I l tiCls ' i I JZiilii' 'lal Js11Tili2 I DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER 8725 JOHN J KINGMAN ROAD SUITE 0944 FORT BELVOIR VIRGINIA 22060-62 18 r____________ _____________________________ ----------- --- -- -- - - ------l -- t - nhGBP illoo I - lj'l - I o ' ---- - - h 1 IJill' I L--- --------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ---------- Polk on tiw Redistribution of DTH Supplkd Information ' c n htio ' rr toH l bt min DT C n r cs i IIH rrn rt r' '' rt t l' r d n fl l i'IC that 1 - rl k ui oo rl lHh l r i - i l l'lrllll rl l o mtr J U m fanl or for purpus s -pt'Cllicalh nuhuni' J h 1ho l - ' - t mm m crh y that '' 'On onng lCccss Furtht r the wit1rmJ Il Jl will nul 1 _ rLtbil h d t' Jr rr olit lr tn 1 lll tflncr llUrKeJ tor rubllc rt ca Ill h U 'i tl lt ly _l t'liJ 'r ro'fWn ft red for sale nn-CtlmpliJJKl mJy result in t orrmnatll' l f 1o cc - md 1 rt quH o mcnt to e urn ail ini'urmallon olhtaim d from OTIC OTICE 'e m pleased to suppl this document m n spon e to uur request lh Jcquisitlon of techrucal reports nutc memorandum ere 1 an he Uefeose Tecbnical lnform11Uion c nter Hffl ' thot i k pc nd illiCrt t of users and conm butors a tive Ill unl _ oing program tt ran o 1 the Clt ms mJ T'hcrefore 1f you know of the cxistc nu n any mti ant rt pllnS Lc that Jrc- rw t m the I TJ Jc-t tron Wt' 'uuld apprc uat n c t I Ill 'pte If tnT ormulmn rd Hcd tu thctr S JUrc s 1nJ J 111 - tbiliry h tpprnpnatc r gu latttJ n trt i kp lrtnl nt o r' Drtcr sl ' P t l qo 2 1 1 S1 i nu r md _ hnJcai ntorm won ' tl - r tm Der' lnment _ klt nsc i m ctl l' '2JO - ili- ulill ltt l ' tt mcm o 11 Tc chnical J I C Umcn l Jttnnal Jnt lfnlattun - tJ noards or pntZ lllPn r J ' i j i mll u J l CJ l 1 -l JQ5 Sca ntrfic and kchntcai Reports i kmcnts l rgat11ZJll lfi mJ l k s 1 n k-rartmenl of Defense ' 00 1-R lntonnatilln S curit Prnl 'ram Regulation our Acquis itions Branch UTI C-OCA _ til t- si- t tn r 'h mg Ill qucsuons o ll may hJ _ 11 _ mm d Ji Uments tv he - uhmllt d Td phom IHlmht T t' r the oltlicc are 703 767-X04 1 o r S 1 27- 0-'0- he Rt'fenru t tntJ Rctrie - al Sl n in llrunch I TIC-IlRR Iii t' SI - 1n J lC-U ll 'nl iJ- mi ri atton 1rJ rm n11i rd H _oJ qu tl lll l kphon number i1r t Jc 1l lll c m o -o ' t76i-R1' '4 or OSN414-827-t --- ' i I O NOT RETl R ' i THIS l O T' IENT TO IHK EACH ACTIVITY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OESTRl'CTJON Of' THIS DOCUMENT ACCORDING TO WPUCABLE REGULATIONS i li _______________________________________________j I ---------------- - --- -ft- - J I - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - -- - - -- -- - - -- -- - - -- - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - o UNCLA SSIFIED Information Warfare Strategies Seminar I o The Uses of IW Against the US in Wartime Prcplrod By The Stnielic Aueumeat Center Sdeace Applicatiou laterudoul Corporatioa Soptamber 1991 o Pftplrccl for No DASWOI-9H -0060 - I SAIC Project No OJ-117 - 04-7301 2 9 Stntegic Assessment Center Science Applications International Corporation Harbour Ceutre 2 Eaton Street Suite 506 Hampton VA 23669 cQOOb 10 031 '10 UNCLASSIFIED o I o The OSDINA JpOnJOI'lOd lnfonnadon Warlluo Worl shop 1be Uses of IW Against lhe US in Wartime wu held 2 '1 2 June 1998 ud cooducted in Hampton Virginia by tbt Strategic Assusmtnt Center of SAIC The worbbop explored lbe uses of information warfJ re IW against 1be Ullbed States and its allie S during wartime Scenarios were generated by three groups of mninlr partk ipants using a red-team approach and gathered observations and insi hiS about how infonnadoo warlluo migbt be employod by potential fUture c ompedtors worbhop was eonducted by mems of thrco teliml8 each rot playing a different prospeetive in the 2020 frame The groups were dircdcd to aeatc two to thtcc information warfare stratcg lcs for use qainst the United Statoa in wartime To provide backp'ouod ll'lld torWtXt the teams were provided a scenario whicb dcscn'bed the politiGal k aad military c va ata lc ediDg to war with the United swes The three 5CC Dirlos stood alone and were indcpendea t of one aa oeber Eld1 Red am Wl 'l expected to f'aee the full weight of US mUQry To meuun this woigbt tn iotelligc oce estimate of the US 2020 Order of Battle was provided The wott shop bad tbc followiftg cha racteristic The Red force o o o o o first red team rol played a near-peer China-like c ompditor tbe second team role-played a regional Iranian-like compcdtor and the ihird team role-played a traDsnallonal non mte guotrilla totroriJt competitor The Each team was Red t-o develop stmtcgies with a focus on the question of why a competitor would use lW to achieve its objectives Stratea ic issues were DOt emptwizod The planners wn diMted to use information warfare in direct support of their theater objectives The warns were ukcd explicitly to think about the lin k agc between be moans of infonnation wartBre and the national ends pursued by a prospective red A numbef of o o o o o These included the following Strateck' Perceptloa Muagemut Eadt tc1m foc u cd heavily oo c nating intc nmional climate conducive to their war aims especially a policy of IUJ acldag US public opinion by creating art lmpm s ion of red forco le gitim acy in tho face ofagiC$Sive US mons Attatk US Ablllty to U n Perfeet B tttlespace Anreaca nc ability to discriminate and anaJyze targets and to lcssm tbe effects of fog and friction was see as 11 critical yet vutntnlble aspect of US forces in the 2020 time frame ladk t Damacc oa Hl11l-Valuc Forees Tbe ability to datnagc or destroy high-value us forces was critiG81 to tbc campaign Red challengcn gencrally could not afford to wah for tbe US to bring it5 fot Ces to bear in the region and pursued an aggresvsi e asymmetric area denial aunpaign n c Umltl or loformat o Warfl re Even though each red was d by the NCAs to consider usc of IW outside the theater including in CONUS to ful1bcr operational ainu in tbeater nonc did so in any significattt and coonlinattd manner primarily no specific gain in theater was perceived he cost in the are9 of Strategic Perception Management ' see above was seen u excessive o o o i3a1HI$ wm rai$Cid in tbl context of the worbbop o o lW strategies below developed and the capabilities n quired to carry out a spcc ific Stmegy Ire summa rizcd Non stawtnptnatlota ComneHtor J IW J ot iltics Dilrupdoa Foc us on denying the US lbe ability to si IStain its forces ainady deployed to Veneruela and Columbia IUid to delay tbe deployment of additional forces Caoabilitjes Tbe ability to use and intearatt information technOIO Y Signlfkmt and timely intelligence C Aplbilitle$ to aequi re informatiop on the US log lsck s infrascru cturc Attaek tile ladMdaoJ SOldier Attempt to fie rade the effcctivenC$$ of US fotecS in the region at the level of the individual soldier r PPhi1ities Knowledge of US communications systems and theit vulnerabilities Ability to sean for andjam elect ronit communkaOons Ability to use the internet direct mailing aDd rtSelt'Ch capabilities -Computer communicltioN and proce$Sirig power D o ExpiDd Time aad Crute UIM 'Iertlilty Strategy directed at the pcm ption that the US must win wan qui kly atKI cleanly u well as its ability to achieve 'topsight and dominut batlespKC awareness Capabilities -Integrating computer n work auack and iritemet psyops It the lowest possible level -Use intbtm ttion 't eclmology to inereue the effectiveness of the guerilla soldier In Rtcfonol Competitor L hllade Artiblla Coatederatloa-Direettd PS 'opa Effort to influen opinioo witbin Islamic S1ateS against the introduction of US a nd Western fortes to the region Capabilities -Command and Control and opcta ional seeuricy -Ability to i ntofp ate and utilize cuktnf and academic knowledge EstabliWnertt and development of an Islamic news netWork throughout the MKidle East and North Aftica U lSR Overlold Attempt to spoof confuse and OlherwlJe degrade the ISR systems ofdte US milit ary Caoabilitig Qencration ofballis tic missile IR plumes t 1$e radar signatUreS and ttansporter ercctor Jau ochtr oea False SAM sites and radar signatwu False minelsubrnlrlnc 11 rgets submarinc-launc hed SAMs PanaUcl communicltions sysu ms with faJ5e SIGINT tratfic -Ability to corrupt naviaadon _ d combat 10 systems o UL EMP Pari Hlrbor Attempt lo intlia damage on high value US forces by extensive use of advanced EMPIRF weaponry Capabi itjts -Lqe numbers of small man-portable EMP devices -Ability to command and c ootrol sirnult aneQIJ$ attaeks throughout 1 e theaw -Pouible of nuclear EMP detnnation in space o o IL neater DHepdon Auempt to erode the ofUS infonnation systems which arc seen as a ' 'ofgravity tbr llllure usC hilities u ofspedal operadoos plratos in lhc Sou1h Chine Sea EMPIIU' devi es on iJiands 111d fisbiq v o o o o I_W -1 w - no UmoflW-1M us ' Introduetion o This seminar spo1110nod by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Net Allsese sm nt is part of its ongoing investigation of the Revolution in Military Affairs RMA This seminar was conducted by the Hampton VA office of the S1rategic Allsesesm nt Center of Science Applications International Corporelion and explonod the uses of information Wlllfaro IW against the United States and its allies during wartime The specific objective of this workshop was to construct a set of plausible 51rategies in the form of scenario outlines for the usc of lW against the United States in wmtime Scenarios generated by three groups of -inar participsnts using a nod-team approach garnered further insights about how information Wlllfaro might be employed by potential future competitors Semhoar Objectives The workshop was condueted by means of three teams each role-playing a different prospective Red force in the 2020 time frame The groups directed to cn ate two to three information warfare strategi for usc against the United States in wartime To provide background and context the teams provided a scenario that dOliCI'ibed the political economic and military events leading to war with the United States Tho three scenarios were independent of one another Each Red team was expected to face the full weight of US military rosoun es To measure this weight M intelligence estimate of the US 2020 Order of Battle was provided o A set of research questions and group worksheets were deoigned to highlight explicit linkages between the means' of information warfare with the national ends as described by the notional political-military command authority Players were directed to focus their strategi at the ope1111ional rad er that s1ralegic-NCA level Information ope1111ions directed at CONUS or any other 51rategic targets were to be joatified in terms of their immediate 'levance to the conduct of the war within the theater of operations In addition the scenario-building process served to highlight concepts and ttends that affect information ope111o 1i ns and might metit further analysis Seminar Desigrl Playenyd Materials Players were drawn from across US Atlantic Command operational and staff organizations other military and government organizations and private industry The participsots played the role of an Information Warfare Command staff and were tasked to address the operational rather than strategic-political dimemions of information warfare o Pagel i o Jllllf fu SII _ I 'I'llo UH Ioj'IJII 1 u USIll w - Biue force lists and full text of the scenarios for eaoh group are included in the Read-Ahead package appended to this report Tabs D through 0 Red force lists were intentionally withhel d from players to stimulate discussion as to the types of cspsbilities aod force structures tbat a US competitor would be required to develop from the present to 2020 in order to support a specific IW strategy Reseauh Ouestioas Wotkshop participants ' asked the fOllowing questions Develop scenarloo with on emphaois 011 the why questlo11 o o Why would a U S adversary attack a particular I W target with particular IW assets Objectiv fur this Hmlur include o Further exploration of the implicatioos and role of information operations in warfare o Wbat objectives might o How might an adversary pursue national objectives with infonnation warfare o Wbat cspsbilities would an adversary ueed to pursue those objectives o o an adversary pursue with information warfare Why IdentifY U S targets which are exploitable or per ved as exploitable by means of information warfare IdentifY U S targets that might NOT be attacked because of Impact on own economy Effect on ''neutral economies Imps on own ISR Reluctance to escalate conflict Impact on world opinion o o IdentifY red targets capability which may need proteCtion from US attacks Seenarios The three scenarios provided bad several factors in common o o A plausible 'story' to take players from the present to a 2020 conflict with the United States Red NCA recognition that r o _ n-furce conflict with the United States was not a viable option o Pagel oo llf o- Wtufu li1rlll'l ' Smlbuul Tile Uw of1WAgllbut Ill US ill Wort me o o Red perceptions that a cleverly designed and quickly executed Information Warfare attack could achieve operational objectives in the short term A primary objective to force US on station forces away from red sovereign territory and to preveut resupply reinforcerneut Stenario 1 o The sceuatio for the first group involved a near-poor Chinese oompetitor to tho United States in East Asia In the sceuatio twenty years of dismal economic perfonnance and political unrest in Indonesia contributed to the slow but ac elerating implosion of that country Attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia an increase in piracy and lawlessness in the South China Sea and the need to securo access to oil resources for its growing eoonomy oontributed to an increasingly aggresvsi e Chinese presence in tho region Hostilities with the United States were cau ed by a Chinese declaration of sovereignty oVer the South China Sea as well as simultaneous air and seaborne assaults on Malaysia lndoneaia's Natuna island and the Sultllnate of Brunei under the pretext of a NEO the prete tion of its nationals and the need to reestablish order throughout Southeast Asia S nerio 2 The sceuatio for the second group involved a regional oompetitor in the Middle East The implosion and partition of Iraq in the last years of the 20111 century led to the growth of an Iranian-directed militant-lslantic state astride the region Incorporating lnm parts of Iraq and Syria Turkmenistan and allied with Yernen this stste directed its attention to securing the withdrawal of American influence in the Gulf States and establishing itself as the legitimate hegemon in the region The New Islamic Republic NJR began offensive operations against the Gulf States to secure their acquiescence to its national security and oil production objectives o Scenario 3 The scenario fur the third group was concerned with the Bolivistes a guerrillaldrug trafficking group in South America and Mexico anomie oollnpse poverty and drug corruption conspired to erode the traditional interstate and state- government structures there The US increasingly dependent on Venezuelan and Colombian oil was concerned with growing conoections between drug preducers and Ultionalistlsocialist rebels there In the midst of the collapae of friendly governments in South and Ceotral America inclnding Mexico US forces were introduced into Mexico and the oil-producing regioiiB of Venezuela and Columbia to restore order and limit tho advance of the rebel movement o Page o Ill o- W Jf Slmqta-1 11e VU1 oI1WA m t ti us bt - _ IW Strategies Seminar Attendance List o First Name Tom Jeff Tom Rich Bill MJKe Worth Joho Mike Jim Tammy Joe Mara Kevm Perry Bob Chuck Barry Polly FDIIlk Jjm Kevin I Hllr1l' Andy Jeff LutName Baldwin Becke r l lelote Blanchfield Brinkmann Brown Carter Davts DZIUDmski Baste Fillrow Gugliotta I Hurwitt I McCrohan Meador Miller Nicholson Slaughter I Spanr Stech Subr Vao loten Waters Wilde Worklnan 0 lion SAIC SAC Hampton SAIC SAC Hampton JWAC SAJC SAC McLean U ACOMJ-28 SAJC SAC McLean USALOMJJ 1'3 USACOM l 35zC USACOMJ-361 USAc OM HAlSC SAIC SAC McLean SAJC SAC McLean JWFC Concepts Division USACOM JOIIlt Kes Urut I JWFC Concepts Division USACOM JTA L U AcOM l 362B USA COM Joint Res Unit USA SA USACOM Jomt Kes Urut SAJC SAC Hampton U AcOM JTASC JWt'C Concepts DiviSIOn JCS J-39 ACCIDIJD o o Page4 Pooitloaffitle Moderator Rapporteur Mr M r Capt USN Coordinat r Lt Co uSAF t Lol USA Lt Col AF CuR - KJII I Orteur Rapporteur Ms Mr Mr 'Maj USAF CDR USN Mr Ms COl USAR Moderator CDRUSN I Mr I LCDRUSN Lt CoLUSAF o lnfot -kJo Wtufan StNtqla SDII Jitu I Tl e Um oIIWAl- tile US lo W11111me Seminar Iosiehts Although the three teams approached the problem of conducting information warfate against the United States from different perspectives and with differing capabilities all three ml teams n acltcd similar conclusions about the most promising methods Stratope Perception M auagement First each team focused heavily on ctoating an international climate conducive to their war aims The ability to create an impression of ted fon e legitimacy in the face of aggressive US actioDSt was a constant o Attack US Ability to Have Perfect Battlespaee Awareaeu A second information warfare strategy elabomtod by each group was an attemp t to confuse delay and even ntislead the US fon e by attacking its ability to collect analyze and uoderstand information Each team concluded that these ISR functions were a vulnerable aspect of US forces in the 2020 time frame Teams chose to do this in at least two different ways o One team determined to Stress the SR System through deception In one instance they built and dispatched hundmls of fake naval ntioes Although the team realized the US Navy would be able to discriminate between real and fake mines they believed that the shear number of possible mines would focus commanders' attention that it would consume valuable time and that it would require the dedication of many different kinds ofiSR resoun es to discriminate real fi Oin the fake mines o A S Ond team decided to Stress American forces' intelligence fUsion capability Realizing that there was very little their side would be able to hide from the US lSR capabilities they determined that they would make the analysis of that data particularly problematic By moving fon es all over the battlespace and they would make the task of intelligence officers more difficult o The Limits of Jiformation Warf The more advanced and larger the red-team lhe less likely the team was to go strategic and attack space aod non-ntilitary computer systems Each team weighed lhe US response to such attacks carefWiy For example the Chinese group never took the fight to space systems while the Islantic fon e actively pun ued the ides of nuclear detonations in space The Boliviste group planned to attack satellite downlink stations in the United States The Chins team did discuss attacking civilian systems in CONUS such as the Social Secwity psyment computers Even though each ml team was directed by he NCAs to consider use of lW outside the theater including in CONUS to further operational aims in theater none did so in any significant and coordinated manner There were several thought processes causing the rejection of CONUS attacks I There was no linkage to theater objectives 2 There was a feeling that a short-term victory could be achieved in-theater but o PageS Itlfo- Wuj'Ufl Slnttqla s-mu I 17rt u ofiWApiMI tilt us w - the longer term reaction of an emotional US public was to be avoided 3 There was concern about negative effects on red's limired ISR and communica tions capability For el lllple ll there were discussions about using Computer NetWOrk attack to disrupt the US banking system The decision not to do so was suworted by statements like Bolivlstes Much of our strength is in our wealth thai is laundered in the US flt18Jlcial system- it would hurt us more than the US Chino NIR It would hurt us too but more importaody would hurt our friends allies and natiom neutral in the conflict Our limited theater objectives will not last long if the enti n world is mobilired against us o The coosequcncc then is thai each team was cautious about attacking strategic targets either in CONUS or in space Each team was focused on pursuing limited objectives in the theater of ope lltions was concerned that strategic attacks on US assets would probably result in retaliation which would negate any possible advantages of doing so o o Pago 6 llf o- Worftuv S- rl 11 Uur Of WApmldu US bf JY- Non-State Trampatiopa Competitor Information WarfaB Strategies National CoiiUIWid Obj- The overall objective of the Boliviste campaign in the region is to keep the United States out of the conflict to the greatest extent possible and to continue operations aimed at seizing control of the stales in the region Sub-objectives included I Attacking US forces t y in the mgion and denying their upply or reinforcemen 2 Indefinitely controlling the flow of oil to the United States from the region and 3 Denying the ability o of US foroes in the region the ability to sec and understand Boliviste force dispositions or intentions Operational-Level Obj-es Operational-level objectives for this S elllo ll'i included I Shaping a favorable international political environment to our overall w ar aims 2 Denying the US the ability to infloence the outcome of the insurgent's actions in this region 3 Use of both conventional and IW nesources to degrade and destroy assets essential to American power projection 4 Protecting insurgent ntilitary political and finsneiol assets with information resources and 5 Protecting Boliviste command control and communications resources from degradation or destnJetion lnfonnation warfare area o was to be used as a method to cripple US efforts within the of insurgent operations as woll as vital resources and supporting infrastructure in CONUS where prudent and in keeping with political guidaoce INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY 1 IW LOGISTICS DISRUPTION CAMPAIGN Coones of Aelioa The first strategy by the non-state transnational group focused on denying the US the ability to sustain its forces almady deployed to Venezuela and Columbia and to delay the deployment of additional fon es The Boliviste movcmen scenario poaseased huge cash ruerves and o was as portrayed by the able to mobilize significant teclmical Page1 L------ -- ------- -- - fn ormlltkm WIU IIr SV ka - I n Um t fIWApbut11ut us In w - o resources in pursuit of thelr aims Using a combination of cash bribery and the threat of violence the Boliviste team attempted to render the civilian inftastructure Ullleliable and ineffective Using positive and nege tive inducetnents they atten pted to bribe seamen truck drivers and rail operators in the region and also attempted to do the same within the United States near likely staging areas In this way critical supplies could become lost or dsmaged They also considered buying bssing rights ports railroads and other infrastructure and legaUy denying them to US forces physically occopy such assets but it might o serve Of course the US could still to slow the momentum of any deployment The logistics campaign did not attempt to stop every article of materiel from making it to US forces wbioh was probably not feasible anyway Rather the effort conceD'Inlted on denying 100% of one or more critical type of supply The cessation of medical supplies for example could induce a serious degmdation in US war-fighting abilities Performance in the field might be affected if soldiers discovered that wounds that would be fairly easy to treat in normal times were now life threstening becsuse of lack of supplies Guerrilla operations and sabotage campsigns would be fneused on cargo tenninals transfer points and apeeific commonications nodes Targets might also include dependiog on the level of security highly-trained and hard-to-replace operotors of logistics systems rather than or in conjunction with destruction of the physical o infrastructure Prior to the sabotage campaign technical computer cadres would be charged with penetrating US computer networks including routing software and systems logistics and the TPFDD While physical attacks on the system took place penetrated systems would be attaeked by means of viruses and other methuds of CNA Systems which could not be taken off-line might have their real-world extent that the overall data corrupted to such an integrity of the system would be in question The team also thought it important to attempt to attack US airlift cspabilities by using for example shoulder-launched missiles near alrbases and by findiog and o Page8 lofo V Wotfut SiHtqla Sonblu I lit Usa ofIW tft US 111 W _ attacking any airlift support infrastructure in the region The combination of simultaneous physical desttuction and CNA might compound damage cause ents and assessm the US to lose track of large amounts of materiel In addition to shrinlting the size of the logistics pipe the oompaign would att mpt to increase demand for supplies thmugh the pipe Through physical attack for instance the Bolivistes would alt mpt to destroy any bulky or critical items that phu ed high demands on airlift By computer Network Attack logistics systems could be corrupted o with high-priority olden for unneedod items cold-weather BDUs for example Coolllln le ellla The and anti-logistics oompaign foeusod on intelligently asses ing US logistics needs using precision-CNA and J 111lallill operstions to significantly decrease the perfonnance of the system Although it was hoped that caseading failures would be injected by such an operstion the r d team took pains to emphasize that information opemtioos would probably not be a silver bullet that would result in a US defeat Red players thought that significant degradstion of the system might be inducod but that red might not be able to locate or have css to single points of failure Although in the acenario the r d force has extensive resources it was thought that the US would probably spond even more and that by the 2020 time frame that the US would have significant defensive capabilities in this area o Red group members conceded that such attacks would probably be more harassing than decisive and would be part of a wider overall campaign The r d team thought however that ex11 ndod attrition of US forees and a long-drawn-out conflict that significantly drainod its resources would be useful a adjunct and possibly cause the US to lose interest and withdeaw from the region over time The group erophasized the notion that W resourees deployod in this scennrio would gamer neither quick nor decisive results o Page9 o III -WIU rueSiuJ4i ll -l Tlro U ofIWAgobut tilo US lo w- CapabUities Required The first important capability that the movement would bave to develop was the ability to use and integrate information tecbnology Significant amoonts of money could buy tbo sophisticated tecbnology and weaponry to ' out suob tactics However the difficulty would lie more in tbe ability to 1rain and maintain the expert computer operators needed to undertake tbe CNA portion of tbe strategy The desrtb of such workers in this highly paid sector of the US economy sugg- that recruiting ideologically-motivated and technically proficient infotmation warriors might be a o serious bottleneck The Bolivistes would also need significant and timely inteUigeru e capabilities to get information on tbe nature of the US logistics infrastructure INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY U ATTACK THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER Counes of A tlon The second strategy explored by the transnational team focused on degrading the effectiveoess of the individnal US soldier Tho team noted that suob a conflict would be labor-intensive in terms of the types of resources that would be required to prosecute a guerilla-type conflict Therefore the ability to degrade the effectiveness of the individual soldier would significantly diminish the US ability to fight elfeetively Fu t this strategy involved attacking the morale and motivation of US troops by taking psychological o operations into the global infotmation network including through the intemet and electronic mail The Bolivistes would set up a web-site in an electronically-open country and post listings of US force deployments and dispositions Photograpba of individnal soldiers in- theater cotdd also be posted to the site with names family members addresses in the US e-mail addresses and other personal data also included in ouline dossiers operation could also include pbotogtaphs The and data about soldiers' family-members and homes in the United States These photos could also be electronically manipulated to o Page 10 - --- ------ o bif- Wuj Sbtllqia-I Tilt UmofIWAfiiiU ' o us br w increase the negative impact on soldiers An electronic newsletter eould be posted to the site or even e-mailed to soldiers and fumilies with information both true and false on individnal US soldiers taken captive and killed in action The ability to capture and use individual e-mail addresses and the use of targeted marketing in the information haute might have particularly devastating effects on the morale of US foroes The idea that guerilla forces were watclting reporting and targeting individuals with impunity coupled with ao online demonstration of the ability to target and kill a specific individual might have important effects throughout the theater o The content of an electronic psyop campaign would employ maoy of the same themes that have been used in opposing US forces before Red would declare o That they bad no quarrel with US citi ens ooly the government that sent them dlere o Press information would be distributed and press conferences with Boliviste officials would attempt to link the US government with drug trafficking and support of corrupt South American officials These press conferences would also emphasize the insurJ ent's respect for US ideals and people but that by involving themselves in the region US forces were bringing the conflict on themselves o Using CNN and other media outlets the objective media and its searoh for both sides of the story could also increase the prospective legitimacy of the movement and to send messages to US soldiers that their cause was illegitimate and their leadership misguided o o A reverse body count could be coupled with such a strategy to encourage the idea that the costs of US engagement in the region were higher than the benefits are worth Second the strategy also focused on IW attacks against the electronics and communications of the individual soldier especially against uncontroiiJ d electronics cell phones satellite telephones such as the Iridium system and lop top computers Attempts would also be made to jam and spoof GPS siguals o Page II In this strate gy the Red team Wu flwstnrlqlt$ - 1 The Uses ofiWAfii MttiJeUS br Wortim6 I fun es were dependent on vulnerable communications and navigation technologies and whether the absence of concentrated its efforts on exploiliDII the extent to which US these technologies would cause small-scale US efforts to fail catastrophically or to failllJIICOftytll The variety of systems available to individual warfigbtcrs was seen as a significant fun e multiplier and the ability to interdict and def l'llde them would serve to increase in insecurity and isolation ofUS fun e CoaWJienefits o The benefits of this -tegy were decreased levels of US morale and a deereased will to fight generated by a psychological assault through information systems The heavy reliance on communications control and navigation systems at the individual level might create vuinerabilities that could be exploited The aimed to induoe militarily significant oases in soldier effectiveness especially if such failutOS included in lraining and exercise events The Jed team asserted that such are not a strategy especially over the long term could cause a loss of unit cohesion and trUst oflhe chaio of oommaod Again the non-state transnational team ernphnsized the fact that information operations in this context would not be a sliver bullet but would become more effective the longer the conflict extends in time IW psychological attacks on Individual soldiers would be extremely intelligence-soun e inteosive The ability to mobilize rosources on a scale necessary to significantly degrade the individual soldier might not be cost-effective o given the likely amount of protection Even over the long term tho benefits of suclt a stmtegy may be outweighed by the costs Such a campaign would also place a premium on the perceived legitimacy of Jed aims throughout the world The Jed fotce would have to have significant breadth and depth of international support and that Its quarrel was not with the American people but with its presence in the region Red did not consider taldng the physical war to US territoey in a significant manner instead the focus was on anacking US popular opinion at the strategic level-this is how US enemies have been effective in the past o Page 12 o llf r'H dtl'l Wlllf w StJwUria Satbuu I n u 'rwAp rn us111 w - lnformation operations against the individual soldier will no however provide quick results although if sustained fur a long period of time this slrall lgy may serve to wear down US forces and result in a loss of political support for actions in the region Capabllltieo Required Besides knowledge of the individual soldier Red Forces recogniud that the most important piece of information they needed was knowledge of US commualcations systems and their vulnerabilities Heavy reliance on commercial commwlications such o as cell and satellite pbonea would plaoe a premium on the ability to use technology and actively attempt to jam them In scanne r addition local EMP bursts and other electronic warfare teebniques were diacussed in attempting to disable electronic systemB such as individual computer systems The use of the internet and sophisticared direct-mailing with other web-research tools would require a large number of tmined and motivared computer operators Substantial investments in computer processing would be required However information warriors of the type described above need not be located in the same place1 and may be highly dispersed throughout the world INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY ill EXPAND TIME AND CREATE UNCERTAINTY Coarse of Action o The third strategy outlined by the non-state transnational both the perception that US wars team was directed at must decided quic kly using overwhebning force and the specific goal that the US be able to achieve topsight and dominant battlespaoe awareness The strategy labeled expanding time and creating uncertainty took low- intensity conflict to the information dimension The US as in the other scenarios was materially superior at almost all levels of conflict However its forces had s everal centers of gravity that could be exploited particularly well by the non-state transnational challenger These center included high casualties a reliance on command and control o Page 13 o WtlljlwStlllltf a-1 The Um ofIWAIoIMI t1u US lit _ systems sophisticated ISR resources host DBiion support structures basing rights ports railroads lines of coliJJilunications and most important of al time US forces could be effectively attacked using traditional guerilla means At the tactical level the Bolivistes would hit vulnerable US targets and run hide and refuse to battl e materially superior Amctiean forces on its own tenns The focus of this strategy would be to deny the US any sense of gratification on the battlefield The consensus among red team members was 1hat time was their ally and 1hat the US was genemly I o impatient and could not put up with a long and draining gnerilla conflict In addition to el pllll ling time the team was interested in creating uncertainty about the aims and capabilities of the movement exaggerating some capabilities and downgrading important aspects of others The ISR portion of the Boliviste strategy focused on overloading and blinding US information assets in the region Group members thought it would be too diffieult to directly attack US intelligence capabilities but 1hat an etrective strategy would be to overload and confuse as many of these systems as possible In addition the team discussed the encryption of message lnlffic throughout tho region on both critical and dummy lnlffic to further complicate US message gathering and processing assets An online worldwide backer contest would be set up with the Boliviste command offering snbstantial monetary rewards to those who disrupt or corrupt US o military computer systems The US would be put on an IW defensive and have to apply resources to monitor its systems In addition tho contest could be widely publicized and the significant neutral media stories on such an event possibly genemted Such a strategy may again slow the ISR and computer processing advantsges on which the US military will come to rely Finally the creating uncertainty strategy attempted to horizontally oscalate the conflict to Mexico and across the South American contineot in order to dilute US resources The red players hoped 1hat further instability in the Mexican situation could o Page 14 o lofomllllilm W q nSWUfia-1 Tie u ofiWAgalosttlte us bt w serve to relocate the focus of US opetatiollll to that mgion Attacks on US military bases would attempt to affect the sewer systems water sopply electricity and other infrastructure Sucll focused targeting of the military bases and broad poblicity of such a strategy would show that the Bolivistes were not out to hurt American poople but rather their government's interference in the region c ls Benelits The Red team asserted that the Bolivistes being o movement would possibly be less effected than the a committed ideological US by efforts to influence morale especially over the long tenn The attempt to expand time plays against a perceived teodency to be unable to susra1n military operations over a long period oftime against a non-specific and asymmetric eoemy The red teant it was initiative - the red team actively avoided -eking US weaknesses Such a stralegy asserted holds much of the strengths and searched for would serve to frustrate the US and deny it a quick and overwhelming victory a premise on which much ofUS doctrine and planning is bssed Red's main strength in this scenario was their large amowrts of cash Hacker con- and other types of information vandalism are very cheap and have the potential to wreak havoc disproportionate to their cost The Boliviste team discussed cost ll lldecffs and military effeetiveness an example of this being the decryption technology between encryption and If the ability to encrypt communications outpaces decryption process ing heavy encryption cheap o race can tie np US processing and analysis technologies expensive Foree Requiremeata Force requirements in this scenario Again sucll a strategy is predicated on are much the same as previous scenarios the ability to undertake physical guerilla opetations but this strategy seeks to integrate CNA and internet psynps at the lowest possible level The Boliviste would not only can-y his grenade and AK-47 into hattie but also his laptop computer and GPS receiver o Page 15 The incressed capabilities that these o lofomurtilm WllljltnSinttqlaSiflfflluul 111 UsnllfIW Agllbut Ill US In WIU'IImit technologies give to standing military forces around the world can also contribute to the effectiveness ofthe guerrilla soldier as well o o o oo ltl ln'lllllimr Will StNU tl ' S- r I 771o Uw f IWA ' Illo us Ill w- lg ormatiog Warfare Strategies Regjonal Comoetitor National Command Objeethles Guidance for the NIR team at the operational level included the following 1 Shaping a favorable international political environment to NIR war aima 2 Denying the US the ability to inlluence the outcome of NIR actions in this region 3 Use of both conventional and IW resources to degtade and destroy assets o strategic objectives interdiction and essential to opposing NIR 4 Protecting the NIR's military political and economic assets from deatruction and S Protecting the NIR's command control comnumications and surveillance resources from degradation or destruction A second NCA objective in support of this effort was to defeat the United States in this region without allowing it to forge an international consensus and military coalition agsinat NIR moves as against Iraq in 1990 The focus of the NIR effort was the isolation of the US from the international community forcing it to act alone in support of the Gulf States Operational-Level Objeedveo Information warfare was to be used as a method to achieve these objectives both inside and outside the theater Attempts to cripple the American effort could be undertaken both within the Persian Gulf region as well as by attacking targets in CONUS o including supporting infrastructure where prudent and in keeping with national command objectives The operational goal of New Islamic Republic forces in the region was to militarily intimidate the UAE Qatar Bahrain Kuwait Oman and Saudi Arabia so that they would acquiesoe to NIR political objectives in the region Missions goal included to support this I Attacking US forces currently in the region and deoying their resupply or reinforcement 2 Protecting the sovereignty of 12 NM exclusion zones in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea 3 indefinitely controlling the flow of tlllfc fi through the Strait of o Page 17 Hormuz and 4 Denying US forces in the region the ability to see and understand our force dispositions or intentions INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY 1 lAC PSYOPS Courses of Aetlon In the first strategy the NJR players undertook a significant theater perception management strategy in the early stages of the conflict The focus of the perception management strategy concentrated heavily on influencing opinion within Islamic states o Failures of the Iraqi attempt at psychological Operations in 1990-91 were noted aod avoided NIR players were interested in splitting the coalition by direct action against the reginles in the region liltber than by attacks on liirael or on American citizens The strategy was focused on two specific targets Saudi Arabia was the first target and as the host-nation for most US forces in the region was seen as the vital center of gravity fur coalition forces Meanwhile NIR players also concentrated their effort on splitting the weakest coalition member - Bahrain - to create the impression that momentum was on the side ofNIR forces The first and most important element in the perception management campaign as discussed by the NIR players was the development of the Islamic CNN and independent and 'ocommercial information channel which gave the impression of an impsrtial but NIR-oriented point of view The development of an Islamic CNN which would be in-plaoe and funetiotting years before the start of the conflict was critical o Some distance between snch a media gronp and the NIR government would have to be maintained in order to maintain legitimacy However the media group perhaps based in Tehran would be more easily controlled by the NIR government than western media outlets and shaping stories could be inserted into broadcasts befure and dnring the conflict Althongh it was emphasized bY the group leader that psychological operations should only be undertaken in areas which would have immediate positive impsct in the theater of Operations the NIR players were convinced that a psychological operations o Poge 18 ---- ------- i o lifo- Wuftln S lwUfll5 s-blu I De U1es 1 WApbul tile US Ill W ntmt o directed campaign immll iare at the hearts and minds of Arabs in the region would have and significant effects on the battlefield First they emphasized that in acoordance with the s enario the NlR would have a certain momentum and legitimacy that made historical Iraqi attempts at such momentum would be translated on operation pale hy comparison This into triwnphalist rhetoric directed at the Gulf states asserting that the Muslim world has stood up and that Muslims themselves rather than western forces now had the ability to underwrite and maonge stability in the region and act in a forceful manner on the world stage o Careful attention WliS paid to the need to be viewed as respousible in the eyes of Muslim as opposed to American or European populations Although oultural differeooes between the Iranians and Arabs narrower than that between were noted the gulf between them was viewed as Muslim and American Western attitudea and thus highly exploitable by a sophistioated NlR psyops campaign The psychological aspect of the campaign was speoificaUy geared toward this Western Arab perceptual gap Speoial forces were to be lslantic Arabian Confederation deployed prior to the orisis states demonstrations to sabotage military command authority attacks structures in in the capital cities of and Mecca Medina in order to foment infi as1ructure aod the region In addition attack or suppress national NlR operatives might stage on Arabs and possibly Arab-Americans and blame the attacks on US or Israeli forces o le ellts Coslllln 'fhe primary benefit of the perception maongcment Slralllgy is that is very low risk yet has the potential of seriously undermining the American wsr effort Although the US has and will have a communicstions and mass medis infi as1ructure that far outstrips that of aoy possible Mid-East competitor the cost of building such a region would not be out ofthe range of a state like the NIR o Page 19 system for the - ------- hifo o W -f SJrttUrlel s-111 ' l 17tt V11B ofIWApbut tlte U91n Wtll'tlnw Capabilitl Required Several signifi aUt capabilities would have to be acquired by 2020 in order for such a strategy to be undertaken First C2 and operational security in special operations for es a key abi ty that would have to be developed to plan and execute Psyop are campaigns The NIR would also have to be able to integrate and utilize cultural and academic kucwledge of the many Iraniao students in US over the Y ' in service of the Psyops campaign Io addition close physical and cultural proximity to the Gulf States would give NlR operatives a significaot advantage vis-a-vis sintilar US psychological o opeoations In addition to good cultural and political information a more robust infonnation architecture would be required The N1R players thought that the development of a Persian or 'Islamic' news network able to reach hoJile s throughout the Middle East and North Africa would pay rich dividends in a crisis Such a service as well as other NlR- oriented programming could be distributed by direct broadcast throngbout the region via a geosynchronous lslamsat INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY U ISR OVERLOAD Courses of Action The NlR team focused its second strategy on spoofing confusing and otherwise degrading the ISR systems of the US military The team attempted to generate numerous signatures some real most false in a variety of configurations mimicking ballistic o cruise and anti-ship missiles mines and submarines as well as aircruft strike packages and SAM sites Theanalysis and fusion portions of US systems were seen as susceptible to overload and would be the weakest parts of the US otilitary's ability to carry out warfare against a sophisticated enemy in the Middle East The strategy focused on pre- war analysis of US military commander and NCA concerns and expectations about what such a conflict would look like and work to actively amplify and exploit those concerns Such a strategy could seek to create coufusion and fog on the part of US commandern about the intentions of the NIR war effort and divert scarce US military from the main effort o Fage 20 resources away o lnf- w q r Stutqla-1 I'llo U oIIWAflllnilt Illo US In w - The first and potentially most -ve aspect of the counter-ISR stnuegy was the attempt to spoof and overwhebn ballistic missile senso111 and clef in the region The NIR would develop the capllhility to generate false ballistic-missile lR plumes radar signatures and TEL vehicles High-fidelity dwnmies and massive numbers of signatures intermingled with the real thing could significantly tie up the sens r fusion and analysis portions of the ISR cbain The benefits of such a stralegy would be gxea1er than simply allowing ordinance to reach the target The true objectives of the NIR could be pursued o while acaree analysis resouroes would be occupied with huntiog dowo weapons peripheral to the main effort A second aspect of the ISR stnuegy involved the generation of large numbefll of submarine and mine signatures in the Persian Gulf Hundteds or thousands of mine targets could be placed throughout the region at the onset of hostilities In sddition dozens of false submarine contacts would mask the operations of real diesel subs both in the Gulf and in the Arabian Sea significantly eomplicatiog naval operations in the region Dummy targets would be seeded with the real thing possibly allowing a submarine or mine to slip through US detection nets bnmediate results in the form of US naval forces witbdrswing trom the PC111inn Oulf were anticipated A third aspect of the ISR s1mtegy focosed on US fears of WMD use Although the team discounted the actual use of chemical or biological weapons mars of their use o could serve to shift a US commander's focus trom carrying out offensive opemtions to protectiog against such an attack The team discussed releasing non-letbal amounts of chemlbio agents near ground-based sensors or in the direction ofUAV's The team also discussed the utility of placing desd animals with obvious signs of chemical poisoning and 1races ofletbal agents in their bodies near US bases or other high-value US facilities The team also planned tnlffic to generate massive amounts of false dummy SIOINT laden with likely keywords to overlosd computer processing and slow the fiow of time-sensitive data from o rs to senso Page 21 users Computer analysis and network and o W S-1 k flmofiWApbutdulJS W communication nodes of no Slnllegic value would appear and generate trafl'ic in the run up to hostilities and would be heavily encrypted to further tie up computiJli resolll'COS The concept of ISR overload was extended to other systems and focused on creating uncertainty about any and all electronic systems the US was using Aircraft navigation TACAN and GPS might be spoofed and januned Combat ID and IFF systems oould be corrupted leading to a number of US iendly fire casualties either against its own or coalition tim es which could be exploited in the psyops compaign o This strategy also included the desire to actually damage or destroy some key US assets o For example a submarine SAM attack on an AWACS or JSTARS aircraft or a torpedo mine hit on a US ship Costs Benefits Such a $1r3tegy would Cl08Ie significant confusion and fog fur US commanders with little cost in tcnns of escalation Capabllitleo Required The NIR would ueed to undertske a oomprehensive strategy to classil ' and tsrget US sensing and processing capabilities and develop specific countenneasures to overload them A list ofpossible high-fidelity decoys includes The ability to generate Ballistic-Missile iR plumes fhlse radar signatures and Transporter Em toriLawleher sets False SAM sites and radar signatures o -False mine tsrgets False Submarine contacts -Submarine-launched SAMs In addition the NIR would need to develop many parallel communication systems and fill them with fhlse SIGINT trafl'ic Many communications nudes and links should lie donnanl until the conflict begins and simultaneously appear heavily encrypted To add to the confusion the NIR should develop an electronic warfm capability and attempt to o Page22 o ' '- ' - ollfll-'8- til us ' '- T u u corrupt navigation and combat ID systems Again the ability to induce doubt as to the reliability of these complex systems could induce caution in US force cause them to slow their operational tempo and allow nod ao oppoltlmity to prevail INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY ill EMP PEARL HARBOR Counes of Actioo The third strabegy for the NIR team focused 011 the abilil ' tD inflict substantial damage on high-value US forces The strategy envisioned the extensive use of advaoced o EMPIRF weaponry to disable US created by sensor and computu systems and using the window abock and surprise to damage one or more high-value targets in the theater Ideally this strategy would take place at a point in time before all US forces deployed to the region EMPIRF weaponry could be sm 88led into Saudi Arabia or aoy other gulf state supporting US forces and deployed near its bases and command complexes The EMP attack would take place throughout the theater simultaneously and be coordinated with a simultaneous attack bY cruise and ballistic missiles groups of fighter aircraft converging on critical targets and submarine-latmebed SAMS against AWACS JSTARll ABL EMPIRF devices would also be deployed against warehouse and storage facilities for spare and replacement electronic equipment The team discussed employing EMPIRF weapons against US naval assets by low observable eruise missiles UAVs and on civilian fishing vessels Large nwnbers of SSMs and decoys would be placed in and around the Strait of Hormuz and would be o fired in conjunction with Sub-SAMs against AWACS see lSR overload above The confusion caused by the simultaneous loss of electronic equipment and massive attack from the air might result in substantial damage or even oinking of high-value naval assets or at least a fighting withdrawal from the gulf The NIR players asserted that such a withdrawal would be a substantial vietDry for the N1R and damaging carrier even more so o Page 23 or destroying a WIIljJuwSO I Io-1 no u ofIW - 11u us ' w - o Coats Beaefllo The primary benefit to the EMP pearl harbor stralegy is that it was the only way other than through low-level terrorist-type aclions or wholesale recourse to weapons of mass destruction that the rod force can hope to illtlict real damage on US military forces in the lield If done conectly the shock and surprise of sueh a coonlinated and overwhelming attack could overwhelm the ability to respond It was noted that the US would prohshly o use EMP and RF weaponry in the campaign anyway and duis to get in the first shot against a force much more dependent on these vulnerable srs-s could result in significant advlmtages on the battlefield On the other hand there was no OODSODS1l$ on the efficacy of detonaling an EMP nuclear weapon in space the g10up agreed that It would result in sisnificont damage to US communications and intelligeru e satellites ovcrbcad However the team was split as to the response that the US wouldtake in such a situation Capabllidel Required The EMPIRF strategy n quired a substantial investment in the technology over the next twenty years The physical size of an EMP device was discussed and it was noted that the ability to develop small l llllllpOrtab e weapons would enshle the NIR to smuggle them across intetuational boWKlaries before a crisis began It was noted that operational security was extremely important to this type surprise would serve to multiply the effects and o create of operation Shock and a significont window of opportunity fur NlR forces The ability to coordinate simultaneous attacks throughout the theater of operations by aclivating tens or hundreds of EMPIRF weapons and launching ballistic and cruiae missiles airmft and submarines at a variety of targets would uire a highly effecrive method of command and control Finally NlR players discussed - king US satellite intelligenoe during the initial - k by means of a single nuclear detonation in space Consensus could not be reached on this issue but it was noted that the shock of such an attack would substantially multiply the effects of the general attack in-theater A nucleer attack on space assets bad o P 8 24 ---- the advantage of significantly damaging the ability 1o assess the nature of the overall attaok albeit for a limit d time In addition there would be no mushroom cloud o oor American casualties tbo1 could be used to justi y a nuclear response The very invisibility to the world community in such an attaok would limit the threat of retaliation Despite lhese advantages several NIR players were of lhe opinion that a nuclear attaok on its satellites would guarantee a dramalic US response that would cancel any advantages of such an attaok o This groop insisted tbo1 bcavy dantage to US high-profile high-value forees early in lhe conflict was critical to winnina the war Psychological operstions were u eful but nolhing would e - te the impression of the US losing as muoh as if it were actually losing Losses of this sort could push US forees away from tbe NIR heartland and foree lhem to fight at a distance o o Pagtt 2S L---- - I ' Io lofoJ'OIIIlolo Wlllfm Snotbuu l Til Um of1WAplmi tl US 1'1 W Near-Peer Competitor China National Commllld Objeotiv The players were directed to pursue two primary objectives First to project maritime power in Southeast Asia and S Dd to pnovent the United States from interfering with that power projection The NCA Uidance was such that the campoiJ ll should be tailored so to limit collateral dnmoge to long-term lllloli nal objectives such as continuing to increase economic and political development o National commnnd Uidance for the Chino team included I Shaping a favorable international political environmeot 2 Denying the US the ability to intluence the outcome of Chinese actioos in this region 3 Protecting Chinese mililllry political and economic assets 8Dd 4 Protecting Chinaos national and military eommand control and communications systems from degradation or destruction OperatiooaJ Level Objeetiv Information warfare was to be used as a method both inside and outside the theater to achieve these objectives Plaoni ng was tasked to relate specific IW objectives to the NCA's campoiJ ll goals Attempts to cripple the American effort could be ondertaken both within the Southeast Asian region as well as supporting infi astructure in CONUS where deemed feasible and prudent o The operational goal was to militarily intimidate and defeat Malaysia the United States and its regional allies and force them to ooquiesce to Chinese political objectives Missions to support this goal included I Attacking US Malay Australian and allied forces cunendy in the region and denying their resupply or reinforcement 2 Protecting the sovereignty of newly declared exclusive economic zones including the region surrounding occupied Natuna lslaud and 3 Indefinitely controlling the sea lanes of communication throughout the South China Sea including the approaches to the Strnits of Malacca and 4 Use of both conventional and IW resources to degrade and destroy assets essential to o opposing its war aims Page 26 ' o m ro- Wtu tJO -I u a 'rwApJtattil# us111 w INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY 1 GLOBAL PSYOPS CoutHIII of Ac tion The group was concet'lll d with portraying China as a hegemon in Southeast Asia as well as a source of economic and political stability in the region The group fucused principally on the peu eption management psychological operations side ofiW in the first strategy and chose not to engage the US military overtly but rather to focns instead on sumoptitious computer network attacks ilnsge management and justification for regional o involvement This S11'8tegy fucused on nonlethal and covert ways to enhance the legitimacy of the Chinese presence in the region and to forestall full seale conflict with the United States by creating the perception in the minds of United States ci targeted as a significant US center of gravity that the costs of an adventure in the South China Ses would far outweigh any possible benefit of becoming engaged in the region Although hostilities bad already begun in this scenario the China play did not wiah to appear 81 Sive or belligerent but radlcr as a aouroe of liability and legitimate authority in the region Information warfare ''' were focnsed on sbaping a favorable international political environment as u as denying the US the ability to influence Chinese actions in the region In this S11'8tegy the Cbincoe players did not wiah to risk at least early in the conflict using convontional and IW ' ' to destroy and degrade assets but rather o to degrade the politica1 center of gravity for US for es The players believed thst the wholesale use of IW attacks against US targets was escalatory and counter-productive during the early stages of the conflict Although such oational command concerns were explicitly above the operational level the team was very concet'lll d about the interaction between levels of military action and the n gion and wider consequences for its intereats arouod the world The teant in its role as near-peer competitor found itself in a very 04American predicament - bow to aggresis vely engage in regional conflict while inaulating the conflict from taking a mon global and uncontrolled character o Pag 21 o WIU otW81fwUr 11$ - l 'flu Vu f WAp IQIIM U lbo w The 1irst course of action COIISidored dise J how to force the US to make costlbeneflt decisions in China's favor The China loam foc1lsecl on trausmitting to the US public the idea that illvolvement in the contlict was benefits of intervention more painlbl than any possible In order to do Ibis tbe group discussed focusing on the economic potential in the region for US oompanies and tsrgeting the pro-Chinese business lobby in tho US It was posited that intomal prossure in the US apinst military involvement in the region could be encouraged among hosinoss groups in the United SUites Business leaden might be convinced that the costs to US co poralions of Chinese military and politicul bepnony would be outweighed by potential ecooomic benefits ofa o stsbilized region controlled by China The group abo focused on oomputer network attack as a method of influencing US perceptions In the 2020 time-period softwlmo will still como oft' the shelf with a si n Computer viruses portion probably being produced in Taiwan now a Chinese posseso might be incorporated into the oode in commercial oft'-tbe-shelf technology to act as sleepers to be awakened at some future date to instill nnoertainty in criticul systems Systems included logistic and transportation systems and other inftasb ucture components that the US will rely upon to stand up its presence in the resion The ability to instill doubt in criticul systems was dii C1l$$0d at length and the conclusion was roached that even If such systems could be compromised on a amall scule the nnoertainty caused by late or misdirected suppllcs would be an order of magnitude higher than the initial investment in time and resources Even a amall disruption in a criticul system could force o expensive solutions and complicate the deployment ofAmerican resources to the region Another focus of the PSYOP campaign was to tsrget US aversion to high casualties China group members discussed methods to genetale and transmit images of body bags being unloadod as well as other casualty preparednesa logistics measures or the 1llct that the military had ordered a very large number ofbody bags to be shipped to tho resion The purpose of such images and reports was to elicit moderating behavior in congress and from the American population It was hoped that significant reductions in the seopo and -1 o American war-oims could be generated from such an approach o o A final method of IW poyop the group discussed was an electronicfutternet version of Hanoi Hanna or Tokyo Rooo Through means of compu M network attack as well as internet broadcasting Chinese IW forces would Ulldertake to find the locations of service m and women and send g n etings to them including pictures of their location via email Live intentet broadcosts taCks on American shipo of fiocilities or photographs of ballistic missile roal or c omputer-gcncrate might create significant confusion in a wired SOC iety and military In additio11 e-mail messages might o be sent to family back home or more conaequentially pictures of home and families in CONUS sent to serviceruen particularly those with critical deployment and warfighting jobs INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY U THEATER DECEPTION Coaneo of Aetloa ln the second seeoario infotmati oo operations manner and wore were undertaken in a more overt aimed at eroding the capabilities of US information systems The overall objeetive of information - attacb is to indua us fo to question the reliability of information S 'lltmB to the point where they would shut thesn off Players felt that because the US military is dependent on complex information systems the sbility to disable them would represent a considerable force multiplier Players emphasized that only a amall portion of systems need be damaged or corrupted in oroer to indoce doubL The group concluded that a corruption rate of 25 percent of all o information was enough for US commandm to lose confidence in their computer S 'lltmB and possibly shut thesn off Chinese special operations forces would use pinues covertly to fomeot uncertainty and disruption in the region These forces were to be plausibly deniable by the Chinese govCI1IIIlCIt I Tho piracy problem would be urased and possibly actively directed by Chinese forces lhrougb funding and covert operations The threat to shipping cornmen e and general safety by this force would be highlighted in the media and contrasted with US claims as the guarantor of security and Slllhilily in the South o Pag 29 llfjMIJrlllflfnr o _ I o Jh UIII I D IW tk US bt WFinally the PLA navy would intervene and Cbina Sea apprehend piJ8Ie vessels operations that would be broadcast across the region The politicallpsycbological aspects of this strategy exttemely important for preparing tho battlefield and undoing the US commitment to the region Apin the team Onsoiously avoided mistabs the Iraqis lll8de in tho GulfWar and wisbecl to gamer wider political support fur their actions A final objective by tho uncertainty China team in this strategy was to create serious as to the effectiveness of American furees in the region This plan was diiected not only a1 the US military but also al cowttries in the region thai would be o counting on US support against Chinese moves The group emphasized electronic warfare and EMPIRF weaponry as a meaas to this end Small vessels or outlying ialands could be fitted with a device that emits EMPIRF thai acciden1ally render systeniS on unfriendly vessels unusable Such a capability would again be employed under the guise of preventing pirates front oofoly navigating the South China Sea The ability to China Ses with such a device was discussed Civilian aystems sucb as Teledesic oo-ver were specifi ally excluded front tatget lists once a satellite was tatgetecl it wvuld be pennanently clslna$ed so that non-combatants as well as one's own ability to use the system would also be affected Tbese types of uninteudecl consequences and elf- were at odds with selectively tatget coJDIIlei Cial and military vessels in tho South - the overall perception mansgement S1rategy Ultimately the group decided that although the capabilities dn not exist now in the scenario ti_mellne the ability to teDiporarily affect satellites might become a reality o o Poge 30 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu