UNCLASSIFIED Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee Study of the Detention and Interrogation Program Executive Summary Approved December 13 2012 Updated for Release April 3 2014 Declassi corion Revisions December 3 2014 Page I of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense did not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national security reasons warranting nondisclosure existed that is tired of taking hits for CIA ghost detainees and that the U S government should not be in the position of causing people to disappear 718 M Despite numerous meetings and communications within the executive branch throughout 2004 the United States did not formally respond to the January 6 letter until June 13 2005 719 2 CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program Imbalanced and Inaccurate Responds with Inaccurate Information CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA 's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General M The Of ce of the Inspector General 016 was first informed of the Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002 nine months after Abu lebaydah became the rst detainee As described the information was conveyed by the BBQ who also informed the OIG of the death of On Rahman In January 2003 the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized interrogation techniques against Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri Separately the OIG received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights according to the OlG s Special W During the course of the 016 s interviews numerous CIA of cers expressed concerns about the lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 21 Other CIA of cers expressed concern about the analytical assumptions driving interrogations 722 as well as the lack of language and cultural background among 7'8 Email from to John Rizzo cc Jose Rodriguez John P Mudd subject DoD s position on ICRC noti cation date September 13 2004 7'9 June 13 2005 Letter to ICRC responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale 72 Special Review Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities September 2001 October 2003 2003-7123-IG 7 May 2004 DTS #2004-2710 72' The chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's rst detention site told the 016 that t he Reports Of cers did not know what was required of them were not knowledgeable of the target translators were not native Arab speakers and at least one of the chiefs of Base had limited eld ex erience See Interview report of Of ce of the Inspector General May 20 2003 According to of CTC Legal there was no screening procedure in place for of cers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN See interview of and Of ce of the Inspector General February 14 2003 See also interview of H Of ce of the Inspector General March 24 2003 In addition to the statements to the OIG described above re arding the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah CIA of cers expressed more general concerns As noted the assumptions at CIA Headquarters that Abu Zubaydah knew everything about Al-Qa'ida including details of the next attack re ected how the Analyst vs Interrogator' issue ha d been around from 'day one See interview of Of ce of the Inspector General February 27 2003 According to Chief of Interrogations subject matter experts often provided interrogation requirements that Were not valid or well thought out providing the example of Mustafa al-l-Iawsawi See interview of Of ce of the Ins ector General April 7 2003 Senior CIA Page 121 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED members of the interrogation teams 23 Some CIA of cers described pressure from CIA Headquarters to use the enhanced interrogation techniques which they attributed to faulty anal tical assumptions about what detainees should know As the chief of RDG stated to the 01G in a February 2003 interview does not know a lot about al-Qa ida and as a result Headquarters anal have constructed models of what al-Qa ida represents to them noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject matter experts it needs The questions sent from CTC Usama bin Laden UBL to the interrogators are based on SIGINT signals intelligence and other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong When the detainee does not respond to the question the assumption at Headquarters is that the detainee is holding back and knows more and consequently Headquarters recommends resumption of EITs This difference of opinion between the interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is com liant is the type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to believes the waterboard was used recklessly too many times on Abu Zubaydah at SITE based in part on faulty interrogator told the OIG that interrogators suffered from a lack of substantive requirements from CIA Head uarters and that in every case so far Headquarters' model of what the detainee should know is awed told the OIG that do not want to beat a man up based on what Headquarters says he should know commenting that want my best shot on somethin he the detainee knows not a shing expedition on things he should know See interview of Of ce of the Inspector General April 30 2003 Two interviewees told the 016 that re uirements were sometimes based on inaccurate or improperly translated interce ts See interview of interrogator h Of ce of the Inspector General March 24 2003' Interview of former chief of Station in the country that hosted the first detention site Of ce of the Inspector General May 29 2003 723 One interviewee noted that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conductin interrogations in English to demonstrate their dominance over the detainee See interview report of Of ce of the Inspector General March 17 2003 The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that t he program continued to face challenges in identifying suf cient quali ed staff -- particularly language-quali ed personnel -- as requirements im osed A enc involvement in Iraq increased 72 According to of CTC Legal tlhe seventh oor leadership can complicate the process because of the mindset that interrogations are the silver bullet and CIA leadership is expecting immediate results See interview of Of ce of the Inspector General February 14 2003 Senior Interrogator - provided the example of Khallad bin Attash who he told the 016 was determined by the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLUE not to warrant the enhanced interrogation techniques According to debriefer called ALEC Station and told them to go to the mat in advocating for the use of the CIA's enhanced interro ation techniques claiming that bin Attash was holdin back information See interview of Of ce of the Inspector General April 30 2003 described the inherent tension that occasionally exists between of cers at the interrogation facilities and those at Headquarters who view the detainees are withholding information - provided the exam Ie of Abu Yassir al Jaza iri See interview of Of ce of the Inspector General May 8 2003 i also described disagreements on whether to subject detainees to the enhanced interrogation techniques as a eld versus Headquarters issue See interview of Of ce of the Inspector General August 18 2003 As described interviewees also described pressure from CIA Headinarters related to the interrogations of KSM and Abu Zubaydah 5 Interview of Of ce of the Insiector General Februari 21 2003 Page 122 of 499 0 UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu