UNCLASSIFIED U S Dapartment of State Case NO F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445819 Datel12f11f2017 RELEASE IN PART BS october 20 1975 To 5113 1111-5101 Aer-d- - - From I Subject Dissent tap on Dept's Delicies on Terrorism I dissent fret the following l The Dept procl-iims that it w_ll not negotiate with terrorists see attached JShe Dept gives as its reason that this policy deters future kidnappings Dissent anggnents this policy is nothing more than a slogan like don't give 1p the ship The Rand study showed that a country' policy on terzorism regardless of what the policy is is the least significant factor in terrorists - planning action and re-action The Rand st1dy also showed- there is no btsis 1 0 alleging that the no negotiation policy rictually deters kidn 1ppings - I have S-iid a grelt deal more on this subject in letters memms etc which the Dept has out h 1s ignored other than to conmission the R1nd stud-y and then thro 5 the results they do not fit in with the Dept's pre conceived notions 2 The Dent punishes Anbis ssdors v -ho successt'nlly negotiite to save lives -- See the ixrxexix -Bever1y - arter Dissent since- I believe- that- negoti-tine -to rg save lives is not only desireole_ in itself -h1t usnillv_ shows a high deg ee of diploniticrskill courige I reconnend th 1t any official v 'ho does this snuld oe't praised t-nh- Do you realize the effect the Carter episode cill h-ve on JS Govt 'offici1ls 1he message is cle-r save lives and ruin your own career - 3 The Dept refnses even to finish the Rind study nroject The c15e studies in -cluding the one on Khirtoum uhich was the 'major point of originil request for in inde ndent study qw hive never been delivered to the Dept even tholgh they are finished seeinse the Dept refuses to pay 'or them I an sure the Dept is afrsid the C1se stidies show sone officialsJincliding high-risking ones making errors which cl sed loss of life Does no one hive the gits to set the stidies 1nd le 1rn from them Why are we pinishing sons 0 like 3e Cirter ho- sncceegped 1nd coveriqg up for v ho ftiled0-0 I- UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016- 67743 Doc No 006445819 Date 12 11 2017- UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445819 Date 12 11 2017 1 k3 The most importint pert of the Rind study section containing reconnendxtions for findings and for changes in policy WIS rejected and ordered to oe re writteh in 1 form pildilble to the Dept by Witering down the conclusions and slicing them in 1 separate innex So the end_resu1t has not yet appeired and when it does it will lack clirity and impact Agzin the Dept prefers to risk human lives rather than face the fact that its policies are imperfect - the 5 The Dept does not even make the existing sections of the study avsilsble to officers handling hosttge siutitions hen I uring the Tanzania Zaire case the office dire tor wasnot told of the studies and only saw them when I'hinded my own COpies to him for his perusal ote one of firSt conclusions of the Rand was that each newnostege_situztion was handled as no previous experie ce was available The Zaire case illuStrited perfectly - Dissent we need the Rand study letThe-Dept disowns Ambassadors who use Official resources to assist in negotiating the T819159 of eiptives 'See the Carter story fet Carter did not iike env more use of resonrces thin other Ambassadors have in other cases ransom money his oeen shirped hy'pouch stored in official safes 1nd persons conticting kidniopers hive been escorted 'by 35 Emhissy officials If the Dept sticks with disowning who do this then in future 01888 will hesitite to ise such rescirces DiSSent all resozrces ShOlld be used to save lives i 5 The-Dept-insists on'innouncing on everv possible occasion and on instructing posts to do the same that we do not give in'to or rehase prisoners hese phrases especially give in to blickaiilf are negative in their innict on 1 hostage situition and confuse not only the public see the Egan case but also impede negotixtions even when the letter are going on priVitely If we want to negotiate but guy agreement we make with the even if only Plblishing a letter from a hostage is going- to be interpreted as giving in to blackmail then we hive too contradictory polichs running head on into e1ch_other As long as those inst untions exist posts hostage situations are going to make the same mistake agsin and again by immediately announcing we dont give in to blackmail just when the 3131 3103 is most tense and when the greatest' flexioility is needed - UNCLASSIFIED USDeparth1ent of State case No Fame-07743 o oc Nojcoe445819 Date 12 C dk 1 5201 7 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 006445819 Date 12 11 2017 Dissent issue instruct'ons to everyone from the PreSident in-the White House se case thru the-Secretary of Stite see the Tensinia cise on down to the lowliest clerk not forgetting the General of the United who tilked too much during a hostzge situation when the post was very wisely maintaining totil silence i when you hive a hostage Eltlitlon close your nozth dont say inything about our policy other than that we desire to keep co nunic1tions open 6 The Dept gives first priority to working with and through the host governnent ind only as a last resort'works directly 'with the terrorists This isuan urtificisl priority _which may make sense in any ordinary diplomatic situatio but is irrelevant to a hostage situttion where is to Sive lives - I Dissent instruct posts to take whatever-steps are needed directlye 9 thru the host government' depending on what will be most effective to ssve lives 7 The Dept has many strands of policies entangling hostage situations relations with foreign acintries good public relations image etc we are encumbered by all this and distracted by it The sole policy is SAVE LIVES Dissent revise illvinstructions-to eliminate idets which - srevthere-selely for press relstions purposes 7ntnd get n down to the h1rd core 'We are not running an sdvertising canptign we sre trying to issue instructions to save lives These instr1ctions shonld'be as clear and simple and free of confusing the instructions in a first-aid kit which tell you how to st0p soneone from to death apply direct pressure to the wound up I Conclusion I have been trying since L971 to push the away from its machismo-inige self-concerns into an policy which worries about hostages rather than how the Dept will look I-belie e some lives may have seen lost and others endangered by the Dent's e refusal to move I think the time his cone to ask the Dept to find the moral courige to take the Rand study admit past mistakes and issue a new policy instructions which is simply Keep quiet negotiateUNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No Date 12 11l2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No C06445837 Date a To b5 DEPA RTM ENT OF STATE PART 86 Washington 0 12 1 20520 CONFIDENTIAL November 13 1975 To - Mr Thornton From - Robert A Fearey% Subject Dissent Message on Terrorism from BB Pursuant to your memo of October 23 and our subsequent telephone conversation information is provided on the points advanced byi n her October 20 Dissent Paper on Department's'Policy on errorism The paragraph numbers below correspond with those in her memorandum l the Department does not negotiate with terrorists By negotiate I mean bargain on ransom or other concessions She is also correct that the Department gives as its basic reason for this policy its belief that our refusal to negotiate with terrorists deters kidnappings With respect to ldissent arguments against this position the US policy 0 not negotiating with or acceding to the demands-of'terrorists is in no sense a slogan It is a carefully considered policy which has proved its soundness over time We seek to deny successes to terrorists so that the incen i tive to terrorists to seize Ameridans abroad and foreign diplo- i mats in this country will be minimized There is considerable -evidence which I can make available to you that our no-ransom no concessions policy is widely known and believed by Palestinian and other terrorists and that it is in fact helping to deter abductions There is also convincing evidence that this policy has not been at the expense of the safe recovery of Americans who have been kidnapped with the possible exception of the Khartoum case says that the RAND study Preposed Policy for Deal'ng hostage Incidents showed that a country's policy on the least significant factor in terrorists' planning action and reaction and that there is no basis for CONFIDENTIAL GEE UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445837 Date 12l11l2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 00644583 Date 12 11 2017 CONFIDENTIAL 2 alleging that the 'no negotiation' policy actually deters kid- nappings dy is by no means as clear or positive in that view as indicates It states that the relation- ship between no-ransom no-concession policies and subsequent ter- rorist actions is unclear but it specifically recognizes that such policies do have deterrent value though not as much RAND alleges as the USG has tended to believe Re allegation that the Department has ignored her earlier letters and memoranda files include a number of memoranda fro my predecessors Ambassadors Meyer and Hoffacker tol lresponding to her criticisms and complaints par ticu ar in regard to the Khartoum incident and RAND's examina- tion of that incident I understand that Ambassador Hoffacker also offered to meet_with to discuss the issues but that she did not re5pond to suggestion queries and proposals were not ignored the file shows they were carefully answered She has never approached me in writing or in person though I would of course have been prepared to see her In answer to Ifurther points under dissent number 1 the RAND study was not commissioned as a result of expressed views it was c0mmissioned because the Department wis Ed' the benefit of RAND's examination of and recommendations on USG policies and procedures in hostage cases Far from the results of the study being thrown away because they do not fit the Depart- ment's preconceived notions the study of which the conclusions and recommendations section was received only a few weeks ago is undergoing careful analysis in prior to its sub ission with our views and recommendations to Mr Eagleburger A number of RAND's recommendations put forward during the course of the study's preparation have already been reflected in-our terroriSm policies and procedures as set forth in A-775 February 5 1975 and A-4709 July 10 1975 - - 2 that the Department punishes Ambassadors successfully negotiate to save lives Saving lives is a major objective in any terrorist incident But it is also important to pursue that objective by means which will minimize incentives to future terrorism 'These two objectives are often in conflict which is why we have carefully drawn policies and procedures set forth in and A-4709 designed to achieve the hostage's safe release while at the same t' denrina juccess to the terrorists There is no basis for allegation that the message is clear save lives ruin your own career Ambassadors who helped to save American f li -- WI 6 uh CONFIDENTIAL I m a g 6 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445837 Date 12l11l2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 00644583 Date 12111201 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 00644583 Date 1211112017 CONFIDENTIAL 3 hostages' lives in the Barbara Hutchison case in Santo Domingo the Col Morgan case in Beirut and in other instances have had their contributions explicitly recognized in commendatory mes sages from the Secretary and other high Department officials 3 Ialleges that the Department refuses even to finish tie ostage study project and related case studies She charges in effect a cover-up by the Department of its handling of terrorist incidents particularly Khartoum The fact is that has done everything possible to expedite completion and delivery of these studies However RAND found that a thorough job required more time_than it had expected and they and we have not wished to sacrifice quality for speed The completed hostage study though still not assembled in one 'piece and formally submitted was received a few weeks ago The case studies of individual terrorist incidents such as the one in Khartoum were not contracted for as a part of the hostage study but were prepared by RAND as working source materials for the hostage study recently committed $12 000 to enable RAND to up-grade these working materials to the status of Reports 8 or 9 case studies including the one on Khartoum bearing RAND's formal approval or Working Notes 4 or 5 case studies not hearing this formal approval The De 5 never refused to pay for these case studies as alleges but rather has pursued their com pletion and submission as rapidly as work on the basic hostage study permitted The Department has c00perated fully with RAND in providing documents and participant witnesses to assist prepara- tion of the case studies to RAND's complete satisfaction The only delays were when a few documents notably some NODIS Khartoum cables initially could not be found As soon as they were found they were provided to RAND There is no basis for __ allegation of an attempted Department cover up on Khartoum or any other incident - charges that RAND's recommendations for changes in terrorism olicies were rejected by the Department and ordered to be rewritten in a form palatable to it by watering down the conclusions and placing them in a separate annex did at RAND's request review sections of its report as they were prepared providing informal written comments and dis- cussing them with RAND officials when they were in Washington CONFIDENTIAL BB UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445837 Date 12 112017 l u' 4-- - CONFIDENTIAL 4 These discussions reflected RAND's and belief that the final RAND report would be most useful if its authors had the benefit of our reactions as preparation of the report proceeded This interchange also permitted us to benefit from some of RAND's recommendations during the two years that the report was in preparation One RAND proposal which apparently has in mind and which has never commended itself to ICCT is that the Secre- tary be asked to approve in advance a ransom Option in instances when it appears that payment of a ransom might save an American life This proposal was extensively discussed by with the RAND study authors in the months prior to completion of their study during which the RAND authors basically maintained their proposal in Spite of arguments against it Some three months ago it was agreed in one of these discussions that because RAND's concept was that the ransom Option should be known only to the Secretary and a few top Department officials and because both RAND and wished the completed RAND report to be made widely available RAND should submit_its full reasoning underlying this prOposal in a confidential letter to would then use this letter in presenting the pr0posal to the Secretary without support for his consideration while discussion of the proposal in the formal widely available report would be confined to its more general aSpects This confidential letter was subsequently received by from RAND By that time however the Secretary had publicly stated at Vail and Orlando that the US Government wouldsnever negotiate with terrorists making it clear that he would not entertain a ransom option accordingly decided that a memorandum from to the Secretary embodying the RAND kg proposal without backing would serve no useful purpose ugheeat this_t1me It accordingly withdrew the confidential letter 0 9 I and included its entire reasoning underlying the proposal in the conclusions and recommendations section of the final report A copy of the confidential letter is nevertheless retained in file with RAND's knowledge alleges that the first three sections of the RAND stu y containing essentially background material and analysis were not made available to officers handling hostage situations ft is true that these sections were not initially distributed by because it was felt that such distribution should await CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 00644583 Date 12 11 2017 -- I- UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 00644583 Date 12 11 2017 in I - 3 CONFIDENTIAL 5 receipt of the conclusions and recommendations section and Seventh Floor decision in disposition of the full report After receipt of that section had been delayed made the initial sections available last July to a number of interested Department offices and to AFSA I would have been glad to make them avail- able to the Office Director had he asked for them or had I felt that they had useful relevance to our Stanford students case which they did not Present plans subject to approval by and receipt of the necessary copies from RAND are to make the complete RAND study including the recently received conclusions and recommenda tions section available to all members of the Cabinet Committee Working Group to Combat Terrorism on which 22 USS departments and agencies are represented The study's title would also be included in the INR Papers Available circular and would thus be available to all interested Department officers and to all Foreign Service Posts abroad - 4 Ialleges that the Department publicly disowns Ambassadors 0 use official resources to assist in negotiating the release of captives such as shipment of ransom funds by pouch storage of such funds in official safes and escorting of persons contacting kidnappers by US Embassy officials BB These things were done in the Stanford students or Patter son cases some with Specific prior Department approval but not by the Secretary and some with subsequent tacit Department approval but not by the Secretary As earlier noted there is no basis for_Ms _Balmerfs charge that the Department disowns Ambassadors who use official resources to assist in'obfaining the release of captives as long as the resources are preperly used 5 - _1contends that the Department overdoes 1t5 public emp asis on our no-ransom no-conce551ons policy and that this over-emphasis impedes negotiations during hostage situations to the detriment of the safe release of the hostages She recom- mends that the US officials maintain silence on these policie during incidents Partly as a resultcm'arecommendation by RAND during prepara- tion of its hostage study it is now a firm and accepted element of our terrorism policies and procedures but not yet formally CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 00644583 Date 12 11 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445837 Date 12 112017 - - I - CONFIDENTIAL 6 transmitted to the field that US officials will not publicly reiterate our no ransom no-concession policies during an inci- dent Our position during incidents is that these policies are well known that their reiteration is therefore unnecessary and implicitly that their reiteration might provoke retaliatory action by the abductors against the American hostage 6 the US policy of refusing to deal directly wit terrorists She recommends that our posts be instructed to take whatever steps are needed directly or through the host government depending on what will be most effeEFive to SAVE - BB For the reasons indicated above the U56 does not negotiate with terrorists The USG on the other hand has in the past and does now authorize USG officials to meet with terrorists or their representatives to secure information about the well being of the hostages to transmit mail and packages to them and to urge their unconditional release For the reasons earlier indicated it is considered inadvisable for the U56 to go beyond this to enter into negotiations looking to concessions to terrorists But our policy is explicitly designed to save lives -- the lives involved in a particular incident and the far larger number of lives of exposed Americans around the world who might be seized if the U56 started to pay ransom or make political concessions 7 is hard to follow but seemS an appeal to eliminate consideration from our release of hostages efforts of our relations with other countries good public relations etc and to concentrate exclusively on saving lives The USG must of course conduct all its activities including saving the lives of American-hostages abroad in light of its foreign policy and public relations interests There have never- theless been instances such as the Egan case in Argentina 13 March when host governments have failed to act effe ive1 to secure the safe release of American hostages and the U56 has not revision of Circular Airgram will-k prepared as soon as a number of S CCT-pr0posed clarification of our terrorism a policies and procedures have been approved by the Seventh Floor CONFIDENTTAL UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445837 Date 12 11 2017 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 006445837 Date 12 11 2017 CONFIDENTIAL 7 acted quickly and firmly to press such governments to take more effective action or has failed to take over the release effort itself when feasible This problem was addressed and necessary provisions made in A-4709 July 10 1975 The US has in effect taken over the effort to secure the release of the current American captives in Eritrea But the problem can never be com- pletely overcome We will never be able to ignore our relations with host governments or with other governments or our public relations interests as we work to recover seized Americans abroad In her final Conclusions refers to her efforts since 1971 to I'push the Department away from its machismo image self-concerns into an outward-looking'policy which worries about hostages rather than how the Department will look She asks the Department to find the moral courage to take the RAND study admit past mistakes and issue a new policy instruction which is simply Keep quiet publically sic negotiate As already noted the U56 does its utmost to secure the safe release of hostages consistent with the denial of successes to terrorists We have had a good record in this effort There have been very few terrorist incidents in which even by the advantage of hindsight we could have achieved better results through dif- ferent policies and procedures viewing the matter not only from the long-term deterrence point of view but also from the point of view of thE'immediate purpose to save American hostage lives It is not a matter of machismo-image self-concerns but of sound policies and procedures for the saving of American lives in both the short and long terms - As for the RAND study this as already indicated is now being analyzed by preparatory to the submission of recommen- dations to for any improvements of our existing terrorism policies and procedures which the RAND recommendations might indicate ile there will be ne or two such recommendations does not perceive in the RAND report any basis for recom- mending important changes in our current terrorism policies Except for its ransom option proposal neither it appears does RAND S CCT RAFearey ijg CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2016-07743 Doc No 00644583 Date 12 11 2017 BB