a unified Ethiopia under Shoan Amhara domination results of their unwilling- ness to institute land and other reforms which would have broadened the regime's appeal and reduced domestic tensions in the long run failure to work with and win over elements of the population most notably in Eritrea and the 0gaden who are striving for greater local autonomy and inefficiency in the military organization on We interpret the IEG's reaction to the Somali threat _and pressure on the U S for assistance and support _ largely as attempts - to insure the ruling group's ability to maintain its power and wealth during and after the succession to develop a rationale for a new pipeline to U S political financial and military support in the event Kagnew Station should close down to provide a justification for increased military expenditures and for further delays in acting on signifi- cant economic and social reforms which are increasingly being pressed on the ruling elite by domestic interests and by foreign aid donors Linkages We believe that Ethiopia also bears some reaponsibility for the recent deterioration in Ethic-Somali relations which have never been close since Somalia's independence in 1960 In recent months the economic stakes of both sides in the disputed Ogsden region have increased greatly as indications of the eventuality of probable commercial oil discoveries have become known Moves by both sides led to border incidents in November which were followed by two seams- UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 0971212017 I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 0971272017 Addis Ababa A-23 P- 3 sessions of bilateral talks at the Foreign Minister level From all available evidence it appears that neither side made any substantial concession from its previous well-known position Inevitably both sides used strong talk with President Siad making what the Ethiopian - Foreign Minister reports as a veiled threat to resort to force At present bilateral negotiations appear to be completely stalled and the prospects for further talks over the Ogaden seem questionable without external pressures on both parties - Somalia and Ethiopia have conflicting claims to Djibouti as well as to the Ogaden which contributes substantially to their rivalry Despite President Pompidou's recent statements of French intention to remain in the TFAI and the apparent acceptance of this by both sides at least in the short run neither has abandoned its claim and each is probably prepared to move militarily to protect its interests if and when France leaves Djibouti Other developments in the general area have sharpened the political confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia The recent satisfactory border settlement and general detente with Sudan have at least for the foreseeable future removed any threat to EthiOpia from the North thus freeing resources for the Somali front Kenya and Ethiopia are on the verge of renewing their defense agreement and are keeping in close touch over the Somali threat During the past year five African states have broken relations with Israel This has made Israel increasingly concerned about its position in EthioPia the linchpin of Israeli interests in Africa We assume that Israel has encouraged Ethiopian concern over the Somali threat OUR REACTION TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS In view of our analysis of the current situation we believe that the - Country Team's options and recommendations not only do not address the real problems of EthioPia but also are laying new groundwork for a continued U S military involvement in EthiOpia in the event that the USG decides to close Kagnew lowing we believe that what appears to be the Country Team's principal recommendation the increase in military aid to $11 5 million is only the foot in the door The referenced airgram provides a shopping list page 8 para 3 in the event of Soviet deliveries of T-54 and MIG-21's revealing the expectations of the Ethiopian govern- ment and the Country Team The response to the Country Team's proposals should be framed with the next group of Ethiopian requirements clearly UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C17980067 Date 09 12 2017 w- _o UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 0911212017 Addis Ababa A-23 P- 4 in mind and with the realization that having taken the first step it will be difficult to refuse other Somali threat -related demands We question the Country Team's assessment that additional arms deliveries to Ethiopia would be a stabilizing factor We consider it important to note that given the inadequacy of the EthiOpian military increments in weaponry have much less than commensurate effect on its overall capability For example large deliveries of modern communications equipment have not enabled Ethiopian forces in Eritrea to coordinate air support with ground maneuvers In this context the volume and cost of weaponry needed to assure security as the Ethiopian government perceives it would involve Egalitical and financial burden on the U S which we find unacceptable A major weapons program would probably have a negative impact on U S interests by reinforcing the Ethiopian belief in a 0 3 commitment and by raising the cost of disengagement Furthermore the Country Team ignores the real possibility that additional weapons would be used in Eritrea thereby seeming to involve the 0 5 in the decade-old insurgency with possible risks to Kagnew ermine We believe that a summit meeting between the President and Emperor and to a lesser extent any meeting at the Cabinet level should be avoided at the present time Agreement to a summit meeting would signal to the Ethiopian Government that we accept their version of the Somali threat and would make it very difficult for the U S to avoid further military commitments We see no objections to consultations with other allies for an exchange of views since we believe most other allies as has France already would tend to down-play the alleged Somali threat However we strongly disagree with the Country Team s option that the 0 3 solicit military aid for Ethiopia from third countries and particularly with the notion that the 0 8 encourage Israel to become even more involved with the Ethiopian military 3 Ec is The AlDerelated possibilities and recommendations for action in the Country Team's messages appear to us clearly contrary to the purpose of economic assistance While the messages take note of the technical drawbacks to the various options the overall significance and in our minds danger of shifting the priorities of U S economic assistance in Ethiopia from develoPmental to military are not properly weighed UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 0911212017 UNDLASSEFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 09 12 2017 0 - -3- Addis Ababa A-23 p 5 We consider that one of the purposes of U S assistance is to encourage the receiving country to concentrate on economic and social development By broadening the Agriculture Sector Loan to allow shifting of IEG funds for military purposes by using part of a housing investment guarantee to allow-purchases of military equipment or by providing PL-480 wheat indirectly for military purposes the U56 would undermine long-term development prospects in Ethiopia and thus its own interests we are concerned that colonization of the Ogaden could exacerbate the tension in that area and between Ethiopia and Somalia We are also disturbed by recent indications of U S Mission encourage- ment of the Ethiopian Government to move ahead with such plans IV OUR RECOMMENDATIONS U S policy guidelines on Africa call for less direct U S involvement in African affairs particularly military African governments to solve their own emphasis on regional economic development projects and international cooperation Therefore a viable long-term U S policy would avoid a commitment to the defense of Ethiopia and its territorial claims or to maintenance of EthioPia's military strength relative to its neighbors It would also encourage the use of diplomatic channels for the settlement of bilateral disputes and in a longer tens framework promote cooperative ventures on the economic side To this end we submit the following recommendations 1 Mission officers should make it clear to the EthiOpian Govern ment that the U S considers Ethiopia capable of meeting the foreseeable Somali military pressures provided that it takes necessary measures to rationally allocate its resources and to eliminate nepotism corruption and political influence in the military program They should also suggest that EthioPia could enhance internal security in the Ogaden through a more equitable and development-oriented policy At the same time it should be made clear that the U S does not have any I'special relationship with Ethiopia other than existing treaty commitments our desire for good bilateral relations and our continued interest in Ethiopia's economic and social progress nor does the U S have any intention of competing with the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa 2 The U S should strongly urge Ethiopia and Somalia to approach the Organization of African Unity 0AU as the prOper forum for dis- cussion and mediation of the territorial and other disputes The approaching 10th anniversary celebrations provides the IEG with the opportunity to set this in motion Ethiopia has the stronger case by OAU standards since all African states have ample reason to avoid re drawing colonial boundaries the OAU beihg on record to this effect Focusing attention in the DAD on Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia may saw I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 09 12 2017 US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 0911272017 i I Addis Ababa A-23 p 6 encourage limitaticms on deliveries of offensive weapons In an era of limited U S counnitments Ethiopia should develop a more self reliant role in the 1world in which it must live 3 We recommend planning now for expansion of Ethic-Somali economic cooperation particularly in the Ogaden An example of a continuing technical Joint venture is the campaign against rinderpest The U S and other foreign donors should encourage Joint exploitation of natural resources affecting both countries e g oil and the Webs Shabelle River Such cooperation would exploit the area s potential in an efficient manner develop the neglected land and people of the Ogaden and reduce tension between Ethiopia and Somalia Classified by Parker D Hyman DOM Subject to Gen Declaas Schedule of Exec Order 11652 Automatically down- graded at 2 year intervals and declass- ified on 12 31 81 I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 017980067 Date 09I12l2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc NO 006472807 Date 01 11 2018 a- - - an - Department of State LIMITED OFFICIAL use 393 FREE 61 STATE Duesaa an ORIGIN Ss-Iu xels DRAFTED BY 3 6 73 EXT 22972 APPROVED BY s S MR HARRY BARNES NEWHIN AF - AHB CLAUDE 6 R055 HR HENDELL Ea COOTE - NR HERBERT SPIRD Isak BBIDBBZ MAR 73 FM SECSTATE HASHDC To AMEHBASSY ADDIS ABABA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE Onassa DISSENT CHANNEL 500' N l TAGSI PINS ET SUBJECIJ DISSENT CHANNEL AIRGRAH FROM 4 MC ADDIS ABAEA DATED FEB 7 1973 STATE 633673 la DEPTI RECEIVED NITH INTEREST THOUGHTFUL IDEIS EXPRESSED IN REF AIRGRAH AND APFRECIATED THEM THEY HILL BE TAKEN Into ACCOUNT DURING CONTINUING ASSESSMENT HERE OF PROBEEHS ADOPESSEDS 2 COUNTRY DIRECTOR LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSION OF ISSUES INVOLVED DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TD ADDISO ROGERS UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-O7743 Doc No 006472807 Date 01 11 2018 BB o UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 006472792 Date 01 11 2018 - 01 51 371 FORN DS LIHITED OFFICIAL USE 2 32 73 EXT - HR HARRY BARNES- ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA DISSENT CHANNEL SUBJ DISSENT CHANNEL NESSAGE FRON NESSRS AND REF ADDIS ABABA DATED FEB 71 1973 THIS UILL ACKNOULEDGE RECEIPT OF REF AIRGRAN DISSENT CHANNEL NESSAGE- -E- INITIAL DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN NADE TO THE UNDER SECRE- TART FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF POLITICAL NILITARY AFFAIRS THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU INTELLIGENCE AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF- THE BUREAUS OF EUROPEAN AND ECONONIC AND BUSINESS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTHENT AND THE CHAIRNAN OF THE OPEN FORUN PANEL 9 -- UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006472792 Dat RELEASE IN PART 01 11 2018 BB BB
OCR of the Document
View the Document >>Untitled Dissent Message on "The Somali Threat to Ethiopia," from Addis Ababa, February 7, 1973, Secret.