i I 5 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct No NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION Notice The attached document contains classified National Security Council information It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have such access to this document Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the secwity law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investiga- tion by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classi- fied information contained herein Access List DATE NAME DATE NAME 14 June 2004 bye mimm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 305856717 UTING ll NAME AND 5003 7123-Ic CONTROL NO REMARKS COPY 0F FROM NAME - AND PHONE NO ClAAct I Handle Via NatSecAct Channels Access to this document Will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities NatSecAct NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions THIS COVER SHEET IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN BLANK Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct II A D0005 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct CIA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General SPECIAL REVIEW WM 3 1 NatSeCAct COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003 2003-7123-IG A 7May 2004 NatSecAct NatSeCAct NatSeCAct D0006 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Releasg2016 O6 1O 005856717 WI mm b 3 NatSecAct TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 2 BACKGROUND 9 DISCUSSION - 11 GENESIS OF POST 9 11 AGENCY DETENTIONAND INTERROGATION 11 THE CAPTURE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BITS 12 Do LEGAL ANALYSIS NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS 23 I GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE DETENTION AND 24 bxs NatseCACt DCI Confinement Guidelines 27 DCI Interrogation Guidelines - - 29 Medical Guidelines 31 Training for Interrogations 31 bxs NatSeCAct DETENTION OPERATIONS AT I 33 34 W3 Staffing and Operations 34 1 - Videotapes of Interrogations bxs NatSecAct 37 Background and Detainees Tia Vb I - i 3 NatSecActQ D0007 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 1 NatSeCAct 1 Staffing 39 Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines 40 Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 41 Handgun and Power Drill 41 Threats 42 43 1 Stress Positions 44 - W3 Stiff Brush and A Waterboard Technique 44 1 hm as 9C 46 W3 NatSepAct 48 Headquarters Oversight 48 bm Facility and Procedures 50 'Site Management 54 Interrogators and Linguists - 57 MN Medical Support 58 NatSecAct - bxs NatseCACt Death of'Gul Rahman - Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 69 Pressure Points 69 Mock Executions 70 Use of Smoke of Cold 73 Water Dousing Hard Takedown ii NatSecAct D0008 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Appraiked for ReleaSe 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the I 78 mm NatSecAct ACCOUNTING FOR DETAINEES 80 I ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO MERROGAIIONS EHTECHVENESS 85 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENTION AND PROGRAM 91 Policy Considerations 92 Concerns Over Participation in the CT Program 94 ENDGAME 95 CONCLUSIONS 100 RECOMMENDATIONS 106 APPENDICES A Procedures and Resources B Chronology of Signi cant Events C Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of the I Central Intelligence Agency Re Interrogation of an Al-Qa ida Operative 1 August 2002 D DCI Guidelines on Con nement Conditions for CIA Detainees 28 January 2003 E DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Noti cation of 17 September 2001 28 January 2003 hnn rr I NatSecAct D0009 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Megan Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAot F Draft Of ce of Medical Services Guidelines on Medical and Support to Detainee Interrogations September 2003 iv NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 m 1 Eu 1 if 533$ 4 D0010 I Hem 5 3 t z I NatSeCAct NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct OFFICE or INSPECTOR GENERAL 1 SPECIAL REVIEW COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003 2003-7123-IG - 7 May 2004 I INTRODUCTION On 17 September 2001 the President Noti cation MON 1 signed a Memorandum of NatSecAct taxi NatSecAct NatSeCAct One of the key weapons 1n the war on terror was the MUN authorization for CIA to undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terroriSt activities 2 T1354 In Noyember 2002 the Deputy Director for Operations DDO informed the Of ce of Inspector General OIG that the Agency had established a program in the Counterterrorist Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad the CT Program He also informed OIG that he had just learned of and had dispatched a team to investigate the death of a detainee Gul Rahman In January 2003 the BBC informed OIG that he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee I Abd Al-Rahim Al Nashiri at another foreign site and requ ezsf -cl that NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0011 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - NatSevot ma a I OIG investigate Separately OIG received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights In January 2003 OIG initiated a review of Agency counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities and investigations into the death of Gul' Rahman and the incident with Al-Nashiri 1 This Review covers the period September 2001 to mid- October 2003 2 Results of the Gul Rahman and Al-Nashiri-related investigations are the subject of separate reports 3 NatSecAct SUMMARY 3 TESL After the President signed the 17 September 2001 MON the DCI assigned responsibility for implementing capture and detentionauthority to the BBQ and to the Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center CT C When US military forces began detaining individuals in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay Cuba NatSeoAct NatSeoAct mu - 4 tract Following the approval of the MON on 17 September 2001 the Agency began to detain and interrogate directly a number of suspected terrorists The capture and initial AgenCy interrogation of the first high value detainee Abu Zubaydah NatSecAct 11- 1 51 Chi-F Appendix A addresses the Procedures'and Resources that OIG employed in conducting this Review The Review does not address renditions conducted by the Agency or interrogations conducted jointly with the US military 2 U Appendix is a chronology of significant events that occurred during the period of this 1 Review NatSecAct are NatSecAct m3 2 mm NatSecAct _ 30012 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - lament-m Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct - Mensa in March 2002 presented the Agency with a significant dilemma 4 The Agency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent additional terrorist attacks Senior Agency of cials believed Abu Zubaydah was withholding information that could not be obtained through then-authorized interrogation techniques Agency officials believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat 2 information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior 1 Al-Qa ida high value detainees NatSecAct 5- activities presented new challenges for CIA These included determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be securely located and operated and identifying and preparing quali ed personnel to manage and carry out detention and interrogation activities With the knowledge that Al-Qa ida personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that I Agency personnel could lawfully use to overCome the resistance In this context CTC with the assistance of the Office of Teclmical Service OTS proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on Abu Zubaydah All of these considerations took place against the backdrop of pre-September 11 2001 CIA aVoidance of interrogations and repeated US policy statements condemning torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners bm and detainees in the international community NatSeCAct - 6 ij The Office of General Counsel OGC took the lead in determining and documenting the-legal parameters and mm constraints for interrogations OGC conducted independent research NatSecAct 4 l The use of high value or medium value to describe terrorist targets and detainees in this Revkw is based on how they have been generally categorized by CT distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United States Senior Al-Qa'ida planners and operators such as A'bu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad fall into the category of high value and are given the highest priority for capture detention and interrogation categorizes those individuals who are believed to have lesser dm' -- knowledge of such threats but to have irifonnation of intelligence value as medium value targets detainees - NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 WI The conduct of detention and interrogation D0013 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSecAct and consultedextensively with Department of Justice D01 and National Security Council NSC legal and policy staff Working DoI s Of ce of LegalCounsel OLC OGC determined that in most instances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities under the MON the criminal prohibition against torture 18 U S C 2340-23403 is the controlling legal 0 constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States In August 2002 Do provided to the Agency a legal opiniOn in which it determined that 10 speci c Enhanced Interrogation Techniques EITs would not violate the torture prohibition This work provided the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide W Program 7 By November 2002 the Agency had Abu Zubaydah and another high value detainee Abd Al-Rahjm in custody at an overseas facility in December 2002 the Agency rendered these two detainees to bm another country to a facility Until NatSecAct 2003 when it was closed was the location for the detention and interrogation of eight high value detainees 5 Agency employees and contractors staffedl NatSecAcne Directorate of Operations DO provided a Chief of Base COB and interrogation personnel the Of ce of Security OS provided security personnel and the Of ce of Medical Services OMS provided medical care to the detainees bxs NatseCACt NatSecAct 8 335701 In addition to NatSe R t September 2002 the Agency has operated a detention facility in 1 known as has 20 cells and is guarded has served a number of purposes functions as a detention debrie ng and interrogation facility for high and medium value targets serves as a holding facility at which the Agency assesses the potential NatSecAct - - Ii hm NatSecAct l4 TOW NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 5 -- MI W NatSecAct value of detainees before making a decision on their dis osition It served as a transit point for detainees going tonXl - 3 NatSeCAct i NatSeCAct - - - 9 With respect to site management and Headquarters oversight of the Program the distinctions between the 1 detention and interrogation activities at on NatSeCACtthe one hand and detention and interrogation activitiele on the other are signi cant The Agency devoted far mm - mater human resources and management attention W33 From the beginning OGC briefed DO of cers 1 assigned to these two facilities on their legal authorities and Agency personnel-staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the condition of detainees in cables 10 There were few instances of deviations from approved procedures lwith one notable exception described in this ReView With respect to two detainees at these sites the use and frequency of one the waterboard went beyond the projected use of the technique as originally described to Do The Agency on 29 July 2003 secured oral Do concurrence that certain deviations are not signi cant for mm purposes of DoI s legal opinions NatSecAct bxi NatSeCAct i i 11 6 51 By contrast the Agency s conduct of mm detention and interrogation activities in afseCACt in particular raises a host of issues The rst Site Manager at was a rst-tour Sof Cer who had no experience or training to run a detention facility He had not received interrogations training and ran the facility with scant Headquarters - NatSecAct 12 NatSecAct mm NatSecAct D0015 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 messenger - - i bxi NatSecAct g-r - g is NatSeCAot a 13 457 During the period covered by mm Review bid not uniformly document or report the NatSeCACtatment of detainees their conditions or medical care provided Because of the lack of guidance limited personnel resources and 1 limited oversight there were instances of im rovisation and other NatSeCACtidocumented interrogation techniques In November 2002 one individual Gui Rahman died as a result of the way he 1 was detained there NatSecAct 14 There is no indication that the CT Program has been inadequately funded Across the board however staf ng has been and continues to be the most dif cult resource 1 challenge for the Agency This is largely attributable to the lack of personnel with interrogations experience or requisite language skills and the heavy personnel demands for other counterterroris'm assignments 15 5119 Agency efforts to provide systematic clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems have been identified addressed CTC irriplemented training - programs for interrogators and debriefers 6 Moreover building upon W1 oneratiOnal and legal guidance previously sent to the eld the DCI NatSecAct - garnr If - 9 ll 6 Before 11 September 9 11 2001 Agency personnel sometimes used the terms interragation nterrogator and debrie ng debriefer interchangeably The use of these terms has since evolved and today CT more clearly distinguishes their meanings A debriefer engages a r detainee solely through question and answer An interrogator is a person who completes a two-week interrogations training program which is designed to train qualify and certify a person to administer EITs An interrogator can administer EITs during an interrogation of a detainee only after the field in coordination with Headquarters assesses the detainee as withholding information An interrogator transitions the detainee from a non-c00perative to a cooperative phase in order that a debriefer can elicit actionable intelligence through - non-aggressive techniques during debrie ng sessions An interrogator may debrief eT dEta m e - during an interrogation however a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee le NatSecACt D0016 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSecAct on 28 January2003 signed Guidelines on Con nement Conditions for CIA Detainees and Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notificatiori of - 17 September 2001 The DCI Guidelines require individuals engaged in or supporting interrogations pursuant to programs implementing the MON of September 2001'be made aware of the guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them The DCI Interrogation Guidelines make formal the existing CT practice of requiring the field to obtain speci c Headquarters approvals prior to the application of all EITs Although the DCI Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI Guidelines in the past they still leave substantial room for misinterpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and interrogation activities NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSecAct 1 16 The Agency s detention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world The CT Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of - individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of US policymakers and military commanders - 17 PM current CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has been subject to Do legal review and - Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency policy and rules that govern interrogations by US military and law enforcement officers Officers are concerned that public revelation of the CT Program rwill seriously damage Agency of cers personal reputations as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself 18 El recognized that detainees may be held in US Goverri' rent custody indefinitely if appropriate law- enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted- Although there hasbeen ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC 7 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0017 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Tor-seensw - - NatSecAct Defense Department and Justice Department of cials no decisions on any endgame for Agency detainees have been made Senior Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the US Goverri'tnent a rather than a CIA issue Even with Agency initiatives to address the endgame with policymakers some detainees who cannot be prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody inde nitely NatSecAct 19 $51 The Agency faces potentially serious long term political and legal challengesas-a result of the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program particularly its use of EITs and the inability of the US Government to decide what it will ultimater do With terrorists detained by the Agency - NatSecAct 20 $51 This Review makes a number of recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities Although the DCI Guidelines were an importantstep forward they were only designed to address the CT Program rather than all A Agency debriefing or interrogation activitiesthe Agency should evaluate the effectiveness of the EITs and the necessity for the continued use of each ii -3 3 8 NatSecAct D0018 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct 21 the General Counsel should seek an updated legal opiniOn from Do revalidating and modifying consistent with actual practice the legal authority for the continued application of EITs If such approval is not forthcoming the DCI should direct that EITs be implemented only within the parameters of the existing written Do authorization The DCI should brief the President on the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have died BACKGROUND A 22 The Agency has had intermittent involvement in the interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to thOse of the United States After the Vietnam War Agency personnel experienced in the eld of interrogations left the Agency or moved to other assignments In the early 19803 a resurgence of interest in teaching interrogation techniques develoPed as one of several methods to foster foreign liaison relationships Because of political sensitivities the then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DDCI forbade Agency officers from using the word interrogation The Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation HIRE training program designed to train foreign liaison services on interrogation techniques 23 ISM 1984 OIG investigated allegatibns of misconduct on the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interroeations id the death of one individual Followmg that investigation the Agency took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its poliQI-on 9 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSeoAct 'interrogationsudebriefings and human rights issues Headquarters I sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance to the eld - 24 ts In 1986 the Agencyended program because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America mo NatSecAct DO Handbook 50-2 which remains in effect explains the Agency s general interrogation policy - It is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage interrogation that involves the use of force mental or physical torture extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of anv kind as an aid to interrogation NatSecAct 10 b 3 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 g f if 3 mo NatSecAct bio i Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Terese-emu NatSeoAct - - DISCUSSION GENESIS OF POST 9 11 AGENCY MERROGAHBN 25 The statutory basis for involvement in detentions and interrogations is the covert action responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947 as amended 7 Under the Ac t a covert action must be based on a Presidential finding that the action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives and is important to the-national security 8 Covert action findings must be in writing and may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States 9 These ndings are implemented through Memoranda Of Noti cation NatSeoAct 26 115$ The 17'September 2001 MON 3 NatSecAct authorizes the DCI acting through CIA to undertakev'operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities Although the MON does not specifically mention interrogations of those detained this aspect of the CT Program can be justi ed as part of general authority and responsibility to collect intelligence 10 a 27 577% The DCI delegated'responsibility for implementation of the MON to the DDO and Over time CT also solicited assistance from other Agency components including OGC OMS OS and OTS - 7 U 15699 Do takes the position that as Commander-'in-Chief the President independently has the Article II constitutional authority to order the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information 3 U so U S C 413b a 9 U Hague so U S C 413b a 1 5 10 UI Eoue so use 403-1 mm mm NatSecAct D0021 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct 28 To assist Agency officials in understanding the scope and implications of the MON between 17 September and 7 November 2001 OGC researched analyzed and wrote draft papers on multiple legal issues These included discussions of the applicability of the US Constitution overseas applicability of Habeas Corpus overseas length of detention potential civil liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act and employee liability actions liaison with law enforcement interrogations Guantanamo Bay detention facility short-term detention facilities and disposition of detainees OGC shared these draft papers with Agency Of cers responsible for implementing the MON Via- 1 r r qr 29 MN NatSecAot 53 - ban d THE CAPTURE OFABLI ZUBAYDAHAND DEVELOPNIENT 01- EITs W3 30 The capture of senior Al Qa ida operative Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the opportunity to obtain actionable intelligence on future threats to the United States from the most senior Al-Qa ida member in US custody at that time This accelerated development of an interrogation program and establishment of an interrogation sitg NatSecAct ClAAot 12 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 l t vam Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ml - NatSeCAct bxi NatSecAct 31 To treat the severe wounds that Abu- Zubaydah suffered upon his capture the Agency provided him intensive medical care from the outset and deferred his questioning for several weeks pending his recovery The Agency then assembled a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah using non-aggressive mm - non-physical elicitation techniques Between June and July 2002 the NatSecACteaml land Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah - was withholding immihent threat information NatSeCAct 32 Several months earlier in late 2001 CIA had tasked an independent contractor who had ' experience in the US Air Force s Survival Evasion - Resistance and Escape SERE training program to research and write a paper on Al-Qa ida s resistance to interrogation techniques 13 I This collaborated with a Department of Defense who had SERE experience in the US Air Force and to produce the paper Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation Techniques A Resistance Training Perspective Subsequently the two developed a list of new and more aggressive EITs that they recommended for use in interrogations 12 CTC had previously identi ed locations for covert sites but had not established facilities A 13 U IFOUG The SERE training program falls under the DOD Joint Personnel Recovery Agency JPRA IPRA is responsible for missions to include the training for SERE and Prisoner of War and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation SERE Training is offered by the US Army Navy and Air Force to its personnel particularly air crews and special operations forces who are of greatest risk of being captured during military operations SERE students are taught how to survive in various terrain evade and endure interrogations and conduct themselves to prevent harm to themselves and fellow prisoners of war 13 NatSecAct D0023 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSecAot NatSeCAot NatSecAct 33 proposed EITs and their potential long-term effects on detainees OTS input Was based in part on information solicited from a number of and knowledgeable academics in the area of OTS also solicited input om 344m I Personnel Recovery Agency IPRA regarding techniques used in its I SERE training and any subsequent effects on students I concluded no long-term effects resulted from use of the HTS including the most taxing technique the waterboard on SERE students 14 The OTS analysis was used by 0G in evaluating the legality of techniques I Nats'ecAct 35 113 I Eleven EITs were proposed for adoption in the CTC Interrogation Program As proposed use of BITS would be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and state of the detainee The Agency eliminated one proposed technique the mock burial after learning from Do that this could delay the legal review The following textbox identifies the 10 ElTs the Agency described to Do 14 51 According to individuals with authOritative knowledge of the SERE program the waterboard was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in a class Except for Navy SERE training use of the waterboard Was discontinued because of its dramatic effect on the students who were subjects - 14 W NatSeCAot Approved for Release 2016 06 10 OTS obtained data Mr D0024 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct mm NatSecAct Enhanced Interrogation Techniques The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands with one hand on each side of the collar opening in a controlled and quick motion In the same motion as the grasp the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator During the walling technique the detainee is pulled forward and then quickly and firmly pushed into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall His head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash The facial hold is used to-hold the detainee s head immobile The interrogator places an open palm on either side of the detainee s face and the interrogator s fingertips are kept well away from the detainee s eyes With the facial or insult slap the ngers are spread apart The interrogator s hand makes contact with the area between the tip of the detainee s chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe In cramped con nement the detainee is placed in a con ned space typically a small or large box which is usually dark Con nement in the smaller space lasts no more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a harmless insect in the box with the detainee During wall standing the detainee may stand about-4 to 5 feet from a wall with his feet spread approximately to his shoulder width His arms are stretched out in frontof him and his ngers rest on the wall to support all of his body weight The detainee is not allowed to reposition his-hands or feet The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor with his legs extended straight out in front of him with his armsraised above his head or kneeling on the oor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time The application of the waterboard technique involves binding the detainee to a bench with his feet elevated above his head The detainee's head is immobilized and an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee s mouth and nose while pouring water onto the cloth in a controlled manner Air ow is restricted for 20 to 40 seconds and the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation Immense mo NatSecAct has 15 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ll any I 00025 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct Do LEGAL ANALYSIS 36 OGC sought guidance from regarding the legal bounds of ElTs vis-a-vis individuals detained under the MON authorization The ensuing legal opinions focus on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment Torture Convention 15 especially as implemented in the Us a1 code 18 2340- 2340A 37 @630 The Torture Convention specifically prohibits torture which it de nes in Article 1 as any act by which severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental is intentionally in icted on a person for such purposes-as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed or intimidating or cOercing him or a third person or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind when such pain or suffering is in icted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public of cial or other person acting in an of cial capacity It does not include pain or suffering arising-only from inherent in or incidental to lawful sanction Emphasis added Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to the Convention are to ensure that all acts of tOrture are offenses under their criminal laws Article 16 additionally provides that each state party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in Article 5 U Mme Adopted 10 December 1934 s Treaty Doc No 100-20 1988 1465 U N T S 85 entered into force 26 June 1987 The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States on 20 November 1994 16 1 WEI NatSeCAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 I - 1 a3 an a 41 V Approved for Release 2016 06 10 b 3 NatSecAct 38 136309 The Torture Convention applies to the United States only in accordance With the reservations and understandings made by the United States at the time of ratification 16 As explained - to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification Article 16 is arguably broader than existing US law The phrase cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a standard formula in international instruments and is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the International Covenant on Civil and Po1itical Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the context of those agreements cruel and treatment or punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or punishnient barred in the United States bythe Fifth Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Degrading treatment or punishment - however has been interpreted as potentially including treatment that would probably not be prohibited by the US Constitution Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual s gender change might be considered degrading treatment To make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel unusual and inhumane treatment the following understanding is recommended The United States understands the term 'cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as used in Article 16 of the Convention to mean the cruel unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth Eighth and or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 17 Emphasis added 15 U Vienna Convention on'the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969 1155 U N T S 331 entered into force 27 January 1980 The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on treaties but it generally regards its provisions as customary int rnational law 17 U move 5 Treaty Doc No 100-20 at15-16 m 17 mm I NatSecAct 30027 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct 39 U In accordance with the Convention the United States criminalized acts Of torture in 18 U S C 2340A a which provides as follows v - Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term Of years or for life The statute adepts the Convention definition of torture as an act committed by a person acting under the color of law speci cally intended to in ict severe physical or mental pain or suffering other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions upon another person his custody or physical control 13 Severe physical pain and suffering is not further defined but Congress added a I definition of severe mental pain or suffering T he prolonged mental harm-caused by or- resulting from- A the intentional in iction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering B the administration or application or threatened administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality C the threat 'of imminent death or D the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death severe physical pain or suffering or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality 19 These statutory definitions are consistent with the understandings and reservations of the United States to the Torture Convention 13 Horse 18 use 2340 1 19 WM 18 U S C 2340 2 4 18 - NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 ye mm 2 311 231 s Wm em El D0028 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 messy le NatSecAct 40 U 15689 Do has never prosecuted a violation of the torture statute 18 U S C 2340 and there is no case law construing its provisions OGC presented the results of its research into relevant issues under US and international law to Dol s OLC in the summer of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the torture statute from OLC in July 2002 An unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC legal memorandum set out conclusions regarding the proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that Section 2340A proscribes acts in icting and that are specifically intended to in ict severe pain or suffering whether mental-or physical 20 Also OLC stated that the acts must be of an extreme nature and that certain acts may be cruel inhuman or degrading but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture Further describing the requisite level of intended pain OLC stated Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying injury such as organ failure impairment of bodily function or even death For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340 it must result in significant harm of signi cant duration lasting for months or even years 21 OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the infliction of severe pain be the defendant's precise objectiVe OLC also concluded that neCessity or self-defense might justify interrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340A 22 The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other provisions of US law are relevant to the detention treatment and interrogation of detainees outside the United States 23 20 IFGUQ Legal Memorandum Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U S C 2340-234OA 1 August 2002 - 21 Ibid p 1 22 Ibid p 39 - 23 #639 analysis of the torture statute was guided in part by judicial decisions under the Torture Victims Protection Act TVPA 28 U S C 1350 which provides a tort remedy for victims of torture OLC noted that the courts in this context have looked at the entire course 19 D0029 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSeoAct NatSeoAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 bxi NatSecAct 41 bosom second unclassi ed 1 August 2002 OLC opinion addressed the international law aspects of such - interrogations 24 This opinion concluded that interrogation methods A - that do not violate 18 U S C 2340 would-not violate the Torture Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the Intemational Criminal Court 42 In addition to the two unclassi ed I Opinions OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at the request of AppendixC This opinion addressed to Acting General Counsel discussed whether the proposed use I of ElTs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah would violate the Title 18 prohibition on torture The opinion concluded that use of EITs on Abu Zubaydah would not violate the torture statute because among other things Agency personnel 1 would not specifically intend to in ict severe pain or suffering and 2 would not in fact in ict severe pain or suffering 43 This OLC opinion was based upon speci c representations by CIA concerning the manner in which ElTs would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah For example OLC was told that the EIT phase would likely last no more than several days but could last up to thirty days The EITs would be used on an as-needed basis and all would not necessarily be used Further the EITs were expected to be used in some sort of escalating fashion culminating with the waterboard though not necessarily ending with this technique Although some of the BITS of conduct although a single incident could constitute torture OLC also noted that courts may be willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the level of severe pain and suffering Ultimately however OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts of an extreme nature have been redressed under the civil remedy for torture White House Counsel Memorandum at 22 - 27 - 24 OLC Opinion by John c Yoo Deputy Assistant Attorney General OLC 1 August 2002 25 35 Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of the Central - Intelligence gency 'Interrogation of a1 Qaida Operative 1 August 2002 at 15 NatSecAct 20 NatSecAot Approved for Releise 2016 06 10 C05856717 -- rf i gig - I i 1's I hi I F-h 11 Euluhr-T uni ultra p- 4 Int-u- Inn D0030 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 1 mm NaiSecAct might be used more than once that repetition will not be Substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions With respect to the waterboard it was explained that the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench The individual s feet are generally elevated A cloth is placed over the i forehead and eyes Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner As this is done the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose the air ow is restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual s blood 5 This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of l suffocation and incipient panic the perception of drowning The individual does not breathe water into his lungs During those 20 to 40 seconds water iscontinuously applied from a height of 12 to 24 inches After this period the cloth is lifted and the A individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth The procedure may then be repeated The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout T his procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning I t is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application Finally the Agency presented OLC a profile of Abu Zubaydah and with the conclusions of of cials and associatedwith the SERE program that theuse of'EITs would cause no long term mental harm OLC relied on these representations to support its conclusion that no physical harm or prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the MU EITs including the waterboard 26 NatSeCAct - - I 26 According to the Chief Medical Services OMS was neither consulted nor involved in the analysis the risk and benefits of EITs nor provided with the OTS report cited in the OLC opinion In retrospect based on the OLC extracts of the OTS report OMS contends that the reported sophistication of the preliminary EIT review was exath least as it related to the waterboard and that the power of this BIT was appreciably overstated in the - report Furthermore OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE interrogators on Am 21 mm - NatSecAct D0031 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release _2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct 44 T84 OGC continued to consult with Do as the CTC Interrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah This resulted in the production of an undated and unsigned decument entitled Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured I Al-Qa ida Personnel 27 According to OGC this analysis was fully coordinated With and drafted in substantial part by OLC In addition to reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute the analysis concludes that the fede'ral War Crimes statute 18 2441 does not apply to Al-Qa'ida because members of that group are not entitled to prisoner of war status The analysis adds that the Torture Convention permits the use of cruel inhuman or degrading treatment in exigent circumstances such as a national emergency or war It also states that the interrogation of Al-Qa ida members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because those provisions do not apply extraterritorially nor does it violate the Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons upon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed Finally the analysis states that a wide range of and other teChniques would not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the 4 - Fifth Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments even were they-to be applicable - manna Jrthe following techniques and Of comparable approved techniques does not violate any Federal statute or other law where the CIA interrogators do not Specifically intend to cause the detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering they act with the good faith belief that their conduct will not cause such pain or suffering isolation reduced caloric intake so long as the amount is calculated to the general health of the detainees deprivation of reading material loud music or white i4 I Er the waterboard-was probably misrepresented at the time as the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant Consequently according to OMS there was no a prigri reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity with which it was used by the interrogators was either ef cacious or medically safe 27 Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of 3 mm Captured Al-Qa ida Personnel attached toL 3 IAA tJ June 2003 NatSecAct 22 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717- El 41 lanai-uni D0032 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 bm NatSecAct noise at a_ decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainees hearing the attention grasp walling the facial hold the facial slap insult slap the abdominal slap cramped con nement A wall standing stress positions sleep deprivation the use of i diapers the use of harmless insects and the water board 1 According to OGC this-analysis embodies Do agreement that the reasoning of the classi ed 1 August 2002 OLC-opinion extends beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions that were speci ed in that opinion 01105 TO AND CONSULTATION WHH Exscurrvs AND CONGRESSIONAL mm OFFICIALS NatSecAct - i 45 At the same time that OLC was reviewing 1 the legality Of EITs in the summer of 2002 the Agency was consulting i With NSC policy staff and senior Administration officials The DCIV I briefed appropriate senior national security and legal of cials on the I proposed EITs In the fall of 2002 the Agency briefed the leadership I of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of both standard techniques and ElTs bj 1 NatSecAct 46 In early 2003 CIA officials at the urging of the General Counsel continued to inform senior Administration of cials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program The Agency specifically Wanted to ensure that these of cials and the Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with White House Counsel and others at the NSC as well as DoI's Criminal Division 1 and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed - them on the scope and breadth of the Detention and ma Interrogation Program NatSeCAct 47 $54 Representatives of the D0 in the presence of the Director of Congressional Affairs and the General I Counsel continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence 44 - Oversight Committees on the use of ElTs and detentions in February 23 Ml NatSecAct D0033 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAot and March 2003 The General Counsel says that none of the participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the Program - I NatSeCAct 48 T51 On 29 July 2003 the DCI and the General Counsel provided a detailed brie ng to selected NSC Principals on detentionand interrogation efforts involving high value - detainees to include the expanded use of According to a Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel following that meeting the Attorney General confirmed that Do _ approved of the expanded use of various EITs including multiple applications of the waterboard 29 The General Counsel said he beIieVes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was doing with respect to- detention and interrogation and approved of the effort According to OGC the senior officials were again briefed regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003 and the Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September 2003 Again - according to- OGC none of those involved in these briefings expressed any reservations about the program GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE DETENTION AND INTERROGAHON NatSecAct - I 49 TM Guidance and training are fundamental to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally politically and legally complex as the Agency s Detention and Interrogation Program Soon after 9 11 the DDO issued guidance on the standards for the capture of terrorist targetsl NatSecAct 0' L NatSeCAct 50 PSZ The DCI in January 2003 approved formal Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees mm Appendix D and Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted NatSecAct P 4 E1 n hm 28 THE The brie ng materials referred to 24 high value detainees interrogated_at CIA-controlled sites and identi ed 13 interrogated usirrg - i 29 Memorandum for the Record bxs August 2003 - ll le A NatSecAct 30034 % 777775pproved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001 Appendix E which are discussed below _ Prior to the DCI Guidelines Headquarters provided guidance via informal briefings and electronic communications to include cables from CIA Headquarters to the field Because the level of guidance was largely a site-specific this Report discusses the pre-January 2003 detention'and interrogation guidance in the sections addressing speci c detention facilities NatSecAot 51 TS In November 2002 CTC initiated training courses for individuals involved in interrogations In April 2003 OMS consolidated and added to its previously issuedinformal guidance for the OMS personnel responsible for monitoring the medical condition of detainees 30 NatSecAct I 52 MN NatSecAct 53 mm NatSecAct - 30 OMS reportedly issued four revisions of these draft guidelines the latest of which is dated 4 September 2003 The guidelines remain in draft 25 Warn-- NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0035 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Tesla 556m NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSecAct r33 - 31 gm v r- NatSecAct NatSecAct 26 W NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - 13 r I ml tic E my rs M In a Mg '5 D0036 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 mm mm NatSecAct NatSecAct DCI Confinement Guidelines NatSeoAct 57 Before January 2003 of cers assigned to manage detention facilities developed and implemented con nement condition procedures Because these procedures were site-speci c and not uniform this Review discusses them in connection with the review of speci c sites rather than in this section The January 2003 DCI Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA detainees held in detention facilities mm NatSeCAct mm I NatSeCAct my I I I NatSecAot 30037 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Torssensr NatSecAct NatSeCAct 58 The DCI Guidelines specify that CTC Shall ensure that a speci c Agency staff employee is designated as responsible for each specific detention facility Agency staff employees responsible for the facilities and participating in the questioning of individuals detained pursuant to the 17 September 2001 MON must receive a copy of the DCI Guidelines They must review the Guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have done so A a can an 1- - 1 NatSecAct NatSeCAct 59 r91 The DCI Guidelines specify legal and require that due provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of all CIA detainees The Guidelines do not require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities conform to US prison or other standards At a minimum hoWever detention facilities are to provide basic levels of medical care gag which need not comport with the highest standards of medical care that is provided in U S -based medical facilities food and drink which meets minimum medically appropriate nutritional and sanitary standards clothing and or a physical environment suf cient to meet basic health needs periods of time within which detainees are free to engage in physical exercise which may be limited for example to exercise within the isolation cells themselves for sanitary facilities which may for example comprise buckets for the relief of personal waste and- tr a c Further the guidelines provide that Lit - du Medical and as appropriate personnel shall be - physically present at 6r reasonably available to each Detention - 28 - WI mm NatSecAct D0033 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSecAct Facility _ Medica1 personnel shall check the physical condition of each detainee at mtervals appropriate to the circumstances and shall keep appropriate records DCI Interrogation Guidelines 60 Prior to January 2003 CTC and OGC disseminated guidance via cables e-mail or orally on a case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read understood or agreed to comply with the guidance provided Nor did thelAgency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on interrogation-procedures 61 Ta NatSecAct The DCI Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these Guidelines received appropriate training in their implementation and have completed the applicable acknowledgement 62 EV-NE The DCI Interrogation Guidelines de ne Permissible Interrogation Techniques and Specify that unless otherwise approved by Headquarters CIA of cers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible Interrogation Techniques Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both Standard Techniques and Enhanced 32 See - k31- relevant text of DO Handbook 50-2 W NatSeCAct '29 I NatSecAct D0039 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSecAct NatSecAct bx1f NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSecAct require advance approval from Headquarters as do standard techniques whenever feasible The eld must docUment the use of both standard techniques and EITs 63 The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define standard interrogation techniques as techniques that do not incorporate signi cant physical or pressure These techniques include but are not limited to all lawful forms of questioning employed by US law enforcement and military interrogation personnel Among standard interrogation techniques are the use'of isolation sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours 34 reduced caloric intake so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee deprivation of reading material use of loud music or white noise at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainee s hearing the use of diapers for limited periods generally not to exceed 72 hours or during transportation where appropriate and moderate pressure The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not speci cally prohibit improvised actions A CT Legal of cer has said however that no one may employ any technique outside speci cally identi ed standard techniques without Headquarters approval 64 M EITs include physical actions and are de ned as techniques that do incorporate physical or pressure beyond Standard Techniques Headquarters must approve the use of each speci c EIT in advance ElTs may be employed only by trained and certified interrogators for use with a speci c detainee and with appropriate medical and monitoring of the process 5 3'3 10- approved ElTs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review 34 According to the General Counsel in late December 2003 the period for sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours 35 m4 8efore EITs are administered a detainee must receive a detailed assessment and physical exam Daily pHysical and evaluations are continued throughout the period of EIT use NatSecAct 30 bx1 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 #52 ff 1 aft- 3 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm H mm i - NatSecAct Medical Guidelinesle3 NatSecACt A 65 $54 OMS prepared draft guidelines for 3' medical and support to detainee interrogations The Chief Medical Services disseminated the undated OMS draft I 1 guidelines in April 2003 to OMS personnel assigned to detention facilities According to OMS these guidelines were a compilation of previously issued guidance that had been disseminated in a piecemeal fashion The guidelines were marked draft based on the advice of CTC Legal 36 These guidelines quote excerpts from the DCI Interrogation Guidelines They include a list of sanctioned i interrogation techniques approval procedures technique goals and 1 staff requirements The OMS draft guidelines also expand upon the i practical medical implications of the DCI Interrogation Guidelines addressing general evaluation medical treatment uncomfortably cool environments white noise or loud music shackling sleep deprivation cramped confinement confinement boxes and the waterboard According to the Chief Medical Services the OMS Guidelines were intended solely as a reference for the OMS personnel directly supporting the use of EITs andwere not intended to be Agency authorizations for the techniques discussed OMS most recently updated these draft guidelines in September 2003 and according to the Chief Medical Services they were disseminated to all OMS field personnel involved in the Detention and Interrogation - Program Appendix F Training for Interrogations NatSecAct 66 rs In November 2002 CTC Renditions and Detainees Group RDG initiated a pilot running of a two-week Interrogator Training Course designed to train qualify and certify individuals as Agency interrogators 37 Several CTC of cers 36 new A 28 March zoosLotus Note from Legal advised Chief Medical Services that the Seventh Floor would need to approve the promulgation of any further formal guidelines For now therefore let s remain at the discussion stage W NatSecAct 3 1 I NatSeoAct ApprOved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0041 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mm mm NatSecAct including a former SERE instructor designed the curriculum which included a week of classroom instruction followed by a week of hands-on training in EITs In addition to standard and enhanced interrogation techniques course material included apprehension and handling of subjects renditions management of an interrogation site interrogation team structure and functions planning an interrogation the conditioning process resistance techniques legal 7 requirements Islamic culture and religion the Arab mind and A Al-Qa'idatnetworks Training using physical pressures was conducted'via classroom academics guided discussion student practice and feedback 67 365 Three of the 16' attendees of the pilot course including a senior Agency interrogator and two independent contractor were certified by RDG as interrogators 33 Their certi cation was based on their previous operational erience The two interrogators who NatSecActere at during the pilot course were deemed certified based on their experience as SERE instructors and their - interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri Once certi ed an interrogator is deemed quali ed to conduct an interrogation employing EITs Seven other individuals were designated as trained and qualified meaning they would have to apprentice under a certified interrogator in the eld for 20 hours in order to become eligible for their certi cations il ll res- e 9 ed 68 By September 2003 few Interrogation Training bm Courses had been completed resulting inmtrained interrogators Three of these are certified touse the Waterboard Additionally a NlatSeCAct 2 Ev- mm NatSecAct 38 574% These certi cations were for Enhanced Pressures which involved all of the ElTs except the waterboard Only the tn'io interrogators were certi ed to use the waterboard based on their previous experience Subsequently another independent contractor who had been certified as an interrogator b ecame certified in the use of the I waterboard Ji 32 messensr W NatSecAct 0042 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct 1 b 3l NatSecAct i 1 mm NatSevot 1 NatSecAct DETENTIONAND MERROGATION OPERATIONS AT bxg NatSecACt Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 M bxs NatSecAot number of physicians Physician s Assistants 39 and COBs completed the training for familiarization purposes Students completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign acknowledgment that they have read understand and will comply with the Interrogation Guidelines 69 In June 2003 CTC established a debrie ng course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in questioning detainees after they have undergone interrogatiOn and have been - deemed compliant The debriefing course was established to train non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value detainees in CIA custody The course is intended to familiarize non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation Program to include the Program s goals and legal authorities the DCI Interrogation Guidelines and the roles and responsibilities of all who interact with a high value detainee As Of September 2003 three of these training sessions had been conducted with a total of Cindividuals completing the training was contemplating establishing a similar training regimen for Security Protective Of cers and linguists who will be assigned to interrogation sites - 1 70 T57 The detention and interrogation activity - examined during this Review occurred primarily at three facilities asl was the facility at which two prominent Al-Qa ida detainees Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri were held with the foreign host government s knowledge and approval until it was closed for operational security reasons in December 2002 The two detainees at that location were NatSevot 39 U Physician s Assistants are formally trained to provide diagnostic therapeu g preventative health care services They work under the supervision of a physician record progress notes and may prescribe'medications 33 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAot mm - Abu Zubaydah and Al Nashiri b 1 NatSevot Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - mm mm NatSeoAct then moved to located in another foreign country Eight individuals were detained and interrogated at including NatSevot W Staffing and Operations b 3 NatSeoAct '71 CTC initially established to detain and interrogate Abu Zubaydah Mas operational between December 2002 had no permanent posmons and was staffed wi tempura duty TDY officers Initially Abu Zubaydah s A ency interrogators at included anl of cer who also served as COB and a senior Agency security of cer- They were assisted by medical and Communications personnel detailed to NatSevot NatSecAot to support the interrogation mission An independent contractor with extensive experience as anjnterrogation instructor at the US Air Force SERE School also assisted the team 72 Once the Agency approved the use of in August 2002 a second independent contractor BITS of SERE experience joined the team This followed a determination by the CIA personnel involved in debriefing that the continuation of the existing methods would not produce the actionable intelligencethat the Intelligence Community believed Abu Zubaydah possessed The team was supervised by the COB and supported by the on-site team of security medical and communications personnel - 73 61 57 The resonsibility of the COB was to ensure the facility and staff functioned Within the authorities that govern the mission In conjunction with those duties the COB was responsible for the overall management and security of the site and the personnel assigned to support activities there The COB oversaw interrogations and released operational and intelligence mm NatSevot Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeoAct cables and situation reports coordinated activities with the Station and Headquarters and reported to the CTC Chief of W Renditions Group NatSeoAct 74 1 87 The two interrogators at le'd each interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri- where EITs were used The interrogators conferred with the COB and other team members before each interrogation session evaluations were performed by both Headquarters and on-site Early on in the development of the interrogation Program Agency OMS objected to the use of on site as interrogators and raised con ict of interest and ethical concerns This was based on a concern that the on site who were administering the HTS participated in the evaluations assessing the 3 - - W3 NatSeCAthfectiveness and impact of the EITs on the detainees 75- 51 57 I The interrogation intelligence bmy requirements for Abu Zubaydah were generally developed at NatSecActHead uarters by CT Usama Bin Laden UBL Grou and refined at 5 and W1 provided input into the rendition and Process staff maintained daily dialogue with Headquarters management by cable and secure telephone and officers initiated a video conference with Headquarters to discuss the efficacy of proceeding with ElTs - - NatSecActM Abu Zubaydah was the only detainee at until Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri arrived on 15 November 2002 The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded after received the necessary Headquarters authorization The two NatSecAct 40 51384 l In August 2002 the group mange became Renditions and indicative of its new responsibilities for running detention facilities and interrogations For consistency purposes in this Review 01G subsequently refers to this group as 35 WT W0 A A NatSecAct D0045 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct interrogators began Al Nashiri s interrogation using EITs immediately upon his arrival Al-Nashiri provided lead information on other terrorists during his firSt day of interrogation 0n the twelfth day of interrogation the two interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions Enhanced NatSeCAct mm ideota es of Interro ations I I NatSeCAct 3 - 77 Headquarters had intense interest in 1 Natseg aglgibreast of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah s interrogations including compliance-with the guidance provided to the site relative to the use of EITs Apart from this however and before bm the use of EITs the interrogation teams at i decided to NatSecActieotape the interrogation sessions One initial purpose was to ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah s medical condition and treatment should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care provided to him by CIA Another purpose was to assist in the preparation of the debrie ng reports although the team advised Legal that they rarely if ever _were used for that purpose There are 92 videotapes 12 of which include EFT I applications An OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in - November and December 2002 to ascertain compliance with the August 2002 Do opinion and Compare what actually happened With what was reported to Headquarters He reported that there was no bm deviation from the Do guidance or the written record I NatSeCAct 78 01G reviewed the videotapes logs and cables in May 2003 OIG identi ed 83 waterboard applications most of which lasted less than 10 OIG also a identified one instance where a verbally NatSecAct 41 EL For the purpose of this Review a'ivaterboard application constituted each i discrete instance in which water was applied for any period of time during a session 36 mm NatSecAct 0045 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 I Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Ml le NatSecAot threatened Abu Zubaydah by stating If one child dies in America and I nd out you knew Something about it I will personally cut your mother s throat 2 OIG found 11 interrogation videotapes to be 1 blank Two others were blank except for one or two minutes of mm recording Two others were broken and could not be reviewed OIG compared the videotapes to logs and cables and identi ed a 21-hour period of time which included two waterboard sessions 1 that was not captured on the videotapes I NatSecAct 79 Ta review of the videotapes revealed I that the waterboard technique employed at was different from the technique as described in the Do opinion and used in the SERE training The difference was in the manner in which the detainee s breathing was obstructed - At the SERE School and in the Do opinion the subject s air ow is disrupted by the rm application of a damp cloth over the air passages the interrogator applies a small bm amount of water to the cloth in a Controlled manner By contrast the W3 interrogator lzontinuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee s mouth and nose One of the interrogators acknowledged that the Agency s use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency s technique is different because it is for real and is more poignant and convincing NatSecAot - 1 Nat ecAct 80- 351 From December 2002 un Fepternber 2003 was used to detain and interrogate - bm eight individuals NatSecAct During this time Headquarters issued the formal DCI Con nement Guidelines the DCI Interrogation Guidelines and the additional draft guidelines speci cally J 42 See discussion in paragraphs 92-93 regarding threats 4 i 37 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 WI - NatSecAot addressing requirements for OMS personnel This served to strengthen the command and control exercised over the CTC Program - Background and Detainees 81 NatSecAct NatSecAot A 82 65 was originally intended to hold NatS C L Hna mum of two high value detainees because the Agency had not established another detention mm facility for these detainees five cells had been constructed to five detainees Abu Zubavdah Al-Nashirik NatSeeAct Several Agency personnel ekpressed concern to OIG that had become overcrowded 83 AA NatSecAct 38 ml CHE mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ggL-fv- Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mini NatSecAot I mm Staffing NatSeCAct NatSecAct i 84 WIS-F Likel had no permanent positions and was staffed with TDY of cers It had the same general staf ng complement as - ats 9010 wa managers told OIG that selecting a COB at 3 they consrdered a combination of factors to mclude grade and managerial experience A senior DO of cer said that by March 2003 because of a lack of available experienced DO of cers who could travel to the selection criteria were limited to selecting CTC candidates based on their grade Like most TDY I personnel who traveled to the COB was generally NatSeCACtexpected to remain for a 30-day TDY 86 419 The duties of the COB to manage the facility its security and its personnel were the same as NatSeCACt those of the COB at The COB also oversaw interrogations and debriefings released cables and reports and communicated daily with the local Station and Headquarters NatSecAct I 87 Di- 57 Although the COB was ultimately tor on-site security the daily responsibilities 1 for security matters fell to security personnel who in addition to bxs NatSeCACtmonitoring the detainees around-the clock also monitored perimeter via audio and video cameras Security personnel at maintained records of vital detainee information to include medical information prescribed medications bathing schedules menus and eating schedules They prepared three meals daily for each detainee which generally consisted of beans rice cheese sandwiches vitamins fruit water and Ensure nutritiOnal supplement 3'9 - 7 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 messy If NatSecAct NatsecAct 88' At roles did not immediately change They continued to assess and interrogate detainees and were identified as interrogators Headquarters addressed the con ict of interest concern when on 30 January 2003 it sent a cable to that stated - NatSecAct fl It has been and continues to be Agency practice that the I individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques is not the same person who issues the assessment of record In this respect it Should be noted that staff and IC who are approved interrogators may continue to serve as interrogators and physically participate in the I administration of enhanced techniques so long as at least one other is present who is not also serving as an interrogator and the appropriate interrogation assessment of reCOrd has been completedMedical Services believes this problem still eXists because the interrogators continue to perform both functions Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines NatSecAct - 89 FE By the timeEbecame operational the Agency was providing legal and operational brie ngs and cables that contained Headquarters 1 guidanceand discussed the torture statute and the Do legal opinion W3 had also established a precedent of detailed cables between land Headquarters regarding the interrogation and debriefing 0f detainees The Written guidance did not address the four standard interrogation techniques that 7 according to CT Legal the Agency had identi ed as early as November 2002 43 Agency personnel were authorized to employ standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without Headquarters prior approval The guidance did not specifically it 43W The four standard interrogation techniques were 1 sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours 2 continual use of light or darkness a cell 3 loud music and 4 white noise- background hum - wraith- - ie- A - My Lumm n 40 mm ml NatSecAct D0050 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 bm NatSeCAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - W NatSecAct address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee nor - did it speci cally address the issue of whether or not Agency Of cers could improvise with any other techniques No formal mechanisms were in place to ensure that personnel going to the eld were briefed on the existing legal and policy guidance Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 90 T31 This Review heard allegations of the use of unauthorized techniques The most significant the handgun and power drill incident discussed below is the subject of a Separate OIG investigation In addition individuals interviewed during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern because Do had not speci Cally approved them These included the making of threats blowing cigar smoke employing certain stress positions the use of a stiff brush on a detainee and stepping on a detainee s ankle shackles For all of the instances the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination regarding the facts Thus although these allegations are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held by individuals associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action NatSeCAct Handgun and Power Drill NatSeCAct and interrogation team members whose purpose it was to interrogate Al-Nashjri and debrief Abu Zubaydah initially staffed The interrogation team continued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks in December 2002 until they assessed him to be compliant Subsequently CT of cers at Headquarters disagreed with that assessment and sent d3 ts A senior operations officer the debriefer a 90 to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri 92 T54 The debriefer assessed Al Nashiri as withholding information at which point reinstatedslieep deprivation hooding and handcuf ng Sometime between 41 le NatSecAct D0051 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved f0r Release 2016 06 10 005355717 W1 NatSecAct a 35 28 December 2902 1 January 2003 the debriefer used an unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri W5 into disclosing informationxt4 After discussing this plan withS I the debriefer entered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri s head 45 on what was probably the same day the debriefer used a power drill to 4511553 I frighten Al-Nashiri With consent the debriefer entered the detainee s cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood naked and hooded The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill - 93 Wis - The and debriefer did not request mm mm authorization or-lreport the use of these unauthorized techniques to W3 However in January 2003 newly arrived TDY of cers who had learned of these incidents reported them to Headquarters OIG investigated and referred its findings to the Criminal Division of Do On 11 September 2003 Do declined to prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report of Investigation 6 7 mm Threats - NatSecAct NatSecAct I - 94 18 During another incident the same Headquarters debriefer according to a who Was present threatened Al-Nashiri by saying that if he did not talk We could get your mother in here and We can bring your family in here The debriefer reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri atSeCRinfer for reasons that the debriefer might beg intelligence of cer based on his Arabic dialect and that Al- Nashiri was in custody because it was widely believed in Middle East circles that interrogation technique involves 45 170139 Racking is a mechanical procedure used with rearms to chamber a bullet pr simulate a bullet being chambered 46 Unauthorized Interrogation Techniq b 1 29 October 2003 NatSecAct 42 I messy NatSecAct D0052 I 'T W tdgh - 44 $7794 This individual was not'a trained interrogator and'was not authorized to use EITs Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mm bm NatSecAct NatSecAct sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee The debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family The debriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he was from when talking with Al-Nashiri The debriefer said he never said he was intelligence officer but let mm Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions 1' NatSecAct 95 An experienced Agency interrogator reported that the ts interrogators threatened Khalid ts A tShaykh Muhammadi According to this interrogator the a GC interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that W3 if anythingelse happens in the United States We re going to kill I W6 your children According to the interrogator one of the I interrogators said Legal had advised tha threats are permissible so long as they are conditional With respect to the report provided to him of the threats that report did not indicate that the law had been violated Smoke I NatSecAct NatSecAct 96 - fgl An Agency independent contractor interrogator admitted that in December 2002 he and another independent contractor smoked cigars and blew smoke in Al-Nashiri s face during an interrogation The interrogator claimed they did this to cover the stench in the room and to help keep the interrogators alert late at night interrogator said he would not do this again based on perceived criticiSm Another Agency interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions with Al-Nashiri to mask the stench in the room He claimed he did not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri s face bw - l 4'2 Mal 00053 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct Positions 97 - OIG receiyed reports that interrogation team members employed potentially injurious stress positions on Al-Nashiri Al-Nashiri was required to knee on the oor and lean back On at least one occasion an Agency of cer reportedly pushed Al Nashiri backward while he was in this stress position On another occasion said he had to intercede after expressed concern that Al-Nashiri s arms might be dislocated from his shoulders hxplained that at the time the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashiri in a standing stress pOSition Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the oor by his arms while his arms were bound behind his back with a belt Stiff Brush and Shackles I hm NatSeoAct 98 TSL interrogator reported that he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri that the interrogator knew were not specifically approved by Do These - included the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain on Al-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri s shackles which resulted in - Nats g gtmn ses When questioned an interrogator who was at NatSecAot acknowledged that they used a Stiff brush to bathe Al-Nashiri He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses ina bath toremove stubborn dirt A CTC manager who had heard of the incident attributed the abrasions on Al Nashjri s ankles to an Agency officer on Al-Nashiri s shackles while repositioning him into a stress position - - - Waterboard Technique 99 $84 The Review determined that the interrOgators used the Waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterb oard and the description of the Waterboard in the Do OLC opinion in that the technique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a large -- number of times According to the General Counsel the Attorney 44 MI NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 10-daylet-yard D0054 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - NatSecAct General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboardand that CIA is well within the scope of the Do opiniOn and the authority given to CIA by that opinion The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a single individual NatSecAct I I 100 Cables indicate that Agency - interrogators pplied the waterboard technique to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 183 times during 15 sessions-over a period of 14 days The application of this technique to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad evolved because of this detainee s ability to counter the technique by moving his lips to the side to breathe while water was being poured To cempensate the interrogator administering the waterboard technique reportedly held Khalid Shaykh Muhammad s lips with one hand while pouring water with the other Khalid Shaykh Muhammad also countered the technique by holding his breath and drinking as much of the water being administered as he could An on-site physician monitoring the waterboard sessions estimated that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was capable of ingesting up to two liters of water Cables indicate that an average of 19 liters 5 gallons of water were used per waterboard session with some of the water being splashed onto Khalid Shaykh Muhammad s chest and abdomen to evoke a visceral response from him On the advice I of the presiding physician water was replaced With normal saline to prevent water intoxication and dilution of electrolytes In addition one of the interrogators reportedly formed his hands over Khalid Shaykh Muhammad s mouth to collect approximately one inch of standing water 47 Cables re ect that during six waterboard W0 7 - 4 7 6 51 According'to the while Khalid Shaykh Muhammad proved to be remarkably resilient to waterboard applications 1e unprecedented intensity of its use led OMS to advise that OMS considered the Ongoing process botheXcessive and pointless This concern was the impetus for OMS to juxtapose explicitly the SERE waterboard experience with that of the Agency 5 in the OMS Guidelines then being assembled 45 mm NatSeoAct 00055 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 messy NatSecAct sessionsrwith Khalid Shath Muhammad the interrogation team exceeded thecontemplated duration of 20 minutes per session with the most notable session lasting 40 minutes 48 mm NatSecAct 101 6r5 attention to detention and interrogation activities The Agency provided lees management it gave to and than took the lead on these activities using astheprimary' detention and interrogation facilityi NatSecAct mg 102 NatSeCAct 1 n 1 - 4 - NatSecAct 48554 The OLC opinion dated 1 August 2002 states You have also orally informed us that it is likely that this procedure waterboard would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application J NatSecAct 46 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 5 r i i hm Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 TOP-SEGREI NatSecAct mm NatSeCAct 103 NatSecAct 104 M0 NatSeCAct 105 NatSecAct 106 M0 NatSeCAct m- m 47 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0057 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm mm b 3 NatSecAct NatSeCAct 107 I I I NatSecAct w- NatSecAct 108 received its rst detainee on September 2002 After the rst month of Operation detainee population had grown to 20 Since then the detainee population ranged from 8 to 20 - - NatSecAc Headquarters Oversight NatSecAct 109 63 The disconnect between the eld and Headquarters regarde arose early After opened the Station acknowledged that in practical NatseCACt NatSecAct r5 - 4 - '1 Tia 110 i 1 T1 a NatSecAct we AR D0058 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSeCAct 111 OIG also found confusion among DO 9 components regarding which Headquarters element was responsible prior to September 2003 50 The proposal for opening or NatSecAct I originated w1th regarding selection of the NatSeoAct NatSecAct him NatSecAct the eld The confusion stemmed in part from the fact that 112 raw and many of the dec1s10ns were made in Despite the transition however the focus of activities id in general and in particular was counterterrorism and those activities were supported counterterrorism funds As a result at Headquarters lnonitored the activities but did r63 attempt to provide management oversight NatSecAct Initially was the author of most cables concerning the facility however maintained that was not a responsibility but a RDG reSponsibilitv RDG did not of cers mm NatSecActhare View Senior CTC of cials acknowledged thatl thaIl activities there NatSeCAct NatSecAct Mas far less important to them b 1 4 and they focused little attention on Wm 49 W0 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 D0059 NatSecAct 3 t'S thogrammatjc assessment of the a lstated its view that the staf ng should includel NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct 113 InDecember 2002 made a staf ng requirements The NatSecAct 114 315 Alsoin assumed responsibility for ecember 2002 after CTC a assessment team traveled to the site The assessment teammade recommendations ranging from administrative improvements such as installation of thermometers in the facility and theuSe of a logbook to programmatic changes such as the need for additional personnel and the endgame for each detainee Subsequently there were some improvements in interrogation support A September 2003 assessment from - staf ng remained insuf cient to support the detention program In response CTC proposed to add three positions to th to address regional interrogation requirements indicated that Facility and Procedures NatSecAct 115 NatSecAct The detention facility inside the warehouse consists of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells three interrogation rooms a staff room and a m1 NatSecActaI- dr I is not insulated and there is no central air conditioning or heating - Individual cells were designed with a recess for electrical space heaters however electrical heaters were not placed in the cells The 50 I estimated there were between 6 and 12 gas heaters in the cell block in November 2002 at the time a detainee Gul-Rahman Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 u- 3 9119 a I H s D0060 NatSecAct the death NatSeCAct Approved for'Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 I m NatSecAct died from hypothermia 51 This was increased to 40 to 60 heaters after NatSecAct 116 had no written standard operating procedures until January 2003 when the DCI Con nement Guidelines were issued A interrogator visiting the facility beforeGul Rahman s death in November 2002 noted de ciency stating that the procedures should be so detailed as to specify who is responsible for turning the lights on and off or what the temperature should be in the facility Although the W1 interrogath relayed this opinion to Manager and planned to author procedures before he could do so -he was sent to for the interrogation of a high value detainee 117 925 The customary practice at was to shave eachdetainee s head and beard and conduct a medical examination upon arrival Detainees were then given uniforms and - moved to a cell All detainees were subjected to total darkness and loud music Photographs were taken of reach detainee for identi cation purposes While in the cells detainees were shackled to the wall The guards fed the detainees on an alternating schedule of one meal on one day and two meals the next day As the - temperature decreased in November and December 2002 the Site Manager made efforts to acquire additional supplies such as warmer uniforms blankets and heaters 52- If a detainee was cooperative he was afforded improvements in his environment to include a mat blankets a Koran a lamp and additional food choices Detainees who were not cooperative were subjected to austere conditions and aggressive interrogations until they became compliant 51 SH-NB The facts and of Cu Rahman s death are discussed later in this ReView - 52 U In November 2002 the temperature ranged from a high degrees Fahrenheit 51 mm 1 - NatSeCAct D0061 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSeCAct NatSecAct 11's 5 51 Prior to December 2002 had no written interrogation procedures According to Station - of cer Headquarters approval in July 2002 of the of a 4 detainee with techniques of sleep deprivation solitary confinement and noise served as the basis for the standard operating procedures NatSecAct According to 7 had no definitive guidance regarding interro ations C until a CTC of cer came to in late July 72002 cable to C CT Legal proposing techniques such as the use of darkness sleep deprivation solitary confinement and noise that ultimately became the model for Other interrogation techniques adopted at which were reported to Headquarters included standing sleep deprivation nakedness and cold showers NatSecAct 119 InterrOgators at were left to their own devices in working with the detainees One new CTC operations of cer explained that he received no training or' guidance- related to interrOgations before he arrived NatSechct r cam- a 1 Other of cers provided similar accounts Several officers who observed or participated in the activities at in the early months expressed concern about the lack of Procedures_ NatSecAct 120 6155 received little general guidance regarding detention and interrogation until after the death of Rahman on November 2002 In the perceived absence of NatSecACteci c guidance from Headquarterg may m C It was not until December 2002 three months after opening that received official written guidance from Headquarters Some of that guidance for example the instruction that only those who had taken the interrogator training NatSecAct 53 Ems first session of the interrogation course began in member 2m In paragraphs 64 65 I 52 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 1 W0 NatSecAct 1 commenced inNovember 2002 should conduct interrogations met with surprise by of cers who had been operating Wig-to NatSecAct November 2002 under other de facto precedures W1 NatSecAct 121 The interrogation process evolved afterthe death of Gul Rahman OnEpecember 2002 bxs announCed it would assume the responsibility for the management and maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities An assessment team traveled tol lin December stated he was comfortable with the level of guidance the Station received after the team s visit NatSeCAct 122 -1351 the emplOyment of EITs is now reportedly well codi ed According to the when mam interrogators arrive he provides them with a folder containing written security issues and the procedures for using Interrogators are required to sign a statement certifying they have read and understand the contents of the folder Written interrogation plans are prepared and sent to Headquarters for each detainee Directorate of Intelligence are not used as interrogators they NatSeCAct 2002 and prepared a list of recommendations are the substantive experts are also monitoring the W3 detainees and a Physician s Assistant is now at whenever ElTs are being employed The staff is watching the temperature and detainee diets more carefully Headquarters monitors medical hygiene and other health safety and related issues by among other things daily cable traf c and quarterly written reports NatSecAct NatsecAct 123 High value detainees Al-Nashiri and Khalid Sha'ykh Muhammad transited enmute to other facilities Several medium value detainees have been detained and interrogated at For example Ridda Najjar a purported mm UBL bodyguard Mustafa Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi an Al-Qa ida NatSecAct A 53 - D0063 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct financier whoreportedly handled the transfer of funds to the 9 11 hijackers and was captured with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad s nephew Ammar al-Baluchi Were detained at Although these individuals were not planners they had access to information of particular interest and the Agency used interrogation techniques to obtain this NatSecAct'rmatiOIL Site Management bxm NatSecAct NatSecAct I NatSecAct 124 41 30 who was at from Hescribed as a high riSk NatSeC gain intelligence facility He' described his role regarding He stated that he'traveled there - to obtain a general sense of the facility or learn firsthand of a speci c interrogation he released all cables regarding the facility and the interrogations conducted there I - NatSecAct C who had several overseas 125 6 41% ents was aid his responsibilities included overseeing the activities at He said he went to the facility about three times explaining that Station management tried to limit the number of trips tn the facility because going there was considered an erational act NatSeCAct H NatSecAct a531 uccause ofothemsim heavil on bi pversee the day-to day running of the NatSecAct ity_ I Egg NatSecAct_ - 126 511570 who'was interviewed 7 during this Review l He was unable to estimate the percentage of time that he spent on detention-related matters but said it varied NatSGCAQlted that he went to mm on a number of occasions and NatSeCAct - 54 mogul NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 2 I Mir- ad-A LI lei D0064 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ml NatSeCAct believed he knew what was occmring there i NatSeCAct NatSecAct 127- prior to its occupancy to a hired This of cer lacked any education or i1 Station assigned responsibility for of cer experience that was relevant to managing the construction of a detention facility He only learned of his assi ent after'reporting to the Station He was responsible for the site W6 bm NatseCACt - 128 The first b 1 Site Manager was a first-tour officer NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSeCAct W NatSecAct 129 When he arrived in the Site Manager had no idea what duties he Would A NatSeCAc feisigned He believes the primary factors in his assignment as Site Manager were the vacancy in the detention program andthat The Site Manager received a copy of the Interrogation Guidelines in January 2003 and certi ed that he had read them The rst formal training the Site Manager received on the useof BITS however was m mm NatSecAct C an interrogation class he attended nine menths into his 55 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct I - imp-seesaw MM 3 NatSeCAct 130 gave the Site Mana er responsibility for anything that had to do with detentionl NatSecAct E - has mi 1 A El '3 1- NatSecAct I C 131 S explained that he selected the Site Manager based on several factors includng added that he watched the Site Manager discharge his duties and was very satis ed with the 1 job he performed said that he and the Site I bxs as 90 A Cfanager talked a lot about issues The Site Manager had free access mam to Station Front Of ce and Ereca ed consulting with the Site Manager at least once a day - 132 W-The Site Manager adVISed he had We 3' 3 NatSecAc'tth Station management including and the every other day or as issues arose He stated that 1 someone from Station management came out to about once a month Ame came once or twice l W6 When Senior Headquarters - t A management accompanied them tel p a 90 EM 133 SW A number of individuals who served at the 1 Station with the Site Manager said that it was abundantly clear to E58 NatSeciaem that he was overwhelmed Additionally they believed l was understaffed and did not receive the attention it requiredNatSecAct a D0066 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approvedvfor Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct m I I ll mm l34 was unaware until Egg bxs atSeCAcbem mtemewed dunng this Rewew that the first Site Managerat A I had been a junior of cer Sstated that a first tour of cer should not be running anything One of the reasons he cited for his revocation of the assignment of the replacement Site Manager at was that the nominee was onl a 6 lIn view ata minimum a 15 more appropriate for the NatSeCAct 1 Interrogators and Linguists NatSecAct 135 $871 The Site Manager explained that the interrogations conducted at during the first months that it was operational were essentially custodial interviews coupled with environmental deprivatidns When Agency officers came to conduct interrogations the Site Manager initially took them to The only guidance he provided them at that time was how to get in and out of the facility securely Substantive experts were in short supply so the interrogators had to read the background on the detainees - The Site Manager explained that the interrogators essentially had the freedom to do what they Wanted he did not have a list of do s and don ts for interrogations 136 T9 During rst four months of operation individuals with no previous relevant experience no I training and no guidance often conducted the interrogations In fact W1 most of these individuals were Sent to in other capacities and NatSecActwere pressed into service at For example one analyst sent to as a substantive expert took over the debriefing interrogation function of three detainees after approximately a week of observing the process Another officer interrogated at ts A said he agreed to do so becauSe it needed to be done and because the a 60 c alternative was to leave the detainees languishing indefinitely Several of cers expressed concern about the extended and sometimes - NatSecAct 8 8 8 8 8 0 57 bxi m NatSecAct D0067 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 gor Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct NatSeCAct unjusti ed detention Of individuals at stated that individuals might have been released or moved sooner had they been debriefed interrogated earlier and if a determination had then been made thabt mere was little justification for their continued daemon at NatISecAct 137 T5 In addition to a shortage of interrogators suffered from a shortage of linguists Because most of the debriefers interrogators at have had mm no relevant foreign language capability linguists must assist in the NatSecAdterrOga donsJ- have occurred however when detainees were not questioned because of a lack of linguistic support Station requested both interrogation and linguistic support when it has been specifically needed but'its requests have not always been accommodated NatSecAct NatSecAct 138 Providing medical attention to detainees has also been a staf ng problem In addition compared to NatSe k trelativelv small number of high value detainees at Medical Support the larger number and less well-known detainees at posed unique challenges 139 NatSecAct Teps cgg 58 W NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 pai 9 lg yr n$ Ei' z - Vi-r h-q q 13 13 - f w Hui-i MM D0068 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSeoAct mm NatSeoAct 14o NatSeoAct 141 Tail NatSeoAct One cable per month reported the results of examinations of the 1 detainee p0pu1ation over the folldwing ve-month period Despite NatSeCActthe reports of the examination and treatment of detainees at which commenced four months after the facility received its rst detainee it is difficult to determine the extent of medical care 56 mm fact one prior cable on 19 january 2003 provided an assessment of 13- detainees at NatSecAot v - 59 D0069 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSevot merry NatSeCAot provided to the detainees for example reported that he did not NatSquCtpare records of any treatment rendered and his OMS suPervisor reported that OMS does not have a written protocol requiring practitioners to produce documentation of patient contact relying rather on the accepted professional requirement to document patient contacts NatSecAot 142 Station reported that it is standard 7 procedure for one medical officer to participate in all renditions to ensure the detainee does not have a hidden weapon to determine the W3 Natsec ttial condition of the detainee and to stabilize the detainee during rendition That officer therefore arrived with any detainees who 53 - r were rendered to As further described in paragraph 161 shortly after the death of Rahman the BBQ sent Agency 1 of cers the Investigative Team to investigate the NatSecActcumstances of the death The advised the DO Investigative Team that detainees are examined and photographed upon their arrival to protect the Agency in the event they were beaten or otherwise mistreated by liaison prior to rendition However when asked for the identity of the medical of cer the information on Rahman s medical examination and copies of the photographs c0uld not produce them He reported that no medical documents were retained from the renditions and the Station did notretain medical documentation of detainees Further the digital photos of Rahman had been overwritten I A '143 NatSecAct j a I i 60 D0070 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 1 mm - NatSecAct NatSecAct A 1 mm NatSecAct NatSeCAc tT 145 NatSeCAct NatSecAct arranged for the US Bureau of Prisons BOP to send al team toSfrom November 59 This team wOrked with the guard force concentrating on techniques such as entry and escort procedures application of restraints security checks pat-down and cell searches and documenting checks of detainees NatSecAct NatSecAct 0 61 mm NatSecAct 00071 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSeCAct NatSeCAct 146 NatSecAct '147 NatSeCAct mm NatSeCAct 62 mm 5 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0072 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 TOP-SEGRESP 148 NatSecAot 149 NatSecAct NatSecAct 150 After CTC assumed responsibility for the management of all CIA interrogation facilities on b 1 NatSecAot b 1 r-wr Ahn NatSecAct 63 mm NatSecAot 00073 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mm 151 NatSecAct NatSecAct 152 NatSecAct W NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 M Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 m b 3 NatSecAct NatSeCAct A 153 NatSecAct 154 NatSecAct 155 NatSecAct NatSecAct 65 mm I NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 m NatSecAct NatSecAct 150 NatSecAct 157 NatSecAct 158 NatSecAct NatSecAct m' 66 W0 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 1020505776717 $22 wan age awn 'E m a w- n 9 a km vxr u D0076 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm Mil bXS NatSecAct 1 NatSecAct 5x1 bxs NatSeeAaD ath of Gul Rahman 159 65 Cu Rahman a suspected Afghan - mm extremist associated with the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddjn organization NatSecAct was captured in on and rendered to I Lwon Nrovember 2002 - Between November 2002 an underwent at least six interrogation sessions conducted bv various members of a team that included the NatSecAot was experienced from decades of work in I the SERE program had helped develop the HTS and had conducted interrogations at had no experience or relevant training in interrogations before their NatSecActassigmnent to but had acquired approximately six months of experience through on-the-job training - A - - NatSecAct 160 Rahman was Subjected to sleep deprivation sessions of up to 48 hours at least one cold shower and a hard takedown euphemistically termed rough treatment 66 In NatSecActaddition Ralunan was apparently without clothing for much of his time aljas part of the sleep deprivation and to mine cultural humiliation Despite these measures Rahman remained uncooperative and provided no intelligence His only concession was to admit his identity on DNovember 2002 otherwise he mm retained his resistance posture and demeanor The November W3 cable reporting that R ahman admitted his identity to of cers includes the following Rahman spent the days since his last session in cold conditions with minimal food and sleep A NatSecAct 65 37 Both the cold shower and hard takedown are described in greater detail later in this Review 67 D0077 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 on Ml NatSeCAct NatSecAct of Rahman on DNovember 2002 noted remarkable physical and resilience and recommended in nart continued environmental deprivations NatSecAct 161 On the afternoon of November 2002 - when delivered food to Rahman he reportedly threw the food his water bottle and defecation bucket at the guards In addition he reportedly threatened the guards and told them he had seen their faces and would kill them upon his release When the Site Manager learned of this incident he authorized short-chaining - Rahman s hands and feet were shackled and connected with a short-chain NatSeCAct 162 found Rahman dead mm in his cell on the morning of LINovember 2002 The ambient bxs Natseci tlperature was recorded at a low ofm degrees Rahman was still in the short-chain position that required him to sit naked from the waist down on the concrete oor of his cell He wore only a sweatshirt 1 NatSecAct_ 163 reported Rahman s death that day in an cable to the DDO The DDO dispatched the DO Investigative Teaml NatSeCAct also the incident to SSCI I and HPSCI The DO Investigative Team conducted interviews and the pathologist performed an autopsy of The autopsy indicated by a diagnosis of exclusion that death was caused by hypothermia After the DO investigation was completed CIA repOrted the death to Do and further briefed the SSCI and HPSCI leadership OIG opened an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident Do declined prosecution of the Agency employee responsible forE investigation will be the subject of a separate Report of Investigation 67 S The pathologist estimated Rahman to be in his mid-3'05 68 NatSecActQ Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ll h-n- J1 H1 tau- 9 Erma - - it D0078 1 NatSecAct bxi NatSeCACtone event in the early months of l I 1 5 mm NatSeCAct i i Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct Specific nauthorized or Undocumented Techniques__ 164 The treatment of Gul Rahman was but Agency activity in I that involved the use of interrogation techniques that Do and Headquarters had riot approved Agency personnel reported a range of iniproviSed actions that interrogators and debriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaining information from detainees The extent of these actions is illustrative of the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and the Agency s msuffiCient attention to interrogations in bxs 165 01G opened separate investigations into two incidents the November 2002 death of Cu Rahman at and the death of a detainee 'at a military base in Northeast Afghanistan discussed further in paragraph 192 These two cases presentedfacts that warranted criminal investigations Some of the techniques discussed below were used with Gui Rahman and will be further addressed in connection with a Report relating to his death - In other cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques the facts are ambiguous or less serious not warranting further investigation Some actions discussed below were taken by employeesor contractors no longer associated with the Agency Agency management has also addressed administratively some of the actions Pressure Points 166 is In July 2002 operations of cer participated with another operations of cer in a custodial interrogation of a detainee reportedly used a pressure point technique with both of his hands on the detainee s neck manipulated his ngers 1 to restrict the detainee carotid artery NatSecAct mm I 60 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 AA Approved for Release 2016 06 10 roam tam NatSecAct x 167 b b who was facing the shackled detainee reportedly watched his eyes to the point that the detainee Would nod and start to pass out then the shook the detainee to wake him process was repeated for a total of three applications on the detainee Thel lacknowledged to OIG that he laid hands - on the detainee and may have made him think he was going to lose consciousness The also noted that he hasl W6years of experience debriefing and mtervrewmg people and until recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations 168 CTC management is now aware of reported incident the severity of which was disputed The use of pressure points is net and had not been authorized and CTC has advised the that such actions are not authorized Mock Executions NatSecAQt NatSeCAct 169 The debriefer who em loyed the handgun power drill on Al-NaShiri dvised that NatSec ctnseiachons were predicated on a technique he had The debriefer stated that when he was between September and October 2002 offered to rea handgun outside the interrogation room while the debriefer was interviewing a detainee who was thought to be withholding informational lstaged the incident which included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA of cers and - guards When the guards moved the detainee from the interrogation room they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee lying motionless on the ground and made to appear as if he had been shot to death 4 b NatseCAct NatSecAct 68 S The actionsl Rahman investigation lire-being addressed as part of the Cul 7o NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 p 313 can Eff I yin Ii at arm - D0080 NatSecAot he needed to report this incident because the several da 5 nor to and NatSeCACiifter the incident When the debriefer was later ind 7 NatSecAot I Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSecAot The debriefer claimed he did not think had 17o rsr openly discussed this plan believed he needed a non-traditional technique to induce the detainee to cooperate he told he wanted to wave a handgun byes in front of the detainee to scare him The debriefer said he did not believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique citing the earlier unreported mock execution - NatSecAot 171 CBS A Senior 0 erations officer recounted that around September 2002 eard that the debriefer had staged a mock execution Ewas not present but understood it went badly it was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived W6 from it Eobserved that there is a need to be creative as long as it is not considered torture Stated that if such a proposal Were made now it would involve a great deal of consultation It would begin I with itnanagement and would include CT Le gal 12DC and the CTC 172 The admitted staging a mock execution in the rst days that as open According to the the technique was his idea but was not effective because it came across asbeing staged It was based on the concept from SERE school of showing something that 10016 real but is not TheSrecalled that a particular CTC interrogator later told him about employing a mock execution technique TIES did not know when this incident occurred or if it was successful He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not believable NatSecAot NatSecAot 69 This same debriefer submitted a cablefroE in early he proposed a number of other techniques including disconnecting the heating system overnight Headquarters did not respond 71 W0 NatSecAot Approved for Release D0081 - NatSeoAct NatSecR o rember 2002 NatSeCAc - the Natsec qa similar act occurring le since then- NatSecAct 175- 1154 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm mm NatSeCAotf 173 TS Four other officers and independent Contractors who Were interviewed admitted to either participatin in mile of the above-described incidents or hearing about them described staging a mock execution of a detainee Reportedly a detainee who witnessed the body 'in the aftermath of the ruse sang 111 b NatSecAct 174 revealed that approximately four days before his intetview with OIG the stated he - had conducted a mock execution in October or Ct Reportedly the rearm wasdischarged outside of the building and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threat information stated that he told not to do it again He stated that he has not heard NatSecAct Use of Smoke A CIA officer revealed that cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in October 2002 Reportedly at the request of b 7 an interrogator the of cer who does not smoke blew the smoke from a thin cigarette Cigar in the detainee s face for about ve minutes The detainee started talking so the smoke ceased heard that a different of cer had used smoke as an interrogation technique 01G - questioned numerous personnel who had worked about A the use of smoke as a technique None reported any knowledge of the use of smoke as an interrogation technique NatSecAct 176 admitted that he has personally used smoke inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point - where they would start to purge After this in a weakened state NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 3 p' 1 - -a g NatSecAct NatSecActw Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct these detainees would then provide with information 0 denied ever physically abusing detainees or knowing anyone Who haS- mm Use of Cold NatSeCAct bm 177 6135 1 As previously reportedleB NatSecAct received its first detainees in mid-September 2002 By many accounts the temperature was hot at that time and remained oenera y hot or warm until November 2002 178 In late lulv to detainee was being interrogated Pnor to proceedmg With any of the proposed methods officer responsible for the detainee sent a cable requesting Headquarters authority to employ a prescribed interrogation plan over a two-week period The plan included the following Physical Comfort Level Deprivation With use of a window air conditioner and a judicious provision deprivation of warm clothing blankets believe we can increase the detainee s physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his - mental trained resistance abilities CTC Legal responded and advised C aution must be used when employing the air cOnditioning blanket deprivation so that the detainee s discomfort doesnot lead to a serious illness or worse asked Rahman his identity and when'he did not respond wu true name Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the guards Rahman was so cold that he could barely say his alias According to theofficer the entire 70 67-11115 was substantiated in part by the CIA o t cer who participated in this-act the - - '73 mm NatSecAct D0083 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 1 4M Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 W NatSecAct gnu-am Him- 313 process lasted no more than 20 minutes and was intended to lower Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons At the conclusion of the shower Rahman Was moved to one of the Tour I sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his head It 1 mm 180 NatSeCAct Wmc This person detected Rahman was showing the early stages of hypothermia and he ordered- the guards to give the detainee a i blanket lorder a cold shower for Rahman Rahman was being uncooperative at the time and the independent contractor stated that it was evident that the shower was not ordered for hygienic reasons - 181 W NatSecAct bxs - l a 182 215 mm NatSecAct '74 W NatSecAct I 90084 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - 'Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 i mm mm NatSecAct 1 NatSecAct 183 Many of the of cers interviewed about i the use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold-showers W6 Howeveri lexplained that if a detainee was cooperative he would be given a warm shoWer He stated that When a detainee was uncooperative the interrogators accomplished two a goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower 31 113he Eggs of a cold shower atSeC Act 184 TSJ December 2002 less than one month after Rahman s hypothermia-induced death a cable reported that a detainee was left in a cold room shackled and naked until he demonstrated cooperation 185 753 When asked in February 2003 if cold bmi was used as an interrogation technique the responded NatSeCAct not per se He explained that physical and environmental discomfort was used to encourage the detainees to improve their mm environmentgobserved that cold is hard to de ne He asked rhetorically How cold is cold How cold is life threatening He stated that cold water was still employed however showers were administered in a heated room He stated there was no W3 NatSeCAcspeci c guidance on it from Headquarters and was left to its own discretion in the use of cold added there is a cable W6 frodeocumenting the use of manipulation of the environment 186 Although the DCI Guidelines do not atSeCAC'tnen on cold as a technique the September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines on Medical and Support to Detainee Interrogations specifically identify an uncomfortably cool environment as a standard interrogation measure Appendix F The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe temperature ranges including the safe temperature range when a detainee is wet or unclothed I NatSecAct D0085 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 g NatSeCA lchave worked since early 2003 when a CT RDG of cer introduced Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 m mxs NatSeCAct Water Dousjng 187 T574 Accordin to and water dousing has been used this technique to the facility Dousing involves laying a detainee down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to 15 minutes Another of cer explained that the room was maintained at 70 degrees or more the guards used water that was at room temperature while the interrogator questioned the detainee NatSecAct NatSeCAct 188 118 A review of cable traffic from April and May 2003 revealed thah Station sought permission from to employ speci c techniques for a number of detainees Included in the list of requested techniques was water dousing 72 Subsequent cables reported the use and duration of the techniques by detainee per interrogation session 73 One certi ed interrogator noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique requested CTC to con rm guidelines on water dousing A return cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towel or sheet may not be placed naked on the bare cement oor and the 'air temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried- immediately 189 113 The DCI Guidelines do not mention water dOusing as a technique The 4 September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines however identify water dousing as one of 12 standard measures that OMS listed in ascending degree of intensity as the 11th standard measure OMS did not further address water dousing in its guidelines 72 The presence of a and medic was included in each report of the use of these techniques 73 Hi l 'ater paragraph used the term cold water bath NatSecAct 76 Tmaem mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 teport' d water dousing xii 5% no r gs-thug Benn hams-ml t Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 W1 NatSeCAot bxn NatSeoAct Hafd Takeiown 190 During the course of the initial investigation of Rahman s November 2002 death the pathologist hm noted several abrasions on the body 74 W3 c tSeCAthho was present during the rst 10 days of Rahnian s con nement reported that he witnessed four or five lofficers execute a hard takedown on Rahman 75 His clothes were removed and he was run up and down the corridor when he fell he was dragged The process took between three to five minutes and Rahman was returned to his cell W6 observed contusions on his face legs and hands that looked bad saw a value in the exercise in order to make Rahman uncomfortable and exPerience a lack of control He recognized however that the technique was not within the parameters of 'what was approved by Do and recommended to the Eb WC that he obtain written approval fer employingS technique Three other officers who were present at the same time provided similar accounts of the incident No approval from mm Headquarters was sought or obtained we NatSevot - 191 According to the hard takedown was used often in interrogations at as part of the W3 atSeCACtitmospherics For a time it was the standard procedure for moving a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell It was done for shock and impact and signaled the transition to another phase of I the interrogation The act of putting a detainee into a diaper can cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because the floor of the I facility is concrete The stated he did not discuss the - C - hard takedown with Station managers but he thought they W1 understood what techniques were being used at W3 NatseCACt stated that the hard takedown had not been used recentl After taking the interrogation class he understood that if 74 The Final Autopsy Findings noted superficial excoriations of the right and left upper shoulders left lower abdomen and left knee mechanism undetermined 75 This incident is also being addressed in the Gul Rahman investigation - 77 mm We NatSecAot 00087 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSeCAct he was going to do a hard takedown he must report it to Headquarters Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance Headquarters approval they do not otherwise speci cally address NatSec f hard takedown 192 T5 stated that he was generally familiar With the technique of hard takedowns He asserted that they NatSeg Egtauthorized and believedthey had been used one or more times at in order to intimidate a detainee stated that he would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not consider it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval Asked about the possibility that a detainee may have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard takedown responded that he was unaware of that and did - - bxs NatSec i c t tumimd the 0 draggmg someone along the comdor a I Abuse imxs NatSegACtther Locations outSIde of the CTC Program 193 Although not the scope of the CTC Program two other incidents were reported in 2003 MN NatSeCAct As noted above one W1 resulted in the death of a detainee at Asadab'ad Base76 NatSeCAct 194 137% In June 2003 the US military sought an Afghan citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint US Army and CIA position in Asadabad located in Northeast Afghanistan On 18 June 2003 this individual appeared at Asadabad Base at the urging of the local Governor The individual was held in a detention facility guarded by US soldiers from the Base During 7675 F0r mare than a year CIA referred to Asadabad Base NatSecAct 78 mess-@1253 le NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - luv uni henna-l I and 4- fr -4 ta W m w D0088 NatSecAct b Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 W7 - 5 mm NatSeoAct the feur days the individual was detained an Agency independent contractor who was a paramilitary officer is alleged to have severely beaten the detainee with a large metal ashlight and kicked him during interrogation sessions The detainee died in custody on 21 June his body was turned over to a local cleric and returned to his family on the following date without an autopsy being performed Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been trained or authorized to conduct interrogations The Agency did not renew the independent contractor s contract which was up for renewal soon after the incident OIG is investigating this incident in concert with Do 77 195 1577mm uly 2003 officer assigned to assaulted a NatSecAct teacher at a religious school assault occurred during the course of an interview during a joint operatior The objective was to determine if anyone at the school had information about the detonation of a remote- controlled improvised explosive device that had killed eight border guards several days earlier W6 196 A teacher being interviewed reportedly smiled and laughed inappropriately whereupon used the butt stock of his ri e to strike or the teacher at least twice in his torso followed by several knee kicks to his torso This incident was witnessed by 200 students - The teacher was reportedly not seriously injured In response to his actions Agency management returned the to Headquarters He was counseled and given a domestic assignment 79 W0 'l NatSecAct% Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 0 NatSecAot' NatSechi'raChj' Pamstan- rendering him 0M lune - 20027 NatSecAct 'Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSeoAct AFCOIINIING FOR DETAINEES I NatSeC L wt NatsecAct - 197' Although the documentation of the capture rendition detention and interrogation of value detainees at and was comprehensive I documentation pertaining todetainees of lesser notoriety has been less consistent 78 Becausethe Agency had no requirement to document the capture and detention of all individuals until June 2003 79 OIG has been unable to determine with any certainty the number or current status of individuals who have been captured and dc - Four speci c examples follow - 198 Abu Bakr Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr is a Libyan who Was captured during a raid on Mav 2002 in NatSecACt NatSeoAct 78 Ts-l included the two a 79 6 Per DDO Guidance as described in paragraph 54 nd two detainees dehad eight detainees which 80 By January 2004 developed a database to include all detainees custody 80 NatSeoAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 't 51 1M Sui-mum I I Mun D0090 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ml NatSecAct NatSevot 199 NatSeCAct NatSecAct 200 33 Ridha Ahmad Al-Najjar Al-Najjar a Tunisian who reportedly was a UBL bodyguard and Al-Qa ida travel facilitator was captured during the same raid in Karachi that netted Abu Bakr onD Bakr were rendered rst detaineer b 1 NatSecAct on September 2002 NatSecAct May 2002 Cable traf c re ects Al-Najjar and Abu June 2002 Al-Naiiar became the 201 Lutfi Al-Gharisi Al-Gharisi Salim Khan is a Tunisian Al-Qa ida detainee captured in Peshawar Pakistan in Seotember2002 The Agency Subsequently rendered himto october 2002 __ mm NatSecAot 81 mm W1 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSeCAct 202 $51 Gul Rahman Rahman was the Afghan who was captured in Pakistan rendered to and died in custody on November 2002 November NatSeCAct 203 NatSecAct ANALYIICAL SUPPORT TO 204 DirectOrate of Intelligence assigned to CTC provide analytical support to interrogation teams in the field are responsible for developing requirements for the questioning of detainees as well as conducting debriefings in some cases NatSecAct __Ana1ysts however do not participate in the application of interrogation techniques NatSecAct 82 messy NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C058567 l7 i 5-2 5 xi 1 I w'ugg Eu 'Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 bm NatSeCAct NatSeCAct 205 According to a number of those interviewed for this Review the Agency s intelligence on Al Qa ida was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Interrogation Program The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and had very little hard knowledge of what particular Al-Qa ida leaders who later became detainees knew This lack of knowledge led to speculate about What a detainee should know vice information the analyst could objectively demonstrate the detainee did know For these reasons several interrogators considered the analytical support provided by to have been inadequate and sometimes awed 206 1w mm NatSecAct When a detainee did not respond to a question posed to him the assumption at Headquarters was that the detainee was holding back and knew more consequently Headquarters recommended resumption of ElTs NatSecAct 207 51 The standard that CTC employed to assess one detainee s level of compliance was articulated in a December 2002 cable requesting interrogators to further press Al-Nashiri for actionable threat information it is inconceivable to us that Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads to locate and detain the active terrorists in his network who are still at large - From our optic the single best measure of this cooperation will be in his reporting Speci cally when we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart future plots based on his reporting we will have much more confidence that he is indeed genuinely cooperative on some level 83 WI mm NatSecAct D0093 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAotto 2002 response Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAci NatSecAct 208 Base recommends against resuming enhanced measures with Subj ect unless there are speci c pieces of information he has provided that we are certain certain are lies or omissions or there is equally reliable additional information from other sources which implicates subj ect in a heretofore unknown plot tolattack' US or allied interests If such is the case Base would eagerly support returning to all enhanced measures indeed we would be the first to request them Without tangible proof of lying or intentional I withholding however we believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show subj ect that he will be punished whether he cooPerates or not thus eroding any remaining desire to continue cooperating Bottom line is we think subj ect is being cooperative and if subjected to indiScriminate and prolonged enhanced measures there is a good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperating or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the statute ' Therefore a decision to resume enhanced measures must be grounded in fact and not general feelings that subj eat is not being forthcoming It was after this interchange that Headquarters sent a new debriefer whose unauthorized actions are discussed in paragraphs 90 through Subsequently after further deliberation and renewed medical and assessment EITs not including the waterboard were authorized for a brief period NatSecAct 209 The shortage of accurate and-verifiable informatiOn available to the field to assess a detainee s compliance is evidenced in the nal waterboard session of Abu Zubaydah W3 as eC Agtccording to a senior CT officer the interrogation team at considered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to terminate EITs believed Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold information disagreed in its 23 December NatSecAct at the time it 84 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 ii '5 if El 3 3- - 99 N u 2 a NatSecAct NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C0585671 Warm W1 NatSecAct generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of the EITs According to this senior of cer the decision to resume use of the waterboard on Abu Zubaydah was made by senior of cers of the DO A team of senior CTC of cers traveled from Headquarters to to assess Abu Zubaydah s compliance and witnessed the nal waterboard session after which they reported back to Headquarters that the ElTs were no longer needed on Abu Zubaydah 210 told OIG that risk for is very different from the risk perceived by CT RDG and the interrogators Speci cally for CT UBL risk is associated with not obtaining the actionable information needed to prevent the next big attack hence are reluctant to agree that a detainee is not employing resistance techniques On the other hand risk for is associatedwith the continued use of HTS which could possibly lead directly or indirectly to a detainee s death or cause him permanent harm NatSeCAct - EFFECTIVENESS 211 115 1 The detention of terrorists has prevented them from engaging in further terrorist activity and their interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the identi cation and apprehension of other terrorists warned of I terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world and supported articles frequently used in the nished intelligence publications for senior policymakers and war ghters - In this regard there is no doubt that the Program has been effective Measuring the effectivenessof EITs however is a more subjective process and not without some concern - -- NatSecAct 212 ITEM 'When the Agency began capturing terrorists management judged the'success of the effort to be getting them off the streets NatSecAct - 85 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSecAct - - NatSecAct With the capture of terrorists who had access to much more significant actionable information the measure of success of the Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the prainees NatS CAct nor-Lara 53 213 Quantitatively the DO has signi cantly increased the number of counterterrorism intelligence reports with the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody Between 9 11 and the end of April 2003 the AgenCy produced over 3 000 intelligence reports from detainees Most of thereports came from - Intelligence rov1d c by the lugh value detainees atDb E3 NatSecAct NatSecAct a 214 CTC frequently uses the information from one detainee as well as other sources to vet the information of another detainee Although lower-level detainees provide less information than the high value detainees information from these detainees has on many occasions supplied the information needed to probe the high value detainees further According to two senior CTC the triangulation of intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa ida activities than would be possible from a single detainee NatSecAct NatSecAct l a 215 Detainees have provided information on Al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups Information of 1 note includes the modus- operandi of Al Qa'ida members who are worth targeting terrorists who are capable of mounting attacks in the United States i NatSeCAct 86 - W NatSecAct _ D0095 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 meme mm - NatSecAct NatSecAct and sources of funding for Al-Qa ida Perhaps the most signi cant information about Al-Qa ida obtained from detainees is on the subject of the group s planned use of weapons of mass destruction WMD in the United States had long suspected Al-Qa ida was attempting to deve10p a WMD capability and information from Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Ahaykh al-Libi Zubayr hinted at such efforts It was the information from Khalid Shaykh Muhammad however that confirmed the suspicions In addition to-information on anthrax chemical biological radiological and nuclear programs l and training in the use of poisons and explosives Khalid Shaykh Muhammad provided information that has led to the capture of individuals who headed the programs to develop WMD capabilities including Sayed Al-Barq who was the head of Al-Qa ida s anthrax - 216 Detainee information has assisted in the identi cation of terrorists For example information from Abu Zubaydah helped lead to the identi catiOn of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammedwoperatives who had plans to detonate a uranium-topped dirty bomb in either Washington DC or New York City Riduan Hambali Isomuddin provided information that led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack inside the United States Many other detainees including lower-level detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan have provided leads to other terrorists but probably the most prolific has been Khalid Shaykh Muhammad He provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair Paracha businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to use to smuggle explosives into the United States Saleh Almari a sleeper operative in New York and Majid Khan an operative who could enter the United States easily'and was tasked to research attacks against US water reservoirs Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information also led to the investigation and prosecution of Iyman Paris the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio Althoughmot 37 mm an L NatSecAct D0097 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mm NatSecAct yet captured information from Khalid Shaykh Muhammed and Abu Zubaydah led to the identificatiOn of an operative termed one of the NatSegAgtst liker to travel to the United States and carry out operations 217 Detainees both planners and operatives have also made the Agency aware of several plots planned for the United States and around the world The plots NatSecchimplans to attack the US Consulate in Karachi Pakistan h1 ack aircraft to y into Heathrow Airport and the Canary Wharf Tower loosen mm track spikes in an attempt to derail a train in the United States NatSecAct blow up several US gas stations to create panic and havoc hijack and y an airplane into the tallest building in California in a west coast version of the World Trade Center attack cut the lines of suspension bridges in New York in an effort to make them collapse and poison the U S water supply by dumping poison into water reservoirs With the capture of some of the operatives fOr the above-mentioned plots it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent Agency senior managers believe that lives have been saved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who were planning attacks in particular Khalid Shaykh Muhammad Abu Zubaydah Hambali and Al-Nashiri NatSeoAct I - 218 T574 CTC judge the reporting from - W3 detainees as one of the most important sources for nished intelligence viewed knowledge of the terrorist target as having much more depth as a result of information from detainees and estimated that detainee reporting is used in all counterterrorism articles produced for the mostsenior policymakers Detainee reporting is also used regularly in daily publications NatSeoAct - In an interview the DCI 88 - le NatSecAot Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 rein-1a 19 D0098 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct said he believe the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from detainees who had otherwise believed theywere safe from any harm in the hands of Americans A NatSecAct 219 13 senior officers familiar with the dissemination of reporting from detainee interrogations voiced concerns about compartmentation In particular those concerns regarded the impact on the timeliness of disseminating intelligence to in CIA and to the FBI while the initial operational recipients of the information are separating out the intelligence from more W3 NatSeCAglansitive operational informationl senior officers who voiced these concerns indicated that the issue was being reviewed by to more precisely assess the impact of the problem NatSecAct 220 Inasmuch as have been used only since August 2002 and they have not all been uSed with every high value detainee there is limited data on which to assess their individual effectiveness This Review identi ed concerns about the use of the waterboard speci cally whether the risks of its use were justified by the results whether it has been unnecessarily used in some instances and- whether the fact that it is being applied in a manner different from its use in SERE training brings into question the continued applicability of the Do opinion to its use Although the waterboard is the most intrusive of the HHS the fact that precautions have been taken to provide on-site medical oversight in 5X1 the use of all BITS is evidence that their use poses risks NatSecAct 221 1 51 Determining the effectiveness of each is important in facilitating Agency management s decision as to which techniques should be used and for how long Measuring the overall effectiveness of EITs is challenging for a number of reasons including 1 the Agency cannot determine with any certainty the totality of the intelligence the detainee actually possesses 2 each detainee has different fears of and tolerance for 3 application of the same EITs by different interrogators may have 89 MI NatSecAct 00099 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mmXB NatSecAct different results and 4 the lack of sufficient historical data related to certain ElTs because of the rapid escalation to' the use of the waterboard in the cases where it was used NatSecAct 222 The waterboard has been used on three detainees _Abu Zubaydah Al-Nashiri and I ialid Shaykh - Muhammad The waterboard s use was accelerated after the limited application of other ElTs in all three cases because the waterboard was considered by some in'Agency management to be the silver bullet combined with the belief that each of the three detainees possessed perishable information about imminent threats against the United States NatSecAct 223 applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during August 2002 During the period between the end of the use of the waterboard and 30 April 2003 he provided information for approximately 210 additional reports It is not possible to say definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah s increased production or if another factor such as the length of detention was the catalyst Since the use of the waterboard however Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative helping with raids by identifying photographs of the detainees captured NatSecAct NatSecActi i and giving interrogators information on how to induce other detainees to talk based on his own experiences - With respect to Al-Nashiri repOrted two waterboard sessions in November 2002 after interrogators determined that Al-Nashiri was compliant However after being moved to where a NatSeCA'C tferent interrogation team assumed responsibility for his interrogations Al-Nashiri Was thought to be withholding I information Al Nashiri subsequently received additional EITs including stress positions but not the waterboard The Agency then determined Al-Nashiri to be compliant Because of the litany of 90 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Prior to the use of HTS Abu Zubaydah 1 provided information for over 100 intelligence reports Interrogators 2 I an an j A i NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short period of time it is dif cult to identify exactly Why Al-Nashiri became morewilling to provide information However following the use of EITs he provided information about his most current operational planning and the saudi Al-Qa ida network as Opposed to the historical information he provided before the use of ElTs 225 On the other hand Khalid Shaykh Muhammad an accomplished resistor provided only a few intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard and analysis of that information revealed that much of it was outdated inaccurate or incomplete As a means of less active resistance at the beginning of their interrogation detainees routinely provide information'that they know is already known IGialid Shaykh Muhammad received 183 applications of the waterboard in March 2003 and remained resilient providing limited useful intelligence until the application of sleep deprivation for a period of 180 hours Although debriefers still must bio - NatSecA ask the right questions to get answers from Khalid Shaykh Muhammad since the employment of sleep deprivation intelligence production from his debriefings totaled over 140 reports as of 30 April 2003 In Khalid Shaykh Muhammad s case the waterboard was determined to be of limited effectiveness One could conclude that sleep deprivation was effective inthis case but a definitive conclusion is hard to reach considering that the sleep deprivation followed extensive use of the waterboard POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE ct 226 38 The EITs used by the Agency under the CTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the United States has taken regarding human rights This divergence has been a cause of concern to seme Agency personnel involved with the Program 91 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mi Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct Policy Considerations 227 merge Throughout its history the United States has been an international proponent of human rights and has voiced opposition to torture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreign countries This position is based upon fundamental principles that are deeply embedded in the American legal structure and jurisprudence The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution for example require due process of law while the Eighth Amendment bars ' 'cruel and unusual punishments 228 The President advised the Senate when submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention to undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel - inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which - do not amount to torture as roughly equivalent to and coextensive with the Constitutional guarantees against cruel unusual and inhumane treatment 81 To this end the United States submitted a reservation to the Torture Convention stating that the United States considers itself bound by Article 16- on1y insofar as the term cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel I unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the 5th 8th and or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States Although the Torture Convention expressly provides that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever including war Or any other public emergency and no order from a superior of cer justifies torture no similar provision was included regarding acts-of cruel - inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 81 439140 - See Message fromfthe President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Sen Treaty Doc 100-20 100th Cong 2d Sess at 15 May 23 1988 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Executive Report 101-30 August 30 1990 Elf-25 29 quoting summary and analysis submitted by President Ronald Reagan as revised by President George H W Bush 92 W W NatSecAot Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 '0 n t a tag Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 messeREI l NatSeCAct 229 U 1 - Annual US State Department Co'untry Reports on Human Rights Practices have repeatedly condemned harsh interrogation techniques utilized by foreign governments For example the 2002 Report issued in March 2003 stated The United States have been given greater opportunity to make good on our commitment to uphold standards of human dignity and liberty N o country is exempt from scrutiny and all countries benefit from constant striving to identify their weaknesses and improve their performance T he Reports serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts pointing to areas of progress and drawing our attention to new and continuing challenges In a world marching toward democracy and respect for human rights the United States is a leader a partner and a contributor We have taken this responsibility with a deep and abiding belief that human rights are universal They are not grounded exclusively in American or western values But their protection worldwide serves a core US national interest The State Department Report identified objectionable practices in a variety of countries including for example patterns of abuse of prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as suspension from bars by handcuffs and threats against family members being forced constantly to lie on hard floors and deprived of sleep Other reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked 230 In June 2003 President Bush issued a statement in Observance of United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture The statement said in part The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims across the world Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere We are committed to building a world where human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law luau IrNatSecAct 30103 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct WA Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right Yet torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush the human spirit Notorious human rights abusers have sought to shield their abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions and denying access to international human rights monitors The United States is' committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this ght by example I call on all governments to join with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting investigating and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program 231 During the course of this ReView a number of Agency officers expressed unsolicited concern about the possibility of recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the bm CTC Program A number of officers expressed concern that a human NatSecA tLts group might pursue them for activities Additionally they feared that the Agency would not stand behind them if this occurred 232W One officer expressed concern that one day Agency officers will wind up on some Wanted list to appear before Natset A CWorld Court forwar crimes stemming from activitie - Another said Ten years from now we re going to be sorry we re doing this but it has to be done He expressed concern 4_ that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak 233 that many countries consider the interrogation techniques employed by the CTC Program hooding stress positions etc to be illegal Although he felt the 1 August 2002 OLC legal opinion provided to the AgenCy mm WA NatSecAct# Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 arrested and tried in the European Union Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm mm - NatSeCAct would preclude prosecution of Agency employees in the United States he believed it to be conceivable that an employee could be - NatSeCAct mm NatSeoAct 234 According to Us - law does not prescribe the conduct of Agency employees and contractors who have employed or authorized their use The said that Do s view is that CIA personnel are acting consistent with customary international law but that view_ may not be shared by others He added My position is that we are covered When asked if the Agency treatment of detainees has been humane he replied that he does not know how others Would define the term but the CTC PrOgram and its activities have been consistent with the Torture Convention as interpreted by the United States 235 W acknowledged he has some concern regarding the Torture Convention However he said his primary focus is what has been codi ed in US law- He recognizes that interrogators may have a problem traveling to some locations overseas NatSecAct ENDGAME 236 -1151 Post 9 11 the US Government is having to address a number of extraordinary matters not the least of Which is an endgame for the disposition of detainees captured during the war on terrorism NatSecAct 95 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct NatSecAct b ili NatSecAct 237 The number of detainees in CIA custody is relatively small by comparison with those in US military custody Nevertheless the Agency er the military has an interest in the disposition of detainees and particular interest in those who if not kept in isolation would likely divulge information about the circumstances of their detention NatSecAct 238 Although the former CTC in early 2002 proposed the establishment of a covert long-tam detention facility OIG found scant documentation of the issue before Agency Nats c aonnel atent a cable to Headquarters on 19 August zuuz In that cable TDY Agency personnel proposed that Agency management consider several options for the future disposition of detainees Such options included constructing a permanent facility outside the United States for indefinite incarceration of detainees or arranging with for incarceration of detainees at the US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay TDY Agency personnel also called attention to security and counterintelligence risks associated with exposure of CIA methodology if detainees are released or rendered to another coun OIG found no cable response from Headquarters NatSecAct 239 6357 With respect to Agency equities a particular concern for seniOr Agency managers is the long-term disposition of detainees who have undergone EITs or have been exposed to Agency sensitive sources and methods Moreover Agency employees have expressed concern that a lack of an endgame for Agency detainees results in overcrowding at Agency detention sites 82 W0 NatSeCAct - NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 96 2 can M- v T1 A 'Im 3 4 pyau u-s' I'm hi 9' beuytm D0106 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 006856717 - - 10 1 1211 240 i I have had theoretical discussiOns about the disposition of detainees The DDO explained that a key issue is what should happen to detainees who have undergone ElTs According to the DDO no one knows the answer to that question and it is a policy decision that I A must be made outside the Agency NatSeCAct A 241 This Review identi ed four options for the dispOsition of detainees These options discussed in more detail ACcording to the DCI Agency of cers below include 242 1 W0 I NatSeoAct NatSecAct 244 NatSecAct 97 W NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 un t-lt- D0107 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSevot NatSevot NatSecAct 245 Policymakers have given consideration to prosecution as a viable possibility at least forcertain detainees To date however no decision has been made to proceedwith this option NatSecAot 247' mm NatSevot 83 #839 Memorandum for the Record dated 2'August 2002 on closed hearings wi 'T- the SSCI 98 1019155611311 W NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 vitae wilt-Wu I 24 net-1 gigs 5 mad a Tia-a k 7 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 see-sewx NatSevot NatSeoAct NatSeCAot 248 US Government and Agency officials have yet to determine if third parties such as the ICRC will eventually have access to individuals whose detention has been disclosed Such is the case of Ibn Sheikh al-Libi whom the US military declared to the ICRC before the military transferred him to CIA control According to the General Counsel Al-Libi was not subjected to any of the interrogation techniques discussed in this Review According to senior Agency officers the Agency is loath to send CIA detainees who have been exposed to EITs or to other '3 I sensitive information as in the case of al-Libi to detention facilities Where they wOuld be available to the ICRC NatSevot 249 Dccording to the DCI the CTC InterrogatiOn Program will continue to exist as long as the Agency continues to elicit information from detainees He added that in the near future he sees no change from the current system NatSeoAct I 00 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Nat Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct - 250 The Agency s detention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identi cation and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world The CT Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of US policymakers and military commanders Theeffectiveness of particular interrogation techniques in eliciting information that might not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured bnwever SecAct 251 After 11 September 2001 numerous Agenciy components and individuals invested immense time and CONCLUSION effort to implement the CTC Program quickly effectively and' within the law The work of the Directorate of Operations Counterterrorist Center CT C Of ce of General Counsel OGC Office of Medical - Services OMS Of ce of Technical Service OTS and the Office of Security has been especially notable In effect they began with almost no foundation as the Agency had discontinued virtually all involvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with earlier interrogation programs in Central America and the Near East Inevitably there also have been some problems with current activities 252 OGC worked closely with Do to determine the legality of the measures that came to be known as enhanced interrogation techniques EITs OGC also consulted with White House and National Security Council of cials regarding the proposed techniques Those efforts and the resulting Do legal opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented That legal opinion was based in substantial part on OTS analysis and the experience and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long4term effects would result from useofztlie proposed techniques 100 mm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 1 his IrwinEzra Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct - 253 W The Do legal opinion upon Which the Agency relies is based upon technical definitions of severe treatment and the intent of the interrogators and consists of nely detailed analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency of cers properly carrying out EITs would not violate the Torture Convention s prohibition of torture nor would they be subject to criminal prosecution under the US torture statute The opinion does not address the separate question 'of whether the application of standard - or enhanced techniques by Agency of cers is consistent with the - I undertaking accepted conditionally by the United States regarding Article 16 of the Torture COnvention to prevent cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - NatSecAct - I 254 Periodic efforts by the-Agency to elicit 1 reaf rmation of Administration policy and Do legal backing for the Agency s use of EITs as they have actually been employed have been well advised and successful However in this process Agency of cials have neither sought nor been provided a written statement of policy or a formal signed update of the DoI legal opinion including such important determinations as the meaning and applicability of Article 16 of the Torture Convention In July 2003 the DCI and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration of cials on the Agency's expanded use of EITs At that time the Attorney General af rmed that the Agency's conduct remained well within the cope of the 1 August 2002 legal opinion NatSecAct 255 A number of Agency of cers of various grade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation activities are concerned that they may at some future date be vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that the US Government will not stand behind them - Although the current detention and interrogation Program has been subject to Do legal review and Administration political approval it diverges sharply from previous Agency policy and practice rules that govern interrogations by US military and law enforcement of cers u statements of US policy by the Department of State and public - T 101 mm I'm NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0111 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 W NatSecAct statements byvery senior US of cials including the President as well as the policies expressed by Members of Congress other Western governments international organizations and human rights groups In addition some Agency officers are aware of interrogation activities that were outside 0r beyond the scope of the written Do opinion Of cers are concerned that future public revelation of the CTC Program is inevitable and will seriously damage Agency of cers personal reputations as Well as the reputationland effectiveness of the Agency itself NatSecAct I Z 256 The Agency has generally provided geod guidance and support to its of cers who have been detaining and interrogating high value terrorists using EITs pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Noti cation MON of 17 September 2001 In particular CTC did a commendable iob in directing the- bxs atSeC Acarrogauons of high value detainees at At these foreign locations Agency personnel with one notable exception described in this Review followed guidance and procedures and documented their activities well NatSecAct W'r - 1 Ia 31 3 '257 TM By distinction the Agency especially in the early months of the Program failed to provide adequate staf ng guidance and support to those involved With the detention and interrogation of detainees in Significant problems NatSeC'AE'tturred rst at the facility known as Although some ElTs were employed with terrorist detainees at most of the interrogations there used standard mm NatSeac thues rs raj 258 Tel UnauthOrized improvised inhumane and undocumented detention andinterrogation techniques were W0 11 NatSeCActgl 3 Mani-mi re erred to the Department of Justice D01 for potential prosecution Each incident will be the NatSeCAct - 102 mm NatSecAct D0112 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 m bX3 NatSecAct subject of a separate Report of Investigation bv the Of ce of Inspector NatSecActaeneral unauthorized techniques were used in the interrogation of an individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by an Agency contractor in June 2003 Agency officers did not normally NatSeCActconduct interrogations at that location Stile Agency Of cers involved lacked timely and adequate guidance training experience supervision or authorization and did not exercise sound NatSecActludgment 259 Tsz The Agency failed to issue in a timely 5 manner comprehensive written guidelines for detention and i interrOga on activities Although ad hoc guidance was provided to many of cers through cables and brie ngs in the early monthsof detention and interrogation activities the DCI Con nement and Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003 several 'months after initiation of interrogation activity and after many of the unauthorized activities had taken place The DCI Guidelines do not address certain important issuesl 1 NatSecAct NatSecAct mm 260 T571 Such written guidance as does exist to NatSecActaddress detentions and interrogations undertaken by Agency of cers 7 is inadequate The Directorate of Operations Handbook contains a single paragraph that mm is intended to guide officers Neither this dated guidance nor general Agency guidelines on routine intelligence collection is adequate to I instruct and protect Agency of cers involved in contemporary interrogation activities NatSeCfAct 261 During the interrogations of two 1 detainees thewaterboard was used in a manner inconsistentmith therzww atSeCAC tritten Do legal opinion of 1 August 2002 Do had stipulated that - mm 103 mm mk- NatSecAct 00113 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeoAct its advice wasbased upon certain facts that the Agency had submitted to Do observing for example that you the Agency 3 have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques may be used with more than once sic that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness i3 after several repetitions One key Al-Qa ida terrorist was subjected to the waterboard at least 183 times at 15 waterboard sessions during a two-week period and was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours In this and another instance the technique of application and volume of water used differed from the Do opinion - rye-59 9 '33 1 - - 262 comprehensive medical 94 q attention to detaineesl where EITs were employed with value'detainees but did not provide adequate attention to detainees Even after the death of a W3 Natsgc e fdtaiileeE OMS did not give suf cient attention and care to these detainees and did not adequately document the medical care that was provided OMS did not issue'formal medical guidelines until April 2003- Per the advice of CTC Legal the OMS Guidelines - were then issued as draft andremain so even after being re-issued NatSeoAct human-ii 263 The Agency did not maintain an accountingof all detainees Speci cally did not ensure that for every detamee responsible personnel documented the circumstances of capture basis for detention specific interrogation techniques applied intelligence provided medical condition'and treatment and the location and status of the detainee throughout his detention Accounting for detainees is improving because of the recent efforts of CTC I NatSecAct 264' Agency officers report that reliance on analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence may have resulted in the application of EITs without justification Some participants in the Program particularly field interrogators judge that CTC assessments to the effect that detainees are I withholding information are not alWays supported by an objective 1 th 104 - NatSecAot 00114 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct W evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the interrogators but are too heavily based instead on presumptions of what the individual might or should know NatSecAct 265 few senior lofficers are concerned that compartmentation practices may be delaying the dissemination of information obtained from the interrogation of detain timely manner They believe it possible to report I useful intelligence while still protecting the existence and nature of the Program NatSecAot 266 The Agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC DetentiOn and InterrOgation Program particularly its use of HTS and the inability of the US Government to decide what it will ultimately do with terrorists detained by the Agency I 105 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0115 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 image-Ray NatSeCAct RECOMMENDATIONS NatSecAct rm- tr- xvi- - - chewNatSecAct D0116 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C0585671 I NatSecAot 3 For the General Counsel Within 10 days Of receipt of this Review submit in'writing to the Department of Justice a request that Do provide the Agency within 60 days a formal Written legal opinion revalidating and modifying as appropriate the guidance provided on 1 August 2002 regarding the use of EITs The updated opinion should re ect actual Agency experience and practices in the use of the techniques to date and expectations concerning the continued use of these techniques For the protection of Agency of cers request of Do that the updated opinion speci cally address the Agency's practice of using large numbers of repetitions of the waterboard on single individuals and a description of the techniques as applied in practice The opinion NatSevot D0117 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 NatSecAct should also address whether the application of standard or enhanced techniques by Agency of cers is consistent with the undertaking accepted conditionally by the United States in Article 16 of the Torture Convention to prevent cruel inhuman or degrading I treatment or punishment and'the potential consequences for Agency officers of any incensistency This Recommendation is signi cant 4 For the DCI In the event the Agency does not receive a written legal opinion satisfactorily addressing the'matters - raised in Recommendation 3 by the date requested direct that ElTs be implemented only the parameters that were mutually understood by the Agency and Do on 1 August 2002 the date 3 written opimon Tlus Recommendatlon IS Sigm cant 5 T51 PM the DCI Brief the President regarding the implementation Of the Agency s detention and interrogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any other authorities including the use of ElTs and the fact that detainees have died This Recommendation is significant A NatSecAct 4 43 mm NatSecAct - 103 mm NatSecAct _Approved for Release 2016 06 10 for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSecAct 1'0 NatSecAct 109 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Tab A D0120 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 rorsseeszr NatSecAct W I AND RESOURCES 1 A team led by the Deputy Inspector - General and comprising the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations the Counsel to the Inspector General a senior 1 Investigations Staff Manager three Investigators two Inspectors an Auditor a Research Assistant and a Secretary participated in this 1 Review NatSecAct 2 st OIG tasked relevant components for all information regarding the treatment and interrogation of all individuals detained by or on behalf of CIA after 9 11 Agency components provided OIG with over 38 000 pages of documents OIG conducted over 100 interviews withindividuals who possessed potentially relevant information We interviewed senior Agency management officials including the DCI the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the Executive Director the General Counsel and the Deputy Director for Operations As new information developed OIG re interviewed several individuals 1 NatSecActB T571 OIG personnel made site visits to the interrogation facilities OIG personnel also visited an overseas Station to review 92 videotapes of interrogations of Abu Zubaydah I - r NatSecAct D0121 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Tab D0122 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release NatSecAct NatSecAct NatSecAct bX3 NatSeCAct b b 3 NatSecAct H 3 NatSeCAct NatSecAct Gas 900 Inl 8003 unr 99E coca 19W 800 003 5293 8003 390 8003 3003 1363 3652 llezl 3003 nv 3003 rib IE 7 i 7 re 591 533351330 513$ VD In 3003 pa al' 13V 3008 19W 3008 NatSecAct SELLIALLOV ONV 3A9010NOHH3 U waged lliiUGi -dei bX3 AON l008 D0123 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Tab Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0124 is Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - 113 Department of ustiee Of ce of Legal Cmmsel 7 categorise will qu Washington Dc 2am August 1 2002 Memorandum for John Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency Interrogation of al Qaeda Capacitive You have asked for this Of ce s views on whether certain proposed conduct wopld violate the prolu'bition against torture found at Section 2340A of title 18 of the United States Code You have asked for this advice in the coms'e of conducting interrogations of Abu Zubaydah As we understand it Zubaydah is one of the highest ranking members of the al Qaeda terrorist organization with which the United States is currently engaged in an international armed conflict following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 2001- This letter memorializes our previous oral advice given on July 24 2002 and July 26 2002 that the proposed conduct would not violate this prohibition I Our advice is based upon the following facts which you have provided to us We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here and this opinion is limited to these facts lfthese facts were to change this advice would not necessarily apply Zubaydah is currently being held by the United States The interrogation team is certain that he has additional information that he refuses to divulge Speci cally he is withholding information regarding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to canduct attacks within the UnitedrStates or against our interests overseas Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of treatment and displays no signs of willingness to disclose further information Moreover yom intelligence indicates that there is currently a level of chatter equal to that which preceded the September 1 attacks In light of the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of threat you believe now exists you wish to move the interrogations into what you have described as an increased pressure phase As part of this increased pressure phase Zubaydah will have contact only with a new httemgation specialist whom he has not met previously and the Sun ival Evasion Resistance Escape training has been involved with the interrogations since they began This phase will likely last no more than several days but could last up to thirty days In this phase you would like to employ ten techniques that you believe will D0125 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - a expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive and encourage him to sclose the crucial information mentioned above These ten techniques are attention grasp 2 walling 3 facial hold 4 facial slap insult slap cramped con nement 6 wall standing 7 stress positions 8 sleep deprivation 9 insects placed in a con nement box and 10 the waterboard You have informed us that the use of these techniques would be on an as-needed basis and that not all of these techniques will necessarily be used The interrogation team would use these techniques in some combination to convince Zubaydah that the only way he can in uence his surrounding environment is through cooperation You have however informed us that you expeci these techniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion culminating With the watcrboard though not necessarily ending with this technique Moreover you have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques may be used with more than once that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their e 'ectiveness alter Several repetitions You have also informed us that Zahaydah sustained a wound during his capture _whicli is being treated I Based on the facts you have given us we understand each of these techniques to be as follows 'l'he' attention grasp consists of grasping the individual with both hands one hand on each side of the collar opening in a controlled and quick motion In the same motion as the grasp the individual is drawn toward the interrogator For walling a exible false wall will be constructed Theindividual is placed with his heels touching the wall The interrogator pulls the individual forward and then quickly and rme pushes the individual into the wall It is the individual s shoul der blades that hit the wall During tltis'motion the head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a c-collar effect to help prevent whiplash To further reduce the probability of injury the individual is allowed to rebound from the exible wall You have orally informedus that the - false wall is in part constructed to create aloud sound when the individualhits it whichwill further shock 01' surprise in the individual In part the idea is to create a sound that will make the impact seem far worse than it is and that will be far worse than-any injury that might result from the action The facial hold is used to hold the head immobile One open palm is placed on either side of the individual s face The ngertips are kept well away from the individual s eyes With the facial slap or insult slap the interrogator slaps the individual s face with' ngers spread The hand makes contact with the area directly between the tip of the individual s chin and the bottom of the corre5ponding earlobe The interro gator invades the indiVidual s personal space The goal of the facial slap is not to in ict physical pain that is severe or lasting Instead the purpose of the finial slap is to induce shock Surprise and or humiliation Cramped con nement involves the placement of the individual in a con neifspace the w-a a n dimensions of which restrict the individual s movement The con ned space is usually dark D0126 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Tor-seem The duration of con nement varies based upon the size of the container For the larger con ned space the individual can stand up or sit down the smaller space is large enough for the subject to sit down Con nement in the larger space can last up to eighteen hours for the smaller space con nement lasts for no more than two hours Wall standing is used to induce muscle fatigue The individual stands about four to ve feet 'om a wall withhis feet spread approxim ely to shoulder width His arms are stretched out in oat of him withhis ngers resting on the wall His ngers support all of his body weight The individual is not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet - - A Variety of stress pom'tions be used You have informed us that these positions are not designed to produce the associated with contortions or twisting of the body Rather somewhat like walling they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with muscle fatigue Two particular stress positions are likely to be used on Zubaydah sitting on - the floor with legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms raised above his head and 2 kneeling on the oor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle You have also orally infonned us that through observing Zubaydah in captivity you have noted that he appears to be quite - exible despite his wound I Sleep deprivation may be used You have indicated that your papers in using this technique is to reduce the individual s ability to think on his feet and through the discomfort associated with lack of sleep to motivate him to cooperate The e ect of such sleep deprivation will generally remit after one or two nights of uninterrupted sleep You have informed us that your research hm revealed that in rare instances some individuals who are already predisposed to problems may experience abnormal reactions to sleep deprivation Even in those cases however reactions abate after the individual is permitted to sleep Moreover personnel with medical training are available to and will intervene in the unlikely event of an abnormal reaction You have orally informed us that you would not deprive Zubaydah of sleep for more than eleven days at a time and that you have previously kept him awake for 72 hours from Which no mental or physical harm resulted You would like to place Zubaydah in a cramped con nement box with an insect You have informed us that he appears to have a fear of insects In particular you would like totell Zubaydah that you intend to place a stinging into the box with him You would however place a harmless insect in the box You have orally informed us that you would in fact place a hannless insect such as a caterpillar in the box with him Your goal in so doing is to use his fears to increase his sense of dread and motivate him to avoid the box in the future by cooperating with interrogators - - Finally you would like to use a technique called the waterboard In this procedure the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench which is approximame four eet-by-seven footy ermine The individual's feet are generally elevated A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes Water 3 - A- D0127 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner As this is done the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose air ow is resuicted for 20 to 40 seconds the to the presence of the cloth This causes an increase in carbon dioxide leVel in the individual s blood This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased e 'ort to breathe This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of suffocation and incipient panic the perception of drowning The individual does not breathe any water into his lungs During those 20 to 40 Seconds water is continuously applied from a height of twelve'to twenty-four inches Alter this period the cloth is lifted and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth The procedure may then be repeated The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small'watering can with a spout You have orally informed us that thistrocedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning You haVe also orally informed us that it is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one applicationl We also understand that a medical expert with SERE experience will be present throughoutthis phase and that the procedures will be stopped if deemed medically necessary to prevent severe mental or physical harm to Zubaydah As mentioned above Zubaydah su 'ered an'injury during his capture You have informed us that steps will be taken to ensure that this injury is not in anyway exacerbated by the use of these methods and that adequate medical attention will be given to ensure that it will heal properly _ In this part we review the context within which these procedures will be applied You- have informed us that you have taken various steps to ascertain what effect if any these techniques would have on Zubaydah s mental health These same techniques with the exception of the insect in the cramped con ned space have been used and continue to be used on some members of om- military personnel during their SERE training _ Becauseof the use of these procedures in training our own military personnel to resist interrogations you have consulted with various individuals who have extensive experience in the use of these techniques You have done so in order to ensure that no prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these proposed procedures - - - Through your consultation with various individuals responsible for such training you have learned that these techniques have been used as elements of a course of conduct without any bXa reported incident of prolonged mental of the SERE school has reported that during the seven- year period that he spent in those positions there were two requests from Congressior- information concerning alleged injuries resulting 'om the training One of mmi m- prompted by the temporary physical injury a trainee sustained as result of being placed in a masseuse 4 A- D0128 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 con nement box The other inquiry involved claims that the SERE training caused two individuals to engagc in criminal behavior namely felony shopli ing and downloading child pornography onto a military computer According to this of cial these claims were found to be baseless Moreover he has indicated that during the three and a halfyears he spent 533$ of the SERB program he trained 10 000 Students Of those students only 'two dropped out ofthe training following the use of these techniques Although on rare occaSions some students temporarily postponed the remainder of their training and received counseling those students were able to- nish the program without any indication of subsequent mental health effects Ir You have informed us' that you have consulted Mo has ten years of experience with SERE trainin lite stated that during those ten years insofar as he is aware none of the individuals who completed the program suffered any adverse mental health effects He informed you that there was one person who did not complete the training That person experienced an adverse mental health reaction that lasted only two - hours A er those two hours the individual s spontaneously dissipated without requiring treatment or counseling and no other were ever reported by this individual According to the information you have provided to us this assessment of the use of these procedures includes the use of the waterboard andurn from the hich you supplied to us has experience with the use of all of these procedures in a course of conduct wi excep on of the insect in the con nement box and the waterboard This memorandum con rms that the use of these procedures has not resulted in any reported instances of prolonged mental harm and few instances of immediate and temporary adverse responses to the training reported that a small minority of students have had temporary adverse ogical reactions during u-aining 0f the 26 829 students trained 'om 1992 through 2001 in the Air Force SERE training 4 3 percent of those students had contac't with services Oithose 4 3 percent only 3 2 percent were pulled from the program for reasons Thus out of the students trained overall only 0 14 cent we ulled om the program for reasons Furthermore when indicated that surveys of students having completed this training are not done be ex con dence that the training did not cause any long-term impact He based his conclusion on the debrie ng of Students that is done after the training More importantly he based this assessment on the fact that although trainingis required to be extremely suess tl in order to be effective very few complaints have been made regarding the training During his tenure in which 10 000 students were trained no congressional complaints have been made While there was one InSpector General complaint it was not due to concerns Moreover be mature one letter inquiring about the long-term impact ofthesetechniques from an individual trained messages 5 D0129 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 over twenty years 0 He fomd that it was impossible to attribute this individual s to his training Enema that if there are any long-term e 'ects of the Ice United States a - using the procedures outlined above they are certainly minirrtal With respect to the waterboard-you have also orally informed us that the Navy continues to use it in'training You have informed us that your on-site who have extensive experience with the use of the waterboard in Navy training have not encountered any signi cant long-term mental health consequences from its use Your on site have also indicated that JPRA has likewise not reported any signi cant long-term mental health consequences from the use of the waterboard You have informed us that other services ceased use of the waterboard because itwas so successful as an interrogation technique but not because of any concerns Otter any harm physical or mental caused by it It was also re rted to be bxa almost 100 percent e ec ve in producing cooperation among the trainees i150 indicated that he had observed the use of the waterboard in Navy training some ten to twe ve times Each time it resulted'in cooperation but it did not result in any physical harm to the student You have also reviewed the relevant literature and found no empirical data on the effect of these techniques with the exception of sleep deprivation With reSpect to sleep deprivation you have informed us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours and still perform excellently on visual Spatial motor tasks and short-term memory tests Although some individuals may experience hallucinations according to the literature you surveyed those who experience such have almost always had such episodes prior to the sleep deprivation You have indicated the studies of sleep deprivation showed no loosening of thoughts attening of emotions delusions or paranoid ideas In one case even after eleVen days of deprivation no or permanent brain damaged occurred - In fact the individual reported feeling almost back to normal after one night s sleep Fm ther based on the experiences with its use in military training where it is induced for up to 48 hours you found that rarely 'if ever will the individual sut ferhann after the sleep deprivation is - discontinued Instead the effects remit a er a feW good nights of sleep You have taken the additional step of consulting with us interro gations experts and other individuals with oversight over the SERE training process None of these individuals was aware of any prolonged effect caused by the use of any of the above techniques either separately or as a course of conduct Moreover you consulted with outside who reported that they were unaware of any'cascs where long-term problems have occurred as a result of these techniques Moreover in consulting with anumber of mental health experts you have learned that the e ect of any of these procedures will be dependant on the individual s personal-history Cultural history and tendencies To that end you have infomed us that yon have 6 - D0130 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 masses 7 - completed a assessment of Zubadyah This assessment is based on interviews With Zubaydah observations of him and information collected from other sources such as intelligence and press reports Our understanding of Zubaydah's pro le winch we set forth below is based on that assessment According to this assessment Zubaydah though only 31 rose quickly from very low level mujahedin to third or fomth man in al Qaeda He has served as Usama Bin Laden s senior lieutenant In that capacity he has managed a network of training camps He has been instrumental in the training of operatives for al Qaeda the'Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan He acted as the Deputy Camp Commander for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan personally approving entry and graduation of all trainees during 1999-2000 Prern 1996 until 1999 he approved all individuals going in and out of Afghanistan to the training catnps Further no one went in and out of Peshawar Pakistan without his knowledge and approval He also acted as a1 Qaeda s coordinator of external contacts and foreign communications Additionally he has acted as al Qaeda s counter- intelligence o icer and has been trusted to nd spies within the organization Zubaydah has been involved in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda- He was a planner for the Millennium plot to attack US and Israeli targets during the Millennium celebrations in I ordan Two of the central gures in this plot who were arrested have identi ed Zubaydah as the supporter of their cell and the plot He also served as a planner for the Paris Embassy plot in 200 Moreover he was one of the planners of the September 1 attacks Prior to his capture he was engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against US intereSts Your assessment indicates that it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qaeda s manual on'resistance techniques You also believe that his experiences in al Qaeda make him well-acquainted with and well-versed in such techniques As part of his role in al Qaeda Zubaydah visited individuals in prison and helped them upon their release Through this contact and activities with other al Qaeda muj ahedin you believe that he lmows many stories of capture interrogation and resistance to such interrogation Additionally he has _spoken with Ayman al- Zawahiri and you believe it is likely that the two discussed Zawahiri s experiences as a'prisoner of the Russians and the Egyptians Zubaydah stated during interviews that he thinks of any activity'outside of jihad as silly He has indicated that his heart and mind are devoted to serving Allah and Islam through jihad and he has stated that he has no doubts or regrets about committing himself to jihad Zubaydah believes that the global victory of Islam is inevitable You have informed us that he continues to express his unabated desire to kill Americans and Jews Your describes his personality as followsr He is highly self- directedindividual who prizes his independence He has narcissistic feamresr l vi hich evidenced in the attention he pays to his personal appearance and his obvious efforts to 7 - - D0131 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 5-- Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Tor-scenar- demonstrate that he is'really a rather humble and regular guy He is somewhat compulsive in how he organizes his environment and business He is con dent selflessm'ed and possesses an air of authority While he admits to at times wrestling with how to determine who is an innocent he has acknowledged celebrating the destruction of the World Trade Center He is intelligent and intellectually curious He displays excellent self-discipline The assessment describes him as a perfectionist persistent private and highly capable in his social interactions He is very guarded about Opening up to others and your assessment repeatedly emphasizes that he tends not to easily He is also quick to recognize and assess the moods and A motivau'ons of others Furthermore he is proud of his ability to lie and deceive others success illy Through his deception he has among other things prevented the location of al Qaeda safehousesland even acquired a United Nations re rgee identi cation card According to your reports Zubaydah does not have any pro-existing mental conditions 'or problems that would make likely to su 'er prolonged mental harm from your proposed interrogation methods Through reading his diaries and interviewing him you have foundno history of mood disturbance or other thought disorder enduring mood or mental health problems He is in fact f remarkably resilient and con dent that he can overcome adversity When he encounters stress or low mood this appears to last only for a short time He deals with stress by assessing its soince evaluating the coping resources available to him and then taking action Your assessment notes that he is generally self-suf cient and relies on his understanding and application of religious and principles intelligence and discipline to avoid and overcome problems Moreover you have found that he has a reliable and durable support system in his faith the blessings of religious leaders and camaraderie of like-minded mujahedin brothers During detention Zubaydah has managed his mood remaining at most points' circumspect calm contolled and deliberate He has maintained this demeanor during aggressive interrogations and reductions in sleep You describe that in an initial eon -ontational incident anaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal which you think was possibly fear Although this incident led him to disclose intelligence information he was able to quickly regain his composure his air of con dence and his strong resolve not to reveal any information Overall you summarize his primary as the following ability to focus goal- directed discipline intelligce emotional resilience street savvy ability to organize and manage people keen observation skills uid adaptability can anticipate and adapt under duress and with minimal resources capacity to assess and esploit the needs of others and ability to adjust goals to emerging opportunities You anticipate that he will draw upon his vast howledge of interrogation techniques to cope with the interrogation Y om' assessment indicates that Zubaydah may be Willing to die to protect the most important information that he holds Nonetheless you are of the view that his I belief that lslam will ultimately dominate the world and that this victory is mama-may- 'rv-r-r h e the chance that Zubaydah will give information and rationalize it solely as a temporary D0132 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 setback Additionally you believe he may be willing to disclose some information particularly infortnation he deems to not be critical but which may ultimately be useful to us when pieced together with other intelligence information you have gained I Section 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person outside of the United States to commit or attemth to commit torture Section 2340 1 de nes torture as an act committed by aperson acting under the color of law speci cally intended to in ict severe physical or mental pain or su erihg other than pain or su 'ering incidental to lawful sanctions upon another person within his custody of physical -control 8 U S C- 2340 1 As we Outlined in our opinion on standards of conduct under Section I 2340A a violation of 2340A requires a showing that the torture occurred outside the United 1 States 2 the defendant acted under the color of law 3 the victim was within the defendant's custody or control 4 the defendant Speci cally intended to in ict'severe pain or suffering and - 5 that the a'cted in icted severe pain or su 'cring See Memorandum for JohnRizzo Acting General Counsel for the Central intelligence Agency from Jay S Bybee Assistant Attorney General Of ce of Legal Counsel Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC 2340 23402 at 3 August 1 2002 Section 2340A Memorandum You have asked us to assume that Zubayadah is being held outside the United States Zubayadah is within US custody and the interrogators are acting under the 'color of law At issue is whether the last two elements would be met by the use of the preposed procedures namely whether those using these procedures would have the requisite mental state and whether these procedures would in ict - severe pain or su 'ering within the meaning of the Statute severe Egg or Sg ering In order for pain or suffering to rise to the level of torture the statute requires that it be severe As we have previously explained - this reaches only extreme acts See id at 13 Nonetheless drawing upon cases under the Torture Victim Protection Act TVP-A which has a de nition of torture that is similar to Section 2340 s de nition we found that a single event of suf ciently intense pain may fall within this prohibitionresult we have analyzed each of these techniques separately In further drawing upon those cases we also have found that courts tend to take a approach and consider an entire course of conduct to determine whether torture has occurred See id at 27 Therefore in addition to considering each technique separately we consider them together as a course of conduct Section 2340 de nes torture as the in iction of severe physical or mental pain or - suffering We will consider physical pain and mental pain separately See 18% With respect to physical pain we previously concluded that f severe pain within the meaning of 9 DO133 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 for Release 2016 06 10 005855717 Section 2340 is pain that is dif cult for the individual to endure and is of an intensity alcin to the pain accompanying serious physical See Section-2340A Memorandum at 6 Drawing upon the TVPA precedent we have noted that examples of acts in icting severe pain that typify torture are among other things severe beatings with weapons such as clubs and the burning of prisoners See id at 24 We conclude below that none of the proposed teclmiques in icts such pain The facial hold and the attention grasp involve no physical pain lathe absence or such pain it is obvious that they cannot said to inflict severe physical pain or suffering The stress positions and wall standing both may result in muscle fatigue Each involves the sustained holding of a position In wall standing it'will be holding a position in which all of the individual s body weight is placed on his nger tips The stress positions will likely include sitting on the oor with legs extended straight out in hunt and arms raised above the head and kneeling on the oor and leaning back at a 45 degree angle Any pain associated with muscle fatigue is not of the intensity su icient to amount to severe physical pain or suffering under the statute nor deepite its discomfort can it be said to be di cult to endure Moreover you have orally informed us that no Stress position will be used that could interfere with the healing of Zubaydah's wound Therefore we conclude that these techniques involve discomfort that falls 'far below the threshold of severe physical pain Similarly although the con nement boxes both small and large are physically uncomfortable because their size restricts movement they are not so small as to require the individual to contort-his body to sit small box or stand large box You have also orally informed us that despite his wound Zubaydah remains quite exible which would substantially reduce any pain associated with being placed in the box We have no information from the medical experts you have consulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kept in the boxes causes any substantial physical pain As a resnlt we do not think the use of these boxes can besaid to cause painlhat is of the intensity associated withse 'ous physical injury The use of one of these boxes with the introduction of- an insect does not alter this - assessment As we understand it no actually harmful insect will be placed in the box Thus though the introduction or an insect may produce trepidation in Zubaydah which we discuss below it certainly does not cause physical pain As far sleep deprivation it is clear that depriving someone of sleep does not involve severe physical pain within the meaning of the statute While sleep deprivation may involve some physical discomfort such as the fatigue or the discomfort exPerienced in the dif culty of keeping one s eyesopen these effects remit after the individual is permitted to sleep Based on the facts you have provided us we are not aware of any evidence that sleep deprivation results in severe physical pain or suffering As a result its use does not violate Section 23 40A Even those techniques that involve physical contact behaveen the interro gator and the Toe-seem 10 D0134 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 for Release 2016 06 10 individual do not result in severe pain The facial slap and walling contain precautions to ensure that no pain even approaching this level results The slap is delivered with ngers spread which you have explained to us is designed to be less painful than a closed-hand slap The slap is also delivered to the fleshy part of the face reducing any risk of physical damage or serious pain The facial slap does not produce pain that is dif cult to endure Likewise walling involves quickly pulling the person forward and then thrusting him against a exible false wall You have informed us that the sound of hitting the wall will actually be far worse thanany possible injury to the individual The use of the rolled towel around the neck also reduces any risk of injury While it may hurt to be pushed against the wall any pain eXperienced is not of the intensity associated with serious physical injury As we understand it when the waterboard is used the subject s body responds as if the subject were drowning even though the subject may be well aware that he is in fact not drowning You have informed us that this procedure does not in ict actual physical harm Thus although the subject may experience the fear or panic associated with the feeling of drowning the waterboard does not in ict physical pain As we explained in the Section 2340A Memorandum pain and suffering as used in Section 2340 is best understood as a single concept not distinct concepts of pain as distinguished from suffering See Section 23 40A Memorandum at 6 n 3 The waterboard which in icts no pain or actual harm whatsoever does not in our view in ict severe pain or su ering Even if one were to parse the statute more nely to attempt to treat suffering as a distinct concept the waterboard could not be said to in ict severe suffering The waterboard is siniply a controlled acute episode lacking the connotation of a protracted period of time generally given to suffering Finally as we discussed about you have informed us that in determining which procedures to use and how you will use them you have selected techniques that will not harm Zubaydahfs wound You have also indicated that numerous steps will be taken to ensure that none of these procedures in any way interferes with the proper healing of Zubaydah s wound You have also indicated that should it appear at any time that Zubaydah is experiencing severe pain or suffering the medical personnel on hand will stop the use of any technique Even when all of these methods are considered combined in an overall course of conduct they still would not in ict severe physical pain or suffering As discussed above a number of iese acts resnlt in no physical pain others produce only physical discomfort You have indicated that these acts will not be used with substantial repetition so that there is no possibility that severe physical pain could arise from such repetition Accordingly we conclude that these acts neither separately nor as part of a course of conduct would in ict severe physical pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute We next consider whether the use of these techniques would in ict severe mental pain or suffering within the meaning of Section 2340 Section 2340 de nes severe mentalde or Suffering as the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from one of several predicate reassess 11 -- - D0135 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 77 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 ar TOP - acts 18 U S C 2340 2 Those predicate acts are the intentional in iction or threatened in iction of severe physical pain or suffering 2 the administration or application or threatened administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality 3 the threat of imminent death or 4 the threat that any of the preceding acts will be done to anather person See 18 U S C As we have explained this list of predicate acts is exclusive See Section 2340A Memorandum at 8 No other acts can supporta charge under Section 2340A based on the in iction of severe mental pain or su ering See id Thus if the methods that you have described do not either in and of themselves constitute one of these acts or as a course of conduct ful ll the predicate act requirement the prohibition has not been Violated See id Before addressing these techniques we note that it is plain that none of these procedures involves a threat to any third party the use of any kind of drugs or for the reasons described above the in iction of severe physical pain Thus the question is whether any of these acts -separately or as a course of conduct constitutes a threat of severe physical pain or su 'ering a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or a threat of imminent death As we previously explained whether an action constitutes a threat must be assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the subject s posi tion See id at 9- No argument can be made that the attention grasp or the facial hold- constitute threats of imminent death or are procedures designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality In general the grasP and the facial hold will startle the subject produce fear or even insult him As you have informed us the use of these techniques is not accompanied by a speci c verbal threat of severe physical pain or su 'ering To the extent that these techniques could be considered a threat of severe physical pain or su ering such a threat would have to be inferred from the acts themselves Because these actions themselves involve no pain neither could be interpreted by a reasonable person in zubaydah s position to constitute a tin-cat of severe pain or suffering Accordingly these two techniques are not predicate acts within the meaning of Section 2340 The facial slap likewise falls outside the set of predicate acts It plainly is not a threat of imminent death under Section or a procedure designed to disrupt the senses or personality under Section Though it may hurt as discuSsed above the e ect'is one of smarting or stinging and surprise or humiliation but not severe pain Nor does it alone constitute a threat of severe pain or su 'cring under Section Like the facial hold attention grasp the use of this slap is not accompanied by a speci c verbal threat of further escalating violence Additionally you have informed us that in one use this technique will typically involve at most two slaps Certainly the use of this slap may dislodge any expectation that Zubaydah had that he would not be touched in a physically aggressive manner Nonetheless this alteration in his expectations could hardly be construed by a reasonable person - in his situation to be tantamount to a threat of severe physical pain or suffering At most this technique suggests that the circumstances of his con nement and interrogation have changed Therefore the facial slap is not within the statute s exclusive list of predicate acts 12 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - Approved for Release 2016 06 10 I Walling plainly is not a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or While walling involves what might be as rough handling it does not involve the threat of imminent death or as discussed above the in iction of severe physical pain Moreova' once again we understand that use of this technique will not be accompanied by any speci c verbal threat that violence will ensue absent cooperation Thus like the facial slap Walling can only constitute a threat of severe physical pain if a reasonable person would infer such a threat from the use of the technique itself Walling does not in and of itself in ictsevere pain or suffering Like the facial slap walling may alter the subject s expectation as to the neatrnent he believes he will receive Nonetheless the character of the action falls so far 'short of in icting severe pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute that even if he inferred that I greater aggressiveness was to follow the type of actions that could be reasonably be anticipated would still fall below anything suf cient to in ict-severe physical pain or sufferingunder-the statute Thus we conclude that this technique falls outside the proscribed predicate acts Like walling stress positions wall-standing are not procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses nor are they threats of imminent death These procedures as discussed above involve the use of muscle fatigue to encourage cooperation and do not themselves constitute the in iction of severe physical pain or su 'ering Moreover there is no aspect of violence to either technique thatIrem otely suggests future severe pain or suffering liorn which such a threat of future harm could be inferred They simply involve forcing-the subject to remain in uncomfortable positions 'While these to the subject that he may be placed in these positions again ifhe does not disclose information the use of these techniques would not suggest to a reasonable person in the subject's position that he is being threatened with severe pain or'su ering Accordingly we conclude that these two procedures do not constitute any of the predicate acts set forth in Section 2340 2 - As with the other techniques discussed so far con nement is not a threat of - imminent death It may be argued that focusing in part on the fact that the boxes will be without light placement in these boxes would constitute a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses As we explained in our recent opinion howetier to disrupt profoundly the senses a technique must produce an extreme e 'ect in thesubjeet- See Section 2340A Memorandum at 10-12 We have previously concluded that this requires that the procedure cause substantial interference with the individual s cognitive abilities or fundamentally alter his personality See id at Moreover the statute requires that such procedures must be calculated to produce this effect see id at 10 18 U S C With respect to the small con nement box you have informed us that he would Spend at_ most two hours in this box You have informed us that your purpose in using these boxes is not to interfere with his senses orhis personality but to-cause him physical discomfort that will encourage him to disclose critical information Moreover you imposition oftime limitations on the me of either of the boxes also indicates that the use of these boxes is not designedor calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality For the larger box in which he can t 13 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 awn Approved for Release 2016 06 10 -- both stand and sit he may be placed in this box for up to eighteen homsat a time while you have I informed us that he will never spend more than an hour at time in the smaller box These time limits further ensure that no profomid disruption of the senses or personality were it even possible would result As such the use of the con nement boxes does not constitute a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality Nor does the use of the boxes threaten Zubaydah with severe physical pain or suffering I While additional time spent inthe boxes may be threatened their use is not accompanied by any express threats of severe physical'pain or suffering Like the stress positions and walling placement in the boxes is physically uncomfortable but any such discomfort does not rise to the level of severe physical pain or suffering Accordingly a reasonable person in the subject s position would not infer from the use of technique that severe physical pain is the next step in his interrogator s treatment of him Therefore We conclude that the use of the con nement boxes does not fall within the statute s required predicate acts - In addition to using the con nement boxes alone you also would like to introduce an 'insect into one of the boxes with Zubaydah As we understand it you plan to inform Zubaydah that you are'going to place a stinging insect into the box but you will actually place a harmless insect in the box such as a caterpillar If you do so to ensure that you are outside the predicate act requirement you must inform him that the insects will not have a sting that would produce death or severe pain If however you were to place the insect in the box without informing him that you are doing so then in order to not commit a predicate act you should not af rmatively lead him to believe that any insect is present which has a sting that could produce severe pain or A Su ering or even cause his death While placing the insect in the box may certainly play upon fears that you believe that Zubaydah may harbor regarding insects so long as you take either of the approaches we have described the insect s placement in the box would not constitute a threat of severe physical or su 'ering to a reasonable person in his position An individual placed in a box even an individual with a fear of insects would not'reasonably feel threatened severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar was placed in the box Further you have informed us that you are not aware that Zubaydah has any allergies to insects and you have not informed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in that same situation to believe that an unknown insect would cause him severe physical pain or death Thus we conclude that the placement of the insect in the con nement box with Zubaydah would not constitute a predicate act Sleep deprivation also clearly does not involve a threat of imminent death Although it produces physical discomfort it cannot be said to constitute 'a threat of severe physical pain or suffering 'orn the perspective of a reasonable person in Zubaydah s position Nor could sleep deprivation constitute a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses so long as sleep deprivation as you have informed us is your intent is used for limited hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses would occur Tobe sure sleep deprivation may reduce the subject s ability to think on his feet Indeed you'ii i'Ea tE that this - '14 D0138 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 the intended result His mere reduced ability to evade your questions and resist answering does not however rise to the level of disruptiOn required by the statute As we explained above a disruption withinthe meaning of the statute is an extreme one substantially interfering'with an individual s cognitive abilities for example inducing hallucinations or driving him to engage in uncharacteristic bohavior See info 13 Section 2340A Memorandum at Therefore the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the required predicate acts - We nd that the me ofthe waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death As you have explained the waterboard procedure to us it creates the subject the uncontrollable I physiological sensation that the subject is drowning Although the procedure will be monitored by personnel with medital training and extensive SERE school ctrperience with this procedure who will ensure the subject s mental and physical safety the subject is not aware of any of these precautions From the vantage point of any reasonable person undergoing this procedure in such circumstances he would feel as if he is drowning at very moment of the procedttre due to the uncontrollable physiological sensation he is experiencing Thus this procedure cannot be viewed as too uncertain to satisfy the imminence requirement Accordingly it constitutes a threat of imminent death and ful lls the predicate act requirement under the statute Although the'waterboard constitutes 'a threat of imminent death prolonged mental harm must nonetheless result to violate the statutory prohibition on in iction of severe mental pain or suffering See Section 2340A Memorandum at 7 We have previously concluded that prolonged mental harm is mental harm of some lasting dtn'ation mental harm lasting months or years See id Prolonged mental harm is not simply the stress experienced in for example an' interrogation by state police See id Based on your research into the use of these methods at the SERB schooland consultation with otherswith expertise in the eld of and interrogation you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental harm would result from the use of the waterboard Indeed you have advised us that the relief is almost immediate when the cloth is removed from the nose and mouth In the absence of prolonged mental harm no severe mental pain or su 'ering would have been in icted and the use of these procedures would not constitute torture within the meaning of the statute When these acts are considered as a course of conduct we are unsure whether these acts may constitute a threat of severe physical pain or su cring You have indicated to us that you have not determined either the order or the precise timing for implementing these procedures 'It is conceivable that these procedures could be used in a course of escalating conduct moving incrementally and rapidly -om least physically intrusive facial hold to the most physical contact walling or the watcrboard 'As we understand it based on his treatment so far Zubaydah has come to eXpect that no physical harm will be done to him By using these techniques in increasing intensity and in rapid succession the goal would be to dislodge this expectation Based on the facts you have provided to us we cannot say de nitivelythat the entire coorse of conduct would cause a reasonable person to believe that he Tor-seeks 15 D0139 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 with severe or su et'in'g the meaning of section 2340 On the other hand however under certain circumstances for example rapid escalation in the use of these techniques culminating in the waterboai'd which we acknowledge constitutes a threat of imminent death A accompanied by verbal or' other suggestions that physical violence will follow might cause a reasonable person to believe that they are faced with such athreat Without more information we are uncertain whether the course of conduct would constitute apredicate act under Seetion 2340 2 - Even if the course of conduct were thought to pose a threat of physical pain or suffering it would nevertheless 4n the facts before constitute a violation of Section 2340A Not only must the course of conduct be a predicate act but also those who use the procedure must actually cause prolonged mental harrn Based on the information that you have provided to us indicating that no evidence exists that this course of conduct produces any prolonged mental harm we conclude that a course of conduct using these procedures and culminating in the - Waterbuard would not violate Section 2340A I - Speci c mg t To violate the statute an individual must haire the speci c intent to in ict severe pain or su ering Because speci c intent is an element of the offense the absence 'of speci c intent negates the charge of torture As we previously opined to have the required Speci c intent an individual must expressly intend to cause such severepain or suffering See Section 2340A Memorandum at 3 citing Carter v United States 530 US 255 267 2000 We have found that if a defendant acts with the good faith belief that his actions will not cause such suffering he has not acted with speci c intent See id at 4 citing South At Lmld of Term v Raise 218 F 3d 518 531 4th Cir 2002 A defendant acts in good faith when he has an honest belief that his actions will not result pain or suffering See id citing Cheek v United States 498 US 192 202 1991 Although an honest belief need not be reasonable such a belief is easier to establish where there is a reasbnable basis for it 'See id at 5 Good faith may be established by among other things the reliance on the advice of expertsBased on the information you have provided us we believe that those carrying out these procedures would not ban the speci c intent to inflict severe physical pain or suffering The objective of these techniques is not to cause severe physical pain First the constant presence of personnel with medical training who have the authority to step the interrogation should it appear it is medically necessary indicates that it is not your intent to cause severe physical pain The personnel on site have extensive- expcrience with these speci c techniques as they are used in SERE school training Second you have informed us that you are taking steps to ensure that Zubaydah s injury is not worsened or his recovery impeded by the use of these techniques Third as you have described them to us the proposed techniques involving physical contact between the interro gator and Zubaydah actually contain precautions represent any serious physical harm to Zubaydah In walling a rolled hood or towel will be used to prevent 16 D0140 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 whiplash and he will be Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 permitted to rebound from theflexible wall to reduce the likelihood of Similarly in- the facial hold the ngertips will be kept well away from the eyes to ensure thatthere isnoinjuryt'othem Thepurposc ofthatfacial hold isnotinjure him but to - hold the head immobile Additionally while the stress positions and wall standing will undoubtedly result in physical discomfort by tiring the muscles it is obvious that these positions are not intended to produce the kind of extreme pain required by statute Furthermore no speci c intent to' cause severe mental pain or surfering appears to be present As we explained in our recent opinion an individual must have the speci c intent to cause prolonged mental harm in order to have the speci c intent to in ict severe mental pain or su ering See Section 2340A Memorandum 8 Prolonged mental harm is substantial mental harm ofa sustained duration e harm lasting months or even years after the acts were in icted upon the prisoner As we indicated above a good faith belief can negate this element Accordingly if an individual conducting the interrogation has a good faith belief that the procedures he will apply separately or together would not result in prolonged mental harm that individual lacks the requisite Speci c intent This conclusion concerning speci c intent is further lbolstered by the due diligence that has been conducted concerning the effects of these interrogation procedures The mental health experts that you have consulted have indicated that the impact of a come of conduct must be assessed with reference to the subject s history and current mental health status The healthier the individual the less likely that the use of any one procedure or set of procedures as a course of conduct will result in prolonged mental harm A comprehensive pro le of Zubaydah has been created In creating this pro le your personnel drew on direct interviews Zubaydah s diaries observation of Zubaydah since his capture and information from other sources such as other intelligence and press reports You found that Zubaydah has no history of mental health problems Your pro le further enaphasizes that in addition to his excellent mental health histOr-y he is quite resilient Not only is Zubaydah resilient but you have also found that he has in place a durable support system I through his faith the blessings of religious leaders and the camaraderie he has experienced with those who have taken up the cause with him Based on this remarkably healthy pro le you have concluded that he would not experienceany mental harm of sustained duration from the use of these techniques either separately or' as a course of conduct As we indicated above you have informed us that your proposed interrogation methods have been used and continue to be used in SERE training It is our understanding that these teclmiqucs are not used one by one in isolation but as a hill course of conduct to resemble-a real - interrogation Thus the information derived from SERB training bears both upon the impact Of the use of the individual techniques and upon their use as a course of conduct You have found that the use of these methods together or separately including the use of the waterhoard has not resulted in any negative long-term mental health cpnsequcnces The continued use of- lhesc gm methods without mental health consequences to the trainees indicates that it is highly improbable m' 17 D0141 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 that such consequences would result here Because you have conducted the due diligence to determine that these procedures either alone or in combination do not produce prolonged mental harm we believe that you do not meetthe speci c intent requirement necessary to violate ySeaion2340A You have also informed us that you have the relevant literature on the subject and consulted with outside Your review of the literature uncovered no empirical data on the use of these procedures With the exception of sleep deprivation for which 'no long- terrn hoalth consequences resulted The outside with whom you consulted indicated were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred as a result of - techniques - As deScn bed above it appears you have conducted an extensive inquiry to rise what impact if any these procedures individually and as a come of conduct would have on Zubaydah You haveconsulted with interrogation experts including those with substantial SERE school eatperienc'e consulted with outside completed a assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on this topic Based on this inquiry you believe that the use of the procedures including the waterboard and as a course of conduct wOuld not result in prolonged mental harm Reliance on this information about Zubaydah and about the e 'cct of the use of these techniques more generally demonstrates the presence of a good faith belief that no prolonged mental harm will result om using these methods in the interrogation of Zubaydah Moreover we think that this represents not only an honest belief but also a' reasonable belief based on the information that you have supplied to us Thus we believe that the speci c intent to in ict prolonged mental is not preseng'and consequently there is no speci c intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering Accordingly we conclude that on the facts in this case the use of these methodsrseparately or a come of conduct would not violate Section 2340A Based on the foregoing and based on the facts that you have provided we conclude that the interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 2340A We wish to emphasize than this is our best reading of the law however you should be aware that there are no I cases construing this statute just as there have been no prosecutions brought under it Please let us know if we can be of further assistance in S By I not Attorney encral a TUFSEEREQL 13 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Tab D0143 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 VCIA Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct I uidelines on Confinement_Conditions For CIA Detainees - These Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA Detainees who are persons detained in det ion facilities that are under the control of NatSeCAct These Guidelines recognize that_ ALL PORTIONS as - environmental and other conditions as well as particularized considerations affecting any given Detention Facility will vary from case to case and lacation to location 1 Minimums Due provision must be taken to protect-the health and safety of all CIA Detainees includingbasic levels of medical care which need not ccmport with the highest standards of medical care that is provided in US-based medical facilities food and drink which meets minimum medically appropriate nutritional and sanitary standards clothing and or a physical environment sufficient to meet basic health needs periods of time within which detainees are free to engage in physical exercise which may be limited for example to exercise within the isolation cells themselves and sanitary facilities which may for example comprise buckets for the relief of personal waste Conditions of confinement at the Detention Facilities do not have to conform with US prison or other specific or pre- established standards 7 2 Implementing Procedures - a Medical and as appropriate personnel shall be physically present at or reasonably available to each Detention Facility Medical personnel shall check the physical condition of each detainee at intervals appropriate to the circumstances and shall keep appropriate records ms mm I CLASSIFIED see seem NatSecAct Mensa W1 NatSecAct D0144 Approved for Release 2016 06771797005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 -4 a t b 3 NatSecAct Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees b Personnel directly engaged in the design and operation of Detention Facilities will be selected screened trained and supervised by'a process established and as appropriate coordinated by the Director DCI Counterterrorist Center - - c NatSecAct Responsible CIA Officer 'The Director DCI Counterterrorist Center shall ensure that at all times a specific Agency staff employee the ResPOnsible CIA Officer' is designated as 'responsible for each specific Detention Facility that each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of - these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached Acknowledgment and that each Responsible CIA Officer and each CIA officer participating in the questioning of 'individuals detained pursuant to the Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001 has been provided with a copy of the Guidelines on Interrogation Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of 17 September 2001' and has reviewed and signed the Acknowledgment attached thereto Subject to operational and security considerations the Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at or visit each Detention Facility at intervals appropriate to the circumstances -- I 4 NatSecAct APPROVED u' ral Intelligence Date NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - - - a I - Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 W b 3 NatSecAct Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees I I I am the Responsible CIA Officer for the Detention Facility known as By my signature below I acknowledge diet I have read and understand and will comply with the Guidelinee on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees of' 2003 _ ACKNOWLEDGE Name - Date mem NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0146 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Tab D0147 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 we Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 mm NatSeCAct ar- Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant'to the Presidential membrandum of notification of_17 September 2001 These Guidelines address the conduct of interrogations of 'persons who are detained pursuant to the authorities set _forth_in_the_Memorandum of Notification of 11 September 2001 A NatSeCAct These Guidelines complement internal Directorate of Operations guidance relating to the conduct of interrogations In the event of any inconsistency between existing Do guidance and these Guidelines the provisions of these Guidelines shall control 1 - Permissible Interrogation Techniques unless otherwise approved by Headquarters CIA - officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA_may use only Permissible Interrogation Techniques ' Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both Standard Techniques and Enhanced Techniques are techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial pressure These techniques include but are not limited to all lawful forms of questioning employed byvUS law enforcement and military interrogation personnel Among Standard Techniques are the use of isolation sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours reduced caloric intake so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee deprivation of reading material use of loud music or white noise at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detaineefs hearing and the use of diapers for limited periods generally not to exceed '72 hours or during transportation where appropriate peerless or - i - bxs THIS DOCUMENT ARE NatSecAct mmxs NatSeCAct D0148 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 77777777 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - - NatSecAct Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandaum of NOtification of 17 SepteMber 2001 - are techniques that do incorporate_physical or pressure beyond Standard Techniques ThE'use of each Specific Enhanced Technique must be-approved by Headquarters in advance and may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with the specific detainee with appropriate medical and participation in the process These techniques are the attention grasp -walling the facial hold the facial slap insult slap the abdominal slap cramped confinement wall standing stress positions sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours the use of diapers for prolonged periods the use of harmless insects the water board and such other techniques as may be specifically approved- pursuant to paragraph 4 below The use of each Enhanced Technique is subject to specific temporal physical and related conditions including a competent evaluation of the medical and state of the detainee 2 Medical and Personnel Appropriate medical and personnel shall be either on site or readily available for consultation and travel to the interrogation site during all detainee interrogations employing Standard Techniques and appropriate medical and personnel must be on site during all detainee interrogations employing Enhanced Techniques In each case the medical and personnel shall suspend the interrogation if they determine that significant and prolonged physical or mental injury pain or suffering is likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended -In any such instance the interrogation team shall i - immediately report the facts to Headquarters for management and legal review to determine whether the interrogation may be resumed 3 Interrogation Personnel - The Director DCI Counterterrorist Center shall ensure that all personnel directly engaged in the I interrogation of persons detained pursuant to the authorities set forth in the MbN have been appropriately screened from - the medical and security standpoints have reviewed these Guidelines have received appropriate training in their implementation and have completed the attached Acknowledgment - mm I Wimxs NatSecAct D0149 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 meu 7 - I b 3 NatSecAct Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant -to the Presidential Hamorandaum of Notification of 17 September 2001 Approvals Required ' Whenever feasible advance approval is required for the use of Standard Techniques by an interrogation team In 'all instances their use shall'be documented in cable traffic Prior approval in writing le-g by written memorandnm or in cable traffic from the Director DCI Counterterrorist Center with the concurrence of the Chief CTC Legal Groupr is required for the use of any Enhanced Technique s and may be provided only where has determined that the specific detainee is believed to possess information about risks to the citizens of the United States or other nations the use of the Enhanced Techniquets is appropriate in order to obtain that _information appropriate medical and personnel have concluded that the use of the Enhanced Techniquets is not expected to produce severe physical or- xnental pain or suffering and the personnel authorized to employ the Enhanced Techniquejs have completed the attached Acknowledgment Nothing in these Guidelines alters the right to act in self-defense Recordkeoping In each interrogation session in which an Enhanced Technique is employed a contemporaneous record Shall be created setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique emploYed the identities of those present and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable This information which may be in the form of a cable shall be provided to Headquarters APPROVED We - Intelligence Date W um NatSecAct 30150 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandaum of Notification of September 2001 I 5 acknofvl'e'dge that I have read and understand and will comply with the 'Guidelines on interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001' of 2003 A ACKNOWLEDGE Name Date - NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0151 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Tab D0152 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 DRAFT GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND SUPPORT TO for Release 2016 06 10 305856717 - mm 5 - b 3 NatSecAct 5 - 4 DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS - September 4 2003 The followingguidelines 'offer general references for medical of cers supporting - the detention of tetrbrists captured and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency for - A interrogation and debrie ng There are three di erent contexts in which these guidelines may be applied 1 during thejperiod of initial interrogation 2 during the more suitained period of debrie ng at an interrogation site and 3 the permanent detention 'of caimlred terrorists in long-term facilities - - 5 s 1 1 MERROGAHON SUPPORT Captured terrorists turned over to C- I A for interrogation may be subjected to a wide range of legally sanctioned techniques all of which are also used on U S pei'sonnel in SERE training programs These are designed to disilocate the detainee maximize his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness and reduce or eliminate his will to resist our-efforts to obtain critical intelligence 3' Sanctioned interrogation te hniques must be speci cally approved in advance by the Director in the case of each individual case They include in approximately ascending degree of intensity - Standard measures without physical or substantial pressure Shaving A A Stripping Diapering generally for periods not greater than 72 hours Hooding - Isolation - - - - - White noise or loud music at a decibel level that will not damage hearing Coirtinuous light or darkness Uncomfortany cool environment - Restricted-diet including reduced caloric intake suf cie to maintain general health Shackling in upright sitting or horizontal position Water Dousing Sleep deprivation up to 72 hours Enhanced measures with physical or pressure beyond the above Attention grasp Facial hold Insult facial sla W NatSecAct 1 D0153 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 bm N'atsecActn I Abdominal'slap Prolonged diapering Sleep deprivation over 12 hours - - 3 Stress positions - - - - on knees body slanted forward or backward A - leaning with forehead on wall Walling - - Cramped con nement Con nement boxes Waterboard - 1 - In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a imPact and not some physical effect with a speci c goal of dislocat ing his expectations regarding the u'eatment he believes he will receive The more physical techniques are delivered in a manner carefully limited to avoid serious physical harm The slaps for example are'designed to induce shock surprise and or humiliation and not to in ict physical pain that is severe or lasting To this end they must be delivered in a speci cally circumscribed manner with ngers spread Walling is only againsta springboard designed to be loud and bouncy and cushion the blow All walling and most attention grasps are delivered only'With the subject thead solidly supported with a towel to avoid extension- exion injury - OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency detainees subject to enhanced interrogation techniques and for determining that the authorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or permanent harm l Guidelines have been issued formalizing these rosponsibilities and these should be read directly Whenever feasible advance approval is required to use any measures beyond standard measures technique-speci c advanced approval is required for all enhanced measures and is conditional on on-site medical and personnelzlcon rming from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique s is not eXpected to - produce severe physical or mental pain or suffering As a practical matter the detainee s physical condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting 1 The standard used by the Justice Department for mental harm is prolonged mental harm mental harm of some lasting duration mental harm lasting months or years In the absence of prolonged mental harm no severe mental pain orsuffering would have been in icted Memorandum of August 1 2002 p 15 3 personnel can be-eit her a clinical or a Unless the waterboard is being used the medical officer can be a physician or a use of the waterboard requires the presence of a physician 1 NatSecAj D0154 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSeCAct -q I effect and his state strong enough that no severe harm will result The medical implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below - - General intake evaluation New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment with a complete documented history and physical addressing in depth any- chronic or previous medical problems This should especially attend to cardiovascular pulmonary neurological and musculo-skeletal- ndings See the section on shac'kling and waterboard for more speci cs Vital signs and weight should be recorded and blood work- drawn tiger top serum separating and'Iavender top tubes for'CBC Hepatitis and C HlV'and Chem panel to include albumin and liver function tests Documented subsequent medical rechecks should be performed on a regular basis the frequency being within the judgment of the medical representative and the Chief of -Site The recheck can be more focused on relevant factors The content of the documentation should be similar to what would ordinarily be recorded in a medical chart Although brief the data should reflect what was checked and include negative Minn All assessments should be reported through approved W3 NatseCACt communications channels applicable to the site in which the detainee is held and sub cut to review release by the Chief of the site This should include an copy of the medical ndings should also be included in an electronic le maintained locally on each detainee which incorporates all medical evaluations on that individual le must be available to successive medical practitioners at site Medical treatment It is important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees even those - undergoing enhanced interrogation Those requiring chronic medications should receive them acute medical problems should be treated and adequate uids and nutrition provided These medical interventions however should not undermine the anxiety and dislocation that the various interrogation techniques are designed to fost r Medical assessments during periOds of enhanced interrogation while encompassing all that is medically necessary should not appear overly attentive - Follow-up evaluations during this period may be performed in the guise of a guard or through remote video All interventions assessments and evaluations should be coordinated with the Chief cf Site and interrogation team members to insure they are performed in such a way as to minimize undermining interrogation aims to obtain critical intelligence r b 1 mwi I NatSecAct D0155 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C0585671 I - NatSecAct - -q Medications and nutritional supplements may be hidden in the basic food provided as a liquid er thoroughly crushed tablet If during the initial phase of interrogation - - detainees are deprived of all measurements of time through continuous light and variable schedules a time-rigid administration of medication or nutrition should be avoided There generally is ample latitude to allow varying treatlnent intervals The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable but should include adequate uids and nutrition Actual consumption should be monitored and recorded Liquid Ensure or equivalent is a good way to assure that there is adequate nutrition Brief periods during which food is withheld 24-48 hours as an adjunct to interrogation are acceptable Individuals refusing adequate liquids during this stage should have uids administered at the earliest signs of dehydration For-reasons of staff safety the rectaltube is an acceptable method of delivery If there is any question about adequacy of uid intake urinary output also should be monitored and recorded Uncomfortany cool environments Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortably cool environments for varying of time ranging from hours to days The length of time will depend on multiple factors including age health extent of clothing and freedom of movement Individual tolerance and safety have to be assessed on a case by case basis and'continuously reevaluated over time The following guidelines and reference points are intended to assist the medical staff in advising on acceptable lower ambient temperatures in certain operational settings The comments assume the subject is a young healthy dry clothed individual sheltered from wind ie that they are a typical detainee Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of At this temperature increased metabolic rate cannot compensate for heat loss The recommended minimum indoor temperatureis The thermoneutml zone where compensatory activity is required to maintain core temperature is to Within thethermoneutral zone is considered optimally comfortable for clothed individuals and for naked individuals Currently policy stipulates as the detention cell and interrogation room temperatures permitting variations due to season This has proven more achievable in some Sites than others If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral range they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented Occasionally I as part of the interrogation process they are housed in spaces with ambient temperatures of between and Unless the detainee is clothed and standing or sitting on a mat this exposure should not be continued for longer than 2-3 hours 4 NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0156 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 mom l NetSecAct At ambient temperatures below detainees should be monitored for the development of hypothermia This risk is greatest in those who are naked or nearly so who are in substantial direct contact with a surface that conducts heat away vom the body the oor whose restraints severely limit muscle work who have comparatively little muscle mass who are fatigued and sleep deprived and are age45 or over - - - Wet skin or Clothing places a detainee at- much greater risk for hypothermia so if a partial or complete soaking is used in conjunction with the interrogation or even for bathing the detainee must be dry before being placed in a space with-an ambient temperature below A Signs of mild hypothermia body temp include shivering lack of coordination fumbling hands Stumbling slurred speech memory loss and pale and cold skin Detainees exhibiting any of these signs should be allowed some combination of increased clothing oor mat more freedom of movement and increased ambient temperature Moderate hypothermia body temperature of is present when shivering stops there is an inability to walk or stand andlor the subject is confused irrational An aggressive medical intervention is warranted in these cases White noise gr loud music I Asa practical guide there is no permanent hearing risk for continuous 24 hours- a day eXposures to sound at 82 dB or lowerhours a dayhours 95 dB for 4 hours and 100 dB for 2 hours Ifnecessary instruments can be provided to measure these anabient sound levels In general sound in the dB 80-99 range is experienced as loud above 100 dB as uncomfortably loud Common reference points include garbage disposer 80 dB cockpit of propeller aircraft 88 dB shouted conversation 90 dB at 25' feet 90 dB inside of subway car at 35 95 dB power mower 96 dB chain saw 110 dB and live rock band 114 dB Fer purposes of intermgation DICT has set a policy that no white noise and no loud noise used in the interrogation process should exceed 79 DB - Shackling Shackling in non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development of pressure sores with treatment and adjustment of the shackles as required Should shackle related lesions develop early intervention is to avoid the mom ml NatSecAct D0157 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - - Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 m b 1 l a - -c development of an interrogation-limiting cellulitis Cleaning the lesion and a slight loosening of the shackles may be all that is required If the detainee is to be shackled standing with-hands at or above the head as part of a sleep deprivation protocol the medical assessment should include a- pre-check for anatomic factors that might in uence how long the arms could be elevated This would include shoulder range of motion pulses in neutral and elevated positions a check for bmits and assessment of the basic sensorimotor status of the upper extremities Assuming no medical contraindications are found extended periods upto 72 hours in a standing position can be approved if the hands are no higher thanhead level and weight is borne fully by the lower extremities Detainees who have one foot or leg casted or who lost part'of a lower extremity to amputation should bemonitored carefully for the development of excessive edema in the weight-supporting leg If edema approaches knee level these individuals should be shifted to a foot-elevatedseated or reclining sleep-deprivation position In the presence of a suspected lower limb cellulitis the detainee should be shifted to a seated leg-elevated position and antibiotics begun Absent other contraindications sleep deprivation can be continued in both these circumstances NOTE An occasional detainee placed in a standing stress position has developed lower limb tenderness and erythema in addition to an ascending edema which initially have not been easily distinguished from a progressive cellulitis or venous thrombosis These typically have been associated with pre-existing abrasions or ulcerations from shackling at the time of initial rendition In order to best inform future medical judgments and recommendations the presence of these lesions should be accurately described before the standing stress position is employed In all cases approximately daily observations should be recorded which document the length of time the detainee has been in the stress - position and level of any developing edema or erythema More stressful shackled positions may also be approved for shorter intervals e g during an interrogation session or between sessions The arms can be elevated above the head elbows not locked for roughly two hours without great concern Reasonable judgment should be used as to the angle of elevation of the arms NatSecAct DO158 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 In it Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - 1 mmxs NetSecAct -- Periods in this arms-elevated shackle position lasting between two and four hours wOuld merit caution and subject should be monitored for excessive distress The - detainee should never be required to bear weight on the upper extremities and the - utilization of this technique should not exceed approximame 4 hours in a 24 hour period If through fatigue or otherwise the detainee becomes truly incapable of supporting himself on his feet after 36 48 hours etc and the detainee s weight is shifted to the shackles the use of overhead shackles shOuld be discontinued Sleep gem'vation Sleep deprivation with or without associated stress positions is among the most effective adjuncts to interrogation and is the only technique with a demonstrably cumulative effect the longer the deprivation to a point the more effective the impact - The standard approval for sleep deprivation per se without regard to shackling position 'is 72 hours Extemio n of sleep deprivation beyond 72 continuous hours is considered an enhanced measure which requires prior approval The amount of sleep required - between deprivation periods depends on the intended purpose of the sleep deprivation If it is intended to be one element in the process of demonstrating helplessness in an unpleasant environment a short nap of two or so hours would be suf cient Perceptual distortion effects are not uncommon after 96 hours of sleep deprivation but frank is very rare Cognitive effects of course are common If it is desired that the subject be reasonably attentive and clear-thinking during the interrogation at least a 6 hour recovery should be allowed Current policy requires 4 hours sleep once the 72 hour limit has been met during standard interrogation measures NOTE Examinations perfonned during periods of sleep deprivation should include the - current number of hours withOnt sleep and if only a brief rest preceded this period the speci cs of the previous deprivation also should be recorded Cramped confinement Con nement boxes _l etainees can be placed in awkward boxes speci cally constructed for this - purpose These can be rectangular and just over the detainee s height not much wider than his body and comparatively shallow or they can be small cubes allowing little more than a cross-legged sitting position These have not proved particularly effective as they I may become a safehaven Offering a respite from interrogation Assuming no signi cant medical conditions cardiovascular muSculoskeletal are present con nement in-the small box is allowable up to 2 hours Con nement in the large box is limited to 8 consecutive hours up to a total of 18 hours a day mmxs NatSecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 D0159 - EVA mu 4 142 5 - Waterboard Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 - - xJ NatSecAct This is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques The historical context here was limit d knowledge of the use of the waterboard in SERE training several hundred trainees experience it every year or two In the SERE model the subject is immobilized on his back and his forehead and eyes covered with a cloth A stream of water is directed at the upper lip Resistant subjects then have the cloth lowered to cover the nose and mouth as the water continues to be applied fully saturating the cloth and precluding the passage of Relatively little water enters the mouth The occlusion which may be partial lasts no more than 20 seconds On removal of the cloth the subject is immediately able to breathe but continues to have water directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect This process can continue for several minutes and involve up to 15 canteen cupsof water Ostensibly the primary deSired effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily occluding the nose and mouth and impact or the continued application of water after the cloth is removed SERE trainees usually have only a single exposure to this technique and never more than two SERE trainers consider it their most effective technique and deem it virtually irresistible in the training setting Our very limited experience with the waterboard is different The subjects were positioned on the back but in a head down Trendelenburg position to protect somewhat against aspiration A good air seal seemingly was not easily achieved by the wet cloth and the occlusion was further compromised by the subject attempting to drink the applied water The result was that copious amounts cf water sometimes were used-e up to several liters of water bottled if local water is unsafe and with '1 salt liter if signi cant swallowing takes place The resulting occlusion was primarily from water lling the nasopharymt breathholding and much less frequently the cropharynx being lled rather than the sealing effect of the saturated cloth DICTC policy setan occlusion limit of 40 seconds though this was very rarely reached Additionally the procedure was repeated sequentially several times for several sessions a day and this process extended with varying degrees of for over a week While SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain resistance to the waterboard our experience was otherwise Subjects unquestionably can withstand a large number of applications - with no seeming cumulative hnpact beyond their strong aversion to theexperience Whether the waterboard offers a more effective alternative to sleep deprivation stress positions or is an effective supplement to these techniques is not yet known - NatSeCAct D0150 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - NatSecAct - 2 a a q - The SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique single exposure to trainees for years and reportedly there have been thousands of applications a without signi cant or lasting medical complications The procedure nonetheless carries some risks particularly when'repeated a large number of times or when applied to an individual less t than a typical SERE trainee Several medical dimensions need to be - monitored to ensure the safety of the subject ar- Before employing this technique there needs to be reasonableassurance'that the a subject does not have serious heart or lung disease particularly any obstructive airway - disease or respiratory compromise from morbid obesity He also must have stable anterior dentition no recent facial or jaw injuries and an intact gag re ex Since vomiting may be associated with these sessions diet should be liquid during the phase of interrogation when use of the waterboard is likely and the subject should be NPO other than water for at least 4 hours before any session The most obvious serious I complication would be a respiratory arrest associated with laryngospasm so the medical team must be prepared to respond immediately to this crisis preferably the physician will be in the treatment room Warning signs of this or other impending respiratory complications include hoarseness persisting cough wheezing stridor or dif culty clearing the airway If these develop use of the waterboard should be discontinued for at least 24 hours If they recur with later applications of the waterboard its use should be stopped Mock applications need not be limited In all cases in which there has been a suggestion of aspiration the subject should be observed for signs of a subsequently developing pneumonia In our limited experience extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce new Most seriously for'reasons of physical fatigue or resignation the subject may simply give up allowing excessive lling of the airways and loss of consciousness An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately and the interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to exPel the water If fails to restore normal breathing aggressive medical intervention is required Any subject who has reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the waterboard and the physician on the scene can not approve further use of the waterboard without specific CIOMS consultation and approval A rigid guide to medically approved use of the waterboard in essentially healthy individuals is not possible as safety will depend on how the water is applied and the speci c response each time it is used The following general guidelines are based on - very limited knowledge drawn from very few subjects whose experience and response - was quite varied These represent only the medical guidelines legal guidelines also are Operative and may be more restrictive W b 1 m1l Nat SecAct Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 D0161 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 - NatSecAct A - or A series within a session of Sevm'al relatively rapid waterboard applications is medically acceptable in all healthy subjects so long as there is no indication cf some - emerging vulnerability such as hearseness wheezing persisting cough or dif culty I clearing the airivays Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed without apparent medical complication The exact number of sessions cannotbe prescribed and will depend on the response to each If more than 3 sessions of _5 or more applications are envisioned within a'24 hours period a careful medical reassessment must be made I before each later session - By days 335 of an aggressive program cumulative effects become a potential - concern Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantagesof this 2 - technique we believe that beyond this point continued intense waterboard applications may not be medically Continued aggressive use of the waterboard beyond this point should be reviewed by the HVT team in consultation with Headquarters prior to any further aggressive use Absent medical centraindications sporadic use probably carries little risk Beyond the increased medical concern for both acute and long term effects including PTSD there possibly would be desensitization to the technique Sleep deprivation is a medically less risky Option and sleep deprivation and stress positions also can be used to prolong the period of moderate use of the waterboard by reducing the intensity of its early use through the interposition of these other techniques NOTE In order to best inform tture medical judgments and recommendations it is important that every application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented how long each application and the entire procedure lasted how much water was used in the process realizing that much splashes of how exactly the water was applied if a seal was achieved if the mm or oropharynx was lled what sort of volume was expelled how long was the break between applications and how the subject looked between each treatment POST-INTERROGATION DETENTION this section is still under construction responsibility for the medical and well-being of detainees does not end when detainees emerge from the interrogation phase Documented periodic medical and re-evaluations are necessary during the debrie ng phase which follows interrogation as well as during subsequent periods of custodial detention Absent any speci c complaint these can be at approximately intervals Acute problems must be addressed at the time of presentation As during the interrogation phase all assessments- examinations and evaluations should be reported thmugh approv communications channels applicable to the site in which the detainee is held and subject to review release by the Chief of that site 10 D0162 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 NatSecAct - Detainee Weights should be recorded on atleast a basis and assessed for indications of inadequate nutrition As a rule of thumb ideal weight for height should be about 106 pounds for an individual 5 feet tall and six pounds heavier for each additional inch of height Terrorists incarcerated in the Federal prison system whose weights fall below this leVel given nutritional supplements Those falling to 90% of these levels who are unwilling to take nutrition orally through hunger strikes have forced feedings through a naso-gastric tube While to date this has not hem an issue with detainees should signi cant weight loss develop it must be'carefully assessed It is possible that a detainee willsimply be of slight build but true weight loss in an already slight individual especially in association with deliberately reduced intake may require some intenention A Additidnally if there are sustained periods without exposure to sunlight the diet will need to be further supplemented with calcium and vitamin D Simply increasing the use of multivitamins will give too much of one substance but not enough of another The OMS recommendation for this situation is two 500 mg tables of plain calcium a day such as two Os-Cal 500 mg tabs with one capsule of the prescription Rocaltrol or alternatively two Centrum Silver tablets less than the recommendation for vitamin D with an additional 500 mg of a plain calcium table - As the period of interrogation or intense debrie ng passes detainees may be left alone for increasing periods of time before being transferred elsewhere Personal hygiene issues likely will emerge during this time with the possible development of signi cant medical problems It is particularly important that cells be kept clean during this period and that there be some provision for regular bathing and dental hygiene and that detainees be monitored to insure they are involved in self-care problems are more likely to emerge in those no longer in active debrie ngs especially those in prolonged total isolation - The loss of involvement with the debrie ng staff should be replaced with other forms of interaction through daily encounters with more than one custodial staff member and the provision of reading materials preferably in Arabic and other forms of mental stimulation 11 WW NatSecAct 00153 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 C05856717 2016 06 10 005856717 NatSecAct NatSeCAct D0164 Approved for Release 2016 06 10 005856717 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu