DECLASSIFIED I - Authorityms c- WW 5 '1 INCOMING AM Department of State 33 A bn 0LA357 0 9 8 9 4 OO RUEHC ACDA DE RUFHOL BGSIBZB 1957 MAR 9 PM 8 49 ZNY IOSEDIZ MAR 57 55 FN AMEMBASSY BONN TO WASHDC IMMEDIATE - GEM INFO PARIS SP LONDON SC ROME SAH BRUSSELS GENEVA STATE GRNC BI EUR SECTION ONE OF Two EONN IDSSO 10 NATUS DISTO USEC SUBJ AMBASSADOR MEETING NITH OHANOELLOR KIESINGER CIA l BY AMBASSADOR AND NSA DEPALMA NET FOG ONE AND ONE HALF HouRs- DISCUSSION OF THE NPT DOD THIS AFTERNOON NITH KIESINGER ALSO PRESENT ON THE N10 GERMAN SIDE WERE DEFENSE MINISTER SOHROEDER SOIENOE MINISTED STOLTENEERO FONOFF STATE SECRETARY ACTING PRESS SCI SPOKESMAN AHLERS AND A NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AEC THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY THE WERE OST RSR PAGE 2 RUFHOL lO500 l A HIS DESIRE FOR BROAD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES NOT LIMITED TO THE TREATY TEXT BUT COVERING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TREATY AND SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE FUTURE OF NATO AND B HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE FRG REQUIRED ADDITIONAL TIME SO THAT THROUGH SUCH CONSULTATIONS QUESTIONS WHICH ARE STILL OPEN CAN BE RESOLVED A PRESS STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE OFFICE TO THIS EFFECT FOLLOWING AGREEMENT ON ITS SUBSTANCE WITH AMBASSADOR FOSTER AT THE END OF THE MEETING 2 KIESINGER OPENED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THAT THE QUESTION OF AN NPT WAS A SERIOUS MATTER FOR THE WHOLE WORLD HE RECALLED 1965 FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE IN WHICH FOSTER HAD REF- ERRED TO THE MANY PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN AN NPT WITHIN THE PONTEXT OF NATO AND THE INTERESTS FOSTER RAD MENTIONED THE SECRET I Authority 3 SECRET -2- BONN 10500 MARCH 9 1967 SECTION ONE OF TWO POSSIBILITY OF AN EROSIVE EFFECT ON THE RIESINGER SAID THAT THE FRG HAS SIMILAR WORRIES HIS ADMINISTRATION IS ON- VINCED THAT EROSION OF THE ALLIANCE IS A PRICE THAT MUST NOT BE RATHER THE NPT MUST LEAD TO A STRENGTHENING OF THE ALLIANCE IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT HE WISHED TO CONDUCT TALKS ON THE SUBJECT WITH HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS 5 THE SOVIETS HAD PLACED THE FRG IN A MOST DIFFICULT THROUGH STATEMENTS MADE BY LEADING SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT THE USSR WOULD SIGN AN NPT ONLY IF THE FRG SIGNED THIS MAKES THE POSITION OF THE FRG UNIQUE AND IMPOSES ON THE GERMAN SIDE A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY WHICH KIESINGER RECOGNIZED PAGE 3 RUFHOL lO500 l A KIESINGER RECALLED THAT HE HAD ON SEVERAL RECENT OPCASIONS REFERRED TO AN ELEMENT WHICH HAD ENTERED INTO US-GERMAN RELATIONS HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE BEEN EX- TENSIVE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO ON THE NPT BUT THESE HAVE MOSTLY BEEN DEVOTED TO THE FORMULATION 0 THE DRAFT TREATY HE WOULD HAVE WISHED THAT THE FRG HAD CONSIDERED THE WHOLE PROBLEM MORE FULLY AT THE TIME THAT FOSTER HAD DIS- CUSSED IT IN HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE THE GEQMAN SIDE HAS RECEIVED MUCH INFORMATION FROM THE US BUT EVEN NOW THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF BROAD QUESTIONS SUCH AS HOW THE UNITED STATES VIEWS FUTURE PRIORITIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NATO WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PROLIFERATION HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH HIS TALKS WITH MCCLOY AND WITH AMBASSADOR MCGHEE BUT WHILE THEY WERE HIGHLY USEFUL HE CONSIDERED THEM PROVISIONAL AND PIECEMEAL IN NATURF THE UNEASINESS PREVALENT AMONG THE GERMAN PEOPLE WITH REGARD TO THE NPT RESULTS FROM UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE TREATY IS IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF OUR TWO KIESINGER UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS A MUTUAL INTEREST BETWEEN THE US AND USSR TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BUT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SOVIET MOTIVES WERE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE US -- WE RECOGNIZE AND 5 FOSTER REVIEWED HIS LONG ASSOCIATION WITH GERMANY AND THE PAGE 4 RUFHOL EUROPEAN NOUENENT AND STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH WITH THE NPT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO INTERESTS AND TO THE OBJECTIVE OF EUROPEAN UNITY THERE BEEN SOME NISUNDERSTANDINC BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FRO AND HE THEREFORE WISHED TO STRESS AGAIN -- AS THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD ALREADY DONE -- OUR DESIRE FOR THE WITH THE FRG FOSTER MADE THAT THERE SECRET v v - unoaanD I - I I -- SECRET -3- BONN 10500 MARCH 9 1967 SECTION ONE OF TWO IS IN EXISTENCE WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT WITH THE SOVIETS AND WITH OUR ALLIES IS THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD BE PUT FORWARD IN THE ENDC AS A FORUM WHERE THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED POULD BE REPRESENTED 6 FOSTER REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE NPT SINGE A BASIC CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE HAD BECAME APPARENT LAST AUGUST EMPHASIZING THAT FROM THE BEGINNING THE FRG ALONG WITH OUR OTHER ALLIES WAS KEPT DESCRIBED THE INSISTENCE DURING HIS THREE DINNER CONVERSATIONS LAST SEPTEMBER WITH GROMYKO THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS THE MCNAMARA COMMITTEE AND SIMILAR MATTERS WERE NONE OF THE BUSINESS AND COULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE TREATY IT HAD BEEN FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE FORMULATIONS IN A TEXT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE USSR WITH ITS ALLIES AND BY THE US WITH ITS ALLIES BEFORE A TEXT COULD BE TABLED IN THE GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE WAY OUR WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED THE PAGE 5 RUFHOL 10500 1 MCNAMARA COMMITTEE ETC BUT HE RECOGNIZED THAT THESE WERE ROLITPCAL QUESTIONS AND NOT PART OF THE TREATY FOSTER MENTIONED THAT THE GENERAL NPT SITUATION HAD BEEN OUTLINED TO FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD AND THE THEN FONMIN DURING THEIR WASHINGTON VISIT LAST SEPTEMBER SUBSEQUENTLY HE HAD SPOKEN WITH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER FOSTER-S PRESENT VISIT WAS A FURTHER INDICATION OF OUR DESIRE FOR FULL CONSULTATION 7 FOSTER POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT AGREE TO PUT FORWARD A PARTIAL DRAFT IN GENEVA AS A RESULT THE NON-ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH OUR FORMULATIONS THEY ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT AND ARE FEARFUL THAT FINAL ORAFTS ARE BEING WORKED OUT BEHIND THEIR BACKS ON WHICH THEY WILL HAVE NO INFLUENCE FOR THIS REASON WE ARE ANXIOUS TO TABLE A DRAFT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WE FEEL THIS IS ALSO DESIRABLE IN OPDER TO ELIMINATE THE MANY MISCONCEPTIONS HAVE DEVELOPED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW TASLING THE TREATY WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD THEN FUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS AND THUS RELIEVE THE FRG FROM THE NECESSITY OF DOING SO FOSTER THOUGHT THAT QUITE POSSIBLY 5035 OF THE POINTS WHICH THE GERMANS HAVE RAISED WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS IF PUT FORWARD BY ANOTHER COUNTRY PAGE 5 RUFHOL b FOSTER EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHALL STILL BE CONSULTING WHEN SECRET ll UECLASSIFIED Amh qmnmijgnjai3 SECRET -A- BONN 10500 MARCH 9 1967 SECTION ONE OF TWO THE DRAFT IS AT GENEVA THE DISCUSSIONS THERE WILL BE A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHILVE NON-PRO- LIFERATIOA THIS OBVIOUSLY PLACES CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES BUT IT OFFERS GREAT PROMISE 08 THE STABILITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE WORLD AND ALSO PRESENTS POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS IN RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND IN REGARD TO MOVEMENT TOWARD EUROPEAN UNITY 9 FOSTER MADE CLEAR THAT INSISTENCE ON SAFECUARDS DOES NOT STEM FROM THE SOVIEIS PHOT THE UNITED STATES AND OF ITS ALLIES WE FEEL THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF THE TREATY WILL BE FURTHERED BY THE MUTUAL TRUST WHICH ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS WILL PRODUCE FOSTER ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS CONTRARY TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS ARE NOT ENGAGING IN DELAYING TACTICS ON THE TREATY THEY ARE ANXIOUS T0 FORWARD AND TNLKED FOR A TIME OF TABLING A DRAFT ON THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENDC ID KIESINGER SAID THAT HE WOULD ALWAYS BE HAPPY IF OTHER COUNTRIES RATHER THAN THE FRG - EXPRESSED OBJECTIVES WHICH ACCORD WITH THE VITAL GERMAN INTERESTS HE ALSO FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE FEAR OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES THAT AN AGREENENT COULD BE REACHED BEHIND THEIR BACKS HIS OWN IDEA NAS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO HAVE DISCUSSED ALL ASPECTS OF NON-PROLIFERATION LOCKED BEFORE ANY INTENTION OF SIGNING THE TREATY HAD BECOME PUBLIC HE WAS DIRECIING THIS COMMENT 10 THE FRG AS WELL AS TO OTHERS HE THOUGHT THAT WE WERE NON AT A POINT WHERE IT WOULD NOT BE EASY MAKE UP FOR WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN GP-S NCGHEE BT NOTE PASSED WHITE HOUSE USIA 3 9 67 SECRET I UECLASSIFIED INCOMING IE AM Department of State 83 SECRET Adhn 0LA55B OO RUERO ACDA DE RUPROL OSSOIOG ZNY h IOODDIZ MAR 67 5 FM AMEMBASSY DONN 9 6 9 5 5 IO IMMEDIAIE Gm INFO PARIS m7 9 PM 3 48 SP LONDON SC ROME BRUSSELS SAH GENEVA SIAIE 1-1 81' EUR 5 I SEGIION INO 0F INO SONN IOSOO 0 NAIUS DISIO NSC SUBJ AMBASSADOR MEEIING NIIR RIESINGER INR CIA II RIESINGER RECALLED IRAI II NAS IRE OF HIS GOUERNMENI NBA TO EUROPEAN IENSIONS AND IRE DIVISION OF IRE PONTINENT AND IO DEVELOP DEIIER RELAIIONS NIIR IRE USSR HE DID NOT NISR DOD IO ROLD IO SIERILE FORMULAS ON IRE GERMAN UNDER NIC UNION REUNIFICATION RELAXATION OF IENSIONS SCI ON IRE OTHER RAND IRE FRG COULD NOI THE REVERSE DEIENIE AEC NOULD DOME PIRSI AND IREN ONLY IN SOME DISIANI 05 AND APPLE DROPPING PROM A NOULD BE A RESOLUTION OP RSR IRE GERMAN PROBLEM KIESINGER UNDERLINED AGAIN IRAI GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR WERE INORDINATELY DIFFICULT AND STATED THAT AFTER WE MIGHT HAVE SIGNED A TREATY AND I REPEAT MIGHT HAVE THE SOVIETS MIGHT STILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE SAME ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE GERMANS THE FRG DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS INTEND TO USE THREATS OR BLACK- MAIL AGAINST GERMANY BUT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE UNDER QUCH CIRCUMSTANCES GERMANY WOULD FACE A PROBLEM AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MUST CONSIDER WE DEFEND OURSELUES BEING OURSELVES DEFENSE WOULD OBVIOUSLY DEFEND ON NATO AND ON THE UNITED STATES WHICH THE SAID AGAIN THE NEED TO KNOW HOW THE UNITED STATES SEES THE FUTURE HE HOPED THAT IT DID NOT SEEM ARROGANT T0 PLACE SO MUCH IMPORTANCE ON THIS POINT BUT HE UISHEQ TO MAKE CLEAR HOW DIFFERENT THE GERMAN POSITION WAS FROM THAT OF NON- ALIGNED COUNTRIES 12 THE CHANCELLOR THEN TURNED TO QUESTIONS 0F PROCEDURE SECRET DECLASSIFIED Aum riwAmm333 SECRET -2- BONN 10500 MARCH 9 1967 SECTION TWO OF TWO IN REGARD TO TIMING HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A DIFFERENCE IN INTERESTS BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG THE US WISHED FOR QUICK TABLING OF A TEXT WHEREAS THE GERMAN SIDE FELT THERE WERE MANY UNSETTLED PROBLEMS STILL TO BE RESOLVED THE FRG MORE TIME BUT THIS WAS NO INDICATION OF ILL WILL ON ITS PART OR OF A DESIRE TO KILL THE TREATY THE CHANCELLOR WISHED TO HAVE AITREATY WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE ON A SOUND BASIS AND IN GOOD CONSCIENCE HE FELT THAT ONCE A TEXT WAS TABLED AFTER SO MUCH EFFORT THE INEVITABLE TENDENCY WOULD BE TO CONSIDER IT AS FINAL IT WOULD BE VERY BAD IF THE FRG IN ACCORD WITH ITS INTERPRETATION OF ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD HAVE TO REJECT CERTAIN FORMULATIONS AT THAT POINT KIESINGER ASKED IN THIS CONNECTION WHETHER THERE POULD BE A BETTER MEANS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG HE WAS WORRIED BECAUSE TALKS WERE NOW TAKING PLACE IN LOCATIONS AND POSSIBLY TO SOME EXTENT AT CROSS PURPOSES HE ALSO WISHED TO KNOW HOW THE US FORESAW FUTURE PROGRESS ON THE TREATY--WHAT WAS OUR 15 FOSTER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO TIMETABLE FUTURE PROGRESS WILL DEPEND IN THE FIRST ON OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES THERE IS NO DOUBT HOWEVER THAT A LONG DELAY COULD PRO- DUCE MORE PROBLEMS SOME COUNTRIES--INDIA FOR EXAMPLE--MIGHT IN THE INTERIM MAKE A POLITICAL DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH NATIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS AS FOR CONSULTATIONS FOSTER SUGGESTED THAT THESE BE HELD IN WASHINGTON IN AN ORDERLY FASHION THE PRESENTATION OF THREE SEPARATE GERMAN MESSAGES BY wmuu 24 Houns as HAD BEEN THE CASE YESTERDAY PRESENTED CERTAIN PROBLEMS FOR HIS STAFF FOSTER STATED THAT WE SHALL RESPOND TO THESE GERMAN SUGGESTPONS BUT NOTED THWT SOME OF EHEM POSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES THE REVISION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS BY THE US AND THE FRG COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS NOT ONJY WITH THE SOVIETS BUT WITH OUR OTHER WESTERN ALLIES AS WELL FOSTER MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD TRAVEL TO OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS CONSULTATIONS WOULD ALSO BE CARRIED OUT IN NAC ON SOME OF THE LARGER PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH THE CHANCELLOR HAD MENTIONED 14 AT THE REQUEST MINISTER STOLTENBERG BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED HIS EARLIER MEETING WITH FOSTER PREPORTED BY SEPTEL THE CHANCELLOR THEN PROVIDED THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT WHICH AFTER MINOR REVISION WAS AGREED IN THE FOLLOWING FORM FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AND THE AMERICAN DISARMAMENT DEPRESEN- TATIVE AMBASSADOR FOSTER HAD AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION TODAY ON Th NPT AND THE CONNECTED THEREWITH IN CONNECTION WITH SECRET x Autho tyM3 0 4 SECRET BONN 10500 MARCH 9 1967 SECTION TWO OF TWO THE FUTURE PROCEDURE THE FEDERAL CHANCELLDR NOTED THAT TN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY T0 WORLD PEACE AND ALSO To THE FUTURE AND THE SECURITY OF THE GERMAN FEOFLE SUFFICIENT Twwz MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR TNOROUGN CONSULTATION ON ALL ASPECJS OF THE TREATY INCLUDING ITS INCORPORATION IN THE COMMON ALLIANHE POLICY OF THE NEST AMBASSADOR FOSTER DECLARED THE READINESS OF THE AMERICAN OOUERNNENT TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND NITN ALL OF THE NATO GP-B MCGHEE BT NOTE PASSED ADVANCE COPY T0 SIS-O WHITE HOUSE USIA 3-9- 67 SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library 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