9 mam i 7 anconsists LIMD 5 pages No i 1 17 67 A UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND capies series 1 Memorandum of Conversation 0 I DATE January 17 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Hatters U u PARTICIPANTS y M vorontsov Counselor Soviet Embassy 2 George Bunn General Counsel ACDA 63 a a a comes TO SE5 3 a EUR Amembassy noscow 1 c is- SOV DISDEL GENEVA GIPM 3 5 255 RPM -Vorontsov invited me to lunch today The follo 'dng were covered 1 NPT - EurOpean Force His reason for asking me to lunch was obviously his concern about stories which had appeared in the Washington Post and in Pravda concerning West German desires to participate in a European nuclear force The Post story Jan 15 1967 says West Germany seeks firm assurance that the intended treaty will not foreclose the possible develOpment of a EurOpean nuclear force in which she might share a a a a The United States it was said has assured Bonn that any ambiguities in the treaty text will be fully clarified by United States officials when the treaty goes through the Senate That is that the united States will specify that the treaty would leave Open the prosPect for a EurOpean nuclear force which would not Spread nuclear weapons to any individual nation In theory at least the present British or French nuclear forces or both might some day be converted into a Western EurOpean force ' ' 1 i EEIMDIS ACDA-I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification 2-62 3 0 913 35-3 DECLASSIFIED _Aumm w SECRET - -2- The Pravda article reports Secretary McNamara as having promised to look after German interests in getting around clauses of the NPT McNamara is reported to have told a German parliamentarian that the treaty would in no way infringe German rights to participate in a joint nuclear delivery system within NATO Vorontsov was concerned as to what the Post article might mean with reapect to views on NPT interpretation and as to what the Pravda article might mean with reapect to his government's present views on the NPT negotiations 3 said the Post story was not accurate and did not come from sources within ACDA so far as we had been able to determine The Pravda account about McNamara just didn't sound to me like anything that McNamara would say Vorontsov pressed to find out what the basis for these stories could possibly be g wanted to know what we had told the Germans with reapect to participation in a European nuclear force 2 replied that the Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of EurOpe The United States of America acquired the assets of Texas automatically when it came into the Union and the U S S R acquired the assets of the individual Soviet Socialist Republics An NPT could not be expected to prevent a United States of urOpe from succeeding to the nuclear assets of France or the U K if they were consolidated into the new state particularly in view of the changed political situ- ation which would have to have come abouto Succession to assets of course could not happen short of the creation of a new federated state It could not happen with just an alliance or a group of states of that kind In our view a United States of Europe would be a recipient under the treaty and the United States cauld not transfer its nuclear weapons to it However if France were one day consolidated with Germany into a new state that new state would automatically have nuclear weaponsa Statements reflecting this point of view would seem to me a small price for the Soviets to pay to gain FRG acquisition to the treatyu SECRET - LIMDIS I in ark 7 mama SECRET - LIMDIS -3- Vorontsov did not disagree but neither did he agree g said he did not know what MDscow's view would be on this point 1 2 NPT - FRG views Vorontsov probed for the FRG's reaction to the treaty drafts I said a spokesman for the Federal Government had reported that the Cabinet had given the enterprise approval in principle This seemed to me to represent quite a step forward Vorontsov said that while as a general rule they did not like Democratic Socialists they had been impressed with Brandt's party in the past They were watching carefully whether Brandt and those who agreed with him or the more conservative Christian Democrats would win out in the govern ment He felt that FRG agreement to a non-Proliferation treaty would be a concrete action the new government could take to evidence its desire to improve relations with its Eastern neighbors 3 NPT Safeguards I said I was particularly con- cerned about the safeguards Article problem While Article I and II seemed more important now in the years ahead whether we got safeguards or not in places like the Near East and India and Pakistan would probably be at least as important as the prOViSiOnS of Articles I and II I did not personally see a way out of the dilemma at the mament for meeting the Soviets' views on this w0uld be nigh impossible for us 3 asked him to report this to Roshchin who he said was much concerned for a status report and to ask whether Roshchin had any new ideas on how this problem might be resolved He agreed that achieving safeguards throughout the world was of interest to both governments but said not to wait on them for new ideas had said the Soviets could not accept control of NATO members by other NATO members as he was leaving for Moscow Vorontsov didn't exPect any change in this view 4 NPT - Timing of next meetings Vorontsov wanted to know when they could expect to receive U S official views on Article I He felt that except for Article if we SECRET LIMDIS are 325 33-1 ol I CH IU - DECESSIFIED I i Authority SECRET - LIMDIS -4- agreed on Article I there should be no other problems in the treaty draft I asked whether we had a Soviet official agree ment to Article I He avoided a response at first but finally said that we did not_ What we had was an indication that Article I would probably be acceptable to them I told him our h0pe was to have an agreed co-chairmen' U S S S R recummendation to the ENDC when it resumed on February 21 said I did not know when they would hear from us as to our views with respect to Article I but it might not be before Mr Foster and Amb Roshchin were to meet on February 16 Vorontsov felt this was not soon enough to meet the February 21 deadline unless there was agreement to their view on Article as well as to the Working Group text of Article I If further negotiations were required with respect to Article the five days between the 16th and the let did not seem to him as sufficient He asked whether there had not been some talk about a trip to Moscow for further discussions I said so far as I knew there was no understanding concerning any such trip on our side although Washington MDscow and New York had all been discussed earlier 5 Comprehensive Test Ban Vorontsov said that after the news on the big hole in Mississippi Project STERLING he assumed we would not be interested in moving forward on the comprehensive test ban I said we had of course known for a long time that there was theoretical possibility of dec0upling by using a big hole We discussed this problem for a minute further but it seemed reasonably evident that he did not think this a fruitful tapic for negotiation at this time 6 Strategic offensive and defensive carriers I asked whether they had anyviews on the statement on this subject in the State of the Union message He said they had seen that and something else unspecified They would wait to see what Amb Thompson had to say He felt out of touch withtis Govern- ment on this problem As Amb Dobrynin had told Mr Foster on march 17 1966 any discussion of ABM's should also include offensive missiles However Vorontsov did not know whether the Soviet government would wish to have a discussion of these matters now It might be that they would simply say they saw SECRET - LIMDIS 74 'i - r DECLASSIFIED -- SECRET - LIMDIS -5- othing fruitful to discuss at this time g commented that our military people seemed to be against the discussions we had in mind and implied that their military pe0ple would have the same view g3 said that while Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry might look upon a subject as a fruitful one for dis- cussion they would not be the ones to decide how the Soviet government would reapond on a matter of this kind 7 Chicoms Vorontsov spined that Liu Shao-ch'i and his allies would win Out in the end but that they were really no more friendly to the Soviet union than Mao was ES felt that Mac must have been in desperate straits to have called the teenage Red Guards to his support and that this must be his last attempt to achieve supremacy In his view Lin Piao was not strong enough to rule the country when Mao was gone 8 NPT - French views Vorontsov said that the French had listened to Soviet views on that the French had said they would not put any obstacles in the way of the treaty but that he did not think the French would sign 2 asked whether the French would put obstacles in the way of IAEA safeguards in Euratom territory if the treaty required IAEA safeguards everywhere ES replied that the discussions had not gotten into that detail SECRET LIMDIS 3 CH Nb'f Inn                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu