Er Ti UEELASSIFIED er Tm Armoriiy aka - - arse emails - PROM I F - I a In omit af fiiffn 1 as Hr su eay new 24 1965 EA Ambassador Brown EafJ - Riehard_E Eneider 3 Trip Report Dhinawan Reversion on the Front Burner The overwhelming impression I have after ten days in Japan and Dainawa is that we have reaehed the point of no return on the reversion issue The pressures have built up in both Japan and Okinawa to the point where I ean see virtually no hope of stalling off beyond the end of next year a deeision on the timing of reversion although the aetual return would take plaee later Partieularly worrisome is the turn of events in Dhinawe sinee Yara's eleetion Tnere our problems eould indeed mount up very rapidly At the same time there is little indieation that we are as yet any eloser to a mutually satisfaetory solution eovering our post-reversion base rights than we were a year ago Dnee again Sato has easily overeome the threats to his power from his rivals within the Party and has put into offiee a eabinet which is by far the ablest and most understanding of the vitals of U S -Japanese relations But the strength of Sato's position ean prove to be transitory he is an aehnowledged lame dusk and the eonsequential intra-party maneuvering to him has only now begun Furthermore by publicly eomnitting his regime to solution of the Dhinawa problem he has given his rivals within the party and his foes outside the party a major test of With the onset of 1969 there is no doubt that ainawa is the number one national issue in Japan It may be argued i UECLASSHJED _ 'stesoottru AT THE HATIDNAL enemy g-l r-l- er s1s 2 that Sate placed himself in his present predicament of needing an agreement with the U 5 on kinewe during 1969 by stressing the issue over the past few years However for better or worse he has done so I think his political judgment was probably sound and that any effort to play down the issue would have handed his opposition an even stronger paint of attack In any event not only Sato but the conservatives and their U S alliance policy could well be at stake in the forth coming effort to resolve the issue Sato continues to proceed cautiously in working out his plans on Dkinawa Neither he nor the Foreign Office has reached any conclusion on GDJ policy towerdapost-reversion base rights although all are overwhelmingly aware that an offer of continued nuclear storage could be political suicide The Foreign Office is toying with some concept of conventional free use but has not thought through the details particularly how to sell it to the Japanese puhlic In fact there appears to he a conscious effort to avoid deciding the GDJ position until the new U S Administration is thoroughly tested Ambassador Johnson keeps reminding the GDJ on the other hand that it must first think through its policies in terms of a realistic assessment of the security needs of Japan and the countries adjacent to Japan whose security is vital to it In the meantime the Sato Government is trying to clear the-dehks on all other U S %Japen issues and develop a pahkage of helpful actions in Asia which will sweeten the Okinawan package for us Typically a small hint by Anhassador Johnson to vice Minister Ushibe that the GUJ might give consideration to how it would participate in the defense of the Ryukyus after reversion sent JDA officials immediately scurrying down to Dkinawa to study the prohlem The Japanese are thus in the preparatory phase of policy making and not moving precipitously Their timetable calls for careful soundings throughout the spring and summer to be folloeed by a summit meeting in washington in the fall They have accepted the wisdom of not pushing the - - - 'RE I'ROOUCI- J AT TilE NATlONfl1 AKC11lVF' - DECLASSIFIED A OO ity It NO 9h' ' 5 # NARA Da 1 3 ne Ad n inistration for an im nediste decision 0 1 the Ry lkyus but arc 110rricd le st it b put off too fa a nd bring them ir t o 1970 wi thout an a3r c n' lt Tne new factor in the Okina a re r t'sion equation within Oidna a 0 1 reversion pressures dctVclo ing the past it has be n th is the In implicit assumption of both o rselves and the J3 panese that tha big boys the U S and Japan wUI settle the problem and the Okinaw ans will docilely acc ept 0 1GBP joint decision This assumption can no longer be counted upon Th3 OkinillJ ln intrusion into th rcversio oo ncgotiat ions can com in tl110 ''lays rhro gh agitation leading to o en incidents with U S forces and through the evangelistic pressures for action on the part of the n C lief Executive Yara The p tential f or a incid t inv lving an open clash between de nstcators a d A erican military forces protectir oar bases is mu h higher today than ever before Giveil the limited capabilities of the Ryukyuan p lice such an incid t has always been possible The od Is have been considerably shortene d in recent 'weeks by thr le factors The increased milita y and radicalism of the w o are begin 'lin J to mimic the tactics of their stude ts Japa se brethren 1 o o 2 the a1'l iguous position of Yara who at the same tim is tha accc tcd leader and spokesman of the iI -ltibasc m vc n nt and is nOl-l responsible for controlling it -- n body knows how h will react w en the crllnch c on s a'ld 3 the developm t of an issue that binds almost all Okin a ans iI ld strikes a sym athetic emotional chord -- the B-52 0p'J ration5 at Kade na and the danger of another i nc idcrlt 1'5' Till DECLASSHWEU Authorinr and33' 1111511114 sro IS 1 - In this climate our insista ce upon exercising our unrestricted rights for 3 52 operations SEN visits etc becomes not only a focal point for potentially dangerous demonstrations but further an inceetive to seek as soon as possible reversion of Uhinawa at the homeland level where the Japanese Government will protect the Uhinawans against the U S General Unger is making every effort to reach a modus vivendi with Yara without making serious concessions on base rights But it is a precarious tash given the pressures Yara is under from his left wing coalition and the inherent desire of the conservative opposition to see i111 i l Yara moreover has cast himself as the confirmed and authentic spokesman of Uhinawan reversion sentiments In his grand tour of Japan he constantly pushed the theme of early reversion But of even more concern to us is his effort at the same time to inject himself into the debate on the conditions for reversion Yara has publicly urged not only homeland level but a thinning out of U S bases He has made it clear that he as Uhinawa' elected leader is going to resist to ignore the Dwinawen view on post-reversion U S base rights Thus it is not impossible that the pace of events in Usinawa could press the Japanese Government to accelerate its current timetable Certainly an incident involving a clash between demonstrators and U 5 military guards around bases will put the Japanese- Government on a very difficult spot The spectra of such a development constantly plagues the Foreign Uffice and other Japanese officials Outside the Ghinawan issue there are some encouraging notes of progress in resolving current U S -Japan problems particularly with respect to trade restrictions against U S impo ts and the reasonably quiet visit of the nuclear sub In very large part these actions taken by the pi m 'aEPaonuoI-io AT THE airman ARCHIVE-ZS k wmy 5 I mesoaai - emf 5 1 Japanese are in their own self-interest and cued to clearing the decks for a favorable decision on reversion But they also reflect the dedication of the current leadership to maintaining a close relationship with us after consideration the Japanese Government has accepted our offer for space coope oration rather than going it alone HoweverJ below the surface there are bubblings of serious discontent from within the ranks of the next generation of leaders about the character of the U S - Japan alliance and Japan's great dependence on the U S These younger men are not necessarily dissatisfied with a partnership with the U S but are concerned that the present relationship gives too little freedom to the new Japanese nationalism a vague and still far from wellrdefined concept They are not now seeking or even necessarily desirous of a break with the U S and embarking on a deGaullist path They do look for a new relationship with the U S by 1930 which meets their principal criterion of equality with us In the context of this new nationalism Dkinawa has become a serious test of willingness to treat Japan on more eqaal termst FIJI a i- E_g f_arog This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu