8513 COMriDEnTIAL' THE WHITE HOUSE WASH 1N GTO N MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT Expanded Session on Security Issues with President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation PARTICIPANTS The President The Vice President Warren Christopher The Secretary of State William Perry The Secretary of Defense Anthony Lake Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Leon Fuerth Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs Lynn Davis Undersecretary for International Security Affairs Thomas Pickering U S Ambassador to the Russian Federation Nicholas Burns Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs NSC Rose Gottemoeller Director for Russian Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs NSC Notetaker Peter Afanasenko Interpreter Boris Yeltsin President of the Russian Federation Oleg Soskovets Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Kozyrev Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavel Grachev Minister of Defense Oleg Davydov Minister of Foreign Economics Trade Georgiy Mamedov Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Viktor Iliyushin First Assistant to the President Yuliy Vorontsov Russian Ambassador to the U S Interpreter September 27 1994 4 35-5 35pm Cabinet Room DATE TIME AND PLACE DECLASSIFIED PER E 0 13526 oCONFIDENTIALDeclassify on OADR 3 iyi ol8 K6H pnMTT'TnpHTTATr The President I would like to start with a summary of what we discussed earlier then go to issues on which there is no controversy then you and I will discuss Nagorno-Karabakh one-onone for a few minutes I would like to break promptly at 5 30 so that you have some time to rest before this evening On the Conventional Forces in Europe CEE Treaty you and I agreed to get our experts together today or tomorrow to discuss areas of flexibility We agree your concerns are legitimate We will then move the talks into a trilateral framework as John Major suggested We agreed that these talks would not be substitutes for the discussions on in Vienna but would support them On COCOM we discussed the issue of Russian arms sales to Iran You said that there would be no new contracts but that you would service existing contracts Our experts are to get together to discuss this matter They will discuss it as a dimension of Russia's joining the successor regime to COCOM President Yeltsin We must work together on this fulfill our promise U We will The President On Bosnia we agreed to consider the idea of an international conference and the Russian government would consider the progress with Milosevic on the question of borders C We have not yet discussed nuclear safety but I want to say a word about it Clearly we need to work together The Vice President told me how you raised the NPT issue in your lunchtime toast I have also appreciated your cooperation on international crime problems I believe that as a political matter one way to keep up the public support for our partnership is to work together on the crime problem People here are very worried about it On nuclear security should we go into specific steps U Secretary Perry I already had a very good one-on-one discussion with Minister of Defense Grachev I start off with the belief that while we remain concerned about nuclear security we are concerned about ours and yours The newspapers have overdramatized the problem but we should take further steps to reduce the risk of losing control of nuclear materials or warheads Both the United States and Russia have strong controls but both can make improvements in our Defense and Energy ministries The issue is not only nuclear warheads but materials as well One action underway in the United States which Russia should follow is to reduce the number of storage sites Another is documentation control I believe we should begin with a CONriDGNTIAtr COMF1 PENT I j rfe confidential exchange of stockpile data and discussion of methods or ways to improve security of warheads and materials already under Defense control and use Nunn-Lugar monies In summary I believe you have good methods of control but both of us can improve and we should cooperate The first steps is an exchange of information on stockpiles The second is discussion of ways to improve control of nuclear warheads and materials We should do this arm-in-arm because a failure could affect both--indeed the whole world President Yeltsin I would like to talk about North Korea You have reached good results in your discussions but what we need is a power plant to be reequipped with light water fules We are proposing the resources of Russia--we build it Of course this would only be done with appropriate controls by the IAEA and the United States How do you view this The President Mr Secretary U Secretary Perry With respect to North Korea the negotiations are ongoing but a great deal still needs to be accomplished North Korea has agreed to freeze its activities It is not reprocessing or refueling It is uncertain whether they will maintain that position We are still unconvinced as to the nature of their transition Kim Jong II has not formally assumed all the positions of leadership and we are somewhat puzzled 0 Mr Lake The problem with the reactor is that for reasons of financial feasibility there is a requirement for a South Korean reactor We would very much appreciate Russian assistance in supporting projects The President I would like to know what you think We have a very delicate role to play Every time we negotiate with North Korea it makes South Korea nervous They are trying to establish a bilateral relationship and they are afraid if they do not build the reactor then North Korea will find a way around it The issue is not just financial We have troops there and they are very exposed We feel we have to work through the South Koreans Maybe you can say something to North Korea to make them feel more secure President Yeltsin Kim Jong II is a more rigid person tougher Some steps backwards are to be expected Right now North Korea is not going to talk to South Korea--it is useless for the next year or two I understand your situation taking into account South Korea and your troops But it may be technically easier for you if we came in and helped with the reactor We could involve U S companies to attract international financing But rnNETDEMTiriT- ONFII BNTIAIj maybe major parts from Russia start talking 2 If you agree maybe we could The President The real problem is that South Korea is ready to pay but not if they cannot do the work President Yeltsin work The President No that is useless It is not going to You mean North Korea is not going to take it President Yeltsin Yes Kim Jong II wants first to strengthen his power base which means no contacts with the South It is not allowing him to take some steps Time is needed Until he firms up his power base under no circumstances is he going to talk to the South Koreans It is a political problem for him to do so j Secretary Christopher There is an important sequencing issue here North Korea seems to have demanded that a light water reactor be delivered and operating before it agrees not to reprocess President Yeltsin Yes U Secretary Christopher We should not exclude the idea of an international consortium But until we get agreement on sequencing it is difficult to move forward jPg Secretary Perry We are worried that even if we agree on financing they will reverse themselves and refuel then all hell will break loose here Thus far they have escaped sanctions by maintaining a freeze Minister Kozyrev The thing is the difficulties are now visible To have a South Korean light water reactor causes additional difficulties for North Korea The leadership simply cannot allow itself to agree The United States representative is saying that the reactor has to be South Korean--this makes the talks more colicated At the same time it was our idea to propose going to a light water reactor to once and for all solve the problem In Geneva with Secretary Christopher and Bob Gallucci we listened to the experts who said a light water reactor is much more safe At the same time the North Koreans are saying that they want a Russian light water reactor It is very important if the two Presidents could reach an accord saying that when the North Koreans are ready to go to a light water reactor then it should be a Russian one It would make current jz onriDEMTi rL CONFIDEMTI-j A and future negotiations simpler Of course it would also be a multi-billion dollar contract for us The President I have a proposal they would agree not to refuel Minister Kozyrev But do you think if we agreed It would make it easier U The President I have a suggestion Suppose we asked Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev to come up with a common diplomatic initiative Our major concern is that we not be put in a position to have to go to the United Nations for sanctions At all costs we need to keep the freeze on Secretary Christopher The President OK U Let's talk again tomorrow U President Yeltsin Sure let's do it I agree I've got a proposal on the issue of nuclear safety What was being proposed on biological weapons--an information exchange--we should do the same on the nuclear issue Did you receive our report on biological weapons The Vice President Pickering has it Ambassador Pickering U I received it yesterday in New York U President Yeltsin We should do the same kind of exchange on nuclear issues We have told you everything about our BW program in that report We have fulfilled our commitment Now we need to figure out how to do a data exchange on nuclear warheads and materials How much time do we need to set up such an exchange Confers with his delegation Soskovets says two months should be enough time Can we agree on two months Secretary Perry It should not take any longer U The Vice President We should complete it by December when our Commission meets U President Yeltsin The Vice President received yesterday Yes let's get it done by December U We're still translating the document U President Yeltsin The point is we have done what we said we have fulfilled our pledge U CCNFTDFNTTATi r NFTPFNTTATi Minister Grachev The cardinal issue is the new U S strategy which I talked about with Secretary Perry yesterday Nuclear security must be considered at the level of the Energy Department and MinAtom too So before Vice President Gore's visit in December we will work out an exchange on nuclear security by then The second issue is nuclear security provided in terms of the START I and II Treaties I informed Secretary Perry of all the issues of nuclear safety and security that were being implemented Missiles are coming out of Kazakhstan and Belarus warheads are being removed from Ukraine all according to schedule We are destroying strategic nuclear arms strictly according to schedule There was a misunderstanding before this visit that we were stopping or slowing down No We showed Secretary Perry that we are on schedule We have cut back 374 ICBMs you saw 13 For submarines we have cut back 184 compared to the 52 you counted As far as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles on heavy bombers --both you and we have taken them all off I'd like to propose that Perry come to one of our tactical nuclear handling sites when he visits in December to see that safety is provided for But we cannot destroy all the tactical nuclear weapons at once--unlike the United States which is geographically in a more favorable position You do not need them But for us within reasonable bounds we need some There could be problems with some of the states to the south They are contained now but as a restraint to aggression some tactical nuclear weapons are needed President Yeltsin To be objective and fair Pavel Sergeyevich I cannot agree I said this to him let's just add them up You say you want to keep tactical nuclear weapons more than strategic OK get rid of that many more strategic Either we knock out all tactical nuclear weapons or sum them up Minister Grachev We're asking that at the level of experts that we look at this question one more time Here is another difficulty We are cutting back strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with START I but the Treaty is not ratified Now START II is pressing us with a date of 2003 to complete reductions If you do not press Ukraine then we will not be able to proceed with START II President Yeltsin What concerns Ukraine is START I not II START II is a matter between us So we have to press Ukraine with all our might The President President Kuchma is coming here You said that he is OK So we need to press them to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the time of the CSCE Summit in Budapest and we have to ensure they get some credit JSONriDEHTIAfe- CONFIDENTIMr The Vice President We should urge President Kuchma together to satisfy this requirement by the time of the CSCE Summit j2 President Yeltsin Yes and Ukraine in general We should bring all the pressure we have to bear We signed the Trilateral accord we three so then what I've got to visit Ukraine in November I'm going to press Kuchma to the wall NPT or they get no gas or oil The Vice President Don't be too hard on him U I will tell him that we need to get NPT out of The President the way to bring START I into force and to ratify START II Then we can begin to explore START III ideas President Yeltsin No Kuchma is fine I think it is very realistic to expect to be able to finish NPT by the end of the year As Grachev here will tell you we have got to get START II going Minister Grachev We are already beginning to think about it The difficulty has been in getting all of the warheads out of those three countries President Yeltsin I propose so that we do not have any surprise misunderstandings that every three months we exchange information on how much has been destroyed The President Yes U President Yeltsin Then our Ministers of Defense should sign on the bottom line who has destroyed v hat and where Secretary Perry To summarize what we and Minister Grachev have agreed First we will cooperate in ratifying START I and II and bringing them into force second once that is achieved we will accelerate the pace of reductions to go even faster by informal agreement using Nunn-Lugar funds to do so Third we will start discussing what reductions will be possible under START III And fourth while we are discussing START III each side will take unilateral reductions beyond START II Each side will be taking unilateral steps toward START III The President Secretary Perry We have been doing some of that already Yes U U President Yeltsin On the ratification of START I that is fine we are destroying all of those anyway On the other points let's do it this way when START II enters into force let us MFI-OEMJHeAt _rr MFTDFMTTATi take all of the weapons to be reduced under START II off of combat status So all of the nuclear weapons subject to START II would be without their warheads pj Secretary Perry The President I like that Done The Vice President Minister Grachev U U OK U Let's let our experts examine this President Yeltsin U The experts will get it all balled up U Minister Grachev President Clinton has said that under the new policy no more reductions will take place until START II is ratified President Yeltsin That is what I'm talking about after START II we should take all the weapons subject to it off combat status right away And it seems to me Bill that we do not have to wait for ratification of START II until we get planning for START III underway We should create a joint working group You remember how much time we took to get START II--and it took ten years to get START I going So we should just get around a table so by the time START II is ratified we have a plan ready for START III and we can dovetail right into it The Vice President That sounds very good partly because such long periods of time are involved here--it is very sound U The President This way we will not have a meeting where people say the experts have not had time to work on it We will get to work on it right away We need to be careful what we say publicly We have to ratify START II Secretary Perry START II I want to keep a strong emphasis on ratifying The President But it is OK to have experts start talking now about the mechanics and details of START III The Vice President Why not U President Yeltsin Let's do it But we will tell the press that after START II we will remove all the reentry vehicles reduced under the Treaty from combat status No other states will be required to do that After START I we will have taken everything out of Kazakhstan Ukraine and Belarus NF DENTIAL' Mr Lake But if we announce this before ratification it could be a problem for the Senate The President No he is saying after ratification It will make the treaty reductions immediately effective rather than waiting seven years It shows we have decided to do something important here President Yeltsin patrolling zones The President We would also like to limit nuclear submarine That is a problem for us U The Vice President Freedom of navigation of the seas is vital to us It goes beyond Russia --other countries are getting submarines are not selling them Minister Grachev This has nothing to do with selling submarines I do not appreciate this humor Off the Kola peninsula some submarines have entered our territorial waters and we almost had a catastrophe President Yeltsin We should be able to do this without hurting the naval operations of either side Minister Kozyrev As the member of the Duma elected from Murmansk I can tell you that I hear from many of my constituents complaining about this matter President Yeltsin I would like to move the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Murmansk to get it out of Moscow The President You have raised a legitimate issue We have had some long discussions on this It causes problems for us but maybe something can be done We should come back to this tomorrow Minister Grachev a solution President Yeltsin problem So it falls to Perry and me to try to work out At least a formulation as to how to view this The President Before that I want to stress that this is a big issue for us throughout the whole history of the twentieth century I want Perry to meet with you to talk about it But we cannot agree to restrain operations along the lines you said Let's talk about it tomorrow eOMFIDENTIMrr ONMDEMTI- 10 President Yeltsin Here is a sixth point for Perry directly relevant to the Presidents Let us say we get rid of the nuclear footballs The President What would my military aide do President Yeltsin The President thought U U Go back to the Air Force or Navy I have got to think about it U I have given it no In our military doctrine we rely on the The Vice President idea of deterrence not only with the former Soviet Union in mind As other nations develop long-range missiles and nuclear warheads of their own we may be in an era where deterrence has a new orientation regardless of the relationship between the U S and Russia There might be other dangers This would need to be studied very carefully President Yeltsin Of course we don't have to decide this today But you have wonderful communications and we have wonderful communication If I need to communicate with the nuclear forces I can pick up any number of telephone lines to do so But to drag around one of these briefcases have one guy guarding another guy--it seems like too much The President I don't know I need some time--one thing I have not spent time on is this issue But when I took this job I understood the symbolic importance that the football has in terms of civilian control over the military's decisions It has nothing to do with you It is a double check that only a civilian elected leader can make this decision pf President Yeltsin OK U The President Now we have agreed to discuss chemical and biological weapons tomorrow because you have given us something to look at And on the demarcation between anti-ballistic missile and theater ballistic missile defense systems--in Naples we made new proposals then in August you made some new proposals in response to ours Now Secretary Christopher has a set of proposals to give you to respond to what you gave us You can look at them tonight Maybe we can get close and finish this Minister Kozyrev It is not such a simple matter I propose we move it to the Commission in October We have included a provi- sion on this in the joint statement You send us your version We will study it back home and decide how to proceed End of Conversation COMTTTnEMgUHrr This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu