0 946 1 5 Vb Directorate of Sgr t Intelligence Guatemala Prospects for Political Moderation- An Intelligence Assessment was 3% re August 1983 Key Judgments lnformalion available a 0 20 July 1983 was used in this report Guatemala Prospects for Political Moderation- The military government of Gen Efrain Rios Monti which came to power in Guatemala in March 1982 is still seized with many of the same social and political problems that have bedeviled that country for years Although a previously growing insurgency has been contained at least temporar- ily the traditional conservative elites still wield considerable political power Moreover the social problems that triggered demands for change and Spurred Indian Stipport for the insurgency have been aggravated by Guatemala's recent economic decline While trying to deal with these problems Rios Montt faces formidable challenges in the months ahead - Continued coup plotting and factional rivalries in the military indicate that the armed forces remain a divided institution We believe that as long as the Army remains largely above the law it probably can and will act to hamper some of Rios Montt s efforts to implement reform In addition we believe the military s new commitment to moderation may be tactical and easily abandoned in favor of more repression should circumstances dictate - We expect the Guatemalan economy to decline further this year and perhaps to stabilize in 1984 Economic contraction will increase already high unemployment and hinder government efforts to relieve socioeco- nomic pressures In addition the private sector is overwhelmingly conservative and Opposed to social reforms These factors are likely to make economic policymaking increasingly contentious DeSpite government efforts to weaken conservative groups these are likely to resume entrenched political habits such as fielding assassins and disrupting new left-of-center organizations Similarly extreme leftists have begun to subvert left-of-center groups in order to press for radical reforms and provoke a rightist reaction - We estimate that the leftist guerrillas remain a potent force of 2 000 to 2 500 full-time armed combatants with the capacity for hit-and-run raids economic sabotage and urban terrorism Although they are unlikely to threaten political stability seriously in the short term they are just as unlikely to be eradicated ret August I 983 i Se r e vo ky-xoco RACT- - We believe that a deterioration in regional security would derail political moderation in Guatemala A radical leftist victory in El Salvador probably would provide Guatemalan guerrillas with improved access to Cuban and Nicaraguan arms and an unimpeded safehaven Even in the face of these challenges we believe that the present trend toward more moderate government is likely to continue during the next year or two provided Rios Montt remains in power The President has demonstrated a strong personal commitment to civilize Guatemala He has adopted a counterinsurgency strategy that combines selective repres sion and civic action He has taken some steps to reduce human rights abuses and integrate previously excluded social'groups such as Indians peasants and urban workers-into the political and economic mainstream - human rights violations have decreased substantially Although abuses remain we judge that the climate of fear the wideSpread indiscriminate brutality and more important the hostility between peasants and the Army have dimin- ished noticeably - Recent political reforms have stimulated moderate leftist parties and new organizations representing previously excluded social groups to partici- pate in the electoral process now getting under way There are tentative signs that exiled Social Democratic leaders are following the Guatemalan situation closely are considering electoral alliances and may return to Guatemala if they obtain guarantees of personal safety Overall after weighing his and weaknesses we judge that Rios Montt has an even chance to remain in power for the next one to two years His authority rests with the military whose power is likely to remain ascendant In our view military backing probably will continue as long as the progress against the insurgents can be sustained and the movement toward elections is maintained A coup attempt in June I983 and continued dissension in the armed forces make it plain that the equally likely outcome Rios Montt s overthrow is an ever-present risk Powerful conservative forces have already stepped up their efforts to discredit Rios Montt and provoke his replacement by the Army His replacement by coup or his assassination in our view would lead to a power struggle in the military and a more rightist leadership and would probably entail the abandonment of moderate programs Sey t YOF V-Nocoy A CT- In any event beyond 1985 the probability of steady movement toward moderate government becomes lower in our estimation We believe that extreme ethnic and class differentiation and sharp socioeconomic diSpari- ties will continue to inhibit the development of political tolerance and compromise key elements of democracy Guatemalan society in our view is not likely to support a stable democratic-pluralist system any time soon instead political polarization and uctuating levels of violence will increase and military domination of the political system will persist The United States can expect continuing difficulties in exerting a moderat- ing or stabilizing influence over Guatemalan political events The Guate- malan military s strong nationalist tradition may well lead it as in the past to reject any US aid conditioned on human rights performance Internal dynamics in any case probably will continue to weigh more heavily in determining the government s counterinsurgency strategy and the political process 5741 Contents Seg t TRA T- Page Key Judgments Introduction 1 The Roots of Violence and Polarization 1 Economic and Social Inequality 2 General Factors 2 The Particular Plight of the Indians 2 Insurgent Exploitation of Inequalities 3 A Rigid Political System - 3 The Record of Repression 4 Reform and Reaction 1944-63 4 Military Consolidation 1963 82 4 Going for Broke 4 Overplaying the Hand 5 Rios Montt Takes Charge 7 Counterinsurgency Successes 7 Human Rights Improvements 7 Broadening Political Participation 10 Promising Initial Results 10 Retaining Military Control 11 The Period Before Elections 11 The Pivotal Role of Rios Montt 12 Constraints on Reform 12 The Military 12 The Economy 12 The Left and Right Extrema 14 Regional Turmoil 14 After Rios Montt 15 Implications for the United States 15 Appendix Guatemalan Chronology 17 vii 574a S y t N- Gualema N0C949RACT- la 'Fiores I - Huohuetenapqo erx -- - f w rg'ly 5 Boundary NOffh Ocean not 50 Kamila 50km BELIZE Puma Barnes Guatemala Prospects for Political Moderation Introductiou We believe Guatemala is pivotal in Central America for US regional interests economy and population are the largest in Central America its proximity to Mexico s southernmost states where Mexico City s authority and presence are weakest gives it a strategic signi cance unmatched by other Central American nations Moreover ethnic cultural and socioeconomic similarities between southern Mexico and Guatemala s Western Highlands suggest a high potential for the spillover of any unrest and instability across their common border Unfortunately a radical outcome of the current struggle in El Salvador would almost certainly affect future developments in Guate- mala more than elsewhere in the region - For three decades Guatemala has been beset by escalating cycles of violence and repression By 1982 in our view the situation had become chaotic be- tween 400 and 500 people were killed in politically related violence Several thousand had dis- appeared and thousands of others had ed the coun- try Virtually every social and political group had become the target of physical or brutal- ity from leftwing and rightwing extremists and gov- ernment security forces alike In the process the country had become increasingly isolated abroad The military which has governed Guatemala through much of its modern history with the support of rightwing politicians and conservative businessmen had deveIOped a siege mentality and seemed deter- mined to crush its opponents through repression against guilty and innocent alike The ensuing polar- ization of political forces into extreme right and left camps in our opinion was propelling Guatemala toward a full-scale civil war and had improved mark- edly the prospects for a Marxist insurgency - Since a young of cers' coup in March 1982 however the government s political military and economic policies have renewed hopes in Guatemala and abroad that the cycle of violence and repression has been or soon may be broken Although contradictory signs Sep T- remain the regime of President Efrain Rios Monti has reduced at least temporarily indiscriminate re- pression and has taken initial steps to reduce political polarization Already a signi cant result of the new approaches has been the loss of momentum by the insurgents in their bid for power Nevertheless a coup attempt in June 1983 dissension in the military and the recent imposition of a state of alarm a milder version of a state of seige to counter mounting criticism of Rios Montt by conservative forces under- score the fragility of the present process toward moderate government- In the light of these developments this paper reviews the history and causes of Guatemala s political vio- lence It assesses the military political parties and the private sector in terms of their potential contribu- tion to moderate that is nonviolent reform- oriented leadership it identi es continuing obsta- cles to moderation and considers whether the pattern of violence and exclusiOn has been broken by the Rios Montt regime or might be broken over the near term one to two years Alternative political scenarios for the medium term three to ve years also are exam- med - The Roots of Violence and Polarization Instability insurgency and terrorism have found fer- tile ground in Guatemala's deep-seated social and economic inequities and the most rigid political struc- ture in Central America Exposure to modern culture has eroded the traditional lifestyles of politically passive social groups eSpecially the majority Indian population and resulted in rising aSpirations and increasing unwillingness to submit to continued injus- tices and oppression The ruling elites have viewed these new demands as a subversive challenge to the established order More often than not they have S ret Se let Guatemala Selected Socioeconomic Indicators Guatemala Average for Average for Central LDCs America Adult literacy l98l 46 71 43 percent Urbanization 1980 39 44 32 percent Life expccuncy at 39 63 SS birth 19800 10 Population average 3 0 2 8 2 4 annual grOWth rate I97 I -80 average annual percent Per capita income 1 080 1 060 890 l98l 5 Labor force in agricul- 55 44 S4 ture 1980 percent reacted with violence and repression thus contribut- ing to social alienation and acceptance of radical alternatives - Economic and Social Inequality Despite impressive economic growth rates averaging 5 to 6 percent annually over the past two decades life for most Guatemalans remains bleak In 981 according to an official Guatemalan estimate about 75 percent of the nation s families were living at or below the poverty line most of them in rural areas where two-thirds of the population lives Uneven distribution of wealth and primitive social services health education and welfare 4ompare unfavorably even by Central American standards- General Factors Several factors have helped to per- petuate Guatemala's rural-dominated society - the country s uneven distribution of wealth and above-average per capita income by LDC standards owe more to the large plantations located along the southern coast than to such newer sectors as manufacturing and mining Although Guatemala has Central America's largest industrial base this sector has not substantially im- proved the lot of the typical Guatemalan 371a The manufacturing sector is relatively capital intensive and oriented toward satisfying de- mand by wealthier Guatemalans and those elsewhere in the hobbled Central American Common Market As a result it has offered limited new employment in the cities and provided scant opportunity for the growth of an urban labor force - The Particular Plight of the Indians The vast major- ity of rural families predominantly Indian live in the highlands to the northwest and north of the capital Most work parcels of land are so poor in quality and so small that modern farm techniques generally cannot be used Dwindling land resources force several hundred thousand Indians every year to migrate to plantations along the southern coast where they take seasonal jobs The ruling elites have largely ignored these groups in the nation s economic and social development- Historically the isolation of the Indians was in part voluntary their cultural traditions and way of life seemed to render them impervious to Western in u- ence National authorities thus tended to assume that the fatalistic introspective nature of the Indians would make them impenetrable to radical subversion In recent decades however growing population pres- sures have weakened the traditional agricultural econ- omy of the Indian making it harder to eke out even a subsistence living At the same time growing expo- sure to modern culture through missionaries relief workers and other influences has undermined long- established Indian attitudes and behavioral patterns and provoked a strong desire especially among young Indians to enjoy the benefits of participation in the cash economlehe combination of rising aspirations and lack of economic opportunity has intensi ed the plight of the Indians further alienating many and making some susceptible to appeals by revolutionaries who stepped up their proselytizing in the highlands during the second half of the 19705 -_ Insurgent Exploirarim of Inequalities Guerrilla leaders have attempted for several years to take advantage of these cultural and economic changes among the Indians by promising that a revolutionary regime would bring about improvements that they could never attain under the present system The results of these attempts have been mixed Although reliable gures are unavailable there is ample evi- dence that one insurgent group the Guerrilla Army of the Poor has created a core of Indian militants and sympathizers In addition Indian activists participate in the Peasant Unity Committee a rural labor organi- zation af liated with the Guerrilla Army of the Poor These insurgent efforts to recruit Indians have been facilitated in the past by antigovernment sentiment provoked by the Army s brutal counterinsurgency tactics and abuses of civilians Nevertheless the same evidence suggests that most Indians have distrusted the guerrillas as much as they have distrusted the government and that the share of the indigenous rural population supporting the insurgents has re- mained small and geographically limited Meanwhile tight security measures and rightwing terrorism have effectively limited the opportunities for guerrilla Oper- ations and recruitment in urban areas - A Rigid Political System Guatemala s political structure itself also contributed to polarization it has inhibited presswes for social change and participation by groups claiming to repre- sent newly politicized constituencies such as peas- ants labor and the middle class The public record shows that since 1954 when a rightist coup ended a decade of social and economic reforms the nation has been ruled by elites who view the national government primarily as an instrument for maintaining social order providing minimal services and allowing the free market to run its course Politics has been devoted to keeping the lid on and preventing a return to power of reformers identi ed with the pre- 1954 reform era The political order that has evolved depends on an informal coalition of conservative military of cers wealthy businessmen and plantation owners and some middle class rightwing politicians They apparently share a tacit understanding that unpredictable and unmanageable political processes such as free elections and greater popular participa- tion are they Seyf t seem to be generally convinced that mobilization of labor and peasants must be prevented or at least strictly controlled - In pursuing this policy of political exclusion the ruling elites have used legal and extralegal means under the guise of democratic politics marked by periodic elections Our review of the open literature indicates that among other things the elites have - Killed the leaders of many independent or Opposi- ti0n organizations that could not be co-opted silenced or frightened into exile Manipulated procedural techniques in electoral and labor laws to deny or delay legal recognition of Opposition political parties and independent unions Subverted the integrity of the judicial system by government- and rightwing-sponsored use of death squads to murder and intimidate judges witnesses and defense lawyers- Within the elite structure interconnected and shifting subcoalitions are formed on particular issues Conse- quently a uni ed monolithic oligarchy has not emerged Indeed the public record shows that consid- erable antagonism and distrust exist among the elite groups - Although some prominent businessmen publicly have espoused the need for social and economic reforms this group and the landowning elite remain less inclined to accommodate change than the mili- tary whose members are recruited from broader elements of society and generally have less to lose nancially Military of cers consider unpatriotic the flow of capital out of the country from businessmen fearful of political instability Conservative politicians have resented the tendency of the armed forces to monopolize the presidency and its occasional use of electoral fraud to keep rightwing civilians out of power - 575 Se%et These potentially disruptive differences however have been dampened by the commonly perceived threat from the left Moreover elite unity has been reinforced by the predominant view that any efforts to improve the living conditions of the lower classes through social and economic reforms would not bear fruit if leftists whom the elites consider to be bent on subversion are allowed to participate in the political process - The Record of Repression Reform and Reaction 1944-63 Guatemala has a long history of fratricidal struggle Much of the Violence in recent decades stems from the revolution of 1944 which cast out the last in a line of traditional military dictators The historical literature on Guatemala shows that during his term in office 1945-51 President Juan Jose Arevalo sought to break the political and social paternalism of a plantation-based economy by enfranchising the Indi- ans promoting social and labor legislation and nur- turing industrialization and export-oriented agricul- ture Reformist policies and an expanded government role in the economy and society brought more diversi- ty new industrialists commercial farmers manag- ers and other businessmen into the private sector and awakened segments of the middle and lower classes to the realization that bene ts could be ob- tained through political action- Supporters of the old order strenuously resisted A'rcvalo's new policies and those of his more radical successor Col Jacobo Arbenz 1951-54 whose re- gime launched a whirlwind of structural changes including agrarian reform According to the public record when Communists became entrenched in the Arbenz government the old guar' overthrew it and reversed many of the wide- spread'reforms made during the previous decade The country then entered an intensely anti-Communist phase that grew increasingly violent over the years - Memories of the Arevalo-Arbenz period instilled in the military and the political right deep suspicions of any movement even to the left of center These suspicions have haunted the political scene since 1954 and successive regimes and their support- most elementary proposals for reform or steps toward modernization Nonetheless the decade of revolu- tion the conservative coup that ended it and subse- quent reactionary policies have left a sense of denied destiny among reformist and radical forces as well as remnants of nationalist resentment against the United States among younger members of the armed forces In November 1960 for example a group of idealistic young Army officers declared their Opposition to their government's c00peration with the United States in training Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion and began a guerrilla campaign that although much transformed and radicalized lasts to this day- Military Consolidation 1963-82 The two decades since 1963 have witnessed the consolidation of the armed forces as rulers of Guate- mala With the exception of one civilian president whose policies were subject explicitly to military veto all Guatemalan chief executives during this period were active-duty Army officers After 1970 the coun- try was ruled by a series of military presidents each of whom had served his predecessor as minister of defense - Going for Broke Several trends combined to augment the political power of the armed forces between 1963 and 1982 The Guatemalan military became profes- sionalized and reached new and higher levels of institutional loyalty as well as technical expertise As in most Latin American countries however conspicu- ously absent from newer professional attitudes was a dedication to the principle of civilian supremacy - While the armed forces were forging a sense of purpose and institutional solidarity and improving discipline and coordination civilian society was frag- menting The economic elite once a homogeneous knit group of plantation owners became in- creasingly complex and diverse as new manufacturers and businessmen from the service sectors injected their own views and pressed their own interests At the same time reemerging political awareness among the middle and lower segments of society undermined established patron-client relations by making these segments even less responsive to the will of the ers often applied the to the Seyfet economic elite Moreover cultural and racial differ- ences between Indians and non-Indians made united political action by middle and lower class groups dif cult to achieve - As the traditional civilian structures and institutions lost their effectiveness the military took steps to ensure that no new ones were created to counter its growing power Nascent political organizations that attracted the support of intellectuals labor leaders young professionals and other reform-minded indi- viduals were either barred from the ballot or intimi- dated by repression Formal steps and extralegal actions restricted and discouraged the establishment of political and labor organizations According to the public record hundreds of political activists Christian and Social Democrats not involved in armed activities against the regime were persecuted or murdered Moreover _the climate of terror was such especially after the June 1980 seizure and murder by rightists of the entire leadership of a labor confederation that union members feared to assemble openly - Somewhat ironically the appearance of an insurgency problem reinforced the role of the armed forces in society The military reacted to the mounting guerril- la threat by opening a strong counterinsurgency cam- paign As the Army extended its presence to isolated guerrilla-infested areas it could justify command of more national resources and foreign military assist- ance As a result the armed forces became the fastest growing element in an otherwise small public sector In addition the military was rede ning its mission expanding guerrilla warfare courses and emphasizing such sociOpolitical activities as civic action and psy- chological operations- Overplaying the Hand The string of military govern- ments that ruled Guatemala during this period not only failed to create the conditions for long-term political stability but progressively undermined the existing power structure through the increased use of repression and inability or unwillingness to distinguish between moderate leftists and radical revolutionaries As the military consolidated its already dominant position in national politics it often turned its coun- terinsurgency tactics on real and suspected political rivals By 1981 there was little public support for the continuation of a progressively brutal system'- Sej t Although previous governments had sponsored or approved extralegal activities the level of of cial and of cially condoned violence reached unprecedented proportions during the presidency of Gen Romeo Lucas Garcia 1978-82 between 400 and 500 people were killed in politically related violence during January-March 1982 _three out of four politically related deaths during Lucas's tenure were attributable to the govern- ment's security services and rightwing death squads The public record shows that under Lucas security needs were seen as requiring the use_of brute force and government efforts to curtail leftist terrorism served to perpetuate the vengeful cycle Virtually all sectors of the population participated in and were victimized by-mpolitical violence Business and con- servative political party leaders were targets of leftist kidnapers and terrorists In turn they nanced rightwing death squads Many labor and left-of- center political party activists as well as students teachers priests and others who survived went un- derground and joined Marxist guerrilla terrorist groups or their front organizations Indian villagers terrorized by the Army s brutal counterinsurgency sweeps collaborated with the insurgents Military police and civilian officials were frequent targets of leftist violence in retaliation for governmental acts of brutality - Moreover the government s inability or unwillingness to distinguish between legitimate political activists and radical revolutionaries reached new levels under Lucas #et ifslimnl in ill a- In i- z Jan 1981 I Apr May I980 JToul number of deaths due 0 political violence including probable ponrble and cum squad figures L'd is 2 555 I I 31 34 r Hr 1 '6 1'23'1 a affirm - '1 an WA 3 1 km 311% than I Lit b ill at Ii - itiAfa nu - h'g'rb phg 1 35 15 my Sit- x if Fa- 1 tan - a 1 3 Moreover the systematic elimination of moderate leftist and centrist leaders created a leadership void that facilitated the clandestine pene- tration-or co optation of many moderate organizations by the radicals in the insurgent movement m Still Marxist guerrillas did not represent a credible threat to the government until the last years of Lucas's ultraviolent administration We estimate that their numbers more than tripled between 19 79 and 1982 from several hundred to approximately 3 000 full-time armed combatants They controlled large areas of the heavily populated Western Highlands had extended their ope the other hand the unity of the conservative forces which had provided a common front against the left and allowed for some continuity and short- term stability had begun to crumble by 1981 After two decades of robust economic growth the private sector was hit by a severe recession induced largely by low world commodity prices the persistent domestic insurgency and a poor human rights record that made foreign financing increasingly hard to obtain- Jifiw F E gamma press reports some plantation owners had begun to pay war taxes to the guerrillas in order to protect their properties Similarly the large and well- organized ultrarightist National Liberation Move- ment which actively collaborated with the regime in the killing of reform-minded moderates at the same time plotted against military control Moreover disaf- fection had developed within the officer corps itself Over the military government s handling of the insur- gency and the economy the country s international isolation and the economic privileges enjoyed by the military high command Rios Montt Takes Charge increasingly concerned about these trends 3 group of Guatemalan Army junior officers on 23 March 1982 toppled the Lucas regime and installed a military junta headed by retired Gen Efrain Rios Montt A highly regarded former Armed Forces Chief of Staff with a reformist reputation in military circles Rios Montt had been victimized by massive electoral fraud in 1974 when he ran as a presidential candidate for the moderately reformist Christian Democratic Party After a few weeks of confusion and hesitation the junta set out to pacify the country by reversing the insurgents momentum improving Guatemala s human rights record and international image and politically integrating previously excluded sectors - such as peasants Indians and urban workers into the social and political Counterinsurgency Successes Rios Montt s primary goal since he assumed of ce has been to bring the insurgency under control For that purpose his government has shifted to a counter- insurgency strategy that emphasizes gaining support of the impoverished peasant mostly indian pOpula- tion in the contested areas particularly in the high- lands The regime has employed innovative measures that have yielded political military and bene ts in the These measures include - Replacing less effective large anti-insurgency andbroaderh an deployment of small military units in order to increase the Army's presence in remote areas where government authority was Sporadic or nonexistent Organizing civilian militia forces about 350 000 nationwide so far to saturate insurgent areas with prOgovernment units and give the local population a sense of participation in self-defense on the side of the armed forces Emphasizing Operations such as am- nesty programs and military civic action to provide food health care and equipment to build houses roads schools and other infrastructurew over the past year the government has reversed the momentum of insur- gent gains setting them back both politically and militarily Fighting and government amnesty pro- grams have reduced insurgent numbers from about 3 000 to a force estimated at 2 000 to 2 500 full-time armed combatants The Army has reestablished au- thority Over most of the p0pulation and territory formerly under insurgent control and it has gained the support of a substantial number of indians who previously provided the guerrillas with food intelli- gence and recruits Consequently insurgent attacks and guerrilla-Army clashes have decreased considera- bly in both frequency and number frOm the levels attained during the last year of Lucas s regimem Human Rights Improvements Reporting from media and independent observer accounts indicate that human rights violations by the Guatemalan Government widespread and chronic under former President Lucas have decreased substantially to the point where discriminate violence that is targeting guerril- las has largely replaced indiscriminate slaughter since Rios Montt came to power This change has been accompanied by a slow improvement in the country s international image Although we lack the evidence needed to con rm or refute many speci c charges of human rights viola- tions The Army used extreme violence against guerrilla- controlled villages during last year s counterinsur- gency offensive The security forces have detained some students professors and others suspected of having ties to the insurgents they have been held for long periods of time without charges and a few apparently have disappeared - The establishment of special secret tribunals in- tended to bypass the regular courts has come under strong criticism at home and abroad for violating due process On the whole however after a review of all available information we judge that the climate of fear the wideSpread indiscriminate violence and more im- portant the hostile relationship between the peasants and the Army characteristic of previous Guatemalan regimes have substantially diminished Recent travels by foreign journalists in the Western Highlands where most of the latest ghting has taken place have provided rsthand observation of human rights improvements in the Several thousand Indians in guerrilla-controlled terri- tory who formerly collaborated with the insurgents for example have sought refuge with the Army after being displaced by last year's intense ghting Rather than seek retribution against insurgent collaborators Sofia Major Political Actors The Military Under Rios Monti the military establishment has expanded its power even further relative to other competing political actors Members ofthe armedforces are highly nationalistic They regard themselves as the guardians ofthe nation above and beyond politics Nonetheless the Army is a divided institution Personal ambitions and rivalries play a major part butfactionalism in the armed forces in Our view also mirrors the social political and economic antagonism of Guatemalan society Most of cers come from middle class or humble origins and resent the venality of the econom ic elite Other of cers mostly at the senior level and with strong ties to wealthy families and rightwing politicians emphasize anti Communist themes and the need to restore discipline and order to Guatema- la - The Private Sector Guatemala '5 economic elite industrialists retailers nanciers and the country's sec ond most important political group Its members exert considerable in uence through their economic and nancial power - Although it has undergone considerable diversifica- tion in the last three decades the private sector as was common practice in the past the military has fed them provided medical services housing and clothing and plans to resettle them in their home villages whenever possible - - - 5 74 predominantly adheres to a conservative economic and social philosophy akin to pure laisse faire capitalism This philosophy clashes with a key com- ponent ofthe current government 's counterinsurgency strategy which calls for increased public spending in the impoverished highlands in order to increase the loyalty ofthe peasants and integrate the Indians into the national mainstream Indeed in our view the private sector currently paying taxes at one ofthe lowest rates in Latin America would have to submit to unprecedented levels of taxation ifRios Montt were to sustain the momentum against the extreme left and nance programs to redress the country's social and economic ills The public debate over the proposed value-added tax illustrates the vast gap between the conservative business community and the government over the pace and substance of social reform policies -' The Political Parties Recently established and not deeply rooted in society Guatemalan political organizations are for the most part persortalistic groups without well-defined ideolo- gies or programs They lack a tradition of addressing issues formulating policy or sustaining contact with a constituency Expediency and the scramblefor' government positions have often dictated last-minute political realignments and discredited most party leaders The three oldest groups the ultrarightist National Liberation Movement and the centrist Christian Democratic and Revolutionaryl arties remain the only ones with any significant grassroots support Left of-center parties were relentlessly perse- cuted during previous regimes and their leaders were assassinated or driven into exile The National Liber- ation Movement which has been responsible for much of the violence is generally considered the The Rios Montt government also has curbed drasti- cally the activities of quasi-of cial rightwing death wealthiest and best organized party and the one that would most bene tfrom early elections Although about 20 new groups haveformed recently in response to Rios Mantt 's political reforms these edgling parties will need time and government support to develop organizational nancial and leadership re- sources to challenge successfully the power ofthe more established and predominately conservative groups - Other Groups The Catholic Church lost its secular power in Guate- mala as a result ofthe liberal anticlerical reforms of the mid 19th century In recent years however the Church has found itself in an increasingly adversarial role vis-a vis the government in reaction to of cial repression against militant priests and lay missionar- ies working with Indians in areas of insurgent activi- ty Moreover Church criticism ofthe present regime has mounted as Church officials concerned about Protestant inroads among the population grow in- creasing suspicious of Rios Monti 's outspoken evangelical Protestantism Labor and peasant groups have not exerted signifi- cant political in uence since the l954 overthrow of the Arbenz regime Private-sector hostility and gov- ernment repressioa have prevented the development of viable labor and peasant movements only about 10 percent of the labor force is organized into unions Recent government overtures to labor indicate that Rios Monti is more forthcoming than previous leaders in addressing union demands In our opinion however these orga- nizations will nd it dif cult to prosper in a social setting that remains predominantly conservative un less they receive substantial of cial support - squads which under previous regimes Operated in the capital and other major towns with impunity Accord- ing to press reports Several hundred policemen the backbone of the rightist hit squads in the past have been discharged or turned over to the secret tribunals in recent months Sjlret Se et Broadening Political Participation In March 1983 the Rios Montt government began a long-term program of political reforms designed to lead ultimately to a restoration of constitutional rule under military tutelage The reforms are intended to stimulate the participation in the electoral process of moderate leftist parties and new organizations repre- senting previously excluded social groups At the same time the changes are aimed at reducing the power of traditionally predominant rightist political parties Rios Montt has been reluctant to set an electoral timetable strongly suggesting that elections remain a low priority for him and that he intends to complete the full four-year term that he was denied by electoral fraud in 1974 The President has said on several occasions that he does not intend to run for of ce in the elections probably to be held in late 1985 or early 1986 and we believe he has no plans to remain in power beyond them He has not made any efforts to organize a personal political power base We believe however that he wants to buy time to allow new political groups to organize and draw away support from the established rightist parties Nevertheless mounting calls for early elections by conservative politicians the business sector and the Catholic Church were echoed recently by many Army officers weary of protracted military involvement in formally running the government These pressures have forced Rios Montt to agree tentatively to a timetable for constituent assembly elections in July 1984 Presidential elections are expected to follow but no date has yet been announced Promising Initial Results The reforms have pro voked a flurry of political activity Signi cantly the substantial lowering of the number of supporters required to form a political party already has caused some of the large established parties to divide and has prompted the formation of several new political orga- nizations as many as 30 groups may try to set up parties The ultraright- wing National Liberation MOvement whose eife nsiit Se ret The New Laws Governing Political Activity The political reforms of Rios Monti are embodied in three decrees issued on 23 March l983 the first anniversary ofthe young of cers' coup in an effort to broaden participation encourage new groups to orga- nize and draw away support from existing parties a law governing the registration ofpolitical parties reduced the number of signatures requiredfrom 50 000 to 4 000 This law also requires that the parties have vt'able political organizations in at least 12 of Guatemala '3 22 departments This measure would give greater representation to rural areas in the party system and by the same token make the parties more representative of the nation as a whole one of Rios Montt's major goals A future decree will make voting obligatory for illiterate and literate citizens alike further ensuring the participation aflower class groups in the political process- Another law calledfor the establishment ofan auton- omous Supreme Electoral Tribunal to run the elec- toral process This Tribunal was inaugurated on I July 1983 and its members were selected by the Supreme Court from a list of 20 candidates submit- ted by a committee composed of university and law school representatives The involvement of university personnel often associated with the left adds to the Tribunal 's credibility as an independent actor- A third law governs the registration of all voting-age citizens a process that reportedly would take approx- imately a year to complete and is cited by of cials as the reason for prolonging the elections timetable The government correctly points out that insurgent forces have destroyed registration lists in many localities Moreover Rios Mont apparently believes that exist- ing lists are fraudulent financial and organizational resources we believe would make it the winner in early elections has protested the government's delayed electoral timeta- bid - 10 acme-r 5 9 a ll The government has reiterated that all groups includ- ing the Communist Party are free to participate in the electoral process the first such offer by a Guate- malan government since 1954 The government is giving ample signs of its sincerity It is trying for example to woo Social Democrats and ether moderate leftists away from guerrilla front there are some tenta- tive signs that exiled Social Democratic leaders are folloMng the Guatemalan situation closely are con- sidering electoral alliances and may return to Guate- mala if they obtain guarantees of personal safety We believe such guarantees are likely to be offered Retaining Military Control To enhance the legiti- macy of the political Opening and to reduce suspicions about military intentions Rios Montt and leading military officers have claimed publicly at various times that the armed forces will not Sponsor a govern- ment party lotwithstanding the public claims of impartiality however a strong undercurrent of con- cern about liberalization apparently exists within the armed forces Gen Rios Morin fcenler with We v r t high ranking Army of cers Concerns about this threat apparently played a major part in a recent government decision to increase the number of military zones thereby facilitating the Army s control over political activity natiOnwide a number of military of cers close to Rios Montt apparently are deter- mined to maintain effective military management of the political system for the next eight to 10 years regardless of the outcome of presidential elections or the type of constitutional reforms arising from the current liberalization The Period Before Elections Rios Monti will have to overcome formidable obsta- cles in the months ahead In our view opposition activities by both conservative and leftis hardliners will grow as the insurgents regroup political and Se ret I Se ret labor union aetivity picks up and the economy contin- ues to slide These problems could spur popular unrest weaken Rios Montt's support in the military and possibly lead to a coup and the return of indis- criminate violence and repression - Tbe Pivotal Role of Rios Moutt Despite the coming challenges we believe the present trend toward more moderate government in Guate- mala is likely to continue during the next One to two years provided Rios Montt remains in power The adoption of a more enlightened counterinsurgency strategy the efforts to broaden pepular participation in the political system and the tangible improvements in human rights demonstrate a signi cant personal commitment by Rios Montt to civilize Guatemala Overall we judge that Rios Montt has an even chance to remain in power for the next one to two years His authority rests with the military and we believe he will retain the support of the armed forces as long as the military progress against the insurgents is sus- tained and the movement toward elections is main- tained Rios Montt s counterinsurgency strategy has raised the Army's morale and most of cers appear to recognize at least for the time being the vital link between popular support and the defeat of the insur- gents Moreover the President has been able to isolate many of his conservative opponents in the military through frequent command rotations and reassign- ments _ The coup attempt in June 1983 and continued dissen sion within the armed forces make it plain that the equally likely outcomev Rios Montt's overthrow is an ever-present risk Most established political forces the private sector rightist politicians and the Catholic Church have stepped up their criticism of the President and his policies in order to weaken his support in the military and provoke his overthrow Rios Montt s replacement by coup or assassination in our view would lead to a power struggle in the military hierarchy and a more rightist leadership and would probably entail the abandonment of moderate progra ms - #ret Constraints on Reform The Military the military remains a divided institution Moreover the Army's newfound commitment to moderation in our opinion may be temporary and easily abandoned in favor of more repressive policies if circumstances dictate Available information gives us little feel for what kinds of debates occur within the councils of the armed forces or for the breakdown of hardline as against moderate opinion We believe nevertheless that reformist sentiment in the military is neither strong nor 50phisticated and could be neutralized by the political and pressures of maintain- ing law and order - Because the armed forces remain largely above the law they will remain a complicating factor in Rios Montt's ability to implement reform Rios Montt does not yet have the power to carry out his commitment to respect human rights when the armed forces are implicated - he Economy We expect the Guatemalan economy to decline about 4 percent this year and perhaps stabi- lize at this lower level of activity in 1984 The foreign exchange shortage is likely to persist as a major economic constraint particularly in the critical import-dependent manufacturing and commercial ag- ricultural sectors We foresee little improvement in export earnings and judge that a new IMF accord currently under negotiation would not attract suf - cient foreign funds to revitalize the economy any time soon Sharp cuts in public expenditures already are jeopardizing the government's ability to carry out promised economic development programs and social services in the Western Highlands a vital part of Rios Montt s counterinsurgency strategy and econom- ic policy Economic contraction also will increase an already high unemployment rate and could hinder 12 Sy t Coup Plotting Against Rios Monti in June 1983 Rios Mani barely survived a plot by disgruntled military officers including most major unit commanders to remove him The attempted coup was a vivid example of the type of recurring challenges facing Rios ontt in the months ahead and it underscored thefragility ofthe present process toward more moderate government in Guatemala It was of the underlying political social and economic problems inherited from previous regimes such as military divisiveness a deteriorating economy an active insurgency and the retention of considerable political power by ultra- conservative elites- The incident however also demonstrated that Rios Monti benefitsfrom severalfactors The absence of a military or civilian candidate acceptable to a wide spectrum of the armed forces to replace him - The concern among many officers that another coup could prompt a series of government turnovers that would hurt the Army's capacity to defeat the insurgents and delay a return to constitutional government The existence of important support for Rios Monti in the of cer corps and fears that a move against him would irreparably damage the military institution 0 The President's political acumen and exibility particularly his ability to adopt either hardline or conciliatory pastures and make temporary conces- sions to his opponents I Although Rios Monti was able to overcome the most recent challenge he will have to deal with other political problems in the near term that are more fundamental 0 A portion of the military motivated by purely personal ambitions will continue to plot against him Civilian critics in the business sector conservative political parties and the Catholic Church al- though temporarily quieted by the state of alarm and press censorship imposed in une will renew their opposition activities inveterate civilian plotters like ultrarightwing lead- er Leonel Sisniega will try to take advantage ofthe military unrest by agitating among discontented officers We believe that a successful coalescence of opposition forces resulting in Rios Montt's overthrow would quickly revert Guatemala to rightwing rule and prob- ably lead to a return of indiscriminate violence and repression Rios Monti probably would be replaced by a caretaker military government that would at- tempt to legitimize its rule by calling for early elections a principal demand of all powerful conservativeforces The ultrart ghtwing National Lib- eration Movement the best organized and nanced political party in Guatemala would be the likely winner in early elections Moderate political organi- zations in our opinion remain too weak and frag- mented to pose a credible challenge to the conserva- tive groups even in the absence of such traditional rightwing methods as elding deathsquads and elec- toralfrauci' Government by the National Liberation Movement would almost certainly eliminate any possibility of reforms aggravate the social problems that spurred in the past Indian support for the insurgents and drive many remaining moderate forces to cooperate with the extreme left l3 57 ret Se fret government efforts to relieve socioeconomic pressures that have caused the alienation and radicalization of many Indians Moreover a spirit of cooperation be- tween the government and local businessmen crucial for suStained economic recovery probably will be even more dif cult to instill than previously - The private sector although composed of different groups with diverse interests is predominantly conservative and Opposed to social reforms Rios Montt s reformist reputation and socialistic rhetoric irritates many leaders of the private sector who regard the President as a Communist The govern- ment s announcement earlier this year of a new value- added tax which consolidates a number of existing taxes without signi cantly raising them has been so vigorously opposed by businessmen that implementa- tion has been delayed until August 1983 Such differ- ences are likely to continue and make economic policymaking and any reform efforts increasingly contentious - The Left and Right Extremes In our estimate the remaining guerrillas remain a potent force with the capacity for hit-and-run raids economic sabotage and urban terrorism Although they are unlikely to pose a serious challenge to the stability of the govern- ment in the next year or so they are just as unlikely to be eradicated Rios Montt's effort to weaken the other end of the political Spectrum-Abe extreme right is likely to have some success in the short term but these established elements will retain substantial retaliatory power For example their nancial and organization- al advantages give them the wherewithal to resume their long-practiced political habits particularly the elding of assassins and otherwise disrupting new organizations representing peasants Indians or urban strict workers Rightwing politicians also are likely to esca- late their personal attacks on the President by for example seizing the issue of Rios Montt s outspoken evangelical Protestantism to inflame religious su5pi- cions amOng the majority Catholic pOpulation - Rightist efforts to discredit the President and provoke his replacement by the Army recently led to the imposition of a state of alarm We believe that rightwing attempts to undermine the government probably will intensify in coming months and may have a debilitating effect Upon the armed forces willingness to support the President and his reformist policies Regiana Turmoil A deteriorating security situation in Central America almost certainly would have a major negative impact on moderate politics in Guate- A radical leftist victory in El Salvador probably would provide the Guatemalan guerrillas with unimpeded use of Salvadoran territory for safe- haven and staging attacks We believe that Cuba and Nicaragua would be emboldened by a radical success in El Salvador and would move quickly to use that country as a major base to supply arms and other assistance to the Guatemalan insurgents Such cir- cumstances probably would strengthen the in uence of conservative hardliners in the military and prompt moderate policies to be abandoned altogether ' l4 33 - vr Sef et revolt but probably would be put down by prepon After Rios Montt der ant law-and-order forces in the Army The guer- we believe that in light of Guatemala s political rillas would probably make inroads among frustrat- i social and ec0nomic problems and Rios Montt's ed moderate leftist groups In this scenario the pivotal role the present trend toward more moderate regime increasingly would resort to repression government probably will not be sustained beyond the Promised elections are canceled after a conservative presidential elections In our view any successor regime is likely to experience instability at least military group assumes control ZS-percent proba- through the mid-19805 Extreme ethnic and class bility This scenario could be precipitated by a if differentiation and sharp socioeconomic disparities in successful rightwing coup against a likely reformist ii our opinion will continue to inhibit the deveIOpment victory in the elections by serious military setbacks of political tolerance and compromise key elements at the hands of the Guatemalan guerrillas or by an ll of democracy These obstacles are unlikely to disap insurgent victory in El Salvador The last of these i pear short of an unexpected violent social upheaval would be quickly followed by Cuban and Nicara- whose consequences cannot be foreseen Thus Guate- guan expansion of assistance to the radical left 3 malan society is not likely to develop a stable insurgency in Guatemala A sieg e mentality almost it democratic-pluralist system similar to that in Costa certainly would set in and indiscriminate repression if Rica for example any time soon - probably would ensue A purge of reformist ele- ments in the military could then be carried out The 25 Assuming that Rios Montt retains power through activity of the guerrillas would increase and their mid-1985 we offer the following broad political sce- ranks would swell in reaction to the Army s counter- narios through 1988 in the order of their probability insurgency offensives against real and suspected Communist sympathizers Fighting between the - Elections are held in 1985 a reformist left-of- Army and better trained and armed insurgent forces center government is elected Rios Monti steps bene ting from increased Cuban and Nicaraguan down 45-percent probability Such a regime would assistance would become heavy and widespread be highly unstable and could be quickly toppled if it This scenario could lead quickly to a full-scale civil tries to push through major reforms Efforts to war and improved prospects for a guerrilla victory implement social and economic reforms would be - strenuously resisted probably successfully by strong conservative forces within and outside the military while labor and peasant groups formed Implications for the United States during Rios Montt's tenure and now the govern- ment's main constituency would press their de- mands for redistribution of wealth and power As in previous periods of social unrest rightist death- squad activities against left-of-center groups proba- bly would resume The United States can expect continuing dif culties in trying to exert a moderating or stabilizing in uence over political events in Guatemala 2 We believe internal dynamics however will continue to weigh Elections are held and a conservative government is elected Rios Mont steps down 30-percertt prob- ability The new government might try to reverse more heavily than foreign in uence In determining some of the reform programs enacted during Rios the government s counterinsurgency strategy and the Montt s tenure It almost certainly would fail to political '2 satisfy growing demands from peasant and labor groups for reforms favored by the Rios Montt government A reformist military clique could 15 S ret Se ret The military's strong nationalist tradition probably will lead it as in the past to reject US assistance conditioned on human rights performance or any other requirements that it perceives to infringe on Guatemalan sovereignty We believe that recent counterinsurgency successes which were accom plished without US assistance and continuing inter- national condemnation despite Rios Montt s effort to reduce human rights abuses have strengthened the go it alone attitude within the of cer corps - vany of cers apparently regard the United States as an unreliable ally and in our Opinion may support a nonaligned foreign policy orientation less identi ed with US regional and global positions than in the past These of cers point to the struggle in El Salvador and to what they perceive as the loss of control by Salvador ans over their own affairs as the outcome of too close an association with the United States Se ret 16 Appendix Guatemalan Chronology - 122' 1944 1 July Gen Jorge Ubico the last in a line of traditional military dictators is forced to re- sign from the presidency and turns over power to a provisional president l 5 r I 51 22 October A junta led by Maj Francisco Arana and Capt Jacobo Arbenz takes power and calls for free elections December Juan Jose Arevalo a well-known university professor who had symbolized resistance to the old order is elected President 1946 October The Guatemalan Congress approves the nation s rst social security law 1947 June A labor code is enacted giving unionized urban workers protection against arbitrary dismissal and recognizing their right to strike 1949 18 July Col Francisco Arana former junta member and conservative opponent of Arevalo's reformist policies is assassinated by unknown assailants 1950 13 November Col Jacobo Arbenz is elected President with 65 percent of the votes cast 1952 27 June A land reform law is promulgated that empowers the government to expropriate uncultivated portions of large plantations 1954 May A shipment of Czechoslovak arms with which Arbenz planned to arm a peasants and workers' militia as a counterweight to the regular Army is seized at the docks by the military 27 June President Arbenz resigns from office after a US-supported invasion force led by rebel Col Carlos Castillo'Armas is unopposed by the Army 1 7 Se%et Se#et 1957 1958 1960 1962 1963 1966 1968 July are disenfranchised the labor code is revised unions are disbanded and the agrarian reform law is revoked by the Castillo Armas regime 27 July President Castillo Armas is gunned down by a young military guard 19 January Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes a former Army General who had served as Ubico s Minister of Communications is elected President 13 November - A large group of young Army officers angered by their government s c00peration with the United States in the training of Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion stages an unsuccessful revolt and some flee to the mountains February Several former military of cers who participated in the failed young of cers rebellion in 1960 begin guerrilla warfare operations in eastern Guatemala 29 March Former President Arevalo returns to Guatemala surreptitiously after being invited by President Ydigoras deSpitc the Army's opposition to run in the coming elections 30 March A military coup led by Defense Minister Col Enrique Peralta Azurdia overthrows Ydigoras and establishes a military junta that abolishes Congress and the Constitution and rules the country during the next three years 6 March Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro the civilian candidate of the centrist Revolution- ary Party is elected President but can assume of ce only after giving the armed forces a free hand over military and security affairs including the conduct of the counterinsurgency war and the naming of the defense minister October The armed forces begin an intensive counterinsurgency campaign aided by rightwing terrorist groups and assassination squads August US Ambassador John Gordon Mein is killed during a botched kidnap attempt by leftist terrorists 18 1970 March Col Carlos Arana Osorio former commander of counterinsurgency operations in eastern Guatemala is elected President with the support of the Army and conservative civilians November The government declares a state of siege until November 1971 and begins a wave of official terror in reSponse to stepped-up urban guerrilla activity by leftist forces 33 t' Stiff-'3 1972 September All l7 members of the Communist Party s executive committee are kidnaped and murdered by rightwing death squads 4t - 1 2r 1974 March Gen Efrain Rios Montt the opposition candidate on the Christian Democratic ticket wins the elections but the government imposes the official candidate Defense Minister Gen Kjell Laugerud demonstrators protest the fraud Rios Montt is sent as military attache to Madrid l is 9 ant 1975 12 December The newly formed Guerrilla Army of the Poor begins operations with the assassination of rightist congressman Jorge Bernal Hernandez a former security adviser to President Arana thought to have been responsible for the disappearance of many leftists in the early 19705 1976 4 February A violent earthquake strikes the capital and other areas of the country causing ex- tensive physical damage and killing about 25 000 people 1977 March Guatemala unilaterally renounces its military assistance agreements with the United States in reaction to Washington s linkage of aid to human rights conditions 1978 March The Defense Minister Gen Romeo Lucas Garcia is elected President amid widespread voter apathy 29 May Army troops in support of local landowners massacre more than 100 Indian peasants including women and children in the town of Panzos October Public protests and a general strike force the government to rescind a 100 percent increase in bus fares in Guatemala City several union leaders are murdered by rightists and the police storm striker-held buildings arresting 400 19 575 1979 1980 1981 #et 25 January Social Democratic Party leader Alberto Fuentes Mohr is assassinated by a rightwing hit-squad 22 March Moderate leftist leader Manuel Colom Argueta is gunned down on 3 Guatemala City street 10 June Leftist terrorists assassinate Gen David Cancinos Barrios the Army Chief of Staff in retaliation for the murders of Fuentes and Colom September A new leftist guerrilla group the Organization of the People in Arms begins operations 31 January Thirty-eight peeple are killed when the police storm the Spanish Embassy which had been occupied by a group of Indians protesting against repression and the seizure of their lands Spain breaks diplomatic relations 21 June The entire 27-person executive committee of a labor confederation is kidnaped and murdered by rightists October Between 200 and 300 guerrillas occupy Solola a city of 25 000 while other insurgent units carry out bombing attacks on two other departmental capitals 20 1982 7 March Despite wideSpread claims of electoral fraud President Lucas's Defense Minister Gen Anibal Guevara is declared the winner in the presidential elections 23 March A coup by young Army officers overthrows President Lucas recent election results are canceled and a three-man junta led by Gen Rios Montt takes power 9 June Rios Montt removes the other two junta members and assumes the presidency and command of the armed forces 1 July The government declares a stage of siege as the Army prepares for the largest counterinsurgency campaign since Rios Montt took power - I983 23 March The government lifts the state of siege and promulgates three laws designed to lead to a restoration of constitutional rule 29 June The government imposes a state of alarm after an apparent rightwing coup attempt and Rios Montt under pressure from Army junior of cersw agrees to set an electoral timetable and dismiss several close advisers 21 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu