Key Findings U Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al Qa ida SM Since I September-2001 detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts aiding intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists helping to thwart terrorist plots and advancing our analysis of the al Qa ida target In addition detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources they also have provided unique insights into different aSpects of the terrorist organization including its ieadershi attack Detainees have given us a wealth of usef al Qa ida assocrates Since 2002 including helping us unravel most of the network Muhammad KSM KSM provided information that set the stage for the detention of Hambali lead contact of Jemaah islamiya J1 to al Qa ida and most of his network a Detainee information was also key to ma in 'd such he ortant ose Padilla and Iyman Fans One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorists has been the thwarting of a number of al Qa ida operations in the United States and overseas Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago with plans to mount an attack Similarly Walid Bin Attash aka Khallad was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate in Karachi Westerners at the Karachi Airport and Western housing areas Since 11 September the capture and debrie ng of detainees also has transformed our understanding of al-Qa ida and af liated terrorist groups OFO providing increased avenues for sohisticated anal sis Before the oature of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002 uncaya provzde detaiis about al-Qa ida s organizational structure key operatives and modus operandi It also was Abu Zubaydah early in his detention who identi ed KSM as the mastermind of the 11 September attacks a In the nearly four years sioce 11 September 2001 successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the ght against 231 Qa ida by providing updat the or anizatio Despite the unquestionable utility of detainee reporting uneorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information moreover we assess that each detainee ve likely has information that he will not revea Detainee Reporting Pivotal for Against A Qa ida Since 1 1 September 2001 reporting from high value al Qa ida detainees has become a crucial piliar of US counterterroxism efforts contributing directly and indirectly to intelligence and law-enforcement Operations against the al-Qa ida target In addition detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources they also have provided unique insights into different a aspects of the terrorist organization including its leadership attack strategy and tactics and CBRN capabilities and ambitions Helping Target Other Terrorists W Detainee reporting since early 2003 has been a High and media detainees have given us a major foundation for much of the Intelligence wealth 0f useful nfonpation on alea Ida Community s analysis on aina ida both in terms members and assoczates Including new details on the of current intelligence publications and of more personalities 3H43 t1V1t1 0f kntovan terronsts in depth intelligence assessments Detainees also divulge either or unwittingly details about terrorists who are unknown to us As is information from other collection detainee reporting 18 disseminated streams detainee reporting is often incomplete or too broadly among US intelii en cc and law genera to lead dztectly to arrests Instead detainees enforcement entities prowde critical pieces to the puzzle which when combined with other reporting have helped direct an investigation s focus and led to the capture of terrorists NOF IIMR Unraveiing Hambali s Network In March 2003 al-Qa ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad KSM provided information about an al Qa ida operative Majid Khan who he was aware had recently been captured KSwaossibly believing the detained Operative was to having tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to individuals working for another senior al-Qa ida associate a In an example of how information from one detainee can be used in debrie ng another detainee in a building block process Khanmconfronted with information about the money u acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named Zubair and provided Zubair s physical description and contact number Based on that information anair was captured in one 2003 During debriefings Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Hambali who was the principle Icmaah lsiamiya ll conduit to al-Qa ida Zubair provided informatio information anazr prowded to track down and arrest Hambaii - Next KSmehen explicitly queried on the issue widenti ed Hambali s brother Abd al Hadi Rusman Gunawan as a ros ective successor to Hambali Bringing the story full circle Abd al I Iadi identi ed a cell of ii operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for training When confronted with his brother s revelations Hambaii admitted that some members of the cell were eventually to be groomed for US operations mat the behest of KSM wpossibly as part of plot to fly hijacked planes llest building on the US west coast Bringing New Targets to Light A variety of detainee reporting has provided us initial information about individuals having links to al-Qa ida and has given us insight into individuals about whom we had some reporting but whose I See Appendix A Capture of Al-Qa ida s Southeast Asian Chief Hambali W W NW aI-Qa ida invoivement was unciear For example detainees in mid 2003 iieiped as buiid a iist of approximatei 70 individuaISWmany of whom we had never heard of beforemthat suitabie for Western cerations Ja far at-Tayyar rst came to the attention when Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the most iikely individuais to be used by aiaQa ida for operations in the United States or Euros provided additional details We to uncovering Ja far s true name Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts Many actionabie leads provided by detainee reporting have assisted the efforts of the FBI iocai an enforcement and the Department of Defense Such information has led to arrests helped in questioning suspects an a ateiy be used in a judiciai process Soon after his arrest KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identi ed as Iyman Faris and who was already under suspicion for his contacts with aI Qa ida operative Majid Khan The FBI and CIA shared inteiligeace from interviews of KSM Khan and Fans on a near reabtime basis and quickiy ascertained that Paris had met and accepted operations taskings from KSM on several occasions Faris is currently serving a 20 year sentence for conspiracy and material so on to a terrorist organization - revelation in March 2003 that he was plotting with Sayf al Rahman Parachawwho aiso used the name Saifnliah aI Rahman Paracha to smuggle explosives into the United States for a pianned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha s business ties in the United States The investigation also invotved questioning Paracha s son Uzair Paracha in New York and resulted in designating in May 2003 Sayf ai Rahman Paracha an enemy combatant Sayf a Rahman Paracha entered into US custody in July 2003 and Uzair was indicted in the Federal Court in Manhattan Sayf ai-Rahman Par he wins in detention at Guantanamo Bay Revealing Plots Potential Targets Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of al Qa ida plots to altack targets in the West and elsewhere Not only have detainees reporled on potential targets and techniques thaz al Qe icla operational planners have considered but arrests also have elsrupted attack plans in progress MR In response to questions about a1 Qa ida s efforts to acquire WMD KSM aiso revealed he had met three individuais involved in almQa ida s program to produce anthrax He apparently misstated we had this information aiready giver that one of the three 4 I operative and ai Qa ida assoc' foreign custody terrorist activity a After being confronted with KSM reporting Sufaat eventually admitted his anthrax program and provide A key Somali Operative working with al Qa ida and a1 ittihad al Islami 111 East Afric Ha lanned to attack the US military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti using explosive iaden water tankers information on his at-large assistaizt's the information from Sufaat and KSM US Targets Here and Abroad Abu Zubaydah was the first of severe detainees to reveal a signi cant quantity of genera threat information against targets abroad and in the United Statesmincluding the White House and other US symbols 0 Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as a baseline for debriefin Debrie ngs of mid levei ai Qa ida Operatives also have reported on speci c plots against US interests - Heathrow Airport Piot Shortly after his capture in March 2003 KSM divuiged limited information about his plot to use commercial airiiners to attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom He discussed the plot probably because he suspected that key al Qa ida i September facilitator and Heathrow Airport plotter Ramzi Bin ai Shibh who had been detained six months previously had already reveaied the information Debriefers used and Bin ai Shibh s reporting to confront Walid Bio Attash aka Khaiiad and Ammar al Baluchi who were caught two months after KSM Khaiiad admitted to having been involved in the lot and revealed that he had directed cell leade locating pilots who could hijack pianos and crash them into the a ort Khallad said he and operative Kha ad s statements provided leverage in debrie ngs of KSM KSM eshed out the status of the Operation including identif in- an additional Revealing the Karachi Plots When confronted with infomation provided by Ammar al-Baluchi Khallad admitted during debrie ngs that aI Qa ida was s-iannin to state the Since 11 September the capture and debriefing of HVDS has signi cantly advanced our understanding of at Qa ida and af liated terron'st groups Before the'capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002 we had signi cant gaps in knowledge about a3 Qa ida s organizational structure ke members and associates and its presence around the at an months of his arrest Abe Lubaydan provzded detalis about alea zda s organizational structure key operatives and modus operandi Early in his detention his information on aE-Qa ida s Shara Council and i vri added to what we were Ieaminm in addition Abu Zu'oaydah s identi cation ea y in his demotion of KSM as the mastermind of- 11 September and aI-Qa ida s premier terrorist piarmer and of Abd aZ-Rahim aE Nashiri as another Since 11 September successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the ght against al Qa ida by providing updated information on the the organizations until his arrest in Juiy 2004 he has reported on how he forged passports and to whom be supplied them also provided invaiuable insights in reports that have aided our analysis of al-Qa ida s current organization the personalities of its key members and aI-Qa ida s decisionmaking process His reporting has contributed to our understanding of the enemy how al Qa ida members interact with each other how they are organized and what their persona networks are like Ahmed Khalfam Ghaiiani aka Haytham al Kini aka Fupi a Tanzanian a1 Qa ida member who was indicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings has provided new insights into al-Qa ida s skilis and networks As a facilitator and one of ai-Qa ida s top document forgets since the 1 1 September attacks with access to individuais across SE NIIMR in confronting detainees to persuade them to taik about topics they would otherwise not reveal a For exam e lists of names found on the computer I a key al Qa ida nanciai Operative an ac ztator for the 11 September in March 2003 represented al Qa ida members who were to receive funds Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on the names to determine who they were and how important they were to the organization The funds that were avaz state to families a The same computer contained a list of e mail addresses for individuals KSM helped deploy abroad who he hoped would execute operations rained the hombmakers Mrespoosihiefor the nombmg of the US Consulate in Karachi Pakistan in June 2002 and the assassination attem anainst President Musharraf in earl Challenges of Detainee Reporting Detainees by virtue of their circumstances have an adversarial reiationship with their debriefers they often try pass incompiete or intentionally misleading Detainees have been particulariy useful in sorting out infonnation perhaps hoping that the voiume of the the large volumes of documents and computer data sortie will make it dif cult to sort out the truth seized on raids Such inform i 1 Illuminating Other Collection orne a so can ne used would not discuss elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlines into Heathrow Airport he may have assumed that Ramzi Bin ai-Shibh who was captured in I 2 had already divulged this plan Refusing To Budge on Certain Tonics We assess that each detainee very likel has Detainees information must be corroborated using muitiple sources of intelligence uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion Sometimes ihe detainee gives information he caicuiateSWrightIy or wrongiymthat the debriefers already know Unoharactezistic for most detainees KSM almost immediately foliowing his capture in March 2003 Khalid Shaykh Muhammad is caplurar and rapcds ma Magic imam one of his Pakislan operatives who was aiso captured in March lei-feted 550 59910 some of Hambah s upgralives in December 2002 Khalid Shaykh Muhammad - Eatmrides 'Abd si- in debriefings Mamba 2903 When mironled with inlormatian Khan admowiedgas that he delivered the money 20 an operative named Zubair-ua Re inform cn leads in Zubair s minute in June Zubair reports lhal he worked crumb for Harribali and provides iragmentary inlorma on Hadf ocal Abd abi-iadi identities to us a ceii of Al operatives whom Hamba had sent to Karachi or training When confronied wilh hid brothers revelations Harman admits thai he was gleaming members 0 Ike ceil to US operations- 1t the behest o a pan oi 950 to y hijacked planes into the miles hu mg on he US was coasl Abd aiv adi September 2003 Mziid Khan Zahair ma son gmw ded by Zubair to capture Hamball s mm key Eeutcnann Samir Bin 1 35 aka who grow-ides the imation of Hamba loading to his cagwre Bashir Lap Bdnging the slory Juli cirde in Septembe 2003 Pakistan amhorhies take down 14 members of the Sepiember 2003 bio Fad This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu