DECLASSIFIED N l AU$ hU il B - N RA Date LP 5t7IJ 'l'h1a docu nt COD8i8ta at 4 pages Copy no q ot1 O copies Series A ' SECRE'l' SUBJEX T REF Garman Attitudes on Nuclear Detenae Questions Bonn Telegram 1019 described the various German attitudes on participation in Alliance nuclear de1'enee ranging t'roIII the view that no increased German role was needed to the possible desira lIiI1ch the GelWlll8 might scme day' develop tor national control or nuclear _apone The purpoee ot the present memorandum is to treat this lut extreme in more detail In the re1'erence telegram _ It 18 trequent l r atated the GelWlll8 th8lllllelvee ot course repudiate etrongl r such an explanation that the p1 1lllary objective or the MLF ie to prevent Gel'lll l Y t'roIII seeldng a n tional nuclear capabU 1t I do not agree that this 18 the p1 1lllary problem In the first place it 18 generall r agreed that there is no responsible political leader in Gel'III I Y at lIlT part an - known private group or lIlT discernible bocI7 of Garman opinion that considers i t desirable tor the Gel'lll llll to have an 1rIdependent nuclear capab1l1t This is darived I believe t'roIII a clear underetand1ng ot the practicalities ot the situation Wich are as follcwe 1 No nation Wich posseeses nuclear _apens or 18 l1kel r to poness them in the future lOOuld under toreseeable c1rcumatances provide Gel'lll l Y nuclear weapons tor a national torce 2 The Germans cOlllll1tted themselves to the WBetern u-opean Union in Protocol No n MocI1 t y1ng and Completing the Brus3ele Treat not onl r not to manufacture ABC weapons but to international inspection to assure ccmpl1ance 3 The Germans are sophisticated enough to lmow that II primitive nuclear weapon such as that the Chinese presumabl r have would not serve an - useful purpose It would mere r attract to th8111 all ot the disadvantases of having a nuclear c a p aMl1 t without the advantases The GenDana in ' order to acquire a i'ulJ3 developed advanced nuclear _apons STetem would first have to make an overt start both in acquiriJIg weapons-grade nuclear materiele elthough recent develoJDBnts make this easier the technology required for the nuclear weapon itselt and an e1'tective missUe del1ve1'7 II 'IItem They now have none of these Since our intelligence activities and those ot the Soviets who have an eetimated 20 000 operatives in Germa w as well as thoee of other nations are directed with great 1 ensity toward discerning a V ouch move lIlT covert develoPlll nt program initiated uld certa1l1ly become known 4 Even with its present wealth and prosperity i t 18 questionable whether a democratic Garman govel'lllllBnt in the light ot the present 1ntl ation 1'7 pressures ehortages in land labor and construction tac1l1tie8 could mob1l1ze SECRET DECLASSIFIED Author N 'IDC l B A D t uIXlIJ - '- SECIIIn' -2- mobilize the necessary popular BUpport to build a nuclear _pone s yat8lll w l thin 8IQ' reasonable length of time The French eftort lIhich hu been a v r1' great burden to the French ecODOll l hu been ataged over nine years starting in 1956 and atill hu not produced a mcdern toree Even i t could oreate some tl'P of mlclear weapon it could never be a tirst-clu one - - proba a l IaJ8 interior to both the gUah and French who have had such a head tart aDd in no wq compa re ble to that ot the Soviets and the U S 5 The Geman8 understand lOhat the reaction ot other oountrie would be i t began tha develo nt of a national nuclear capab1J 1ty It could be done onlT at great coat to the tr1 relations the FRG hu aought consiatent to eatablish in Weatern l Urope It would be generaJJ r ooncl w led that the bad e back in the saddle The Soviat Union along w l th tha Faatern l Uropean countries would I believe before the r saw this accompliahed make it the occaeion tor evary tl'P of threat a nd sanction poseible - - perhaps even tc sabotage or war 6 The Germa na IIIU t realise that thie aot i t uruiertaken w l thout our consent would elsa 1nval 1date the be e1s ot U S sacurity guarantees for and oould lead to romDYel ot U S tore troa Gel'lllAllif W could never permit our troops to remain here II a hostage to a Gtmttan gove1'llIlI Ilt dventuroue in the nuclear field o Sine could never hope to attain either a conventional or a nuclear torea COtIItI8Il8Ul' te w l th that of the Soviets ahe would at beat gain a second-rate mlclear toree at the risk ot giving up the protection of the greateat nuclear pawar - - at a time en she will have goaded her tr d1tional enOll r to the point of war 7 There is moreover no wq in lIhich it could be shown that the acquisition at a national nuclear capability oould lead to the expectation which represents the principal unBtable element in the German eituat10n - the rBUtt1t1cation of It i not believed that the German people in their current prosperous eituation w l thin Weat Gel'IIlAIlif would IIUpport such riakII II would be imposed by the foregoing In seeld ng to cl ar11' r this point I do not w l ah to give the 1atpreseion that there is no naed to provida a greater role tar in nuclear datense I think there are very compelling re llona to do so A te1lure to respond to German concerns on this i BUe will pose a erious obatacle to Germltn-Amar l can cooperation aeros the ole range at i sue an which WI will need Ge1' ll8Jl support in the cam1ng month and yeare It would in all probability alaa lead in t1llla to compensating move by the Ge1' Il8Jla die-advantageous to us in variaue and unpredictable wqa - - both w l thin and w l thout the mlcleer arena A NUCLEAR Sl XlIIB'l' -3A NUCLEAR For example it w do not find a eolut1on to the problem nth1n the Alliance on the baaie o ex1eting propoeala I believe the l JIG w lll seek alternative nuclear arrangements - - other than a national nuclear torce Several theoretical though not nece88 practioal poea1bll1tiee ex1et A bilateral Geman-U S nuclear arrangement in the atrategic going beyood currmt cooperation in the tactical range - - 111 colllJ1dered teaa1ble tor well-1alo1m reaeone 1 r IIg - not - A e1m1l r bilateral approach to Britain 111 not bel18Veci to be feasible no matter 1IIIat goTVIIIIIIiI1t i in powr there in the light o well-known British political attitudes and the importance the Britieh attach to Brit1ah-U S relatione 2 pol1tic 3 A poee1ble alternative that Ge man y ha I believe woulA be to aeek aCllllll bilateral nuclear aaeiatenc e 1'rcm Prance perhapa along the linea o t Ge man y'a preaeut relatiOMhip nth the u s tie woulA o CClurle entail a change in poliq by de Gaulle lGO 111 aga1net 8lO' further Genaan nuclear 1mal't'fllllllllt however he or aome llUCee eor goTen'lll8llt could change tbie pol1q Ge man y could help the French pq their enormoua nuclear bill 'oIb1l e admitting the d n lJ1 e o t France over Ge man y All a 1III'71' 'w the French might aOlll8 d q be wi 1 ng tor a priea to atation weapClllll in Ge man y under French control and or to parmit eome Genaan participation in the pl enn1 DB IIIId targeting o t nuclear weapone in France 4 A tourth altamat1n - - praeentq s ngly impoea1ble alao o de Gaulle - - woulA be a lIJIllt1leteral lropean approach involving both EIlgl and and France tor the oreation o a lropean nuolear force in beC8J 88 1ib1ch could participate as an equal S A ruth alternative Mluld be _ moci1 t1cation o meting propoaala 1ib1ch woulA still pranrve a active Amerioan participation and b a hardware componeut B ROO-NUCLEAR I w lll not at this tiDle attempt to elCaIDina in detail the 1IIIole range o t pose1ble non-nuclear mo that the GermaIlII might make in the event there is a failure to provide tor them a greater role in nuolear de tenee However this could aaeume a variety o t torma It could lead to a developunt of German national1em - - to a more 1ne1etent and belligerent attitude o t Ge man y in its relatione nth other nations and in Mlrlci counc1la It could on the other hand result in an independent and introspective approach to German probleIIUI or to the seeking ot general aolutione throuslt a bilateral political relationship nth Franoe Altarnativel r it could poseibq lead to a SlOO El' DECLASSIFIED Autho irx W B 'i' RA Date ul IJ - ---- -4- to A tum to the Fat even at the explllllle of nwtraJ 1 s Al though it is not poaaib1e IIOlI to tore ee with pnollion Ih1ch C01Il'8e would take in the long run - - nor nead we neces expeet the worst - a rq one or combination of the above lIIDVell would poae serious problema tor American secur1t y and cI1plomao y American Enb aa y Bonn October 20 1965 - '- SEC 'T                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu