DECLASSII mu human 9133 3 I 7 This doc 1 pagess umber_ n of SECRET copies 1 2 handed to Amb von Lilienfeld by ASFisher 2 22 57 cp 4 RHKranich chron 586 mm 7 NPT file om rammrgous The United States amt is presenting herewith a draft smery of interpretations relating to the non-proliferation treaty This may comet he made final of cause until ass-ensnt hes been reached on the test of treaty pmisims for EHBC Co-Chaimen to introduce into the ENDC A final written mry of interpretations will be transnittod later In accordance with agreement between Secretary Rush and foreign Minister Brandt we would plea to give these final interpretstions in writing to the Soviet Union as soon thereafter as possible - In our discussims in Haahington we were agreed that it mid not be desirable to request consents Eton the Soviet Union but that we would infm the Soviets that we are providing than with suntan in order to inform than of explanations are have givu to our mm allies in response to their questions 9 1 m- tresty deals only with 1what is prohibited not with that is permitted 2 It prohibits transfer to my recipient whatsoever of 'huclear weapons or control over than looming bombs and warheads It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices 3 It does not deal vith snc therefore does not ptihlbit of nuclear delivery vehicles or olives-y systems or we then to shy recipient so lug sa such does not involve hubs or ma'e SECRET GROUP 1 Ext ludad from automatic DECLAssu-mu 1 Authority 11 072 43 I SECRET It It does not cool 1with allied consultations on diatoms so long no no tronsfor of weapons or control on than results 5 It does not cool with existing arrangements for deployment of nuclosr weapons within allied territory es these do not involve shy tronsfor of nuclear weapons or control ovor theo unless and until decision wore node to go to oer et which tine the treaty would no longer be controlling 6 lt aocs not deal with the problem of European unity end would not her succession by a new federeted Harmon state to tho molt-er statue of one of its former conponcnte A new federated European ststo would have to control all of its external security fmctims including defense end ell foreign policy utters to external sorority but umld not have to be so centralized no to com govermentsl factions It would bar however transfer including ownership of circles weapons or control over than to new mltilatorel or other entity lacking the attributes of fedoreted s'teto essential to bring into play the legal doctrine of mcessionaddition to the foregoing points certsin interpretetim regarding proubuls'r language will be provided once the preamble is egroed upon Bo ere Soviet concurrence to torsolstions in tho proublo which lend tt-sslves to the following intorprotetions s It is th- intent of tho nucleor-respon-stetoo to achieve at the eerlioot possible dots the of the nuclear stuns recs Article IV provides moons for treaty sin-curios to progress towsrc' this objoctivo b It is the intent of the molar-weepon-ststes that mlesr weapons cod delivery vehicles should be eliminated tron notional ersono'ls pursusnt to treaty on genersl and complete oisemt DECLASSIFILU Auma w m I c Apart rm nuclear explosive devices the treaty in no way inhibits the peaceful applications of atomic energy It would not prohibit any non-nuclear- ueapon-stete free proceeding with developent of a fast breeder reactor 6 Apart from unclear explosive devices the treaty in no es hinders cooperation between states regarding the peaceful applications of ethnic energy a It is the intention of nuclear-weepm-ststee which possess mleor explosive devices to poke nuclear explosive services available to other parties in a non-discriminatory manner under appropriate internatimel managements with devices remaining under control and custody on the states uhich provide them The exited States has also provided its allies with a draft formulation of Article concerning the application of international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities If this formulation proves ecceptehle to our allies and the Soviet Union it would lend itself to the fellatio interpretetimsz a It amid not ilpinae upon the essential interests of the Federal Republic of Germany end other mm more in developing peaceful nuclear tee-helm h It would provide a resemble period of time for application of mu eahauerds to become etfective c It would not prevent the thited States or any other supplier Eran selling plutonium to mums and the Federal Republic of Genny d It would not establish inspection arrangements which could be exploited for industrial espionage o It not effect the right of any state to decline to receive inoividusl nu inspectors DEC LASSIFIEIJ l Authority SECRET The Gem MW of February 3 1967 expresses need for achieving binding interpretations with the Soviet on the reservation of the possibility to protoct oater-n Elmope by 1 molar enti-nieoile lyeten Ae we previously Explained to Ambeeudor Kneppetein the draft tmty doee not end we believe it cannot diffuentiete bottom offeneivo and defoneive melee am therefore nuclear thud for anti-ballistic missiles would be subject to the am rota-lotion as other nucleu- weepoue no tun-fer would be penittod of the nuclear warheads or control over than However the treaty would not preclude deployment of onti-ballietic nieeileo in the un- mannor thet US mfeoe-to-ei nieeileo are now deployed lie believe that the question of poeeible deployment of entiehallietit Iniuileo should continue to be examined in other contexts State 141%6 LIMDIS Drafted by AURA Immanichmh Cleared w EURuladdy GER Puhan EI lR prinyteen Gin-hRGai-thoff Meeker 5 8 2 21 67 Weehmston February 22 1967 SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu