I d D ECL-4 SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unclassified J Declassified Holdings of the National Archives AuthoritY 23 Pg W'P SECRi T------_ _ - f CM-1407-64 5 June 1964 I I I LEMORANDUM FOR General LeMay V heeler Admir al McDonald General Greene Gener l Subject Review of the SlOP Guidance U I I 1 As a follow-up action of the meetings of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Director Strategic iTarget Planning at Omaha 22-23 October 1963 I requested the IDirector Joint Staff to undertake a review of the guidance for SIOP-64 as an initial study in the development of guidance for SIOP-65 This initial study Enclosure hereto has now been completed 2 After reviewing the enclosure I have questions in Ply mind with regard to the following I a The validity of that portion of the answer at the top of page 9 which states TIThe prirnaryconcern should continue to be directed toward destroying or neutralizing the enemy I s military capabilities in order to minimize damage to the US and our allies The secondary concern should be to extend the attack to include the enemy I s urbani industrial system as required b The conclusion on pages 12 and 15 which indicates that the priority for the allocation of force when US forces are alerted or pre-empt should continue to remain on military targets Can this conclusion be substantiated or is it in consonance with the JSCP-65 military objectives for general war indicated onpage4 c Does the Joint War Garnes Agency's Report of the SIOP-64 War Game s lbstantiate the need for attacking the fifty Chinese cities discussed on page 15 ' 1 - lt DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unc lassified Declassified Holdings of the National Archives Authority 2 3P51 TOPSEG d Should SIOP-64 be revised subject to review of the weight of effort redistribution analyses to be submitted in accordance with SM-349-64 to provide a greater weight of effort against urban industrial targets 3 I would appreciate receiving your views on the substance of the Enclosure 0 v MAXWELL D TAYLOR Chairman J oint Chiefs of Staff 2 DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the UnGlassjfied Declassified Holdings of the National Archives AuthoritY 23 51 ENCLOSURE A REy J EW OF THE GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF SIOP 64 u THE PROBtEI i To review the guidance for SIop-64 as an initial study iln the development of the guidance for the next SlOP 1 2 DISCUSSION I 2 General 3 a As an initial step in the development of the guidance 4 for the next SlOP the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff re- 5 quested that the guidance for the preparation of SIop-64 be 6 reviewed giving attention to certain specific points 7 The points raised by the Chairman in his memorandum are con- 8 tained in Appendix A hereto 9 b Guidance for the preparation of SlOP is contained in Annex C to JSCP The objectives concept and definition 10 11 of the job to be accomplished are derived from the basic JSCP 12 document Guidance for the current SlOP was prepared in con- 13 formance with JSCP-64 Since JSCp-65 has recently been 14 approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this review should 15 give due consideration to the conformity of the instructions 16 with the content of this new JSCP 17 c The formulation of the SlOP can be divided into three parts 18 19 1 Guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 2 Preparation of the plan by JSTPS 21 3 Approval of the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 22 The degree to which the ultimate plan is responsive to 23 the objectives stated in JSCP is determinant upon the inter- 24 action of all three parts 25 The acceptability to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a SlOP submitted for approval is dependent 26 to a considerable extent upon both the adequacy of the 1 Enclosure A 27 DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unc lassified Declassified Holdings of the National Archives AuthoritY 23 Pg i g1 i1gance in expressing the views of the Joint Chiefs of i ' ' StAff and the degree to which the guidance can be and has 1 2 - Specific changes to the resultant SIOP 3 in terms of application of forces to meet the specific 4 requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is logically a 5 function of the review associated with the approval 6 process 7 o been followed I The review presented herein is restricted to consideration of the adequacy of the SlOP guidance 8 Concurrent actions directed toward improvement of 9 SIop-64 within the terms of the existing guidance 10 will not be addressed in this review 11 d Since guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the 12 first step in the sequence of preparation of a SIOP due 13 consideration should be given to the fundamental part 14 which this guidance plays in order to place it in proper 15 perspective 16 The SlOP is a capabilities plan and thus the results attainable are a function of the forces available their emplo31nent and the current threat 17 All 18 of these factors are subject to change over a relatively 19 short period of time 20 For this reason the guidance must be sufficiently broad and flexible to be compatible with 21 the dynamic character of these factors 22 For example guidance for the preparation of Slop-64 was prepared on 23 the basis of higher missile reliabilities than those 24 which ultimately were promulgated and used in the plan 25 Thus had the guidance been more specific it may not have 26 been possibie to satisfy entirely the requirements within 27 the reduced capability of the force 28 e The significant elements of the SIOP guidance are t e objectives concept definition of the job to be done 29 30 of a target list the division of this target 31 list into separate tasks and target categories target 32 in't r ms TOF SECRET 2 Enclosure A DECL SIFIED Reproduced from the Unqlassified Declassified Holdings of the National Archives Authoritj 2 30 g pk orities withL and between tasks required target 1 de ructiQn by categories and broad flexibility of 2 impfementation in terms of options and withholding require- 3 i ments Analysis pertaining to each of these significant 4 elements is provided herein in the order in which they 5 appear in the current guidance document 6 Each question posed by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff is addressed 7 at the end of the major paragraph to which the particular 8 question appropriately applies 9 10 OBJECTIVES ' 1n 3 The first of the significant elements to be considered i - the review of SlOP guidance is the objectives 11 12 a The military objectives of the United States for the 13 employment of US nuclear offensive forces in a major 14 strategiC attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc contained 15 in the guidance for SIop-64 are quoted as follows 16 United States plans for nuclear offensiVe operations 17 in the event of general war will be designed to achieve 18 in concert with other US and Allied offensive and defensive 19 operations the objectives listed below 20 a Destruction or neutralization of the military 21 capabilities of the enemy while retaining ready 22 survivable effective and controlled US strategic 23 capabilities adequate to assure to the maximum 24 'extent pOSSible retention of US military superiority over the enemy or any potential enemies at any poL t during or after the war 25 26 27 b Minimum damage to the United States and its 28 Allies and in all events limitation of such damage 29 to a level consistent with national survival and 30 31 'independence c Bring the war to an end on the most advantageous 'possible terms for the United States and its Allies 1f 3 Enclosure A 32 33 DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unqlassified I Declassified Holdings of the National Archives Authoritj 23 Pg zOP SECRET b The foregoing statement of objectives stems from the objectives section of JSCP-64 quot d above 1 In addition to the objectives 2 the JSCP included the objective of destroying 3 or neutralizing the enemy s war supporting and industrial 4 recovery capability 5 It is noted that the translation of JSCp-64 objectives into SIop-64 objectives omitted this 6 requirement 7 However detailed instructions for the attack of urban industrial targets is contained in other portions of the idance 8 9 c Tne military objectives for general war as contained in the recently approved JSCp-65 which reflect priority 10 11 rather than substance changes to the objectives contained 12 in JSCP-64 are as follows 13 ltGenera 1 War In addition to the limited war objectives 14 which are applicable the military objective in general war 15 is to defeat the Soviet Bloc alone or in combir tion with 16 the Asian communist Bloc as required to terminate hostilities 17 on terms advantageous to the United States this objective In achieving military forces of the United States 19 1 Will defend the United States and assist its 20 allies against enemy attack 21 2 While providing the ability to accomplish 3 below will when directed destroy or 18 neutralize on a 22 23 selective basis if required the rrdlitary capabilities 24 of the enemy as necessary to limit damage to the United 25 States and its allies to the maximum extent practicable 26 3 Will maintain an assured capability Qnder all 27 conditions and will when and as directed destroy on 28 a selective basis the war supporting and urban industrial 29 resources of the enemy_ Wnen directed this undertaking 30 may be carried out concurrently or separately with 2 31 above 32 II rep SECR1 I- 4 Enclosure A _ -c -- - DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unc lassified I Declassified Holdings of the National Archives AuthoritY 2- gog pep SECREt d THe objectives as stated in the fbregbing parag aph I 'j J i Will be included in their entirety in future I SIOP guidance 1 2 in order to ensure that the specitic equlrement for an 3 assured capability to destroy the enemy's war supporting 4 I and urban industrial resources is stated clearly QUESTION i Is the language expressing objectives appro- priate from the point of view of realism and practicability ANSWER Except for the omission of the objective of attack Df urban industrial priate targets the language is appro- Guidance for the next SlOP will include the 6 7 8 9 10 11 to conform to the objectives as stated in JSCp-65 12 - 1 - What should be the objective of the attacks on 13 14 the USSR 15 - 2 - Red China AN WER The objectives of the attack on the USSR and Red China should be as stated in JSCP-65 The objectives are 16 17 general in nature and apply equally to the USSR and Red 18 China 19 Moreover the specific instructions contained ih the guidance can be stated in such a way as to accommodate 20 equally the different characteristics of the individual 21 target systems of the two countries 22 23 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS I 5 specific requirement for attack of urban industrial targets QUESTION 4 The second significant element to be considered in the I ryview of SlOP guidance 1s the concept of operations 24 25 a In broad terms SlOP guidance provides that under 26 conditions of general war the United States will launch 27 a strategic nuclear attack capable of execution under all 28 reaaonably foreseeible cond -t ons under wb1ch ostilities 29 mar begin 30 Additionally the SlOP will provide for seleetive response to the extent possible with due con- 31 sideration to the degree of survivability and capability 32 of -the committed forces 33 5 Enclosure A -- _ Reproduced from Holdings of the National Archives DECLASSIFIED Authority 23 g b is concept is de ived from JSCP-64 and will remain 1 the same since JSCP-65 is essentially the same in this 2 re 3 stop guidance has established two basic conditions for 4 the employment of strategic nuclear force s - pre emption and 5 retaliation 6 c A plan for the attack of the enemy target system is required under each of the foregoing conditions 3 7 tailored to permit selectivity of response commensurate 8 with the circumstances of execution 9 of d To provide for the desired flexibility and selectivity 10 response five 11 options are identifiedj Options I and II in pre-emption7 and II13 IV and V in retaliation 12 e Broadly speaking the results to be accomplished by 13 each of the options as the initial effort in the execution 14 of the nuclear strike plan are 15 16 1 Attack option I - Assure a high degree of probability of damage to the enemy nuclear capability 17 yet provide for a more discriminatory attack than any 18 other option 19 Minimize collateral damage against urbani industrial centers to the extent possible consistent with 20 the military objectives 21 2 Attack Option II - Attack the enemy s military 22 target system to emphasize thoroughness of attack but 23 still minimize collateral damage against urban industrial 24 centers where possible 25 3 Attack Option III - Retaliate against the most 26 urgent enemy military nuclear targets in response to an 27 ambiguous attack on a apparently l ited scale 28 4 Attack Option IV - Retaliate against a more complete29 military target system than that in Option III still th keeping collateral damage to a minimum consistent the military requirement 30 31 32 'fOP ggCRE'il- 6 Enclosure A ------- - ' -- -- - -- - ------- ---- ---- ---o _ o - --- -- - - - o - - - --- - ---- --- ------ ---------- - DECL4 SSIFIED AuthoritY Reproduced from the Unclassified Declassified Holdings of the National Archives 2 3P51 5 Attack Option V - Retaliate against the full I spectrum of target categories in order to destroy the 2 will and ability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to wage war 3 remove the enemy from the category of a major industrial 4 powe r and assure a post-war balance of power favorable 5 to the United States 6 f In application the options provide for the selective 7 release or stated another way the selective withholding 8 of strikes against certain categories of targets 9 For example selection of Option I would result in the 10 execution of strikes against the enemy strategic nuclear 11 threat in accordance with the over-all pre-emptive plan 12 nile 13 withholding planned strikes against the other target categories 14 Inherent in the option is the capability for the subsequent release of all or a 15 portion of the withheld force to carry out strikes in 16 accordance with the over-all pre-emptive plan 17 Selection of Option II would result in the initial execution of a 18 larger portion and the withholding of a smaller portion 19 of the over-all pre-emptive plan than in Option I There 20 is no pre-emptive option which provides for the execution 21 of the entire pre-emptive plan as an initial effort 22 However if required this objective can be approximated 23 by executing Option II and immediately releasing the 24 withheld portion of the force to carry out the remainder 25 of the attack plan 26 Under conditions of retaliation the selection of Option III would result in the initial 27 execution of strikes against the enemy nuclear capability 28 in accordance with the over-all retaliatory plan while 29 withholding planned strikes against other target categories 30 Withheld forces could be released subsequent to the initial 7 Enclosure A 31 DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unclassified Declassified Holdings of the National Archives AuthoritY 2- 3r g r executibn of the option if required Thus in effect there is lnpereht in all options the capability to e ecute es entially ' the over-all attack plan if the 2 3 4 ci'iricumstances dictate 'QUESTION 1 Is the language expressing the concept 5 appropriate from the point of view of realism and 6 practicability 7 ANSWER The language expresses the intent of the 8 objectives and concept as contained in JSCP and appears 9 to be realistic and practicable 10 QUESTION Is there a requirement for more than two 11 12 options pre-emption and retaliation If it is assumed that regardless of the manner 13 in which general war in initiated both sides will respond 14 over a short period of time with the maximum capability 15 available then only two options pre-emption and 16 retaliati n would be required 17 ANSWER On the other hand if it is assumed that more discrimination in attack will be 18 required to respond to a variety of circumstances of 19 initiation of general war then additional options are 20 required JSCp-65 recently approved by the Joint Chiefs 21 of Staff provides that the SlOP will be capable of total 22 execution under all reasonably foreseeable conditions 23 that hostilities may begin and will provide for selective 24 response to the extent possible with due consideration 25 to the degree of survivability and the capability of the 26 committed forces 27 QUESTION Should we continue to have options to attack 28 only military targets rather than attacking a combination 29 of military and urban industrial targets in all options 30 8 Enclosure A - - a - --' AuthoritS' 2- 3051 I ANSWER ttack i-- All options now provide a capability to both military and urban industrial targets 1 - x Gept fo Yes However 2 Option V the attack of urban industrial targets 3 iswith hEifl9 for subsequent execution as required The 4 v ' primary concern should continue to be directed toward 5 destroying or neutralizing the enemy's military capabilities 6 in order to minimize damage to the US and our allies 7 The secondary concern should be to extend the attack to 8 include the enemy's urban industrial system as required 9 Attacking military and urban industrial targets in all 10 options denies us any selectivity in our attack and could 11 dictate automatically the destruction of US urbani 12 industrial areas by the enemy 13 QUESTION Should these options give more stress to population as the main target ANSWER 16 additional exmphais on the attack of the urban industrial 17 target system by stating a requirement for an assured 18 capability to destroy the 19 urban industrial resources war supporting and This should result in greater 20 population casualties in that a larger portion of the urban 21 population may be placed at risk 22 In a recent study conducted by the Joint staff assisted by the Joint 23 strategic Target Planning Staff on the effect of placing 24 greater emphasis on the attack of urban industrial targets 25 in order to destroy the USSR and China as viable societies 26 it was indicated that the achievement of a 30 per cent 27 fatality level i e 212 7 million people in the total 28 population 709 million people of China would necessitate 29 an exorbitant weight of effort 30 The magnitude of effort required to achieve the 30 per cent national fatility level 14 15 The revised objectives in JSCp-65 place ene yfs Encl sure A to JCS 2056 414-1 - fOP GBPEGRET 9 -c l DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unrlassified J Declassified Holdings of the National Archives _ Enclosure A 31 DECL SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unclassified I Declassified Holdings of the National Archives AuthoritY attribu eq is to the population distribution of basica y 'is I n ber China which agrarian nation with 84 per cent of its population'ip ural aPeas - 230 g Thus the attack of a large of place names would destroy only a small fraction 1 2 3 4 The rate of return for 5 a weapon expended diminishes rapidly after accounting for 6 of' the total population of China the 30 top priority cities I involved in the In view of the many complexities 7 reapportio ent of available forces and weapons from one target category to has been directed to as appropriate exa ine another the Joint Staff with the assistance of DSTP alternative examples of redistribution of 8 9 10 11 targeting weights of effort between the various categories 12 of targets and to derive theoretical consequences of 13 execution of a SlOP thus retargeted 14 Results of this study should provide the basis for possible change to the priority 15 assigned population as the main target 16 17 NSTL and Tasks 5 The third significant area of interest in the review of 18 tte SlOP guidance is the analysis of the job to be done in 19 terms of a target list and the division of this target list 20 itto separate tasks 21 I I i a The current SlOP guidance defines two groups of targets 22 which must be subject to attack 1 military targets and 2 urban industrial and war supporting resource targets 24 The military targets are divided into two target lists 25 identified as Tasks Alpha and Bravo Task Alpha targets 26 are those nuclear delivery forces posing a threat to the 27 United States and its Allies and to United States and Allied 28 forces overseas 29 Task Bravo targets are the other elements of the Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces and resources in 23 Enc19sure B to JCS 2056 414-1 q'OP SECRET 10 _ - - - - - - - - _ - Enclosure A 30 DECL 4 SSIFIED Reproduced from the Unclassified j Declassified Holdings of the National Archives Authoritj being I 2 gC g The urban industrial and war supporting resources target iist is identified as Task Charlie Separation of the target list comprised of nuc ear delivery forces posing a threat to the United States and its Allies from the 2 3 4 target list comprised of other Sino-Soviet Bloc military 5 forces provides the mechanical means to 6 accom odate desired degree of discrimination in attack the 7 Moreover since Task Alpha targets are of a higher prlority in their 8 entirety than Task Bravo targets this separ-ation provides 9 a 10 two convenient tool for aligning the mili ta cy targets into prior ty QUESTION groups 11 Is there a requirement fCll' T2 sk Bravo or may its essential elements be blended into Task Alpha ANSWER JWGA war On the basis of preliminary analysis of the ga ing of SIop-64 of planning or execution 14 it appears that Tasks Alpha and 15 16 However by so doing selectivity 17 of response and convenience of priority groupings would be negated 12 13 Bravo may be combined with little increase in complexity Unless final analysis of SIop-64 war g ing 18 should 19 dictate to the contrary it is considered that a require- 20 ment for Task Bravo does exist 21 Target Priorities and Damage Expectancies I 1 22 6 The fourth significant element in the review of SIOP I 23 gfidance is target priorities within and between tasks and 24 required target destruction by categories 25 a SIOP guidance establishes the relative priority for 26 the allocation of forces between the tasks and within the 27 tasks and the damage expectancies required on Task Alpha 28 and Task Charlie targets 29 b The guidance provides that Tasks AlPha and - Bra o 13e 30 provided a higher priority in their entirety than Task 31 Charlie for the allocation of forces 32 TOP SECRE t' This guidance will 11 Enclosure A r req ire in adjustment to satisfy the new objectives contained JSCP 65 Specifica11y Task Ch rlie objectives should 1 2 be gliteri equal priority with the Task Alpha objectives for 3 the's llocation of forces to achieve prescribed damage 4 lev ls 5 - particularly in retaliation under conditions -- in which United states forces are in a normal alert posture 6 In the pre-emptive options under conditions in which the 7 United states forces are in a normal alert posture and in 8 all options under conditions of tension during which a 9 larger portion of the force would be on 10 alert priority for the allocc ti0J 1 of force should continue to remain 11 with the Task and Bravo targets 12 c The current guidance makes no distinction between 13 Al la tasks with regard to the priority of allocation of rapid 14 reaction US offensive forces to time sensitive enemy 15 targets Since the Task Alpha targets are in the main I 16 I time sensitive while the Charlie targets are not priOri y force 18 On the other handl 19 in the application of the rapid reaction offensive should be given to the Alpha targets 17 since the objectives require that an assured capability 20 must be provided under all conditions to destroy urbani 21 industrial targets systems which are also highly 22 surviv ble should be allocated to the destruction of Charlie targetJl 23 This latter consideration is provided for in the current 24 I guidance in that the instructions direct the establiShme4t 1 of a secure retaliatory force for this purpose d The priorities within Task Alpha established in thl 25 26 27 28 guidance are as follows 1 Active heavy and medium bomber home bases and 29 30 primary staging bases 31 2 Soft ICBM sites 12 Enclosure A DECLASSIFIED Authority 2 gog S8A 4 Jl f IBUO WN 84l to s6U PIOH P8 J SSBP80 f peY SSBpUn 84l WOlt p8 JnpOld8tj 3 Known and fixed IRBM MRBM sites 1 4 Pr irrtary missile launching submarine bases or 2 3 their access to the sea 5 Primary heavy and medium bomber dispersal bases 4 and active light bomber home bases 5 6 Primary nuclear and CBR weapons storage facilit es 6 7 outside of major urban centers 7 Known active local control centers that exercise 8 control over nuclear delivery forces which present a 9 threat to the United states or its Allies not co-located 10 with those forces but located outside of major urban 11 centers 12 e This priority is established as a guide for the 13 allocation of forces to target categories within Task 14 Alpha and does not address the question of time sensitivity 15 of application 16 With increasing numbers of missiles becoming available to the strategic delivery forces it s 17 believed that time sensitivity should be considered in 18 establishing priority of attack 19 On this basis the priorities as currently stated should be revised to p1ac control centers 7 above to a position immediately following known and fixed IRBM MRBM sites 3 abbOVaese s' and ahead of primary missile launching submarine 4 above l This would provide a more suitable priorit-l listing by order of importance for the allocation of forces based on the application of rapid reaction offensj ve forces against time sensitive targets 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 f In the current SlOP guidance a 9010 damage expectancy is established as a goal against all but the hard in the Alpha target list 20 target This goal is stated as 28 29 30 a maximum nor a minimum but one which is highly desirab e 31 and probably attainable with the available forces 32 -4 0P In SECRE Enclosure A 13 DECLASSIFIED Authority - '---- -_ _- ----- --------- 2 30g - ' ' t ''aor''''' tll l '''''''''_''' _'' ' _ seA 4 JJ f leUO lBN e4Ho s5U PIOH pe J ssepeo rpe JrtstIDcili'841'luOJJ pwnpoJdetj add1 ion recognizing the possibility that the forces might o ' i ' not t ' capabie Df accomplishing theSe objectives guidance 2 is prl Yided to the effec t that lower damage levels will be 3 accep d with due regard to the established order of 4 priority of individual target categories 5 g Recdgnizing that damage expectancies within target 6 priorities may fluctuate as a function of many variables 7 associated with weapon application and operational require- 8 ments the guidance stipulates that over-all damage 9 95% except for those targets of highest priority i In this I latter instance the guidance may be questionable in that I 12 the attaiTh Uent of 95% probability of damage may not be 13 consistent with economical weight of effort Thus it 14 1 ' 1 appears desirable to consider revising the guidance to provide more specific instructions in this regard 15 I 16 h The current SlOP guidance provides that the force 17 to be applied to achieve the desired damage level agains1t 18 Task Charlie targets will be that force necessary to 19 inflict significant damage to 70% of the floor space in 20 the 100 largest of the Sino-Soviet cities 21 The use of the floor space criteria is intended only to define the 22 size weight of the force to be allocated to Task Charlie 23 and not to define the target objectives 24 A study was conducted recently by the Joint Staff assisted by the 25 Joint strategic Target Planning Staff to determine the 26 effect upon the USSR and China if the forces in Slop-64 27 were applied in accordance with the current guidance 1 e 28 study reported that destruction of the USSR as a viable 29 society would be achieved by accomplishment of the 30 targeting objectives now provided in the current guidancie 31 AppendiX D to JCS 2056 414-1 _ TOl SOORE r 14 DECLASSIFIED Authority LS0 g Enclosure A ' ' - TOP SEG11J P Analogous criteria applied to China would require the 1 target ng of 50 cities - Reduction from 70 per cent to 2 50 per pent ih industrial capacity floor space would 3 permit the targeting of only 30 cities in China wh ch is 4 essentially the targeting level currently programmed in 5 Task Charlie in SIOp-64 6 If 30 per cent of the urban population and 50 per cent of the industrial capacity are 7 the criteria then the execution of Attack Option V in 8 SIop-64 would destroy such a level of the Chinese urban 9 population and industrial capacity that China would no 10 longer be a viable nation 11 Based on the foregoing it appears desirable to consider specifying the per cent 12 floor space damage and number of cities placed at risk 13 for each the USSR and China 14 I QUESTION What relative weight of effort should be 15 II expended in accomplishing Tasks Alpha Bravo and Charlie I o J 17 assuming these three tasks should be retained AN R The guidance will require revision to satisJy I the objectives as contained in JSCp-65 16 Specifically I 18 19 Task Charlie objectives should be given equal priority 20 with the Task Alpha objectives for the allocation of 21 forces to achieve prescribed damage levels particularl r 22 in retaliation under conditions in which US forces are 23 in a normal alert posture 24 In the pre-emptive options under conditions in which the US forces are in a nor mal 25 alert posture and in all options under conditions of 26 I tension during which a larger portion of the forces would 27 be on alert priority for the allocation of force should 28 continue to remain with the Task Alpha and Bravo targetB 29 I 30 emphasize that its main effort should be directed at thf 31 urban industrial structure of the enemy with a maximiza ion 32 of population casualties 33 QUESTION Is Task Charlie properly stated so as to I 15 DECLAsSIFlED Authority L30 g Enclosure A ' ' ANSWER On the basis of a recent study conducted by the 1 Joint Staff assisted by the Joint strategic Planning Staff 2 it ppears desirable to specify the per cent floor space 3 damage and number of cities placed at risk for each-the 4 USSR and China 5 In view of the many complexities associated with the apportionment of available forces and weapons from 6 one target category to another the Joint Staff has been 7 directed to examine alternative examples of redistribution 8 of targeting weights of effort between the various categories 9 of targets and to derive theoretical consequences of execu- 10 I tion of a SlOP thus retargeted Results of this study 11 I should provide a basis for determination of whether or 10t 12 additional emphasis should be placed on urban industrial 13 damage and population casualties in the Task Charlie 14 I guidance QUESTION 15 Are the targets under Task Alpha grouped in the proper categories and order For example are we 16 17 directing too much attention to bomber bases staging aid 18 dispersal bases and nuclear and CBR weapons storage with 19 insufficient attention being paid to those elements of 20 I I I control which direct the functioning of the enemy militTry 21 apparatus I 22 ANSWER It is considered that Task Alpha targets arr 23 properly grouped in categories In view of the increaStng 24 US strategic missile inventory however the order should be 25 revised to accommodate considerations of time sensitivity 26 Specifically the priorities as currently stated should be 27 revised to place control centers currently #7 priority to 28 a position immediately following known and fixed I IRBM M 29 sites currently #3 priority and ahead of primary miSfile 30 launching submarine bases primary 31 heavy and medium bfmber dispersal bases and active light bomber home bases and 32 I rimary nuclear and CBR weapons storage facilities endix D to JCS 2056 414-1 9P fE1QRE'f Enclosure A 16 DECLASSIFIED Authority _l 30 g -_ ---_ -- 33 T' d OP I SECRET I Flexibility 1 'The in t he fifth and last significant element to be considered of SIOP guidance is the broad flexibility of l view 1 2 implementation in terms of options and withholding requirements 3 a The current SlOP guidance provides a requirement for a flexible plan capable of execution through implementation 5 of anyone of five attack options 6 pre-emption and III Options I and II in 7 IV and V in retaliation permit selective response to or initiation of hostilities over the 8 broad 9 of foreseeable spectrlli conditions considering the degree of survivability and capability of the committed 10 forces 11 In addition the guidance requires that there also be a selective capability to withhold under each 12 option all strikes against Red China and its satellites I 13 and against the Soviet Bloc satellites I either individually QUESTION 16 vlould it be desirable to have options which I will permit striking in isolation a the China 14 15 or collectively USSR 17 b Red 18 and c targets of interest to NATO in the Soviet Satellites 3 as well as the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whole 19 The number of options which would be required 20 to provide the full range of selectivity suggested by the 21 question would render it infeasible from the standpoint of 22 planning 23 ANSWER The current withholding capability provides for striking in isolation the USSR and Red China The proposal regarding an option which would permit striking in isolatlon I the subject of a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 24 25 s i 26 T11'is 27 the targets of interest to NATO in the Soviet satellites 4 report was concurred in by the services but was withdrawn 28 prior to consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 29 The report essentially concluded that such an option was not 30 required 31 JC S 2056 396 - J OP 3ECRBT 17 Enclosure A DECLASSIFIED Authority '230 g -- '- 'QUESTION ' Sf '0 t p edure I be Review the operational problems concerned and 1 for executing country withholds Should there 1 2 capability to withhold all attacks in Albania Bulgaria 3 and Rumania ANSWER 4 5 To provide for full flexibility of response to the broad spectrum of circumstance-under which war may be 6 initiated the capability should exist to withhold attacks 7 against Soviet satellites either individually or 8 collectively 9 The operational withhold procedures are directly tied to the release procedures that is forces 10 are directed to carry out or to withhold their aSSigned 11 strikes 12 Regardless of the mechanics of the planning I procedure the operational procedure would remain essentially the same 13 14 There presently exists a capability to withhold all attacks in all co ntries for which suc l a requirement exists including Albania Bulgaria and 15 r 16 17 Rumania TOF 8EeRE 18 Enclosu re A DECLASSIFIED Authority L 30 g -- --- S8A 4 lJ f IBUOlWN 84 JO - -- -- i 5'L PI H J1 SBP80 f P8 J SSBPUn' 4 ' OJJ P8 lnpOJd8Cl roP SijGRET APPENbrx TD ENCLOSURE A FotLOW-UP ACTIONS ON THE MEETINGS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH THE DIP CTOR OF STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING AT OMAHA 22 - 23 OCTOBER 1963 1 Review the guidance for SIop-64 This review to be under- 1 taken now as an initial study in the development of guidance 2 for SIop-65 3 Give particular attention to the following 4 points a The language expressing the objectives and the concept 5 6 of the SIOP 1 Is the language appropriate from the point of view 7 8 of realism and practicability 2 Waat should be the objective of the attacks 9 a the USSR 10 b Red China 11 b Tne statement of the options 12 1 Is there any requirement for more than two options 13 I preemption and retaliation 14 2 Should these options give more stress to popu ations as the main target 15 16 3 Should we continue to have options to attack nly 17 military targets rather than attacking a combination of 18 military and urban industrial targets in all optionSj 19 4 Would it be desirable to have options which wtl1 20 i permit striking in isolation a the USSR b Red ctina 21 and c targets of interest to NATO in the Soviet 22 I Satellites as well as the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whoJ e 23 c The statement of the tasks 24 1 Are the targets under Task Alpha grouped in i t le 25 I proper categories and order For example are we dil ect- ing too much attention to bomber bases staging and is- pereal bases and nuclear and CBR weapons storage wi h insufficient attention being paid to those element I o ' II 26 27 28 29 control which direct the functioning of the enemy mi1 itary 30 31 apparatus Appendix to Enclosure A - rep SECI tET DECLASSIFIED Authority 2 gog lQ re ' r Jl V f QJ It' tl2r S8J 4 lJ ' leuo leN 841 JO s6u PIOH P8 J SSep80 I p8 J ssepUn 84 WOJJ p8 lnpoJd8tf II 2 Is tpere a requirement for Task Bravo or may its essential elements be blended into Task Alpha 1 2 3 Is Task Charlie properly stated so as to emphasize 3 that its main effort should be directed at the urbani 4 industrial structure of the enemy with a maximization of 5 population casualties 6 d Damage levels 7 I What relative weight of effort should be expended in accomplishing Tasks Alpha Bravo and Charlie j 8 assuming 9 10 these three tasks should be retained 2 There should be a review of desired damag levels for each category of target within each task I ta ing into 11 12 I account the probable effect of human casualties In putting 13 physical plants and facilities out of action Without need 14 for severe physical damage to the plant or 15 faCil tY Consideration should be givEn to the hardness or I relative 16 I vulnerability of targets as well as utilizing population 17 loss as the primary yardstick for effectiveness in 18 destroying the enemy society with only collatera 19 I attention to industrial damage 20 e Options and flexibility 21 Review the operational problems concerned an 22 procedures for executing country withholds Id there 23 be a capability to withhold all attacks in Albarljia 24 Bulgaria and Rumania 25 20 Appendix to Enclosure A DECLASSIFIED Authority L 30 g 3I reRJE I - _ J ENCLOSURE B DRAFT MEMOF ANDUM FOR Subject Chief of Staff U S Air Force Chief of Staff U S ArwS Chief of Naval Operations Commandant Marine Corps Review of the SlOP Guidance U 1 As a follow-up action of the meetings of the Secreta J 1 of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Director 2 Strategic Target Planning at Omaha 22-23 October 1963 r 3 requested the Director Joint Staff to 1k dertake a review 4 of the guidance for SIOp-64 as an initial study in the 5 development of guidance for SIop-65 6 This initial study 7 Enclosure hereto has now been completed 2 This study is inter in nature and must be reviewed 8 upon completion of the final report of the Joint War Games 9 i Agency on war gaming of SlOP-64 However I believe it will prove useful in formulating the guidance for the prepa ration of the next I 10 l - 11 srop 12 13 3 I would appreciate receiving your views on the sub- 15 stance of the Enclosure i 21 Enclo ure B DECLASSIFIED Authority 2 30g saAl 8J f leuolJ8N a l to s6uIPIOH palJlssepao I pa JlssepUn a WOJt pa8npoJdati This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu