UNCLASSIFIED Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Detention and Interrogation Program Executive Summary Approved December 13 2012 Updated for Release April 3 2014 Declassi corion Revisions December 3 2014 Page I of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED a ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be suspect 28 then informed the management of the Renditions Group that no professional in the eld would credit and later judgments as assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures 329 At the end of their deployment in June 2003 SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a basis by an experienced interrogator known to him who would assess how forthcoming he is and remind him that there are differing consequences for coo eratin or not cooperating 33 O In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review noted that concerns about con ict of were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an which only they were approved to employ judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique at a daily compensation reported to be $1800 day or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique 331 D The Detention and Interrogation of Abd aI Rahirn aI-Nashiri I CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri s Level of Cooperation Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques M Abd al Rahim al Nashiri 332 assessed by the CIA to be an al- Qa ida terrorist operations planner who was intimately involved in planning both the USS Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid October 2002 333 He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government including on plotting in the Persian Gulf 334 and was then rendered by the 32 The email which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site stated that allthough these guys believe that their way is the only way there should be an effort to de ne roles and responsibilities before their arro ance and narcissism evolve into un roductive conflict in the field ee email from h 1 subject mm tasting for IC DUNBAR and date June 16 2003 at 4 54 32 PM 319 Email from RDG Tasking for IC DUNBAR and SWIGERT date June 20 2003 at 2 19 53 PM 33 12168 3018222 JUN 03 The June 2013 Response states In practice by April 2003 staff had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the program As it concerned and however the appearance of impropriety continued albeit to a lesser degree because they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated emphasis added The June 2013 Response is inaccurate For example in June 2003 SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM a detainee whom they had interrogated 33' Memorandum for Ins ector General Attention Assistant 10 for Investigations from M D edical Services- re Draft Special Review Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program 2003-7123-IG at 13 For more information on al-Nashiri see detainee review of Abd al Rahim al Nashiri in Volume 3 ALEC - 11357 0212422 DEC 02 _36710 33 See 36595 36726 ALEC For disseminated intelli ence see IA For other reiortini from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody see Page 66 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CLA to DETENTION SITE COB ALT in Country I on November I 2002 where he was held for - days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November I 2002 335 At DETENTION SITE GREEN al-Nashiri was interrogated using the enhanced interrogation techniques including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times 336 In December 2002 when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE M In total aI-Nashiri was subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods with each period typically ending with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative 338 Of cers at CIA Head uarters disagreed with these assessments with the deputy chief of ALEC Station commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should not make sweeping statements in cable traffic regarding aI-Nashiri s compliance 339 Of cers at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques based on4their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent attacks 3 0 M Shortly after aI-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE CIA interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri s cooperation and compliance by his engagement and willingness to answer questions while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his compliance based on the speci c actionable intelligence he had provided or the lack thereof For example in December 2002 interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was cooperative and truthful and that the consensus at the detention site was that aI-Nashiri was 70868 For disseminated intelligence see 33 AI-Nashiri's time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records As described elsewhere standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation loud continuous music isolation and dietary manipulation Based on CIA records the other four enhanced interrogation periods of al Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 5-8 2002 December 27 2002 January 1 2003 January 9 10 2003 and January 15-27 2003 See 10030 1115412 DEC 02 10073 2117332 DEC 02 10140 0317272 JAN 03 ALEC 1917292 JAN 03 339 Email from to cc subject SITE follow-up date December 15 2002 34 See for example ALEC 0723152 DEC 02 ALEC - 1303522 DEC 02 ALEC - I 802472 DEC 02 ALEC 1917292 I AN 03 CIA Of ce of Inspector General Report of Investigation Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at SITE October 29 2003 See also CIA Of ce of Inspector General report Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities September 2001 - October 2003 2003 7 123-16 released on Mai 7 2004 Page 67 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu