and that the consequences UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 606473516 Date 01 11 2018 DE PA RTM ENT OF STATE o c 20500 RELEASE IN PART 36 December 9 1974 SECRET TO - Samuel W Lewis Acting Your dissent Memorandum Critique of The Substantive Handling of The Cyprus Crisis dated Ausut 1974 scsasce' In accordance with the procedures set forth in the Department Notice of May 8 1974 concerning dissent messages this will constitute the response to your unissent Memorandum on Cyprus dated August 9 1974 Although the Secretary has had the opportunity to consider your Memorandum the Policy Planning Staff takes responsi- bility for this reply in which the tureau of European Affairs also concurs I apologize for the length of time which has elapsed - This is essentially an argument about US prescience and US power You assert in substance that l Themstatus quo ante crisis was infinitely better than the present situation and we should therefore have made greater efforts to preserve it This argument brackets the time sequence of the actual crisis 2 Before the copp -it was known that Ioannides would be severe ' -9Jstrong US representations to loannides would have prevented the crisis -- nevertheless foreknowledge was not translated into policy primarily because intelligence from Athens was at best conflicting and-because the 056 was not' in touch with the decision-making element in the GOG SECRET GDS UNCLASSIFIED Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date 01 11 2018 BB Q3 DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM 5 55 August 9 1974 sesam DISSENT MEMORANDUM The Secretary To Thru - Mr Lord From Thomas D Critique of the Substantive Handling of the Cyprus Crisis In response to your request for views including dissenting views on US handling of the Cyprus crisis I submit the comments I The intelligence from Athens was at best The CIA is backgrounding the press that conflicting UgwthElligenee had forewarning of the coup on Cyprus that STATE a that loan des had decided not 0 intervene in 3'In fact he CIA summary-of July the day 5 coup h This is a misrepresentation While the State Department's area specialists anticipated trouble on Cyprus and at tempted to do sg ething about it s early as May 17 areported_on July 14 Cyprus of the had de contained the statement Ioannides -that cided not to intervene on Cyprus It Ioannidgs deliberately mis t_e Then on July 18 he - the Greek mili ary aresnou solidly behind what Ioannides has man Brigadier General Ioannides achieved for Greece on the island is parity with the Turks and any Turkish invasion of the island wouldg unite all of the Greek nationals behind Ioannides It would be hard to imagine judgments more divorced from reality than these As events were soon to show geese mm 0 STATE AFFEALS REVIEW PANEL ifRELEASE IN FULL yr ADDITIONAL INFORMATIO NRELE ORIGINAL DECISION UPHELD ASED Exemp ons 5 27 1 QSXQ ARPAcUonCmin' ' VEar I a EL Date 30 07 I sarqb the facts of the matter were jus Greek military was not behind Ioanni coup on Cyprus made a Turkish invasion inevitable Turkey's effort to remove the Greek military shattered rather than solidified Ioannides' military base and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus did not unite all Greek nationals behind Ioannides but rather convinced the Varmy'to_bring in a civilian government which the people would support Why was the reporting from Athens _ong on all appears to be that%_ counts The were completely bemusec and bedazzled contact with Ioannides In this Eibn the recent Inspector's Report on Athens only link with Ioannides the opposite the des the Ioannides fby the gconnec exp ssed concern that the hvas _ aces The status cuo ante crisis on Cyprus was infinitely better for US interests than the present situation efbre the GreekHengineered coup on the island there had been no - intercommunal violence for several years the political situation within the Greek Cypriot community and between the Greek and Turk Cypriots was reasonably stable Greece and Turkey were not in direct confrontation and the US was New Greece and Turkey are directly engaged in gile and volatile the 1 not involved Cyprus the internal situation is fra death and devastation are enough t5 fuel the hatred of sides for many years and the US is involved Because of the overriding USG interest on preventing Cyprus from causing a Greco Turk confrontation we should have made greater efforts to preserve the-status guo before the crisis - 3 The present crisis could have been prevented ested that Ambassador Tasca If the 20n May 17 the Department sugg get'word to General Ioannides of the US National Guard and EOKAHB succeed in 'getting rid' of Makarios and installing a leadership responsive to At a direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey would become inevitable This prediction in STATE 103030 proved to be all too accurate Ambassador Tasca argued against such representations and continued to do so It is also important to realize that although he later View that lens 421m 21 '11 1 P am humans-mm that the U56 was informed of t1 prevented Sampson in power the GOT insisted on two things 1m Makarios coup i in tats 3 changed hi tune GeneralJIoannides in late June or early July told_ that he was planning an anti When fhgz epartment learned that Ioannides was giving us a message we cabled Embassy Athens stating It is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering a way to topple Makarios from power a move which could have disastrous consequences for US interests in eastern Mediterranean as well as for peeples of Cyprus Greece and Turkey In our view effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of chaos eventually causing Greco Turk confrontation involving Soviets in Cyprus situation STATE Ambassador Tasca continued to argue against such representations Eventualw ly the Department was informed by phone that the US message had been conveyed at appropriate level belovaoannides I do not think the USS knows whether or not our message was really conveyed to Ioannides In any case Ioannidms and his friends are now putting out the line in Athens 1e anti Makarios coup and said nothing - I believe that Strong US representations to Ioannides would have prevented the crisis This judgment is shared by the rest of the Greek language area specialists in SE The assertion of course cannot be proved But it is certain that no or very faint representations to Ioannides resulted in his pushing ahead with the anti Makarios coup which set in train the crisis and brought the predicted results Turkish intervention on Cyprus could have been Following the Greek army coup which placed replace- ment of Sampson and the withdrawal of elements of the Greek army responsible for the coup Only the achievement of these goals could possibly have prevented a Turkish invasion If the US had made strong representations to the Government of Greece for the removal of Sampson ahd the Greek coup leaders the Greek military which_eventnal ly-overthrew Ioannides have taken such actions in order to avoid Turkish intervention This assertion likewise cannot be proved In retrospect however it clear that the failure of any party connected with the Cyprus situation to move against SampSon and the Greek coup rendered intervention by Turkey inevitable ages is w ul- The USG was netwin touch with the decision making in the see the I 1 a D 3 ng I gbessador accepted_ situatig i both the Ambassador ft I were apparently very reluctant to the Ioannides what he did not wish to hear 1 US was opposed to a Greek coup on Cyprus In short there was no meaningful communication between the USG and the GOG until Under Secretary Sisco's arrival in Athens and his insistence on talking to Ioannides _By that time it was too late to avert the Cyprus crisis of 1974 6 US handling of the crisis produced significant tactical successes but a protracted Greco Turk confronta ition over Cyprus may result Since the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis a ceasefire has been achieved a Greco Turk th war averted and a negotiating process will soon begin wi some chance of solving the Cyprus problem The British are out in front with US diplomacy playing a crucial sup porting role Ioannides has been overthrown and constitu tidnal government reestablished in Greece the SOViets have been neutralized and the UN engaged in the peace keeping fa aspect of the situation However our policy has not been an unmitigated success there are real problems looming vThese are The balance between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus has i- been upset For the past several years the situation has remained in rough equilibrium because the Greek majority _on the island itself was balanced by Turkish power in the area Now the Turks have overwhelming power on Cyprus and in the area - i 7 The situation of overwhelming Turkish power is unetable because of the likelihood that Greece will m 'eventually respond by augmenting its own military presencn on Cyprus both to improve its relationship vis a vis Turkey and to protect the-Greek Cypriots Since the Cyprus power balance between Greece and Turkey strongly favors the latter the chance for negotia- tions resulting in agreement is reduced Turkey will push 'too hard witness the continuing violations of the ce fire of July 22 and the Geneva agreement and Greece and the Greek Cypriots will be unable to aCcept a humiliation or sell out The Geneva agreement is already being described in many Greek and Greek Cypriot quarters as bOth a humiliation and a sell out a daminf Jungian 5 itagpii 33 ii rainasatia sa i an is 1 mil53's 1 Eigqj is positionsf - pressure from the US as well- Ln Path 5 1 i is igug rhgg i L - 13 11 5 tiara 4mm The fate of the Karamanlis government is closely linked to the Cyprus situation Karamanlis political government and constitutionalism in Greece are to some extent at the mercy of developments in Cyprus Karamanlis will be required at a minimum to spin out the Cyprus negotia tions while he strengthens his own position in Greece Any developments in the Cyprus situation which result in further major military or diplomatic defeats for GreeCe would place Karamanlis and his government in extreme jeopardy If the Karamanlis government falls its successor whether left or right civilian or military 5 will probably blame the US for Greece's defeat on Cyprus_ the Greeks are 'not going to blame themselves and would be dedicated to redeeming Greece's Cyprus humiliation If the Cyprus situation deteriorates further the Soviets will be presented with good opportunities in Greece the The detachment of Greece from NATO and elimination of US bases under a Karamanlis successor government and an antiHTurk insurgency on Cyprus should not be excluded as potential results of a failure of the and Cyprus _Geneva talks US policy has favored Turkish objectives and Following the July 22 ceasefire Turkey war materiel into Cyprus and to acquire territory by force Since the Geneva Agreement Turkey has continued to reinforce and is advancing as this is written August 7 Regardless of whether or not strong USG representations to Turkey could in fact have contained their military thrust Greeks and Greek Cypriots will regard the US the author of the ceasefire as responsible for TIrkey's gains Moreover 'now that Turkey has an entrenched military position on Cyprus it will be very reluctant to give it up and only strong as the rest of the interna On the 7 continued to pour men an tional community will induce Turkey to do so other hand no Greek Government and no Greek'Cypriot Government can accept a negotiated solution which involves a 'n anythingi sence made mainland Turkey military presence on Cyprus 1 like their present numbers Therefore US acquie in Turkey's powerful military beachhead on Cyprus has successful negotiations in Geneva extremely doubtful p 21 sax- 2 mm 6 47 Turn-wt W251 V3123 93 a - 'j Partition is not a solution it simply creates a different set of problems Eyen now after two weeksmof fighting killing and evictions there are still perhaps 40 000 Turk Cypriots outside of the Kyrenia triangle and several thousand Greek Cypriots inside it Moreover the Kyrenia Nicosia Turkish salient is too small to support the entire Turk Cypriot population Therefore partition still requires Turkey to take a great deal more real estate and still requires an enormous population shift I doubt if either of these requirements is possim ble without-a war between Greece and Turkey But even if such shifts could be achieved and if the objections of the Soviets and others Couldlma ignored the Cyprus problem would still not be solved There would simply be a'new ill defined frontier for Greece and Turkey to-fight over with the Greeks regarding Kyrenia as a kind of Mediterranean Alsace Partition will not work any better in Cyprus than it has in Ireland or Palestine Partition will guarantee that Cyprus will remain a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey thus destabilizing NATO's southeastern flank permanently 8 J- Recommendation yprus problem depends A long term solution to the upon a tradc off between a greatly reduced urkish military If presence and complete autonomy forvthe Turk-Cypriots are to be successful the Geneva negotiations on Cyprus Turkey which has the position-of greatest strength will have to make the most compromises Greece says it cannot accept either federation or the presence of two Turkish Divisions on Cyprus Clerides will accept-federation with an autonomous Turk Cypriot Administration but only a symbolic Turkish military presence Turkey will insist on both autonomy for the Turk Cypriots and its continued military presence The trade off is obvious federation for withdrawal but it will require maximum pressure on Turkey Drafted EUR SE TDBoyatt mjb 8 12 74 ext 20529 I 1 ante tft 1 Gehrig aims 1 shuns it tsiis iatii iiaa a ya UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date 01 11 2018 SECRET 2 3 After the coup it was known that a Turkish military intervention could only have been prevented by removal of Sampson and the Greek coup leaders on Cyprus -- strong US representations to the Greeks to remove them would have prevented the intervention nevertheless foreknowledge was again not translated into policy 4 After the Turkish intervention it is a fact that the present situation which is tending to evolve toward partition of the island is fraught with peril permanent Greek-Turkish confrontation with permanent destabilization of NAIO's southeastern flank and permanent opportunities for the USSR_in-the area -- strong 05 pressure on Turkey in favor of a tradeoff of Turkish military withdrawal for federation on Cyprus can'substantially correct this situation even if the status guo ante cannot be restored nevertheless it does not appear that these perceptions are being translated into policy Nobody would claim perfection for our policy concerning Cyprus but a different view of what we eculd have foreseen and what we could have done is I think legitimate 1 In general it would have been very hard for the use as a government to foresee the present and to make greater efforts to preserve the status guo on cyprus in consequence even if our channels of communication had been perfect - Most people concerned with the area worried about the status 390 in the whole area whose importance transcended that of Cyprus The status 0 on Cyprus however good it looks in retrospect was based on second-class status for the island's Turkish population and had been repeatedly called into question since independence -- not least by Makarios himself SECRET -- UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date 01 11 2018 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date 01 11 2018 SECRET 3 It was clear that the two status use were somehow - related but it was not clear how they were related For this reason it could not be clear that resolute US action to preserve the status guo on Cyprus was the sine gga non of regional stab ty even had it been true and even had the success of US action been assured The hesitancy which marked our Cyprus policy before the caup may therefore have been inevitable or at least natural 2 In that general framework our specific policy before the coup was almost bound to be hesitant too Intelligence reports from Athens were at best conflicting as you put it Beyond that as you also note stronger US representations might not have been heard in Athens But even if they had been made'and heard the long-term consequences for US policy in the area were problematic Ioannides might in fact have backed down and then been ejected in favor of a civilian government But we might also have been left in the center of a dispute between an enraged Turkish government and an irritated and more entrenched Greek junta coming off a successful coup on Cyprus with very important facilities in both Greece and Turkey in jeopardy With the best of information we would have confronted a range of difficult choices 3 This was also true after the coup which clearly made Turkish intervention likely and some I kind of US action necessary There was no real doubt that after over a decade of acquiescence the Turks were determined this time to set right what they considered a fundamentally wrong and necessarily unstable situation on Cyprus and that they would not i fr intervention would provoke the Greek-Turkish war everyone wished to avoid But the question of how best to avoid it was once again complex Your advice judging from your Memorandum would have been to remove the basis for Turkish intervention and therefore of Greek-Turkish war by pressure on the Greeks to remove Sampson and the Greek officers responsible for the coup Had such pressure been applied and been successful the Turks might have backed down in the upshot the humiliated Greek junta might have been replaced Unhappily this was not the only possible SECRET US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date 01l11 2018 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 006473516 Date 01 11 2018 - 4 or even only likely prospect As you note success could not have been assured even with better intelligence And another result might have been Sampson in the Greek Cypriot saddle an infuriated Greek junta at war with Turkey which had'landed on Cyprus the US in the middle and the_whole infra-structure of the Western security position inthe Eastern Mediterranean at risk Or alternatively since Sampson appeared from the outset a very dubious horse with little staying power especially after Makarios' escape became known it was arguable whether any push-was needed At least I think it is hard to argue that the range of ambiguous choices shrank with the coup - In this situation we chose to struggle for breathing space We sought to encourage the UK to bring the other'two Guarantor-Powers into negotiation to discourage the Turks and reprove the Greeks without condemning either publicly in ways which could only harden both their positions and to warn them both off war This policy was not totally successful in large part because the Turks apparently made a definite decision to intervene and placed their demands in London at a high enough level to ensure rejection -But war was avoided negotiations began - and in the upshot civilian government was restored in Greece - We were-not entirely responsible for either the successes or the failures whatever the Greeks may now insist -But this outcome with all its faults avoided the Worst preserved-some-US capacity to mediate between two valuable Allibs and thereby at least Opened onto a future consonant with broad US policy interests -- 19 4 th' Tu'ms'h'mt wentrom' I see-11's - engaged in essentially the course you recommend encouraging the parties toward a solution acceptable to them in the awareness that_Turkey with its strengthened position will need to make the most concessions and that some form of tradeoff between military withdrawal'and federation will probably underlie any agreement - Thus there appears-to be no basic disagreement on current policy There is none concerning the perils of the-present situation for US and Western interests in the critical area At the same time SECRET UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C06473516 Date 01 11 2018 SECRET 5 I recognize we may have different views on timing and what the US can and should do -It is apparent that the road ahead will be long and involved and the outcome uncertain But that is the real problem we cannot assure a given outcome by maximizing pressure on Turkey or on anyone Both the Greeks and the Turks are aware that we do not necessarily espouse all their-objectives as a matter of policy All we favor as a matter of policy is a solution that they the communities on Cyprus and the international community can live with Only time and much more effort will tell whether one can-be achieved Still while there are few grounds for optimism there are as yet no grounds for despair _ - Concur EUR - Mr Stable -cc The Secretary The Executive Secretary Mr Lord - EUR - Mr Hartman -s P-prp Mr Smith Drafted by x28613 SECRET UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006473516 Date 01 11 2018