- -- -_ W _ _ C 013 8 4 4 6 0 - - ---- - _ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Y EO 13526 3 3 h 2 T H E B A T T L E F O R I R A N Contents I INTRODUCTION II IRAN ANCIENT AND MODERN A The Nation 1 Imperial Past 2 The People 3 The Economy 4 Politics and Government B Between Russia and The Kest 1 Aggression from the North 2 The Oil Dispute 1949-53 3 Iran and U S Foreign'Policy Ill COVERT ACTION A The Genesis of TPAJAX B THe Planning Phase C Putting the Plan into Action 0 Involving the Shah E The First Attempt--and Failure F Turning Defeat Around IV THE AFTERMATH OF VICTORY -A V THE LONG VIEW OF THE COVERT ACTION IN IRAN APPENDICES A S Whose Oil An Abbreviated History of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute Biographic Sketches C The Legend The Iranian O peration in the Press D E F G The Plans for TPAJAX Chronology The Trial of Mosadeq and Riahi Pap of Tehran 3 3 h 2 CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED I2065 CONDUCTED Of 2 7 3 G RIV TFVE OL RY U LLVL LJ VUVv ItLta REVW ON DERIYEJ FROM Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 TU I 7 v X1 f'f a U - C01384460 t Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 W3RXI NG PAPER OZ-t% l1%M I FDREWORG This account of the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the political action operation that altered the course of history in Iran was written with the enthusiastic cooperation of the Near East Division Directorate of Operations It is based on files remaining in the Division although the great bulk of the correspondence and traffic dealing with the operation was destroyed in 1962 on the draft history written in 1954 by Dr Donald N Wilber on personal interviews with a number of active and retired Agency officers who participated in the action on Central Reference Service personality files and on a variety of open sources Unless otherwise noted major documentary sources were NE Division files Claud H Corrigan CIA History Staff Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 4q AD'11NISTIiAl1Ut Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C0138446 0 THE BATTLE FOR IRAN INTRODUCTION I Iran in late 1952 was sliding toward economic and political chaos Its young ruler Mohammad Reza Shah was indecisive and vacillating in' the face of the crisis created by his fanatically nationalistic Premier the 72-year-old Mohammad hosadeq l His country was involved in a bitter dispute with Great Britain over the oil concession- that the British had since 1901 built into a lucrative industry Iran's nationalists personi- fied by Mosadeq had paralyzed this industry rather than allow foreigners to continue to direct its operations and benefit froin their natural With the dispute at an impasse and with Hosadeq ruling by resources decree the country seemed headed for an economic collapse and political anarchy whose final outcome could well have been the establishment of a Soviet satellite in the diddle East How the diplomatic and intelligence servicesof the United States ioyai to_tne history worked with Iranians I anan to prevent the loss or Iran is the subject or tills 3 3 h 2 Understanding of how and why this action was taken-will be clarified by an initial review of historical events and of Iran's people economy and politics II IRAN ANCIENT AND MODERN A The Nation 1 Imperial Past The first Persian2 empire that of the Achaemenid dynasty was founded by Cyrus the Great in the Sixth Century B C through conquest 1 See Appendix B for a brief biography of Mosadeq 2 Persia was derived through Greek from Persis the name the Greeks used for Parsa the tribe and province of the Achaemenids In 1935 Reza Shah insisted that forei nets use Iran the native usage which means Land of the Aryans rather R M-h 1 I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 %-i juxrI- C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 of-the hedes and other kingdoms of the region now generally known Cyrus grandson Darius further extended the as the Middle East empire which he divided into 20 satraps or provinces connected-by-------- a network of imperial roads The Achaemenid empire endured for almost 200 years until it was destroyed by Alexander the Great of Macedonia the Greeks were soon succeeded by the Parthian dynasty which in turn was followed by the Sassanids who ruled for 400 years from the third to the seventh centuries A D and whb restored the glory of ancient Persia In 651 however the Arab invasion swept across Persia which for the next nine centuries was ruled by a succession of foreign conquerors A native Persian dynasty rose again at the beginning of the 16th century when the Safavids came to power their rule lasted over 200 years and reached its peak under Shah Abbas from 1587 to 1620 Invading Afghans overthrew the Savavids in 1722 and were in turn driven out by Nadir Shah a Turkic-speaking tribesman who launched a campaign of conquest that included invasions of India and the Caucasus The succeeding dynasty that of the Qajars lastedntil the early 1920's when Reza Khan a colonel in the Iranian army's Cossack Division seized power in a military coup Me became Shah in 1925 deposing the Qajars and founding the Pahlavi dynasty N 1 1nen Iran was occupied in 1941 by-British and Soviet troops in order to guarantee the Allied supply route to the Reza Shah embattled Russians abdicated and was succeeded by his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the present Shah 2 The people Of Iran's population in 1952 of under 18 million more than I Toro were ethnic Iranians of Indo-European stock Persians made up Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 1a C01384460 c r u rr Approved for Re 2017 09 27 C01384460 SUio bf the total The other ethnic Iranians included Kurdish Gilani Ullazandarani Lur Bakhtiari and Baluchi tribesmen many of whom were nomadic or seminomadic peoples Another 22A or so of the population were Turkic peoples primarily the Azarbaijani of the northwestern provinces but also including the Turkaman and Qashqai tribal groups Arabs made up about S% of the po pulation and the remainder were non-Muslims including Armenians Assyrians and Jews Persian or Farsi as it is known in Iran was -the -official language spoken by most ethnic Iranians although Turkic and Arabic dialects sere also in use Almost all Iranians are Shia Muslims in contrast to the Sunnis who predominate in the Muslim world Shiites believe that the true succession to the leadership of Islam continued through the line of 'Ali ioliainad's son-in-law in the series of the 12 Imams in contrast to the Sunnis who insist that the Caliphs succeeding Mohammad were selected by the consensus of the Muslim community Although there is no organized Shia hierarachy certain titles distinguish special members of the religious community A cleric of limited theological training is a mullah while one who has studied at a higher institution is a mujtahid and qualified to adjudicate questions of religious conduct The most important Iranian-religious leaders have borne the honorary title of Ayatollah and the leader at the Shrine at the city of Qom may issue decrees which have the force of la to the faithful A descendant of Mohammad may use the title Sayyid as part of his name but he is not necessarily a religious figure The social structure in the early 1050's included an elite composed of the shah his court and the 200 or more ruling families whose wealth Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 l1- RT- '1 001384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 -derived from agricultural landholdings Below the elite was the upper middle class that included government officials professional men 'The urban middle class consisted importers bankers and merchants mainly of savall merchants craftsmen lower level clergy and teachers and as a group had not benefited greatly from the economic development and-educational opportunities of the previous two decades The day laborers street vendors and service workers were at the bottom of 'the urban class structures Most of the country's people were working in the 1950 era as tenants bound to their landlords by an almost feudal system Outside the Iranian social structure were the tribes whose social system in times of peace impeded the progress and modernization of Iran and was a source of weakness In times of stress however the tribes were a source of strength C -i'n the 1941-45 period they remained relatively untouched by the general collapse but nonetheless national internal while retaining som estability the tribes contributed tohconfusion and disorder through their clannish narrow-mindedness tribal rather than national loyalties and readiness to resort to violence ' -As a people Iranians have been described4 as having an intense national pride that has resulted from a fairly homogeneous stock and a - 2 500-year history In spite of this pride in the achievements of past dynasties and the high level of intelligence among those who have had the means to develop their potentials the national movement of the 1950's accomplished little 4 John Marlow in Iran A Short Political Guide Frederick A Praeger New York 1953 SE 'Ji S S Sr1 c -r k ' - 4t ' Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 -M C013 84460 - - ''-' - '- -- I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Jjb lw -- Among the reasons accounting for this are the fact that nationalistic feelings and native intelligence are of ten accompanied try ndi'vi dual i sm -that-A nhi bi ts 'cooperati one rtby a cynicism that despises enthusiasm by an impatience that derides calculation and by a volubility that abhors discretion Their nationalism thus has lackec an air of c ounon purpose of willingness to sacrifice of the dedication that-has given impetus to-the national movements of other 'less well-endowed peoples 3 The economy In 1950 Iran was still basically an agricultural nation with a backward economy Farming stock raising forestry and fisheries probably accounted for half the gross national product wheat was the major crop followed by barley rice cotton and tobacco Manufacturing was growing in importance with textiles--cotton and wool--leading-the cemient match and glass industries although food processing was still the most important non-oil activity Oil of course prior to 1951 when the effects of the dispute with the British were severely felt was contributing about a third of budgetary revenue and nearly two-thirds of foreign exchange started to climb when the war nded going fromr-7 13 million Z 16 03 mi Ilion 1946 to - 1952 they were onlyi8 3 million Oil revenues in r in 1950 by In 1950 31 217 000 metric tons of oil were exported but this fell to 9 158 000 metric tons in 1951 and to a pitiful 14 000 metric tons in 1952 when the British left Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 4 ' C01384460 ro tiro r nn i4U 11H1b l nr l 1' L - nnl oa ri n Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 4 Politics and government Until the early years of the 20th century Persia had either been an absolute monarchy or had been under the rule of foreign invaders In July 1906 however popular resentment against the excesses of 1luzaffir ad-Din a Shah of the Qajar dynasty whose excursions to Europe were nearly bankrupting his country s treasury grew so strong that widespread demonstrations and riots forced him to proclaim a constitution This relatively ed liberal document supplernen in 1907 and amended in 1925 1949 and provided for a governor nt of three branches 1957 The power of the executive was vested in the cabinet and in government officials acting in the Shah's The judiciary was composed of a hierarchy of civil courts up through name the Supreme Court while the legislative branch comprised the parliament or Majlis of 136 members elected by the people every 2 years an4l after 1949 t e smaller Senate half of whose members were appointed by the Shah and half elected Whatever power remained in the hands of the Qajar Shah vanished soon after World War I in which Iran had maintained a slightly pro-German the forces of-' In Febcuary neutrality that was violated byjTurkey Russia and Britain 1921 a young reformist politiciian Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai and Col Reza Khan commander of the Iranian Cossack Division combined to overthrow r the government Zia ed-Din became Premier and Reza Khan commander-in-chief of the army but the two soon quarreled and Zia ed-Oin fled into exile -y - --_ tjin flay 1921 - Reza Khan remained 5 The Cossack Division at that time the only well-organized and effective unit in the army came into being as a result of H asr ed-vin Shah's visit to Russia in 1873 The Shah admired his Cossack escort and asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize a Cossack cavalry regiment in the Iranian army it grew to a brigade and then a division and its White Russian officers and noncoms were retained until October 1920 when Reza Khan replaced Col Starross'ejsky as commander and other Iranians took over for the remaining Russians ET 6 t4' ih 2iNo J - o'G'w_ l i lbt jf 'iR 1 s Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 in power as Minister of War devoting himself to the reorganization of the army Unifying the heterogeneous military units into a closely knit expel the Bolsheviks Contr ola ed army he employed it t pacify -Azar baijag and - _ _ _ quell the rebellious tribes Reza Khan took lover as Premier in 1923 and two years later he -became Shah The two focal points of Reza 6hah's dictatorial rule were nationalism and modernization and in this he greatly resembled Kemal Ataturk in Turkey although his methods and goals were less radical He improved the status of women and checked the power of the Shia clergy but he stopped short of Ataturk's romanization of the national language--Farsi retained its Arabic script As a nationalist he was suspicious and guarded toward the Soviet Union andchallenging toward the British particularly as to the oil concession which he felt did not-sufficiently benefit Iran He brought in first American and then German economic advisers to reorganize the country s finances and to serve as a counter-_ weighs to Soviet and British influence Reza Shah's dictatorial rule ended with the occupation of his country by the Soviets and the British in August 1941--an episode that will be-discussed below--and a month later he abdicated in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 6 who was proclaimed Shah by the Majlis He left Iran at once and eventually didd in exile in South Africa in 1944 The Iranian government he left behind faced a difficult period with a 'tussian occupation in the north and a British one in the south Tehran remained a neutral zone but the Allies controlled the transportation HHiiss biography appears in ppendix B o Approved for Release 2017109127 C01384460 C01384460 _ _ _ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - 1 43RKING PAPER system and wartime shortages of food and consumer goods led to a crippling inflation Suddenly brought to power in an occupied country the young Shab partially who had been educated in Europe and who was believed to favor constitutional government was unable _ _ __-to provide strong leadership to his government As a result the power of the Majlis increased a large number of transitory political parties and partisan newspapers were started the tribes again became defiant the clergy became stronger and the Communists--banned as a party in the 1920's--returned in the guise of the Tudeh Party Tudeh headed by -leftists and former Communist Party members received funds and direction from Moscow and recruited both members and sympathizers throughout Iran during the war years and ti until its overt apparatus was crushed in 1954 era Little rnore than a 'department of Reza Shah's government in the 1920's and 1930's the -aajlis emerged from the years of occupation as a revitalzzed if irresponsibleIt insisted on confirming the appointment of the Apolitical force U S financial advisory mission in 1942 it imposed limits on the government's right to negotiate oil concessions and it took on the selection of a new Premier as its privilege--although the Shah retained the right to approve or disapprove the choice In its dealings with Premiers or 5hahs 'the Majlis had a powerful weapon--the quorum veto The constitution stated that the Majlis could only be considered convened when two-thirds of its 136 deputies had reached Tehran and half of those present in the capital constituted a quorum thus if 91 deputies were in Tehran the absence of 46 of them could keep the assembly from functioning Political parties in the Western sense had never been strong in Iran and during the war years their number had multiplied Only the Tudeh was SEC T _ w M -- -- w rr nuWw v -V4 FVU y MS M4Y tA' 'L y Y RiilTe r e w Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 _ - wwMo I u 5 C01384460 I-_ k ING PAPER Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460' an effective political organization and it was included among the nor i ty' parti es as opposed to the majority ' -grouping that tended - __ ___ __ - -_ to vote together on key national issues ' In general political forces in postwar Iran had sorted themselves out into left right end center groups Tudeh and its sympathizers were on the left The right was 'more hetero eneous and included Dr Mohammad Mosadeq's National Front the fanatical religious organizations Fedayan Islam and Mpjahadin Islam 8 'the several small fascist parties most Tehran university students and professors arad many small merchants and businessmen The center was moderate and inclf6ed to be more pro-Western it included the Shah most army officers the Democratic Party and the wealthy merchants and landowners who favored the-status quo Aided by landowner control over the peasant vote center candidates usually won the majority of Majlis seats X14 but in the late 1940's and early 1950's the nationalistic policies of the right regularly won the voting support of the left and center B Between Russia and the West 1 Aggression from the North - Iran lost wars and territory to Czarist Russia in 1313 and 's again in 1328 and has lived in varying degrees of dread of its northern neigh bor ever since L 1 Great Britain was the counterbalance to Russian potiver--the British goal was to keep Iran as a buffer between Russia and 7 For example in the 15th Majlis elected in 1950 the National Front was composed of Mosadeq and eight followers who nonetheless were usually able to carry a majority of deputies with them on key votes 8 Fedayan Islam numbering at most a few hundred' members carried out terrorist acts in support of its goal of restablishing Islamic_ ____ _o law and practice to a dominant place in Iran Mojahadin Islam was more political its religious spearhead in the Majlis included mullah Ayatollah Kashani and Shams Qanatabadi two influential politically oriented religious leaders - a 7 o -o e rv r -nw x a wwarr v -s c ca s M M' Approved for Release 2017109127 C01384460 C01384460 f1 Y'nC1l 4 1 fs 1 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 India--until 1907 when Britain and nussia signed an agreement to Iran into zones of influence divide The British purpose was to secure Russia as an ally in Europe against the growing power of Imperial Germany and the result was that northern and central Iran as far south as Isfahan was open to Kussian economic and political influThe British zone was southeastern Iran adjacent to Indian Baluchi- ence stan until 1915 when in return for rights to the oil-rich southwestern zone the British recognized kussian claims to control of the Turkish Straits During World War I Iranian neutrality was violated by the Turks the Russians and the British the Russians entered northern Iran to counter Turkish advances through Iran toward the Caucasus while the British sent in troops and organized Iranians into the British-officered South Persian Rifles to counter German attempts at subversion among the tribes and sabotage of the oil pipeline The Russian military collapse in 1917 left a vacuum in northern Iran and the Caucasus that the Bolshe- viks Turks Germans and British attempted to fill BritairlS anti- Bol- shevik intervention in Russia and Iran ended in 1919 but a treaty was concluded with Iran in August British protectorate 1919 that would have made Iran a virtual This treaty was never ratified by the Majlis however and when Reza Khan and Seyyid Zia ed-Din seized power in 1921 Iran formally repudiated it From the start Soviet Russia's official policy toward Iran was In a January 1918 note the Soviets renounced all Czarist friendly privileges contrary to the sovereignty of Iran and promised to aid the Iranians in expelling British and Turkish occupying forces ' _ ' __ oA' i ' '4 ti 6 a1s i 'h T1 '9 bi ii'1'7 YY 7 t F ' tuPl iiir Their note h s' ' k Fi' ' d J SS rt oKSMii'LiiWR i c rv Y i_ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 1 ' ' i SM J'dt%d '1ro' fh lia 1-1 1 1 -- C O 13 b 4 4 6 U 1 n tiiN Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 also declared that the 1907 treaty with Britain was no longer binding In an additional note of 26 June 1919 the Russians annulled all Iranian debts renounced allMnussian concessions in Iran--including the Russian Discount Bank and all railroads harbors and highways built by them-and declared the capitulAtions privileges and exemptions guaranteed to hussian citizens in Iran null and void The Soviet-Iranian _ Treaty of Friendship of February 1921 formalized the provisions of the 1919 note renounced any interference in one another's internal affairs gave Iran the right to maintain naval forces in the Caspian Sea and permitted Russia to send troops into Iran if it should become a base for a third-country threat to the Soviet Union This final provision which originally applied to White 6ussian forces was subject to Soviet interpretation of what constituted a threat and was a significant factor in restraining forceful British response to the Iranian % takeover of the oil industry in 1951 Iranian relations with the Soviets in the 1920's concentrated on trade which built up significantly until 1926 when a sudden and strict embargo was placed on Iranian agricultural products mainly from the northern pro- y vinces The embargo forced Iran_ to conclude a commercial treaty with the Russians that introduced barter transactions and gave the Soviets exclusive S marketing privileges in Iran -This had several results of Iranian foreign trade rose from 23b in 1926-27 to over The Soviet share 3876 in 1923 -29 Iranian industrial development was deliberately discouraged by the arti- ficially low prices the Soviets put on competitive manufactured goods 1 and Iran began to turn toward Germany as a foreign trade partner Germany in addition to increasing its puro'bases of Iranian products also became involved in the construction of the- Trans-Aranian Railway one r ft csWwy r 'r 'w - o ww' t ' bNw'w r 91-Wi Approved for Release 2017109127 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 AUMINi lKAIiVt - WOKKINsi PAPER o of Reza Shah's most important accomplishments Germans ran Iran's internal airlines in the late 1920's and the 1930's supplied railway rolling stock and motor vehicles and aided industrialization in Iran by setting up foundries coal mining equipment a cement factory textile and paper mills and a machinegun factory A German financial adviser replaced the American Ur Arthur Millspaugh in 1927 and the Germans and Iranians signed a trade treaty in 1923 and a treaty of friendship in 1929 As a result Germany's share of Iran's foreign trade rose from 8- in 1932-33 to 45 5 in 1940-41 and by August 1941 the number of German advisers technicians and businessmen in Iran reached 2 000 The nature and extent of this German penetration into Iran became very significant when German armed forces invaded Russia in 1941 and rapidly moved deeply into the soviet Union Iran was the shortest and most feasible route for badly needed war materials to be sent to Russia by its new allies in the 'hest Further the possibility of a German takeover in Iran was a risk the nussians could not allow On 19 July and 16 August 1941 the British and Soviet diplomatic missions in Tehran pre-sented notes demanding the expulsion of the Germans in Iran but Iran insisted it was neutral and that no danger existed On 25 August the final Allied demands were presented and the invasion began the Soviets entered Iran from the north in three cola ms the British froin the south in two Iranian armed resistance was negligible except for a sharp fight in Khuzistan that cost 55 British casualties The Ali Mansur cabinet resigned on 27 August and the official sirrender took place the next day r Approved for Release 2017 09 27C01384460 1'Jlll fYl nnlyr C01384460 T - _ Yl TrT Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Under its terms the Soviets were to occupy the five northern provinces and the British the southern provinces leaving central Iran and the capital to the Iranians all Germans were to be expelled or turned over to the Allies Iran was to facilitate the transport of Allied supplies Reza Shah's position was made untenable by the poor performance of his army and by the subsequent hos-tile Allied propaganda campaign and he abdicated in favor of his 22-year-olod son on 16 September 1941 Although most Germans were interned or sent back to Germany a number of key agents escaped and sought to stir up the tribes to sabotage and rebellion Maj - l -fflnavs Julius Schulz eworked among the Qashgdi and Franz i4ayr tried 'to stir up the Kurds and sabotage the railroads A number of prominent Iranians were found to be listed among 1ay r's actual or potential agents and many-_ - of _ them--including Maj Gen Fazlollah Zahedi who in 1953 became the leading Iranian military man in the coup that ousted Mosadeq and who succeeded -were arrested and sent to detention camps in Palestine him as Premier The de facto situation of the occupation was confirmed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance signed by the soviet Union Britain and Iran on 29 June 1942 In this treaty the Allies promised to withdraw their forces from Iran not later than six months after hostilities with Germany and its associates had ceased Although the Iranians feared Russia and disliked the British presence and methods -employed in seizing and running the transport system they declared war on Germany in September to ensure being on the winning side 1943 presumably When Roosevelt Churchill and Stalin met in Tehran in November 1943 without ever officially consulting or advising the Iranian government they signed the Declaration on Iran which recognized Iranian assistance to the war effort promised economic aid and reaffirmed Iran's independence sovereignty and territorial integrity i v EaN' 'sF' ii LY' I's s '-' ' L ' R % nFti o C x 'y U i #' i y i' EUR r w c G u - _ a 4i u aRiF_asr n- _ o s9 r La 1 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09127 C01384460 Nw etheless when the war ended in 1945 there were difficulties In late 1944 they attempted to get Iranian approval with the Soviets for their exploitation of oil in Semnan in thevSoviet zone ' ' The furor' over Iran's rejection of this offer which was backed up by U S Ambassador Leland Morris' statement that the U S Government recognized the sovereign right of Iran to rdfuse to grant oil concessions led to the resignation of Premier Sa'ed With the new Premier under heavy Soviet pressure Mohammad Mosadeq introduced a bill into the''Majlis making it a r-rime for any cabinet minister to enter into negotiations with or to grant-oil' concessions to foreigners without the approval of the Majlis The bill was passed on 2 December 1944 - Frustrated in their attempts to obtain a solid claim to oil in On 29 northern Iran the Soviets became reluctant to'leave Azarbaijan Novemher 1945 the United States proposed that all Allied troops be evacuated by 1 January 1946 but the Soviets insisted on the March 1946 date previously agreed to by the British On 12 December the Autonomous Republic of Azarbaijan was proclaimed a national assembly elected and Ja'afar Pishevari a veteran Comintern ardent -was named Premier At the same time a Kurdish uprising took place in western Azarbaijan and a was Kurdish People's Republic proclaimed- with Qazi Mohammad as president it prompty allied itself with the Autonomous Republic A On 22 January 1946 the Shah asked Qavam as-Saltaneh to form a new government After dismissing General A rfa who had pro-British tendencies as Chief of Staff Qavam went to Moscow in February to negotiate with the kussians The Soviets proposed that their troops remain indefinitely in parts of Iran that Iran recognize the internal autonomy of Azarbaijan whose premier would also be designated governor- 14 T t 2 r i iSG i _ is o' - roC w W wr rw -mow b n - __ _ _ Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 F C01384460 WORKING PAPER Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460' general and that rather than a Soviet oil concession a joint Tr Iranian-Russianstock-7 ompany be' seto'up -with -51% of -the--shares --to be - H owned by Russia 49Y- by Iran Qavam rejected these demands and returned to Tehran where he faced a political crisis The 14th Majlis was due to end its two-year term on 11 March 1946 and it had voted that no elections for the next Majlis could be held while foreign troops were had still in the country U S forces left Iran 1 January the British on 2 March The deputies' attempts to meet and vote to extend their terms were frustrated by Tudeh demonstrators who until-after II March I physically prevented a quorum from gathering Qavam was thus left to atcvwe rule the country until the 15th Majlis could be elected _ Iran then brought the matter of the continuing Soviet occupation before the new United Nations Security Council and under U N and U S pressure the Soviets on 4 April 1946 concluded an agreement with Iran that called for evacuation of ail Soviet troops within a month and a half after 24 March 1946 the establishment of a joint stock oil company which would be approved by the Majlis within 7 months after 24 March and arrangements for improvement of relations between the Iranian government and the people of Azarbaijan A Accordingly Qavam worked out an agreement with Pishevari that would have conceded most Communist demands while leaving Azarbaijan under the nominal authority of Tehran The Soviets appeared to be gaining influence- in Iran an impression that was reinforced when on 2 August 1946 Qavam brought three Tudeh Party members and a Tudeh sympathizer into his popular front cabinet 'In the meantime Tudeh had provoked an oil -- 1 I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 i Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 workers' strike in Khuzistan that involved 100 000 workers oviolence and sabotage ti anc The inclusion ofATudeh in the Qavam government brought British reaction British troops were moved from India to f'- o t a Iraq with the stated purpose of securing supplies of Iranio--Britain needed Basr Then with encouragement from British cons i military advisers in their region a coalition of Qashqai fo and other tribesmen was formed which in a demonstration of f Bushire Abadeh Kazerun Bandar Amir and besieged Shiraz was ultimately worked out in mid-October between the tribal _ ford - e A Khan Qashgai and General Zahedi then commanding the garrio in which the government recognized the tribes' demands On Qavam resigned and took office again and the new cabinet h not include the Tudehites on 24 November Qavam ordered the Azarbaigan to supervise the elections for the 15th Majlis chance to redeem itself for the failure in 1941 the-army r enthusiastically There was little-resistance from the liyh' Azarbaijan forces and on 14 December the autonomous collapsed The army also captured the Kurdish stronghold of executing the leaders of that rebellion In Tehran T udeh 1- were raided and the way was opened for the elections to be hear 'When the 15th Majlis was finally inaugurated in August opposition led by Dr Mosadeq began to fight the ratificatio oil agreement In the face of Soviet pressure on the Irani- 1947 o on of ' -- t -U S Ambassador George U Allen in a speech on 11 Septembc- ans Irano American Cultural Relations Society made it clear th o r before-I'd -o at Iran o14 yM'e--t - w N - _ an y a K aou w r ia cv n a %o- ro r- t r - i r ti a w n Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 free to accept or reject the Soviet offer and that in any case Iran would be supported by the United States against Soviet threats or prOssure - -Citing-American --policy-aimed at-eemovi'hg'the' fear of 'aggression any ere in the world Allen said The United States is firm in its conviction thatany proposals made by one sovereign government to another should not be accompanied by threats or intimidation When such methods are used in an effort to obtain acceptance doubt is cast on the value of the proposals Our determination to follow this pplicy as regards Iran is as strong as anywhere else in the world This purpose can be achieved to the extent that the Iranian people show a determination to defend their own sovereignty Patriotic Iranians when considering matters affecting their national 'interest may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedome to make their own choice Iran's resources belong to Iran Iran can give them away free of' charge or refuse to dispose of them at any price if it so desires 9 Thus convinced of U S support an 22 October 1947 the Majlis rejected the Soviet oil agreement by a vote of 102 to 2 and instead passed a bill that forbade further oil concessions to foreign governments or partners and called for negotiations with the Angio-Iranian Oil Company for a greater share'of the profits This measure was to have far-reaching effects on Iran's relations with Great Britain and the United States 2 The Oil Dispute 1949-53 The involvement of Great Britain in Iranian oil went back to the original O'Arcy concession of 1901 the first of a series of grants that were renegotiated at varipus times to keep up with the growth of the oil industry and world demand for oil The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded in 1909 but it took on a new complexion in 1914 when the British government became the major shareholder 9 The New York Timesi 12 September The reason for this 1947 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 AD-iINISTRATI VE - WORKING PAPER C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 official investment was obvious Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 and forced the decis ion which had been debated for nearly a decade to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to burning oil On the brink of a major way- the navy had to be assured -rbe of a source of oil which was both efficient and cheap Anglo-Iranian after Anglo-Persian A 1935 __Oii Company continued to extract oil under its original concession for the next 3 0 or so years building pipelines as well as a large refinery at Abadan The concession was rereptiated in 1933 to give Iran a greater share of the net profits and to modify the concession area Managers and technicians continued to be either British or Indian with the Iranians providing unskilled or semiskilled labor Following the passage of the Majlis legislation of 1947 rejecting the boviet oil concession the Iranian government presented to Anglo-Iranian a list of 25 points to be discussed Chief among these were British taxation on Iran's share of company profits Iran's rights to the c anpany's installations at the end of the concession in 1993 a reduction in the number of _ British employees the royalty basis--that -is the price to be paid to Iran for each barrel extracted and sold through AIDC's marketing and transporting system and Iranian tax and custom exemptions After lengthy P discussions the so-called Supplemental Agreement raising the royalty payment f'roin 4 to 6 shillings a ton and giving Iran 20 6 of - distributed profits and general reserve was sent to the Majiis on 19 July 1949 Debate began shortly thereafter but the term of the 15th Majiis ended before a vote on ratification could be taken Elections for the 15th iiajlis were fidally completed in March 1950 and Mosadeq and his eight National Front colleagues led the balloting in Tehran Ali Mansur R ti w Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 AOMINISIRHTIVE - WORKING APcR Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 was named Premier and the proposed Supplemental Agreement was turned nyer tp jbe ajl is Special Oil Commission for study i n June 1950 the same month in which Gen Ali Razmara a former Chief of Staff became Premier he commission's report to the Majlis stated that the agreement did not adequately secure Iran's rights and should not be ratified Razmara's Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement and reopened negotiations with the AIOC which by February 1951 was willing to agree to a 50-50 profit sharing similar to the agreement that Aramco had worked out with Saudi Arabia Razmara however had asked a group of experts to study the feasibility of nationalization of the oil industry their view was that Iran lacked sufficient technical expertise to run the industry that the concession could not legally be cancelled that heavy compensation would be due Britain and that both foreign exchange and prestige would be lost by hasty nationalization When Razmara opposed irwaediate nationalization as impractical under the circumstances he was assassinated on 7 March 1951 by a member of Fedayan Islam the rightist religious terrorist group Hosein Ala briefly succeeded Razmara as Premiere and the Maj iis approved the principle of nationalizing oil When Ala resigned in April the Majlis voted to recommend Mosadeq to the Shah as Premier A and he was appointed to the post on 29 April Acting-swiftly the Majlis approved on'l May a nine-point nationalization law i This act began a summer of hectic but fruitless bargaining that culminated in impasse and the departure in October 1951 of British managers and technicians Because the true issue in the dispute was political in that the Iranians had come to identify oil resurgent with their own nationalism the two governments were never able to understand I 3Y r 't r9 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 WORKING PAPER f Y one another's position i 1 M 1 1 i i o V - The British attempting to deal with a political problem in economic terms believed that the Iranians had to sell their oiI or go broke and ghat the best approach was to wait them out at first for workable terms and later--after nationalization--for adequate compensation The Iranians assuming that the West could not do without their oil were convinced that by hiring non-British technicians and teasing hankers they could operate the oil industry on their own To the British the Iranians seemed irrational and wasteful to the Iranians the British appeared overconfident and condescending As a result their negotiations were so unproductive and mutually frustrating that the British even considered military intervention to seize Abadan although the strong possibility that the Soviet Union would invoke its 1921 treaty with Iran to oppose such a British move served as an effective deterrent Ehe legalistic approach of the British government which as the major stockholder in the AIOC regarded the oil concession as a treaty or at the very least an agreement between nations was to take the matter first before the International Court of Justice and then to the Security Council of the United Nations In the end the Security Council deferred to the decision of the ICJ as to its own jurisdiction and when in June 1952 the court ruled that the concession was not a treaty and hence not a proper matter for_ it to consider all-legal approaches were exhausted The dispute was'at an impasse' and by October 1952 diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off 3 10 Iran and U S Foreign Policy United States foreign policy under President Harry Truman has 10 H more detailed but still necessarily brief description of the oil dispute is included as Appendix B to this history - Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 'been generally characterized as the containment of Communist aggression Whatever its name the policy evolved in 19117 when the British Government i nformed the Uni ted States' that-- i t eoul d -no -onger af ford t o support w Greece and Turkey--militarily and financially--against the very real threat of Soviet aggression and subversion In assuming this burden Truman said in a message delivered before Congress in March 1947 I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out-their own destinies in their own way I believe that-our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes The world is not static and the status guo is not sacreI But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion or by such subterfuges as political infiltration In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour 11 the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East Usually credited with originating the containment theory behind the Truman doctrine is George F Kennan who in February 1946 as counselor of the U S embassy in Moscow sent the Department of State a long telegram in which he analyzed Soviet postwar policy aims His telegram struck responsive chords in Washington James Forrestal then Secretary of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense gave the telegram wide circulation within the national security bureaucracy returned from his tour of duty in Russia Forrestal When Kennan sponsored him for the post of director of the National War College where he stayed for less than a year before becoming head of State's new Policy Planning Staff 11 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Haarrr S Truman 1947o U S Government rinting Office Washington D C 19b3 PP 17'J-9 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 I C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C013844601E - WORKING PAPER '_ R ET Kennan's article The Sources of Soviet Conduct which appeared in Foreign Affairs for July 1947 and which-'is''credited frith the initial statement of the containment policy was an amplification of his Moscow telegram It was originally written for Forrestal in response to a paper on Marxism and Soviet power prepared by a Forrestal staffer and sent to Kennan for comment 12 In January 1947 Kennan addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on his views on the Soviet Union and Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong asked him for a paper along the lines of the talk for publication in that journal Rather than write another paper Kennan asked Forrestal's permission to publish the one he had done earlier and when this was forthcoming sent it to Armstrong with the request that it be signed X In the X paper's description of the exercise of Soviet power Kennan noted the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism that was deeply imbedded in the minds of Soviet leaders Moscow invariably assumed that the aims of the capitalist world were antagonistic to Soviet interests and that said Kennan means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with Thus he continued the main element of any U S policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies These could be contained by thfadroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvers of Soviet policy but which cannot be ' 12 Much of this background is taken from John C Donovan The Cold Warriors Q C Heath Co Lexington Mass Toronto and London 1974 9 Qt - a Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460'VE - 140RKING PAPER -SE-UFXT charmed or talked out of existence 13 __ w _ --o_ owever an Ke nnan' s view and-an oot-hat -of former'-Secretary 'of -Stat'e' ' 14 1 Dean Acheson he was not the author of a containment policy or doctrine he merely described what was happening That he did it well in a way that met the approval of a number of key policyrrakers of the time is obvious but it was continued Soviet intransigence in pursuing openly Worth aggressive policies that led to the 'J S reattion to the Korean invasion l5 in 1950 and the Korean War in turn institutionalized a set of operational premises along these lines A The Soviet Union would resort to military expansionism if it were not checked by visible countervailing military power B Local imbalances of military power which favored the Soviets or a Soviet satellite would lead to further Koreas C The most appetizing local-imW ante to the Soviets was in Central Europe 0 The global balance of power would shift in favor of the Soviets if they were able to swallow the rest of Central Europe i e West Germany and Austria only the Greco-Turkish flanks had such a critical function for the balance of power Japan was next most critical E Local imbalances in secondary and tertiary areas must not be neglectdd the capability and clearly communicated will to defend whatever areas the Communists chose to attack was necessary to prevent them from picking and chosing easy targets for blackmail and aggression A number of small territorial grabs could add up-to a critical altera- tion of the global balance and our failure to defend one area would demoralize nationals in other such localities in their will to resist the Communists It was against this background of U S policy and-planning that the status of Iran in late 1952 was considered and although Dwight D 13 In later years writing in his tiemoirs--1925-50 Kennan said that the X article's most serious defect was the failure to make clear that what I was talking about when I mentioned the containment of Soviet power was lot the containment by military means of a military threat but the political containment of a political threat whatever such hindsight is worth Kennan's words were generally taken to-mean political and military containment on a universal scale 14 In Sthree Comments on the 'X' Article by W Averell Harriman Arthur Krock and Dean Acheson Foreign Policy No 7 Summer 1972 15 In the view of Seyom Brown in The Faces of Power Constancy and Change in U S Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson Columbia University reFrss New or ondonW i 1 Approved for Release 2017109 27 001384460 IC01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Eisenho-wer succeeded Truman as President on 20 January 1953 and John Foster Dulles became his Secretary of State with the avowed intention to go beyond containment toward dynamic-'liberat ion --U -S poIicyr o_ -- oo __ __ in Iran continued to stress the need to contain Soviet 'power there as elsewhere The U S involvement in Iran's oil problems was admittedly reluctant we had backed the Iranian government in 1947 when it resisted the oil concession the Russians were seeking to arrange in the north Our statements at that time probably did much to encourage'the Iranian ' as o mood to challenge the British concession as well andAthat challenge grew into a bitter dispute the United States found itself caught in the middle of an argument between its chief European ally and an underdeveloped diddle Eastern country to which it was providing military and economic aid 'As a result the U S role became not so much one of mediator but rather as an honest broker attempting to bring two clients into an agreement for their mutual benefit State Dean Acheson had proposed 16 Truman's Secretary of in July 1951 that the President send Averell Harriman his foreign policy adviser to Tehran to reopen negotiations Uespite violent anti-American rioting by Tudeh the day he arrived Harriman did get the two sides talking again but to little Ir avail -when the British brought the case before the Security Council A in October 1951 flosadeq argued Iran's position before the Council afterward he visited Washington and met with Truman and Acheson but their talks came no closer to reaching a basis for settlement 16 As recounted in Acheson's story of his years at State Present at the Creation W W Norton Co New York 1969 pp 499-511 and X80-685 f aY a o ls o e yy jjw e t h Cr2 i 's a' 'L7t tT A n G'R 'tf 'ioi k r a y ym' R'7 rto 4 _ - v rsa __ r Approved for Release 2017109 27 001384460 1 C01384460 Approved forRelease 2017 09 27 C01384460 With the British out of-Iran the United States continued to look for solutions and proposals involving both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the American oil industry were put ' forth without success By the'end of 1951 the Conservatives under 'hurchill were back in power in Britain and less willing than Labor to be frustrated by Iran and Mosadeq's position increasingly dependent on Tudeh support grew more precarious By February_1953 he was at odds with the Shah and both Britain and the United States were ready to look for realistic a'l ternati ve- solutions A Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - WORKING 'PAPER III COVERT ACTION A The Genesis of TPAJAX The many chroniclers of Central Intelligence Agency misdeeds whether in their books magazine articles or newspaper columns have -l-ong placed the August 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mosadeq near the top of their list of infamous Agency acts Complete secrecy about the operation that was-known under the cryptonym of TPAJAX has been impossible to enforce under existing laws and enough talkative people including many Iranians we re- privy to s g iiCnts of the onerati on to ma ke it relatively easy for journalists to reconstruct the coup in varied but generally inaccurate accounts 17 one The point that the majority of these accounts miss is a key the military'-coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U- S foreign policy conceived and approved at the highest levels of government It was not an aggressively simplistic solution clandestinely arrived at but was instead an official admission by both the United States and United Kingdom that normal -rational methods of international communication and commerce had failed TPAJAX was entered into as a last resort The target of this policy of desperation Mohammad Mosadeq was neither a madman nor an emotional bundle of senility as he was so often pictured in the foreign press however he had become so committed to the ideals of nationalism that he did things that could not have conceivably helped his people even in the best and most altruistic of worlds In refusing to bargain--except on his own uncompromising terms--with the 17 A number of these are included in Appendix C Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 - ADMINISTRitTI VE - WO cKING PAPER Anglo-Iranian Oil Company he was in fact defying the professional politicians of the British government These leaders believed with good reason that cheap oil for Britain and high profits for the company were vital to their national interests There had been little in their experience to make them respect Iranians whom company managers and Foreign Office representatives saw as inefficient corrupt and self-serving That the British misjudged their adversaries badly is obvious they were convinced that when Iran felt the financial pinch its resolve would crumble and an ngr ccm ant could be i vr ked out to the - 'a t -fact-i on cf both sires Henry Grady who spent two unhappy years as U S Ambassador to Iran during the height of'the oil dispute quoted 18 the British theme that he had heard' in so many variations as Just wait until the beggars need the money badly enough--that will bring them to their knees In fact of course the loss of oil revenue did not bring the Iranians to their knees it merely forced them to take the risky steps that increasing- ly endangered their country's future It was the potential of those risks to leave Iran open to Soviet aggression--at a time when the Cold War was at its height and when the United States was involved in an undeclared war in Korea against forces supported by the U S S R and China--that compelled the United States in planning and executing TPAJAX How real were the risks in what'Mosadeq was doing 3 3 h 2 Had the British sent in the paratroops and warships as they were to do a few years later against the Egyptians at Suez it was almost certain that the Soviet Union 18 -In his article in the 5 January 1952 S2 rda y Evening Post entitled What went Wrong in Iran I 4 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 r AD o INIS MATI VE - WOP-KING PAPEF would have occupied the northern portion of Iran by invoking the Soviet- Irbnian Treaty of Friendship of 1921 It was also quite probable that the Soviet army would have moved south to drive British forces out -on behalf of their Iranian allies Then not only would Iran's oil have been irretrievably lost to the blest but the defense chain around the Soviet Union which was part of U S foreign policy would have been breached ha d The Soviets would have the opportunity to achieve the ancient Russi an dream of a port on the Persian Gulf and to drive a wedge between Turkey and jndi Under uch circumstances -the danger of a third world war seemed very real When it became apparent that many elements in Iran did not approve of 1osadeq's continuing gamble or the direction in which he was pushing their country the execution of a U S -assisted coup d'etat seemed a more desirable risk than letting matters run their unpredictable course Aosadeq was already openly threatening to turn to other sources for economic help--the Soviets--if Britain did not meet his demands or if the United States did not come forth with massive aid to replace his lost oil revenue Peacefully or in war the Soviet Union appeared to be the only potential beneficiary of Mosadeq's policies Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 I 3 3 h 2 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 AD'-UHISTtRATIVE - 1 13 RUttG P-APIER 3 3 h 2 the aped Premier was rapidly become a prisoner of the left because of his growing reliance on the support of the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party 20 Which had a membership in 1952 of about 25 000 plus many more thousands of supporters and sympathizers 3 3 h 2 11H gh I evel a proval 20 to explore the matter was obtained throuc h Department of State As the or-ianization repricing the Communist Party of Iran outlav ad by Reza Shah advice since Tudch had been r Qceiving Soviet financial support end 1941 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ' ADMINISTRATIVE - WZRKIN6 PAPER ET channels a CIA NEA Division officer wha w s there Irecalls attending a decisive -neeting2l at State_in company with Kermit Roosevelt at which Gen W Bedell Smith pru ided shortly after he left the Agency to become Under Secretary of State early in Feh ruary 1953- Smith's affirmative response to the question Go we go ahead was the informal green light that the planners in NEA Division had been waiting for his laconic unprintable answer was Smith's main contribution to the meeting at which the reasons for overthrowing 'dosadeq were carefully discussed 21 No minutes of this meeting are available in u0 files Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 A0 MI14ISTr VfIVE - WORKING PARER SE T 3 3 h 2 I Final official approval of TPAJAX came on 11 July 195 24 as an action based on NSC Report 136 1 U S Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran which had'been adopted by the National Security Council as action No 680 and approved by the President on 20 November 1952 The fact that this decision and the staff work preceding it were very closely held in Washington is borne cut by a memorandum of 10 June 1953 from the Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs GTI to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs recommending policies-more supportive of Mosadeq It reasoned in Iran that since conditionx were deteriorating almost to the point-of no return and since an attempt to remove Mosadeq would risk a civil war and would even if successful alienate the Iranian people we should increase our financial and technical assistance to Iran in the hope that Mosadeq would be able to muddle through The desk officers' position paper recognized that increased U S aid would of course frustrate British policy which was to undermine o osadeq's position By late June however State was aware of the planned-operation and a further position paper that s-tipulated certain conditions to be met by the British was prepared on 25 June as described in the discussion of planning below B 3 3 h 2 The Planning Phase To carry out a operation a great deal of advance planning was necessary 24 No documentary evidence of this approval is available in the CIA Executive Register or the remaining files on TPAJAX Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 ADMINIS' 'ATI JS Their first point of agremnent_was that Maj Gen Fazlollah Zahediz6 was the logical choice to head the coup despite the fact that his career balance sheet had nearly as many minuses as pluses Zahedi's obvious assets were his record as a leader and combat officers his devotion to the Sh ah a nd the course of his country's destiny His debits were many his wartime reputation as a pro-Nazi and suspecfied agent who had been arrested by the British and sent to Palestine was further tainted by charges of corruption In addition he had been out of the army for four years and had only limited contacts with active duty officers at the regimental and battalion levels He nonetheless was regarded as the sole Iranian with sufficient support among Iranian army officers and pro- Shah politicians to be the central coup figure 26 See Aooendix B for ' biographic details - s- Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C0138060 tJt1d X4'1 J1 hip 1 L- - oo iani ' I ni R- SECRET SECRF -T Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 _ -- - Au il 41STRJUIVJ The planning discussions also took up the assumptions on which the plan would be based These were that_ Zahedi was the best candidate for- coup leader that the Shah must be brought into the operation against his wilt if necessary that the army would follow the Shah rather than Mosadeq if given a clear-cut choice that a genuine legal or quasi-legal basis must be found for the coup that public opinion must be aroused against Mosadeq and that the new government to be established in power must be guarded from possible Tudeh countercoup attempts Tehran Station and Headquarters I Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 i C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMIUSTRATIVE - WORKING PAPER tio ere_ 'c pt apprised of these assumptions with which they did not always agree The Station for example backed Ambassador Hend rson when he told Washington that the Shah probably would not act decisively against Mosadeq while Headquarters was concerned about finding a possible substitute for General Zahedi because of the negative aspects of his 3 3 h 2 -ck - rcund The proposal that anti-4osadeq lead-ers seek religious refuge was never implemente in the field it probably reflected the views of Iprim arily concerned with psychological and propaganda operations v as attuned to the utilization of loyal custams and traditions they had 35 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C0138-4460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - WOF KING PAPER completed a revision of the plan Their major change was to concentrate on building up the size and effectiveness of the anti-14osadeq forces rather than on countering actions by the elements supporting the Premier 3 3 h 2 Reduced to its essentials the plan called for the following sequence of events in which timing was of great importance The goal of the operation was'to replace Mosadeq with a leader whom the Shah and the army would support and who would be willing to negotiate a reasonable oil settlement that would prevent an economic collapse and reduce Iran's vulnerability to the Soviet Union General Zahedi was such a man perhaps the only one who met all the requirements 30 Also included in appendix 0 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 001384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADIIINISTMrlVE - WORKING PAPER Zahedi would be brought to power through a military coup that would because of the Shah's participation be fundamentally legal who had been indecisive under the pressure of the oil The Shah dispute and Mosadeq' maneuvering for more power would be induced to-do his pa 3 3 h 2 The Shah's role f wc6ld by to siren three documents a'royal decree firman in Farsi naming Zahedi as Army Chief of Staff another firman appealing to all ranks of the army to carry out the orders of the new'Chief of Staff and an open letter calling on army officers to support the bearer- General Zahedi The letter would be used by Zahedi to recruit the coup group of officers in key posts that would enable them to carry out the military objectives of the plan including the seizure of army headquarters Radio Tehran the army radio station the houses of Mosadeq and his principal associates ' police and Gendarmerie headquarters the telephone exchange the Majlis building and the National Bank Key government figures army officers and newspaper editors supporting Aosadeq wouild be arrested Special measures would be Ir prepared for dealing with the anticipated violent reaction of Tudeh Party members to Mosadeq's-overthrow The plan envisaged three-different scenarios by which the coup might _be carried out first a massive religious protest against the government 31 The Gendarmerie were a national paramilitary rural the National Police were an urban force 001384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 police whereas C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - -CORKING PAPER followed by military action by the army pfficers loyal to Zahedi the second alternative taking advantage of the crisis that would develop at the anticipated moment when Mosadeq would force the Shah to leave the country and then starting the military action or as the third alternative starting the military action the moment that Mosadeq 32 frustrated by the Shah presented his resignation and sent the Tudeho and National-Front mobs into the street Under any of these scenarios the military action itself was seen' as beginning with General Zahedi assuming the post as Chief of staff seizin g nrtliy heaiquarters acid ordering the arrest of Mosadeq and his compatriots The Shah would then appoint'Zahedi as Premier and the Majlis would be called into session to confirm his appointment the plan also discussed the'use of the press including propaganda themes as well as utilization of the Majlis the political parties religious leaders and bazaar merchants in carrying out the operation Finally it estimated33 the coup's chances of success and the probable implications for the United States if it should fail that It was this plan CIA to the Department of State in order to obtain simultaneous high-level approval I 3 3 h 2 As a sidelight it should be mentioned that before Roosevelt left he briefed U S Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson who was in Washington for consultation The briefing on the proposed operation took place- on 6 June 1953 and was attended by General 32 This was a technique Mosadeq had used before to rally the street mobs to his support and to intimidate his opposition It was anticipated that he would try it again if the Shah put any sort of pressure on him 33 No formal estimates as to the potential for success of the coup were prepared by ONE althou h that Office was producing special estimates on the situation in Iran I Approved for RRelease 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 AiiFilNIS7r AfIVE - Cabell the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Wisner the Deputy Director for Plans memo o this conversation notes that the Ambassador stated categorically that the Shah would not back Zahedi when the time came for action unless extreme pressure was exerted possibly including the threat of replacing him Ambassador Henderson also warned that-the army would not play a major role in the coup wi-thout the Shah's activeocooperation and he urged that an alternate plan be prepared that would utilize the Amini brothers in more general terms he pointed out the inconsistency of telling the Shah that no more U S aid o would go to Iran while Mosadeq remained in power while at the same time the Point Four technical assistance program was in the process of implementing a $3 40 0 000 Village Council program Overall the Ambassador vas negative about many aspects of the plan although less so than he had been when consulted in Tehran He agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arranging a prolonged European visit thereby adding his absence to the war of nerves against Mosadeq By mid-June the purpose of the plan was known to some senior Department of State officers and the Office o f Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs prepared a comment on 25 June for the Secretary-of State that in general approved of the plan--including the assumption of the risks of failure However State set forth two conditions that had to be met 1 the United States must be prepared to offer immediate and substantial economic assistance--an estimated $60 million the first year--to the new government in Iran in order to stabilize the economy and convince the public tha their new government would be able taD do more for them than Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - 'CORKING PAPER the ofd one and 2 the British must give a firm commitment to be Flexible in approaching the oil settlement and not attempt 'to force the new government to accept terms that would alienate public opinion To be acceptable State said the oil settlement should recognize nationalization of the oil industry provide for Iranian control of ail property installations and production in Iran allow the Iranian government complete freedom of choice of technical and managerial personnel as well as freedom in the sales of oil and oil product and dispose of the problem of compensation within the framework ofthe existing nationali- zation law and on a basis which would not saddle Iran with excessive indebtedness to the Anglo-Iranian oil Company On 7 July these views were passed to the Sri tish by Henry A Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs and on 23 July British Ambassador t-1iakins gave Under Secretary of State W Bedell Smith a Foreign Office memorandum which in diplomatic language acceded to the U S conditions The memo set forth the principles that compensation should be left to the impartial arbitration of an inter- national tribunal and that terms of a future arrangement must not appear to provide a reward for the tearing up of contractur al obligations or disturbing world oil prices The British government would thus be ready to cooperate with the new Iranian government Tn trying to reach an agreement within the bounds of those two principles Whiie th-is answer was obviously not an across-the-board acceptance of the State conditions it was not a specific rejection and was clearly an affirmative answer to the question of the British taking a-reasonable flexible approach that would not arouse the Iranian people against the new government Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 COI 384460 - AD UNISTRATIVE - WORKING PAPER 3 3 h 2 C Putting the Plan i-nto Action After formal approval came from the British Foreign Office and the Prime Minister on 1 July and from the U S Secretary of State and on-11 July 4EA Division organized itself for the support of the operation The news that General Zahedi had virtually no military assets of his own was also painfully'confirmed r Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 IC01384460 - Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 SECRET ADMINISTRMTIVE - 1 'ORKING PAPER 42 SECRET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 IC01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 SECRET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 i SECRET ADAINISTRATIVE - WMING PAPER 44 SECRET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 i C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 0 3 3 h 2 The task of recruiting General Schwartzkopf was assigned to who on 26 June visited the general then serving as Administrative girector Department of Law and Public Safety State of New Jersey revealing specific details Schwartzkopfs 14ithout proposed was outlined role in convincing the Shahl and won the general's complete cooperation contingent on the following 1 that he be all-owed to present himself to the Shah as a major general rather than as a brigadier for prestige purposes 2 that he be fully briefed on the political situation and all details of the operational plan and 3 that he be allowed to give some logical explanation of his trip to Iran to the Governor and the Attorney General of New Jersey After a discussion of possible cover Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADAINISYRA1IVE - WJRKI iG PAPER stories it was agreed that arrangements would be made for the Government of-Pakistan to invite General SchwartAopf to visit Karachi for the purpose of giving advice on police and security matters and that it would be logical for him to stop and visit old friends in Beirut and Tehran along his route that shortly before Schwartzkopf also warned his departure from Tehran in 1946 General Razmara then Chief of Staff had tried t-6--poi-son ''the Shah's mind against Swartzkopf because of his resistance to Razmara's desire to absorb the Gendarmerie over which SChwar ZlGvfii into the army o$ ria3aii-tdi hf'e3d e a e ra -As a result of this Schwartzkopf felt his normally cor-dial relations with the Shah had become slightly strained by the time of his departure from Iran in 1948 A question that arose during the planning phase was whether or not to proceed with the U S Point Four aid program to Mosadeq's Village Council program part of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 under which landlords had to give the government 20' of their profits 10' to go back to' the peasants and l 'lo to the Village Council for health educa- tional and agricultural improvements corxnitted Point Four officials had $3 4 00 000 to the program which was being exploited in Iran as evidence of U S support for Mosadeq and despite some misgivings both Ambassadc r Henderson and the Department of State felt that cancelling the aid would only serve to irritate Mosadeq and perhaps alert him to the fact that the United States was beginning to actively oppose him Over Station and Headquarters objections it was finally decided to proceed with the Village Council commitment Then late in July Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 T AD11 NiST CATIUE SE the Station recommended that William Warne the Point four representa- tive in Tehran who was closely identi ffed with U S support for-Mosadeq be called away from Tehran during the operational phase of TPAJAX but it was decided that no adequate excuse could be found for the move which Warne would oppose and so it was dropped 0 Involving the Shah Probably the biggest question mark for TPAJAX planners was the Shah's role in the coup--not only how he would play it but would he even play it at all They had little reason to be overconfident for his indecision and susceptibility to bad advice were notorious Shah had his reasons however The He had assumed the throne in 1941 when his father a semiiiterate strongman was forced to abdicate by the occupying power Britain and the U S S R Leader of a defeated and humiliated country for the first 4-z years of his reign the young Shah37 attempted to survive by-ruling as a constitutional monarch His very existence was threatened by'Tudeh on the left and by Premier Ahmed Qavam on the right a British correspondent who interviewed him in 1947 described him as a very frightened young man Although Qavam as a strong Premier was in a position to bring the Pahlavi dynasty to a premature end he apparently decided to keep the monarchy and took steps to build up the Shah's popularity crediting him with recovering Azarbaijan from the Soviets Seemingly stimulated by this appearance of success the Shah took a more active role as ruler and in 1947 began to intervene more vigorously in political affairs The attempted assassina- tion by a Tudeh Party member in 1949 frightened him again but he survived 37 A biography of the Shah is included in Appendix Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 _ AO4 gISITtA11VL - nl lb r'Ar'c X the shots and cast about for some stabilizing factors in his situation The U S Embassy made this assessment of him in 1951t The Shah is confused frustrated suspicious proud and stubborn a young man who lives in the 'shadow of his fathers His fears questionings -and indecisiveness are permanent instabilities of character Yet he has great personal courage ' many Western ideals and a sincere though often wavering desire to raise and preserve his country for and a victim of advice He is at all times eager How then to convince this mistrusting but gullible ruler of the soundness and effectiveness of the TPAJAX plan in which his own participo L 5 as suet I on w a _ _ 1Ke 1 c 1 1 C1TlC71 i 3 3 h 2 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 ' ra1s iP ari VE Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 13fiKI IG i5 A C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 AD-UIJIST iTIUt - QTiKIIIG PAPER Qhile the coup r o ay 9 rsization bras beih9- been keeping the political pot boiling pulled together - had iiisadey His supporters had held a massive demonstration on 21 July to mark the second anniversary of the riots that ousted Qavam and brought Mosadeq in as Premier Tudeh participation in' the demonstration had been heavy -pointing up Mosadeq's increasing reliance on Coarnunist supporters Of the crowd of more than $0 000 demonstrators estimated to have met in Majlis Square 'Tudeh members and sympathizers probably outnumbered followers of the National Front by ten to one During the first week in August Mosadeq carried out a national referendum on dissolving the Majl is that was passed by an enormous majority despite the insistence of opposition deputies that such a refrendum was illegal attempted unsuccessfully to persuade anti- 4osadeq deputies to resist his efforts to oust them by taking religious sanctuary or bast in the Majiis building 4osadeq's reasons for wanting a new Majlis were obvious his National Front 3g had lost much of its cohesion since he had quarrelled with Kashani Baghai Makki 3 Kashani an influential mullah and polittical figure had been a Mosadeq ally and was the elected Speaker of Majlis Baghai and rlakki were members of the Premier's original nine-man National Front that had swung th 'lis toward nationalization of the oil industry see ppendix A A f 1 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 A 3 3 h 2 and other supporters over his proposed constitutional amendments transferring power from the Shah to the Premier The National Front primarily composed of nationalistic rightwingers was alarmed by Mosadeq's growing e iance on Tudeh and this became a major issue in the propaganda campaign In an attempt to get across to the Iranian people- the chang ih 'attitude of the U S Government toward Mosadeq Secretary of State Dulles in his 28 July press conference replied care Irate a 0110ws' 'The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian government has these developments make it more caused our government concern difficult 'to g rant aid to Iran E 1 In the early days of August Roosevelt compelled to build up the pressure on the Shah Alterations were nade in the original plan with regard to the firinans the Shah was to sign one was to name Zahedi as Chief of Staff while the other would declare illegal the referendum dissolving the Majlis 39 But getting the actual documents signed was becoming a critical matter saw the Shah on 2 August and left the palace believing he had obtained the Shah's agreement to dismiss Mosadeq and appoint Zahedi as Premier but when Roosevelt met with the ruler the following day he had become reluctant to act saying that he was not an-adventurer and could not take chances like one Roosevelt's argument was that the government could be changed_in no other way and that if the Shah did not join 39 one of the most rapidly changing facets of the plan was the content ' of the firmans in their final format there were two--one removing Mosadeq as Premier the other appointing General Zahedi in his place Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 1 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 J-JM IttI57RATI VE - WORKING 'PAPER with the army to oust Mosaded either a Communist Iran or another These alternatives the United Korean-type conflict was inevitable States was not prepared to accept At this meeting the Shah asked for direct assurance from President-- Eisenhower that he approved of-the Shah's taking the initiative against Mosadeq but before this could be passed to Washington the President fortuitously inserted an item in his speech to the Governors Conference in Seattle on 4 August40 to the effect that the United States could not sit 1Uty by and watch - r'c' n v 1 hind n_ 1 J t L'd lbo nV sGVr Ct liSGL LrfC coincidence of this speech by telling the Shah that the President's comment on Iran had been made to satisfy him but the ruler continued to balk do 8 August the Shah still irresolute -told Roosevelt that he would send a message ofencouragement to the army officers involved then gb to the palace at Ramsar on the Caspian and let the army- act apparently without his official knowledge If that action were successful he would name Zahedi as Premier but the Shah said that while he approved of the planned action he would no t sign any documents Under this extreme pressure the Shah finally agreed to sign the papers see Zahedi personally and then leave for Ramsar The next day he did meet with the general but the firmans were not yet ready to be signed The Shah went on to Ramsar after promising to sign the decrees as soon as they were brought to him 40 1 As -reported in The New York Times for 5 August 1953 1 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460o ADMIUSTPATIVE - WORKING PAPER RoOSEV A t altered' the plan one final time by deciding that one firman should dismiss Mosadeq from the Premier's post and the other name Zahedi as his successor E The First Attempt -- and Failure 3 h 2 The Shahs decrees were now in the hands of the coup group and the next step was to implement the military action plan as soon'as'possible One point seems clear although the exact details are missing--the initial coup attempt was betrayed - Rumors of a coup to be staged'by the army had been in the air for some time and the Iranians' desultory view of security and their tendency to be talkative were notorious but according Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - WORKING PAPER 3 3 h 2 to Roosevelt it was probably Colonel Uac'ari chief of the secret police who told Chief of Staff Riahi August that the coup was totting the night of 15 General R i ahi had been informed of the plot by 1700 on the l5th - General Kiani was arrested and held by Colonei N asiri arid other Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 coup officer's C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADIMIN1SIF IMVE - ' 31 t -QNG PAPER 3 3 h 2 What happened to the other coup officers with assigned missions number of them heard the news that the coup was Flown and so'did nothing Others were frustrated by the precautions General Riahi took when he learned the coup was coming that night General 5atmangelich who was to have captured the Chief of Staff's headquarters turned back when he saw a large number of troops and tanks surrounding it General Guilanshah who was with Batmangelich said that after their abortive attempt on the headquarters they rode around town looking the situation over until about 0230 when they separated Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 ADIU NISTRATIVE - WORKING PAPLoR SE The first coup attempfi-- a conventional milit ary takeover reinforced by the Shah's signed-orders--had taken less than 12 hours from Saturday night 15 August until early in the morning of Sunday the 16th 4s the chronology of TPAJAX41 shows the next three days were filled with can fus io Mss tiartl c fnrrpc believed that that' had crushed the thing they most feared--an army takeover on behalf of the Shah Their reaction vas to mop up on their remaining enemies and to exploit their victory to the fullest Monday and Tuesday the 17th and 18th the 7'udeh Party seized the spotlight rioting and demonstrating in the streets in a'wild outburst of antimonarchical feeling while Roosevelt and his men waited their chance to reverse things The second and winning phase of the operation was not to come until Wednesday the 19th F Turning Defeat Around 57 I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 001384460_ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 AD 1 i ISIR 11I'Ji - iAPER 1 r Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 - 3 3 h 2 ADIMVIISTRITI-VE -- WORKING P iPER At noon I on '96 l ugust R adiG ienr ari oroadi ast a stateirrain't dissolving the 17th Majlis ilajlis _ d_ and promising early elections for the next Later that afternoon the Station learned from the radio that the Shah 'xo fiown to Baghdad Headquarters after the coup As Roosevelt said when he returned to He just took off with us at all--just took off He never communicated The immediate-Station reaction was to try to arrange for the Shay to broadcast to his peopl e from _Baghdad as soon as possible Headquarters was asked to have the Department of State through the U S Ambassador in Iraq press the Shah to take an aggressive stand about the vents in Tehran State however was firmly opposed to any U S effort to contact the Shal The next day Monday the 17th the Shah did make a number of statements that ware broadcast over the Baghdad Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 A0 -i1t11STRhT1VE - WORKING PAPER radio insisting that he had not abdicated that he was confident of the loyalty to him of the Iranian people and that he had indeed dismissed Premier M osadeq and appointed Zahedi under his constitutional prerogatives On his own initiative U S Ambassador to Iraq Burton Derry had seen the Shah on Sunday night the 16th and had suggested some ideas for the forthcoming statement that by happy coincidence were very much in line faith Station thinking Y Foreign idinister Fatemi who had been released at dawn on the 16th' along with the rest of the thandiu of p risoners taken in coup the attempt held a press conference at 1400 that afternoon in which he implicated the Court and blamed thd Imperial Guard for planning the 'coup Ne said that his own views would be found in an editorial in his paper Bakhtar Emruz which was also read over Radio Tehran at 1730--it was along inflammatory and savage attack on the Shah and his dead father Its broadcast and subsequent printing was' credited with doing much to stir up the Tudeh-led anti-Shah mobs that raged through Tehran on 17 and 13 August At the same time the violence of its tone anal language aroused much public sympathy for the Shah Fatemi spoke again at 1930 to the crowds massed in Majlis Square as did a number of pro-Mosadeq etajlis deputies The Shah was sharply attacked by every speaker there were insistent demands for his abdication and the people were told for the first time that he had left the country 3 3 h 2 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 - _- Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINISTRATIVE - WORKING PAPER 3 3 h 2 On 1llonday the 17th Radio Tehran began broadcasting lists of those i nvol vad in the coup attempt Rumors that these officers were were to be hanged on a large gallows reportedly being constructed were widely circulated Fatemi'continued to rail against the Shah in 6akhtar Emruz and his editorial on the 17th said in part O traitor Shah you shameless person you have completed the criminal history of the Pahlavi reign behind your desk to the gallows S y The people want to drag you from mid-morning Tudeh-led mobs were in the streets of Tehran tearing down statues of the Shah and Reza Shah defiling them and dragging them through the streets Henderson arrived fromEeirut as scheduled h When Ambassador drove back to the Embassy past the empty Opdastals of the royal statues of which only the broken -bronze boots remained 1 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 1001384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 1JMMISTRAFIVE - WORKING PJA PER SEC 3 3 h 2 Roosevelt had hoped that it would be possible to emphasize the religious aspects of the demonstration to be held the l9th but if this was to be done the' mullahs wanted to hold it on Friday 21 August which was a religious festival day For a number of reasons not the least of which was the widespread rumor that the arrested officers were to be hung on the 20th -the operation could not be held off theo two extra days the religious leaders wanted 44 Richard Cottam in Nationalism in Iran University of Pittsburgh Press 1964 described p 37 the bazaar mob in some detail as follows along with the mullahs and frequently closely allied with them are the profesThese men typically center their activities in a varze-s-h9ah athletic club There are many varieties of varzeshgahan _ some o them respectable clubs which not only serve as centers for sional mob leaders athletes but also for-other valuable group activities dut the varsesh- aahan of the mob leaders are centers for athletic young toughs known as chaqu keshan who can be hired for for any kind of corrupt or terroristic activity when a sizable political demonstration is desired the nob leaders purchase the participation of large numbers of unskilled laborers In 1952 observers claim to have seen workers demonstrating for the Communists -for the royalists and for the Mosadegist National Front on successive- days Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 In Washington the Department of State and Headquarters had gotten the bad news On the 14th Roosevelt had sent two Messages to tell Head- quarters that the first attempt had failed He did not furnish a great deal of detail on just how bad things were since he was well aware that the reaction would be to cut the losses get everyone out and scrub the show His requests for State 0 apartment help iA getting Ambassador Berry in Baghdad to instruct the Shah on what to say in his speech there were as noted earlier turned dawn State indicated that in the absence of any satisfactory indication of possible success of the coup -the United States wished to avoid assuming responsibility for urging statements on the Shah beyond those - Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 iiUMNISTWFIVE - WiRKING PA PER 3 3 h 2 he himself was disposed to make Tuesday the 18th became a day of waiting The Shah and Queen Soroya flew to Rome from Daghdbd that morning when he arrived at 1500 hz made additional statements to the press but did not issue a call to action by the forces supporting him In Tehran bands of Tudehites still roamed the streets and a mob sacked the headquarters of the Pan-Iran Party and small Tudeh and National Front mobs fought each other The secret police attempted to prevent the publication of opposition newspapers but a number of them including Dad and Shahed were able to get on the streets with replicas of the Shah's firmans The Tudeh Party newspaper blamed the coup-attempt on Anglo-American intrigue and called for a democratic -republic- to replace Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 S the monarchy Mosadeq's spokesmen on Radio Tehran annou ced that a 100 000-vial reward would be paid for information on the whereabouts of Ge eral Zahedi and that all General Riahi demonstrations were banned addressed a meeting of all senior officers cif the Tehran garrison at the lecture hall of the Mili-tary School and told them in very strong terms that they should remain loyal to the government Despite the ban on demonstrations there was continued fighting in the streets on the evening of 18 August Mosadeq's security forces wereosent out to clear the streets and their -operations took on a strong anti-Tudeh tone as they beat up demonstrators and forced them to shout pro-Shah slogans Belatedly realizing what was happening Tudeh leaders went out_into the streets to try to talk the demonstrators into going home but the excesses of two days of anti-Shah 0 3 3 h 2 rioting had already done their damage For the Station there was good news fran Kermanshah ''Farzanegan finally returned from there early Wednesday morning He reported that Colonel Bakhtiar was willing to march on Tehran results came from the attempt to persuade the leading Shia cleric in Qom to declare a holy war against the agents of communism although the pro--Shah newspapers had been prepared to exploit the story if possible And Headquarters sent a message that Tuesday evening that Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 I C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 ET said in blunt terms that in the absence of strong recorrRi-iendations to the contrary from Roosevelt and Henderson the operation against Mosadeq' should be discontinued To the men on the scene howevery the operation seemed far from hopeless There were strong indications of a resurgence of support for the Shah bolstered by the propaganda efforts of Station agents Tudeh' violence and-demands for a republic were putting the continued life of the monarchy into the hands of the army and of the people of Tehran The ultimate c1hoice was co be thelr Early on the morning of the 19th pro-Shah groups began to gather in the bazaar area in south 'Tehran Many of the people assembling were undoubtedly those that Kashani was paying 200 tomans 2 000 riais or about $26 65 at the exchange rate of 75 rials to the dollar a head to be in the streets but there were also many others who had been stirred up by Tudeh actionsand who were lookina fnr IeAr -arehin As the various groups of demonstrators moved northward out of south Tehran 5 they merged as they reached Sepah Square where they met the troops sent to turn them back The soldiers mired hundt eds of shots gVer 45 The map of Tehran included as I-Appendix Cshows the area through which the demonstration moved and its targets Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 001384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 AOMINISTPIATIVE - WORKING PAPER their heads but whether the order to fire into the crowd was never given or was ignored they did not shoot into the mob I Sensing that the a r y was with them the demonstrators not only began to move faster but took on a festive holiday atmosphere As-Roosevelt said later it had become a mob wholly different from any seen before in Tehran it was full of well-dressed white-collar people carrying pictures of the Shah and shouting Zindebah Shah Long live the Shah' Then the troops began to join in the demonstration Troops from the Imperial Guard which had been disbanded-efter its involvement in the 1$ August coup attempt had gathered and truckloads of soldiers began driving through the streets shouting and waving pictures of the I Shah Drivers kept their lights on as they had been asked to do as a sign they supported the Shah 3 3 8 2 By mid-morning after the demonstrators had reached Sepah Square and fanned out into the center of the city General Riahi reported to' Mosadeq that he no longer controlled the army but the Premier told him to hold firm Mosadeq's house a prime target of the demonstrators was being defended by C olonel Momtaz' battalion Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 'o C AIJMIWISTR I I V _ - WORKT J PAMER 3 3 h 2 - Radio Te-hran was a key target since it would not only be able to broadcast the news of the success of the Shah's forces in the capital but would also help convoi r-ce the provinces to join it supper Ling the Zahedi government It was important also to get it in unsabotaged condition ready to broadcast During the morning hours on the 15th it had been broadcasting cotton prices then switched-to recorded music uninterrupted by news bulletins Shortly before 1 30 it suddenly went off the air apparently as the pro-Shah troops and demonstrators took control of the building in a short sharp struggle 1-4 en it resumed broadcasting aFter a short period of technical difFicuities -all that could be heard was a confused babble of happy voices Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 wT I Zahedi put in the tank and taken wash to Radio Tehran where he made his speech In it he promised to restore the rule of law individual'freedom oand freedom of assembly and he added some popular items such as raising wages cutting the cost of living providing free medical treatment and building more roads The speech was recorded and broadcast again that night Although the Kermanshah division did not reach the-capital until after the excitement was over they had entered Hamadan enroute just as the Tudeh Party there was staging a large pro-taosadeq demonstration which 3akhtiar's troopers ended in short order In the wake of the coup Zahedi named Qakhtiar as military governor of Tehran where he enforced martial law and was instrumental in the year that followed in' removing hundreds of Tudeh members and sympathizers from the army officer corps 46 Mosadeq's forces put up more than token resistance at Staff Headquarters and at the Premier's house but they were quickly overwhelmed 46 isewspaper' This experience led to Bakhtiar eventually being appoint n 1955 as the first chief of Iran's newly formed counterintelligence organization - SAVAK Sazeman-e Etala'at va Amnyat-e Keshvar - Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 C01384460_ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMI Isai-JIVE VORKING PAPER in particular e nnett Love' s dispatch to The New which was based on local newspaper accounts York Tirpes - grossly exaggerated the casualties Love's story said that accounts of the coup more than 300 people were killed or wounded that 14osadeq's house was stormed fly Sharman tanks which in turn were battered by shells from loyalist tanks and that Colonel Momtaz' who led the defenders at the Torn to pieces was Premier's house was torn to pieces by the mob a favorite of Love's he used it to desc H be what happened to Foreign 'Minister Fatemi in his newspaper office r o f LiNe coup were re l ati vti y In fact however casualties light c onsidering the nufnbcr of pcoplic involved the official toll was 43 dead and 35 wounded and neither Momtaz nor Fatemi was even scratched let alone dismembered And Mosadeq whom the journalists'variousl y described-as slipping up a ladder and over his back wall in his pajamas or lying weeping in bed also in'pajamas when the troops burst in was not even in his house when it was attacked lie had gone next door and taken temporary refuge with U S Point Four chief 1olilliam Marne who was somewhat embarrassed to have a deposed Premier or his hands - cv n for a brief pariod Over the next few days Mosadeq and other senior officials o his government turned themselves in or sere arrested News that began to trickle in from the provinces after Zahedi's broadcast on Wednesday-afternoon was uniformly -cnod Radio Tabriz reported that Azarbaijan was in the hands of the army while the station at Isfahan came on the air at 1300 with strong statements in support of Zahedi and the Shah Kerman proclaimed its loyalty to the-new government at 2000 and Meshed though not imsaediately heard from had changed sides as soon as it heard the news frorn Radio Tehran TPAJMl final details were 3 3 h 2 loyal' wrapped up officers wL re pl aced i n cornrnand of all units -oF the Tehran garrison the seizure of key military targets was completed and the arrest lists were carried out The nation was under martial law a curfew was put into -W a_ - Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 r iD'fIt ISfRJIl'I IE - '43RKIN effect and at 2200 Radio 'TePtran signed off for the night In Rome the Shah was preparing to return to Iran in triumph on 22 August In a formal statement he said It was my people who-have shown me that theyvere faithful to the monarch and that 21z years of false propaganda my country did not want the Communists and therefore h as 0 been faithful to me 11 IV The Aftermath of Victory A successful'TPAJAX left behind a good deal of debris 71 a' Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 PA P ER C 013 8 4 4 6 0 - - -_ - - n Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 ADMINISTRATIVE - WORKIING PAPER Theyvere curious of course as to why there had been so little reporting from the Station and from Poosevel t during the three days after the failure of the first attempt to overthrow Mosadeq Roosevelt explained frankly and at length that if he and his nen had reported what they were doing Washington would have thought they were crazy arid told they to stop of rca Further had they reported in detail the reasons why they felt justified in taking the actions they were taking they'wouid have had no time to carry them out Therefore their course wa-s to act while reporting as little as possible and assuming that they have very little more to lose and everything to win Everyone recognized of course that if the outcome had been different a substantially different attitude toward Roosevelt's decision and actions might have emerged in many quarters Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 S I 3 3 h 2 11'oti il5tkr l'IVE- a I lG F'I 'cR A 73 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 '- - Approved for Release 2017109 27 001384460 A I The 4ashgai had di sliledMosadeq of course because of his reliance on the Tudeh but they also retained a deep-seated animosity toriard the Shah whose father had brutally pacified the tri e - When the vote of the tribal council was taken it seas by a very narrow miargin in favor of peaceful acceptance of Zahedi despite the sentiments of Khosrow and the other Qashgai khans for armed rebellion 48 It was feared that in the confusion of the coup the tr ibesinen might try to take advantage of the situation by a revolt against the new government While the army might have been able to put uo% n such a revolt in short order the situation cooul d have enhanced TLIdeh' s chances to stage a countercoup Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 r C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 i Then Roosevelt was debriefed at Headquarters on 23 August he noted that except for an att _mpt by' soma Qashgai to disarm certain Gendarmerie posts Shiraz was very quiet throughout the coup After Zahedi was securely in control several of the other tribes volunI teered'to take steps to control the Qashai themselves if necessary rather than have the army sent in after them Despite their anti-Shah feelings had however the Qashga accepted the coup with as good grace as they could muster As in every f fight there ware losers Both ilohamniad Mosadeq and Brig Gen Taqi Riahi were indicted under Article 317 of the tilitary Criminal Procedure which states Anyone who devises a plot with a view to either overthrowing the foundation of -the State o or the succession of the Monarch - or insti ates the people to arm thertiselves against the power of -the Monarchy shall be sentenced to-death The verdict of the Military Court of First Instance and of the Military Court of Revision against the two accused was guilty and the I I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADMINIS'Tl'c 1TI VE - 'ovnieING P P E R ET punishment was set at three years of solitary imprisonment for tosadeq and three years of imprisonment with hard labor for General Riahi 49 for the other key figures in the coup General Zahedi served as Premier until April 1955 when he left Tehran for medical treatment in West Germany His relationship with the Shah whose throne he had helped to save was a stormy one they quarrelled in February 1954 regarding the elections and Zahedi angrily objected to what he termed the Shah's childish vacillation over official appointments also at odds o v er General Batm- ngelich from the post of army Chief of Staff 50 wh om Zahedi He and the Shah ware wisheri to dismiss In general the Shah resented any attempt by Zahedi to take credit for the coup In his opinion he was the primary motivating factor and Zahedi-was onlyohis'chosen instrument He had appointed Zahedi as_a strong man who could do the job that had to be done but once Zahedi had done it the Shah reverted to the monarch's traditional dislike and fear-of a strong man The general-Is son Ardashir fared better he married Princess Shanaz the Shah's daughter by his first marriage in November 195P they were later divorced and he is currently serving as Iranian Ambassador to the United States d 49 3 3 h 2 A summary of the court proceedings and the verdicts is included as Appendix F Approved for Release' 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ADAINISTRtiTI JE - W31MIteG PAPER 3 3 h 2 Cot Abbas Farzanegan who played such a key role in building the military organization to carry out the coup was promoted to brigadier general and became Deputy Minister of Posts Telephone and Telegraph before taking over as Minister in April 10 54 He retired from the army when the Zahedi government fell a year later moving to the United States until 1958 when-he again returned to Iran He served briefly as governor of Isfahan and then occupied a series of ambassadorial posts that included Kuwait Norway and the Netherlands Col Nematollah Plasm the Imperial Guard commander was%also promoted to brigadier general for his loyal -service during the coup E I ET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 CO 1384460 o __ T _ M Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 R rl 3 3 h 2 _t ADMIN'ISi filIVE - 'JNUNG PAPER Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Nui-il gl Si Looking back on T AJAX after 21 years were in those 1 - 0 3 3 h 2 the crucial moments obviously four long days when the operation hung in the balance shifting toward disaster but ready to swing toward victory if the right breaks came As it turned out Roosevelt was The first 'fortunate enough-td get at least two very important breaks lay in the fact that the Tudeh demonstrations of ''ouqu t cn - -juc tc p fnr They degenerated into vicious 17 and l$ anti-Shah riots and the acts of violence and desecration turned a great many people against Mosadeq and his allies Alarmed by the open threats' to the monarchy and disturbed by the Tudeh clamor for a socialist republic the people and the army rallied to-the pro-Shah demonstrators on the morning of the 19th The second break came though the tactical mistakes made by i4osadeq's followers his Chief of Staff General Riahi had almost the whole story of the on upcoming military coup attempt by late afternoon jo before the action started 15 August hours All he had to was to order the police and military security forces to start arresting officers suspected of being involved in the plot and the coup would never have started The failure of Iranian security in general was part ofthis break Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 - ADIIINISYRaTIVE - WUIRKlla FADER 3 3 h 2 0 Riahi had some evidence of U S involvement yet his police and military allowed -nerican cars to come and go at will unstopped and unsearched ' V The Long View of the Covert Action in Iran The long-term impact of TPAJAX did not as Churchill hoped enable the Westoto turn things around in the Middle East over the years since 1953 Western influence in that region has steadily declined But the course of Iranian history was clearly changed by the events of 19 August While by no means a dedicated Western ally Iran retains its fear of the Soviets and the enormous wealth that it has gained from the increased value of oil in the 1970's has been used and is still being used to build strong military forces not only for self-defense but to support Iranian aspirations for dominance in the Persian Gulf as well But a powerful army a modern air force and well-equipped navy cannot be built in a vacuum changes in the country's social and economic structure to iriprove national-health and educational levels were necessary to provide adequate manpower for these Forces The Shah's program to modernize his country has also made land reform one of its key programs by 1963 the Crown lands had been sold to the peasants living on them and by 1971 the government claimed that the task of redistributing the land o%- ned by the wealthy elite was complete There is little questi on as to who is running Iran of course the Shah has a monopoly of pol i t i cal power and although parliamentary elections and procedures-ii-my furnish the windovi-dressing of democratic gov rnment it i s the Shah alone who determines national policy The success of the ghito Revolution-- that is reform and change directed from the top--has solidified the foundations 79 14 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 S' T Arj U NISFRATI E - WaRKIN PAPER of the throne that seetned so shaky and insecure in the violent days of 1952 and 1953 TPAJAX was also to have a very lasting effect outside Iran however It changed for a- time at least some of the methods of conducting and carrying out U S foreign policy 'The success of covert action in Iran where the course of history was altered and a pdtential 'ally and its valuable petroleum assets kept from slipping into the Communist world by U S backing for a military coup predisPosed U S planners to apply the technique elsewhere Had Roosevelt's luck not held and had 19 August turned from a successful gamble into a nightmare of disaster the United States might well have avoided commit ting its covert action forces to assist in the overthrow of the proCommunist government in Guatemala-in 1954 _ Arid there is reason to doubt that the attempt in 1961 to overthrow Castro's devolutionary government in Cuba would ever have been planned and staged without the successes in Iran and Guatemala glittering in the background to remind the makers of policy that he who dries not venture has scant hope of gain Ir Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 - - C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 i APi'LUDIX A Whose Oil An Abbreviated History of the Ancglo-Iranian Oil Dispute 1943-53 In 1372 the then Shah of Persia Piaser ad-Din in return for muchnc eded cash gave to Baron Paul Julius de Reuter 'a concession to exploit all his country's minerals except for gold silver and precious stones all its Forests and uncultivated land and all canals and irrigation works as well as a monopoly to construct railways and tra iways the resulting uproar -- __- Although from neighboring Russia caused this sweeping concession to be cancelled de Reuter who was a German Jew with British citizenship persisted and by 1889 regained two parts of his original concession--the operation of a bank and the working of Persia's mines Under the latter grant de Reuter's men explored for oil without great success and the concession expired in 1999 the year the Baron died Persian oil rightskhen passed to a British speculator William Knox D'Arcy whose first fortune had been inade in Australian gold mines The purchase price of the concession was about 50 000 pounds and in 1903 the enterprise began to sell shares in The First Exploitation Company Exploratory drilling proceeded and by 1904 two producing wells were in Shortly thereafter 1 interest in oil was sharply stimulated by the efforts of Admiral Sir John Fisher First Lord of the Admiralty to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to oil As a result the Burmah Oil Company sought to become involved in ersian oil and joining with D'4rcy and Lord Strathcona formed the new Concessions Syndicate Ltd which endured until 1907 when Burmah Oil bought D'Arcy out for 200 000 pounds ash and 900 000 pounds in shares 1 Burmah's first gusher came in a 1 180 feet in 14ay 1948 o near tasjed Soleyman and a year later after some complicated financial Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 - Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 APPENDIX A dealings in London the Fnglo-Persian Oil Company APOC was born incorporating the shares and rights of the earlier concessionaires The company chose Abadan as the site of its refinery and made local s physuad rangements for its security with both the Shiekh of Mohammerah and the Cakhtiari tribal khans the former was paid an annual rental and Was promised receive continued autonomy from Tehran while the latter wire to 3on of net oil revenues to be paid out of the Persian government's share of 10M ' 'hen Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 his persistent prodding changed the Royal Navy over to oil To ensure 510 a source of cheap oil the British government became a majo5 shareholder in the APOC in 1914 adding 2 million pounds in capitalization and signing a 30-year contract for fuel oil at cut rates Churchill wrote in 1923 that this contract had saved Britain no less thar'S7 5 million- on its wartime oil purchases Differences as to how profits were to be shared between the Persian r d d 'JY The company claimed that government and the APOC began after - Persia's share of the profits applied to the earnings of the three subsidiaries actually operating in Persia based on article 1 of the D'Arcy concession which defined its limits as throughout the whole extent of the country Persia claimed its-as entitled to a share of the profits from all operations including extracting producing refining and marketing 1 its oil wherever these operations might take place here were also proble 9s over British claims for wartime damage to pipelines by 3akhti aris incited by 0er ian and Turkish agents The British attempt to negotiate a settlement calling for new profit-sharing arrangements fell through in 1920 and the relationship tott n d along under the old agreem nt until 1933 SE ET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Al PEENDIX A In 1921 Reza Khan a colonelr the Iranian cossacks- in o o r 7 ' 1K fo' 4TS0$L -_G-CiS l n 'Cr3'C' 7r 'S L' - oN--F3-fo 't- F'47-r6o - seized power by deposing the nlast i ajar Shah _ He visited Abadan after becoming Shah himself in 1925 and his account of the trip gave warnings of things to come Fie noted that of the 29 000 employees in ti-e oilfields and refinery 6 000 were foreigners and he expressed concern that so few Persians were being trained for'higher level posts He also saw that the British staff enjoyed an obviously higher standard of living than the others and that while the refinery area appeared prosperous the surrounding districts had not felt any positive impact from this major industry in their'area Finally he was disturbed by a manager's description of cutting down production- in order not to upset world markets--but at a loss to Persia So Persian dissatisfaction continued to build up until N ove iber 1932 when the governm-nt notified the company that the D'Arcy concession signed and r the Cajar regime was annulled and a new concession would be granted on the basis of equity and justih This new concession was not easily arrived at--the British government referred the annulmznt to the League of Nations whose Council sent Dr Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia to reconcile the two sides Two legal points were thus established that were to affect the later dispute in 1951 the right to annul the concession was recog- nized and the League accepted the viewpoint of the British that such a case z o d be brought to the Council under Article-15 of the Covenant which provided for a hearing on disputes between members that were likely to lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations and for the solution of which no legal recourse existed The two parties finally worked out a new concession agreera nt that was ratified by he i' a jl i s the i ersi an S CR ET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460' Approved for Release 2017109127 C01384460 parliament and signed by Reza Shah on 2 3 Flay 1933 it extended the life of the concession to 1393 and set up a new royalty basis By its terms Persia would receive 4 shillings on every ton of oil sold in Persia or cxportad plus 20 of the dividends overS 671 250 shareholders with a minimum dividend distributed to ofS750 000 par year To avoid rersian taxation the company agreed to pay a small additional royalty-on tonnag-e and it would continue to pay British taxes out of gross profits It was the oil business as usual until the summer of 1941 when G irmany invaded the Soviet Union Because German influence in Iran as Persia was renamed in 1935 by Reza Shah had grown significantly and because the country was the best route for Allied supplies going to the- w beleaguered Soviets the Allies determined to send in occupation forces A Russian troops took over the five northern provinces British forces went into the south and the area around Tehran was neutralized Following 'r 3 m tr l ti e o 11 aT S e d z t 4-'t three days of futile and desultory resistance theAShah abdicated in favor of his young son Mohaiwaad Reza Pahlavi until 1946 4 J s Iran was an occupied country Abadan continued to produce petroleum products for the Allies but the Soviets took advantage of the situation and attempted to obtain an oil concession in the north Premier In late 1944 the Soviets wereadvised by Sa'ed that the cabinet had ruled out the granting of further concessions until after the war When pressure was applied through the loftwing parties Sa'ed eesigned at which point the Majlis passed a bill introduced by Dr F ohami nad 119sadeq forbidding any discussion of or signing agreements for an oil concession with any foreign rc'resentatives The bill passed d -spite Co rununist opposition thereby blocking a Russian concession but in the coursa of the inbate the possibility os' revokin the Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 0 c IX A AIOC concession was seriously raised Despite the 1 al 1 prejni Lr Qavam in April 1946 signed an agretrno nt giving the U S S R an oil concession in northern Iran The iajlis refused to ratify the concession and in the bill rejecting it the legislators declared that it was forbidden to grant any concession to export oil to foreigners further they instructed the government to took into possible violation of the rights of the people in connection with the southern oil concession held by the AIUC With the wartune occupation over the British oil- managers began to nave l au k Groublcs fine 9401 g i--her al raise but this was only the start strike-w-as sattltu with a a In 1947 the Iranian Ministry of finance sent a delegation to London to discuss money due the Iranian gov_-rn nt various employee grievances reduction of foreign staff expansion of local distribution facilities and the AIOC policy of concentrating refining activities outside Iran To these complaints the company obviously feeling secure in the legality of its concession was relatively unresponsive The taw of 22 October 1947 instructed theA government to open discussions with the AIOC to s -cure the nation's rights to its oil resources These discussions started more than 5 years of bargaining and debating proposal and counterproposal charge and countercharge until they eventually reached the Security Council of the United Nations the Iranians led off in August 1943 with a 50-page memorandum that listed 25 points that were to b discussed with the company in implementing the 1947 law The main items on this list included British taxation of Iran's share of oil profits Iran's ultimate rights to AIOC installations outside the country at the end of the concession it had already been prQmi sed those in Iran reduction ' m 1 in the number of foreign employees V the l-q- A V V a f O A of the concession by 1993 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 vi S ET left in the yround the the Iranians felt they would rave little oil royalty_ basis and tax and custom exemptions Mejotiations with company representatives began the following month continuing intermittently thereafter Shortly before the 16 January 1949 attempt by a Tudeh Party namber to assassinate the Shah at Tehran University Premier Saved identi- fied higher profits and more Iranian employees as his main goals in these discussions he -pointed out that Iran's oil royalties for 1947 were just over17 I whereas the AI C had paid some 5 million in mi11ion 3ritish inco me taxes' ' Specifically Iran wanted control of the company's operations as well as a 50-50 split of'the net profits On 5 ttay 1949 AI OC chairman Sir William Fraser came to Tehran with a draft of the Suppl c me ntal Agreeiaent and this draft was basically the agreement sic-nod by the government and company on 17 July Tha royalty payment eras increased from 4 to b shillings per ton and Iran was to get 20 of the distributed profits with a minimum of 2 5 million and general reserve terms 4'rX JYy Yr an a%ecv 1 tY2s well short of the 50-50 sharing Iran wanted and kihichAAraraco process of agreeing to give Saudi Arabia The agreement was sent to the Majlis on 19 July and debate began on 23 July lasting 15th Majlis formally Event out of existence _ rt'r Y in the 4 days before the The oil agreement bill as well as the new election bill were left over to the next hajlis Elections for the 16th lajlis began in the Fall of 1949 and were Kat1 0W2q Tro Kf finally completed in March 1950 with Or Mosadeq and his eightAfol lowers leading in the balloting in Tehran Ali Mansur became Premier and in June the oil agrea ment was turned over w thy 13-man special oil co rmi ssion that included iolosadeq and five other members of the National Front Six days later the Shah dismissed Mansur and appointed General Ali Razmara former Chief of Staff as Premier The com ni ssion reported back to the Ad jl i s Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ice -Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 S 5 - APPENDIX A T that the agrcam nt was not adequate to secure the rights of Iran and that it was opposed to its ratification The Minister-of Finance then withdrew the agreement announcing that ncyotiations for increased royalties would be reopened1951 with the A10C In February the AIOC offered Iran an agreement similar to Aramco's including the 5110-50 profit sharing but it was too late the liati onal Front was intent on nationalizing oil and it dominated the Majlis The oil corl-iiission indicated it too favored that course despite the report from the experts appointed by Razrnara to study the feasiblity of nationalization The experts had pointed out Iran's lack of technical and financial expertise plus the facts that the concession could not legally be cancelled that Iran would be liable for up to 500 million jin compensation that haavy losses in foreign exchange and prestige would result and that it would be unwise to antagonize Britain On 7 iotarch General Razrnara was shot and killed by a member of Fedayan Islam a rightist terrorist group and liosein Ala succeeded him as premier When the Majlis in rai d- larch unanimously accepted the principle of nationalization the British Forei gn Office noti fi d the Preiaier that an a ct of nationalization would not legally terminate the oil company's operations Shortly Viereafter strikes broke out in 'the south as a result of the company's cutting a hardship allowance for Iranian workers i'n certain area plus otht rgrievances Martial lawwas declared on 26 March and-in - arty April rioting began in Abadan that did not end until troops fired into the crowd 6 were killed and 30 wounded and two British oil workers and a sailor were also killed As r em'aers of the National Front were presenting their draft of an oil nationalization law to the special oil co imittee Premier Ala resigned Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 _ _ _ _ _ _ __ s _ _ v C 013 8 4 4 6 0 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 r AP rI1DIX A The Majlis approved the law and at the sa ie time voted to rzco n mend to the Shah the appointment of Nosadeq as Premier the Sci dte followed suit the Shah acceded appointing Mosadeq on 29 April- two days later he signed the nine-point law that in broad terms ordered the government takeover from the AIOC the company's response was to hold up the Flay monthly advance paymant of92 million 1 and to ask that entire oil problem be submitted to arbitr tion a request that Iran did not acknowledge On 25 ''day the British goverrrnent brought the matter Before the International Court of Just-ice Lil- c m- da y i t dcspa tched tiic I til Inde pe n dent Paracliute Bri- gade Group to Cyprus two Royal Navy cruisers and three frigates were already in the Persian Gulf area I7 ' 1 -t3't 1 In a dditi on to the government' request the AIOC asked the ICJ to-appoint an arbitrator as provided in the 1933 concession agreem znt simple The Iranian view of these appeals to The Hague was Iran did not recognize the competence of the court to dual with tho matter which concerned Iran's internal affairs The United States became seriously involved in these discussions for the first time in mid-May 1951 A State Department statement of 19 May urged- both sides to try to find an agreeable compromise solution it noted that the United States recognized the sovereign right of Iran to control its resources and industries but said that the technical knowledge capital and trcn sport and marketing facilities were all controlled by the AIOC It further stated that U S oil companies had indicated-that they would not in the face of unilateral Iranian action against the AIOC 'be willing to undertake operations in Iran or provide technicians to work there' The note pleased neither 'Iran -nor 'Bri'tain ' which was the dbj--ct of U 'S pressure to accept the nationalization concept and work toward a compromise At President Truman's urging conveyed through Ambassador Grady in Tehran and Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 __ _ ___ - - v-- _ C 013 8 4 4 6 0 _ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 i1PPENDIX A by letters to Prime Minister Atlee and Premier ilosadeq the British agreed to send a delegation and the Iranians agreed to accept it -Talks got undcrway on 14 June with the Iranians d 1111 ndin9 that the AIOC hand over 75 of net oil revenues since 20 -larch and put the other 25 E into a bank presumably to be -vcntuaily paid as compensation The British 5 clays later proposed that a new company be established by the AIOC to operate the oi l industry on behalf of Iran the profit split would b_- 50-50 No compromise between these two points of view appeared possible and on 21 Jun6 Lhe 3r i L i h want back to tl c ICJ a request for an injunction to halt the nationalization process until the court had ruled on the original U K application Since Iran had already refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction it was not reprei sented when the court issued an order to maintain the status quo as of 1 May 1951 with a Board of Supervision consisting of two Iranians two Britons and one individual of another nationality empowered to run the industry Iran ignored this order and prepared to m6ve the managers of the National Iranian Oil Company 11I3C into Abadan while the HIOC began to slow down the output of the refinery and prepare for evacuation Export of nil stopped and in the face of an antisal otage law introduced in the Nail is 'the British staff resignad Hosadeq wrote to President Truman on 27 June complaining about the British attitude and the actions of the British technicians whom he wishzd to retain a s contract cmployee s-to run the oil industry Truman's reply on 9 July stressed the U S desire for a peaceful settlement and urged Mosadeq to go along with the ICJ order he also offered to send his foreig'n policy adviser Averel1 Harriman to Iran to help work out a solution Mosadeq agreed to accept Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 CO 13 8 4 4 60---------- _ 1 1_ 11_1 _ ---111 _-- _ o _ _ C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 r1F'3cl 1JIX A liavrrii an as a m_ diator provided that any scheme he suggested would be consistent with the nationalization law Harriman's arrival in Tehran on 15 July was hardly ausiiicious in the course of a massive demonstration a ainst the United States Tudeh mobs fought with the National Front and other ele-Ments the police and then the army int-6rvcned and 15 people were killed over 200 wounded the Minister of Interior' General Zahedi resi ned as a result of the criticism he received ovar the handling of the detnonstrat i on So_nking to Nri d some coiTiimon ground ror agrcttslcnt iiarriiuan persuaded llosadeq to enter into further discussions on how to imple-ment the law contingent on the 3ritish'accepting the principle of nationalization flew to London to arrange for a new British mission to Iran but found the Labor cabinet insistent on an improvement in conditions in the oil a'ea including an end to provocation of British staff Compromise versions of the messages between the two governments were worked out by Harriman and Prime 1inistcr Atlee- and Foreign Secretary Morrison agreed to send Richard Stokes Lord Privy Seal as the head of a high-level delegation to Tehran Stokes' proposal after preliminary meetings with the AIOC staff in Abadan was very similar to the earlier British suggestion that an AIOC purchasing organization with Iranian representation handle the mark ting of the oil as a monopoly with profits evenly divided Iran of course would not give up the idea of nationalization and said it would discuss only three points--the purchase of oil for British needs AIOC claims for compensation and conditions required for continued em- ployment of British technicians At a private maeting of Harriman Mosadaq and Stokes the latter suggested that a British general manager be appointed to act under dYrection of the NIOC I Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 The Iranians would not C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 APMENDIX A' accept this proposing instead a board of management composed of axperts from countries with no special political interest in Iran Stokes ' t'l51 would not ev_n discuss this point and returned to London on 23 August _ U S Ambassador Grady was replaced in Tehran on 11 September by Ambassador Loy Henderson and Mosadeq was advised by H arrim an from Washington that his proposals-were not workable since they did not conform to the practical and coiiinarcial aspects'of the international oil industry Iran told the sriali British staff still in Abadan that it must leave the country within C fi Vm j September and oil ji October the last of the AILC per sorine duly left Iran In the meantime the British government asked that the case be considered by the U N Security Council as a potential thr at to world ' peace and on 1 October the Council agreed to put the question of intervention on its a9c nda The Security Council from Mosadeq flew to New York to prasent Iren's case listened to both sides 'debated the British resolution 15 to 19 October and finally decided to adjourn the qucstion until after the ICJ had ruled on its own jurisdiction In the British general elections shortly thereafter the Conservatives were returned to powar with Winston Churchill as Prime Minister and Anthony Eden as roraign Secretary in a speech in Commons Eden declared there were three elements that would be involved in a satisfactory solution to the proble n--first the Iranian economy depended on efficient operation of the oil industry second the beneFits must be shared between Iran and the developers of-the ail resources anti finally fair compensation must bz paid for tht act of nF tionalization The ICJ met on 9 June 1952 and the legal arguments eventually were reduced to the interpretation of the Iranian declaration of 2 October 1930 SE ET s Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 _ rep ENDIX A r rca nizing the Jurisdiction of the Ferman -nt Court of International Justice predecessor to the ICJ in disputes arising aftar the ratification of the pr sdnt declaration with regard to situations or fact relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions subs quent to the' ratification of this declaration at issue ocre whe The legal points ther the dispute rclatad to a treaty or convention and if so vas it a treaty or convention covered by tha declaration The court Finally ruled that tha word subsequent rafe rred to treaties and not situations and t iat since the oil concession was not a treaty it did not have jurisdiction The British thus lost their CJ case and with it their ch n ce to have the Security Council 'pass on their resolution Thr matter nonatheleess remained at an impasse involved waited nearly solutions w rc sought While the nations- 3 months for the ICJ ruling other compromise In November 1951 officials of the International Lank for Reconstruction and Devclopmcnt I3RD proposes' that tie bank finance as trustee the production and refining of Iran's oil and then sell it to the f%IGC at current Persian Gulf oil prices Iran to receive paym nt at these prices less an agreed discount w iich would go to the AIOC The Sritiph-were willing to go along with this if AIGC technicians would be employed but Iran would not agree to either the technicians or the discount The I3RD tried again proposing a neutral board of nanage- tent responsible to the bank which would arrange 'a bulk export contract for the sale of oil through established distribution channels the profits oinuld be divided three ways--on_ share to Iran one to the bulk purchaszr and one to be 'he l d in' reserve by the- bank iowcve r on the qu stion of non-Iranian management the use of British technicians and the selling price of the oil tie negotiations ui ti nately broke down -a Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 o The IDRD C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09127 C01384460 APPENDIX A Uni ssi on return td to New York on 23 M rch 1952 At about the s acne tine President Truman notified Mosadeq that the United States would not give Irari a loan of $120 million at a time whcnothe country had an opportunity to get adequate revenue from its oil resources he thus none too subtly pressed Mosadaq to settle tile oil dispute Relations betwean the Iranian and British governments deteriorated steadily Iran ott- Zptcd to sell th_- oil stored in the tanks at Abadan to Italian and Japanese firms but AIQC action in the courts plus the cooperation of the international oil industry with the 3riiisn timited In January 1952 Mosadeq the amounts of oil that could be deliver d had ordered all British consulates closed he followed that by closing all foreign information and cultural ccntcrs in Iran He made some a ttempt to reach anrecment with the British on compensation but his proposals included large offsetting amounts for unpaid royalties and other payments stoppzd by the cessation of oil production in 1951 11han thr British in October 1952 d-scribcd his final proposals as unreasonable and unacceptable Mosad q broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom The pre aier in the meantime had scored internal political victories of his own Reelected by the new 4ajlis in July 1952 he asked for six months of emergency powers to rule by decree in order to deal with the critical economic situation When the Shah refused Mosadcq resigned and Cavam was appointed in his place 'the result was four days of ri oting by both Tudeh and the National Front fls e r Qavam resigned and on 23 July A 1 rlosadeq again became _premier er his political al l y and one of oTLhran' s best known rel i gi ous f i gures the mul I ah Aye toll ah Kash rH idws named Speaker of the Majlis which then voted iosadoq decree powers for one year The tage was set for the anti -Shah Senate and the Shah corscurrLd and the s Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 A PEII DIy A political wineuvering of early 1953 during which Mosaripq pzrmitted the Tudeh Party and its front groups considerable freedom pzrhaps with the idra of pressuring the United States to come to Iran's aid Implied threats to turn to the Cor lrnunists ware contained in a oszdcq iatter of 23 lay 1953 to Presiddnt Ciscnhowar requesting a large loan and the tisenhower reply as a matter of policy was cold in its rejection of this threat and its accompanying bid for help CisenhowerIs ictter concluded I fully understand that the Gov rnmnt of Iran must determine foreign nr d n sti c policies I -are l i kelyIf to b most advantag oos to Iran and the Iranian people In what I have vrittcn I am not trying to a2dvise the Iranian rovcrnment on its best interests I wn nerdy trying to explain why in the circumstances the Government of the United States is not presently in a position to extcndmore aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil In case Iran should so desire the United States 3overnmtnt for its elf -whiClh hopes to be able to continue to extend technical assistance and niilit'ary aid on a basis co aparable to that given during the past year I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous situation in Iran -ind sincerely hope that before it is too late the Covcrn knt of 1 ran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent a further deterioration of that situation Following the ' August 1953 coup that overthrew 'losadeq the oil dispute was settled along the lines that h ad been proposad to Mosadcqthe oil industry was n itionalized but its operations ware directed by a group of Foreign oil companies Tile details of this arrangemr nt wise worked out by a szries of conferences but Herbert Hoover Jr as special oil a_dvis ar to the Secretary of State had an important role in convincing the Iranians of tits wisdom of doaling with a consortium Betwaun Hoover's initial visit to Tehran in October 1953 and the announc mcnt of a new agreement in 116gust 1954 Britain anti Iran resumed Undzr th- terms of the agreement diplo'natic relations the National Iranian Cil Company dele- gated basic operations in 100 000 square miles of southwestern Iran to an international consortium known as Iranian Oil Participnts Ltd until I Sec a fac r my of S E R ET A-14 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 A' PENUIX A 1979 with an option of extension to 1594 British Petroleu n the new name of the AIOC owned 40j Zoyal Dutch-Shell Fraiicaisc des P troles 6% and U S oil co iipanias 149% Cornpa jhi e 7% each to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Standard 3i1 Company of California Socony Mobil Oil Company The T xas Company and Gulf oil Corporation and 5% to Iricon Agz hcy Ltd comprised of nine small U S oil companies Since 1551 the 11IOC has carried out a number of operations of its own and after the passage ofoa new oil law in 1957 has al Iowed Italian U S and Canadian companies to explore for oil and conduct operations outside the consortium's territory The consortium has produced 90% of Iran's oil however and the rate of production has been the highest in the world increasing at en' annual rate of almost 11 7 in the 151 60's and reaching 1 7 million barrels in 1971 which was 10% of world output and second largest production in the Middle East Price increases levied by Iran and other Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petrol-cum Exporting Companies in 1971 and 1972 resulted in an estimated for those y--ars and the diddle East oiicrisis of late even higher S14 billion 1973 raisad prices Iran is currently very concerned about its estimated reserves which at current rates of extraction may barely last until- 1994 Joil accounts for 237 of Iran's GNP including sore S5' ' of its foreign exchange earnings and 1 0 of its budgetary revenues Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 xPPr 1DIX A 3ibIion raphy University of Pittsburch Press Nationalism in Iran Cottam - Richard nittsburgh Pa 1964 rFor1rad Alan W The Angla-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952o f California Press Bcrkelcy end Los Angales vi Achdi rooklyn idarlowe John York nac Theo Gaus' Sons Inc 1969 o lJohn ess Lona n Nl-w I rani an-Ameri can 'Dijo University hJati onal i sm oand Sri ti sh Imrcri al i sm Tha Cressct 1961 Iran--A Short Political Cuida Frederick A Praeger Ic Elwell -Sutton Lawrence P Pcrsian Gil--A Study in Po-wer Politics Lawrence and %li shirt Ltd London 1955 Lenczowski George Oil and State in the Middle East University-Press Ithacag N Y 1 60 A-16 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Cornell C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 MapjAppendix oOUNOARY REPRESENTATION Ia NOT NECESSARILY AUTNORITATIVa A Kr AFflovodak urkty KixyPArya1 Ban Pahlarr M Mashhad Baghdad Ao4 Jiri Pakistan Raikoad ROM radar Abb G'L Bahrain Ia _ 0 O AAIaa 0 S0 a1ar Base Oman 100 150 Wl - Ad Dawhah LIMed 501297 3 73 0i3 Concession Boundaries APOC concession 1901 APOC concession 1933 - Consortium concession -E 1954 a 1o T -t -1 f 4 - o-a - Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 _ C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 E R'o ra hi APPENDIX Ske 3 3 h 2 iofOHA 'Vii-0 MOSADEQ The barn bones of the life of the man who was Premier of Iran from 2 9 Apri l'1951 to 19 August '1953 and who was the target of TPAJI X H- was born about 13 31 003 or 1379 are probably more accurate dates but- 13 11 was always rj aXjmjnn given as his official birth year because of the restrictions on th a ge of Majlis deputies in Tehran his mothc 5 Cfocing a mzmbcr of 'the ruling Qa jar dynas ty grid his i d Lher the iii nI sLer of F inance for so nic jv yc re His family background was thus the elite wealthy landovrning class His secondary education --complete l4osadeq was sent to Khorasan as the Shah's financial agant while barely out of his i iiddlc tarns In 1906 forced into exile because of his role in the Constitutional Revolution that year lie went to Europa to study la Y at Paris Liege an Ncuchatel earning his LL D from the last institution in 1914 Raturning to Iran he alas elected to thv Majlis in 1915 serving on its financial com nittee As Under Secretary of Finance in 1917 he resigned after only a few months in office because he was prevented from carrying out reforms in tha notoriously padded payroll system lie becasna governor' of Fars Province in 1921 but his criticism of Reza Shah led to arrest in 1930 and c ile to the villages He was again arrested in 1941 but was released in the general political amnesty after Reza Shah's abdication Mosadcq was again elected to the Ma j l i s in 1944 when in 1947 he oryanizcd the National Front a small tightly knit and highly influential Troup As o member of the oil commission he -gained in influence not only in tha pia jl i s but among the people and his Apri 1 1951 appointment as Prcmier seas at the lajlis' request August 1953 he concentrated Frori then until his removal s ncrgies on expropriating the 3ritiosh-owned SECRET from office in Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 APPENDIX D oil ins ustry in defiance of Vastcrn attempts to negotiate a settlc n nt that stopped short of complete nationalization Sentenced to three years in prison in a post-coup trial he was eventually pardonod by the Shah in August 1956 but he was forced to remain in his village of Ah nadabad under virtual house arrest for the 11 years until his death Ic had suffered from cancer of the jaw and finally in llarch_1 E7 succumbed to internal bleeding after two operations in Tehran often bizanre The above facts lido little to explain his behavior as a pol i ti ci on but moos t o f his actions even his most emotional and apparently irrational ones wire probably wall calculated The popular world im qt of him as an enfeebled old man given to hysterical weeping and fainting spells served his own purposes and gave him trem_ndous lcvcraSe among his people He used the accepted belief that he- was ill and weak to avoid things or people he did not want to face and his apparent physical debility added to the drama of his personality t ate r which in public speeches was capable of movi ngAhi s opponents losadcq's power rose from his consunna e ability to appeal to national aspirations and emotions By attempting to deal with a heated political problem'in logical rational terms based on economic facts the 3ritish %%r - re unable to achieve anything in the oil dispute but acs unify the people of Iran Reza Shah had held power for 20 years by rte apps a l ' to latent Iranian nationalism Mosadeq used this aw'aak sned nationalism acid the desire for independence to keep himself in -power and to defy 3ritain His speeches and programs appealed to social discontent xeno jhobia religious fanaticism and national pride in past glories His enormous 5amb7c on the oil issue based on his belief that Sri tain Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 APPENDIX B and the United States would not let Iran go Com nunist was part vanity part Islamic fatalism lie utilized foremost the tcchnicpa of opposition-- his nine-man National Front opposed ovary govarnmcnt in po orcr whether under Sa'ed Mansur Razmara or Ala--und then once Premier his single plank was opposition to the British over the oil question Mosadeq %Vas antagonistic to tine Shah for many reasons was a his mother ajar whose family was overthrown by the Shah's fo ther the same man that had exiled and then imprisoned him in addition he had long believed in constitutional reform to reduce the paver of the monarehy He opposed the army because it had brought Rcza Shah to powar'and was the main source of support for Mohairrrnad Reza Shah by retiring senior officars and putting in his own Chief-of Staff the young French-trained Brig en Tagi Riahi he had obtained a degree of controlover the army But by so doing he s t the stage for the officer him corpse to turn a_ainst His own axtrcii nationalism fantasies of 'otnnipotence and lack of cnnsci- ice--in manipulating Tudeh at the risk of it getting out of control as it did in the streets of Tehran on 1 8 August were the seeds of his own eventual downfall But he-was a most unusual man one whose character caught the world's fancy even as he drove his coontrymnn toward-disaster At any time in 1951 or 19$2 he could have had the saint compromise through which his successors gained a nution lized oil industry efficiently run by foreign experts to give Iran the revenue that financed the Shah's White Revolution lie chose to gamble on total victory over Critain the United States and the international oil industry--and he lost Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 APPENDIX 8 MAJ GEN FAZLOLLAH ZAHEDI Born in 1897 in Hamadan Zahedi graduated from the Military School in Tehran and served during the years of World War I and the postwar period under Reza Khan then a colonel in'the Cossack Brigade As at combat officer he was decorated for action against assorted bandits and insurgents including rebellious Kurds Lurs and Turkomans He had became a division commander by 1942 after service as head of the Gendarmerie and the Tehran Police but he was arrested by the British that year For pro-German activity his name was found in the papers of Franz Mayer a principal Nazi agent in Tehran as an officer who would protect German agents and deported to Palestine where he was held until 1945o Despite his arrest and subsequent three years in a detention camp he did not become fanatical ly anti-British as did many xenophobic Iranians 'Returning to Tehran after the war in 1945 Ne was given command of the Fars Division and promoted to major general In 1948 as Inspector General of the army he was severely injured in a tank accident losing four ribs and after 7 months of medical treatment in r Germany some of it by U S Army doctors he was retired in May 1949 The Shah made him his honorary adjutant and in November 1949 appointed him Director General of the Tehran Police In April 1951 Zahedi became Minister of Interior in the Ala cabinet and was retained in that post by Mosadeq when he became Premier He resigned in August 1951 following J There was a Cossack Brigade in the Persian Army solely because Nasred-Din Shah visited Russia in 1878 and was provided with a Cossack escort by the Czar The Shah was so impressed 'by the Cossacks that he asked the Czar to send him hussian officers to organize such a unit in The Brigade retained Russian senior officers and noncoms until 1920 and as long as it was in existence it was the best trained and most professional unit in the army his own army Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 0 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Ai i'criD1 X__B _-_ -_ _ the anti-U S riots in Tehran on 15 July in which the mob got out of hand and the army had to be called in to fire on them with the result that many died and hundreds were wounded on both sides He was a prime suspect of the Mosadeq government as a potential coup leader and was briefly arrested in February -' 1953o ARDESHIR ZAHEDI Born in December 1927s General Zahedi's son Ardeshir was educated at the Am erican Uni versi tV in he earned a BS degree in 1950 Bei-tut anti et Utah State Ifni ve r si tv where Because of his trafning and language ability he served with the Rural Improvement Commission which was administering U S 'technical assistance until he was forced to resign in 1952 by Mosadeq During the planning and operational phases of the coup he acted as the communications channel to his father and performed very well under difficult circumstances He was-married for a time to the Shah's daughter by Queen Fawzia and has never remarried singe his div once He has retained the Shah's-favor and in fact introduced the Shah to Farah in May 1959 the girl who later became Queen and mother of the Shah's sons Ardeshir was the Iranian Ambassador to the United States in 1960-62 and returned again in April ' In the interim he was Ambassador to the United 1973 to the post Kingdom 1962-67 and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1967-71MAJ GEN NAaR BATMANGEL ICH General Batmangelich also spelled Batmanqilich oe Batmangelij was born in Tehran about 1905 and educated in Germany the Iranian Military School and the German Staff College He fought in the Luristan and Fars tribal campaigns and wa N _nterned by the Allies from August 1943 ET- Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 - _ _ C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 APPE14DIX B to Jun 1945 He visited the United states on a purchasing- mission in 1950 and was put on the retired list in 1952 by Mosadeq Named Chief of Staff of the army immediately after the 1953 coup he retained that post despite friction with Premier Zahedi until December 1955 when he was made Ambassador to Pakistan to ease him out of the army command Clashes with General Hedayet Chief of the new Supreme Staff were the probablg cause of his reassignment He then became Ambassador to Iraq in January 1957 was Minister of interior in 1958-59 and became Adjuta6t to th e 'Shai in 1957o -3 3 h 2 After serving as Governor of Khorasan 1965-68 he retired to private life He had ser%ed as Permanent Iranian Delegate to the CENTO Military Committee b efore retiring from the army 1965 Batmangelich ne%er lied down his behavior on the night of 15 August details of which were known only to few insiders in the Zahedi coup group He failed to take his objective -the Staff Headquarters and breaking down- he either turned himself in or was arrested by troops loyal to Mosadeq There was reason to believe he talked 6reely to interrogators providing them with a list of other officers in%ol 6ed in the coup S Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 I APPENDIX -B MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI When Mohammad Reza became Shah in 1941 at the age of 22 following his father's abdication Iran was occupied by foreign troops--Soviet British and American--and its army was demoralized He had no solid power base and no political machine and as a result he spent the first 10 years of his reign in conflict with the traditional political power structure bent on regaining the influence it had -lost to Reza Shah The military coup that ousted Mosadeq in August 1953 was thus a major milestone n the Shc ri' P011-1 t i c all 11 4 c Mohammad Reza was born on 26 October 1919 he studied 6 years as a cadet'at the'Miiitary School of Tehran and then went to Switzerland in 1931 for his secondary education Returning in 1936 he attended the Iranian Military College from which he graduated 2 years later as a second lieutenant His first marriage in 1939 'was to Princess Fawzia of Egypt sister of King Farug and a daughter Shanaz was the only child of this marriage Divorcing Fawzia he married Sorya Esfandiari a half- German half-Bakhtiari beauty to whom he was very devoted but the marriage Y was childless and the throne needed an heir After the inevitable divorce he married Farah Diba in 1959 and Crown Prince Reza was born in 1960' followed by two daughters and prince Ali Reza securing the succession of the Pahlavi line Although various sources -' criticized the young Shah as suspicious and indecisive to the point of permanent instability others saw his strengths An OSS report in 1943 said Mohammad Shah is a man of much stronger purpose than is generally realized He stands alnost alone distrusts most advisers is honest in his efforts to sedure a democratic form of government for Iran He is nest easily influenced and cannot Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 be shaken Installed as a figurehead during the 1941 crisis he may yet surprise the factions in his country and the outside powers He thinks along Western lines and he is inalienably attached to his Iranian army The military budget is half the national expenditure just now Yet of course the army is almost his only backing within Iran In 1951 also on the positive side the U S Embassy in Tehran I noted It is important to observe that the Shah in ten years of political wavering has river turned against the intellectual interests sports and hobbies which he learned from European sources His mind remains alert and his principles although often betryyed retain great similarity to Christian ethics and phiiospphy The tragedy in the conflict of this healthy i ntellect against the vicious Persian scene carries some triumph since the Shah so far has not become corrupted the Shah took the successful coup of 1953 as a popular mandate to seize control of his country from the political factions and the ambitious generals he has never since allowed them to threaten his position or his program His hasty flight to Baghdad and Rome eras either Forgiven or forgotten in the triumph of the moment and although General Zahedi was often angered'by the Shah's vacillation and lack of decisiveness those very characteristics enabled him to frustrate the volatile Zahedi and eventually bring about his resignation and voluntary exile Given confidence by the popular support he saw during the coup he pressed ahead to consolidate his power carefully controlling political activity which he has said can be permitted to function freely only after economic and social development have taught the people to act responsibl y reforms launched in 1962 as the White Revolution have accomplished much without the power and prestige of-the throne coupled with the Shah's authoritarianism and determination the reforms and development probablycould not have taken place The rapid escalation of oil prices in 1973 -74 has enhanced the Shah's prestige as sp 6kesman for a more extreme oil-producing countries and he SE T Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 APPENDIX 3 has been quick to resent criticism of the view that oil is the main resource of those countries a resource that cannot be'replaced and that must be conserved if only-by the pressure of cost the situation has clearly made the Shah a man whom the world listens to and he has made the most of it 4 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460- IC01384460- Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 f APPENDIX C THE LEGEND HOW THE PRESS VIEWED TPAJAX The world of journalism--ever on the alert for the mote in somebody else's eye--found long ago that the Central Intelligence Agency made great copy Proceeding on the theory that-their readers will believe anything dealing with spies agents and the secret world of espionage a number of writers have told what they insist is the inside story of the CIA involvement in ran in 1953 A sampling of these is included here without extensive comment since the distortions and guesses will be obvious to those who have read this history Andrew Tully for example in CIA--The Inside Story devotes Chapter 7 King-Making in Iran to a version of TPAJAX most-notable for the purple of its flamboyant prose Some significant passages are It was in 1953 of course that the CIA stage-managed the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh that celebrated compulsive weeper who had seized Britain's monopolistic oil company and was threatenAt ing to do business with the Kremlin the time CIA's coup was hailed as a blow for democracy which it was But after 'disposing of Mossadegh CIA and the State Department reverted once again to a weakness that so often has been disastrous In the setting up of the new regime in which CIA took a major part no consideration was giveU as to whether the new men hack any t Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 IC0138446O Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 intention of attempting to relieve the It was misery'of the Iranian people enough for the United States that they were anti-Communist When Mossadegh announced the expropriation of Anglo-Iranian Oil and nationalization of Iran's oil fields the international uproar was thunderous Mossadegh could not do that and the Western bankers would prove it to him Iranian oil was virtually boycotted Mossadegh promptly tried to swing some deals with smaller independent companies to work the Iranian fields but the State Department gave these companies little encouragement - which is to say it told them hands off Meanwhile 'Iran was losing its oil revenues and going broke Even American financial aid was not enough although the State Department with understandable reluctance donated $1 600 000 for a technical rural improvement program in 1951 and followed that with a foreign aid grant of $23 000 000'in 1952 Most of the latter was used to make up Iran's foreign exchange shortages but Iran remained financially unstable Meanwhile CIA learned that Mossadegh was carrying on a clandestine flirtation with Iran's furtive Communist party the Tudeh Soviet intelligence agents flocked into the ancient capital of Teheran and the traffic jam between them and Allen Dulles' energetic young men was almost ludicrous Almost daily emissaries from the Soviet danced attendance on'Mossadegh as he lolled recumbent on his oouch oalternately dozing and weeping Inevitably the old dictator put it squarely up to President Eisenhower In a letter received by the President on May 28 1953 Mossadegh overplayed-his hand - he attempted to blackmail the United States by warning that unless Iran got more American financial aid he would be forced to seek help elsewhere Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 Elsewhere was the Soviet Union with which Mossadegh suggested he would conclude both an economic agreement and a mutual defense pact Since Iran otherwise was broke that meant Mossadegh would have to pledge the rich Iranian oil fields and the refinery at Abadan the world's largest in return for The financial assistance from the Soviet danger to the West was clear With Iran's oil assets in its pockets the Russians would have little trouble eventually achi evi ng a prime object cif Rvssi an fore3 an policy since the days of the Czars - access to a warm water outlet on the Persian Gulf the free world's life line to the Far East' But even if Russia were to get just Iran's oil the western world would-be weakened throughout the middle East and Soviet prestige would soar It was clear too of course that Anglo-Iranian Oil had a stake of billions of dollars and when private enterprise of that magnitude is involved State Departments ' and Foreign Offices are apt to react most sensitively The time had come for the United States to embark on an international gamble CIA reports were that Mossadegh although popular with the masses 'had never been able to undermine the young Shah with his people If something were to happen whereby the Shah was able to take over more firmly the reins of government there was a good chance Mossadegh could be unseated In any event the Shah had a better than even chance of winning any popularity contest with Mossadegh So for a month the White'House stalledMossadegh avoiding a direct reply in a welter of polite diplomatic notes seeking further discussions Then President Eisenhower favored Mossadegh with a blunt reply - No Everybody agreed it was a calculated risk a gamble that Mossadegh could be dealt with in such a fashion that he would be powerless to carry out his threat The CIA forthwith set the wheels in motion for dealing with this tough old man Approved for Release 2017109127 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 First on August 10 Allen Dulles flew to Europe to join his wife for a holiday Although the political in the Swiss Alps situation in Teheran was becoming more ominous - Mossadegh was conferring daily with a Russian economic mission - United States Ambassador Loy Henderson decided he' would like a vacation to Switzerland too Almost simultaneously the Shah's sister the pretty and tough-minded Princess Ashraf marched into the royal palace and gave her brother the rough side ofher tongue for his Then hesitancy in facing up to Mossadegh she too f l ew off to Switzerland certainly the Russian espionage network must have surmised that something was cooking-as Dulles Hendersonn and Princess Ashraf turned up at the same Swiss resort Their suspicions were strengthened when an old Middle Eastern hand named Brigadier General H Norman Schwartzkopf suddenly was discovered in the midst of a leisurely flying vacation across the Middle East He had been to Pakistan Syria and Lebanon and while the Russians fumed he ultimately turned up in Iran The Reds had a right to be fearful for Schwartzkopf had long been an anathema to the Kremlin Americans remember him most vividly as the man who ran the Lindbergh kidnapping investigation in 1932 when he was head of the New Jersey State Police But the world of international politics knew him better as the man who from 1942 to 190 had been in charge of reorganizing the Shah's national police force In this job Schwartzkopf spent little time tracking down ordinary criminals he_was kept busy protecting the government against its enemies a job that required the setting up of an intelligence system to keep watch on various political cliques which might seek-the Shah's overthrow Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C 013 8 4 4 6 0 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 1 In the course of these intriguing duties Schwartzkopf had become a close friend and adviser to the Shah and more important to Major General Fazlollah Zahedi one of his So when colleagues on the police force Schwartzkopf turned up in Teheran in August he could explain with a straight face that he had come merely to see old friends again ' The Russians stormed and protested over his presence in Iran but Schwartzkopf went his casual way dropping in to see the Shah one afternoon spending the morning with General Zahedi and renewing contacts with other old pals in the police and army - V a v AT1C1 s13C1Cle n ty the On located his courage and authority Thursday August 13 the Shah handed down a ukase that sounded as if it had been written in collaboration by Schwartzkopf and Zahedi Vtt li e1 11IV ti Mossadegh was ousted as Premier and his successor was to be General Zahedi The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh and the wheels seemed to be turning But for some reason the colonel seemed seized by inaction It was not until two days later on midnight of August 15 that the colonel and a platoon of his troops showed up at Mossadegh's residence There they found themselves surrounded by an array of tanks and jeeps manned by hard-faced Army veterans Mossadegh had rounded up while the colonel vacillated The colonel of course was clapped into jail and Mossadegh announced that a revolt against the rightful government of Iran had been crushed He also had some unkind things to say about the youthful Shah and Iran's king of kings and his queen took the hint and hopped a plane for Rome by way of the then royally safe country of Iraq Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Schwartzkopf however held his own ground on the Iranian stage He took over as unofficial paymaster for the Mossadegh-Must-Go clique Certain Iranians started'to get rich and the word later was that in a period of a few days Schwartzkopf supervised the careful spending of more than ten million of CIA's dollars Mossadegh suddenly lost a great many supporters The climax came on Wednesday August 19 four days after Mossadegh had crushed the revolt The tense capital was filled with troops mounted against a new uprising but none of them looked very happy There seemed no reason for alarm when a long and winding procession of performers appeared on the scene for one of these impromtu In the procession parades common in Teheran were tumblers weight-lifters wrestlers boxers -- all performing their specialties as they moved slowly along the streets As usual crowds flocked out into the streets to watch the show and to follow the parade Then apparently somebody gave a signal The weird procession suddenly broke into an organized shouting mob Long Live the Shah The crowd Death to Mossadegh they cried joined in the shouting some of them undoubtedly keeping one hand tight against pockets where their American wages were secured Soon the entire capital was in an uproar and when the din was at its loudest troops who had remained loyal to the Shah launched their attack For more than nine hours the battle raged with Mossadegh's troops fighting fiercely but gradually giving ground Obviously they were confused by the tactics and swift logistical maneuvers of the Shah's forces who had been exposed to some American who knew the ropes Anyway by midnight Mossadegh's soldiers had been driven into a little ring around the Premier's pa lace'and they were forced-tosurrender Troops forcing their way into the palace captured Mossadegh -as'he -lay weeping in his bed - 'clad in silk striped pajamas Somebody telephoned Rome and the Shah and his queen packed again to return to Teheran and install Zahedi as Premier Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 T CO138446O Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 This was a coup necessary to the security of the United States and probably to that But it'was another of the Western World case of the United States not requiring tough It enough terms in return for its support is senseless as some observers have written to say that the Iranians overthrew Mossadegh all by themselves It was an American operaBut at the end tion from beginning to end CIA -- and the American government -- stood by while a succession of pro-Western and antiCommunist administrations uninterested in the smallest social reforms brought Iran Amid once again to the edge of bankruptcy of course the American taxpayer has contributed hundreds ofmillions of dollars to this corruption Then David Wise and Thomas B' Ross in their explosive bestseller The Invisible Government provided yet-another version as follows 1953 Iran But guerrilla raids are small actions compared to an operation that changes a government There is no doubt at all that the CIA organized and directed the 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and kept Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi on his throne But few Americans know that the coup that toppled the government of Iran was led by a CIA agent who was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt Kermit Kim Roosevelt also a seventh cousin of President Franklin D Roosevelt is still known as Mr Iran around the CIA for his spectacular operation in Teheran more than a decade ago He later left the CIA and joined the Gulf Oil Corporation as government relations director in its Washington office his a vice-president in 1960 Gulf named One legend that grew up inside the CIA hadit that Roosevelt in the grand Rough Rider tradition led the revolt against the weeping Mossadegh with a gun at the head of an Iranian tank commander as the column rolled into Teheran Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 1 SECRET A CIA man familiar with the Iran story characterized this as a bit romantic but said Kim did run the operation from a basement in Teheran -- not from our embassy He added admiringly It was a real James Bond operation General Fazollah Zahedi ' the man the CIA chose to replace Mossadegh was also a character A six-foot-two handsome worthy of spy fiction ladies' man he fought the Bolsheviks was captured by the Kurds and in 1942 was kidnapped by the British who suspected him of Nazi intrigues During World War II the British and the Russians British agents after jointly occupied Iran 4tchIng Zahedi claimed they found the following items in his bedroom a collection of German automatic weapons silk underwear some opium letters from German parachutists operating in the hills and an illustrated register of Teheran's most exquisite prostitutes After the war Zahedi rapidly moved back-intoHe was Minister of Interior when public life Mossadegh became Premier in 1951 Mossadegh nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in April and seized the huge Abadan refinery on the Persian Gulf The refinery was shut down thousands of workers were idled and Iran faced a financial crisis The British with the backing of Western governments boycotted Iran's oil and the local workers were unable to run the refineries at capacity without British techniques Mossadegh connived with the Tudeh Iran's Communist party and London and Washington feared that the Russians would end up with Iran's vast oil reserves flowing into'the Soviet Union which shares a common border with Iran Mossadegh running the crisis from his bed -- he claimed he was a very sick man -- had broken with Zahedi who balked at tolerating the Tudeh party He died September 1 1963 at age sixty-seven Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C 13 446 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 It was against this background that the CIA and Kim Roosevelt moved in to oust Mossadegh and install Zahedi -At the time of the coup Roosevelt then thirty-seven was already a veteran intelliHis gence man He was born in Buenos Aires father the President's second son was also named Kermit Kim was graduated from Harvard just before World Saar II and he taught history there and later at the California Institute of Technology He had married while still at Harvard He left the academic life to serve in the OSS then joined the CIA after the war as a Middle East specialist His father had died in Alaska during the war -his uncle Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt died on the beaches of Normandy a year later The British and American governments had together decided to mount an operation to overthrow Mossadegh The CIA's estimate was that it would succeed because the conditions were right in a showdown the people of Iran would be loyal to the Shah The task of running the operation'' went to Kim Roosevelt then the CIA's top operator in the Middle East Roosevelt entered Iran legally He drove across the border reached Teheran and then dropped out of sight He had to since he had been in Iran before and his face was known Shifting his headquarters several times to keep one step ahead of Mossadegh's agents Roosevelt operated outside of the protection of the American Embassy He did have the help of about five Americans including some of the CIA men stationed in the embassy In addition there were seven local agents including two top Iranian intelligence operatives These two men communicated with Roosevelt through cutouts -- intermediaries -- and lie never saw them during the entire operation As the plan for revolt was hatched Brigadier General H Norman Schwarzkopf who used to appear on radio's Bang Busters turned up in Teheran He had reorganized the Shah's Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 001384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 A police force-there in the 1 940s He was best known for his investigation of the Lindbergh baby kidnaping case when he headed the New Jersey State Police in 1932 'Schwarzkopf an old friend of Zahedi's claimed he was in But town just to see old friends again he was part of the operation On August 13 the Shah signed a decree dismissing Mossadegh and naming Zahedi as Premier The uncooperative Mossadegh arrested the unfortunate colonel who brought in his notice of dismissal Mobs rioted in the streets the thirty-three-year-old Shah and his queen at that tiriie Mile beautiful Soraya fled to Baghdad by plane from their palace on the Caspian Sea For two chaotic days Roosevelt lost communication with his two chief Iranian agents Meanwhile the Shah had made his way to Rome Allen Dulles flew there to confer with him Princess Ashraf the Shah's attractive twin sister tried to play a part in the international intrigue but the Shah refused to talk to-her In Teheran Communist mobs controlled the streets they destroyed statues of the Shah to celebrate his departure Suddenly the opposition to Mossadegh consolidated The Army began rounding up demonstrators Early on August 19 Roosevelt from his hiding place gave orders to his Iranian agents to get everyone they could find into the streets The agents went into the athletic clubs in Terreran and rounded up a strange assortment of weight-lifters muscle-men and gymnasts The odd procession made its way through the bazaars shouting pro-Shah slogans The crowd grew rapidly in size ' By mid-morning it was clear the tide had turned against Mossadegh and nothing could stop it Zahedi came out of hiding and took over Mossadegh The Shah returned from exile went to jail and the leaders of the Tudeh were executed Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 In the aftermath the British lost their monopoly on Iran's oil In August 1958 an international consortium of Western oil companies signed a twenty-five-year pact with Iran for its oil Under it the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company got 4'0 percent a group of American companies got 40 percent Royal Dutch Shell got 14o percent and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 6 percent Iran got half of the multimillion-dollar income from the oil fields under the deal the Anglo-Iranian was assured a compensation payment of $70 000 000 _ The United States of course has never officially admitted the CIA's role The closest Dulles came to doing so was in a CBS television show in 1962 after his retirement from the CIA 10 He was asked whether it was'true that the CIA people spent literally millions of dollars hiring people to riot in the streets and do other things to get rid of Mossadegh Is there anything you can say about that Well Dulles replied I can say that the statement that we spent many dollars doing that is utterly false The former CIA chiefalso hinted at the CIA's Iran role in his book The Craft of Intelligence support from-the outside was given j to the Shah's supporters ' he wrote without directly saying it came from the CIA Magazines dial their part-as well In The 'Saturday Evening Post for 6 November 1954 Richard and Gladys Harkness co-authored an article entitled The-Mysterious Doings of CIA which appears to have been a key source Cor bath Tully and Wise-Ross Richard and Gladys said Gulf Oil Standard Oil of New Jersey and California The Texas Company and Socony-Mobile Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Another CIA-influenced triumph was the successful overthrow of Iran in the summer of 1953 of old dictatorial Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and the return to power of this country's friend Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi On May 28 1953 President Eisenhower received a letter from Mossadegh amounting to a bare faced attempt at international blackmail The White House stalled Mossadegh for one month then turned down the crafty premier with a blunt no This was a calculated risk at best It was a daring gamble in fact that Mossadegh w ould n ot reiaa in in power to carry out ' his th reat It was as well a situation which required a little doing The doing began in short order through a chain of stranger-than-fiction circumstances involving Allen Dulles a diplomat a princess and a'policeman On August tenth Dulles packed his bags and flew to Europe to join his wife for a vacation in the Swiss Alps The political situation in Teheran was becoming more conspiratorial by the hour Mossadegh was consorting with a Russian diplomatic-economic mission Loy Henderson United States Ambassador'to Iran felt he could leave his post for a short holiday in SwitzerPrincess Ashraf the attractive and strongland willed brunette twin sister of the Shah chase the same week to fly to a Swiss alpine resort It was reported that she had had a stormy session with her brother in his pink marble palace because of his vacillating in facing up to Mossadegh The fourth of the assorted characters in this drama Brig Gen H Norman Schwartzkopf -at this time took a flying vacation across the Middle East His itinerary included apparently aimless and leisurely stops in Pakistan Syria Lebanon -- and Iran Schwartzkopf is best known to the public as the man who conducted the Lindberg kidnapping investigation in 1932 when he was head of the New Jersey state police But from 1942 through 1948 he was detailed to Iran to-reorganize the Shah's national police 1 1 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 4 _ Schwartzkopf'sojob in Iran was more than the tracking down of routine criminals force He protected the government against its enemies -- an assignment requiring intelligence on the political cliques plotting against the Shah knowledge of which army elements could be counted on to remain loyal and familiarity with Middle East psychology 'Schwartzkopf became friend and advisor to such individuals as Maj Gen Fazlollah Zahedi his colleague on the police force and the Shah himself Schwartzkopf returned to Iran in August of 1953 he said just to see old friends again Certainly the general will deny any connection with the events that followed his renewal of acquaintanceships with the Shah _and Zahedi But as Mossadegh and the Russian propaganda press railed nervously at Schwartzkopf's presence in Iran developments started to unfold in one-two-three order On Thursday August thirteenth the Shah suddenly issued a double-edged ukase Mossadegh was ousted by royal decree and his successor as premier was to be General Zahedi The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh Two days later at midnight of Saturday August fifteenth the colonel went to Mossadegh's residence-to find himself and his platoon surrounded by tanks and jeeps The colonel W as clapped-in jail and Mossadegh proclaimed that the revolt had been crushed The Shah and his queen taking events at face value fled to Rome by way of Iraq On Wednesday August nineteenth with the'army standing close guard around the uneasy capital a grotesque procession made its way along the streeoa leading to the heart of Teheran There were tumblers turning handsprings weight lifters twirling iron bars and wrestlers flexing their biceps As spectators grew in number the bizarre assortment of performers began shouting pro-Shah slogans in unison The crowd took up the chant and then after one precarious moment the balance of public psychology swung against Mossadegh 'Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Upon signal it seemed army forces on the The fighting lasted Shah's side began an attack a bitter nine hours By nightfall following American-style military strategy and logistics loyalist troops drove Mossadegh's elements into They a tight cordon around the premier's palace surrendered and Mossadegh was captured- as he lay weeping in his bed clad in striped silk pajamas In Rome a bewildered young Shah prepared to fly home and install Zahedi as premier and to give Iran a pro-Western regime Thus it was that the strategic little nation of Iran was rescued from the closing clutch of Moscow Equally important the physical overthrow of Mossadegh was accomplished by the Iranians themselves It is the guiding premise of CIA's third force that one must develop and nurture indigenous freedom legions among captive-or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own-liberty 45 More than a year later Crosby Noyes writing in the Washington Star for 27 September 1953 discussed obliquely the significance of Ambassador Henderson CIA Director Dulles and Princess Ashraf being in Zurich the same week in August and mentioned General Schwarzkopf's visit in detail making any direct accusations he hinted Without It is possible that the CIA agents whose departure from Iran was observed - and reported were on purely routine intelligence missions It is possible -- as a leading columnist has suggested -that Mr Henderson's trap to Switzerland was no more than a 'policy of studied indifference' on the part of the State 45 Richard and Gladys Harkness The Mysterious Doings of CIA The Saturday Evening Post November 6 1954 pp 66-68 Reprinted by special permission of The Saturday Evening Post 1954 The Curtis Publishing Company Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Department toward the Mossadegh regime A friend of the Princess Ashraf here in Washington holds stoutly to the view that her visit with the Shah was undertaken simply to ask him for money It is possible that Allen Dulles is genuinely fond of mountain-climbing and that Gen Schwarzkopf just happened to show up in Teheran at a critical-moment It is all perfe c tly possible Dut as 'Long as the practice of putting two and two together continues the argument about what really happened in Iran last summer seems likely to continue Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 3 3 hg APPENDIX 0 r Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 -Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 a Presentation to the Shah 2 3 3 h 2 Major issue is to maintain indepen- dence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit To do this llossadeq must be removed 3 Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty 4 While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States 03 3 h 2 5 Alossadeq must go 6 F__1f inancial aid will be foxtxi coming to successor government 7 Acceptable 6il settlement will be offered-but successor government will not be rushed into it b Demands on the Shah You must take leadership in over' 1 throw Mossadeq 2 If not you bear responsib2lity for collapse of country 0-2 S C R E T SECR Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 3 3 h 2 A After agreement with Shah per above inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor g6vernment with US-UK support B Agree on specific plan'for action and timetable for action There are two ways to put Zahedi in office 1 Quasi-legally whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal firman 2 ' Military coup Quasi-legal method to be tried first 'Yf success ful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action If it fails mili- tary coup will follow in matter of hours D- 3 i i S E C S -ET RET Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 oS SIEC 3 3 h 2 E T J I _ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460' 3 3 h 2 - D- 5 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 001384460 -i ENDIX 0 3 3 h 2 0- 6 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 B Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows 1 ' Ground one that Mossadeq government basically a anti--religious as most clearly demonstrated q-and Tudeh oand Mossadeq ties' between Mossadeq and USSR 2 Ground two that Mossadeq is lea Ing country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship 4 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release_ 2017 09127 001384460 PPEN IX 0 C Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day Immediately followed by effort have Majlis- pass a motion to censure the government This is to be followed by the dis- missal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor If successful the coup would be completed by early afternoon Failing success the coup would be inouxited 'Later that ever'iing 17 0-8 I o Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 001384460 0 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 111 9 _ -3 3 h 2 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ' 1 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 0 3 3 h 2 kPPENDIX E I E-3 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C 013 8 4 4 6 0 _ _ - _ - _ _ -z a w _ Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 _ _ _ _ f u c x C01384460 ri 'r't t 1 X E Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 17 1 y CtJ 1 3 3 h 2 I Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 ' C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 PPLN'DIX F rho following is a U S Embassy translation of tine Court of Ruvision It vordict aclainst Nlosaduq and Riahi handed down on 12 4zy 1954 revievis the case suns up the charges against the tyro defendants and examinl s their respoctivo defense It objects - to and overrules the versiict of the military Court of First Instance and conclud s by resentancing the defendants Under the indictment issued by tho Army Prosecutor the accused ovlere charg d o 4i th the following In conricct ion wi th Dr Mohaaimad t-1osadeq-- 1 Order for the arrest of Col Nematollah asiri now brigadier general Coutmander of the Royal Guards who carried the order for the dismissal of Mosaf2eq it ur r e st of off --1a Jiil a-C f Si u iiniVf ftcial t and Persons 3 Disarming of the royal Cuurds protecting HIJM the Shah and the royal palaces IF Sealing of the royal palaces eispossessing the officials and guard of the Royal Court from the properties and palaces of the Shah 5 Issue of telegrams to the Iranian 'Pmbassauors abroad instructing them not to contact F1Ir4 the Shah C Issue of instructions for omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in the military centers 7 Issue of instructions for the holding of neetin s try taking advantage of Government propaganda facilities with a view to insulting the monarch and the constitutional rayime end broadcasting the meetings by radio 3 Issue of instructions For pulling dot-in and breaking the statues of the late Shah and the present Shah with a view to humiliating the royal household and encouraging insurgents to rise against the constitutional monarchy in Iran 9 Issue of instructions for the dissolution of th Majlis 10 Issue of instructions for keeping under surveillance the members of the royal household in Azerbaijan 11 Issue of instructions for the unlawful arrest of General Zahedi the Prime 's'inister appointed uy the Shah and the offer of a raward to the person capturing him -12 Elimination of the royal anthem from the projram of Tehran Radio and 13 fiction for the formation of a regency council by referendum In connection with Brig Gen Tagi 2iahi 1 Arrest of Col Nematollah Nasiri now briyadii r general- who was carrying the order for Dr Mosad gls dismissal and other officers without any legal warrant 2 Disarming of tha Royal Guards 1 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 -Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 4%PPENOIX F 3 Issua of instructions for the omission of the Shah' s nama from the Horning and evening prayers of the soldiers and 4 Issuer of instructions that the dernonstratinns of the Tudah Party should not be checked ant insuryonts should not be prevented from inakino demonstrations against HIM the Shah and that those people pulsing down the statues of the late Shah and those of the pres nt Shah should not be checked By virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Punal Law capital punishm nt was demanded for the above-named The casa was referred to the Court of First-Instance which Court after performing the legal formalities and investigating the case affirmed that ponde d with ticlC- 31 r o f h' Arm y Dr Mosade-q's'offunces corresd Pcn ai_ Law With clue reard to'Article 413 of_the Army Judicial and Penal Late article 44 of the' Criminal Code and Article 46 of the same Law since the accused is over 60 years of age he was condemned to three years of'solitary imprison4 ment General Riahi's offence was found to conform with paragraph b of Article 330 of the army Judicial and Penal Laii and he was condemned to two years of correctional imprisonment and permanent dismissal From the army according to Article 298 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law Aftur th communication of the verdict issued the Ailitary Prosecutor and the accused appealed fora revision according to Articles 217 and 218 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Article 219 of the same Law The casa was ro ferred to this Court according to File No 109 -on Oecem ar 26 1953o The Court of Revision was formed on April 8 after pass through the necessary formalities and listened in nine sessions to the explanations of tine Prosecutor and the objections of the accused and thoir defense dounsals about the defects of the file and the incompetence of the Court 5 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 APPENDIX 1 On April 22 1951 the on final mashers of the Court by a -majori ty vots of six to one aid not find the ob j pct i ons of the accused and their defense counsMis al out the dafects of the file and incompentence of the Court plausible and declared their preparedness to investigate the substance of the accusations levelled against both of the accused Court of Revision in 17 sessions held from April 23 to iiay The 1 2 'listened to the objections of the Prosecutor the accused and their defense counsels in respect to the ver ict issuad b y the Court of First Instance and to the last defences of the above-nao d t 12 20 or may 12 15514 it declared that the matter had been sufficiently debated and announced an adjournment of the trial The Court irr zdiately started its deliberations and with due retard to the substance of 'Ar ticle 209 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law campleted the deliberations at 3 30 p m on May 12 1951 and issued the following verdict Court's Verdict A The main objections of the Prosecutor' and the accused to the verdict issued oy the Court of First Instance are as 'tinder Summary of the objections of the Army Prosecutor to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance in re 4d to Dr i'laharma l Mosadeq l HIIo r s statements to the effect-- hat -he -waived his cl aims for the injustices rendered to him'Sy the accused'have been' int rpreted-by the Court of'First Instance as the pardoning by I1IM of his personal' co aims while in fact a' personal right has a special interpretation from the judicial vicwp irit The Cour't's interpretation is hot'Froper E ecause liI ' the Shah had not lodged a personal c laim against Dr 'Mosadeq 'so that''ne could ttithdr aw hi s c l a i m i n d ue course 2 Since the Court of rst f stance has ruled that the crimes attributed to Dr 1oha rnad mosdz -aq correspond- wi th Ar t icle 317 of the army Judicial and Pana'l Ljiv grid has i ssudd i ts 'verdict n 4 with due regard to article '4F of th'c 'CriG i nCode ' a since the a ovv-naned's crime is Lorna out by th-a ci rcur-istances mentioned' in the 3 ove bra i4o-ha r- rad iiosadeq apparently should hove Lien cond'crnn d to ten yLar sI 'soji Lary confine 4 'Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C 013 8 4 4 _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 Another mistake made Ly thi Court is that reference has bc en nave in the verdict to Article 11 1 of - the Criminal Co-11e while this Article refers to aitig tion of the original punishm ent and Dr MohaqaaJ 1'1 'sa 'eq h- s I e en conde ml ed to solitary confl ne - i t Tipso two f i cts are tit re a years' 3 contradictory 4 'Tile Court of First Instance 1i s not stated in the verdict -jhether the verdict was issued by a unanis ious -or majority vote Suar iary of the objections raised by the Army Prosecutor against the Court's verdict in c0'1n0ction with General iahi 1 The Court has not observed Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Lana the Court's verdict roust be substantiated and borne out by facts in connection with the crimes attributed to the dCLliS6d a nd their 0717 it rTi'i ty with the r el t Yarrt i egu i uw tions Moreover the subordinate punishment dismissal from Army service which must never be mentioned in the vardict has been mentioned contrary to Article 298 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law Tile Court's reasoning in regard to the defenses put u by 2 the defense counsels of the accused sup rorts the bill of indictment and the Prosecutor's statements nacre iri the Court The Court has considered the General's actions as h t le and as having been carried out with ill-will and for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchy however tine punishment cecreed has been made to conform with Article 330 of the Judicial La i i e the negligence of duty vis-a-vis the orders of the Army 3 The Court has considered Gcneral Riahi responsible for the actions attributed to hire end tias affirmed the bill of indictment but has made an oversight in fitting the crime to the relevant article of the Law For the Court has in its verdict made clear that the issue of the instructions for the olaission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers and the failure to check the pulling down of the statues and the explic3 t announcement that the' hah was a fugitive ware meant to overthrow the monarchy Therefore the crime co it li tted by the above-nai ied cones forins wi th Arti cl e 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law Summary of the Objections Raised by General Riahi and his Defense Counsel to the Verdict issued by the Court o First instance 1 With regard to Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law General Riahi was not neglecting his military duties while executing the orders of his sup rioors so that the Court of First Instance should not have cond mled hisa according to Paragraph b of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 iAPPEIIDIX F 2 The Court has by setting orth its reasons considered that the Article referred to by the Prosecutor did not correspond with the accusations levelled against General Riahi and the Court exonerated the xcused of the charges levelled against him Th2refore there were no grounds for the i-rmy Prosecutor to request that the same accusations be again levelled againstthe accused 3 During August 1 -10 Or r oham iad Mosadeq held a legal and official title as far as all army officers were concerned and no one bias aware of the com nand dismissing him hence the legalization of Mosadeq's orders Moreover ever since HIM the Shah ordained that General Riahi the then Chief of General Staff should receive his orders directly from the then Rinister of National- Defense the Minister was the only lawful commander of General R i ahi 4 In connection with the omission of the 'Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers to which the Court has alluded this had nothing to do with the direct will of General Riahi hence the Article regarding the c-ancellation of an instruction could not apply to him The Commander of the Officers' College asked for instructions in this connection in order that probable iricidents might be averted and the than Chief of-General Staff reported the matter to the Minister of llational Defense and communicated the order issued by the Minister The Sux-iiary of the Objections of Or Mohammad Nosadeq and his Lawyer to the Verdict of the Court of First Instance 1 Concerning the arrest of Col Nematollah Ilasiri presently a brigadier general if I meant to conceal the disposal order I would not have given a receipt for it This order could not possibly have remained a secret even though Colonel Nasi ri was arrested His followers and some other no doubt knew of it He was detained because he had come to my house at 1 00 a m to arrest me and complete his coup d'etat ' When he understood that the guards of my house were increased he only -submitted the order of His Majesty 2 The Court of First Instance said that I issued a notice- about an imaginary coup d etat in order to call the royal Guards aggressors and to provoke the followers of'Uis 14ajesty - and that I detained the fai-thful servants of the monarch so that people might be incited against this regime I did not issue any order to arrest the followers of the monarchy Ti e police forces were responsible for-all the actions which took place The duty of the Royal Suards is to protLct His'Aaj sty and the royal palaces It cannot arrest ministers or Majlis deputies Approved for Release 2017109 27'001 384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 e APPENDIX F 3 The Court of First Instance said that I ordered-theRoyal Guards to be disarmed so that tifien His Majesty returned he would have no one to protect him and hence the mobs could have freedom of action t1y purpose was to prevent another coup d etat i You said that I sealed the royal palaces in order to doprive I lls Majesty of his own properties Because His Majesty left the country without any previous notice my action was simply to protect the royal properties The Court of First Instance mentioned thy fact that tel e5 gr4rns mere sent to the Embassies of Iran in foreign countries forbidding the members to meet His 11ajesty I have no knowledge oF such telegrams and if Fatemi should say that I told him to so so I shall bear any punishment set by law 6 The Court of First Instance also said that I ordered the omission of the name of his liajesty from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers It was thought that His Majesty did not wish to have his name prior to that of Iran so the order vas given to the soldiers to pray only for the perpetuity of Iran After all if' the soldiers pray for _the perpetuity of Iran this'does not mean that treachery was meant to his Majesty 7 The Court of rirst Instance said that Aosadeq and his Friends meant to insult Ills Majesty by allowing the people to d monstrate and take part in meetings -fienever the representatives of tha guilds or the National visa parties asked tobe allo14ed to demonstrate thoy were given the right to do'so provided that the leftwing parties ware not permitted to take part to talk or to demonstrate The meeting of that da y had no other basis _If the speakers said things and did wrong it was not my fault and I should not be blam d for their actions 3 The Court of First Instance b lieved the destruction of the st tuas of Nis Majesty and his father was to excite the people against His Majesty and his powers -I know nothing of the destruction of the statues In the f irst place inste'llation of the statues was against the Shariat I wos tole on August 17 th-t tie leftwing parties intended to destroy the statues of Reza Shah If they would have one so the Government would have been accused of having cooperated with them To prevent this the Nati onai i st parties and guilds did so and their actions were taken only on the basis of opinion an- not to excite the people against the monarchical regime 9 About dissolving the Hajlis the Court of First Instance said 'The proclacaation of the accused to dissolve' the Aajlis had no precedence in the parliainc ntary history of Iran and indicates that fie avant to put an end to the par lia-mentary regime and to the fundamentals of tie governaient of this country First Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 APPENDIX F I lust say thut if an act which has not been Bona before and is not written in the laws is carried out one cannot say that it is a crime Secondly our Constitution is rased upon govcrnmant of the people and by the people so a Faferenduin which is also based on the same principles is completely logical and legal Thirdly referendum is a good tool in th honds of governments by which they can rely upon the people For these reasons a referendum was for the benefit of the country and democracy 10 About the arrest of the royal family in Azerbaijan I must - say -that I knoo o1 nothing and the police have done their duty 11 The Court of First Instance referred to the order for the imprison acnt of General Zah di the elact ad Prima Minister He tans appointed after I was dismisses 'anti bc qaus my Govern- ment could not arrest him no crime has taken place th at'I nmay be punished fora 12 ' The Court of First Instance thnuc ht that the oni ssion o f the National Alntham from Radio Tehran was against the customs of the country I did not give an order for the omission --of the UationaiA nthem but I personally believe that some authorities could cause trouble for those parsons who go-to places for fun and hear the anthem but might not honor it as they should I a n sure you do not want the people to be mothered by evory possible mathod 13 The Court referred to the formation of the Regency Council tirough a raferendum This action of mine is the test clue to show that ny deeds did not follow the contents of r ti cl 317 of tha Army Judicial and Penal Law If my deeds were according to the three sub j -cts of that irticle I did not have to orim a Reg enc y C -uncil through a raferenduti I intended to send some r presantktives to Rome so that they inight beg His olajesty to return or to appoint the Regan cy Council in case His Majesty did not wish to return If His Majesty would not appoint the Regency Council there was no iajlis and the Government had no right to do so either The oon 1 y possible solution was through a referan-dum which in turn is neither against -the laws nor the benefits of the country B Considering the objections in the appeals o the Army Prosecutor Dr iohammad llosadeq accused No 1 Gen Taqi Riahi accused l4o '2 and their lawyers which seamed to be acczptabl e- for the fol loci ng reasons the verdict of the Court of First Instance is invalid In the case of Dr Mohammad Mosadeq First us the Army Prosecutor ol jrct the Court of First Ins-_-nce thought that the communication of the Royal Court m_ nt that His hla jo sty ovcr l poked his personal rights This is not so because His Majesty's position is so high that it fines not allow him to t co ne a private ntiff -iloreov-r the offense was not a personal one so t iended party would ov rl ook his rights Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 W C01384460 S- j Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 In ad itinn to that according to Articla 55 of the Criminal Coca pardon cyan only be given whin the crime has been established For thas roasons thu rePcrence of the Court to the a''Love co-a wnlcution is invalid Secondly considering the nature of the aecus tion and the reasoning used by the Court of First Instance whz raby it compared the puni shriant to that of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Lair end observing P rticle 46 of the Criminal Coda the puni shin ont fixed for tin bras snl i t ry confi nern nt G -cause theo sai d f rti cl e has fixed the maximum nd mi nimunr penalties of sol i tary confinament wi tliout taking the ni ti gating ciecuanstanccs into consic oration the period of solitary confiricr cnt could be fixed without any trouble Although the Court tried to reduce the sentence and referred to Article V of the Criminal Code the effttct of this Article is not noticed ire the fixing of tilt purl-1 shin r l t In the caso of General Riahi 'according to Articla 7v of the Constitution and Aorticl-cs 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and P nal Law the v rdict of the Court hac to b_- reasonable and the Court had to pay careful' att--ntion to the accusations Not only is the verdict of the Court bout en Taqi Riahi unreasonable gut also his dads do riot correspond to section 6 of Article 33 of tha Army Juuieial and Penal Law this Article concerns th failurt of cournanders to fulfill their military duties in special circumstances On the other hand the Court t f First Instunce'rea'soned that the actions of Or rdosadeq accused No 1 corresporidad to Hrticle 317 of thn Army Judicial and Penal Law The Court also related all the accusations aJainst General Riahi accused No 2 to spine of the deeds of or Mosad q Ji rect 1 y and indirectly Thdrefore the verdict was liven on the basis of the unity of their criraas although considering their confessions on - 'can sce that the crirmns ware not the s rna for both of than For this reason the verdict of the Court of First Instance is not correct For t ic bo vare sons the verdict of the Court of First Instance is cancelled in accordance with article 233 of the Army Judicial and Fcnal Law and the verdict of thi-s Court is now announced for Gr Mos dcq six votes to once and General Riahi five votes to two For Or rlosadeq lie confessed to some of his crimes and by mcuns of fallacious Win confusing argurncnts he tried to escape tha punishnntnt For the rest Considering iris File and t he testimony of witn'sses in the Court his daft-nse r id not influence the verdict ofothe Court nd none of it had any judicial vol uc His ibnorance of sn ne of the events such is the tele rLms to Iranian ambassao'ors ordcrin th m not to raeet liis Majesty formstion of ineetinys through ovarnricntsl facilities the speech at the rocetin- of au ust 1 1953 F tcmi 'who waa re ardcd by'the bYk l n Approved for Release 2017 09127 C01384460 C01384460 Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 ccused as his Forzign Mlinistcr tier e--stru tion of the st tuozs of His Hajesty and those of Rozza Sham nd the arrest of tlic royal family does not scam ace ptaijlc because nc was Princ Mainist-r though illegally and accor ing to trticla 6 of the Constitution a Prime Minister is r sponsiflr for all events In s ma places lie has shown good will such as concArning the _ 1 formation of a Rze cncy Council through a reFarcridua about which he frankly said fly -int-_ntions -jera to send some rcpresentstivr s to Rogge in order to beg His 'la jesty to return and if His Aa jesty did not wish to do so to hag- him to appoint the Re ancy Council In case - His iola j sty did not ygree to ci ther of those fi ro raqursts the Regency Council was to be appointed by a referendum The Prosecutor of this Court believes that his statement is neither legal nor logical th rcFore he does not accept it If olosadeq mere right he would have sent the represcnt itives to Roiric during the four elays of iris i l legal regime m1though he had-all possible means of transport tion ind so on in his hands he did not do so No action was taken for the a pointmant of rzpres notaitivcs to be sent to Rome His good will did not even induce him to send wires directly or indirectly through the Embassies of Iran in 5arindad and Rome to His Jolajasty although' he cou l d e dono so On the contrary the talegrvms sent to the Iranianhav' amb --ssadors in orvign countries shmv and prove that he did n ot -intend L to show gooe-will in this case Likcwiso in connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the Horning and evening prayors in military centers his statomcnts are contradictory to those in -jda'by G-'naral Riahi because the accused has stated Since it was ass 1-1cd that 11I 3 the Shah did not -wish his name to precadc that of Iran it was ordered that the soldiers should pray for the country in order that HIM t ie Shah might rcign in an indepzndo_nt and frre country the morning and evening prayers of the solci rs For the continued sxist-cnc of Iran rocs not incicate any tre son agdinst HIM tha Shah Gzncral Riahi has alleg d that cn the proposal of the '-oiaiianc zr of the Ali l i tary College in order to prev -nt undcsi ralbl a events the prayer in q j stion wjs chang-d with the advica of Dr Mosac r q ho tvz-r th o s 3id uccuszd Dr Mos adeq nas not Locan dUc to p rovz his good will in altering t ie morning and evening pr ay trs or in omitting HIA the Shah's na ac from the praycrs and has not shown why he did not take this action Lciorc receiving his disnii ssal or cr or host ft h p n c th-t these tvcnts tdhich -rc ac ainst th_ monarchy oc car ro G after the issue of the Ji sini s S al orC Gr and his rafusal to oi cy it Tnoraforc in short the acti vi tits of the Ls ov -n a rcd f ro n 'u -ust 16 at 1 000 i m until %u ust 19 'singly o n r co l l ecti vt l cl _ rly f al l under Arti clc 317 of the airmy Ju lici l and Venal L w Cons-i eri ng the fact tip It thy r iy Prosecutor applied for a ro-vision o the verdict issued f y the Court of F irst Inst nc_ a' ovz-naaand is by virtu---of Arti cl c 317 o - th- rmy Judicial and n 31 Law cone in z ' to thrza yz-ars of sol i t ry io if risonr l snt consic ri ng i1y fact thaat hiss io -i is ov r sixty years ET F-9 Approved for Release 2017109 27 C01384460 o Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 1%P- E1i1JIX F trio' of his i tcntion sin cC -Au-ut 15 1953 t_'o--liictcd from the p -riou of his ii tlifison i nt nic p- -Wist C For Ccncral ki alli In call th - actions cm-a-iitted by 100 ano ral 2iahi's Aim wos caaral y to facilitate the achi avemtnt of the ai as of tha a ccus -d No 1 Dr llosac q h i l h ving full knowlt i9e of thK aims and objactivts of thc' al ovz norncd he has collutrcv with accused' ito 1 to wzaken the scnsc of roy slty ' shako tht- position of tha r tonarchy climinatt tha mormnents _yhi c_ 3 indicated the exi stcnce of th - monarchy tncoura-c tha z dvcrso rics of t'vi rnon- rchy and tl#c Gr ny and prosecute t ibse w lose hearts are ki nul ed with the fire for the love of the ' king and the monarchy The issue of the instruction for tha altert tion of the morning and evening prayo_rs b omitting the Shah's name froril tht prayer the despatch of talejrams tr the 6th Airmy Division of Fars and the Mi1itart'oGov - rnor of Abadan y- to Atha effact that tha Shah was a fugitive- the fact that ire did not prevent tha pulling dorm of the statues 'and the instruction for shooting on Aujust 19 at individuals who inanifast-_d their royal f_atings arc in the opinion of the jury sufficient proofs to corrobora_e his coliaboration and complicity with accused No 1 Dr ftohimnad llos deq -' ThcreFort- the above-namxu was an accomplict of Dr lloha-mead Mosaueq and by virtu of Articla 317 of the rmy Judicial and Penal Law and Arti-clcs 23 and 29 of the Criminal Co t and Articlc 30 of thy' said Law he is cone -mncd to threw yc rs imprisonment with herd labor The p ariod of his datcnti-on since August 19 will be deducted from leis term of imprisonmcnt An app- al may be ma c to the Suprem- Court against the aiJove vo rcict 1ithin tan days of its d cl-ration with ue r Jard to Vic circumstances m_nti onco' in article 2'3 of tilt Army Judicial and P-nal Law Presil' nt of the Court of Revision far Vie Evrnts of august 15 to 19 1 53 Ganaral J avadi Sigr aturt of the Jury Gcnzral Isa 5adayat Ebrshi t Vall i ' General h asroi l an Choshn-cvi san Gencrol AhM4d Hjudani sulostitutt Ganerdl Esatollah Zsrgarni assistant Lt Col Alaliyari array Prosecutor tiay 12 1991 3 30 p m Approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 C01384460 -t o SM approved for Release 2017 09 27 C01384460 a _t-hA - lri MUSE r AY-9 S AM R ABAD I 21V ' Kh Y 14 SNl POP l j q - Ministry' of 'Jar 2- The Majiis - 3 - Arsenal 4 - Teiegra K Office 5-- U S c crt I assy 6 - Police HQ Guards Barracks file Bazaar w 'Approved for ReIease _ _ 2017 0-7 0_ _9 27- a C01 3__8441 6Yg                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu