Joint Publication 3-14 PREFACE 1 Scope This publication provides joint doctrine for planning joint space operations 2 Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders JFCs and prescribes joint doctrine for operations education and training It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective 3 Application a Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff commanders of combatant commands subunified commands joint task forces subordinate components of these commands and the Services b The guidance in this publication is authoritative as such this doctrine will be followed except when in the judgment of the commander exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided more current and specific guidance Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational alliance or coalition military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law regulations and doctrine For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CURTIS M SCAPARROTTI Lieutenant General U S Army Director Joint Staff i Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3 14 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-14 06 JANUARY 2009 o Realigns space situational awareness as the fifth space mission area o Adds and defines protection and space deterrence within the space control mission area o Provides additional depth to the discussion of space debris and potential effects of collisions o Organizes space support mission area into assured access to space and satellite support operations o Highlights the links between defensive space control and space deterrence o Captures the role of non-Department of Defense DOD capabilities with regard to mitigation as well as options for the joint force commander o Refines the space coordinating authority o Describes the positive impact on deterrence that commercial and multinational space capabilities can provide by increasing resiliency of space architectures o Expands the list of entities with space operations roles and responsibilities o Updated to be consistent with national policy DOD instructions and other joint publications iii Summary of Changes Intentionally Blank iV JP 3 14 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ix CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS Section A Military Space Contributions to Joint Operations I-1 General I-1 Space and the Principles of Joint Operations I-3 Section B Operational Considerations for Space I-7 General I-7 Characteristics of Space I-8 CHAPTER II SPACE MISSION AREAS Introduction II-1 Section A Space Situational Awareness II-1 General II-1 Key Objectives II-1 Functional Capabilities II-2 Interagency Consideration II-4 Section B Space Force Enhancement II-4 General II-4 Components of Space Force Enhancement II-4 Section C Space Support II-6 General II-6 Components of Space Support II-6 Section D Space Control II-8 General II-8 Components of Space Control II-8 Section E Space Force Application II-9 Space Force Application II-9 CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES General III-1 Command Relationships III-1 v Table of Contents Space Coordinating Authority III-2 Theater Space Network III-3 Role of Non-Department of Defense Capabilities III-4 CHAPTER IV ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Section A The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders IV-1 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff IV-1 Geographic Combatant Commanders IV-1 Section B United States Strategic Command and Functional Components IV-2 General IV-2 Joint Functional Component Command for Space IV-3 Other United States Strategic Command Functional Components IV-4 Section C United States Strategic Command Service Component Space Operations IV-6 General IV-6 Army Component IV-6 Marine Corps Component IV-7 Navy Component IV-7 Air Force Component IV-8 Section D Space Related-Support to the Joint Force IV-9 Combat Support Agencies IV-9 Other Agencies and Organizations IV-11 Commercial Space Operations IV-14 Multinational Space Operations IV-16 Other Space-Related Support IV-16 CHAPTER V PLANNING General V-1 Operational Art and Operational Design V-2 Key Planning Considerations V-5 Control and Coordinating Measures V-10 APPENDIX A B C D E F G vi Space-Based Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance A-1 Missile Warning B-1 Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability C-1 Satellite Communications D-1 Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing E-1 Operationally Responsive Space F-1 Space Fundamentals G-1 JP 3-14 Table of Contents H J References H-1 Administrative Instructions J-1 GLOSSARY Part I Part II Abbreviations and Acronyms GL-1 Terms and Definitions GL-6 FIGURE II-1 V-I B-1 D-1 E-1 G-1 G-2 Space Situational Awareness Functional Capabilities II-3 The Joint Space Tasking Order Process V-11 Missile Warning Support Request Procedures B-2 Military and Commercial Satellite Systems D-2 The Global Positioning System Space Control and User Segments E-3 Orbit Types G-4 Sun-Synchronous Orbits G-5 vii Table of Contents Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW o Provides the Fundamentals of Military Space Operations o Discusses the Space Mission Areas Space Situational Awareness Space Force Enhancement Space Support Space Control and Space Force Application o Explains the Command and Control of Space Forces o Presents the Roles and Responsibilities for Space Operations o Addresses Space Operations Planning and the Joint Space Tasking Order Fundamentals of Military Space Operations Military Space Contributions to Joint Operations Space capabilities have proven to be significant force multipliers when integrated into military operations Space capabilities provide global communications positioning navigation and timing PNT services environmental monitoring space-based intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR and warning services to combatant commanders CCDRs Services and agencies To facilitate effective integration joint force commanders JFCs and their staffs should have a common and clear understanding of how space forces contribute to joint operations and how military space operations should be integrated with other military operations to achieve US national security objectives Space and the Principles of Joint Operations National security objectives and the needs of the supported commander compel the conduct of space operations Space forces employ principles of joint operations and enable the application of the principles of joint operations by other joint forces Operational Considerations for Space Space capabilities should be integrated and synchronized by the supported commander into specific joint offensive and defensive operations operation and campaign planning and into their concept of operations operation plans OPLANs and operation orders Space forces simultaneously support multiple users This requires extensive coordination planning and the early identification of requirements and capabilities Commander United States Strategic Command ix Executive Summary CDRUSSTRATCOM will prioritize space capabilities and make apportionment and allocation recommendations for Department of Defense DOD systems in coordination with supported commanders Characteristics of Space The space environment has unique characteristics that impact military operations Characteristics of space include No Geographical Boundaries International law does not extend a nation's territorial sovereignty up to Earth orbit Therefore nations enjoy unimpeded satellite overflight of other nations through space Orbital Mechanics Satellite orbits must follow certain orbital parameters due to laws of physics Satellite operators can in limited circumstances change a satellite's orbital parameters but this will deplete fuel which can significantly degrade the performance or life-span of a system Environmental Considerations The space environment is a significant limiting factor influencing every aspect of a satellite's size weight and power affecting the performance and life-span of any operational spacecraft Electromagnetic Spectrum EMS Dependency Spacebased assets depend on the EMS as their sole medium for transmitting and receiving information and or signals The electromagnetic frequency bands that space-based systems use are fixed and cannot be changed after launch Therefore it is vital that US forces achieve EMS control to ensure freedom of action for space assets Space Mission Areas Space Situational Awareness x Space situational awareness SSA involves characterizing as completely as necessary the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial environment and the space domain SSA is dependent on integrating space surveillance collection and processing environmental monitoring processing and analysis status of US and cooperative satellite systems collection of US and multinational space readiness and analysis of the space domain It also incorporates the use of intelligence sources to provide insight into adversary use of space capabilities and their threats to our space capabilities while in turn contributing to the JFC's ability to understand adversary intent JP 3-14 Executive Summary Space Force Enhancement Space force enhancement operations increase joint force effectiveness by increasing the combat potential of that force enhancing operational awareness and providing critical joint force support Space force enhancement is composed of ISR missile warning environmental monitoring satellite communications SATCOM and PNT Space Support The space support mission area includes the essential capabilities functions activities and tasks necessary to operate and sustain all elements of space forces throughout the range of military operations Components of space support include spacelift satellite operations and reconstitution of space forces Space Control Space control supports freedom of action in space for friendly forces and when necessary defeats adversary efforts that interfere with or attack US or allied space systems and negates adversary space capabilities It consists of offensive space control OSC and defensive space control DSC OSC are measures taken to prevent an adversary's hostile use of US third-party space capabilities or offensive operations to negate an adversary's space capabilities used to interfere with or attack US allied space systems DSC are operations conducted to preserve the ability to exploit space capabilities via active and passive actions while protecting friendly space capabilities from attack interference or unintentional hazards Space Force Application Space force application is combat operations in through and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict by holding terrestrial targets at risk The space force application mission area includes ballistic missile defense and force projection capabilities such as intercontinental ballistic missiles Command and Control of Space Forces Command Relationships Joint space forces and capabilities are integral parts of military operations worldwide requiring multiple command relationships between CDRUSSTRATCOM and the CCDRs CDRUSSTRATCOM has the Unified Command Plan UCP -assigned role to conduct space operations CDRUSSTRATCOM has designated the Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Space JFCC SPACE to manage daily space operations CDRUSSTRATCOM will determine command authorities xi Executive Summary and delegate operational control or tactical control as appropriate Normally space forces supporting multiple geographic combatant commanders GCCs remain assigned or attached to United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM However there may be a need during operations for command of these resources to be transferred to a GCC Space Coordinating Authority A supported JFC when delegated space coordinating authority SCA from the GCC integrates space capabilities and coordinates joint space operations in the operational area Based on the complexity and scope of operations the JFC can either remain SCA or designate a component commander or other individual as the SCA The SCA has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force Theater Space Network Each GCC has space operators resident on staffs at multiple echelons who serve as theater advisors for national and foreign space capabilities military civil and commercial These individuals concentrate primarily on working the detailed activities of theater space operations in support of the SCA in developing collecting and prioritizing space requirements Several DOD and national agencies deploy theater support teams that can provide additional space services and capabilities Each Service uses different means to provide space expertise to satisfy the combatant command CCMD Service component's space support requirements Role of Non-Department of Defense Capabilities CCDRs have requirements that cannot always be provided by DOD space capabilities alone DOD space capabilities can be supplemented through national and foreign military civil and commercial capabilities Roles and Responsibilities The Chairman of the Joint The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a uniform system for evaluating readiness of each CCMD Chiefs of Staff and combat support agency CSA to employ space forces to carry out assigned missions and provide guidance to CCDRs for the employment of space capabilities and planning of joint space operations xii JP 3-14 Executive Summary Geographic Combatant Commanders GCCs will consider space capabilities when selecting alternatives to satisfy mission needs as well as develop and articulate military requirements for space and space-related capabilities and provide prioritized theater space requirements to CDRUSSTRATCOM They will integrate space services and capabilities into OPLANs concept plans campaign plans theater guidance and objectives and plan for the employment of space capabilities within their area of responsibility Commander United States CDRUSSTRATCOM will plan and conduct space force enhancement space support DSC SSA and as directed Strategic Command offensive cyberspace operations and space force application CDRUSSTRATCOM will serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters except as otherwise noted CDRUSSTRATCOM also has specific responsibilities related to strategic deterrence cyberspace operations electronic warfare global strike global missile defense ISR countering weapons of mass destruction and analysis and targeting Joint Functional Component Command for Space Commander JFCC SPACE coordinates plans integrates synchronizes executes and assesses space operations as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM CDRUSSTRATCOM has delegated coordinating authority to Commander JFCC SPACE for planning of space operations in operationallevel support of USSTRATCOM's UCP missions Other United States Strategic Command Functional Components Commander United States Cyber Command as the supported commander for SATCOM performs functions and activities of the SATCOM operational manager including oversight management and control of SATCOM resources Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance plans coordinates and integrates DOD ISR in support of strategic and global operations as directed Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense is responsible for operational planning in support of GCCs to include asset management of missile defense forces United States Strategic Command Service Component Space Operations CDRUSSTRATCOM exercises command and control C2 of assigned and attached space forces through JFCC SPACE in coordination with Service component commands and their operations centers including United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command US Army Forces Strategic Command USASMDC ARSTRAT Air Force Space Command AFSPC 14th Air xiii Executive Summary Force AF Air Forces Strategic AFSTRAT US Marine Corps USMC Forces USSTRATCOM MARFORSTRAT and US Fleet Forces Command Army Component USASMDC ARSTRAT conducts space and missile defense operations and provides planning integration control and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions strategic deterrence global missile defense and space operations serves as the Army force modernization proponent for space high altitude and ground-based midcourse missile defense serves as the Army operational integrator for ground-based midcourse defense and conducts mission-related research and development in support of Army Title 10 United States Code responsibilities Marine Corps Component MARFORSTRAT as the USMC Service component to USSTRATCOM represents USMC capabilities and space interests Marine Corps requirements for space exploitation and space force enhancement are supported through MARFORSTRAT MARFORSTRAT brings resident knowledge and access to Marine Corps capabilities that can support USSTRATCOM mission areas and advises CDRUSSTRATCOM on proper employment and support of USMC forces Navy Component Commander US Fleet Cyber Command COMFLTCYBERCOM Commander Tenth Fleet COMTENTHFLT is the Navy's central operational authority for space in support of maritime forces afloat and ashore COMFLTCYBERCOM COMTENTHFLT is responsible for directing operations of assigned space systems as an integral element of network operations and associated space control activities and providing space expertise support products and services as required US Tenth Fleet is the space support element for fleet satellite and ultrahigh frequency follow-on Air Force Component AFSPC serves as the Air Force Service component to USSTRATCOM for space and cyberspace In support of space operations Commander AFSPC presents 14 AF a component numbered air force C-NAF designated as AFSTRAT to USSTRATCOM The C-NAF commander then assumes tactical-level responsibilities of the Service component commander as delegated by the AFSPC commander to include operating space capabilities and presentation generation readiness and sustainment of Air xiv JP 3-14 Executive Summary Force space forces assigned to CDRUSSTRATCOM AFSPC operates the Air Force Satellite Control Network AFSCN which supports national security defense and intelligence satellites during launch and early orbit periods and is used to analyze anomalies affecting orbiting satellites For particular constellations the AFSCN provides routine control functions and operates a few satellite constellations with a dedicated control network Combat Support Agencies The joint force uses DOD space capabilities supplemented by national and foreign civil and commercial partners The CCDR's staff element is responsible for a specific function which works through its channels to the correct CSA e g Defense Information Systems Agency DISA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Security Agency Central Security Service Defense Threat Reduction Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency to obtain the needed support or products Information from other DOD agencies or United States Government organizations e g National Reconnaissance Office National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is available through established procedures Commercial Space Operations Commercial SATCOM are a critical part of US military operations and planning should include protection of these services DISA is the only authorized provider of commercial SATCOM for DOD Multinational Space Operations Multinational space operations provide the joint force many opportunities including increasing interoperability with and extending battlefield advantages to allies demonstrating responsible behavior in space and reassuring allies of our commitments to mutual defense Partnerships can enhance collective security capabilities and can provide a deterrent effect against adversaries from attacking or interfering with friendly space capabilities Planning Operations Plans and Space Operations Commanders address space operations in all types of plans and orders at all levels of war Additionally plans must address how to effectively integrate capabilities counter an adversary's use of space maximize use of limited space assets and to consolidate operational requirements for space capabilities Joint force planners incorporate space forces and capabilities into the basic plan and the applicable annexes The completed plan should describe xv Executive Summary how space operations support the commander's stated objectives how the adversary employs its space forces the process and procedures through which additional support will be requested Annex N Space Operations provides detailed information on space forces and their capabilities that the supported commander can use throughout the joint operation or campaign Operational Art and Operational Design Since operational art integrates ends ways and means across the levels of war operational art and operational design should be considered when planning space operations at all levels A mix of DOD commercial multinational and allied space capabilities can support or enable operational art and operational design They are a means to achieve the required end or a way to support or enable other means to achieve the required end As such space forces and capabilities must be considered equally with forces and capabilities throughout the operational environment Key Planning Considerations Space presents unique planning and operational considerations that affect friendly adversary and neutral space forces alike Space capabilities require extensive and advanced planning Space assets are sufficiently capable and robust however operational planners must understand the limited number of resources available and the distinct challenges with space force reconstitution Numerous resource and legal considerations impact planning and affect mission success The space planner understands planning and operational considerations for employment of space capabilities and has a firm knowledge of the threats to the use of those systems by an adversary The space planner must understand what can be done to limit an adversary's use of space capabilities and how to protect our own use of space Control and Coordinating Measures Control and coordinating measures are used by JFCs to provide deconfliction between assets and missions to maximize efficient and effective use of limited assets and to provide effective C2 of forces and assets within a defined area For most DOD space operations control and coordinating measures are primarily accomplished through applicable guidance from CDRUSSTRATCOM and JFCC SPACE CDRUSSTRATCOM operations orders provide and assure space capabilities by integrating subordinate component efforts to maintain strategic and operational advantages The joint space tasking order development xvi JP 3-14 Executive Summary process does not account for missions performed by nonDOD space assets or those limited space forces assigned to a GCC thereby creating potential conflicts between DOD and non-DOD agencies It is then incumbent upon the GCCs and JFCC SPACE to coordinate as required to minimize conflicts CONCLUSION This publication provides joint doctrine for planning joint space operations It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all joint forces describes the military operational principles associated with support from through and operating in space explains Joint Staff CCMD USSTRATCOM and USSTRATCOM functional and Service component relationships and responsibilities and establishes a framework for the employment of space forces and space capabilities xvii Executive Summary Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS Space power is a critical enabler to National Security and it is where the US has a competitive edge General James E Cartwright Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff April 2011 SECTION A MILITARY SPACE CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT OPERATIONS 1 General a This publication provides guidance for planning executing and assessing joint space operations It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all joint forces describes the military operational principles associated with support from through and operating in space explains Joint Staff combatant command CCMD United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM and USSTRATCOM functional and Service component relationships and responsibilities and establishes a framework for the employment of space forces and space capabilities b Space capabilities have proven to be significant force multipliers when integrated into military operations Space capabilities provide global communications positioning navigation and timing PNT services environmental monitoring space-based intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR and warning services to combatant commanders CCDRs Services and agencies To facilitate effective integration joint force commanders JFCs and their staffs should have a common and clear understanding of how space forces contribute to joint operations and how military space operations should be integrated with other military operations to achieve US national security objectives To achieve optimal military utility from space a basic understanding of space tools and the ability to coordinate activities between involved agencies and organizations and when appropriate integrate all necessary space capabilities with all other available capabilities military national civil commercial and foreign provides greater efficiencies and unified action JFCs should establish a means to reasonably include appropriate outside agencies and organizations in operational planning execution and assessment activities c US military use of space capabilities has changed significantly since military satellites were first placed in orbit Continuous improvements in space technology have led to the development of more advanced space systems as well as a host of commercially available capabilities This has changed how commanders view space capabilities Adversaries have also purchased and developed their own space capabilities This has led to a situation where space is a congested contested and competitive environment 1 Vulnerability I-1 Chapter I a Military civil and commercial sectors of the US are increasingly dependent on space capabilities and this dependence is a potential vulnerability as space becomes increasingly congested contested and competitive Purposeful interference PI consists of deliberate actions taken to deny or disrupt a space system service or capability PI with US space systems including their supporting infrastructure will be considered an infringement of US rights Such interference or interference with other space systems upon which the US relies is irresponsible in peacetime and may be escalatory during a crisis When practical and authorized the joint force will protect civil commercial and foreign space capabilities b Commanders should consider the possibility of hostile actions from state and non-state actors intended to deny friendly forces access to or use of space capabilities while developing strategic estimates plans and other documents and planning future operations and activities They also should anticipate the proliferation and increasing sophistication of space capabilities and products with military utility that could be used by any adversary for hostile purposes Potential adversaries no longer have to develop large infrastructures to obtain or interfere with space capabilities Today many capabilities can be easily purchased Options available to exert influence or prevent an adversary's access to space capabilities include diplomatic informational military and economic measures 2 Freedom of Action US forces should have the freedom to take advantage of the capabilities provided by space systems at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force 3 Protection Commanders should protect critical space systems and supporting infrastructure and take steps to assure availability of space-enabled mission-essential functions by developing techniques measures and relationships to maintain continuity of services 4 Global Reach and Responsiveness Space-based capabilities are unique in that they are not subject to traditional air overflight restrictions and may already be in position to support operations when crises arise However there may be instances when the rapid surge of a capability or the expeditious replacement of a capability is required In those cases commanders should be aware that increasing capabilities of deployed spacebased systems may be accomplished in hours to days while development and deployment of replacement capabilities could take a year or more 5 Space Deterrence Joint force operations contribute to the nation's multilayer approach toward deterring aggression against our space capabilities and infrastructure by a Promoting and demonstrating responsible behavior when employing space capabilities b Pursuing partnerships that encourage restraint in potential adversaries c Contributing to quick attribution for attacks d Protecting our space capabilities and infrastructures and I-2 JP 3-14 Fundamentals of Military Space Operations e Implementing appropriate responses should deterrence fail d Space systems provide specialized capabilities and offer global force enhancements critical to mission success To realize the global advantage provided by space capabilities JFCs must collaborate with USSTRATCOM and national agencies to ascertain military utility vulnerabilities and availability of space-enabled capabilities to achieve best efficiency and effectiveness 2 Space and the Principles of Joint Operations a National security objectives and the needs of the supported commander compel the conduct of space operations Space forces employ principles of joint operations and enable the application of the principles of joint operations by other joint forces b Space capabilities enable the following applications of the principles of joint operations 1 Objective The purpose of the objective is to direct military operations toward a clearly defined decisive and achievable goal a Employing Commander United States Strategic Command CDRUSSTRATCOM ensures that space objectives support and are aligned with the supported commander's objectives and are included in planning b Enabling Space operations provide insight into the operational environment OE including adversary actions and capabilities Space forces enable continuous dissemination of supported commanders' guidance 2 Offensive The purpose of an offensive action is to seize retain and exploit the initiative a Employing CDRUSSTRATCOM establishes and maintains freedom of action in space by ensuring the availability of space capabilities to the joint force while when directed denying the opposing force the same advantage b Enabling Space forces provide globally available satellite communications SATCOM PNT environmental monitoring warning systems and ISR capabilities and services These capabilities support our leaders' efforts to employ the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values and interests achieve objectives consistent with national strategy and conclude operations on terms favorable to the US 3 Mass The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results a Employing CDRUSSTRATCOM integrates and synchronizes supporting space forces to maximize effectiveness when concentrating combat power at the proper time I-3 Chapter I and place This integration and synchronization conserves available resources minimizes impact on non-adversaries and maximizes the effect on the adversary b Enabling Space forces support the joint forces' ability to concentrate combat power at the proper time and place by providing SATCOM to coordinate and direct forces ISR to facilitate situational understanding and targeting and PNT to synchronize operations navigate and guide precision munitions 4 Economy of Force The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts a Employing CDRUSSTRATCOM implements apportionment and allocation prioritization guidance Maintaining effective liaison with supported commanders enables CDRUSSTRATCOM to recommend appropriate space forces actions and levels of effort b Enabling Space forces support JFCs in attaining information superiority thereby reducing uncertainty and permitting reductions in the number and type of forces needed for secondary efforts This allows commanders to concentrate forces and apply combat power at other points in the operational area Space-based PNT enables joint force employment of precision munitions to minimize the number of weapons needed to create desired effects and minimize collateral damage 5 Maneuver The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power a Employing When necessary and feasible CDRUSSTRATCOM directs the positioning of space forces to achieve advantage over adversaries The employment of US space capabilities in multiple orbital regimes provides a standing position of advantage This advantage includes freedom from overflight restrictions b Enabling Space forces provide ISR PNT weather and communications support to the joint force enabling precise friendly force tracking FFT enhancing joint force situational awareness maneuverability and command and control C2 effectiveness throughout the operational area This enables the joint force to perform precise coordinated maneuvers with speed confidence and stealth even in featureless terrain or under limited visibility 6 Unity of Command The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective a Employing In order to execute the responsibility to advocate plan and conduct space operations for national security objectives CDRUSSTRATCOM exercises combatant command command authority COCOM over assigned US military space forces CDRUSSTRATCOM normally delegates operational control OPCON and or tactical control TACON of assigned space forces to subordinate USSTRATCOM commanders Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense SecDef I-4 JP 3-14 Fundamentals of Military Space Operations CDRUSSTRATCOM retains control of assigned space forces even if they are deployed within the area of responsibility AOR of a geographic combatant commander GCC Space forces typically operate in general or direct support to other JFCs with no reassignment of space forces or redelegation of operational authorities This allows CDRUSSTRATCOM to maintain unity of effort not only for space forces but across all strategic forces CDRUSSTRATCOM must integrate and employ b Enabling Supported commanders identify priorities to ensure supporting commanders and agency directors have clear guidance on the supported commander's intent integrate space capabilities into planning and operations and consider the impact if space capabilities are unavailable Supporting commanders then provide details of how priorities are fulfilled CDRUSSTRATCOM provides priorities and conflict resolution guidelines in support of joint space operations 7 Security The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage a Employing CDRUSSTRATCOM conducts continuous operations to establish and maintain space situational awareness SSA which includes assessment of the capabilities and intent of potential or actual adversaries In turn this supports development of defensive measures within fielded space capabilities operational planning to defeat threats and timely employment of available defensive measures to ensure the availability of operational space capabilities b Enabling Space forces employ space-based ISR and missile warning capabilities with timely assured and responsive C2 systems This enhances the joint force's ability to observe areas of interest AOIs and increases its situational awareness JFCs maintain awareness of threats to space forces in their AORs and take measures to preempt or counter those threats in order to preserve US freedom of action in and access to space 8 Surprise The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared Surprise is closely linked to security since security measures are often needed to achieve the element of surprise a Employing CDRUSSTRATCOM's centralization of operational space C2 capabilities coupled with effective SSA contributes to comprehensive assessment and speed in decision making This supports the ability of US forces to overwhelm adversaries' decision-making cycles achieving surprise Effective space control operations can negate threats and adversary efforts to interfere with or attack US or allied space systems b Enabling Space operations provide timely information and data collection enhanced information sharing and precision targeting 9 Simplicity The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear uncomplicated plans and concise orders I-5 Chapter I a Employing CDRUSSTRATCOM provides authorities intent and guidance for space operations in orders and operational plans This enables space forces to execute synchronized and mutually supporting operations with economy of force b Enabling CDRUSSTRATCOM's guidance complements supported JFC plans and operations and provides a common understanding of required space capabilities 10 Restraint The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force A single act could cause significant military and political consequences therefore the judicious use of force is necessary a Employing In the conduct of space operations CDRUSSTRATCOM observes the law of war rules of engagement and rules for the use of force b Enabling Space forces contribute to the joint force's awareness of the OE and munitions accuracy 11 Perseverance The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state a Employing Satellites remain in their established orbits for years after deployment and require long-term Service commitment to ensure continued availability b Enabling Space forces enable persistent insight into adversaries' actions and disposition This helps to dissuade potential adversaries from direct military confrontation and fosters confidence in our situational awareness thereby improving public resolve 12 Legitimacy Gaining and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace host nation HN government international audience and US populace and Congress will assist the joint force in attaining the national strategic end state Legitimacy is based on the legality morality and rightness of the actions undertaken a Employing Adherence to law of war and compliance with US-ratified legal regimes enhances legitimacy in US military space operations Most of the law relating to space activity is based on international treaties rather than on customary law or teaching by scholars The key treaty is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 Legitimacy is further underscored by safe and responsible space operations b Enabling Space forces help maintain high standards of accuracy in military operations for example precision guided munitions Space forces also enable verification of other nations' compliance with treaty obligations and international mandates I-6 JP 3-14 Fundamentals of Military Space Operations SECTION B OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPACE 3 General a The importance of space operations is increasing due to the enabling capabilities they provide to the joint force Space capabilities are vital to overall military mission accomplishment and provide advantages needed for success in all joint operations 1 Space capabilities should be integrated and synchronized by the supported commander into specific joint offensive and defensive operations operation and campaign planning and into their concept of operations CONOPS operation plans OPLANs and operation orders 2 Supported and supporting commanders coordinate as appropriate the deployment and employment of space forces required to accomplish the assigned mission 3 Space forces simultaneously support multiple users This requires extensive coordination planning and the early identification of requirements and capabilities CDRUSSTRATCOM will prioritize space capabilities and make apportionment and allocation recommendations for Department of Defense DOD systems in coordination with supported commanders SecDef will determine solutions for the supported commander's needs that cannot be fulfilled by the supporting commander 4 The use of space capabilities by friend and foe alike is increasing in both volume and sophistication Adversary knowledge of US space capabilities and the role of space assets in joint operations are considerable and many resources are expended to constantly increase the awareness of technology and concepts of operation for current and planned space systems b Commanders consider the following guidelines when planning and executing military operations and when requesting space capabilities 1 Understand how others including other United States Government USG departments and agencies adversaries partner nations intergovernmental organizations IGOs and nongovernmental organizations NGOs use space capabilities to support military and civilian operations and how the use of those space products services may impact operational tempo and engagement outcomes such as use of Global Positioning System GPS by civil aviation 2 Provide multinational partners appropriate access to systems and information The joint force strives to provide necessary and appropriate space-related information at the lowest appropriate security classification level However established procedures for disclosure of intelligence information specifically information on US space systems and operations must be followed in pursuing this goal Furthermore it is the responsibility of all original classification authorities to specifically consider releasability issues when creating documents and security classification guides I-7 Chapter I 3 Look for opportunities in the evolving strategic environment to partner with other responsible nations IGOs NGOs and commercial firms 4 Maintain an awareness of the space forces and their operational status 5 Understand how and why space capabilities are integrated across the range of military operations to include defense support of civil authorities DSCA 6 Maintain SSA and assess the potential impacts on space-based and groundbased systems and operations 7 Evaluate the consequences of lost or degraded space capability and the availability of other means to perform the mission 8 Maintain and exercise military forces plans and capabilities for operating in and through a degraded disrupted or denied space environment 4 Characteristics of Space The space environment has unique characteristics that impact military operations All commanders should have a basic awareness of the fundamental advantages and disadvantages offered by space operations in order to effectively employ space capabilities Once considered a sanctuary space is becoming increasingly congested contested and competitive The number of objects in orbit around the Earth has grown dramatically over the years increasing the potential for collisions As more countries become space-faring nations and commercial and private interest continues to grow competition for coveted orbits and radio frequency RF spectrum will continue to increase a No Geographical Boundaries International law does not extend a nation's territorial sovereignty up to Earth orbit Therefore nations enjoy unimpeded satellite overflight of other nations through space Operating from space provides line of sight LOS access to large areas including remote and denied access areas which offers advantages for communications navigation ISR indications and warning and meteorological and oceanographic METOC information b Orbital Mechanics Satellite orbits must follow certain orbital parameters due to laws of physics A satellite's orbit is chosen to best satisfy a satellite's mission Satellite operators can in limited circumstances change a satellite's orbital parameters but this will deplete fuel which can significantly degrade the performance or life-span of a system c Environmental Considerations The space environment is a significant limiting factor influencing every aspect of a satellite's size weight and power affecting the performance and life-span of any operational spacecraft 1 Space Weather Apart from the threat of meteorites almost all hazards to space capabilities come from the sun The various phenomena resulting from the sun's activity are collectively termed space weather and manifest as increased electromagnetic noise ionospheric interference or prolonged impact by energetic charged particles Solar I-8 JP 3-14 Fundamentals of Military Space Operations flares charged particles cosmic rays the Van Allen radiation belts and other natural phenomena in space can affect communications navigation accuracy sensor performance and even cause electronic failure 2 Debris Operational satellites are under constant threat of impact Orbiting particulates left behind during a satellite's lifetime debris from satellite explosions or impacts orbiting trash such as rocket bodies or natural objects such as meteoroids can damage operational systems Further complicating this problem is that many of these pieces of debris are too small to track with current sensor capabilities Currently the US tracks only approximately 10 percent of space objects that are assessed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA to be a valid threat to spacecraft a Debris Dispersal If an object detaches from an orbiting body no matter what its size it will initially follow the same orbit varied only by the event that caused the breakup This means that debris may take weeks months or even years to separate from its source even clouds of objects created by explosive events will only slowly disperse once the initial explosion is complete Depending on altitude and velocity such objects may remain in a stable orbit for extended periods of tens or even hundreds of years b Collisional Cascading The preferential use of certain orbits compounds the collision risk by concentrating large numbers of objects in discrete bands There is growing awareness of the problem of congestion in space While there are about 800 active satellites in Earth orbit the United States Department of Defense Space Object Catalogue now provides details of nearly 21 000 space objects each larger than around 10 centimeters In addition there are an estimated 300 000 items of untracked debris between one centimeter and 10 centimeters in size As the orbital space around the Earth becomes increasingly cluttered a future collision may create a runaway chain of events that creates collision after collision rendering some orbits unusable for centuries This is known as collisional cascading or the Kessler Syndrome d Electromagnetic Spectrum EMS Dependency Space-based assets depend on the EMS as their sole medium for transmitting and receiving information and or signals The electromagnetic frequency bands that space-based systems use are fixed and cannot be changed after launch Therefore it is vital that US forces achieve EMS control to ensure freedom of action for space assets See Appendix G Space Fundamentals for additional information on space characteristics I-9 Chapter I Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 CHAPTER II SPACE MISSION AREAS Weather intelligence communications precision sic -navigation-and timing are all capabilities we have brought to the fight from the space domain and are relied upon in virtually any and every military operation Mr Michael B Donley Secretary of the Air Force November 2010 1 Introduction US military space operations are composed of the following mission areas space situational awareness space force enhancement space support space control and space force application This chapter summarizes the role of each mission area and how they contribute to joint operations SECTION A SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 2 General SSA is fundamental to conducting space operations It is the requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space environment and the OE upon which space operations depend SSA involves characterizing as completely as necessary the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial environment and the space domain SSA is dependent on integrating space surveillance collection and processing environmental monitoring processing and analysis status of US and cooperative satellite systems collection of US and multinational space readiness and analysis of the space domain It also incorporates the use of intelligence sources to provide insight into adversary use of space capabilities and their threats to our space capabilities while in turn contributing to the JFC's ability to understand adversary intent SSA is a key component for space control because it is the enabler or foundation for accomplishing all other space control tasks 3 Key Objectives SSA supports the following key objectives a Ensure space operations and spaceflight safety SSA provides the infrastructure that ensures that US space operators understand the conditions that could adversely impact successful space operations and spaceflight safety i e collision avoidance b Implement international treaties and agreements SSA is a means by which compliance via attribution can be verified and by which violations can be detected c Protect space capabilities The ability of the US to monitor all space activity enables protection of space capabilities helps deter others from initiating attacks against space and II-1 Chapter II terrestrial capabilities and assures allies of continuing US support during times of peace crisis and conflict d Protect military operations and national interests SSA supports and enhances military operations 4 Functional Capabilities SSA can be divided into four functional capabilities Figure II-1 a Detect Track Identify D T ID For SSA D T ID is the ability to search discover track maintain custody of space objects and events distinguish objects from others and recognize objects as belonging to certain types missions etc D T ID's primary role is in support of safety of flight and support of offensive space control OSC and defensive space control DSC missions This capability is required to provide the operations center data for creation of a common operational picture COP and presentation to the decision makers The JFC benefits through comprehensive knowledge of inventory of space objects events and status which may affect the user's missions b Threat Warning and Assessment TW A For SSA TW A is the ability to predict and differentiate between potential or actual attacks space weather environment effects and space system anomalies as well as provide timely friendly force status TW A's primary role is in direct support of OSC and DSC and relies heavily on D T ID characterization and data integration and exploitation DI E This capability is required to provide the JFC with an assessment of events related to space capabilities all segments-- space link and ground and advanced warning of potential events of threats and their impacts to space capabilities or other capabilities dependent on space These threat warnings and assessments may also contribute to or serve as indications and warnings of other potential events or threats which might affect non-space capabilities and or non-DOD capabilities and services c Characterization For SSA characterization is the ability to determine strategy tactics intent and activity including characteristics and operating parameters of all space capabilities ground link space and threats posed by those capabilities This provides the JFC and other decision makers with the knowledge and confidence to make assessments of space capabilities objects and events which may affect the mission Characterization of blue assets is necessary to support blue system anomaly resolution establish baselines for evaluating adversary space object surveillance and identification capabilities and CONOPS and supports indications and warning development d Data Integration and Exploitation For SSA DI E is the ability to fuse correlate and integrate multi-source data into a tailorable COP and enable decision making for the entire set of space operations missions This capability enhances the other three functional capabilities of SSA and provides the ability to identify correlate and integrate multiple sources of data and information and to provide SSA services These enhancements support II-2 JP 3-14 Space Mission Areas Space Situational Awareness Functional Capabilities Characterization Sensor Multi-INT and Data Sources Deep Space Surveillance Human intelligence Signals intelligence Geospatial intelligence Measurement and signature intelligence Open-source intelligence Foundational Intelligence Operational Knowledge Operational Intelligence Breakups and separations Space object identification Custody Launch detection Near Earth S T Threat Warning and Assessment Detect Track Identify Re-entry Detect and track Cataloging Commercial and foreign entities High-altitude nuclear detonation Orbital ASAT Direct ascent ASAT Ground attack Anomaly detection Directed energy attack RF attack Laser attack Jamming Indications and warning Cyber attack Environmental monitoring System status End-of-Life Adversary Capability Timeline NIE SIPB Intelligence center Operations support I W Strategic Operational Tactical Stakeholders Subscribers Strategic Operational Tactical Strategic Operational Tactical Stakeholders Subscribers Stakeholders Subscribers Unclassified Unclassified Data Integration and Exploitation Data sensors UDOP and user services Multi-Sensor Fusion Strategic Operational Tactical Planners Scenario Analysis Operators Decison Makers Ensure Freedom of Action Legend ASAT I W INT NIE antisatellite weapon indications and warning intelligence national intelligence estimate RF S T SIPB UDOP radio frequency science and technology space intelligence preparation of the battlefield user defined operational picture Figure II-1 Space Situational Awareness Functional Capabilities II-3 Chapter II the JFC and other decision makers by facilitating decision making with earlier predictions at higher confidence and more responsive courses of action COAs for space and non-space forces DI E should provide the information technology capability to 1 Search and discover better sources of data and information across multiple organizations missions and security levels 2 Rapidly integrate that data into real-time SSA operations centers 3 Identify to the operator or commander the discovery and context of changes as they occur 4 Retrieve process and store data according to its use e g real-time or routine operations training rehearsal research 5 Provide user-centric displays tailored to needs and access levels and 6 Provide these functions via operator-centric displays and tools that permit autonomous or manual execution as well as reminders and status of pending or ongoing tasks e g blue force status 5 Interagency Consideration The overall SSA of the US can benefit from cooperation with non-USG satellite operators by gaining insight into commercial and foreign systems' status mission capabilities and maneuver plans Potential satellite conflicts should be brought to the attention of USSTRATCOM This cooperation also has the potential to reduce the demands on US space and intelligence systems Multiple C2 nodes will often require SSA information making unity of effort for SSA activities essential SECTION B SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT 6 General Space force enhancement operations increase joint force effectiveness by increasing the combat potential of that force enhancing operational awareness and providing critical joint force support Space force enhancement is composed of ISR missile warning environmental monitoring SATCOM and PNT They provide a critical advantage by reducing confusion inherent in combat situations Space force enhancement operations also afford JFCs access to denied areas and persistence which are not provided by comparable air land or maritime capabilities Space force enhancement functions often are provided by other USG departments and agencies commercial firms consortiums and multinational partners 7 Components of Space Force Enhancement a Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Monitoring AOIs from space helps provide information on adversary location disposition and intent aids in tracking II-4 JP 3-14 Space Mission Areas targeting and engaging the adversary and provides a means to assess these actions through tactical battle damage assessment BDA and operational combat assessment It also provides situational awareness warning of attack and feedback on how well US forces are affecting the adversary's understanding of the OE In countering weapons of mass destruction WMD monitoring from space can characterize and locate adversary WMD capabilities and neutral enemy and friendly activities that may be sources of potential chemical biological radiological and nuclear CBRN hazards The support request procedures for products and information are dependent on the individual system See Appendix A Space-Based Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance for more details b Missile Tracking Space-based systems ground-based systems correlation center C2 systems and CCDR national leadership decision support systems support time critical event conferencing These systems provide allies and senior leaders the requisite timely warning and characterization of ballistic missile events to include launch mid-course tracking terminal phase re-entry and nuclear detonations to support threat non-threat determination and follow-on decision making c Launch Detection Space-based and ground-based sensors provide real-time and post-launch analysis to determine orbital characteristics and potential conjunctions with other objects in space Detection of space launches is accomplished for both domestic and foreign launches Launch detection data is used to evaluate events that could directly or indirectly threaten US or allied space assets Similar to missile warning this information is analyzed to determine potential impacts on assets so that timely warnings and recommendations for suitable countermeasures can be made For domestic launches this capability supports the characterization of nominal and anomalous space launch events d Environmental Monitoring Space forces provide data on meteorological oceanographic and space environmental factors that might affect military operations Additionally space capabilities provide data that forms the basis for forecasts alerts and warnings for the space environment that may negatively impact space assets space operations and their terrestrial users Imagery capabilities can provide joint force planners with current information on sub-surface surface and air conditions e g traffic capability beach conditions vegetation and land use Knowledge of these factors allows forces to avoid adverse environmental conditions while taking advantage of other conditions to enhance operations Such monitoring also supports joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment JIPOE by providing the commander with information needed to identify and analyze potential adversary COAs In support of military operations in CBRN environments this monitoring also provides geospatial information weather terrain impacts on CBRN hazard transport persistency along with the assessment of a CBRN hazard incident on the natural environment e Satellite Communications SATCOM provides the JFC or subordinate commander with the ability to establish or augment telecommunications in regions of the world that lack suitable terrestrial infrastructure The broad range of unique SATCOM capabilities allows the JFC to shape the OE SATCOM uses include instant global connection to the Department of Defense information networks DODIN transmission of critical intelligence II-5 Chapter II the ability to tie sensors to shooters and establish survivable communications in austere locations with limited or no infrastructure The term SATCOM includes military commercial civil and allied SATCOM systems Allocation of SATCOM resources is governed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 6250 01 Satellite Communications For additional information see Appendix D Satellite Communications f Positioning Navigation and Timing Space-based PNT assets provide essential precise and reliable information that permits joint forces to more effectively plan train coordinate and execute operations Assured PNT information is a mission essential element in virtually every modern weapon system Precision timing provides the joint force the capability to synchronize operations and enables communications capabilities such as frequency hopping as well as network and cryptological synchronization to improve communications security COMSEC and effectiveness PNT also enables precision attack from stand-off distances thereby reducing collateral damage and allowing friendly forces to avoid threat areas g Navigation Warfare NAVWAR NAVWAR refers to deliberate defensive and offensive action to assure friendly use and prevent adversary use of PNT information through coordinated space cyberspace and electronic warfare EW capabilities 1 Comprehensive NAVWAR effects are generated through coordinated integrated and synchronized space cyberspace and EW operations NAVWAR is further enabled by supporting capabilities such as ISR and spectrum management 2 At the operational level a JFC may gain a desired advantage by integrating diverse capabilities to create NAVWAR effects Offensive and defensive NAVWAR operations must be integrated to ensure that friendly PNT information use is unimpeded when simultaneously attempting to deny adversary use of PNT information When formulating NAVWAR COAs JFCs should be cognizant of and balance intended NAVWAR effects and potential unintentional degradation to friendly forces' equipment and impacts to civil commercial and scientific users as stipulated by US national space-based PNT policy SECTION C SPACE SUPPORT 8 General The space support mission area includes the essential capabilities functions activities and tasks necessary to operate and sustain all elements of space forces throughout the range of military operations 9 Components of Space Support a Spacelift Spacelift is the ability to deliver satellites payloads and material into space Assured access to space includes spacelift operations and range operations 1 Spacelift operations are conducted to deploy sustain augment or reconstitute satellite constellations supporting US military operations and or national security objectives II-6 JP 3-14 Space Mission Areas The use of commercial launch vehicles may be advantageous in certain instances to augment DOD launch capability This aids the development of the US commercial space industry and supports the intent of the National Space Policy to leverage alternative space capabilities Space launches are planned well in advance often years and executed in accordance with the established space launch manifest planners should account for the long lead times involved with the manifest scheduling process 2 Range operations are a key enabler of spacelift operations and include the capability to provide assured responsive access to space safely and reliably Space ranges provide operations support launch traffic control and scheduling services for spacelift operations Launch ranges may also be responsible for planning and execution of spacecraft recovery operations b Satellite Operations Those operations conducted to maneuver configure operate and sustain on-orbit assets 1 Satellite operations are characterized as spacecraft and payload operations Spacecraft operations include telemetry tracking and commanding TT C maneuvering monitoring state-of-health and maintenance sub-functions TT C is the process of monitoring spacecraft systems transmitting the status of those systems to the control segment on the ground and receiving and processing instructions from the control segment Payload operations include monitoring and commanding of the satellite payload to collect data or provide capability in the OE Satellite operations are executed through a host of satellite operations centers linked to on-orbit assets via dedicated and shared networks Some systems utilize dedicated antennas for both mission data retrieval and routine satellite TT C Additionally as a critical and essential link between the satellite operator and joint force and a significant contributor to SSA satellite operations include protection mechanisms to assure access to space assets 2 DOD satellites are monitored sustained and operated by Service component satellite operation centers Globally dispersed antennas e g those of the Air Force Satellite Control Network AFSCN the Naval Satellite Control Network NASA networks National Reconnaissance Office NRO and GPS ground antennas provide the necessary links between the satellite operations centers and satellites to execute spacecraft and payload operations 3 Rendezvous and proximity operations RPO are specific processes where two resident space objects are intentionally brought operationally close together Servicing of space assets requires the capability to rendezvous conduct close proximity operations and or dock with the space asset On-orbit servicing capabilities enable inspection repair replacement and or upgrade of spacecraft subsystem components and replenishment of spacecraft consumables e g fuels fluids cryogens RPO may also be used to provide information on spacecraft events To minimize the risk of collision and the creation of orbital debris all RPO activities should ensure space flight safety RPO planners should coordinate with Joint Functional Component Command for Space JFCC SPACE to confirm space flight safety procedures are in place For more information on RPO activities planners should consult Department of Defense Instruction DODI 3100 12 Space Support II-7 Chapter II c Reconstitution of Space Forces Reconstitution refers to plans and operations for replenishing lost or diminished space capabilities This includes repositioning reconfiguring unaffected and surviving assets augmenting capabilities with civil and commercial capabilities and replacing lost assets SECTION D SPACE CONTROL 10 General Space control supports freedom of action in space for friendly forces and when necessary defeats adversary efforts that interfere with or attack US or allied space systems and negates adversary space capabilities It consists of OSC and DSC These operations change in nature and intensity as the type of military operations change 11 Components of Space Control a Offensive Space Control OSC are measures taken to prevent an adversary's hostile use of US third-party space capabilities or offensive operations to negate an adversary's space capabilities used to interfere with or attack US allied space systems OSC entails the negation of adversary space capabilities through deception disruption denial degradation or destruction actions Adversaries both state and non-state actors will exploit increased access to space-based capabilities to support their operations Therefore the importance of space capabilities in military operations makes it incumbent on the US to prevent or negate adversary efforts that interfere with or attack US allied space capabilities OSC actions target an adversary's space-related capabilities and forces using both lethal and nonlethal means OSC operations support US national security actions taken to negate attacks against US and friendly space assets 1 Prevention Prevention precludes an adversary's hostile use of US or thirdparty space systems services to support their operations Prevention can include diplomatic informational military and economic measures as appropriate Prevention measures support space negation measures by allowing the US to use other instruments of national power For example diplomatic means could be used to persuade a commercial SATCOM provider to terminate commercial SATCOM services being used by an adversary The US could also present evidence of an adversary's use of a third-party system and garner support for economic sanctions against the adversary Prevention measures strengthen safety stability and security in space as well as maintain and enhance security advantages afforded to the US by space systems 2 Space Negation Active defensive and offensive measures to deceive disrupt degrade deny or destroy an adversary's space capabilities Measures include actions against ground data link user and or space segment s to negate adversary's space systems or to thwart hostile interference with or attacks on US allied space systems a Deception Those measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation distortion or falsification of evidence to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests II-8 JP 3-14 Space Mission Areas b Disruption Those measures designed to temporarily impair specific targeted nodes of an adversary system usually without physical damage to the space system c Degradation Those measures designed to permanently impair either partially or totally the utility of targeted adversary systems usually with physical damage d Denial Those measures designed to temporarily eliminate the utility of targeted adversary systems usually without physical damage e Destruction Those measures designed to permanently eliminate the utility of targeted adversary systems b Defensive Space Control DSC are operations conducted to preserve the ability to exploit space capabilities via active and passive actions while protecting friendly space capabilities from attack interference or unintentional hazards DSC can be a prelude to OSC operations 1 DSC includes operations that protect US or third-party space capabilities from adversaries' attack For instance by showing that an adversary is using a US or third-party system in a hostile manner international pressure may be brought to bear against the adversary thereby potentially forcing the adversary to cease its hostile actions DSC actions protect friendly space capabilities from attack interference or unintentional hazards Although focused on responding to man-made threats that can affect either terrestrial or space-based systems such as GPS and SATCOM jammers DSC actions may also safeguard assets from unintentional hazards such as space debris RF interference and other naturally occurring phenomena such as radiation and weather 2 DSC preserves US access to and use of space by employing all means available to react to events affecting US and allied space capabilities DSC is built on several elements including capabilities to detect and characterize an attack ability to attribute an attack to an adversary ability to defeat the attack and the ability to operate through or deter an attack A robust DSC capability influences adversaries' perceptions of US space capabilities and makes them less confident of success in interfering with those capabilities 3 DSC contributes to space deterrence by employing a variety of measures that help assure the use of space and consistent with the inherent right of self-defense deter others from interference and attack defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems and if deterrence fails defeat efforts to attack them SECTION E SPACE FORCE APPLICATION 12 Space Force Application Space force application is combat operations in through and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict by holding terrestrial targets at risk The space force application mission area includes ballistic missile defense and force projection capabilities such as intercontinental ballistic missiles This mission area is incorporated into national II-9 Chapter II space policy as well Specific responsibilities can be found in DODI S-3100 13 Space Force Application II-10 JP 3-14 CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES Fully integrated space capabilities will provide depth persistence and reach capabilities for commanders at the strategic operational and tactical levels Assured space systems and well-trained and experienced space professionals significantly reduce the fog friction and uncertainty of warfare Lieutenant General Richard P Formica Commander United States Army Space and Missile Command Army Forces Strategic Command 11 May 2011 1 General Specific command relationships are designated and discussed by the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance and defined and described in Joint Publication JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Applied to space forces they establish and maintain unity of command effort and purpose in achieving joint force and national security objectives CDRUSSTRATCOM advocates plans and executes military space operations and has the responsibility to prioritize deconflict integrate and synchronize military space operations for current and planned joint operations 2 Command Relationships a Joint space forces and capabilities are integral parts of military operations worldwide requiring multiple command relationships between CDRUSSTRATCOM and the CCDRs Therefore clearly defined command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective execution of space operations for the supported CCDRs CDRUSSTRATCOM has the Unified Command Plan UCP -assigned role to conduct space operations CDRUSSTRATCOM has designated the Commander JFCC SPACE to manage daily space operations CDRUSSTRATCOM will determine command authorities and delegate OPCON or TACON as appropriate b Normally space forces supporting multiple GCCs remain assigned or attached to USSTRATCOM However there may be a need during operations for command of these resources to be transferred to a GCC GCCs have the following responsibilities 1 Provide their prioritized space requirements to CDRUSSTRATCOM 2 Establish specific joint force guidance and objectives for space operations This guidance is integrated into appropriate OPLANs and their annexes 3 Specify OSC and DSC objectives to be met and provide guidance for the employment of C2 systems communications systems intelligence logistics and attack operations This guidance should be reflected in appropriate OPLANs and their annexes III-1 Chapter III The component commanders jointly conduct operations under the guidance and in support of the objectives of the GCCs 4 Consolidate validate when necessary and prioritize space operations requirements within their AORs from subordinate JFCs and component commanders for operations within their operational areas 5 May designate a space coordinating authority SCA and delegate appropriate authorities for planning integrating and coordinating space operations within the operational area 3 Space Coordinating Authority a A supported JFC when delegated SCA from the GCC integrates space capabilities and coordinates joint space operations in the operational area Based on the complexity and scope of operations the JFC can either remain SCA or designate a component commander or other individual as the SCA In selecting the appropriate option the JFC considers the mission nature and duration of the operation preponderance of space force capabilities made available and resident C2 capabilities including reachback The SCA has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force b The SCA gathers operational requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations Following coordination a prioritized list of recommended space requirements based on joint force objectives is provided to the JFC Upon JFC approval the list is submitted to the GCC for coordination with CDRUSSTRATCOM To facilitate prompt and timely support CDRUSSTRATCOM may approve direct liaison as appropriate This does not restrict CCMD Service component commands from communicating requirements directly to their counterpart USSTRATCOM Service component commander However SCAs keep their respective commanders apprised of all such coordination activities to ensure that space activities are coordinated deconflicted integrated and synchronized SCAs at subordinate commands if designated will accomplish the same requirements for submission to the CCMD SCA as directed Summarizing the SCA's roles and responsibilities include 1 Integrating space capabilities 2 Planning coordinating and synchronizing space operations in the operational area and ensuring inputs from the joint force staff and components are incorporated 3 Maintaining situational awareness of theater space operations and coordinating with the CCMD SCA or Commander JFCC SPACE to integrate theater space operations into DOD space operations 4 Providing consolidated space requirements through the JFC for coordination as required III-2 JP 3-14 Command and Control of Space Forces JOINT SPACE ELEMENT Recent joint operation experience has shown that the designated space coordinating authority SCA should consider establishing a joint space element to aid the SCA in the execution of day-to-day responsibilities All Service components need to provide some level of support to the designated SCA to create synergy in space planning The joint space element provides the Services and operational units in the operational area with a vehicle for planning space operations For example in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the Commander US Central Command USCENTCOM designated the joint forces air component commander as the SCA The Army and Air Force provided support to the USCENTCOM SCA creating a level of synergy in space planning However since there was no Navy representation on the SCA staff the SCA provided direct space support to the lead carrier strike group CSG in theater The CSG commander required direct liaison authorized in order to interact with the SCA at the operational level for support to all tactical level maritime units Various Sources 4 Theater Space Network a Each GCC has space operators resident on staffs at multiple echelons who serve as theater advisors for national and foreign space capabilities military civil and commercial These individuals concentrate primarily on working the detailed activities of theater space operations in support of the SCA in developing collecting and prioritizing space requirements If a GCC delegates SCA to a component commander the GCC should maintain a space point of contact POC on the CCMD staff to coordinate space matters and maintain a link with the SCA Several DOD and national agencies deploy theater support teams that can provide additional space services and capabilities b Services assign space operators to various joint and Service echelons JFCs may assign space experts to the joint force component commanders' staffs JFCs and their components request space services and capabilities early in the planning process to ensure effective and efficient use of space assets Each Service uses different means to provide space expertise to satisfy the CCMD Service component's space support requirements c The Army integrates space capabilities at the army corps division special forces groups and fires brigade levels using space support elements SSEs SSE organic space experts are resident on the headquarters HQ staff as an integral part of the staff and are directly involved in the staff planning process from the beginning The element is responsible for identifying opportunities to employ space force enhancement or space control and then coordinating the required support When deployed the SSE establishes and maintains contact with the SCA It also coordinates with the SCA on procedures for space support requests and reachback support The SSE participates in the conduct of mission analysis to determine which space-based capabilities are applicable to the particular operation and then coordinates and makes recommendations for the allocation and use of III-3 Chapter III space services and capabilities The mission analysis performed by the SSE forms the basis of the staff's space running estimate as well as annex N Space Operations for all orders and plans d The Air Force integrates space capabilities through the director of space forces DIRSPACEFOR The DIRSPACEFOR is a senior Air Force officer with broad space expertise and theater familiarity Air Force Space Command AFSPC ensures DIRSPACEFORs are qualified to perform their responsibilities and the commander Air Force forces COMAFFOR provides theater-specific information and orientation upon the DIRSPACEFOR's arrival The DIRSPACEFOR facilitates coordinating planning executing and assessing of Air Force space operations for the COMAFFOR to include providing support for joint space operations to the SCA The COMAFFOR can also direct the DIRSPACEFOR to support the SCA by providing advice on Air Force space forces When the COMAFFOR serves as the joint force air component commander and is designated the SCA the DIRSPACEFOR typically accomplishes the day-to-day duties assigned to the SCA e At the operational level of war Navy component commanders and numbered fleet commanders operate through their maritime operations centers MOCs MOCs support all assigned operational missions C2 of assigned forces and employment recommendations to the respective JFC Within the MOC the space support working group SSWG provides support to all warfare areas planning teams and decision forums where space systems and services impact operations The SSWG coordinates with the SCA as required and ensures space-based capabilities and vulnerabilities are included in the deliberate planning process and that space requirements are integrated into each phase of the commander's operational plans The SSWG also provides reachback support for assigned forces The SSWG is tailored to meet individual MOC mission requirements and will most likely include reachback support from Commander Tenth Fleet COMTENTHFLT f The Marine Corps conducts decentralized combined arms operations and embraces the essential enabling capabilities of space-based systems on intelligence cyberspace operations CO EW and information operations IO Currently the Marine Corps does not operate any satellite systems but functions as an equitable partner and active contributor to the National Security Space and joint space communities g United States Cyber Command USCYBERCOM integrates cyberspace capabilities through the CCMDs' joint cyberspace centers This includes integrating SATCOM with terrestrial communications for seamless management of cyberspace capabilities to support the joint force requirements 5 Role of Non-Department of Defense Capabilities a CCDRs have requirements that cannot always be provided by DOD space capabilities alone Accordingly DOD's reliance on non-DOD space systems continues to grow DOD space capabilities can be supplemented through national and foreign military civil and commercial capabilities III-4 JP 3-14 Command and Control of Space Forces b Non-DOD capabilities can be leveraged to mitigate consequences of lost or degraded DOD space capability This has a multi-layered effect by contributing to deterrence against further aggression or interference and by improving resilience of a particular capability thereby improving mission assurance and the joint forces ability to operate in a degraded environment Options include leveraging allied foreign and or commercial space and nonspace capabilities as well as use of hosted payloads on a mix of USG commercial and allied platforms in different orbits and employment of responsive space capabilities c USSTRATCOM or other organizations will coordinate the appropriate assets to fulfill the required capabilities sought by the CCDR d NASA has launch facilities and environmental Earth science products applicable to joint operations The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA under the Department of Commerce DOC provides METOC information through the polar operational environment satellite POES system geostationary OE satellites DOD's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program DMSP foreign systems and other environmental monitoring systems as well as locating distress alerts via the search and rescue satellite-aided tracking SARSAT system Additionally commercial satellite programs such as Automatic Identification System and Long Range Identification and Tracking contribute to homeland security through global tracking of shipping traffic The capabilities that many non-DOD agencies provide to joint forces are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV Roles and Responsibilities III-5 Chapter IH Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 CHAPTER IV ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Operating within the increasingly congested contested and competitive space environment requires strategically reexamining our processes planning flexibility awareness of the space environment and collaboration efforts with all spacefaring nations and corporations Lieutenant General Susan J Helms Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Space United States Strategic Command 11 May 2011 SECTION A THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND COMBATANT COMMANDERS 1 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS will a Establish a uniform system for evaluating readiness of each CCMD and combat support agency CSA to employ space forces to carry out assigned missions b Develop joint doctrine for the operation and employment of space capabilities of the Armed Forces and formulate policies for joint space training and military education of the Armed Forces c Integrate space forces and their supporting industrial base into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and formulate policies for the integration of National Guard and Reserve forces into space activities d Provide guidance to CCDRs for the employment of space capabilities and planning of joint space operations 2 Geographic Combatant Commanders GCCs also play a key role in space operations Accordingly they will a Consider space capabilities when selecting alternatives to satisfy mission needs as well as develop and articulate military requirements for space and space-related capabilities b Provide prioritized theater space requirements to CDRUSSTRATCOM c Integrate space services and capabilities into OPLANs concept plans CONPLANs campaign plans theater guidance and objectives and plan for the employment of space capabilities within their AOR IV-1 Chapter IV d Use staff elements and component commands to plan monitor advise coordinate and execute space operations within their AOR If SCA is delegated to a component commander the GCC should have sufficient space expertise on the CCMD staff to coordinate with the SCA and maintain situational awareness of space operations If space operations support and coordination with the GCC's SCA is anticipated GCCs should ensure that subordinate JFCs who are delegated SCA also have space POCs on their staffs e Provide input to the Joint Staff for evaluations of the preparedness of their CCMD to carry out assigned missions by employing space capabilities f Plan for and provide force protection for space infrastructure and forces assigned deployed and operating in their AOR SECTION B UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS 3 General a With regard to the UCP-assigned space operations mission the CDRUSSTRATCOM will 1 Plan and conduct space force enhancement space support DSC SSA and as directed offensive cyberspace operations and space force application 2 Advocate for space capabilities 3 Provide military representation to USG departments and agencies US commercial entities and international agencies for matters related to military space operations as directed 4 Serve as the DOD manager for human spaceflight operations 5 Provide warning and assessment of attack on space assets 6 Serve as the single POC for military space operational matters except as otherwise noted 7 Plan execute and assess security cooperation activities that support space operations in coordination with the GCCs 8 Conduct SSA operations for the USG US commercial space capabilities and services used for national and homeland security purposes civil space capabilities and operations particularly human space flight activities and as appropriate commercial and foreign space entities b CDRUSSTRATCOM also has specific responsibilities related to strategic deterrence CO EW global strike global missile defense ISR countering WMD and analysis and targeting Accordingly CDRUSSTRATCOM IV-2 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities 1 Synchronizes plans for global missile defense coordinates global missile defense operations support and advocates for missile defense and missile warning capabilities For more information on missile warning and defense see Appendix B Missile Warning and JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats 2 Plans integrates and coordinates the security operation and defense of the DODIN a responsibility that has been delegated to Commander USCYBERCOM Within the DODIN space-based capabilities and services play a key role 3 In coordination with the CJCS plans directs coordinates and controls assigned space assets and forces for daily operations and crisis action planning in the event of military action against the US and or its allies In addition USSTRATCOM provides warning to US national leaders of attacks against US space assets worldwide USSTRATCOM executes these warning responsibilities through JFCC SPACE and its Joint Space Operations Center JSPOC 4 Performs the functions roles and responsibilities of the strategic missile warning functional manager office FMO and the theater missile warning FMO that are collectively responsible for the management and oversight of the missile warning mission 5 Exercises COCOM over assigned space forces and assets 6 Ensures the availability of space capabilities to the joint warfighter 7 Implements apportionment and allocation prioritization guidance 8 Provides conflict resolution in support of joint space operations 9 Serves as the SATCOM Operational Manager for DOD CDRUSSTRATCOM has operational authority for SATCOM on-orbit assets control systems and SATCOM terminal infrastructure Directs day-to-day operation of DOD-owned SATCOM resources to provide authorized users with global SATCOM support as operations and evolving requirements dictate 4 Joint Functional Component Command for Space a Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Space Commander JFCC SPACE coordinates plans integrates synchronizes executes and assesses space operations as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM CDRUSSTRATCOM has delegated coordinating authority to Commander JFCC SPACE for planning of space operations in operational-level support of USSTRATCOM's UCP missions The purpose of JFCC SPACE is to provide unity of command and unity of effort in the unimpeded delivery of joint space capabilities to supported commanders and when directed to deny the benefits of space to adversaries JFCC SPACE responsibilities are reflected in the pertinent USSTRATCOM directives and or orders Commander JFCC SPACE exercises C2 of assigned space forces and ensures SSA through the JSPOC IV-3 Chapter IV b Joint Space Operations Center JSPOC provides Commander JFCC SPACE with agile and responsive C2 capabilities to conduct space operations on a 24 7 basis The JSPOC is built around an Air Force air and space operations center adapted specifically for space missions and global operations and provides reachback to CCDRs' SCAs The JSPOC 1 Provides operational-level space C2 support to Commander JFCC SPACE 2 Provides SSA and maintains the single integrated space picture that is shared with CCDRs and appropriate SSA users 3 Plans directs controls integrates and assesses space operations on behalf of CDRUSSTRATCOM and Commander JFCC SPACE 4 Supports the intertheater responsibilities of Commander JFCC SPACE and coordinates with theater SCAs 5 Develops COAs plans and executes military space operations 6 Conducts day-to-day operations When a space-related incident or contingency requires enhanced space support the JSPOC assesses the situation and notifies the appropriate operations centers within USSTRATCOM and the National Military Command Center as necessary 5 Other United States Strategic Command Functional Components a United States Cyber Command A subunified command USCYBERCOM plans coordinates integrates synchronizes and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DODIN and is prepared to conduct military CO in order to enable actions throughout the OE USCYBERCOM exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned and attached forces to secure operate and defend designated DODIN and conduct offensive CO when directed Forces are employed for planning and executing global CO in accordance with assigned missions and orders Commander USCYBERCOM as the supported commander for SATCOM 1 Directs the operation and defense of DODIN in support of DOD's full range of missions 2 Plans coordinates and oversees or directs SATCOM network plans 3 Performs functions and activities of the SATCOM operational manager including oversight management and control of SATCOM resources 4 Coordinates with the Defense Information Systems Agency DISA to augment military satellite communications MILSATCOM with commercial SATCOM 5 Serves as a liaison among USSTRATCOM DISA and other users for SATCOM-related issues IV-4 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities 6 Provides SATCOM status and resolution of outages or other problems from its Joint Operations Center using the Global Satellite Communications Support Center satellite C2 centers CCMD joint cyberspace centers and other supporting elements such as the regional satellite communications support centers RSSCs For more information on CO see JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations and JP 6-0 Joint Communications b Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance JFCC ISR Plans coordinates and integrates DOD ISR in support of strategic and global operations as directed Develops allocation recommendations for ISR assets and associated processing exploitation and dissemination PED capabilities and high altitude deconfliction business rules in support of global force management of PED capabilities JFCC ISR is also responsible for synchronizing global ISR with DOD collection requirements 1 The JFCC ISR AOI extends worldwide from underwater to space and overlays but does not affect AORs assigned to GCCs 2 JFCC ISR coordinates with multiple agencies which operate or use space capabilities including the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA National GeospatialIntelligence Agency NGA National Security Agency Central Security Service NSA CSS NRO the Services and other mission partners Specific roles and responsibilities of JFCC ISR in relation to space operations are to a Develop and maintain a global COP of ISR which is shared in real time with JFCC SPACE USSTRATCOM and other CCMDs and JFCs via DODIN b Identify define and assess gaps shortfalls priorities and redundancies of ISR capabilities c In support of CDRUSSTRATCOM's responsibilities as the ISR Joint Functional Manager recommend allocation of airborne space-based and surface-based ISR resources to fulfill global and theater ISR requirements JFCC ISR does this in coordination with JFCC SPACE and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense JFCC IMD and appropriate CSAs on multi-mission sensors and requirements supporting space surveillance missile defense and warning and ISR operations d Coordinate with DIA as the Defense Collection Manager and JFCC SPACE in support of ISR-capable operationally responsive space ORS activities Recommend allocation of ISR ORS capabilities c Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense The JFCC IMD is responsible for operational planning in support of GCCs to include asset management of missile defense forces CDRUSSTRATCOM is the joint functional manager for missile defense and serves as the global synchronizer for missile defense planning JFCC IMD coordinates with Services CCDRs and DOD agencies to identify and recommend through the joint force provider global DOD missile defense sourcing solutions IV-5 Chapter IV For more information on missile defense see JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats d Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike JFCC GS JFCC GS provides planning and force management in order to deter attacks against the US its territories and bases and when directed defeat adversaries through decisive joint global strike SECTION C UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND SERVICE COMPONENT SPACE OPERATIONS 6 General CDRUSSTRATCOM exercises C2 of assigned and attached space forces through JFCC SPACE in coordination with Service component commands and their operations centers including United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command US Army Forces Strategic Command USASMDC ARSTRAT AFSPC 14th Air Force AF Air Forces Strategic AFSTRAT US Marine Corps USMC Forces USSTRATCOM MARFORSTRAT and US Fleet Forces Command These Service components have distinct space missions Common Service component responsibilities are to advocate for space requirements within their respective Services provide a single POC for access to Service resources and capabilities make recommendations to CDRUSSTRATCOM on appropriate employment of Service forces provide assigned space forces to CDRUSSTRATCOM and CCDRs as directed assist in planning support to space operations and assigned tasking and support CDRUSSTRATCOM and other CCDRs with space mission area expertise and advocacy of desired capabilities as requested 7 Army Component a USASMDC ARSTRAT conducts space and missile defense operations and provides planning integration control and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM missions strategic deterrence global missile defense and space operations serves as the Army force modernization proponent for space high altitude and ground-based midcourse missile defense serves as the Army operational integrator for ground-based midcourse defense and conducts mission-related research and development in support of Army Title 10 United States Code USC responsibilities b USASMDC ARSTRAT contains two brigades One provides space support space force enhancement and space control operations the other provides space force application operations 1 USASMDC ARSTRAT provides advanced geospatial intelligence GEOINT FFT ballistic missile warning from deployed joint tactical ground stations space expertise with Army space support teams commercial satellite imagery products through commercial imagery teams SATCOM planning by four RSSCs and communication transmissions and satellite payload control of the wideband satellite constellation that includes Defense Satellite Communications System and Wideband Global Satellite Communications WGS and support to SSA IV-6 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities 2 In its role of missile defense USASMDC ARSTRAT provides global missile defense forces to dissuade deter and defeat ballistic missile attacks 3 In its role for SATCOM USASMDC ARSTRAT is designated by CDRUSSTRATCOM as the wideband consolidated satellite communications system expert C-SSE military ultrahigh frequency UHF C-SSE for communication transmissions and for satellite operations management payload control of wideband SATCOM and the military UHF SATCOM constellations USASMDC ARSTRAT is also the specific SSE for the WGS the Global Broadcast Service GBS and the Mobile Users Object System MUOS 8 Marine Corps Component a MARFORSTRAT as the USMC Service component to USSTRATCOM represents USMC capabilities and space interests Marine Corps requirements for space exploitation and space force enhancement are supported through MARFORSTRAT MARFORSTRAT brings resident knowledge and access to Marine Corps capabilities that can support USSTRATCOM mission areas and advises CDRUSSTRATCOM on proper employment and support of USMC forces During planning and execution MARFORSTRAT informs the CDRUSSTRATCOM of changes in space capabilities that would significantly affect operational capabilities or mission sustainment MARFORSTRAT assists in developing joint OPLANs and provides necessary force data to support all assigned missions to include deliberate or crisis action planning b MARFORSTRAT directly supports subordinate functional components and Service component commanders on the proper employment of USMC forces and capabilities assists in developing operational and exercise plans and provides necessary force data to support all assigned missions including the space mission through the Marine Corps space cadre MARFORSTRAT provides support to facilitate planning operations and exercises for space through established policy and joint employment of assets to Marine Corps forces 9 Navy Component a Commander US Fleet Cyber Command COMFLTCYBERCOM COMTENTHFLT is the Navy's central operational authority for space in support of maritime forces afloat and ashore COMFLTCYBERCOM COMTENTHFLT is responsible for directing operations of assigned space systems as an integral element of network operations and associated space control activities and providing space expertise support products and services as required US Tenth Fleet is the SSE for fleet satellite FLTSAT and ultrahigh frequency follow-on UFO b COMFLTCYBERCOM COMTENTHFLT currently executes many of these duties through personnel assigned to Naval Network Warfare Command Space Operations directorate COMFLTCYBERCOM COMTENTHFLT provides planners and space reachback for maritime forces and coordinates with other Service space operations entities including space operations officers on strike group staffs on joint force maritime component commander staffs or maritime HQ c Navy component responsibilities are to IV-7 Chapter IV 1 Develop space effects packages naval space plans for maritime forces and provide space products in support of combat plans to satisfy strike group and forward deployed and theater maritime forces' requirements derived in the planning process 2 Provide SSA for maritime forces 3 Synchronize with the fleet staffs to provide operational assessment of maritime operations to facilitate translation of the maritime operator's space needs into actionable items and ensure delivery of critical space capabilities 4 Provide satellite vulnerability data products to maritime and other special customers d The Naval Satellite Operations Center assigned under COMFLTCYBERCOM is responsible for operating managing and maintaining assigned narrow band satellite systems to provide reliable space-based services in direct support of Navy and joint forces These systems include FLTSAT UFO MUOS and varied payloads Interim Polar and GBS 10 Air Force Component a AFSPC serves as the Air Force Service component to USSTRATCOM for space and cyberspace Its mission is to organize train and equip Air Force forces providing space control force enhancement space support and CO to the JFC AFSPC accomplishes its mission through 14 AF which oversees space launch and on-orbit checkout These numbered Air Forces provide operational forces for space and cyberspace Commander AFSPC provides strategic planning and develops CONOPS to support strategic-level operations AFSPC is the specific SSE for advanced extremely high frequency AEHF and Milstar b In support of space operations Commander AFSPC presents 14 AF a component numbered air force C-NAF designated as AFSTRAT to USSTRATCOM The C-NAF commander then assumes tactical-level responsibilities of the Service component commander as delegated by the AFSPC commander to include operating space capabilities and presentation generation readiness and sustainment of Air Force space forces assigned to CDRUSSTRATCOM This C-NAF commander performs Service operational needs identification and prioritization and supports Service-component aspects of deliberate and crisis action planning and integration for global and theater objectives c The AFSPC commander is responsible for services facilities and range control for the conduct of DOD NASA and commercial launches from DOD ranges Through control of DOD satellites AFSPC provides continuous global coverage operations for essential intheater secure communications environmental monitoring and navigational data for joint operations and threat warning AFSPC also operates ground-based radars to monitor ballistic missile launches around the world and guard against surprise attack AFSPC assures access to space by providing launch and range operations for a variety of launch vehicles d AFSPC operates the AFSCN which supports national security defense and intelligence satellites during launch and early orbit periods and is used to analyze anomalies IV-8 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities affecting orbiting satellites For particular constellations the AFSCN provides routine control functions and operates a few satellite constellations with a dedicated control network SECTION D SPACE-RELATED SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE 11 Combat Support Agencies The joint force uses DOD space capabilities supplemented by national and foreign civil and commercial partners The CCDR's staff element is responsible for a specific function which works through its channels to the correct CSA e g DISA NGA NSA CSS Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA or DIA to obtain the needed support or products Information from other DOD agencies or USG organizations e g NRO NOAA is available through established procedures The SCA can work with or through USSTRATCOM to establish additional support a Defense Information Systems Agency Provides services and support for a wide range of missions including communications C2 information assurance IA and DODIN services and plays a key role in ensuring that US capability to operate in space is maintained The Director DISA 1 Acquires commercial communications services including commercial satellite network assets for DOD 2 Defines system performance criteria for MILSATCOM systems identifying areas of deficiency and recommending corrective actions as appropriate 3 Assists USSTRATCOM with IA for SATCOM services 4 Provides MILSATCOM technical support to include representation to international and North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO forums 5 Provides teleport or gateway sites to support capacity in space For additional information see Department of Defense Directive DODD 5105 19 Defense Information Systems Agency DISA b National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Supports US national security objectives by providing timely relevant and accurate GEOINT to the DOD the intelligence community IC and other USG departments and agencies conducting other intelligencerelated activities essential for US national security providing GEOINT for safety of navigation information preparing and distributing maps charts books and geodetic products designing developing operating and maintaining systems related to the processing and dissemination of GEOINT and providing GEOINT in support of the combat objectives of the Armed Forces of the United States NGA is a DOD agency and is designated a DOD CSA NGA is also an element of the IC 1 NGA serves as the DOD lead for all acquisition or exchange of commercial and foreign government-owned imagery-related remote sensing data for DOD NGA also serve IV-9 Chapter IV as the DOD lead for terrain environment modeling and simulation coordinating with DOD modeling and simulation activities related to the geospatial aspects of natural and man-made features across the environmental domains of Earth the atmosphere and near-Earth space As the DOD lead for GEOINT standards NGA prescribes mandates and enforces standards and architectures related to GEOINT and GEOINT tasking collection processing exploitation and international geospatial information for the DOD components and for the non-DOD elements of the IC 2 NGA is also the functional manager for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence NSG NSG integrates technology policies and capabilities to conduct GEOINT in a multi-intelligence environment NGA provides GEOINT to support senior national decision makers and helps plan and prosecute military objectives NGA's strategy supports operational readiness through a set of geospatial foundation data This may include controlled imagery digital elevation data and selected feature information which can be rapidly augmented and fused with other spatially referenced information such as intelligence weather and logistics data The result is an integrated digital view of the mission area For additional information on GEOINT see JP 2-03 Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations c National Security Agency Central Security Service The NSA is the USG lead for cryptology and its mission encompasses both signals intelligence SIGINT and IA activities The CSS conducts SIGINT collection processing analysis production and dissemination and other cryptologic operations NSA CSS provides SIGINT and IA guidance and assistance to the DOD components as well as national customers The Director National Security Agency Chief Central Security Service DIRNSA CHCSS serves as the principal SIGINT and IA advisor to SecDef the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence the DOD Chief Information Officer the CJCS the CCDRs the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Director of National Intelligence DNI as well as other USG officials NSA CSS is designated a CSA of the DOD and is also an element of the IC NSA CSS's SIGINT mission helps protect the nation by providing information in the form of SIGINT products and services that enable national-level decision makers to make informed decisions and operate successfully DIRNSA also provides IA advice and assistance regarding national security information and information systems to the USG departments and agencies and serves as the National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security The joint force contacts the Overhead Collection Management Center for support d Defense Intelligence Agency Provides intelligence support to all CCMDs for a variety of missions including but not limited to all-source military analysis measurement and signature intelligence MASINT human intelligence counterintelligence cyberspace IO personnel recovery peacekeeping and coalition support indications and warning targeting BDA collection management and intelligence support to operations planning 1 DIA's core space-related functions include IV-10 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities a Coordinating DOD and national technical collection policy with agencies having policy responsibilities for those systems b Facilitating and overseeing the PED of tailored and timely MASINT in order to help the joint force and national customers c Acting as the senior defense intelligence collection representatives and primary CCMD advocate for MASINT and technical collection capabilities d Characterizing the environment threats and challenges and defining technical and operational capabilities in support of DOD and IC planning e Conducting evaluations and assessments on space-based collection capabilities supporting the DOD Intelligence Information System Enterprise 2 Missile and Space Intelligence Center MSIC MSIC is an element of DIA that produces finished all-source scientific and technical intelligence in support of the CCMDs force planners and policymakers It develops and disseminates scientific and technical intelligence on foreign threat systems including guided missile systems directed energy weapons selected space programs or systems and related command control and communications in support of operationally deployed forces and the materiel acquisition process MSIC also develops and distributes digital simulations of threat weapon systems and provides threat simulation support to force developers and operational forces 3 Defense Special Missile and Aerospace Center DEFSMAC DEFSMAC is a collaborative DIA and NSA activity that provides tasking technical support analysis and reporting for various DIA and NSA intelligence activities For additional information see JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations and DODD 5105 21 Defense Intelligence Agency e Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA is the DOD CSA responsible for countering WMD and addressing the entire spectrum of CBRN and high yield explosive threats DTRA's programs serve to safeguard the US and our allies from the threat of WMD and include basic science research and development and operational support to US warfighters on the front line The Director of DTRA is dual-hatted as the Director of the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction which synchronizes countering WMD efforts across the CCMDs and leverages the people programs and interagency relationships of DTRA at the strategic level This synchronization partnership is especially vital in developing and enhancing space capabilities for arms control and verification CBRN defense and forensics and WMD consequence management For additional information see DODD 5105 62 Defense Threat Reduction Agency 12 Other Agencies and Organizations a National Reconnaissance Office A joint organization engaged in the research and development acquisition launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems IV-11 Chapter IV necessary to meet the needs of the IC and of DOD NRO conducts other activities as directed by SecDef or the DNI 1 The Director NRO responsibilities include support to intelligence and warning monitoring arms control agreements and crisis support to the planning and conduct of military operations The NRO liaison officers and theater support representatives located with each of the CCMDs serve as direct links to NRO for the CCDRs and their staffs 2 Taskings for NRO systems are accomplished through other agencies GEOINT requirements are tasked through NGA SIGINT requirements through NSA and MASINT requirements through DIA The basic reference for obtaining support is the Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems Manual For additional information see JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations b National Air and Space Intelligence Center NASIC NASIC is an Air Force organization that assesses foreign air and space threats NASIC can provide deployed forces with unique aerospace intelligence capabilities for DOD operational commands research and development centers weapon acquisition agencies and national planners and policymakers In collaboration with other IC elements NASIC's Counter Space Operations Cell provides foreign counterspace threat intelligence supporting military operations and serves as the primary NASIC focal point for operational defensive counterspace support As such NASIC is seen as the all source intelligence integrator for intelligence relating to suspected PI and electronic attack affecting DOD and USG space systems c National Ground Intelligence Center NGIC The Director NGIC is responsible for ground-based counterspace-related mobile EW systems technical characteristics performance signatures capabilities limitations and vulnerabilities of current and projected ground-mobile satellite jammers and EW systems impacting space capabilities d National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration A component of DOC NOAA provides many products with commercial civil and defense applications 1 NOAA has many programs and products with military applications including a Operational Significant Event Imagery OSEI --broadcast print and Webquality imagery created by the OSEI team of particularly significant or newsworthy environmental events which are visible in available satellite data These events include dust storms fires floods icebergs ocean events severe weather hurricanes and other events each of which can impact military operations b National Geophysical Data Center--receives and archives Earth observations from space to include data from DMSP The DMSP constellation assigned to USSTRATCOM is comprised of several near polar-orbiting satellites monitoring the METOC and solar-terrestrial environments IV-12 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities 2 NOAA operates the Space Weather Prediction Center SWPC as part of the National Weather Service SWPC supports the USG and civilian space weather customer base In addition SWPC partners with the Air Force Weather Agency AFWA space weather production center to provide support to DOD The two organizations work together to provide real-time monitoring and forecasting of solar and near-Earth space weather events that impact military operations AFWA leverages SWPC's research and technique development capabilities to improve space weather support to military operations 3 NOAA's operational environmental satellite system is composed of geostationary and polar orbiting satellites Both kinds of satellites are necessary for providing a complete global weather monitoring system The satellites also carry additional instruments which are used to support aviation safety and maritime shipping safety which can impact military operations 4 NOAA also operates SARSAT which is a global search and rescue SAR system that detects and locates distress signals from emergency beacons carried by mariners aviators and land-based users and then relays this information to SAR authorities around the world SARSAT's global-reach is designed to primarily support civilian users however the system also supports military units particularly in permissive OEs DOD use of the SARSAT system is promulgated by DODI 3003 01 DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue SAR e Missile Defense Agency MDA The MDA's mission is to develop test and field an integrated layered ballistic missile defense system BMDS to defend the US its deployed forces allies and friends against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of flight 1 Missile defense technology being developed tested and deployed by the US is designed to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges--short medium intermediate and long Since ballistic missiles have different ranges speeds size and performance characteristics BMDS is an integrated layered architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets The system's architecture includes networked sensors and ground- and sea-based radars for target detection and tracking ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the force of a direct collision called hit-to-kill technology or an explosive blast fragmentation warhead and a command control battle management and communications network providing the warfighter with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor missiles 2 Missile defense elements are operated by US military personnel from USSTRATCOM United States Pacific Command United States Northern Command United States Central Command United States European Command and others The US has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies including the United Kingdom Japan Australia Israel Denmark Germany Netherlands Czech Republic Poland Italy and many others The MDA also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability IV-13 Chapter IV f Air Force Weather Agency A field operating agency and the lead weather center of the United States Air Force AFWA enhances the combat capability of the US by delivering timely accurate and reliable environmental situational awareness worldwide to the Air Force Army joint warfighters CCMDs the IC and SecDef AFWA Space Weather Operations Center provides real-time monitoring and forecasting of solar and near-Earth space weather events that impact military operations to the DOD AFWA is the POC for all DOD and IC space weather information NOAA's SWPC supports AFWA by providing research and technique development capabilities to improve space weather science for military operations Additionally AFWA is a leader in military meteorology It fields high quality weather equipment and training to Air Force operational weather squadrons and weather flights at locations around the world AFWA builds a comprehensive weather database of forecast climatological and space weather products These products and services are exploited by military commanders and decision makers for many types of military operations 13 Commercial Space Operations a The commercialization of space supports a growing demand for technologies services and products which are commonplace in households businesses agencies and governments on a global scale Users of space-based products enjoy a wide range of products and services including global positioning data satellite radio direct-to-home television and even imagery-based products Businesses and governments at all levels benefit from commercial space operations Agriculture fisheries and geophysical services are among industries that benefit Emerging services such as space-based transportation and space-based tourism are no longer out of reach Due to the demand for space-based products and services the USG has established policy to foster the use of US commercial space capabilities around the globe These capabilities include 1 Commercial Satellite Communications Commercial SATCOM are a critical part of US military operations and planning should include protection of these services DISA is the only authorized provider of commercial SATCOM for DOD See JP 6-0 Joint Communications System and CJCSI 6250 01 Satellite Communications for more information 2 Environmental Monitoring Commercial satellites provide remote sensing information Meteorological satellites and various weather agencies provide additional and redundant capability to US systems Additionally many scientific and experimental satellites contribute information on the space environment and terrestrial monitoring See Appendix C Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability for more information 3 Positioning Navigation and Timing US space-based PNT capabilities are by Title 10 USC Section 2281 and national policy dual military-civilian use GPS is available to commercial and civilian users and has become the PNT system of choice for US and international applications such as commercial shipping safety of life timing of commerce activities and commercial aviation The US is committed to improving current GPS capabilities to enhance today's PNT capabilities for both military and civil user IV-14 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities communities See Appendix E Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing for more information 4 Commercial Satellite Imagery Space-based imagery provided by commercial entities has become an important capability for civil and military operations Commercial satellites provide electro-optical infrared and synthetic aperture radar imaging Companies can provide imagery cartography basic analysis vessel tracking data and much more The joint force obtains these products through NGA just like they would for products from US capabilities In general the benefits of these products are that they are readily obtainable they may free up national systems for higher priority tasks they can have high resolution and they are relatively inexpensive Because these products are unclassified US forces often share them with multinational and HN members 5 Human Space Flight Space-based transportation and tourism will be critical to future competition and development of space-related equipment components and procedures The National Space Policy incorporates maintaining and integrating space capabilities to support civil space agencies b Commercial satellites present capabilities that military commanders may draw on to support planning operations and even morale and welfare of the fighting force However commercial space operations present unique challenges Although commercial space capabilities may provide services they lack assured access and timeliness because capabilities used by US forces are also used by adversaries Military commanders may request satellite surge capabilities while providing DSCA during natural disasters yet commercial vendors may require long lead time and multiyear leasing to gain access to a capability Finally using commercial satellites for military operations presents additional legal issues which must be considered c Even though these challenges exist military use of commercial capabilities has dramatically increased due to requirements surpassing MILSATCOM resources To help meet the increased demand many commercial satellite product vendors have established government services and solutions branches within their organizations to coordinate usage requirements with DOD and other USG departments and agencies Although these relationships may be largely transparent to military field commanders the products they request may be eventually fulfilled by a commercial application In any case requests for space-based products and services follow standard channels through established procedures d Use of commercial services enhances the resilience of our space enterprise potentially mitigating the benefits an adversary might gain by attacking US space systems and by assuring joint forces can operate effectively even when DOD space-derived capabilities have been degraded disrupted or destroyed By enhancing resilience of space capabilities commercially provided space services enhance deterrence by encouraging adversary restraint in interfering with or attacking those often multiuse multinational systems IV-15 Chapter IV 14 Multinational Space Operations a Multinational space operations provide the joint force many opportunities including increasing interoperability with and extending battlefield advantages to allies demonstrating responsible behavior in space and reassuring allies of our commitments to mutual defense Partnerships can enhance collective security capabilities and can provide a deterrent effect against adversaries from attacking or interfering with friendly space capabilities Space capabilities derived from a mix of DOD commercial multinational and allied platforms enhance the resilience of our space enterprise and increase the ability of joint forces to operate effectively through a degraded disrupted or denied space environment b The NATO Alliance has integrated several space capabilities and established offices which coordinate specific programs for NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe oversees most programs such as coordinating with USSTRATCOM for the shared early warning SEW system The NATO Consultation Command and Control Board oversees the Consultation Command and Control Agency which is responsible for NATO's commercial space imagery and SATCOM programs c For most other nations the civilian and commercial segments dominate space operations Therefore civilian space agencies have often taken the leadership role for space Agencies such as the European Space Agency the United Kingdom Space Agency the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency France's Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales and the Indian Space Research Organization often issue national policies and strategies in which military space operations may not be addressed There are allied space operations centers such as the European Union Satellite Centre and several others but they are not typically part of military forces However there may be agreements and procedures in place for them to support military operations d US forces rely extensively on foreign environmental satellite capabilities to augment DMSP data Foreign geostationary environmental satellite data is essential for military operations in Europe and Asia and in the western-Pacific and Indian Oceans e Multinational forces MNFs will have many of the same requirements for space services and capabilities as do US forces However US foreign disclosure policy will dictate the nature and scope of disclosure and release of space-derived products to multinational partners Commercial imagery products are normally unclassified and will be of great benefit to multinational partners Weather data is also readily available to share as is GPS navigation support Of special importance is the provision for missile warning and defense against attack from ballistic missiles USSTRATCOM is responsible as part of an interagency process and in coordination with GCCs for assisting in development of missile warning architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called SEW See JP 3-16 Multinational Operations for additional information 15 Other Space-Related Support a Defense Support of Civil Authorities Natural or man-made disasters and special events can temporarily overwhelm local tribal state and non-DOD federal responders IV-16 JP 3-14 Roles and Responsibilities DOD has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events SecDef may approve requests from civil authorities or qualifying entities for military support In addition under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority DOD officials may provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control to save lives prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage within the US DSCA is performed within the parameters of the National Response Framework 1 The space assets capabilities available for DSCA include satellite imagery overhead persistent infrared OPIR FFT environmental monitoring SATCOM and GPS 2 Although traditionally an intelligence mission space personnel can assist with DSCA by helping acquire commercial satellite imagery The value of this imagery is that it is unclassified and can be shared with multiple agencies and partner nations Available sources of commercial imagery include both military sources and commercial vendors A satellite imagery source specifically put in place for foreign humanitarian assistance is the International Charter Space and Major Disasters In addition the SCA can request support through USSTRATCOM from an Army space commercial imagery team to provide directly downlinked commercial satellite imagery commercial imagery spectral analysis and custom mapping products For additional information see JP 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities b Information Operations The integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation LOOs to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp the decision making of our adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own 1 Commanders should plan to fully integrate IO into their operations to include how space-based capabilities can support IO It is vital that IO and space representatives coordinate their efforts through an IO cell The IO cell brings all capabilities to include special technical operations into the planning cycle to ensure the commander's objectives are achieved Planners need to coordinate and synchronize space control with IO portions of plans to include which desired effects can be created by space forces or other informationrelated capabilities Effective synchronization will prevent negative impacts to IO portions of plans 2 IO can benefit greatly from global communication reachback support timing and global synchronization IO planners should coordinate with the SCA to cue space assets to recognize key events or triggers if they are needed to initiate IO portions of plans 3 Space forces have active and passive capabilities collecting controlling exploiting and protecting information that can support joint force efforts to conduct military operations 4 Space planners need to be integrally involved with IO planners in the planning process as a member of the IO cell to ensure that redundant links and appropriate bandwidth are available to accomplish rapid and reliable global communication IV-17 Chapter IV 5 Some of the ways space-based capabilities can support information-related capabilities in the field are providing two-way secure communications in remote areas imagery of an operational area position and navigation information ISR and weather terrain and environmental monitoring See JP 3-13 Information Operations for additional information c Cyberspace Operations The physical domains air land maritime and space and information environment rely on cyberspace for instant communications but the linkages between space and cyberspace are of particular importance as space provides a global connectivity option for CO In addition cyberspace provides the means by which space control and transmission of space sensor data are conducted These interrelationships are critical and the linkages must be addressed during all phases of joint operation planning See JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations for additional information d Purposeful Interference Response Team PIRT The USG considers PI with its space systems as an infringement on its rights PI consists of deliberate actions taken to deny or disrupt a space system service or capability The PIRT is led by DOD through USSTRATCOM and brings together representatives from the USG to include the Departments of Defense State Commerce National Telecommunications and Information Administration NTIA Homeland Security and Transportation Federal Aviation Administration the Federal Communications Commission CSAs and other selected centers of the IC and the SCAs of the geographic CCMDs The PIRT is designed to provide an interagency forum to evaluate the impact of suspected PI on US national interests and provide coordinated interagency options to resolve them IV-18 JP 3-14 CHAPTER V PLANNING Planning begins with the end state in mind providing a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning 1 General a Commanders address space operations in all types of plans and orders at all levels of war Additionally plans must address how to effectively integrate capabilities counter an adversary's use of space maximize use of limited space assets and to consolidate operational requirements for space capabilities 1 The GCC may request CDRUSSTRATCOM's assistance in integrating space forces capabilities and considerations into each phase of campaign and major OPLANs 2 Joint force planners incorporate space forces and capabilities into the basic plan and the applicable annexes e g A B C H J K L M N S and V at a minimum 3 During mission analysis planners assist the CCDR to identify specified implied and essential tasks for space forces Additionally the adversary's capabilities including their ability to impact our space forces and their use of space capabilities are considered in JIPOE Finally military planners identify those space forces and capabilities that are potential adversary or friendly centers of gravity COGs or are critical parts of COGs 4 In staff estimates the planners examine their functional specialties to identify the role and contributions of space forces in the various phases of the joint operation or campaign During preparation of the commander's estimate space forces and capabilities are war gamed along with other forces to allow the JFC to make an informed decision 5 The completed plan should describe how space operations support the commander's stated objectives how the adversary employs its space forces the process and procedures through which additional support will be requested 6 The JFC should plan for joint forces to operate in and through a degraded disrupted or denied space environment Planners should consult space or functional experts to discern which capabilities will not be available during the operation The completed plan should describe how the commander will execute the plan in the event space capabilities are degraded disrupted or denied Planning should consider mission assurance options such as requesting rapid restoration of space assets and leveraging allied foreign and or commercial space and non-space capabilities to help assure mission success 7 Space forces can also be used to support or conduct flexible deterrent options FDOs Conducting a ballistic missile defense exercise with US allies is one possible FDO V-1 Chapter V if the CCDR is facing a ballistic missile threat Another FDO could be to publish in the world media high-resolution images from commercial satellites and other systems to clearly demonstrate the adversary's preparations for war and to raise public awareness 8 Annex N Space Operations provides detailed information on space forces and their capabilities that the supported commander can use throughout the joint operation or campaign The format for annex N is found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CJCSM 3130 03 Adaptive Planning and Execution APEX Planning Formats and Guidance Annex N directly relates to those space capabilities included in other places such as annex A Task Organization annex B Intelligence appendix 3 Information Operations to annex C Operations annex H Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations annex J Command Relationships annex K Communications Systems annex L Environmental Considerations annex M Geospatial Information and Services annex S Special Technical Operations and annex V Interagency Coordination b Coordination Coordination of space operations between the staffs of the supported and supporting commanders is normally established through the designation of an SCA The designated SCA coordinates the identification of operational requirements and their inclusion in the appropriate annex The result of this process is a supportable valid statement of requirements that can be used by the supporting commander 1 During coordination the operational requirements are evaluated to identify shortfalls in capability appropriate use of space forces compliance with national policy and feasibility of mission success 2 When shortfalls or other limitations are identified they are forwarded to SecDef via the CJCS for further coordination resolution adjudication and apportionment c Supporting Plans USSTRATCOM components develop supporting plans as required Consideration is given to and balanced with requirements of all supported joint force space users 1 The Joint Staff evaluates requirements based on priority of use alternative solutions impact of loss and SecDef or CJCS guidance The review and approval of the supporting plan are the responsibility of the supported commander 2 If the supporting commander cannot meet the supported commander's requirements because of planning commitments previously granted to other commanders or agencies the CJCS or SecDef will adjudicate and resolve the conflicting requirements 2 Operational Art and Operational Design a Since operational art integrates ends ways and means across the levels of war operational art and operational design should be considered when planning space operations at all levels A mix of DOD commercial multinational and allied space capabilities can support or enable operational art and operational design They are a means to achieve the required end or a way to support or enable other means to achieve the required end As V-2 JP 3-14 Planning such space forces and capabilities must be considered equally with forces and capabilities throughout the OE For additional information on operational art and operational design see JP 3-0 Joint Operations and JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning b Operational design is characterized by the following fundamental elements 1 Termination Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art and operational design Space-based ISR supports the JFC's general situational awareness by enabling understanding of when to terminate operations Space-based ISR can also persistently monitor situations in support of stability operations or treaty obligations 2 Military End State Once the termination criteria are established operational design continues with development of the military end state and conditions based on the national strategic end state Since space operations are usually in support of other operations the end state is not usually space specific 3 Objectives Once the military end state is understood and termination criteria are established operational design continues with development of strategic and operational military objectives Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished Depending on the operation or campaign there may be space specific objectives but there will always be a requirement for space support to military operations in support of other objectives of the operation or campaign 4 Effects Identifying desired and undesired effects within the OE connects military strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks Determining specific desired and undesired effects in relation to space operations can help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the OE that promotes unified action 5 Centers of Gravity The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass the effects of combat power against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them COGs are those characteristics capabilities or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action physical strength or will to fight Given our dependency on space capabilities space assets should be considered a COG for the JFC Space assets are also important in helping to identify enemy COGs 6 Decisive Points By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action For example decisive points for the assured access to space are launch complexes and ground stations 7 Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort As JFCs plan the operation they may use multiple LOOs and or lines of effort Generally LOOs describe the linkage of various actions on nodes and or decisive points with an operational or strategic objective A line or effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose--cause and effect--to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions Lines of effort are V-3 Chapter V often essential to helping the commander visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power Inasmuch as space operations support most operations LOOs and lines of effort may be a factor during space planning 8 Direct and Indirect Approaches In theory direct attacks against enemy COGs are the most direct path to victory However where direct attack means attacking into an opponent's strength JFCs should seek an indirect approach If space-enabled C2 is an adversary's COG then OSC is an example of a direct approach against the space component of the adversary's C2 COG If public support for military operations is an adversary's COG then the use of SATCOM to deliver IO messages is an example of an indirect approach against an adversary's COG 9 Anticipation JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation Space-borne ISR fused into the COP supports the JFC's overall situational awareness and improves his ability to exploit unexpected opportunities The predictive attributes of SSA are key to the anticipation of threats to space systems A JFC anticipates and plans for the loss of space systems or capabilities through regular exercises 10 Operational Reach Operational reach is the duration and distance across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities Since national boundaries do not extend into space satellites may provide the timeliest access to denied areas 11 Culmination Culmination has both an offensive and defensive application In the offense the culmination occurs at the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully Attacking an enemy's C2 structure through OSC operations can reduce their combat power and lead to earlier culmination Conversely loss of critical space capabilities could lead to unanticipated early culmination for the JFC 12 Arranging Operations JFCs must determine the best arrangement in the execution of operations This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources When best to employ space capabilities particularly during offensive operations is a key concern for the JFC Space-based sensors can provide details of geography of the operational area thereby supporting planning and arranging of operations In phasing operations planners should consider the footprint visibility and signal strength of available space-based capabilities e g GPS accuracy and OPIR a Simultaneity and Depth The intent of simultaneity and depth is to bring both military and nonmilitary power to bear concurrently across the tactical operational and strategic levels of war to overwhelm the adversary across multiple domains thus disrupting the opponents decision cycle causing failure of their moral and physical cohesion PNT and SATCOM enable precision operations on a global scale and can be optimized to provide capabilities anywhere within a theater or within multiple theaters Additionally space force V-4 JP 3-14 Planning enhancement contributes to the establishment and maintenance of a space COP which is critical to carrying out simultaneity and depth in joint operations b Timing and Tempo The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy With proper timing JFCs can dominate the action remain unpredictable and operate beyond the enemy's ability to react For instance the employment of OSC capabilities against adversary communications can inhibit the enemy's timing and tempo 13 Forces and Functions Commanders and planners plan campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions or a combination of both see JP 3-0 Joint Operations for a discussion of joint functions Space control focuses on defeating adversary efforts to interfere with or attack US or allied space systems while enhancing our own For additional information on the elements of operational design see JP 3-0 Joint Operations and JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning 3 Key Planning Considerations a Space presents unique planning and operational considerations that affect friendly adversary and neutral space forces alike Space capabilities require extensive and advanced planning Space assets are sufficiently capable and robust however operational planners must understand the limited number of resources available and the distinct challenges with space force reconstitution Numerous resource and legal considerations impact planning and affect mission success The space planner understands planning and operational considerations for employment of space capabilities and has a firm knowledge of the threats to the use of those systems by an adversary The space planner must understand what can be done to limit an adversary's use of space capabilities and how to protect our own use of space Finally a planner understands how space capabilities relate to and support capabilities and operations throughout the OE b Global Access The fact that there are no geographical boundaries or physical obstructions in space gives military forces global access and extensive advantage 1 A single satellite in a low Earth polar orbit will overfly every location on the Earth's surface within a 24-hour period However basic orbital mechanics limit the time some satellites can remain over a particular geographic area The amount of time that a terrestrial AOI will be within a satellite's direct field of view will vary from minutes to years depending on the satellite orbit type and the field of view of the satellite sensor antenna see Appendix G Space Fundamentals for a more in-depth discussion of orbit types and considerations 2 With a sufficient number of satellites in appropriate orbits it is possible to maintain continuous LOS of and have access to any points on the surface of the Earth V-5 Chapter V 3 Global access is one of the key advantages that space capabilities offer Most spacecraft can serve multiple users around the world simultaneously e g missile warning satellites 4 Despite such global access however terrestrial obstructions can affect or limit observations of some points on the Earth from space c Persistence A geostationary orbit allows a satellite to remain over the same area of the Earth 24 hours a day providing continuous access to a given terrestrial AOI However geostationary orbits do not permit high resolution views of high latitude regions Polar or highly inclined orbits are needed to view these regions at the cost of reduced dwell time over a given AOI Because orbits are easily determined short dwell times and intermittent coverage by a given satellite may provide an adversary significant windows of opportunity for unobserved activity Therefore most satellite surveillance systems consist of multiple satellites or be supplemented by other sensors if continuous surveillance of an area is desired d Limitations on the operating lifetime of a satellite include the following 1 The design life of the satellite 2 Maintenance Considerations Physical maintenance currently cannot be performed on most satellites while in orbit Maintenance is conducted daily using RF digital commands Satellite maintenance relies on the use of redundant systems robust design and alternative subsystems configurations 3 As with physical maintenance on-orbit refueling cannot currently be performed on satellites on orbit so the amount of fuel carried for changing or maintaining the spacecraft's desired orbit and altitude must be taken into consideration Satellite orbital maneuvers may be costly in terms of fuel expended Although some satellite maneuvers can occur quickly e g station keeping the ability to move a geosynchronous satellite over another part of the Earth may require weeks or months to perform Satellite maneuvers requiring the use of fuel could shorten the overall useful life of the satellite 4 The type of orbit used by the spacecraft 5 Space Weather Unexpectedly large or frequent space weather events could shorten a satellite's planned life either by a significant single event or an increased rate of degradation to instruments and systems 6 The ever-increasing potential of collisions from other satellites or space debris e Predictable Orbits A satellite's motion or orbital location is predictable allowing for warning of satellite overflight maintaining situational awareness and tracking the location of objects in space However there are several forces at work that slowly degrade the predictive accuracy of a satellite's location These forces will cause a satellite's orbit to slowly change A satellite may maneuver and change its orbit making the orbit hard to predict to anyone but the organization initiating the maneuver However maneuvering may V-6 JP 3-14 Planning come at a high cost in terms of onboard fuel a limited resource These motion predictions satellite ephemeris become less accurate over time and require periodic updates on a daily to weekly basis f Vulnerability All segments of a space system are vulnerable to interference or attack Space segments are vulnerable to attacks or interference such as direct-ascent antisatellite interceptors laser blinding and dazzling Additionally ground-to-satellite link segments are susceptible to jamming and other forms of interference and ground segments such as C2 facilities are vulnerable to attack Launch facilities must be protected to ensure access to space so that force replenishment may be accomplished Some space capabilities may also be subject to exploitation such as an adversary using commercial GPS receivers for navigation Knowledge of an adversary's OSC and exploitation capabilities will allow a joint space planner to develop appropriate responses Space capabilities are also subject to the effects of space weather including sunspot activity and various types of terrestrial weather Rain clouds fog and air particulates can interfere with the differing wavelengths used by various satellite functions g Space Deterrence The US employs a variety of measures to deter others from interference and attack on our space systems and those of our allies DSC capabilities contribute to a multi-layered approach to deterrence which also includes efforts to promote responsible use of space capabilities and development of partnerships that encourage adversary restraint Deterrence is also enhanced as we improve our ability to quickly detect characterize and attribute attacks Planners must develop options to deter defend against and if deterrence fails to defeat efforts to interfere with or attack US or allied space systems h Resource Considerations Long lead times to replenish or replace space assets may result in less than adequate space assets to meet a commander's requirements 1 Current launch campaigns take weeks to months to generate and execute provided that all hardware including payload is available at the launch site Payload availability prelaunch processing positioning weather and on-orbit checkout are factors that can significantly lengthen the time from call-up to operating on-orbit 2 Some forces can perform multiple missions For example some missile warning sites perform secondary missions of space surveillance and missile defense 3 Multiple DOD organizations apportion space capabilities according to established and validated priorities which allow the greatest total mission assurance for the joint force While there are numerous satellites capable of supporting a requirement higher priority requirements will be satisfied first 4 Users may be preempted based on priority Competition for bandwidth priorities for tasking and similar constraints combined with satellite physical access to specific locations impact availability of space capabilities i Timing Considerations SATCOM is heavily dependent on precise timing capabilities Precise time enables information throughput by increasing the effective use of V-7 Chapter V the bandwidth and allows for the frequency hopping and cryptographic functions inherent in some communications systems 1 According to CJCSI 6130 01 CJCS Master Positioning Navigation and Timing Plan MPNTP Coordinated Universal Time UTC United States Naval Observatory USNO is the time standard for DOD and the source for time widely disseminated by GPS throughout DOD However the vulnerabilities of GPS warrant that communication systems have a backup capability to acquire timing information 2 Cryptologic systems and capabilities rely on precise time for synchronization of encrypted communications and information systems Many communications networks use frequency hopping to improve security and increase resistance to jamming Therefore it is essential that planners allow for redundant timing capabilities in the event GPS is disrupted or degraded For more information see CJCSI 6130 01 CJCS Master Positioning Navigation and Timing Plan MPNTP j Legal Considerations The joint force complies with US policy and laws as well as US-ratified treaties and international law when planning space operations Legal advisors participate in all stages of space operations planning and execution assessing compliance with applicable legal requirements and providing recommendations as required There are relatively few legal restrictions on the use of space for military purposes The US is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity Consistent with this principle peaceful purposes allow US defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests 1 Some contracts and consortium agreements could prohibit certain space assets from being used for military purposes For example certain corporate agreements prohibit using SATCOM for military operations 2 The law of armed conflict and certain treaties acts and conventions as they pertain to the use of force regulation of the means and methods of warfighting and protection of civilians must be complied with when conducting space control and space force application operations a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1967 The Outer Space Treaty provides that every activity in outer space must be carried out in accordance with international law including the United Nations UN Charter which recognizes the inherent right of self-defense All nations are free to use and explore outer space no nation may appropriate any part of outer space and every activity in outer space must be carried out with due regard to the corresponding interests of other nations No nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction may be placed in orbit around the Earth installed on the Moon or on any other celestial body or otherwise stationed in outer space A limited range of military activities such as establishing bases weapons testing and the conduct of military maneuvers are also prohibited on celestial bodies to include the V-8 JP 3-14 Planning Moon However the use of military personnel for scientific research and for any other peaceful purpose is permitted b Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 1976 This convention prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as a means of destruction damage or injury to the environment including outer space if such use has widespread long-lasting or severe effects c Other Space Treaties Other major treaties pertaining to space are the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space The Rescue and Return Agreement the 1972 Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Liability Convention and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Registration Convention of 1974 The Rescue and Return Agreement obligates nations that have ratified this treaty to cooperate in the rescue and return of distressed personnel of a spacecraft and upon request of the launching authority to take those measures it deems practicable to return space objects of other nations that come to Earth within its territory The Liability Convention provides a system for assessing liability for damage caused by space objects Generally a nation is responsible for direct damage caused by a space object to objects on the ground or to aircraft in flight Damage caused to other space objects on the other hand will only lead to liability if one party can establish fault on the part of the other party Finally the Registration Convention requires nations to notify the UN as soon as practicable after an object has been launched into outer space providing certain descriptive information to include orbital parameters and a general statement of the purpose of the space object d Noninterference with National or Multinational Technical Means of Verification Various arms control treaties prohibit interference with national or multinational technical means of verification i e the array of intelligence-gathering capabilities that can be operated from outside the territory of the observed nation in order to monitor the treaty compliance to include photoreconnaissance satellites and space-based sensors e Frequency Spectrum Management The International Telecommunications Union governs the allocation of the RF spectrum with all member nations to coordinate frequency assignments and orbital positions of geosynchronous and non-geosynchronous satellite orbits Individual countries have sovereignty over frequency usage within their borders Outside of the US users of any spectrum dependent device to include space systems must obtain HN approval to operate those devices in that country In addition to frequency clearance users must get landing rights from the HN when operating outside of US territory These are coordinated through the GCC's joint frequency management office Within the US users must obtain frequency clearance from the NTIA through its Service frequency management office for operations in US territory 3 In some cases national policy dictates that space-based capabilities are made available to civilian users The USG is committed to minimizing impact to peaceful civil use V-9 Chapter V of GPS outside of the operational area to ensure GPS becomes the space-based navigation capability of choice JFCs should be aware of this commitment and factor it into NAVWAR planning and OPLANs k Multinational Space Operations 1 Space capabilities have become increasingly important to operations for all nations and NGOs Access to commercial space services has enabled even the smallest of nations to use GPS commercial space imagery SATCOM and other services Space capabilities are being used across the range of military operations by our multinational partners and have become a critical enabler for civil and military operations Currently the US has the predominance of military space capability however many nations are pursuing their own space capabilities Small satellites also present a very affordable option for many nations As other nations begin to provide and have access to their own or commercial space capabilities the US must seek to partner with responsible nations to provide improved US space capabilities and maintain the strategic advantages we derive from space 2 Most nations do not have military space forces and only limited if any military space systems They rely on dual-use satellites and leverage commercial space assets It is critical to integrate and coordinate the requirements for various national space capabilities and to work releasability issues of US space capabilities in multinational operations The evolving strategic and fiscal environment allows for additional opportunities to partner with responsible nations IGOs NGOs and commercial firms 3 Space is addressed in NATO's Bi-Lateral Strategic Command Functional Planning Guide for Space Operations NATO Restricted document and provides guidance for space integration in the operational planning process 4 Control and Coordinating Measures a Control and coordinating measures are used by JFCs to provide deconfliction between assets and missions to maximize efficient and effective use of limited assets and to provide effective C2 of forces and assets within a defined area For most DOD space operations control and coordinating measures are primarily accomplished through applicable guidance from CDRUSSTRATCOM and JFCC SPACE CDRUSSTRATCOM operations orders provide and assure space capabilities by integrating subordinate component efforts to maintain strategic and operational advantages In turn the subordinate components develop supporting plans directives in support of CDRUSSTRATCOM's guidance to provide synchronized theater and global space capabilities See Figure V-1 b The joint space tasking order development process does not account for missions performed by non-DOD space assets or those limited space forces assigned to a GCC thereby creating potential conflicts between DOD and non-DOD agencies It is then incumbent upon the GCCs and JFCC SPACE to coordinate as required to minimize conflicts To this end CDRUSSTRATCOM grants JFCC SPACE direct liaison authority with other DOD and non-DOD agencies to help deconflict space operations V-10 JP 3-14 Planning The Joint Space Tasking Order Process Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Strategy Combat Plans Planning CDR JFCC Space Space Tasking Order C A SOD TNL Strat Dev SET Planning JIPTL Production JSTO H-12 Hours MSP MSP Combat Operations Execution JSTO H-6 Hours JSTO Production Deconfliction Unit Reports JSTO Execution Assessment Report Combat Assessment Legend CA CDR JFCC JIPTL JSTO combat assessment commander joint functional component command joint integrated prioritized target list joint space tasking order MSP SET SOD Strat Dev TNL master space plan space effects team space operations directive strategy development target nomination list Figure V-1 The Joint Space Tasking Order Process V-11 Chapter Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 APPENDIX A SPACE-BASED INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE 1 Overview Space-based ISR is a part of the synchronization and integration of sensors assets PED systems for collection of data and information on an object or in an AOI on a persistent event driven or scheduled basis The JFC and the components have access to space capabilities that can collect diverse military diplomatic and economic information that can be valuable for planning and execution across the range of military operations Specifically information can be collected processed exploited and disseminated on such diverse subjects as indications and warning to include ballistic missile launch targeting analysis friendly COA development adversary capability assessment BDA or characterization of the OE 2 Application a Intelligence The product resulting from the collection processing integration evaluation analysis and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations Space systems contribute to the development of intelligence through surveillance and reconnaissance activities b Surveillance Space systems provide systematic observations of aerospace surface or subsurface areas and places persons or things by visual electronic photographic or other means that provide commanders with situational awareness within a given area Surveillance from space does not imply that a single satellite or capability must be continuously collecting Satellites that are able to provide a snapshot in time can be augmented by additional capabilities collecting in the same or even different areas of the EMS There will be short gaps in collection minutes or a few hours but capabilities will be concentrating on a target which over time constitutes surveillance These following capabilities can continue collecting on a target as the previous satellite moves out of the area of access in its orbit 1 Several satellites in low and medium Earth orbits can provide coverage of targets on the order of minutes Geosynchronous satellites can provide surveillance because their orbits allow them to have persistent access to large portions of the Earth Collection from geosynchronous systems may by necessity be prioritized based on the area of the world and where within the EMS it can be tasked to collect In many instances the number of requirements levied against a system may also necessitate a prioritization of collection Satellites may also be a contributor to an overall surveillance effort consisting of space terrestrial and airborne systems that together provide continuity in surveillance when space systems alone do not have continuous access or are unavailable 2 The JSPOC maintains the satellite catalog based upon a global network surveilling on-orbit objects comprised of ground based radar optical telescopes and a single space-based optical telescope This database is used to provide overflight warning to A-1 Appendix A supported commanders This database is also used for flight safety to inform satellite operators when satellites are in the path of other man-made orbiting objects c Reconnaissance Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods information about activities and resources of an enemy or adversary or to secure data concerning the meteorological hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area Single low and medium Earth-orbiting systems or architectures that provide limited numbers of low or medium orbital systems are well suited to the reconnaissance mission Generally their access to specific targets is limited in time based on their orbit such that data collected will be a snapshot of events in the portion of the EMS where they can collect Geosynchronous or geostationary satellites are capable of performing reconnaissance from space as well focusing their collection efforts on a target or region for a relatively short amount of time before focusing on another area 3 Advantages a The prime advantage of space-based ISR capabilities is their global and wide-area coverage over denied areas where little or no data can be obtained from ground and airborne sources Other advantages these systems possess include mission longevity and reduced vulnerability to adversary action While able to provide worldwide coverage demands on individual space-based systems often exceed their capacity and their associated orbit requirements may limit the ability to meet operational requirements Space-based ISR is limited by advanced denial and deception techniques Space-based systems are owned by military non-military and national agencies International cooperation in military spacebased ISR systems with allies and other partners may contribute to US national security objectives by enhancing interoperability supporting coalition operations and building partnership capacity b Often the product of a space or terrestrial capability can enhance accuracy and shorten reaction times to the user by cueing another space system to survey an AOI Likewise a space-based capability may be used to cue a terrestrial-based system for more precise location discrimination and targeting c ISR systems also enhance planning capabilities by providing updated information regarding terrain and adversary force dispositions Space-based imagery in particular supports the full range of military intelligence activities including indications and warning current intelligence order of battle scientific and technical intelligence assessments targeting and combat assessments Imagery is also used to conduct mission planning and rehearsal For additional information on space-based intelligence support see JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence and the other JP 2-0 series publications 4 Limitations In addition to the access limitations and a predictable overflight schedule dictated by the satellite orbit satellite systems may be affected by a variety of atmospheric disturbances A-2 JP 3-14 Space-Based Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance such as fog smoke electrical storms and precipitation and clouds which affect the ability of imaging systems to detect adversary activity missile launches and battle damage Other limiting factors include priority conflicts tasking PED limitations and low numbers of assets 5 Support Procedures a There are a number of national military and nonmilitary space capabilities that can be used individually or in combination to provide the information required by the JFC The support request procedures for products and information are dependent on the individual system See JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations for additional information on national imagery sensors and capabilities b National and DOD ISR Support National ISR systems provide direct support to the President The information provided by these systems is used by senior government leaders to make strategic political or military decisions and is also of great utility to the JFC Information from national systems is provided to the JFC by direct and indirect feeds in addition to Service component tactical exploitation of national capabilities programs and distributed common ground system elements Requests for ISR support should go through the intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-2 and or the operations directorate of a joint staff at the CCMD or joint force and the J-2 collection manager Additional sources of information and assistance include the liaison officer embedded JFCC ISR representative or support team assigned from the appropriate national or DOD intelligence agencies See JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence for additional information on fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint operations and unified action c Nonmilitary and Commercial Imagery Support National and USG civil imagery satellites provide most of the imagery support to joint operations However nonmilitary space surveillance systems including commercial and allied space capabilities may augment DOD space systems enhancing surveillance and reconnaissance coverage of the Earth 1 Commercial electro-optical imaging satellites are capable of providing large area mid-resolution images with a revisit time from 3 to 15 days Recent increases in the number and quality of commercial imagery satellites provide a valuable opportunity to augment national systems with panchromatic multispectral and radar imagery products All commercial imagery is requested through the NGA 2 The greatest limitation of commercial imagery is a lack of understanding in how to use the available systems Commercial imagery timelines are not adequate to fulfill most stated theater collection requirements with revisit times between 3 and 15 days Lengthy revisit times and competition will dictate how long a request for imagery takes to fill which could take up to a year In times of conflict these capabilities could provide an advantage to adversaries since the sale of information from these systems is often not restricted The sale of commercial imagery to non-USG customers may be interrupted i e A-3 Appendix A shutter control via the procedures contained in CJCSM 3219 01 Interruption of Remote Sensing Space System Data Collection and Distribution During Periods of National Security Crisis 3 NGA is the sole DOD action agency for all purchases of commercial and foreign government-owned imagery-related remote sensing data by DOD components To support this NGA has established contracts with major commercial imagery vendors 4 Before commercial products can be relied upon for targeting and accurate geolocations they should be verified by NGA NGA provides this service on a case-by-case basis Requests for these services must be validated by the appropriate geospatial information and services GI S staff agency at the CCMD or Service component before being forwarded to NGA Commercial imagery resolution and timeliness may not be adequate to satisfy specific needs d Geospatial Information and Services Support Joint forces receive current and accurate GI S products from NGA In addition NGA can provide supplemental updates to military forces on port conditions river stages recent urban construction vegetation analysis ice coverage and oceanographic features Space-based imagery can provide current information on terrain surface moisture conditions oceanic subsurface conditions beach conditions and vegetation that permit identification of avenues of approach specific ingress and egress routes and other mission parameters to assist in the JIPOE 1 Currently the major source for geospatial data is visible-spectrum imagery provided by national intelligence systems Imagery provides a detailed overhead view of the area that is analyzed to identify natural and man-made features Stereo imagery provides elevation data and improved identification of features Ephemeris and altitude data that accompanies the imagery allows for the precise geodetic positioning of the image and mensuration of features 2 Panchromatic multispectral and hyperspectral imagery are contributing sources of data for the development and update of GI S Satellite systems are vital for OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE the International Charter Space and Major Disasters and the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme office were instrumental in providing free satellite imagery and finished assessment products to the international humanitarian assistance foreign disaster relief efforts in Haiti In addition to these international resources Headquarters United States Southern Command created an information portal to share satellite imagery products full motion video feeds from airborne assets and finished assessment products with the international community to aid the planning and execution of international relief efforts Various Sources A-4 JP 3-14 Space-Based Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance providing GI S data because of their global coverage and periodic updates 3 During a crisis it is important to understand that geospatial information producers are in direct competition with intelligence activities for national collection systems In some cases this competition could be mitigated by the use of civil and commercial imagery sources as discussed above See JP 2-03 Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations for additional information A-5 Appendix A Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 APPENDIX B MISSILE WARNING 1 Overview Missile tracking operations contribute to the ability to provide warning of ballistic missile launches Voice and data warning information is relayed to the joint force in near real time to support tactical decision making and provide executable data to the missile defense network to counter the threat 2 Application a The missile warning mission uses a mix of space-based and terrestrial sensors Missile warning includes the notification to national leaders of a missile attack against North America as well as attacks against multinational partners It also includes notification to GCCs multinational partners and forward deployed personnel of missile attack 1 A well-organized missile warning system structure allows commanders to maximize detection and warning of inbound ballistic missiles thereby ensuring effective passive defense active defense and attack operations 2 Missile warning systems process raw sensor data into missile warning reports and disseminate the information to users globally Missile warning consists of multiple ground and space-based systems located worldwide b Space-based sensors such as Defense Support Program and space-based infrared system usually provide the first level of immediate missile detection Some satellite sensors also accomplish nuclear detonation detection Ground-based radars provide follow-on information on launches and confirmation of strategic attack The majority of their day-today mission is space surveillance however the radars are always scanning the horizon for incoming missiles These ground-based radar systems include the following Ballistic Missile Early Warning System PAVE Phased Array Warning System and the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System Upgraded early warning radars are Space-based and terrestrial sensors play a role in missile detection and warning B-1 Appendix B multi-mission radars supporting the missile warning space surveillance and the missile defense missions There is no room for error in missile warning for homeland defense therefore all information provided must be timely accurate and unambiguous For information on performance criteria for missile warning see CJCSI 6210 02 Information and Operational Architecture of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment System c Because the reaction time for theater forces to respond to incoming missiles is relatively short GCCs have adopted a strategy known as assured warning This strategy weighs accepting potentially false reports against the time required to obtain unambiguous reports Under this strategy the GCCs have elected to receive quicker launch notifications understanding that the warning could be ambiguous In addition missile warning elements process raw sensor data from satellite systems form that data into missile warning reports and disseminate the information to theater users Missile warning elements consist of multiple US ground and in-theater units d Missile Warning Requests JFCs should forward requests for missile warning to CDRUSSTRATCOM via approved procedures See Figure B-1 Missile Warning Support Request Procedures Supported Combatant Command Coordination Coordination Subordinate Joint Force United States Strategic Command Direction AFSPC SMDC ARSTRAT COMFLTCYBERCOM Notification Request Coordination to Determine Report format and contents Timeline required Dissemination media primary and backup User education required Joint Staff Once the system is in place coordination will continue for feedback and refinement Legend AFSPC COMFLTCYBERCOM Air Force Space Command Commander US Fleet Cyber Command SMDC ARSTRAT US Army Space and Missile Defense Command US Army Forces Strategic Command Figure B-1 Missile Warning Support Request Procedures B-2 JP 3-14 Missile Warning 1 When requesting support from missile warning elements users should clearly state their requirements and applicable objectives as appropriate Requests should include specific threat assessment location and type of threat duration of support requested primary and secondary communications media preferred for reporting false reporting tolerance and levels and units within the command structure to which the warning data and information will be provided 2 Upon receiving a request CDRUSSTRATCOM will assess its ability to provide support based on the assets assigned to the command Once the command has determined a COA it will provide that feedback through the SCA of the supported command e Missile Warning Exercise Support 1 Exercise Design The theater event system TES elements will use operational hardware software and procedures to the maximum extent possible for exercises For each exercise requiring TES support USSTRATCOM will determine after taking into account the requirements of the requesting agency if the TES processor elements or a simulation device will support the exercise USSTRATCOM will provide the Missile Warning Center theater and all participating TES elements or simulation organizations with the missile launch scenario the voice reporting architecture and templates if different from real-world 2 Exercise Coordination Coordination with USSTRATCOM is required prior to TES elements or simulation systems injecting exercise traffic Request for TES exercise support must be submitted to USSTRATCOM via a consolidated exercise support request USSTRATCOM will review and approve exceptions on a case-by-case basis and is responsible to ensure that a user's message is released announcing the exercise specifics 3 Dissemination of exercise data over the Integrated Broadcast Service requires separate approval and coordination 4 The TES elements must keep exercise and real-world data separate and clearly defined f Shared Early Warning The US exchanges missile detection and warning information with its multinational partners The objective of SEW is the continuous exchange of missile early warning information derived from US missile early warning sensors and when available from the sensors of the SEW partner Information on missile launches is provided on a near-real-time basis This information can take the form of data voice warning or both The objective of SEW is to enhance regional stability by providing ballistic missile warning to CCDRs sponsored partner countries and NATO allies GCCs will recommend sponsor SEW partner countries DOD policy is to provide continuous nearreal-time ballistic missile early warning information on regional launches that is of the same high quality and timeliness as the launch warning that would be made available to US forces if operating in the same area at the same time Currently the SEW system provides both messages and voice warning to partner countries For information on missile defense see JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats B-3 Appendix Intentionally Blank 13-4 JP 3 14 APPENDIX C SPACE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING CAPABILITY 1 Overview METOC support from space facilitates the development of forecasts and assessments of environmental impacts on both friendly and adversary military operations Environmental monitoring satellites which typically use sun-synchronous geosynchronous and Lagrangian orbits see Appendix G Space Fundamentals for additional information about orbits as well as some intelligence satellites provide terrestrial and space environmental monitoring for joint forces Environmental monitoring information includes data provided by non-DOD satellites such as NOAA weather and NASA research satellites which are used by AFWA and Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center FNMOC and the Naval Oceanographic Office NAVOCEANO to support joint forces and Services 2 Application a Weather The terrestrial and space environment can adversely impact a wide range of space systems and missions Space-derived meteorological information is crucial to understanding and reacting to the effects of the environment on both space and terrestrial operations This information helps commanders assess the environmental impacts on both friendly and adversary forces alike and helps to complete operational preparation of the environment The environment affects almost all aspects of operations A few examples are mission timing route selection target and weapon selection mode of weapon delivery communications reconnaissance and surveillance b Oceanography Knowledge of the location and characteristics of oceanographic features such as sea heights sea surface ice currents fronts and eddies is essential to all maritime forces It is especially critical for undersea warfare operations and can be used by commanders to avoid submarine or maritime mine threats This knowledge can also be used to concentrate forces in an area where an adversary is most likely to be operating to optimize SAR operations at sea and to help determine optimum locations for amphibious landings c Space Environment Environmental data from the space domain must be available to integrate into SSA information to form a space COP This enables joint forces to determine the impact of environmental factors on both adversary and friendly space and weapons systems 3 Advantages a A prime advantage of environmental satellites is their ability to gather data in remote or hostile areas where little or no data can be obtained via surface reporting stations For example space-based environmental data is critical over most oceanic regions where data can otherwise be very sparse b Environmental satellites typically gather data in the visual infrared and microwave spectral bands Infrared sensors provide images that are based on the thermal characteristics C-1 Appendix C of atmospheric features such as clouds and Earth features such as land masses and water bodies This data can be used to calculate the altitude of cloud tops and ground or water surface temperatures c Thermal and visible images together provide the coverage and extent of clouds at various levels as well as other physical features such as ice fields and snow Current microwave sensors are used to measure or infer sea surface winds direction and speed ground moisture rainfall rates ice characteristics atmospheric temperatures and water vapor profiles d Space-based monitoring of the space domain provides the ability to detect and mitigate the impacts of space weather on satellites manned spaceflight and communications to from and through space Detection of solar events and measurement of the radiation environment allow operators to protect resources and deduce likely causes of spacecraft anomalies 4 Limitations a Polar-orbiting satellites have periodic revisit rates over the target area and therefore have a limited time over target for observations However these satellites provide global coverage and high-resolution data at all latitudes b Geosynchronous satellites provide lower resolution images but maintain a constant view of their coverage area The image quality of geosynchronous satellites degrades as distance and angle from the point directly under the satellite increase Coverage at polar latitudes is poor or nonexistent US owned and operated geostationary environmental satellites are focused on the western hemisphere the continental US eastern Pacific and western Atlantic Foreign national capabilities are used for the remainder of the globe c Some METOC parameters needed by forecasters for operational support including heights of cloud bases and visibility restrictions cannot be accurately determined from environmental satellites Data from several sources including surface observations upper air soundings and satellite data are combined to determine these parameters d Due to the magnitude of the space domain space-based capabilities are limited in their ability to characterize the space environment in all areas thereby creating gaps in complete situational awareness 5 Support Procedures a METOC support to joint operations is critical to a JFC's awareness of the OE during all types of joint operations and across the full range of military operations This support is normally provided by METOC forces assigned to one or more of the participating components When two or more units are involved in a joint operation coordination of their support is normally accomplished by the joint METOC coordination cell See JP 3-59 Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations for more information on the organization of METOC forces C-2 JP 3-14 Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Capability b METOC satellite system data is supplied to AFWA FNMOC and the NAVOCEANO These central facilities provide users with real-time and stored environmental satellite cloud imagery processed products and satellite information incorporated into other environmental products Another source of environmental satellite system information for joint operations is direct downlink of environmental satellite data from fixed and deployed mobile ground- and ship-based tactical data processing terminals within the operational area c AFWA is responsible for collecting processing and providing space environmental data products to the joint force d Weather satellite system data is distributed via the DODIN C-3 Appendix Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 APPENDIX D SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS Protected space communications make possible the ability to command and control forces and support national decision makers in a contested communications environment including the high end nuclear environment Lieutenant General Susan J Helms Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Space 11 May 2011 1 Overview SATCOM military commercial foreign and civil provides global coverage which affords the US and allied national and military leaders with a means to maintain strategic situational awareness and a means to convey their intent to the operational commander responsible for conducting joint operations in a specific area see Figure D-1 SATCOM also provides critical connectivity for tactical maneuver forces whose rapid movement and nonlinear deployments take them beyond LOS communication Military forces are dependent on space-based communications systems to access essential information services in the execution of operations SATCOM systems provide communications that facilitate C2 access for authorized users survivable communications for Presidential support nuclear C2 and ISR sensor collection data 2 Application a SATCOM provides a beyond LOS information transport capability It allows for communications from the highest levels of government to the theater tactical level for all matters to include operations logistics intelligence personnel and diplomacy 1 It supports a variety of media to include digital video and audio and standard network data feeds 2 SATCOM are space-based communications relay systems consisting of uplinks and downlinks The frequency band and waveform are two major factors that determine the throughput capacity and the degree of protection and survivability provided to the communications system anti-jam AJ anti-scintillation low probability of intercept LPI and low probability of detection LPD capabilities 3 The frequency bands over which current MILSATCOM operate are a UHF for narrowband communications b Super-high frequency SHF for wideband communications D-1 Appendix D Military and Commercial Satellite Systems Protected EHF Q Ka-Band Milstar I II Survivable protected communications for national leaders and joint force AJ LPI LPD EMP hardened Crosslinks no ground relay required Polar Protected communications for north polar region LPI LPD AEHF Milstar Follow-on Greater throughput International partners Wideband X Ka-Band High data rates for deployed forces and enterprise users DISN enterprise extensions and DISN reachback for deployed forces DSCS X-band only Airborne and maritime COTM capability Some AJ WGS Narrowband Ka-Band UFO GBS Ka payload High throughput Small antenna Smart push-pull data broadcasts DSCS follow-on X and Ka-bands COTM with Ka-band airborne and maritime Greater throughput International partners WGS UHF P L-Band UFO WGS - X- and Kabands Return channel capability with 2-way Ka-band Airborne and maritime COTM capability Lightweight mobile Low data rates space segment limited Supports joint force INTEL LOG nets DAMA IW increases user accesses No AJ Commercial L S C X Ku Ka Bands MUOS UFO follow-on Global cellular service On-demand use Support legacy UHF transition Greater number of accesses Augment MILSATCOM Mobile and fixed satellite services High throughput telemedicine CSS split-based operations video Less protection Pay for services Legend AEHF AJ C COTM CSS DAMA DISN DSCS EHF EMP GBS GHz INTEL IW Ka Ku advanced extremely high frequency anti-jam C-band 3 7-4 2 GHz communications on the move commercial satellite services demand assigned multiple access Defense Information System Network Defense Satellite Communications System extremely high frequency electromagnetic pulse Global Broadcast Service gigaherz intelligence integrated waveband Kurtz-above band 27-40 GHz Kurtz-under band 12-18 GHz L LOG LPD LPI MHz MILSATCOM MUOS P Q S SHF UFO UHF WGS X L-band 1-2 GHz logistics low probability of detection low probability of intercept megahertz military satellite communications Mobile User Objective System P-band 250-500 MHz Q-band 33-50 GHz S-band 2-4 GHz super high frequency ultrahigh frequency UHF follow-on ultrahigh frequency Wideband Global Satellite Communications System X-band 9-12 GHz Figure D-1 Military and Commercial Satellite Systems D-2 JP 3-14 Satellite Communications c Extremely high frequency EHF band is utilized for protected SATCOM through the EHF satellites and their hosted payloads The EHF satellite constellations including the military strategic and tactical relay Milstar and the AEHF system are hardened against solar and nuclear radiation EHF communications are also supported by the EHF payloads hosted on UFO satellites The EHF waveforms operate in scalable data throughputs and support survivable secure protected and jam-resistant communications b Narrowband SATCOM systems support secure voice and data transmission at relatively low data rates for both mobile and fixed users 1 Narrowband communications traditionally support requirements such as emergency action message dissemination between SecDef and CCDRs force direction messages tactical C2 low data rate broadcasts and force report-back message transmission and reception 2 Narrowband systems support highly mobile tactical users Compact terminal equipment and directional and omnidirectional antennas allow deployed joint forces to quickly and efficiently exchange both voice and data communications 3 Narrowband systems include mobile and fixed terminals installed in air maritime and ground platforms command centers and command posts and missile launch control facilities 4 Narrowband communications use UHF frequencies that allow excellent transmission quality through all types of terrestrial weather to small tactical terminals however UHF and EHF frequencies can be totally disrupted by ionospheric scintillation Additionally the bandwidth itself is limited and therefore can only achieve data rates in the kilobits-per-second range c Wideband SATCOM supports multichannel secure voice and high data-rate communications for C2 crisis management and intelligence data transfer 1 Wideband communications support a range of government strategic and tactical users such as the White House Communications Agency the uniformed services Department of State Joint Staff CCDRs joint task forces MNFs mobile units unmanned aircraft systems and other elements as needed 2 Wideband SATCOM provides Defense Information Services Network common user information transport and allows the JFC to reach back to other portions of the DODIN It also supports Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network NIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network SIPRNET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 3 Wideband communication tactical terminals support exercises and the deployed operations requirements of tactical forces for high-capacity multichannel communications aboard ships and aircraft as well as in support of ground forces D-3 Appendix D d Protected SATCOM supports survivable voice and data communications not normally found on other systems 1 Protected SATCOM provides scalable throughputs over a wide band of spectrum In a hostile environment where a wideband system could be degraded protected SATCOM will allow survivable communication but at a reduced data rate 2 Protected SATCOM characteristics such as narrow beamwidths and the use of frequency hopping technology provide capabilities such as AJ scintillation-resistance LPI and LPD Due to these unique capabilities the use of the protected SATCOM frequency band has often been reserved for the most critical strategic forces and C2 systems e Commercial Capabilities Commercial SATCOM offers another venue to satisfy DOD's rapidly growing information needs Some wideband services and personal communications services e g satellite phones are examples of current commercial SATCOM support to strategic and tactical mobile users Commercial systems currently support much of DOD's predictable wideband and fixed SATCOM needs when MILSATCOM is not available Leasing commercial services also affords faster access to advanced capabilities and services than traditional government research development and acquisition programs However in an environment where both the US and its potential adversaries will have almost equivalent access to the same advanced technologies and commercial services sustaining military advantage may largely rest on the US ability to integrate those technologies and commercial services into its force structure faster and more effectively than the adversary The DOD agencies Services and CCMDs procure commercial SATCOM solutions using the Future Commercial Satellite Communications Services Acquisition program which is an acquisition vehicle managed by DISA 3 Advantages The inherent capabilities of satellite systems provide significant advantages over other communications systems a Global Coverage Collectively SATCOM systems provide global coverage If required satellites can provide focused capacity in areas of special interest b Real-Time Over-the-Horizon Transmission of Voice and Data Like other communications media most SATCOM systems provide real-time connectivity for both voice and data but unlike other communications media above high frequency SATCOM can provide over-the-horizon voice and data transmission c Data Relay SATCOM links preclude the need for long terrestrial communications links Furthermore SATCOM enables US forces to communicate without substantial terrestrial communications architecture d Flexibility Satellite systems allow global coverage and interlinking between frequency bands and systems and certain systems are able to provide a relatively LPD Flexibility gives the JFC a great deal of latitude in mixing and matching satellite systems to meet specific operational requirements Directional antennas afford LPD wide bandwidths D-4 JP 3-14 Satellite Communications allow higher data rates ground stations permit cross patching and satellite positions make global coverage available e Support to Mobile Forces SATCOM systems can provide the communications required by mobile forces operating over wide areas This is especially true for those forces that require dynamic C2 when they are on the move 4 Limitations SATCOM has the following limitations a Limited Capacity Requirements for SATCOM service worldwide exceed the capacity of current MILSATCOM systems Through partnering the DOD supplements SATCOM capabilities with commercial international and civil systems 1 Due to the number of SATCOM users the priority of use and the criticality of information carried over these systems oversight through requirement validation and adjudication is required at the DOD Joint Staff and CDRUSSTRATCOM levels 2 Identified requirements are carefully scrutinized through a validation process resulting in USSTRATCOM apportioning resources for OPLANs with capacity eventually being allocated based on priority and availability 3 Within their allocated capacity CCDRs manage direct and control individual networks supporting component air land maritime space and special operations forces b Connectivity Limitations Limitations on terminals and teleports gateways are key planning considerations 1 SATCOM terminals are designed to operate in specific spectrum bands across specific satellites and in specific environments Thus SATCOM terminals will have to be selected based on mission the environment they will be used in and data needs 2 Teleports gateways are required to gain access into the DODIN These are finite gateways with limited resources 3 Due to the distances traveled on a SATCOM transmission path significant latency is introduced into the communications link which can adversely impact some C2 systems and applications which are latency-sensitive Accelerators and similar hardware and or software solutions should be considered to aid in mitigating this See United States Strategic Command Strategic Instruction SI 714-4 Consolidated Satellite Communications SATCOM Management Policies and Procedures C-SMPP for additional information on the SATCOM request validation process c Orbital Considerations Most DOD communications satellites are in geosynchronous orbits over the equatorial plane where they appear to be stationary over a D-5 Appendix D point on the Earth's equator See Appendix G Space Fundamentals for a description of geosynchronous and geostationary orbits 1 A constellation of three geostationary communications satellites equally spaced or nearly so can provide near-total Earth coverage between 65 degrees north and south latitude However due to signals becoming weak at the edges of coverage MILSATCOM generally employs a constellation of four satellites to provide adequate worldwide coverage between 65 degrees north and south latitude 2 In general a mixture of geosynchronous and polar satellites are required for full global coverage A mixture of satellites in low Earth orbit LEO medium Earth orbit MEO or highly elliptical orbits HEOs can also provide global coverage however this requires a greater number of satellites in the constellation to accomplish d Frequency Constraints Except in forcible entry situations the terminal segments associated with space systems are subject to the same HN and NTIA frequency clearance processes as terrestrial radio systems In addition frequency bleed-over among antennas must be considered when configuring ground segments e g antenna farms to ensure selfimposed interference is avoided not only on radio systems but GPS frequencies as well e Terminal and Antenna Size Because antenna size frequency bandwidth and data rate capacity are interrelated commanders often must compromise either information flow rate or mobility 1 Generally the higher the frequency e g SHF EHF the greater the available signal bandwidth hertz and the higher the data rate bits per second capacity Similarly within these frequency bands the larger the antenna size the greater the data throughput but a SATCOM terminal's mobility is reduced However small terminals and antennas are required to minimize the impacts on tactical force mobility and ensure that the many different platforms of the supported forces are suitably integrated in the operational physical power and electromagnetic environments Hand-held and or man-pack maritime and airborne platforms have especially demanding constraints 2 Lower frequency systems have narrower signal bandwidth and lower data rate capacity f Susceptibility to Jamming and Interference All radio receivers including satellite systems are susceptible to jamming and interference Unintentional interference can be as harmful to SATCOM operations as deliberate jamming Mandatory jamming and interference resolution processes for all JFCs Services and agencies are contained in SI 714-5 Space System Electromagnetic Interference EMI Resolution Procedures 1 Narrowband satellites are the most susceptible to both jamming and intercept due to their narrower bandwidth large antenna beamwidth and low power While most commercial satellites have no protection against jamming military UHF satellites have limited resistance through the use of different modulation schemes and the use of spread spectrum techniques D-6 JP 3-14 Satellite Communications 2 Military wideband systems operate at higher frequencies smaller antenna beamwidths and wider bandwidth The narrower antenna beamwidth provides some advantage in jam resistance and intercept versus narrowband systems For instance WGS provides greater protection against interference over its commercial counterparts through active beam shaping beam steering and ability to cross-band communications links between X-band and Kurtz-above band 3 Military protected systems i e Milstar or AEHF afford even greater protection through the different techniques possible with wider available bandwidth However since the wider bandwidth is used to create added protected features data rates are actually decreased g Constellation Reconfiguration While the ability to move satellites to reconfigure constellations may be an advantage there are also significant disadvantages to repositioning satellites 1 Most communications satellites currently in service are positioned to provide communications connectivity to a large number of users Moving any of the primary satellites to a new satellite region could disrupt communications connectivity for this population and could impair their ability to accomplish their missions Movement of satellites requires extensive coordination with multiple agencies The process to move communications satellites is described in SI 714-4 Consolidated Satellite Communications SATCOM Management Policies and Procedures C-SMPP 2 Repositioning satellites can take weeks and can consume a significant amount of onboard station-keeping fuel thereby reducing the operational life of the satellite 3 To offset this limitation JFCs must identify their SATCOM requirements through the Joint Staff Satellite Communications Database SDB according to the latest version of CJCSI 6250 01 Satellite Communications by following the defined process of submissions through the appropriate CCMD SATCOM is incorporated into OPLANs as described in SI 714-4 h Solar Activity Increased solar activity can disrupt SATCOM for short periods of time In extreme cases this can cause communications outages 1 Sun activity causes atmospheric scintillation that mostly affects small receivers in the Arctic and tropical regions operating in the UHF frequency band 2 The detection of solar flares can be used to forecast solar effects thereby minimizing the disruption of communications by using workarounds 3 All SATCOM is susceptible to solar activity i Interference Due to Precipitation SATCOM in the Kurtz-under and Kurtz-above bands and EHF systems are particularly affected by precipitation the higher the frequency the greater the effect Precipitation not only degrades the signal but if heavy enough can cause a complete outage While the percentage of time a system will not be available due to D-7 Appendix D precipitation is small this is an operational constraint which must be considered during planning or operations j Sun Conjunctions Sun conjunctions in this context when a satellite is aligned between the Earth and sun cause communications disruptions and outages Since their time and duration can be predicted such events can be planned for and the impact on operations minimized k Considerations for Military Use of Commercial SATCOM Systems Access to commercial SATCOM systems raises several issues which must be considered 1 Communications are not protected 2 Potential competition for access with other customers including adversaries 3 Non-US ownership or control of commercial SATCOM services outside the borders of the US 4 The potential inability to quickly access commercial SATCOM capacity in many areas to which the military could deploy often on a short notice 5 Access and availability to commercial services are based on contractual terms which could be terminated at times not convenient to the military 6 Potential for commercial SATCOM unencrypted TT C links and lack of vendor ability to identify geolocate and support DOD jamming or interference response 7 Acquisition of commercial SATCOM may have time constraints and should be considered Additional time may be required if the vendor must obtain landing rights to operate and HN approval for frequencies from a foreign country l National Systems for Communications In some cases specialized DOD communications needs can be met through national systems As with MILSATCOM systems these assets may be highly subscribed and therefore require careful coordination and planning with national systems operators before military use can be ensured 5 Support Procedures The SATCOM requirements process is defined in CJCSI 6250 01 Satellite Communications A summary of the process is provided below a Requirements Process The ultimate objective for SATCOM management is to provide the right users SATCOM resources when and where needed in accordance with operational priorities DOD needs to continually assess the SATCOM systems' effectiveness in pursuit of this objective 1 The Joint Staff CCMDs Services and DOD agencies are all key stakeholders with MILSATCOM requirements CDRUSSTRATCOM per the UCP serves as the D-8 JP 3-14 Satellite Communications advocate for DOD operational SATCOM matters representing the DOD SATCOM community by coordinating and orchestrating consolidated user positions with CCMDs Services and agencies 2 Each GCC will consolidate validate and prioritize all requests for use of SATCOM systems within their AOR 3 CCMDs and Services will validate their requirements and submit them to the Joint SATCOM Panel co-chaired by the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM 4 DOD agencies will validate and submit requirements in support of their agency mission and or function to the Joint SATCOM Panel co-chaired by the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM 5 Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks and Information Integration is responsible for non-DOD and federal agency requirements b Format SATCOM requirements for user connectivity will be submitted via the SDB Management Tool or via DISA Form 772 SDB Requirement Request Form Current and future requirements will be submitted with the format described in the DISA-published SDB Management Tool user guide c Prioritization CCMDs Services and DOD agencies review each requirement to ensure that it is valid has a clear operational concept identifies the operational needs and missions supported and provides a mission impact if not satisfied The requirements are then prioritized by category as prescribed and documented in CJCSI 6250 01 Satellite Communications d Submission All SATCOM military and commercial requirements are submitted to the Joint Staff through the joint satellite communications panel administrator JSPA at DISA who administers the SDB e Future Requirements Future connectivity requirements are satisfied through ongoing changes to strategy doctrine forces weapon systems or changes in technology The SDB consolidates future SATCOM requirements to assist planners in determining future SATCOM capabilities trends architectures and acquisition strategies f SATCOM Access Access is requested via the SATCOM allocation process described in SI 714-4 Consolidated Satellite Communications SATCOM Management Policies and Procedures C-SMPP Lengthy lead times necessitate early planning for a satellite access request or gateway access request GAR Terminals identified in the satellite access request or GAR must be certified to operate on DOD satellites have approval to connect to the DODIN COMSEC keymat and have HN-approved frequencies if operating in a foreign country g Adjudication Per CJCSI 6250 01 Satellite Communications the CJCS has final adjudication authority for competing DOD SATCOM access requirements that cannot be resolved by CDRUSSTRATCOM D-9 Appendix D h Urgent Requirements For urgent requirements not documented in the SDB a request is submitted to USSTRATCOM with information copies to JSPA Urgent requirements can be submitted by CCDRs Service Chiefs and the directors of DOD agencies but they must be validated as an operational necessity The request must contain justification for urgent processing For urgent requirements the Joint Staff can grant a 30day waiver for SDB approval See JP 6-0 Joint Communications System for keystone communications doctrine D-10 JP 3-14 APPENDIX E SPACE-BASED POSITIONING NAVIGATION AND TIMING 1 Overview a Space-based PNT systems in combination with terminal units support strategic operational and tactical missions by providing the joint force with essential and precise three-dimensional position capability navigation options and a highly accurate time reference US military forces use GPS for their space-based PNT information b In conducting joint military operations it is essential that PNT services be available with the highest possible confidence PNT services must meet or exceed JFC mission requirements Any information that makes reference to time must be able to provide that time in terms of the standard temporal reference defined by UTC as maintained by the USNO master clock which is the standard for all military systems c GPS satellites broadcast navigation information on a continuous basis The transmission has two levels of service--a standard positioning service SPS and a precise positioning service PPS The positioning code in each permits very precise matching of receiver-generated and satellite-generated waveforms hence precise measurement of the distance to each satellite 1 SPS which utilizes the coarse acquisition code is the unencrypted civilian positioning and timing service that is provided to all GPS users 2 PPS is a more accurate military positioning velocity and timing service available to authorized encrypted users e g US military and some allies on a worldwide basis with limited AJ capabilities Access to PPS is controlled by use of cryptography encryption keys loaded in the terminal units d DOD Policy for Precise Positioning Service In 2005 Congress directed that all DOD aircraft ships combat vehicles and indirect-fire weapon systems must be equipped with a GPS receiver However certain federal civil agencies and multinational members are also authorized use of the PPS through department-level special agreements GPS policy is included in the DOD GPS Security Policy DODD 4650 05 Positioning Navigation and Timing and CJCSI 6130 01 2007 CJCS Master Positioning Navigation and Timing Plan MPNTP each requires all DOD assets to use a common precise time UTC USNO the standard geospatial reference frame defined by the World Geodetic System 1984 WGS-84 provided by NGA and a common precise celestial reference frame provided by USNO 1 Only DOD-approved PNT systems e g inertial navigation system and GPS PPS will be used for combat combat support and combat service support operations Exceptions to this policy are approved according to the MPNTP 2 GPS is the primary source of PNT information for the DOD Civil capabilities are permitted for use in peacetime operations when the use of the system does not jeopardize the ability to accomplish the US military mission E-1 Appendix E 3 All DOD combatant users must acquire train with and use GPS PPS systems in accordance with the DOD GPS Security Policy and the MPNTP 2 Application GPS plays a key role in military operations by enabling precise location and navigation in all four physical domains land maritime air and space and by providing precise timing in cyberspace GPS capabilities are increasing across the space control and user segments see Figure E-1 In addition to the precise location navigation and accurate timing some of the applications include a Land Operations The inherent precision of GPS allows precise site surveys emplacement of artillery target acquisition and navigation GPS establishes a common reference grid within the operational area enables a common time helps establish common direction and facilitates synchronized operations Some of the benefits of using GPS include 1 Mine fields and obstacles can be accurately surveyed emplaced and recorded 2 The accuracy of artillery fire is improved through precise gun emplacement precision gun laying precision observer location reduced target location error and precision guided artillery and mortar rounds Accuracy also considerably enhances the effects of massing artillery fires and facilitates fire support coordination measures 3 Armored mechanized and wheeled units can travel buttoned-up and still maintain highly accurate position awareness 4 Exact location and navigation information helps logistic support by expediting resupply efforts The precise information also supports the timely and efficient evacuation of wounded personnel to aid stations 5 Enables FFT 6 Enhances air support b Maritime Operations 1 Ships and submarines can precisely plot their position thereby allowing safe port operations and navigation through restricted waters 2 Coastlines can be accurately surveyed by using a combination of laser range finding and highly accurate position information 3 Mines can be laid and precisely plotted for friendly force avoidance and safe efficient retrieval 4 Rendezvous at sea sea rescue and other operations that require precise tracking can be facilitated using space-based PNT support E-2 JP 3-14 Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing The Global Positioning System Space Control and User Segments Space Segment Legacy Block IIA IIR Modernized Block IIR-M Modernized Block IIF Basic GPS C A civil signal L1C A Standard positioning service Precise positioning service L1 L2 P Y Nav NDS 2nd civil signal L2C M-code signals L1M L2M Flex AJ power 7 dB 3rd civil signal L5 Control Segment Legacy Upgraded AEP Modernized OCX V1 TT C L1 L2 monitoring IIR-M IIF TT C WAGE AII LADO SAASM New MCS AMCS New architecture Signal monitoring M-code User Segment Legacy Upgraded PLGR DAGR C SEL ADAP Modernized GAS-1 MAGR 2K GB-GRAM MGUE MUE MSR Legend IIA IIF IIR IIR-M ADAP AEP AII AJ AMCS C A C SEL DAGR dB Flex GAS-1 GB-GRAM GPS L1M block IIA block II follow on block II replenishment block II replenishment - modernized advanced digital antenna production architectural evolution program accuracy improvement initiative anti-jam alternate master control station coarse acquisition combat survivor evader location defense advanced GPS receiver decibel flexible GPS antenna system ground-based GPS received application module Global Positioning System M-code on the L1 frequency L2C L2M LADO civil signal on the L2 frequency M-code on the L2 frequency launch and early orbit anomaly resolution and disposal operations MAGR 2K miniaturized airborne GPS receiver 2000 M-code military code MCS master control station MGUE military GPS user equipment MSR modernized space receiver MUE modernized user equipment Nav navagation NDS nuclear detonation detection system OCX operational control segment P Y precise code PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver SAASM selective availability anti-spoofing module TT C telemetry tracking and commanding WAGE wide area GPS enhancement Figure E-1 The Global Positioning System Space Control and User Segments E-3 Appendix E 5 PNT enables precision weapons delivery as well as missile warning and defeat c Air Operations 1 Information on PNT enhances airdrop air refueling SAR reconnaissance terminal approach and recovery low-level navigation targeting and precision weapons delivery 2 Air corridors for friendly return-to-force procedures can be set with greater accuracy and aircraft have a greater capability to safely follow these corridors 3 Nontraditional ISR and dynamic targeting enables near-real-time reallocation of airborne firepower d Space Operations The GPS navigation service provides exact positioning to other satellites to enable their position autonomy The same service enables orbital rendezvous between space systems e g space docking for the Soyuz or other replenishment vehicle with the International Space Station It also provides precise time to communications satellites and to systems in geosynchronous orbits New launch vehicles rely upon GPS position and derived velocity information to aid in determining attitude orientation e Navigation Warfare NAVWAR encompasses various offensive defensive and support operations to ensure unimpeded availability of PNT information for the US and its multinational partners and when necessary deny PNT information to an adversary NAVWAR is a cross-domain air land sea space and cyberspace and cross-mission area capability enabled by taskable space systems EMS operations civil-military unity of effort and alternate sources of PNT information NAVWAR should be a consideration in all joint planning 3 Advantages a Accuracy The GPS constellation provides continuous global service Accuracy of the service is provided by the type of receiver used the number of satellites in view and the geometric configuration of those satellites b Accessibility Because GPS equipment is passive it is capable of providing continuous real-time information Any authorized user with a keyed PPS receiver has access to the most precise PNT information However commercial user equipment cannot receive and process the PPS information and is limited to the SPS signal c Graceful Degradation Each GPS satellite can store information onboard for up to 60 days In the event the GPS constellation cannot be updated accuracy will gradually degrade The rate of degradation is very slow in the first few days but increases with time This allows GPS to be used for several days even if the update capabilities are interrupted d Common Grid The default navigation grid used by the GPS is the WGS-84 WGS84 can be easily converted to any grid reference using the terminal device E-4 JP 3-14 Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing e Jamming Space-based navigation systems e g GPS are susceptible to jamming and interference The use of GPS encryption like a more robust military code and nulling antennas filters as well as the correct placement of GPS receivers on various platforms improves jamming resistance Tactical measures employed by joint forces decrease vulnerability from ground-based jamming such as placing a hand-held receiver at the bottom of a foxhole Integration of GPS with other sources of PNT such as inertial navigation systems can make a PNT solution even more robust to GPS jamming f Anti-Spoofing A S With the precise capability provided by the GPS a logical concern is that an adversary could generate false signals to mislead an authorized user with respect to position or timing information A S technology is designed to mitigate receiver confusion that could be caused by intentionally misleading transmissions 4 Limitations a Adversary exploitation of the SPS can reduce the US military advantage Commercial GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming b Jamming GPS can adversely affect civil and first responder operations as well as joint military operations within a geographic area The stronger the jammer the larger the affected area To account for potential GPS jamming CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs factor it into their EW plans Consideration must also be given to friendly interference which is mitigated via the joint restricted frequency list Coordination procedures for this list are detailed in JP 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare c Signals from at least four satellites are required to build a three-dimensional position and navigation picture only one signal is needed for timing Units relying on hand-held GPS receivers in areas of dense vegetation or steep terrain may have diminished GPS capabilities due to the lack of LOS reception of GPS signals d GPS navigation signals are also affected by ionospheric scintillation tropospheric errors and signal multipath issues Receivers capable of two frequency reception minimize errors e Denial of the GPS navigation signal may have a direct negative impact on joint systems that have nothing to do with navigation This is particularly true for communications systems that rely on GPS timing E-5 Appendix Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 APPENDIX F OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE 1 Overview a Per Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 9 July 2007 ORS is defined as assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of JFCs' needs ORS provides a means to synchronize and integrate space capabilities in time and purpose with the employment of other forces by the JFC ORS also provides the capacity to respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities and or provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities per National Security Presidential Directive NSPD -40 US Space Transportation Policy In doing so ORS balances the requirement to meet JFC urgent space needs with the need to innovate when adapting space capabilities to changing requirements Strategic or long-term needs are not a primary focus of ORS b Establishing Needs The CDRUSSTRATCOM validates system requirements for systems to be acquired by the ORS Office and provides operational oversight for all ORS activities consistent with the UCP and other applicable authorities This includes collecting prioritizing and managing identified joint force needs and coordinating ORS capabilities to meet those needs c Capability Development The ORS Office is a joint organization established under Section 2273a of Title 10 USC The mission of the office is to develop enabling capabilities to fulfill joint military operational requirements for on-demand space support and reconstitution and to coordinate and execute ORS efforts across DOD with respect to planning acquisition and operations Collaboration by the ORS Office with DOD IC and other national security space mission partners ensures a range of solutions are considered when providing responsive actionable and near-real-time space capabilities to commanders and other users The ORS Office expedites development and fielding of capabilities by architecting and demonstrating operational prototypes to both satisfy short-term urgent needs and illustrate proof of concepts in anticipation of eventual operational fielding through established acquisition processes 2 Application a ORS missions can support USSTRATCOM space mission areas of space force enhancement space control and space support by providing timely responsive space capabilities when needed b To accomplish these missions ORS capabilities are implemented in a three tiered approach 1 Tier-1 uses existing or on-station capabilities to create highly responsive space effects through the employment modification and revised application of these space capabilities The targeted timeframe for the application of Tier-1 solutions is immediatelyto-days from the time the need is identified Tier-1 solutions focus on existing ground and space systems operations and procedures Although mission or system utilization analysis F-1 Appendix F OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE A successful example of an operationally responsive space ORS space force enhancement capability delivery is ORS-1 In late 2007 Joint Functional Component Command for Space and United States Central Command USCENTCOM requested a solution to overcome an impending shortfall in intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR capabilities This shortfall was the result of normal degradation of on-orbit systems in concert with schedule slips to the replacement system In April of 2008 Commander United States Strategic Command CDRUSSTRATCOM validated this need and initiated the ORS process by tasking the ORS Office to assess the need and develop conceptual solutions The ORS Office formed an interagency team which further defined the requirements collected input from the broader space community including industry and developed a solution set These solution options were presented to CDRUSSTRATCOM and the decision was made to request execution of the ORS-1 satellite mission as the selected course of action In October of 2008 the ORS Executive Committee led by the Executive Agent for space approved ORS-1 Over the ensuing 30 months the ORS Office developed the complete ORS-1 mission spacecraft payload launch command and control tracking processing exploitation and dissemination with extensive input from USCENTCOM On June 28 2011 the ORS-1 satellite was launched into low-earth orbit by the Minotaur-1 launcher from National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Wallops Flight Facility One interesting aspect of the ORS-1 capability is the manner in which this system seamlessly integrates into USCENTCOM's existing architecture for tasking ISR collection systems and receiving products in return The key to this architecture is the adapted use of the Planning Tool for Resource Integration Synchronization and Management PRISM system within the USCENTCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center PRISM is the mechanism used by USCENTCOM to task many airborne ISR collection platforms including the high-altitude U2 system By adopting PRISM as the means for tasking the ORS-1 satellite the ORS-1 system was easily integrated into the USCENTCOM capability set In a similar manner use of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade to process and exploit the ORS-1 imagery resulted in re-use of an existing processing exploitation and dissemination process for which USCENTCOM had a high level of familiarity Various Sources may be needed Tier-1 solutions will not typically involve the design engineering or fabrication of new materiel items 2 If all possible Tier-1 options have been evaluated and no Tier-1 solution can respond to the need a Tier-2 solution will be considered Tier-2 solutions will utilize field- F-2 JP 3-14 Operationally Responsive Space ready capabilities or deploy new or additional capabilities that are field-ready The targeted timeframe for delivering usable Tier-2 solutions is days-to-weeks from the time the JFC need is established Tier-2 solutions focus on achieving responsive exploitation augmentation or reconstitution of space force enhancement or space control capabilities through rapid assembly integration testing and deployment of affordable small satellites 3 There may be cases where an expressed need cannot be addressed through existing capabilities Tier-1 or through rapid deployment of field-ready capabilities Tier-2 In such events ORS efforts must focus on the rapid development and deployment of a new capability Tier-3 Once developed Tier-3 capabilities will be responsively deployed and employed in the same manner as Tier-2 assets The targeted timeframe for the presentation of an operational Tier-3 capability is months-to-1-year of the established JFC need Meeting this challenging timeline cannot be accomplished unless the amount of new development involved is very limited c To develop capabilities ORS leverages existing technology and capabilities to maximize their benefits This includes exploring non-space options as well as other materiel and nonmateriel solutions 3 Advantages ORS helps to synchronize and integrate space capabilities in time and purpose with the employment of other forces by a JFC Advantages of ORS include a Rapid presentation of new or enhanced space capabilities in response to JFC needs These capabilities will be operational within one year of that need b Rapidly adapt or augment existing space capabilities when needed to expand operational capability c Rapidly reconstitute or replenish critical space capabilities to preserve operational capability providing the JFC assured persistent space power 4 Limitations a Shortened timelines will challenge every aspect of the development and deployment process and potentially increase risk b Congressionally suggested cost ceilings will require very well-defined JFC needs In turn these will drive minimal developmental approaches These cost ceilings may affect the ability to place satellites in other than LEO however there is nothing to restrict ORS satellites from taking advantage of a ride-share to MEO or geosynchronous Earth orbit GEO F-3 Appendix F Operationally Responsive Space-1 prior to launch at Wallops Flight Facility VA F-4 JP 3-14 APPENDIX G SPACE FUNDAMENTALS 1 General a Space is a domain enabling many joint force-essential capabilities These capabilities derive from exploitation of the unique characteristics of space among which include a global perspective and lack of overflight restrictions as well as the speed and persistence afforded by satellites 1 Global Perspective Space has been labeled the ultimate high ground for good reason Even LEO satellites which are relatively close to Earth's surface altitudes from roughly one hundred miles to a few hundred miles have fields of view spanning hundreds of miles At greater distances GEO satellites can view slightly over one-third of the Earth at once At this range only three evenly-positioned GEO satellites are needed to provide almost complete global communications coverage regions near the North and South Poles cannot be covered by GEO satellites due to reasons discussed below Thus space affords a global vantage point from which to assess several considerations from tactical to strategic levels 2 Lack of Overflight Restrictions Unlike the international rules for overflight of state aircraft under which nations may prevent--using force if needed--aircraft overflight there are no international satellite overflight restrictions Thus space provides unhindered access to points spanning the globe It is this unhindered capability of ISR communications and navigation coupled with the ability to traverse the globe in very short periods that provide capabilities unrivaled by other domains 3 Speed and Persistence Satellites travel at incredible rates of speed and unlike aircraft do not require constant propulsion to remain in orbit These factors enable satellites not only to cover vast amounts of ground in very short periods of time but also to provide continuous operation and coverage Often a satellite's life-span is limited only by the reliability of its onboard systems and the quantity of propellant available for station keeping and additional maneuvers b All of these unique aspects make space a very desirable domain within which to operate However space also has many peculiar characteristics which must be appreciated by joint forces to plan and operate effectively 2 Unique Characteristics of Space While physical laws on land in the water or in the air are directly observable and commonly understood at a fundamental level the physics of Earth-orbiting objects-- satellites --within the vacuum of space is more difficult to observe and understand The unique attributes of space have profound implications for the inherent capabilities and limitations that derive from them Consequently though a comprehensive discussion of orbital mechanics is neither possible nor desirable within this publication certain basic precepts must be understood to leverage space power effectively G-1 Appendix G a Gravitational Forces Predominate Due to the Earth's gravitational field satellites orbiting the Earth are in a constant state of falling toward the Earth's center At the same time the satellite is hurtling at extremely high speeds in a direction near-horizontal to the Earth's surface On average the Earth's surface curves downward five meters for every eight kilometers traveled horizontally Consequently if a satellite is to stay in a simple circular LEO it must traverse eight kilometers of the Earth's surface in the time required to fall five meters toward the Earth's center In essence the Earth's surface will curve away at a rate proportional to the rate the satellite is falling and the satellite will never actually hit the Earth The horizontal speed required to achieve this circular LEO is roughly 17 500 miles per hour The speeds required for orbit insertion and the rates at which a satellite falls to Earth are dependent on the altitude and shape of the orbit in question An orbit is the trajectory or path through space a satellite will follow due to Earth's gravity The time it takes a satellite to complete one full revolution on its orbit trajectory is known as its period b Orbits Are Fixed in Space With the exception of a few external forces see perturbations discussion below orbits do not move That is a given satellite's orbit is fixed in space while the Earth rotates beneath the orbit and while the satellite itself races around the orbit like a car on a racetrack This phenomenon results from the satellite's angular momentum A gyroscope illustrates the effects of angular momentum on a much smaller scale When holding a spinning gyroscope it is difficult to twist in various directions The inertia or resistance to positional change is the effect of the gyroscope's angular momentum Satellites' high altitudes and thus great radial distances from Earth's center and very high velocities mean satellites have tremendous angular momenta implying extremely large inertias and thus orbital planes that are very resistant to movement Therefore they are not easily repositioned c Satellites Are Not Very Maneuverable Contrary to popular but misleading conceptions about maneuvering in space satellites cannot maneuver much if at all because of the effects of angular momentum Maneuvering such as changing an orbit's size or inclination costs fuel and can severely limit the life of a satellite As a historical example if a space shuttle used every bit of onboard fuel to change its orbital plane the maximum plane change it could effect would amount to no more than two and a half degrees A more important inference drawn from these limits is that satellites cannot hover over a given point on Earth nor can they bend their orbital planes to maneuver to a specified point Thus a satellite's arrival over a particular point on the Earth depends almost wholly upon the passage of time as the Earth rotates through the plane of the satellite's orbit and the satellite orbits around the Earth d Orbital Planes Must Pass Through Earth's Center Gravity is the predominant force continuously pulling the satellite toward Earth's center Because of this phenomenon any orbit traced by a satellite must be within a plane that passes through the center of the Earth Practically this means orbits cannot be designed to be offset or overhead e g a halo orbit over the North Pole to one side or another from the Earth each orbit must encircle the Earth e Perturbations Can Change an Orbit Certain external forces can change the parameters of an orbit producing an exception to the general rule that orbits are fixed in G-2 JP 3-14 Space Fundamentals space These forces are generally known as perturbations because they perturb or alter the orbit These include atmospheric drag atmospheric particles exist even at very high altitudes albeit in very low concentrations gravitational pull of the sun Moon and other planets variations in the Earth's gravitational field resulting in orbital plane changes and other effects solar pressure from the sun's radiation and interactions between solar radiation and the Earth's magnetic field Perturbations have significant impacts on planning considerations For example contrary to popularly held notions about satellite tracking no country has the ability to continuously track every satellite orbiting Earth However if a satellite's position is known at several points predictive models using basic laws of physics can be used to calculate the satellite's future position Unfortunately orbital perturbations can degrade the accuracy of those models Generally the lower a satellite's altitude the shorter the accuracy duration of a given model and consequently the greater the need for upto-date prediction data see paragraph 3 Operational Considerations f Certain Orbits Have Special Characteristics Certain orbits have features that seemingly violate the general rules discussed above On closer examination however these apparent exceptions are seen nonetheless to follow the general rules 1 Geosynchronous Geostationary Geosynchronous satellites track in their orbit around the Earth at the same rate at which the Earth rotates upon its axis they are synchronized to the Earth's rotation Therefore these satellites have a period of 24 hours Note The Earth makes a rotation around its axis in a sidereal day about 23 hours and 56 minutes as indicated in Figure G-1 during that time it moves a short distance about 1 degree along its orbit around the sun So after a sidereal day has passed the Earth still needs to rotate a bit more before the sun reaches its highest point A solar day is therefore nearly 4 minutes longer than a sidereal day If placed directly over the equator to a groundbased observer a satellite in such an orbit appears to hover a little over 22 000 statute miles above that point However the satellite is actually moving very fast in pace with Earth's rotation This special but very common type of geosynchronous orbit is called geostationary because it appears stationary above Earth GEO orbits allow constant LOS with a given very large slightly over one-third of the Earth footprint and thus lend themselves readily to gross environmental imagery i e tens-of-square-miles pixel sizes and global communications This effect only occurs at this specific altitude and inclination resulting in a band of valuable space real estate known as the Geosynchronous Belt An exception occurs near the poles where communication with high north or south latitudes roughly 75 degrees or greater is not possible because of a lack of LOS with the satellite 2 Sun-Synchronous Natural perturbations will cause satellite orbits to change over time and mission planners can use this effect to their advantage Such is the case with sun-synchronous orbits see Figure G-2 Although often modeled as symmetric the Earth actually is non-spherical with an asymmetric mass distribution A cross-section of the Earth is about 44 kilometers wider at the equator than at the poles with varying mass properties e g water versus mountains This oblateness of the Earth causes an orbital perturbation known as the J2 effect to alter the orientation and rotation of an orbital plane By incorporating the J2 effect and carefully selecting the inclination of the orbit a satellite can be placed in an orbital plane that shifts by slightly less than one degree per day to the east The result is when the satellite passes over a given point it will do so with the same sun G-3 Appendix G Orbit Types Highly Elliptical Orbit Geosynchronous Orbit Molniya DSP Altitude 400 km at perigee 40 000 km at apogee Speed 10 13 km s at perigee Period 11 hours 58 minutes Altitude 35 786 km Speed 3 075 km s Period 23 hours 56 minutes Semi-Synchronous Orbit Low Earth Orbit GPS DMSP Altitude 20 184 km Speed 3 8746 km s Period 11 hours 58 minutes Altitude 850 km Speed 7 426 km s Period 101 minutes Legend DMSP DSP GPS Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Defense Support Program Global Positioning System km km s kilometers kilometers per second Figure G-1 Orbit Types angle hence the label sun-synchronous This does not imply that a sun-synchronous satellite passes over the same point every day only that when the satellite does pass over a given point along its ground track it will have the same sun angle and thus the sun shadows cast by features on the Earth's surface will not change These types of orbits are particularly useful for reconnaissance and weather applications where maintaining a constant viewing condition is critical e g height determination change detection 3 Highly Elliptical Orbit An HEO as its name implies is a very flat ovalshaped orbit The usefulness of such orbits derives from the fact that satellites close to Earth travel quickly and those further away travel slowly At their most distant points from Earth satellites in HEO orbits can be over 25 000 miles away The relatively slow satellite speeds at these points combined with long orbit tracks provide HEO satellites long dwell times at these distance points again giving the appearance that satellites in these orbits hover for a time being Such orbits are normally inclined so that these long dwell times occur over highlatitude points on Earth ideally suiting them for communication satellites serving highG-4 JP 3-14 Space Fundamentals Sun-Synchronous Orbits Typical Low Earth Orbit Sun-Synchronous Orbit Figure G-2 Sun-Synchronous Orbits latitude locales e g Russia Scandinavia Canada Although many types of HEO orbits are possible the most useful is termed a Molniya orbit from the Russian word for lightning so named because of the dramatic speed of the satellite as it passes close to Earth In general the oblateness of the Earth perturbs the argument of perigee so that even if the apogee started near the North Pole it would gradually move unless constantly corrected with station keeping thruster burns To avoid this expenditure of fuel the Molniya orbit uses an inclination of 63 4 degrees for which these perturbations are zero This type of orbit inclined at 63 4 degrees maintains perigee in the Southern hemisphere so that it dwells in the Northern hemisphere for nearly 11 hours of its 12-hour period Three satellites set in phased Molniya orbits could thus provide continuous Northern-tier coverage Other applications include weather and ISR A variety of commonly used orbit types and their parameters are described in Figure G-1 4 Lagrangian Orbits While the above orbits are used for the vast majority of DOD satellites there are other useful orbits including Lagrangian orbits Five points L1L5 near any two large objects in space e g the Earth and Moon are within both bodies' influence and revolve around the larger body at the same rate as smaller body These points are ideal locations for sun-observing satellites such as the Solar Heliospheric Observatory--a joint European Space Agency-NASA mission Ka was launched in December 1995 and NASA's Advanced Composition Explorer satellite was launched in August 1997 Both of these satellites orbit the sun near the L1 Lagrange point between Earth and the sun--a unique orbit where the satellite stays on the line between the sun and Earth where their gravities balance In this orbit these satellites have a prime view of the solar wind and provide near-real-time 24 7 continuous coverage of solar wind parameters and solar energetic particle intensities for example coronal mass ejections and solar flares which can G-5 Appendix G disrupt radio transmissions and cause damage to satellites and electrical transmission line facilities resulting in potentially massive and long lasting power outages 5 Low Earth Orbit There is no formal definition of LEO but it is generally considered to have an apogee of no more than 1000 kilometers from farthest point from the point in the orbit to the center of the earth At low altitudes atmospheric drag will limit a satellite's life unless it is boosted periodically into a higher altitude therefore operational life will be dependent on the amount of fuel available At an altitude of 320 kilometers without any boosting operational life would be expected to be around one year increasing to around 10 years at an altitude of 800 kilometers LEO is ideal for observation environmental monitoring small communications satellites and science instrument payloads Manned orbital objects such as the International Space Station generally remain below 500 kilometers to prevent the need for heavy shielding to protect the crew from Van Allen belt radiation Objects in LEO have the advantage that they pass relatively close to the Earth so they can use less powerful sensors and transmitters but will only be in the view of a ground user or station for the short period of time when overhead For this reason for some applications it is usual to provide a constellation of several satellites spaced around the same or similar orbits to provide continuous coverage A satellite in circular LEO with an altitude of 850 kilometers will travel at a speed of 24 600 kilometers per hour about 7 kilometers per second and have a period of 101 minutes 6 Medium Earth Orbit Additionally there is no formal definition of MEO but by convention it is considered to include those orbits between LEO and geostationary orbit A semi-synchronous orbit is a special case of a MEO which has a nearly circular orbit which repeats an identical ground trace twice each day hence the term semi-synchronous The GPS satellites use this type of orbit at an altitude of around 20 830 kilometers and speed of around 14 330 kilometers per hour g One Satellite Often Is Not Enough No one-size-fits-all satellite exists for every application Even satellites perfectly optimized for a particular mission may lack the required coverage for that mission In such cases a constellation--multiple satellites performing a single mission--is used to provide increased coverage or timeliness to meet mission requirements For example navigation constellations such as GPS are designed to ensure that signals from at least four satellites can be simultaneously received at any location on the ground enabling three-dimensional position fixing unavailable using only a single GPS satellite Other examples include communications constellations which are designed to ensure continuous connectivity between both ends of the communications link To provide truly global coverage such systems may include both equatorial and polar components A final example includes weather and reconnaissance systems which typically require constellations that combine both high and low altitude components This construct provides a capability to combine wide-area low-resolution coverage with limited field-of-view highresolution coverage to provide a complete weather picture Regardless of configuration constellations are designed to optimize mission components across multiple satellites so that overall mission requirements are met G-6 JP 3-14 Space Fundamentals 3 Operational Considerations The unique characteristics of space drive important operational considerations that must be weighed when planning to provide space services and capabilities to the joint force a Revisit Rates Revisit rate refers to the interval between successive passes of a satellite over the same point on the Earth Revisit rates are dependent on the geometry of the orbit itself as well as its period the time required for a satellite to complete one orbit The larger the orbit the longer the period will be For example typical LEO periods average from 90 minutes to a few hours During this time the Earth will continue to rotate on its axis beneath the orbit Thus by the time the satellite completes one orbit its track over the Earth has shifted appreciably Revisit rates for some satellites are as much as several days while other satellites have much shorter revisit rates depending on the orbit In the extreme GEO satellites have no revisit rate since these satellites constantly maintain LOS with particular sectors of the Earth b Access Windows Access window refers to the amount of time a given satellite will be able to maintain LOS geometry with a fixed point on Earth's surface With the exception of satellites in GEO and HEO orbits a satellite cannot dwell over a fixed point for any prolonged length of time The closer a satellite is to the Earth's surface the faster it will travel and the smaller the field of view available to that satellite LEO satellites for example can maintain sensor contact and or communications with a fixed point for only about 10 to 15 minutes Access times and fields of view for other satellites increase proportionally to increasing satellite altitudes Just as knowledge of friendly access windows ensures timely satellite contact knowledge of enemy access windows helps in planning appropriate countertactics c Currency of Predictive Data Parameters describing a given satellite's position in space are derived from various sensors' observations of the satellite's azimuth elevation and range These position snapshots are used to predict future satellite locations Generally the lower a satellite's orbital altitude the shorter the time window within which a given prediction will remain accurate because aggregate perturbation impacts such as atmospheric drag increase in severity with decreasing altitude Consequently for satellites in LEO predictive models usually cannot provide accuracy within required tolerances beyond roughly one or two days For the field-deployed joint force this fact drives the need to ensure data sets are as current as possible for all orbits increasing in importance for orbits closest to Earth d Electromagnetic Interference Every capability leveraged from space derives from the EMS whether the capability enables ISR communications or navigation All of these capabilities are thus subject to disturbances known as EMI EMI can be natural or manmade An example of natural EMI derives from effects caused by Earth's ionosphere This outer region of Earth's atmosphere consists of ionized atmospheric gases that create random noise within the EMS However this is not a uniform region The sun's electromagnetic energy and the Earth's magnetic field interact in complex ways to strengthen or weaken this interference with both global and local impacts Understanding and predicting these impacts help to mitigate their effect through preparation e g selecting different operating G-7 Appendix G frequencies boosting power timing transmissions to occur during periods of minimum interference This understanding also helps in space control where employment of capabilities can be masked by and or attributed to environmental impacts An example of man-made EMI is drawn from jamming where a stronger electromagnetic signal is used to overpower a weaker signal Knowledge of the space domain and of threat capabilities can help mitigate both natural and man-made EMI e Lack of Serviceability Normally space assets are not serviceable after launch the Hubble Space Telescope International Space Station being the most common exceptions This means that their ability to change functions recover from failures or attacks or maneuver is based almost entirely on the design of the system at the time of deployment some software uploads may be possible This limits flexibility compared to terrestrial assets which can be serviced repaired or upgraded Lack of serviceability puts tighter constraints on the operational C2 since some requests can reduce the asset lifetime e g too much fuel expenditure or too much battery depletion during eclipses G-8 JP 3-14 APPENDIX H REFERENCES The development of JP 3-14 is based upon the following primary references 1 Federal Law a Title 10 USC b Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 2 Strategy and Policy Documents a The National Security Strategy of the United States b The National Defense Strategy of the United States c National Military Strategy d NSPD-27 US Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy e NSPD-39 US Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing Policy f NSPD-40 US Space Transportation Policy g National Space Policy of the United States of America h Unified Command Plan i National Security Space Strategy j Presidential Policy Directive-4 National Space Policy 3 Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance a DODD 3100 16 DOD Management of Space Professional Development b Report to Congressional Defense Committees DOD Plan for Operationally Responsive Space c DOD Global Positioning System Security Policy 4 Department of Defense a DODD 3100 10 Department of Defense Space Policy b DODD 4650 05 Positioning Navigation and Timing PNT c DODD 5100 01 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components H-1 Appendix H d DODD 5105 19 Defense Information Systems Agency DISA e DODD 5105 60 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency NGA f DODD 5105 62 Defense Threat Reduction Agency g DODI 3100 12 Space Support h DODI S-3100 13 Space Force Application i DODI S-3100 14 Space Force Enhancement j DODI S-3100 15 Space Control 5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a CJCSI 3110 01H 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JSCP b CJCSI 3910 01A Friendly Force Tracking Operations Guidance c CJCSI 6130 01D 2007 CJCS Master Positioning Navigation and Timing Plan MPNTP d CJCSI 6210 02B Information and Operational Architecture of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment System e CJCSI 6250 01D Satellite Communications f CJCSM 3122 01A Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JOPES Volume I Planning Policies and Procedures g CJCSM 3122 03C Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JOPES Volume II Planning Formats h CJCSM 3219 01C Interruption of Remote Sensing Space System Data Collection and Distribution During Periods of National Security Crisis 6 Joint Publications a JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States b JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms c JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations d JP 2-01 3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment e JP 2-03 Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations H-2 JP 3-14 References f JP 3-0 Joint Operations g JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats h JP 3-05 Special Operations i JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations j JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations k JP 3-13 Information Operations l JP 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare m JP 3-16 Multinational Operations n JP 3-27 Homeland Defense o JP 3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations p JP 3-59 Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations q JP 3-60 Joint Targeting r JP 4-0 Joint Logistics s JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning t JP 6-0 Joint Communications System 7 International Law a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1967 b Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 1977 c Charter of the United Nations 1945 8 Service Publications a Air Force Doctrine Document 3-14 Space Operations b Army Regulation 115-11 Geospatial Information and Services c Army Regulation 900-1 Army Space Policy H-3 Appendix H d Field Manual 3-14 Space in Support of Army Operations e Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5400 43 Navy Space Policy Implementation 9 Supporting Documents a CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8035 Change 2 b CDRUSSTRATCOM Operational Directive for JFCC SPACE c CDRUSSTRATCOM Strategic Command Instruction 534-5 Space-Based Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness SB-JBFSA Support to Combatant Commands and Allies d CDRUSSTRATCOM Concept of Operations Operationally Responsive Space ORS e CDRUSSTRATCOM Strategic Instruction 534-19 Operationally Responsive Space f JFCC SPACE Concept of Operations g Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University Space Industry Study h SI 714-02 SATCOM System Expert SSE and Consolidated SSE C-SSE Responsibilities i SI 714-03 Satellite Communications SATCOM Support Center SSC Management j SI 714-05 Satellite Communications SATCOM Electromagnetic Interference EMI Resolution Procedures k SI 714-05 Space System Electromagnetic Interference EMI Resolution Procedures H-4 JP 3-14 APPENDIX J ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 1 User Comments Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to Joint Staff J-7 Deputy Director Joint and Coalition Warfighting Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center ATTN Joint Doctrine Support Division 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk VA 23435-2697 These comments should address content accuracy usefulness consistency and organization writing and appearance 2 Authorship The lead agent for this publication is the US Strategic Command The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations J-3 3 Supersession This publication supersedes JP 3-14 06 January 2009 Space Operations 4 Change Recommendations a Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC J7-JEDD b Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director Joint and Coalition Warfighting Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Support Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development J-7 JEDD c When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated 5 Distribution of Publications Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted However access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance with DOD Manual 5200 01 Volume 1 DOD Information Security Program Overview Classification and Declassification and DOD Manual 5200 01 Volume 3 DOD Information Security Program Protection of Classified Information J-1 Appendix J 6 Distribution of Electronic Publications a Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at https jdeis js mil NIPRNET and http jdeis js smil mil SIPRNET and on the JEL at http www dtic mil doctrine NIPRNET b Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs Services and Joint Staff Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy Defense Attache Office to DIA Defense Foreign Liaison IE-3 200 MacDill Blvd Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling Washington DC 20340-5100 c JEL CD-ROM Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the CCMDs and Services J-2 JP 3-14 GLOSSARY PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AEHF AF AFSCN AFSPC AFSTRAT AFWA AJ AOI AOR A S advanced extremely high frequency Air Force Air Force Satellite Control Network Air Force Space Command Air Forces Strategic Air Force Weather Agency anti-jam area of interest area of responsibility anti-spoofing BDA BMDS battle damage assessment ballistic missile defense system C2 CBRN CCDR CCMD CDRUSSTRATCOM CHCSS CJCS CJCSI CJCSM C-NAF CO COA COCOM COG COMAFFOR COMFLTCYBERCOM COMSEC COMTENTHFLT CONOPS CONPLAN COP CSA C-SMPP CSS C-SSE command and control chemical biological radiological and nuclear combatant commander combatant command Commander United States Strategic Command Chief Central Security Service Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual component numbered air force cyberspace operations course of action combatant command command authority center of gravity commander Air Force forces Commander Fleet Cyber Command communications security Commander Tenth Fleet concept of operations concept plan common operational picture combat support agency Consolidated Satellite Communications Management Policies and Procedures central security service consolidated satellite communications system expert DEFSMAC DI E Defense Special Missile and Aerospace Center data integration and exploitation GL-1 Glossary DIA DIRNSA DIRSPACEFOR DISA DMSP DNI DOC DOD DODD DODI DODIN DSC DSCA D T ID DTRA Defense Intelligence Agency Director National Security Agency director of space forces USAF Defense Information Systems Agency Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Director of National Intelligence Department of Commerce Department of Defense Department of Defense directive Department of Defense instruction Department of Defense information networks defensive space control defense support of civil authorities detect track identify Defense Threat Reduction Agency EHF EMI EMS EW extremely high frequency electromagnetic interference electromagnetic spectrum electronic warfare FDO FFT FLTSAT FMO FNMOC flexible deterrent option friendly force tracking fleet satellite functional manager office Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center GAR GBS GCC GEO GEOINT GI S GPS gateway access request Global Broadcast Service geographic combatant commander geosynchronous Earth orbit geospatial intelligence geospatial information and services Global Positioning System HEO HN HQ highly elliptical orbit host nation headquarters IA IC IGO IO ISR information assurance intelligence community intergovernmental organization information operations intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance GL-2 JP 3-14 Glossary J-2 JFC JFCC-GS JFCC-IMD JIPOE JP JSPA JSPOC intelligence directorate of a joint staff joint force commander Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Space USSTRATCOM joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment joint publication joint satellite communications panel administrator Joint Space Operations Center LEO LOO LOS LPD LPI low Earth orbit line of operation line of sight low probability of detection low probability of intercept MARFORSTRAT MASINT MDA MEO METOC MILSATCOM MNF MOC MPNTP MSIC MUOS United States Marine Corps Forces United States Strategic Command measurement and signature intelligence Missile Defense Agency medium Earth orbit meteorological and oceanographic military satellite communications multinational force maritime operations center Master Positioning Navigation and Timing Plan Missile and Space Intelligence Center Mobile Users Object System NASA NASIC NATO NAVOCEANO NAVWAR NGA NGIC NGO NIPRNET NOAA NRO NSA NSG National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Air and Space Intelligence Center North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Oceanographic Office navigation warfare National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Ground Intelligence Center nongovernmental organization Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency National System for Geospatial Intelligence JFCC-ISR JFCC-Space GL-3 Glossary NSPD NTIA national security Presidential directive National Telecommunications and Information Administration OE OPCON OPIR OPLAN ORS OSC OSEI operational environment operational control overhead persistent infrared operation plan operationally responsive space offensive space control operational significant event imagery PED PI PIRT PNT POC POES PPS processing exploitation and dissemination purposeful interference purposeful interference response team positioning navigation and timing point of contact polar operational environment satellite precise positioning service RF RPO RSSC radio frequency rendezvous and proximity operations regional satellite communications support center SAR SARSAT SATCOM SCA SDB SecDef SEW SHF SI SIGINT SIPRNET SPS SSA SSE SSWG SWPC search and rescue search and rescue satellite-aided tracking satellite communications space coordinating authority Satellite Communications Database Secretary of Defense shared early warning super-high frequency United States Strategic Command strategic instruction signals intelligence SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network standard positioning service space situational awareness space support element space support working group Space Weather Prediction Center TACON TES TT C TW A tactical control theater event system telemetry tracking and commanding threat warning and assessment GL-4 JP 3-14 Glossary UCP UFO UHF UN USASMDC ARSTRAT USC USCYBERCOM USG USMC USNO USSTRATCOM UTC Unified Command Plan ultrahigh frequency follow-on ultrahigh frequency United Nations United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command Army Forces Strategic Command United States Code United States Cyber Command United States Government United States Marine Corps United States Naval Observatory United States Strategic Command Coordinated Universal Time WGS WGS 84 WMD Wideband Global Satellite Communications World Geodetic System 1984 weapons of mass destruction GL-5 PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Army space support team None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 attack assessment An evaluation of information to determine the potential or actual nature and objectives of an attack for the purpose of providing information for timely decisions JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 ballistic missile early warning system None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 constellation A system consisting of a number of like satellites acting in concert to perform a specific mission Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 Coordinated Universal Time None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 Defense Meteorological Satellite Program None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 Defense Satellite Communications System Geosynchronous military communications satellites that provide high data rate communications for military forces diplomatic corps and the White House Also called DSCS Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 Defense Support Program Satellites that provide early warning of missile launches Also called DSP Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 defensive space control Operations conducted to preserve the ability to exploit space capabilities via active and passive actions while protecting friendly space capabilities from attack interference or unintentional hazards JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 friendly force tracking A system that provides commanders and forces with location information about friendly and hostile military forces Approved for replacement of blue force tracking and its definition in JP 1-02 Global Positioning System A satellite-based radio navigation system operated by the Department of Defense to provide all military civil and commercial users with precise positioning navigation and timing Also called GPS JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 ionosphere None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 link encryption None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 maneuverable reentry vehicle None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 multiple reentry vehicle None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 multispectral imagery The image of an object obtained simultaneously in a number of discrete spectral bands Also called MSI JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 GL-6 JP 3-14 Glossary navigation warfare Deliberate defensive and offensive action to assure and prevent positioning navigation and timing information through coordinated employment of space cyberspace and electronic warfare operations Also called NAVWAR Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02 negation In space operations active and offensive measures to deceive disrupt degrade deny or destroy space capabilities being used to interfere with or attack United States allied systems Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 offensive space control Those operations to prevent an adversary's hostile use of United States third-party space capabilities and services or negate deceive disrupt degrade deny or destroy an adversary's efforts to interfere with or attack United States allied space systems Also called OSC Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 overhead persistent infrared Those systems originally developed to detect and track foreign intercontinental ballistic missile systems Also called OPIR Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02 period The time it takes for a satellite to complete one orbit around the earth JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 polar orbit A satellite orbit that passes over the North and South Poles on each orbit has an angle of inclination relative to the equator of 90 degrees and eventually passes over all points on the earth Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 prevention In space usage measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of United States or third-party space systems and services Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 protection 1 Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel equipment facilities information and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area JP 3-0 2 In space usage active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary's attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 proximity operations None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 purposeful interference None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 regional satellite communications support center United States Strategic Command operational element responsible for providing the operational communications planners with a point of contact for accessing and managing satellite communications resources Also called RSSC Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space None Approved for incorporation from JP 1-02 GL-7 Glossary space asset Equipment that is an individual part of a space system which is or can be placed in space or directly supports space activity terrestrially Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space-based infrared system None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 space capability 1 The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission 2 The ability of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in or through space Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space control Operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and when directed deny an adversary freedom of action in space Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space coordinating authority A commander or individual assigned responsibility for planning integrating and coordinating space operations support in the operational area Also called SCA Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space force application Combat operations in through and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict by holding terrestrial targets at risk Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space force enhancement Combat support operations and force-multiplying capabilities delivered from space systems to improve the effectiveness of military forces as well as support other intelligence civil and commercial users Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space forces The space and terrestrial systems equipment facilities organizations and personnel necessary to access use and if directed control space for national security JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 space power The total strength of a nation's capabilities to conduct and influence activities to in through and from space to achieve its objectives JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 space sensor None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 space situational awareness Cognizance of the requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space environment and the operational environment upon which space operations depend Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space superiority The degree of dominance in space of one force over any others that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from space-based threats Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space support Launching and deploying space vehicles maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit rendezvous and proximity operations disposing of including deorbiting and recovering space capabilities and reconstitution of space forces if required Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 GL-8 JP 3-14 Glossary space surveillance The observation of space and of the activities occurring in space Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 space systems All of the devices and organizations forming the space network Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 sun-synchronous orbit An orbit in which the satellite's orbital plane is at a fixed orientation to the sun i e the orbit precesses about the earth at the same rate that the earth orbits the sun Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 terrestrial environment The Earth's land area including its man-made and natural surface and sub-surface features and its interfaces and interactions with the atmosphere and the oceans JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-14 theater event system Architecture for reporting ballistic missile events composed of three independent processing and reporting elements the joint tactical ground stations tactical detection and reporting and the space-based infrared system mission control station Also called TES Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 very small aperture terminal None Approved for removal from JP 1-02 GL-9 Glossary Intentionally Blank JP 3 14 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JP 1 JOINT DOCTRINE JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP JP 3-0 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0 PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above Joint Publication JP 3-14 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process STEP #1 - Initiation STEP #4 - Maintenance l l l l JP published and continuously assessed by users Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication Revision begins 3 5 years after publication Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature l l l l l l Maintenance Joint doctrine development community JDDC submission to fill extant operational void Joint Staff JS J-7 conducts frontend analysis Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation Program directive PD development and staffing joint working group PD includes scope references outline milestones and draft authorship JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent LA Service combatant command JS directorate Initiation ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION Approval Development STEP #3 - Approval l l l l JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 JS J-7 prepares publication for signature JSDS prepares JS staffing package JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature STEP #2 - Development l l l l l l LA selects primary review authority PRA to develop the first draft FD PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC FD comment matrix adjudication JS J-7 produces the final coordination FC draft staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing JSAP system Joint Staff doctrine sponsor JSDS adjudicates FC comment matrix FC joint working group This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu