DIANNI I-LINEI IEIN CHAIRMAN saxsv oLonoIA VICL JOHN D W Ellfif lURll-I f r'A non onscort JAMLS L liliiL'l I IDAHO cancmaa KIJLSKI coats INDIANA MAIIK IJDMI EOI carrot HUB o MARK WT-IHIHE InltE att n tt MARTIN twang now MI con-ow UKIAHUMR ANGUS KING SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IIarIn-r In NFvana FM on I-IrrIo WASHINGTON DC 6475 TN-IL MICHIGAN L'x UI INPOFE I-X December 30 2014 SCOTT UIHI L2 IDR DI SAYI Cl The President The White House 1600 Avenue NW Washington DC 20500 Dear Mr President As you know on December 9 2014 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released the Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its Study of the Detention and Interrogation Program I write today to describe and transmit the recommendations derived from the Committee s report These recommendations are intended to make sure that the United States never again engages in actions that you have acknowledged were torture I believe that several of the Committee s ndings should prompt additional oversight and better sharing of information for all covert action and signi cant intelligence collection programs The recommendations below are divided into the following three categories 1 Changes to US law that I will propose in the beginning of the next Congress II Additional recommendations that can be implemented through Executive Branch administrative action and recommendations or reforms that were previously proposed by the CIA in its June 2013 response to the Committee s report several of which were repeated recently by Director Brennan in his December 11 2014 press conference I LEGISLATIVE RECOMNIENDATIONS I will introduce the rst four recommendations as legislation in the beginning of the 114th Congress some of them would codify your January 22 2009 Executive Order No l349l entitled Ensuring Lawful Interrogations 1 Close All Torture Loopholes The U S domestic law prohibiting torture and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 were both interpreted by the Of ce of Legal Counsel to allow the CIA to use coercive and abusive interrogation techniques New legislation will make clear that such interrogation techniques are prohibited 2 Establish the US Army Field Manual as the Exclusive Set of Interrogation Techniques - The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 limited the interrogation techniques available to U S Department of Defense personnel to those explicitly listed in the Army Field Manual New legislation will expand this limitation to US Intelligence Community personnel as well consistent with Executive Order 13491 January 22 2009 3 Require the U S Government to Notify the Red Cross and Provide Timely Access to All Captured Detainees New legislation will require the US Government to provide noti cation of new detainees to the International Committee of the Red Cross and provide access to those detainees as soon as is practicable consistent with Executive Order 1349i January 22 2009 4 Prohibit CIA Detention of Detainees New legislation will prohibit the authority of the CIA to hold detainees beyond a short term transitory basis consistent with Executive Order 13491 January 22 2009 II ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS The second set of recommendations can be implemented administratively Those eleven recommendations are listed below and are grouped into the following categories Strengthening Covert Action and Other Intelligence Oversight within the Executive Branch 1 Recommendation The National Security Council NSC should improve its oversight of covert action programs and lead more formal rigorous interagency evaluations mat least on an annual basis to determine whether all elements of covert action programs are effective appropriate and should be continued These evaluations must be independent and not reliant upon the CIA for an assessment of its own activities 0 NSC Principals should be informed of all signi cant covert action undertakings and have access to all relevant information necessary to evaluate these programs 0 Further subordinates of NSC Principals to include regional Assistant Secretaries of State and attorneys at the State Department s Of ce of the Legal Advisor as well as National Security Division NSD attorneys at the Department of Justice DOJ should have access to all relevant information on covert action and other signi cant intelligence programs in order to carry out their of cial duties - NSD attorneys should also support the Of ce of Legal Counsel OLC by ensuring that OLC opinions on covert action and other intelligence activities are based on complete and accurate information 0 As the President s representative and pursuant to 22 U S C 3927 the U S Chief of Mission has full responsibility for the direction coordination and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country and shall be kept fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country Therefore U S Chiefs of Mission should he kept fully and currently informed with respect to all CIA activities in the country including negotiations with host countries as well as CIA intelligence operations Chiefs of Mission should also be permitted to discuss CIA activities within their area of responsibilities with appropriate State Department policymakers 3 Rationale As described in Finding #7 of the Study The CIA impeded re ective White House oversight and decision-making Part of Finding #7 also states The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the operation and e ectiveness ofthe CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program to the White House the National Security Council principals and their staffs This prevented an accurate and compiete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials thereby impeding oversight and decision-making Improving CIA Management and Accountability 2 Recommendation The CIA Director in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence should formally designate a speci c CIA of cial to be responsible for each covert action program and signi cant intelligence activity carried out by the CIA This CIA of cial should be responsible and accountable for the conduct of such program-s and activities Rationale As described as part of Finding #12 of the Study The CIA is management and operation of its Detention and interrogation Program was deepb awed throughout the program 5 duration For example the CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and interrogation roles and provided inadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective questioning of CIA detainees resulting in diminished intelligence 3 Recommendation The DNI should designate an of cial or office within the Intelligence Community to review key assessments and representations made about intelligence programs and activities to other parts of the government and to the American public in order to ensure that they are accurate The DNI shouid further establish an of cial process by which employees of the Intelligence Community are obligated to correct any inaccurate representations they make Rationale As described as part of Finding #2 of the Study the Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its coercive interrogation 4 techniques and the examples provided by the CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies The Committee found them to be wrong in fundamental respects For example in some cases there was no relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by detainees during or after the use of the CiA s enhanced interrogation techniques Recommendation The DNI should ensure that all intelligence agencies have an adequate process in place for screening and selecting appropriate personnel for sensitive intelligence and covert action programs The process for selection and screening should include review of information in an employee s background as well as an employee s performance evaluations Rationale As described as part of Finding #12 of the Study Numerous CIA o icers had serions documented personal and professionai problems including histories ofvioience and records ofabasive treatment ofothers that should have coiled into question their suitability to participate in the CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program their employment with the CIA and their continued access to classified information In nearly all cases these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these o icers to detention and interrogation positions Recommendation The DNI should issue new directives to ensure contractors do not carry out inherently governmental functions as part of covert action programs These directives should include ways to enforce prohibitions on contractors conducting interrogations directing operations evaluating programs and managing intelligence programs Rationale As described in Finding #13 of the Study the two that CIA contracted with to develop and operate its coercive interrogation program carried out inherently governmental functions such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence services assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program and participating in the interrogation of detainees held in foreign government custody This was in violation of existing prohibitions on contractors carrying out these activities By 2008 contractors made up 85% of the workforce of the CIA detention and interrogation operations The should improve the enforcement of the existing prohibitions and determine if further restrictions should be implemented 6 Recommendation CIA Accountability Boards should review management problems and failures of CIA leadership as well as address systemic or structural problems at CIA in addition to evaluating speci c alleged wrongdoing by individuals Pursuant to Section 102A of the National Security Act and Intelligence Community Directive No 111 the Committee also recommends that the DNI should be more involved in conducting accountability reviews especially those that may involve senior CIA leaders including the Director Rationale As described in Finding #17 of the Study The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel serious and sign i cont violations inappropriate activities and systemic and individual management foitures Under current practice CIA Accountability Boards rarely examine possible management failures or systemic and structural problems at CIA Reforms to Detention and Interrogation Policv 7 Recommendation The Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the DNI should issue a new directive to make permanent an interagency center of expertise for information on interrogation best practices Rationale The Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies which was created pursuant to Executive Order 13491 on January 22 2009 recommended the creation of an interagency team of experts to conduct interrogations of high- value detainees The Attorney General chaired the interagency Special Task Force and announced its recommendation on August 24 2009 to create a High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group HIG which draws expertise from the FBI CIA and U S military This integrated interagency approach has clear advantages over the one-agency approach that was used to interrogate many high value detainees from 2002 to 2008 8 Recommendation The Attorney General and BM should issue a new directive to require that all national security interrogations are videotaped based on the May 12 2014 Department of Justice requirement Rationale Creating and retaining a video record of interrogations will ensure that there is an objective record of key investigations and interactions with individuals who are held in U S custody It will also provide federal authorities clear and indisputable records of important statements and confessions made by individuals who have been detained by the US government Improving CIA Of ce of Inspector General Oversight 9 Recommendation The CIA Director should issue a new directive to require that the CIA Inspector General be informed of all new covert action programs including the signing of new Presidential Findings or Memoranda of Noti cation the significant expansion or modi cation of existing covert action programs and any other covert action or intelligence collection operations that could raise new issues relevant to oversight The CIA Of ce of the Inspector General should also verify the information provided by CIA and have complete access to all documentation including intelligence and sourcing cables necessary to verify that information provided and to conduct effective oversight Rationale As described as part of Finding #9 of the Study The CIA avoided resisted and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA is Detention and Interrogation Program by the CIA s O ice Inspector General 01G The CIA did not brief the GIG on the program anti after the death of a detainee by which time the CIA had held at least 22 detainees at are different CIA detention sites Another part of Finding #9 of the Study states Daring the 016' reviews CIA personnelT provided 01G with inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program as wet as on the e iectiveness of the CIA s enhanced interrogation techniques The inaccurate information was included in the final May 2004 Special Review which was later deciassh ied and reieasedpabiicly and remains uncorrected Strengthening Congressional Oversight 10 Recommendariom Restrictions on the ability of Members of the congressional intelligence committees to access information from the Intelligence Community should be limited to time-sensitive operational details of covert action programs Adequate staff access as determined by the committees should be provided to ensure that the committees as well as individual Members can carry out their oversight responsibilities The committees should have access upon request to any documentation required to conduct effective oversight including intelligence and sourcing cables Rationale As described in Finding #6 of the Study the CIA actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program in part because access to information on the program was restricted to the chairman and vice chairman of the Committee until 2006 Improving the Declassification Process 11 Recommendatiom The DNI should establish a formal declassi cation review process to declassify information quickly when requested by Congress Rationale Members of the Committee have found the declassi cation process to be slow and disjointed even for information that Congress has identified as being of high public interest Declassi cation of the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of the Committee s final report took approximately eight months and signi cant parts of the declassi cation process were inconsistent and negotiated while the process was ongoing instead of being determined in advance CIA-PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS Finally I agree with the recommendations made by the CIA in its June 2013 response to the Committee s report l many ofwhich overlap with the recommendations above The CIA recommended the following 1 The CIA has made this response to the Committee s report available at luneZOl 3 Response to the SSCI Studv_on_thc_dlii_nner Detention and Interrogation l rogrampdf See 8 1 1mprove management s ability to manage risk by submitting more covert action programs to a special review process 2 Better plan covert actions by explicitly addressing at the outset the implications of leaks an exit strategy lines of authority and resources 3 Revamp the way in which CIA assesses the effectiveness of covert actions 4 Ensure that all necessary information is factored into the selection process for of cers being considered for the most sensitive assignments 5 Create a mechanism for periodically revalidating OLC guidance on which the Agency continues to rely 6 Broaden the scope of accountability reviews 7 Improve recordkeeping for interactions with the media 8 Improve recordkeeping for interactions with Congress I look forward to working with you to implement these recommendations and ask that you publicly support them when I publicly release this letter in early January Sincerely yours I 1333 12 Dianne Feinstein Chairman cc The Honorable James Clapper Director of National Intelligence The Honorable John Brennan Director Central Intelligence Agency The Honorable Eric Holder Attorney General The Honorable Chuck Hagel Secretary of Defense The Honorable John Kerry Secretary of State Recommendations on pp 1643 pp 22-24 of the The CIA has not provided the Committee with an update on the implememation status of these recommendations 9 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu