Director Operational Test and Evaluation Warfighter Information Network - Tactical WIN-T Increment 2 Second Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation May 2015 This report on the Warfighter Information Network -Tactical WIN-T fulfi1ls the provisions of Title 10 United States Code Section 2399 It assesses the adequacy of testing and the operational effectiveness operational suitability and survivability of the WIN-T d J a Director This page intentionally left blank Executive Summary Thi s report assesses the test adequacy operational effectiveness operational suitability and survivability of the Warfighter Information Network - Tactical WIN-T Increment 2 to support a Full-Rate Production decision scheduled for May 11 2015 This report is the second follow-on assessment to the Director Operational Test and Evaluation DOT E WIN-T Increment 2 lnitial Operational Test and Evaluation IOT E Report dated September 2012 The IOT E report supported the September 18 2012 Full-Rate Production decision and the WIN-T Increment 2 Follow-On Test and Evaluation FOT E 1 Report dated September 2013 supported the September 19 2013 Full-Rate Production decision The Defense Acquisition Executive issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum ADM on September 27 2013 which directed the Army to conduct a second FOT E FOT E 2 to demonstrate l the Point of Presence PoP meets threshold reliability requirements 2 significant reduction in the complexity of the start-up reboot troubleshooting and shutdown procedures for the Soldier Network Extension SNE and PoP 3 significant reduction in the complexity of the SNE Combat Net Radio CNR Gateway operations The ADM directed that FOT E 2 assess other defic1encies noted during FOT E I including the Highband Networking Waveform HNW network and cybersecurity This assessment is based on the WIN-T Increment 2 FOT E 2 conducted October 15 through November 2 2015 by the Army Test and Evaluation Command at Fort Bliss Texas and White Sands Missile Range New Mexico It was conducted in conjunction with the Anny's Network Integration Exercise 15 1 The test location provided a dispersed environment in desert and limited urban terrain Testing of WlN-T Increment 2 was adequate aod was conducted in accordance with the DOT E-approved test plan DOT E's evaluation focused on the issues listed in the 2013 ADM and the first demonstration of PoP and SNE configuration item integration on Stryker vehicles during an operational test The test unit 2 d Brigade 1st Annored Division at Fort Bliss White Sands Missile Range is a heavy brigade combat team that provided a brigade headquarters and six battalions equipped with WIN-T Increment 2 The FOT E 2 test unit conducted mission operations which included offensive defensive and stability missions with WIN-T Increment 2 employed at-the-halt and on-the-move The Army intends WIN-T to provide the information transport backbone to brigade and battalions WIN-T Increment 2 builds upon the WIN-T Increment I at-the-halt network to support on-the-move operations through two waveforms the Net-Centric Waveform NCW for ground-to-satellite communications and the HNW for ground-to-ground line-of sight communications when the unit command centers are at-the-halt or on-the-move The WIN-T communications backbone enables exchange of voice video and data throughout theater corps division brigade combat team battalion and company level elements The new capabilities Increment 2 provides include enhanced on-the-move Voice over Internet Protocol VoIP telephone and mission command applications Operational Effectiveness During IOT E and FOT E 1 all items not assessed during FOT E 2 were found operationally effective During FOT E 2 the following configuration items were operationally effective o SNE with CNR Gateway o NCW reassessed due to FOT E network outages o PoP and SNE integrated into Stryker vehicles The following configuration items were not operationally effective o HNW line-of-sight network and network management tools o Tactical Relay- Tower TR-T The SNE was operationally effective The CNR Gateway interface was improved and Soldiers were able to bridge their dispersed unit networks with the CNR Gateway By using the CNR Gateway brigade and battalion commanders can obtain situational awareness from the forward areas of combat Soldiers made great use of the WIN-T Chat application during unit operations Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP AlJ-Terrain Vehic1e MATV SNE users found the back seat display useful and applications such as Tactical Ground Reporting System TIGR to be effective During the 2013 FOT E I the SNE was useful for conducting VofP phone calls however long call set up times limited the utility of VOIP During FOT E 2 VOiP phone calls supported the unit' s mission and call set up times were improved with less than 1 5 percent of calls demonstrating 30 second or longer call setup times The NCW network was operationally effective There were two NCW network outages on May 18 2013 during FOT E 1 Network Integration Evaluation 13 2 that degraded the network's satellite support for I hour or more due to disadvantaged users placing a drain on satellite power Between FOT E J and 2 the Army applied fixes to NCW network to support a more resilient network During FOT E 2 the NCW network did not demonstrate the extended outages seen during FOT E l The Stryker PoP and SNE were operationally effective and similar to the effectiveness demonstrated by the MATV PoP and SNE Stryker SNEs exhibited a higher rate of satellite acquire and align states than MATV SNEs This may have been due to the limited number of Stryker SNE and Stryker PoPs and the differences in mission location and usage The HNW network TR-T and HNW network management tools were not operationally effective Between IOT E and FOT E 1 the HNW NCW decision algorithm was modified to prefer NCW over marginal HNW Jinks to reduce wavefonn cycJing behavior as described in the JOT E report Tactics techniques and procedures were also modified to encourage network operations to restrict the number of immediate HNW neighbors and to conduct more monitoring of the HNW network Between FOT E 1 and 2 the Army made no substantial changes to the HNW network ii When evaluated in an operational environment using the same metrics as those used in Army developmental testing HNW with TR-T did not demonstrate the Capabilities Production Document transmission range with data rate for on-the-move and at-the-halt HNW or the potential link quality to meet the required data rates in an operational environment HNW demonstrated limited transmission range for on-the-move nodes especially in forested areas Ranges for mobile PoP to TCNs using the HNW network were similar to FOT E I HNW connects on-the-move PoPs to TCNs at distances greater than 5 kilometers 50 percent of the time providing intermittent links at low data rates Based on IOT E results measured at Fort Campbell Kentucky for the most part HNW mobile transmission range is limited to distances of 1 kilometer or less in forested teITain HNW demonstrated low quality at-the-halt links that provided limited range for transmitting data When supporting command posts the HNW network for the most part supported coJlocated Tactical Operations Centers TOCs and at further distances the NCW satellite network carried the majority of network traffic HNW carried 63 percent of the brigade' s inter-TOC traffic but 72 percent of this traffic was between collocated TOCs within a distance of 1 kilometer or less As distance increased to l 0 kilometers the HNW network required the TR-T to support more user traffic At distances of 10 kilometers or more the NCW satellite network supported 81 percent of user traffic while the majority of remaining HNW traffic was supported by HNW using the TR-T In the absence of the NCW satellite HNW did not mainta n the brigade network The availability of satellite communications cannot be guaranteed under all possible combat scenarios particularly when conducting operations against an enemy with the capability to jam such communications or execute successful computer network attack Also terrain vegetation and frequency spectrum limitations based on the unit's location in the world can further limit satellite support During FOT E l NCW outages HNW lid not maintain the WIN-T network in the absence of NCW satellite with three to five battalion command posts separated from the brigade network Poor use of the TR-T and the Range Throughput Extension Kit RTEK antenna did not provide range extension to the HNW network At the beginning of FOT E 2 the TR-Twas placed at an advantageous location on a hill providing line-of-sight Even in the advantageous location the TR-T provided intem1ittent support to keep stationary command posts located at operational distances of 10 kilometers or more in a single HNW network TR-T HNW links were of low quality and unstable throughout the day providing asymmetrical use of HNW and NCW Although each TCN and the TR-Tis equipped with a RTEK flat-paneled antenna which improves the link quality of long-distance links the brigade made little use of this capability HNW is not stable at distances During FOT E 2 longer distance HNW links were intermittent and the connectivity was not symmetric In these cases data traveling between WIN-T Increment 2 command posts would use an HNW link in one direction while the reverse connection would use an NCW satellite link for extended periods of time This lack of symmetry could affect the Soldier's use of applications that are latency sensitive such as VoIP and increase network congestion due to queuing problems iii HNW network management tools did not support the Soldiers' employment of the HNW network Soldiers commented that the HNW tools provided inconsistent and inaccurate results for TR-T placement The TR-Twas relocated halfway through FOT E 2 to a location that did not provide additional connectivity Further analysis showed significant line-of-sight ten-ain blockage that would interfere with HNW transmission ln this position when brigade units moved north the TR-T did not provide connectivity from the brigade command post to nearby maneuver battalions and other dispersed elements Operational Suitability The suitability ratings for FOT E by configuration item are shown in Table 1 - - ot bTt T a ble 11 WINT Increment20 eraf1onaISma 11 y Configuration Item Suitable Maintainable 1 Reliable VWP Yes Not Assessed Yes M-ATV PoP Yes No Yes Styker PoP No No Yes M-ATV SNE Yes No Yes Stryker SNE No Yes No With one 3-mmute maintenance action not able to assess VWP Mean Time To Repair MTTR During FOT E 2 the Vehicle Wireless Package VWP the M-ATV PoP and M-ATV SNE were operationally suitable The Stryker PoP and Stryker SNE were not operationally suitable The WIN-T PoP met reliability requirements for both the M-ATV and Stryker variants The M-ATV SNE met reliability requirements but the Stryker SNE did not meet reliability requirements The majority of WTN-T fncrement 2 Essential Function Failures are due to software failures The Stryker SNE met the 30-minute maintainability requirement Neither the M-ATV or Stryker PoP nor the M-ATV SNE met the maintainability requirement The maintainability of the VWP could not be assessed no fajlures were observed in the test The unit success rate was similar to FOT E l and the Anny remains dependent upon contractor field service representatives for maintenance when deployed to combat operations The Stryker PoP and SNE presented Soldiers with significant human factors engineering and integration issues that interfered with the unit's performance of mission operations These Stryker WIN-T deficiencies include o Position of WIN-T PoP and SNE displays in front of gunner position o WIN-T Increment 2 antennas prevent 360-degree gun coverage o WIN-T Increment 2 operations with the engine turned off can drain batteries to a level that requires replacement iv o Operating WfN-T Increment 2 on vehicle power does not allow Silent Watch operations Stryker commanders reported that WIN-T Strykers required more battery replacements than Stryker without WIN-T The WIN-T Program Manager states that WIN-T has high-power requirements that can drain the batteries of a Stryker vehicle below their charge threshold when the engine is not running Survivability WIN-T Increment 2 has improved its survivability but there are areas that are not survivable which require improvement The classified annex to this report details those deficiencies Recommendations The Army should take the following actions to improve the WlN-T Increment 2 system o Improve employment of HNW with TR-T and RTEK Provide tactics techniques and procedures with improved training to employ the HNW network to take full advantage ofrange extension capabilities provided by the operation of the TR-T and RTEK o Improve NCW Determine the cause of momentary NCW link outages and provide a fix for this problem o Reassess the TR-T The Anny should assess the fielding quantities of TR-Ts to support brigade operations o Improve Network Operations Tools The Army should improve network operations tools to better support the Soldiers' ability to install operate and maintain HNW Tools should support planning and execution of HNW networks optimizing employment of the TR-T RTEK and use of terrain o Improve Stryker VIN-T Integration The Army should improve the integration of WIN-Tinto Stryker vehicles o - Integrate WfN-T to afford better use of interior and exterior space to allow more user access less mission interference and improve Soldiers' field-of-view during operations - Improve Stryker WIN-T operations to allow support of all mission environments including Silent Watch Improve Suitability with an Alternative Power Source Develop an alternative atthe-halt power source for WIN-T Increment 2 and its required air conditioning to eliminate the need to run PoP SNE and VWP vehicles 24 hours a day This capability is required for both MRAP MATV and Stryker variants v o Improve survivability The Army should address the deficiencies and recommendations lfated in the classified annex to this report and the Army Research Laboratory Survivability Lethality Analysis Directorate report d h Director vi Contents System Overview 1 Test Adequacy 11 Operational Effectiveness l 7 Operational Suitability 45 Recommendations 59 Classified Annex Survivability Separate Cover vii This page intentionally left blank Section One System Overview System Description The Army intends the Warfighter Infomrntion Network-Tactical WIN-T to transport infonnation to the right place at the right time including when the communications nodes and the unit command centers are moving The WIN-T communications backbone enables exchange of information voice video and data throughout theater corps division brigade combat team battalion and company-leveJ elements WIN-T Increment 2 builds upon the WIN-T Increment l at-the-halt network to support on-the-move operations The fundamental new capabilities for Increment 2 are enhanced on-the-move Voice over Internet Protocol VoIP telephone and battle command applications The new technologies that provide these capabilities are o Net-Centric Waveform NCW for ground-to-satellite communications Tactical Communications Node TCN Point of Presence PoP and Soldier Network Extension SNE vehicles all use the NCW Each maneuver brigade has a distinct NCW network to provide connectivity when the command centers are at-the-halt and to connect the Increment 2 mobile configuration items when the brigade is on-the-move o Highband Networking Waveform HNW for ground-to-ground line-of-sight communications The HNW provides additional connectivity to TCN and PoP vehicles within the formation to provide an additional communications path and off-load traffic from the satellites when line-of-sight exists SNE vehicles are not HNW-capable There are HNW networks at the division level and at each maneuver brigade o Colorless Core Security Architecture The Colorless Core supports multiple security levels by leveraging a common internet protocol IP backbone to simplify network management and optimize bandwidth a ocation The Colorless Core transmits everything over IP and encrypts all traffic whether classified or not with a Type I High Assurance IP Encryptor-compliant device The traffic from each classification enclave then flows through a Colorless Core private network router through the transmission system WIN-T Increment 2 Configuration Items The WIN-T Increment 2 capabilities described above are provided by nine configuration items listed below o Tactical Communications Node TCN o Point of Presence PoP o Soldier Network Extension SNE o Satellite Tactical Terminal STT o Tactical Relay - Tower TR-T o Network Operations and Security Center NOSC o Vehicle Wireless Package VWP o Modular Communications Node - Basic MCN-B o Regional Hub Node RHN Tactical Communications Node TCN The TCN Figure 1-1 is best described as a mobile cell phone tower The TCN provides communication and networking services at-the-halt and on-the-move and is capable of connecting to other WIN-T configuration items using both HNW line-of-sight and NCW satellite communications The TCN provides an an-ay of communications services including secure and non-secure local area networks and VoIP phones computer Combat Network Radio CNR Gateway capability and video networking The CNR-Gateway allows the TCN to integrate the Army's push-to-talk single channel radios with the WTN-T VoIP capability A TCN is employed at the division brigade and battalion levels The TCN platform is hosted on an armored Family of Medium Tactical Vehic1es FMTV vehicle The circular antenna for the HNW line-of-sight network is mounted on a IO-meter telescoping mast located just aft of the TCN's cab The flat plate Range Throughput Extension Kit antenna extends the range of a single HNW link and is also on the mast The mast must be stowed in the down position for travel and can be extended at-the-halt A 15-kilowatt generator for on-the-move operations i s in the center of the vehicle over the forward dual or second axle A 30-kilowatt towed generator is used at-the-halt In the rear of the vehicle atop the electronics bay is the dome that houses the NCW 20-inch 3-axis stabilized satellite communications antenna During the Initial Operating Test and Evaluation IOT E both Follow-on Test and Evaluations FOT E the TCN was production representative Figure 1-1 WlN-T Increment 2 TCN 2 Point of Presence PoP As with the TCN the PoP Figure 1-2 provides connectivity to the HNW and NCW networks As fielded the PoP is employed at the division headquarters three vehicles the brigade headquarters two vehicles and maneuver battalion headquarters one vehicle per headquarters and consists of a communications package installed into a unit owned tactical vehicle PoP capabilities include VoIP telephone and a suite of mission command applications During IOT E and FOT E the Army installed the PoP on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles M-ATVs During FOT E 2 the PoP was installed on both MRAPs and Strykers The three Stryker PoPs were located with the commander and S3 at 4-17 Infantry and the Brigade Special Troops Battalion BSTB commander The other 6 PoPs were integrated into MRAPs The Army employed Stryker PoPs at the BSTB and the 4-17 Infantry S3 to increase the statistical significance of the Stryker PoP data On the M-ATV the HNW line-of-sight antenna is mounted on the roof just forward of the rear axle The 20-inch 3-axis stabilized NCW sat ellite communications antenna is mounted on the roof at the rear of the vehicle On the Stryker the NCW and HNW antennas are also located near the rear of the vehicJe The Stryker WIN-T integration differs from the MRAP in its configuration of internal components The Stryker WIN-T Multi-Domain Atlas MDA is accessible from the gunner position and the JBC-P is hosted on a separate display The MRAP and Stryker vehicles integrate WIN-Tusing different versions of vehicle internal communications systems The Stryker PoPs employed during FOTE 2 is production representative NCW SATCOM- Net-Centric Waveform Satellite Communications HNW- Highband Networking Waveform Figure 1-2 WIN-T Increment 2 PoP Installed in an MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle M-ATV Left Integrated onto the MRAP Right Integrated onto the Stryker Soldier Network Extension SNE The SNE Figure 1-3 provides at-the-halt and on-the-move connection to the network via NCW satellite communications SNE nodes are employed by company commanders throughout a brigade combat team SNEs can be employed as retransmission vehicles to connect 3 separate radio networks and can provide communications to higher echelons Like PoPs SNEs consist of a WTN-T communications package installed into a unit-owned tactical vehicle MRAPs for the IOT E and FOT E During FOT E 2 the SNE was integrated onto 7 Stryker vehicles in 4-17 Infantry SNE capabilities include VoIP and mission command applications Like TCNs SNE vehicles provide a CNR Gateway to interconnect shorter-range legacy radios The SNE uses an 18-inch 2-axis stabi lized antenna for NCW satellite communications This antenna is smaller and less maneuverable than the 20-inch NCW antenna used in the PoP As with the Stryker PoP the Stryker SNE integration differs from the MRAP SNE in its configuration of internal components The Stryker SNE WIN-T MDA is accessible from the gunner position and the JBC-P is hosted on a separate display The MRAP and Stryker vehicles integrate WIN-Tusing djfferent versions of vehicle internal communications systems During FOT E 2 the majority of SNEs were used by company commanders and were production representative NCW SATCOM- Net-Centric Waveform Satellite Communications Figure 1-3 WIN-T Increment 2 SNE Left Integrated onto the MRAP Right Integrated onto the Stryker Satellite Tactical Terminal STT The STT Figure 1-4 is a towed trailer-mounted satellite terminal with an onboard generator that provides greater satellite bandwidth to the TCN when it is stationary The STT can function as the network manager when the Regional Hub Node is not available The STT was developed during the Increment 1 program The STT supports the Increment l frequency division multiple access FDMA and time division multiple access TDMA waveforms and the Increment 2 NCW During the IOT E and FOT E the FDMA and the NCW waveforms were used The STT s used during IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 were productionrepresentati ve 4 Figure 1-4 WIN-T STT Tactical Relay - Tower TR-T The TR-T Figure 1-5 is a 30-meter mast providing a relay capabilily to extend the range of the HNW line-of-sight communications network One TR-Tis fielded to each brigade During the IOT E one TR-Twas at Fort Campbell Kentucky and one was at Fort Bliss White Sands Missile Range WSMR During the FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 a single TR-Tat WSMR was used The TR-T used was production-representative Figure l-5 WIN-T TR-T Network OperaJions and Security Center NOSC The Increment 2 NOSC Figure 1-6 provides the hardware and software infrastructure to support Soldier network management of the WIN-T Increment 2 network The Increment 2 NOSC has two designs one to support the brigade NOSC-B and another to support the division NOSC-D The NOSC supports communications planning monitoring network configuration and management and Information Assurance The NOSC is transported on an FMTV and network management components are permanently housed and operated in the vehicle shelter on the FMTV The set of network 5 management laptops in the command posts are connected to the equipment in the NOSC via tactical fiber-optic cable The NOSC ac quires transmission services from a co-located TCN and includes a trailer with an environmental control unit and generator The NOSCs used for the IOT E and both FOT Es were production-representative Figure 1-6 WIN-T NOSC Vehicle Wireless Package VWP The VWP is a communications package designed to connect subscribers over the air to TCNs The parent TCN provides a wireless hot spot for VWP-equipped vehicles There are two VWP-equipped vehicles per TCN The Anny intends the VWP to provide wireless connectivity to Secret IP Router Network SIPRNET or Non-secure IP Router Network NIPRNET through the Local Access Waveform out to a required range of 4 kilometers For the IOT E and both FOT Es the VWPs were integrated on MRAPs This was production representative oYodular Communications Node - Basic MCN-B The MCN-B Figure 1-7 is a tactical fiber link that provides NIPRNET and SlPRNET access to buildings and tents up to I kilometer away from the parent TCN The MCN-B transit cases are transported as loose cargo on the back of the TCN During IOT E and FOT E the MCN-B were production representative 6 Figure 1-7 WIN-T MCN-B Regional Hub Node RHN An RHN Figure 1-8 is a satellite ground station that operates outside of theater or in sanctuary There are five RHNs in operation around the world The RHN is designed to provide long haul tactical communications and network management services to users such as those using WIN-T Each RHN wilJ be supplied with a Regional Hub Upgrade Kit which will allow the RHN to support the NCW as well as Ka Ku FDMA Satellite Communications SATCOM frequencies WIN-T Increment 2 provides eight NCW modems per division to the existing regional hubs The Army intends each RHN to have sufficient numbers of modems and transmission bandwidth to support three divisions and a corps headquarters During WIN-T Increment 2 operational testing the Network Service Center - Training at Fort Gordon Georgia replicated the support provided by an RHN Figure 1-8 Regional Hub Node 7 'Nlission Control Applications WIN-T supports the transport of voice and data via mission control applications During the IOT E and both FOT Es the mission control applications provided by WIN-T Increment 2 on the PoP and the SNE were o Tactical Ground Reporting - a multimedia patrol preparation and debriefing tool o Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Forward Observer System - allows Soldiers to plan control and execute fire support operations at maneuver brigade and below o Jabber Chat - chat service o Command Post of the Future CPOF - command and control software system for battlefield visualization available only on the PoP for FOT E o Ventrilo - a telephone service that is traditionally bundled with CPOF The WIN-T MDA tablet in the PoP and SNE provides users access to these applications MRAP PoPs and SNEs are equipped with a fully functional MDA in the back and a Smart Display Unit suppl ied by the JBC-P program in the front A switch that resides between the front and back seats connects the two displays The front display can access JBC-P directly and allow participation in-progress WIN-T phone cans The WIN-T operator in the rear seat in an MRAP must use the WIN-T MDA in order to initiate or answer phone calls or access most WINT applications Stryker PoPs and SNEs maintain separate displays for WIN-T and JBC-P The MD As host two other non-WIN-T applications in addition to the applications described above These are o Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below Joint Capability Release JCR and Joint BattJe Command - Platform JBC-P to track friendly and hostile forces on the battlefield JCR and JBC-P also provide chat capabilities o The Combat Net Radio CNR Gateway provides access to multiple shorter-range legacy combat net radios such as the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System The CNR Gateway is provided on SNEs and available at the TOC through the TCN Concept of Employment Figure 1-9 portrays the notional concept of employment of WIN-T Increment 2 waveforms at the division and below Each maneuver brigade has a separate NCW satellite network A division has four maneuver brigade NCW networks plus a division-level network The HNW line-of-sight network supports all division nodes 8 - - HlllWLOS - - FOMA SATCOM NCWSATCOM --WI MVRBDETOC I I I P0 -1 ' I I I J HNW - Highband Networking Waveform FDMA - Frequency Division Multiple Access NCW - Net-Centric Waveform WGS - Wideband Global SATCOM EPLRS - Enhanced Position Location Reporting System SAW - Soldier Radio Waveform MVR BN - Maneuver Battalion MVR BOE - Maneuver Brigade BOE CDR - Brigade Commander ATH - At-the-Halt SNE - Soldier Network Extension LOS - Line-of-Sight SATCOM - Satellite Communications VWP - Vehicle Wireless Package TCN - Tactical Communications Node SINCGARS - Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System STT - Satellite Tactical Terminal CP - Command Post TOC - Tactical Operations Center TAC - Tactical Command Post PoP - Point of Presence NOSC - Network Operations Security Center NOSC-D - Division I NOSC-B - Battalion Figure 1-9 WIN-T Increment 2 Division-Level Communications Network Notional 9 This page intentionally left blank 0 Section Two Test Adequacy Operational Testing The Follow-on Test and Evaluation FOT E 2 of the Warfighter Information Network Tactical WIN-T Increment 2 was adequate to support an assessment of operational effectiveness operational suitability and survivability The test was conducted in accordance with a DOT E-approved test plan and is intended to support a FulJ-Rate Production Decision review scheduled for May 2015 The test focused on whether issues discovered during IOT E and FOT E I have been corrected The WIN-T Increment 2 program completed its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation IOT E in May 2012 DOT E issued its assessment of IOT E in September 2012 to fulfill the provisions of Title 10 United States Code Section 2399 That assessment found the Tactical Communications Node Point of Presence PoP Net-Centric Waveform satellite communication Colorless Core Security Architecture Satellite Tactical Terminal Network Operations and Security Center Vehicle Wireless Package Modular Communications Node Basic and Joint Gateway Node operationaUy effective The Soldier Network Extension SNE Highband Networking Waveform HNW and the Tactical Relay-Tower TR-T were not operationally effective The WIN-T Increment 2 system overall was not operationally suitable and not survivable The Defense Acquisition Executive issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum on September 26 2012 which directed the Army to conduct an FOT E to demonstrate improved reliability for the system and improved SNE and HNW line-of-sight performance prior to a Full-Rate Production Decision The Army Test and Evaluation Command conducted the FOT E durfog May 7-24 2013 as part of the Network Integration Evaluation NIE 13 2 at Fort Bliss Texas White Sands Missile Range New Mexico and Fort Gordon Georgia DOT E issued its assessment of FOT E 1 in September 2013 The assessment found that the SNE was not operationally effective The HNW and TR-T were not operationally effective and could not maintain an HNW network in support of brigade operations over a tactically representative area of operations The Tactical Communications Node the Vehicle Wireless Package the TR-T and the Network Operations and Security Center were operationally suitable The PoP and the SNE were not operationa1ly suitable WIN-T Increment 2 improved on survivability however there were areas that were not survivable and required further improvement The Defense Acquisition Executive issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum ADM on September 27 2013 which directed the Army to conduct a second POT E FOT E 2 to demonstrate 1 the PoP meets threshold reliability requirements 2 significant reduction in the complexity of the start-up reboot troubleshooting and shutdown procedures for the SNE and PoP 3 significant reduction in the complexity of the SNE Combat Net Radio Gateway operations The ADM directed that POT E 2 assess other deficiencies noted during FOT E 1 This evaluation is based upon the October 2014 FOT E 2 the May 2013 FOT E 1 the 2012 IOT E and developmental testing directed by the Program Manager and conducted by 11 General Dynamics at their Taunton Massachusetts facility This includes two product verification tests PVTJ and PVT2 performed during fiscal year 2014 FYl4 to verify changes aimed at addressing issues from the September 2013 ADM The operational test dates and the events that led up to the FOT E 2 appear in Table 2-1 Table 2-1 Test Schedule Activity Date WIN T Increment 2 New Equipment Training NET Courses Operational Test Readiness Review OTRR 2 July 14 - August 25 2014 August 15 2014 Validation Exercise VALEX August 25 - September 19 2014 Instrumentation Data Validation August 25 - September 19 2014 Garrison Communications Exercise COMMEX 22-26 September 2014 September 22 -October 4 2014 Data End to End 24 September 2014 Baseline Inventory September 29 - October 2 2014 Unit Preparation Week Field COMMEX October 3-6 2014 Pilot Test October 7-11 2014 OTRR3 October 15 2014 October 15 - November 2 2014 Record Test November 2014 Authenticated Database Delivery The test unit znd Brigade 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss White Sands Missile Range is a heavy brigade combat team that provided a brigade headquarters and six battalions equipped with WIN-T Increment 2 The Network Service Center-Training at Fort Gordon replicated the support provided by a Regional Hub Node Test Scenario The test units executed decisive action operations that included offensjve defensive and stability missions employed at-the-halt and on-the-move The Brigade Modernization Command issued warning orders fragmentary orders and operations orders to transition the test through scenario phases Each phase was designed in accordance with the requirements of the 72-hour Operational Mode Summary Mission Profile The 19-day operational test included the following mission and scenarios Mission 2 11d Brigade o lst Armored Division ini6ally executed Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security operations in accordance with a six phased operational plan o Scenario Concept Phase 1 Pilot The Armored Brigade Combat Team ABCT conducted reception staging onward-movement and integration prepared for combat and 12 conducted Wide Area of Security WAS to secure villages This phase consisted of brigade and battalion command post exercise platoon situational training exercises interaction with the Attican National Army ANA representing the host nation military and host nation civilians and attacks against Attican Liberation Army ALA representing the opposing force strongholds - Phase 2a October 15 -18 2014 The ABCT conducted WAS to defeat the ALA forces and reestablished the Attican government in the Area of Operation This phase consisted of WAS company level raids and cordon and searches The threat was the ALA in villages - Phase 2b October 19- 22 2014 The ABCT conducted Combined Arms Maneuver and WAS in AO Bliss to disrupt the ALA and rogue Attican forces The ALA massed and seized key terrain Rogue ANA forces occupied and defended Condron Airfield while rogue Attican forces attacked from Las Cruces through the Adobe Vi1lage A-V Gap ABCT conducted operations to isolate ALA by conducting CO raids and cordon and searches Phase 3a October 23-26 2014 The ABCT conducted Combined Arms Maneuver and WAS to disrupt ALA and rogue Attican forces The ABCT attacked to defeat rogue ANA and ALA strongholds in AO Bliss A mechanized battalion attacked to destroy Attican forces in the west A Stryker battalion attacked to destroy ALA and Attican remnants in the east A cavalry squadron isolated and eroded ALA combat power - Phase 3b October 27-30 2014 The ABCT defended against Ellisian attack and secured villages The ABCT - defended against EJlisian attack from west and attacked ALA strongholds A Stryker battalion attacked to secure Zamania A mechanized CO team defended against Ellisian attack through the A-V Gap A Cavalry squadron - conducted force-oriented zone reconnaissance in support of the brigade - Phase 3c October 29 -November 2 2014 The ABCT secured borders and prepared for future operations The ABCT consolidated position on Bliss A mechanized battalion secured brigade western boundary A Stryker battalion conducted security operations in vicinity of Zamania A cavalry squadron conducted screens along the brigade's northern boundary preventing rogue ANA and ALA elements from entering the brigade Area of Operation The brigade's movement of Tactical Operations Centers TOCs and units allowed the FOT E 2 to test the on-the-move capability of WIN-T Increment 2 Figure 2-1 shows a map of the primary TOC locations used during NIE 15 1 Table 2-2 provides a summary of executed unit movements during the WfN-T Increment 2 FOT E 2 13 105 75 W10625 Wtoejs Imam r1j nl_ km Figure 2-1 A map of the White Sands Missile Range Locations used during NIE 15 1 14 Table 2-2 WIN-T Increment 2 FOT E 2 Executed Unit Movements UNIT Location 1 Brigade Main TAA Salerno Brigade Tactical Operations Center TAA Salerno Brigade Special Troops Battalion TAA Salerno 1-1 Cavalry Squadron Move 1 Location 2 Oct 28 Route Purple East Oct 27 Route PurpleEast Oct28 Route Purple East Oro Grande Oct22 Route Red 1-6 Infantry Battalion Dona Ana Oct22 4-17 Infantry Battalion Westbrook Oct22 4-27 Field Artiller y Battalion Dona Ana Oct26 47 Brigade Support Battalion McGregor Range Complex Oct 30 Move2 Location 3 Move3 Location 4 Oct29 RCRC-S Oct 31 Route Purple East RCRC Oct 31 Oct29 Route Red Range 100 Route Violet Oro Grande East McGregor Range-South Oct29 Oct28 Thurgood Canyon Pad 25 McGregor Range Route Purple East TAA- Tactical Assembly Area RCRC - Rhodes Canyon Range Complex RCRC-S-Rhodes Canyon Range Complex-South Informatio11 Assurance During the FOT E 2 the Army Research Laboratory Survivability Lethality Analysis Directorate ARL SLAD conducted a Cooperative Vulnerability and Penetration Assessment on WIN-T Increment 2 The Army Threat Systems Management Office with support from ARUSLAD executed an Adversarial Assessment These tests were performed in accordance with the DOT E memorandum Procedures for Operational Test and Evaluation of Information Assurance in Acquisition Programs dated August 1 2014 Electronic Warfare During the FOT E 2 Electronic Warfare testing consisted of open-air jamming and direction finding operations The Threat Systems Management Office provided and operated the jamming direction finding and GPS-imitating equipment to support the multiple 72-hour scenarios in an Electronic Warfare environment All threats portrayed were in accordance with the accredited threat training support package for WIN-T Increment 2 15 System Support During the WIN-T Increment 2 FOT E 2 the Program Office provided three Field Service Representatives FSRs for the WIN-T configuration items and one additional FSR for the Satellite Tactical Terminal satellite trailers Test Limitations The Army conducted the WIN-T Increment 2 FOT E 2 in accordance with the DOT E-approved test plan The test included the following limitations o Tbe Army used three Stryker PoPs and seven Stryker SNEs during tbe test Although deemed an appropriate sample a fully equipped Stryker BCT would employ 10 PoPs and44 SNEs o Due to Federal Aviation Agency and Federal Communication Commission restrictions the Army was not able to jam the Net-Centric Waveform satellite uplink The Army was not able to develop a method for simulating the loss of satellite capability in a threat represeotative way 16 Section Three Operational Effectiveness During the May 2013 FOT E 1 DOT E assessed whether changes made to WIN-T Increment 2 following IOT E improved the operational effectiveness of the Soldier Network Extension SNE Highband Networking Waveform HNW and Tactical Relay-Tower TRT while maintaining the operational effectiveness of the remainder of the system During FOT E 1 the following configuration items were operationally effective o Net-Centric Waveform NCW o Tactical Control Node TCN o Point of Presence PoP o Vehicle Wireless Package VWP o Network Operations and Security Center NOSC o Satellite Tactical Terminal STT o Colorless Core Security Architecture During the May 2013 FOT E 1 the following configuration items were not operationally effective o SNE o HNW line-of-sight waveform o TR-T During FOT E 2 DOT E assessed performance outlined in the September 27 2013 Defense Acquisition Executive Acquisition Decision Memorandum to include deficiencies noted in the DOT E FOT E 1 report and the integration of PoP and SNE into Stryker During FOT E 2 the following configuration items were operationally effective o SNE with Combat Net Radio CNR Gateway o NCW reassessed due to FOT E network outages o PoP and SNE integrated into Stryker The following configuration items were not operationally effective o HNW line-of-sight waveform and network management tools o TR-T 17 Network Usage The HNW and NCW traffic percentages for IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 are shown in Figure 3-1 FROM POP AND TCN FROM POP SNE AND TCN 100% 100% 80% 80% 60% 60% 40% 40% 20% 20% 0% 0% IOT E FOT E o NCW o HNW FOT E2 IOT E FOT E o NCW o HNW Other FOT E2 Other Figure 3-1 Amount of NCW and HNW Traffic at IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 The FOT E 2 other'' traffic includes muiti-wavefonn combinations of HNW NCW traffic FOT E 2 provided a higher median HNW traffic load at 1 0 Megabits per second Mbps than FOT E I 516 Kilobits per second Kbps During FOT E 2 HNW carried a higher portion of user traffic compared to FOT E 1 although the majority of this HNW traffic originated within a transmission range of 1 kilometer or less The percent of user traffic using HNW and NCW networks is dependent on the operations being performed the location of the Tactical Operations Centers TOCs and the network configuration determined by the Brigade S6 WfN-T Increment 2 uses a large amount of data throughput to support the functions of the colorless core network As captured with FOT E 2 data instrumentation the unit transmitted 846 Gigabytes Gbytes of data over the WIN-T colorless core network between PoPs TCNs and SNEs The colorless core network supports both Secret Internet Protocol Router SIPR and Non-secure Internet Protocol Router NTPR network traffic Within the colorless core WIN-T supported 396 Gbytes of SIPR user traffic between PoPs TCNs and SNEs 1 NIPR network traffic provided a small percentage of overall network load SIPR traffic provides the voice video and data throughput used to support the unit's mission When SIPR traffic is transmitted on the colorless core it expands by a factor of approximately two because of network overhead encryption and tunneling when passed over the colorless core Due to instrumentation and unknowns in the network architecture this does not capture all traffic Although direct comparison is impossible the majority of the difference is due to the expansion necessary 10 take data from the SIPR to colorless side The intention is to express the expansion of STPR traffic on the colorless core and the perceived data throughput by the user 18 During FOT E 2 NCW and HNW demonstrated connectivity similar to IOT E and FOT E 1 Figure 3-2 shows the number of WIN-T Increment 2 platforms connected to the Brigade Commander' s PoP during IOT E FOT E land FOT E 2 60 50 Number or WtN T c onnect1ons at the 40 Bngode Commander's PoP 30 IOT E 0 - AJI INC2 Nodes - HNW 10 60 Number of WIN-T c onnec uons at the Bngade Commander' s PoP FOT E1 so 40 30 20 10 60 Number ofWIN-T so connect10t1s at the 40 Brigade Commancler'sPoP 30 FOT E2 20 10 Days since test start Figure 3-2 Brigade Commander's PoP Network Links during IOT E FOT E I and FOT E 2 Temporary network drops are depicted as straight vertical lines which represent reduced connections within the WIN-T network When the brigade commander's vehicle was turned off the connectivity plot red line forms a V-shaped notch in the FOT E 2 line graph The stability of the number of connections maintained by the brigade commander's PoP tends to be similar to IOT E with momentary drops in the number of NCW routes The brigade commander's experience as representative of a PoP mobile user remains similar to IOT E and FOT E 1 19 Along with supporting Soldier's mission command applications WlN-T Increment 2 uses a large amount of data throughput to maintain the network and network services Figure 3-3 shows the percentage of SIPR traffic used to support various applications for the SNE left and PoP right VoIP POP TIGR VoIP SNE 7% Net Mgmt 18 2% 3% Chat 1% Other Chat 2% 1% JBC P CNR % oo E-mail 1 Figure 3-3 SIPR Traffic Observed during FOT E 2 The distribution of application traffic provides the Soldier' s experience and use of the network The applications with the highest demands on WIN-T incJude the CNR Gateway Information Assurance Active Directory Command Post of the Future Tactical Ground Reporting TIGR System and Network Management services WTN-T lncrement 2 uses a significant portion of SIPR traffic 50 to 64 percent maintaining the network with hlformation Assurance Network Management and Active Directory applications Considering the discussion of SIPR to colorless core expansion 25 to 30 percent of the total load supported by the colorless core is mission traffic During FOT E 2 the usage ofNCW was similar to that observed during IOT E and FOT E 1 The total offered plus received load for the mobile configuration items TCN PoP and SNE is listed in Tables 3-2 and Table 3-3 depicted by the median throughput values at-thehalt and on-the-move During FOT E 2 the similarity of WIN-T usage to past operational tests was due to the increased usage of NCW following IOT E This was due to the adjusted HNW routing algorithm to combat cycling outlined in the IOT E report which reduced HNW use during FOT E 1 as well as the closer density of units during FOT E 2 which increased shortrange at-the-halt HNW As shown in Table 3-3 on-the-move HNW provided little support for TCNs and PoPs compared to NCW 20 Table 3-2 Median NCW Network Loads Kbps d unng IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 ' At-The-Halt On-the-Move IOT E FOT E 1 FOT E 2 SNE 17 37 33 POP 12 29 30 TCN 45 275 230 SNE 16 36 34 POP 21 33 TCN 63 112 38 110 Table 3-3 Median HNW Network Loads Kbps d urmg IOT Eo FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 ' FOT E 1 FOT E 2 IOT E POP 23 3 8 At-The-Halt TCN 137 18 121 POP 17 2 6 On-the-Move TCN 25 8 3 Network-Centric Waveform NCW During FOT E 2 the NCW satellite network was operationally effective and provided consistent connectivity to NCW-equipped WIN-T Increment 2 configuration items During IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 the NCW network experienced momentary outages 30 seconds or less where users lost 10 or more NCW connections however these disruptions did not affect the Soldier's mission During FOT E 1 the NCW experience d two severe network outages which disrupted WIN-T Increment 2 sate1lite communications for a period of I hour each The Army determined the problem was due to disadvantaged users requiring increased NCW power and fixed this deficiency Figure 3-4 shows the number of nodes with dropped routes which is defined as losing lO or more routes within a 2-minute time period FOT E 1 on left FOT E 2 on right During FOT E 2 the NCW network was more stable with the number of nodes reporting more than 10 dropped routes in a 2-minute period befog less than 30 per incident throughout FOT E 2 Compared to the outage periods during FOT E l where nodes reported lO or more dropped routes 120 times or more within a 2-minute period NCW demonstrated an improvement in stability during FOT E 2 21 FOT E1 FOT E2 110 110 There are 19 times when 10 or mo e Cls eport 10 or more lost links 100 90 80 Number of Cls reporting 1O less links within a 2 min time bin 70 60 ll 50 40 30 20 20 10 10 OL___ -- _ '- SW 05f10 05f12 0 1o 05 16 05 18 05l20 05 22 f I Diie Q l' M 0 14 0 16 0-18 0-20 0-22 0-24 0 26 0-28 0-30 N-01 N-03 Date Figure 3-4 Number of Reports of' WIN-T Increment 2 Platforms Dropping IO or More Network Centric Waveform Routes Nearly Simultaneously within two minutes Left FOT E 1 rugbt FOT E 2 The FOT E 2 NCW network did not experience the traffic demands of the FOT E l network Compared to FOT E l FOT E 2 supported a lighter network load of user traffic FOT E 2's average brigade spectrum usage was near 20 megahertz MHz with the peak NCW spectrum usage not exceeding 52 MHz FOT E I's average brigade spectrum usage was 40 MHz with the peak NCW spectrum usage not exceeding 70 MHz The median colorless core network load at FOT E 2 on the NCW network was roughly 2 33 Mbps which is approximately the same as FOT E 1 This indicates that FOT E 2 NCW traffic experienced Jess dramatic spikes that would have raised the average and peak spectrum usage Highhand Networking Waveform HNW During IOT E and FOT E 1 HNW and the TR-T were not operationally effective Between FOT E 1and2 the Army did not make changes to the HNW or TR-T systems to improve perfonnance During FOT E 2 t he HNW and TR-T were not operationally effeccive because they did not extend and maintain the brigade' s WIN-T Increment 2 network HNW and TR-T deficiencies include o When evaluated in an operational environment using the same metrics as those used in Army developmental testing HNW with TR-T did not demonstrate Capabilities Production Document CPD transmission range with data rate for on-the-move and at-the-halt HNW or the potential link quality to meet the required data rates in an operational environment o Limited transmission range for on-the-move nodes especially in forested areas 22 o Low quality measured by link burst rate of at-the-halt links provided limited range for transmitting data o In the absence of the NCW satellite HNW did not maintain the network o Poor use of TR-T and Range Throughput Extension Kit RTEK antennas to support network extension o Lack of stability for longer distance links can interfere with lat e ncy and jitter intolerant applications and add to network congestion o Network Management tools did not support effective use of TR-T and RTEK HNW is a Time Division Multiple Access TDMA terrestrial line-of-sight wavefonn TDMA is a channel access method that allows multiple users to share a single frequency channel by dividing the signal into different timeslots HNW communications are divided into IO millisecond intervals termed epochs Each epoch is divided into 160 time frames and 150 of those time frames can be allocated to neighboring nodes on an on-demand basis to support the transfer of data traffic The more time frames a node is assigned the more traffic it can send over an HNW radio link The remaining IO time frames are reserved for network overhead traffic necessary to manage the waveform The expected data rate is the burst rate R multiplied by the fraction of time allocated to sending user traffic M T r- X where M is the number of time frames Tr is the length of the time frame and X is the amount of time allocated to preamble and overhead hytes and propagation delay The burst rate is defined internally by the radio and depends on the physical layer link quality For HNW the burst rate is a measure oflink quality not data throughput and can have eight values 6 Mbps 9 Mbps 12 Mbps 18 Mbps 24 Mbps 36 Mbps 48 Mbps aad 54 Mbps A 54 Mbps link is the highest quality link and is capable of sending the most traffic As the lower burst rates provide poor quality link WIN-T Increment 2 selects the NCW satellite network for routing data when the HNW burst rates measure 6 Mbps or 9 Mbps This allows the NCW satellite to provide a higher data rate and avoid the HNW NCW cycling problem observed during IOT E 23 Effmive Dotll ltate i I Mbp t vs hn tJloO Burst Rat in MBPS - - 6 9 - 48 54 12 - 18 24 36 HNW Jink data rates are determined by combining the link's burst rate link quality with allotted time slots The relationship between a burst rate and time slots presents a linear function to determine estimated data rates as shown in Figure 3-5 Based on FOT E 2 data each colored line represents a link burst rate listed in the legend from 0 to 54 Mbps The colored points represent the data samples from FOT E 2 used to determine the link burst rate to the data rate graph To draw examples from Figure 3-5 if the network allots 50 time slots to a 6 Mbps burst rate link shown in green the resulting data rate is 900 Kbps If the same 50 time slots are allotted to a 54 Mbps burst rate link shown in purple the resulting data rate is 12 Mbps over 12 times the data rate of the 6 Mbps burst rate link The WIN-T CPD approved October 17 2014 states that WIN-T Increment 2 should provide high-capacity line-of-sight ground-to-ground networking radio communication for maneuver battalion brigade combat team command posts and division headquarters stationary with the auxiliary flat-plate antenna 27 Mbps at 12 kilometers 10 meter mast and mobile 18 Mbps at 2 kilometers threshold The CPD refers to the throughput rates as the shared transmit receive data rate available at the input output of the radio or transmission device and states ranges are dependent on li ne-of-sight and do not include blockages HNW CPD data rate performance provides a means to characterize expectations for an HNW network to discuss deficiencies noted during FOT E 2 HN V is a shared data rate by design which means the network allocates more time slots to links needing to transfer more data Therefore during FOT E 2 DOT E assessed HN V to determine demonstrated data rates and potential data rates based upon demonstrated link quality burst rates and possible time slot aJlocations DOT E evaluated demonstrated and potential performance during operational test in a manne r similar to the Army's HNW developmental tests i e assessing the CPD requirement for data rate at the stated distance Dming the 2012 Production Qualification Testing - Government PQT-G Army developmental testing assessed 24 WIN-T Increment 2 as meeting the data rate at distance requirements by testing two nodes in isolation not part of a larger network under optimum conditions which included measured distance no terrain or vegetation blockage and unlimited time slots to support higher data rates Although the use of both stationary and mobile communications would be expected in an operational network PQT-G did not test both on-the-move and at-the-halt CPD data rate requirements at the same time because there were not enough time slots in test setup to support both links 38 36 34 32 '30 28 Command Post TCN Requirement 27 Mbps s 26 ----------------------------------------------- 2-1 CJ 2 2o 18 ------------------- ---------- 16 1-t B 12 10 i i 8 6 Mobile PoP Requirement 18 M bps 8 -- --- Burst Rate m MBPS - 6 --18 4 -9 -5 a 2 12 - 18 -2-1 - 35 0 ---- ---- -- - 0 10 20 30 40 50 ------------ 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 1-40 150 Allocated Time Slots Figure 3-6 Estimated Data Rate by Number of Time Slotis for a Given Burst Rate Dashed lines represent the requirements Table 3-4 Number of Time Slots Needed to Meet CPD Requirements of 27 Mbps and 18 Mbps for the TCN and PoP Required Time Slots for a single link -ca ca Cl E Cl Cl Cl 54 Notes 27 983 656 492 328 246 164 123 110 Command Post TCN Requirement 27Mbps 18 73 Mobile PoP Requirement 18Mbps Q c c C Cl 6 Burst Rate Mb s 9 12 18 24 36 48 ca - c a 656 437 328 219 164 110 82 13 5 492 328 246 164 123 82 62 55 CP Requirement as bidirectional single link 128 219 f 64 1 D 82 41 37 OTM Requirement as bidirectional single link 9 55 Although WIN-T Increment 2 demonstrated the CPD data rate requirements during the two-node point-to-point PQT-G developmental testing in 2012 due to the limited number of time slots available across a brigade network the WlN-T Increment 2 HNW network shows little potential to meet its CPD data rate requirements in an operationally realistic network As discussed above for a link to pass data the network allocates its limited time slots on demand 25 to enable the HNW link to pass data To examine HNW's ability to support data rates DOT E has to examine link quality measured in link burst rates and allocated time slots Figure 3-6 shows WIN-T Increment 2 effective HNW link data rates by time slots for given burst rate values compared to the CPD requirements Viewing these data only the best quality HNW links measured by Jink burst rate can support CPD data rates Given the network limitation of 150 time slots Table 3-4 shows the number of times slots needed to meet the 27 Mbps and 18 Mbps CPD requirements for potential HNW link burst rate values DOT E also examined bidirectional values half the CPD requirement to detennine time slots required for paired transmit and receive nodes attempting to use the CPD data rates The grayed-out values indicate those combinations that are not allowed by the waveform hecause the number of time slots is greater than the number available Red values indicate time slot allocations that could support a single link data rate but exceed the observed best practice limit of 50 time slots per node as used by network managers during FOT E 2 Using more than 50 time slots may support a single HNW link' s desired data rate but this use increases the risk of not supporting time slot demand across the rest of a hrigade HNW network Using this value is not operationally realistic as it may not leave sufficient time slots to support the remaining HNW network with reasonable data throughput Table 3-4 shows that the CPD at-the-halt TCN command post data rate requirement of 27 Mbps and the mobile PoP data rate requirement cannot be met without exceeding the best practice number of time slots of 50 When this number is exceeded the HNW network is at risk of not supporting brigade data regardless of distance In the case of bidirectional links tbese restrictions stilJ remain since the time slot allocation is doubled to support each HNW node on the link The maximum number of time slots that can he alJocated to any HNW node is set by the unit network operations to ensure available bandwidth across the brigade During FOT E 2 the typical number of time slots was 50 for TCNs and 25 to 50 for PoPs At times the Network Management Soldiers would change these values depending on unit activity-DOT E views this typical time slot limitation as their best practice-necessary and operationa11y realistic As shown in Table 3-4 the number of slots required to meet the CPD requirements for a single unidirectional link full CPD requirement in all instances is greater than 50 This indicates that the number of time slots allocated to a single link necessary to meet CPD requirements is excessive In the case of unidirectional links the doubling of timeslots to support fu11 link data rate results in the same excessive allocation The CPD requirements can be met but under conditions that are not operationally realistic These unrealistic conditions are compounded when recognizing the brigade would require stationary command post TCN and mobile PoP data rates at the same time to support combat operations 26 CV r 100% 90% 80% ti i a i c I - ' c c CV CV o _ III 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0 -f N i m I o 54 Mbps o 48 Mbps o 36 Mbps o 24 Mbps o 18 Mbps 12 Mbps LI l ' r--- co ai S E 1 Distance between PoP and TCN in KM 9 Mbps N o 6 Mbps I Figure 3-6 a TCN-to-PoP Mobile Percentage of Links at a Burst Rate with Distance 100% CV 90% o 54 Mbps 80% o 48 Mbps 60% 1J c 40% 18 Mbps 30% o 12 Mbps 200 o 10% o 9Mbps ti a i al c - J c CV J CV o _ 70% 36 Mbps o 24 Mbps 50% o6 Mbps 0% OU lM NLI l 0 - - U l m 1 - u - N -1 ai - U l - j N N Distance between TCNs km Figure 3-6 b TCN-to-TCN Command Post Percentage of Links at a Burst Rate with Distance During FOT E 2 WIN-T Increment 2 did not demonstrate its CPD HNW data rate requirements or demonstrate the potential HNW link burst rates required to support its CPD requirements The FOT E 2 1-INW network supported data rates well below the CPD requirements The maximum TCN to PoP mobile data rate was 12 Mbps and was established for 10 seconds which served as the single example of a PoP achieving data rates in excess of 9 Mbps The TCN to TCN command post links did not demonstrate an effective data rate of 12 Mbps much less the 27 Mbps CPD data rate requirement at any range Since HNW is a demand assigned waveform DOT E will examine HN V link burst rates and their potential to meet HNW CPD requirements data rates at distances considering various time slot allocations Figure 3-6 a and b shows FOT E 2 HNW links with their recorded percentage of burst rates link quality at distance ranging from 0 to 20 kilometers The PoP to TCN mobile values are shown in 3-6 a and the TCN to TCN command post values are shown in 3-6 b Each figure includes a dashed line to indicate the CPD requirement distance 2 kilometers for PoP and 18 kilometers for the TCN The FOT E 2 HNW link burst rates of 54 Mbps and 48 Mbps which provide the potential to meet the CPD data rate requirements of 18 Mbps mobile and 27 Mbps command post are colored red and dark red As shown in Figure 3-6 a TCN to PoP mobile links demonstrated the potential link burst rates l 5 percent of the time at 2 kilometers As shown in Figure 3-6 b TCN to TCN command post links demonstrated the potential HNW link burst 27 rate of 48 Mbps or 54 Mbps 15 percent of the time at 4 5 kilometers dropped to no potential and then showed a brief 5 percent potential at 12 kilometers During FOT E 2 WIN-T Increment 2 demonstrated neither its CPD requirements nor a significant potential using excessive time slots to meet its requirements for HNW data rates at distance HNW Single-Hop HNW Multi-Hop NCW oe Waveform Usage Fraction ofTime 08 04 I 2 00 s 10 16 20 Distance km Figure 3-7 a Network Connectivity of Moving PoPs during IOT E at White Sands Missile Range WSMR HNW Single-Hop HNW Multi-Hop NCW 08 Waveform Usage Fraction ofTime O6 04 02 25 30 Distance lkm Figure 3-7 b Network Connectivity of Moving PoPs during FOT E at WSMR 0 8 o o HNW Single-Hop HNW Multi-Hop NCW Other Waveform Usage 0 6 Fraction of Time 0 4 0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 Distance km Figure 3-7 c Network Connectivity of Moving PoPs during FOT E 2 at WSMR 28 100% 90% 80% o 54 Mbps 70% o 48Mbps 60% o 36Mbps Percent of HNW Single Hop links 50% o 24Mbps With first leg burst rate U 18Mbps 40% 12 Mbps 30% o 9Mbps o 6Mbps 20% oNo Link 10% 0% 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Oistance km f 'igure 3-8 HNW Link Burst Rates Single Hop of Moving PoPs during FOT E 2 at WSMR HNW does not provide transmission range to support mobile subscribers Figure 3-7 a-c illustrate the connectivity of the HNW line-of-sight network to support PoPs while they are onthe-move at speeds greater than 5 miles per hour mph Data in the figures were accumulated over the duration of WIN-T Increment 2 IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 in the desert terrain of Fort Bliss Texas and White Sand s Missile Range WSMR New Mexico All figures show that Soldiers rely upon NCW satellite for the majority of the mobile user data traffic At distances greater than 10 kilometers TCNs and PoPs are connected for the most part by the NCW satellite At close ranges of l kilometer or less HNW is used almost 80 percent of the time of which single-hop HNW was used 60 percent of the time Figure 3-8 shows the singlehop HNW link burst rates link quality of the HNW portion of mobile data traffic at distance during FOT E 2 While the percentage of HNW usage decreases at distance the links decrease in data rate potential produce links that cannot transfer data and become intermittent in nature In particular even at shorter ranges less than 5 kilometers when HNW use is greatest link burst rates decrease rapidly and do not provide substantial data rates At IOT E and FOT E 2 the network's use of multi-hop HNW was more frequent During FOT E 1 network operations placed more restrictions on the waveform to avoid the cycling witnessed during IOT E Multi-hop HNW performance by link segment is similar to single-hop but overall data throughput is reduced as the data traverses two or more HNW links 29 07 Frec tion ol Tome Spenl on Mode 05 0 4 0 3 02 0I 5 10 15 20 25 30 O ante lkml Figure 3-9 Network Connectivity of Moving PoPs during IOT E at Fort Campbell HNW does not provide support for mobile users when transmitting in vegetation During IOT E HNW was used in the forested environment at Fort Campbell Kentucky Figure 3-9 illustrates the effective HNW transmission range at Fort Campbell Soldiers using HNW in Fort Campbell's forested terrain experienced the loss of HNW at less than 2 5 kilometers with most use occurring at less than I kilometer As no improvements were made to the HNW radio no additional testing in forested areas was conducted during either FOT E I or FOT E 2 The poor transmission range performance of HNW demonstrated during IOT E at Fort Campbell is representative of the system in forested terrain 70 - Colocaled x 1 km 245 1 Gbytes CJ Near 1 x 10 km 44 1 Gbytes 60 c JFar 10 km 43 9 Gbytes Colocated TRT Only x 1 km 0 2 Gbytes Near TRT Only 1 x 10 km 6 0 Gby1es c JFar TRT Only 10 km 26 9 Gbytes - - Total Load 526 0 Gbytes Iii' 50 2 - 0 S -110 -0 ro 0 _J 30 Q 20 10 0 0-15 0-16 0-17 0-18 0-19 0-20 0-21 0-22 0-23 0-24 0-25 0 -26 0-27 0-28 0-29 0-30 0-31 N-01 N-02 Date Figure 3-10 Offered Load per day between TCNs Figure 3-10 shows the FOT E 2 user traffic load per day between TCNs command posts The black line shows the total traffic load per day Most of the traffic over HNW during FOT E 2 was between stationary TCNs The bar chart is divided in color by the HNW link distance between the TCNs The three distance categories Collocated ''Near and Far are 30 defined as Jess than l kilometer 10 kilometers and over JO kilometers respectively 2 An inset bar chart shows just the traffic that was supported by the TR-T The legend provides the total data supported by category during the test Table 3-4 Gbytes of Traffic on HN V and NCW at Collocated Near and Far Distances and Percentage of Traffic over NCW and Percentage of HNW Traffic over the TR-T NCW Single Hop TCN Near 4 1 207 32 Far 180 4 38 6 12 Colocated TR-T 0 6 27 Percent NCW PercentTR-T 1 58% 2 37% 80 71% 0 13% 13 25% 61 86% When supporting command posts the HNW network for the most part supported collocated TOCs and at further distances the NCW sate1lite network carried the majority of network traffic HNW carried 63 percent of the inter-TOC traffic but 72 percent 245 Gbytes out of 344 Gbytes of the HNW TOC traffic was between collocated TOCs within a distance of one kilometer or less At distances of 1 kilometer or less there are other communication methods that might be more appropriate due to size and manning requirements At near distances between I and LO kilometers 27 out of the 44 GBytes of colorless traffic supported by HNW used the TR-T Table 3-4 shows the amount of NCW and HNW traffic observed at these three distances along with the percentage of traffic over NCW and the percentage of HNW traffic that transmitted single hop went over another TCN or was supported by the TR-T At shorter distances almost all of the traffic is supported by HNW without use of the TR-T By 10 kilometers and the threshold of near HNW is still supporting most of the unit traffic but the TR-T is used to relay more of the traffic At far distances greater than I 0 kilometers almost all of the unit traffic 81 percent is supported by the NCW satellite with 61 percent of the remaining HNW traffic 19 percent of total supported by the TR-T Although HNW does not have the physical design to provide reliable support at far distances greater than 10 kilometers the brigade's use of the TR-Tis necessary to maintain its line-of-sight HNW network In the absence of satellite communications HNW will of necessity be the primary means the WlN-T system will attempt to use to transmit data The availability of satellite communications is not assured under all possible combat scenarios Satellite communications is limited in certain tenain and vegetation and can be removed or disrupted by an enemy with the capability to jam satellite communications or conduct successful computer network attack Available frequency spectrum to support satellite communications is limited hased on a unit's location in the world this limitation is compounded with the increased demand of Jarger formations e g brigade division and corps WIN-T Increment 2 is designed to use HNW line-of-sight teJTestrial communications to provide network support for unit missions in combination with the NCW satellite network 2 Thc se distances are rounded down to the nearest kilometer The collocated distances also include some data where distances could not be determined with instrumented data but should be less than I kilometers due to knowledge ofTOC locations at the time 31 When NCW satellite is not available HNW is not able to maintain the brigade's network The two NCW outages experienced during FOT E 1 resulted in a disconnected network with Jimited HNW connectivity among the widely dispersed elements of a brigade Per the FOT E 1 report during the two observed outages three to four of the brigade' s eight HNW-dependem TCN command posts were separated from the brigade's network The brigade' s use of a single TR-Twas not effective to extend the HNW network During lOT E FOT E I and FOT E 2 Soldiers routine y attempted to use HNW to connect command posts at distances greater than the 12-kilometer range re quired by the CPD In addition the HNW radio demonstrated poor transmission range The Army did not increase the number of TR-Ts assigned to the WIN-T Increment 2 brigades see recommendation in both the IOT E and FOT E I report A single TR-Twas used during IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 consistent with the Army's basis of issue plan With only one TR-T the brigade is not able to maintain long-range HNW connectivity within its area of operations 1218 1216 1214 Altitude m at end points 1212 1210 1208 ------------------------------------------------------- ------ --- - - - - ---------------- ----- -------- - - ------ - -- - - --- - - --- 1206 1204 - Line-or-Sight ------ 413 Earth basefine - First Fresnel Zone 1202 4 2 6 8 10 12 Distance km c Terrain Figure 3-1'1 The Line-Of-Sight blue and first Fresnel Zone Paths for Two TCNs at 12 Kilometers Distance The CPD range of 12 kilometers for two IO-meter mast TCN antennas is challenged by physical limitations of HNW frequency spectmm As shown in Figure 3-11 the radio transmission represented by the first Fresnel zone of a 12-kilometer link between two TCNs receives significant blockage from tbe curvature of the earth on flat terrain 3 To achieve such distances the HNW waveform must avoid terrain and vegetation that can interfere with its transmission or employ a TR-T for higher antenna height HNW is not a reliable means of communication at these distances 3 The frequency used is 4 9 gigahertz GHz The altitude of 1 200 meters is approximately the altitude of the Salemo site on WSMR The full height used for the antennas was 12 8 meters The additional 2 meters allow for the approximate height of the transport vehicle ou which the TCN masc is mounted 32 TR-T Data sent 14 _ 12 VI QJ 10 0 - u ro _ c 8 6 o TR-T RTE K 4 o TR-T HRFU QJ 2 0 -o Figure 3-12 Amount of Data Sent by Stationary TOCs over the TR-T during the Test versus Burst Rate During FOT E 2 the TR-T provided links that were of low quality and the brigade made little use of the range-extending RTEK antenna Each TCN maintains one RTEK which can improve one HNW link of the supported command post The use of the RTEK needs to be prioritized by the network operations to optimize the HNW network During POT B the brigade made minimal use the RTEK and this usage docs not allow conclusions as to RTEK improvements to the overaJl HNW network Figure 3-12 shows the amount of data that was sent over the TR-Tat different HNW link burst rates The data is further divided into whether that link used the RTEK flat panel antenna or not The Brigade Main TOC used an RTEK-to-RTEK link to transmit data to the TR-T and this use of the RTEK supported a total of 16 Gbytes of user traffic Traffic sent over the TR-T using a 1-IRFU link totaled another 17 Gbytes of traffic With the use of the TR-T and RTEK the HNW link burst rates appear improved but did not demonstrate maximum burst rates The Anny should increase the usage of RTEK antennas to improve HNW performance and emphasize RTEK use within network management tools Figure 3-13 shows contributions of the TR-Tat FOT E 1 during the Network Integration Evaluation 13 2 In order for two platforms to he connected by HNW through the TR-T the links from the TR-T to each platform required link burst rates above 12 Mbps The median single-hop burst rates between TCNs and the TR-Tare shown at the beginning of the test left and near the end of the test right Dotted lines indicate nodes with no HNW connections The brigade' s command posts are labeled At the beginning of FOT E I Figure 3-13 left side the TR-T did not provide increased connectivity of the HNW network All the nodes connected to the TR-T maintain stronger single-hop direct links between other HNW TCNs The TR-Tis not able to connect the Tactical Command Post or TOC to the Brigade Support Battalion BSB TCN to the south or the maneuver battalion TCNs to the north Dashed lines indicate no HNW links only the 33 NCW satellite During the end of FOT E I Figure 3-13 right side the TR-T did provide connectivity to distant nodes such as Tactical Command Post and 111 but the link burst rates were too low for the HNW to be used In both cases there are isolate-0 battalion TCN nodes that could not rely on HNW for connection to either the brigade command post or other battalion TCNs During FOT E 2 the TR-T did not provide significant additional HNW connectivity Figure 3-14 shows the HNW links on October 18 2014 following the first deployment of the TR-T The colors of the lines represent the median burst rate between those TCNs The righthand plot is an inset zoom of the region near the brigade command post The brigade TAC TOC and the Brigade Special Troop Battalion BSTB are located at Salemo within 217 meters of each other and maintain the highest link burst rate of 54 Mbps The distance from Salemo to Dona Ana where 1-6 and 4-27 are located is 33 kilometers Line-of-sight to 1-6 and 4-27 from the brigade is blocked by terrain The distance from Salerno to Westbrook where 4-17 is located and McGregor-South where the BSB is located is 29 and 27 kilometers respectively The TR-T is located at Chaparral the highest elevation located in the middle of the three TOC locations The 1-1 was beyond line-of-sight connectivity at Oro Grande The TCNs did not move during the day which provided a stable environment for link establishment during the day Despite this advantageous setup the TR-Twas not able to provide reliable connectivity 4-27 and 1-6 communicated through the TR-T because of terrain blockage yet only 50 percent of the user traffic from brigade command post to 4-27 and 1-6 used HNW over the TR-T With a poor link burst rate of 9 Mbps the brigade is on occasion able to communicate directly with 4-17 and the BSB HNW extended with the TR-T supported 15 percent of the traffic from brigade to the BSB and 25 percent of the traffic from the brigade to 4-17 The NCW satellite network supported the remaining unit traffic HNW is not stable at distances Figure 3-14 shows the intermittent nature of HNW by displaying which wavefonn HNW or NCW was used during the day of October 18th to communicate between the brigade command post and 1-6 The HNW connection shown in red was intermittent throughout the day and the connectivity was not symmetric To illustrate lack of symmetry the data traveling from brigade to 1-6 would use the HNW link while the reverse connection 1-6 to brigade would use NCW satellite for extended periods of time This lack of symmetry could affect the Soldier's use of applications that are latency sensitive such as Voice Over Internet Protocol VoIP and increase network congestion due to queuing problems Satellite-based NCW has longer latency than line-of-sight HNW 34 26km 1 1 22 km 1 35 o 1 6 o 8km oo o ooo o oo oo ooo TAC BSTB TOC TR-T 4 27 13km 14km Single Hop Burst Rate - 6mbps 9mbps 1 - l 12 mbps 18 mbps - 24mbps - 36mbps - 48mbps o o 4 27 Single Hop Burst Rate o o 54mbps Needed for Two-Hop HNW o o o - 35 km o o oo Gmbps 9mbps o o 12 mbps 4 1 18mbps 28km o - 24mbps - 36mbps 48mbps S4mbps BSB o N dforTwo-HopHNW Figure 3-13 Median HNW Burst rates and Distances between TCN and TR-T Configuration Items Left Beginning of FOT E May 8 2013 Right End of FOT E May 19 2013 35 BSB o 8km o oo 1 6 Single Hop Burst Rate - 6mbps 9 rnbps 1 - I Umbps 18mbps 24mbps 36mbpso - 48mbpso - S llmbpso o N iP l forTwo-Hnn HNW Figure 3-14 Median HNW Burst Rates and Distances between TCNs and TRT Configuration Items on October 18 2014 1-6 to BOE - NCW HNW-SingleHop - BOE to 1-fl Figure 3-15 Offered Load between BDE Main and 1-6 on October 18 2014 36 HNW-MultiHop HNW-TR-T Training afforded to Soldiers and HNW network tools did not support proper deployment of the TR-T On October 22 d 1-6 moved between 1-1 and McGregor and 4-27 left Dona Ana on October 25 and moved east towards McGregor situated with the BSB The TR-T remained at the high-elevation location Chaparral In this configuration the TR-Twas east of all other HNW nodes providing little additional connectivity for maneuver battalions but did provide a link between brigade and 1-1 as shown in Figure 3-16 On October 26 4-17 moved near Oro Grande Bugger Bear Mountain 24 3 kilometers distance from the nearest HNW node 1-6 but beyond HNW line-of-sight The TR-T moved to the A location in Figure 3-16 the intersection of Route Blue and Route Purple In the following days the TR-Twas able to pass traffic from brigade to 4-27 and the BSB who were co-located 1-1 and 1-6 1- l had moved from Oro Grande to a location within line-of-sight to the TR-T before moving north on October 29 The new TR-T location did not provide improved support of the network compared to the previous location Also the brigade command post received a lesser quality link As shown on the right side of Figure 3-16 terrain analysis of the location A position shows that line-of-sight to the brigade command post was lost Further analysis shows that alternate locations near the actual TR-T location had the potential for line-of-sight between the brigade command post and the TR-T In the figure example the location labeled B'' maintains line-of-sight connectivity Analysis of the signal attenuation from brigade to 1- J shows that there is less signal loss from the B location than from the A location The B location is closer to other battalions allowing the TR-T to enhance their HNW connectivity When the brigade command post moved north the TR-T did not provide additional connectivity between the brigade and the hattalions 27 October Actual A Alternate Location B ' Lino-of-Sight ------ 413 E arth Mte Wle F'ir t o 1 z 1141 S1111 le Hop Burst Rate - 6 mbps 9mbps 12 irbps 18 irbpso 24 lt pso 36irbpso 48 rrbpso 54 mbps' oNeeded for Two-lioo HNW 1210 c - - - 1 5 O to M Figure 3-16 TR-T location on October 25 and October 27 2014 along with a proposed alternate location Left An image of the locations with the median burst rate color-coded lines Right an analysis of the terrain f'eatures along paths A and B Moving the TR-T to a less advantageous location indicates that network management tools were not providing Soldiers with useful information Soldiers commented the HNW plam1ing tools did not provide consistent answers on TR-T locations and did not rank potential locations by quality The HNW network tools provide operators with the ability to block traffic from other nodes The Army added this feature in response to the problem noted during IOT E 37 that moving PoPs could disrupt the HNW network Soldiers using these features in an improper manner can reduce the effectiveness of HNW As an example on October 26 and October 27 427 blocked the HNW link from the BSB 4-27 was a prefen-ed neighbor of the BSB even though they were stationary and separated by less than 1 2 kilometers During FOT E 2 the TR-T could connect four to five command posts Although nearest neighbor restrictions were lifted on the October 20 the number of TR-T-su pported nodes does not increase as seen in Figure 3-17 which shows how many HNW neighbors the TR-T maintained by hour based on JO-second samples Adjusting nearest neighbor parameters did not improve HNW connectivity 10 8 TR-T Neighbors 6 4 I I 2 0 0-18 0-19 0-20 0-21 0-22 0-23 0-24 0-25 0-26 0-27 0-28 0-29 0-30 0-31 Date Time Figure 3-17 Number ofTR-T Neighbors HNW Connections during FOT E 2 On October 24 a TCN to TCN link of 26 kilometers was observed consistently over a period of 10 hours from 10 00 to 20 00 UTC time from 4-27 to J-1 While the Army stated this is an example of HNW effectiveness this link provided little support to the unit's mission This 26-kilometer link supported a marginal 9 Mbps link burst rate and did not support significant user traffic for the majority of time The upper portion of Figure 3-18 shows the link' s burst rates over time and the lower half shows the corresponding data rate The region of HNW connectivity is highlighted Over the entire day of HNW connectivity the links supported 70 kbps of traffic in each direction between 4-27 and 1-1 This traffic is mostly network overhead and not associated with mission data 38 N-01 24 Mbps 1-1 to4-27 - - 4-27 to 1-1 18 Mbps I I Burst rate HNW connectivity period I 00 00 02 00 04 00 06 00 08 00 10 00 U OO 14 00 16 00 111 00 20 00 Zl OO 00 00 Datemme j 102 --- -- --- - --r---- ---- -- -- -- -- - 10 1 Offered Load kbps o ----- -- l l 100 HNW connectivity period 1 _ - r __ __ 04 00 I I I l - - - - - - - _ __ 02 00 1 I ' f -- - - -- - - r-- - - - - - 10 1 ___ 00 00 1-1 to 4 -27 4-27 to 1-1 __ _ __ ___ 4 ll OO 08 00 ---1 -- _ _ L _ _ __ 10 00 __ _ _ ___ 12 00 14 00 _ __ 16 00 I - __ __ _ ___ 111 00 20 00 _ ___ 22 00 __ 00 00 DatefTime Figure 3-18 HNW Connectivity between 4-27 and 1-1 on October 24 from approximately 10 00 to 20 00 UTC Soldier Network Extension SNE During FOT E 2 the SNE with CNR Gateway was operationally effective and supported the unit' s mission with extended CNR coverage VOIP phone calls chat and mission command applications During IOT E the SNE demonstrated poor data throughput which did not allow Soldiers to use mission command applications or conduct successful on-the-move VoIP calls After IOT E the Army adjusted the SNE's data transfer configuration buffering removed the Command Post of the Future mission command application and ensured the use of the more efficient WIN-T VoIP application 39 DOT E reported after the FOT E I conducted at the Network Integration Evaluation 13 2 in May 2013 that the SNE was useful for VoIP but not for most other functions SNE reliability combined with complex start-up and reboot procedures provided a negative user experience for overall SNE effectiveness At FOT E 1 the SNE CNR Gateway was not effective as IO out of 16 attempts at establishing the CNR Gateway were unsuccessful Capacity and VoIP Figure 3-19 shows the distribution of the SNE total load for IOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 During FOT E the SNE supported sufficient traffic load to support the intended functions of the SNE' s mission command applications 0 035 -- ----r-- --- --- --- ---- ---- - FOT E2 - FOT E -IOT E 0 03 0 025 SNE Probability 0 02 Density 0 015 0 01 0 005 o -_ _ ___ _ --J 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 20C Total Load kbps Figure 3-19 SNE Total Load at IOT E FOT E and FOT E 2 The SNE's ability to support VoIP phone was operationally effective During FOT E 1 the SNE supported data throughput to conduct VoIP calls but the utility of VoIP was limited by long caH setup times with 12 percent of phone calls experiencing a wait time of 30 seconds or more During FOT E 2 the long call set-up times were reduced to 1 5 percent Figure 3-20 shows FOT E 2 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle MATV SNE user responses to the capability provided by the VoIP softphone The majority of Soldiers found the VoIP softphone useful to support the unit's mission 40 I would like to deploy with the VOiP Softphone 40 30 o 0 - StrOll ly Disa Tee Di agree Agree Stro11gly A ree Figure 3-19 MATV SNE Users' Responses to the Capability Provided by VoIP Mission Command Application The SNE and PoP mission applications were operationally effective Soldiers made great use of the WIN-T Chat application during unit operations MATV SNE users found the back seat display useful and applications such as Tactical Ground Reporting TIGR system to be effective SNE users noted in the focus groups that lite versions of the software such as TIGR lite did not provide the full suite of needed capabilities During FOT E 1 Soldiers using the SNE experienced a high rate of system reboots which reduced the effectiveness of mission command applications Figure 3-21 shows the MATV SNE user ratings of the improved graphical user interface used in FOT E 2 MATV SNE Soldiers found that the new user interface assisted them with operating mission command applications and assisted with accomplishing their mission The WIN-T Inc 2 display graphical user interface GU now allows me to complete my mission easier 20 15 IO 5 Strnngly Dis gree - Disagree Agree Strongly gre o Total Figure 3-21 MATV SNE Responses to the Ability of the WIN T Multi Domain Atlas MDA to Provide Ease in Completing the Mission 41 Combat Network Radio Gateway During FOT E 2 the CNR Galeway was operationally effective As shown in Figure 322 the Army simplified the user interface for the CNR gateway The left image provides the old interface and the right provides the new interface u ' r ic7J'rif - _ _ Figure 3-22 Old left and New right CNR Gateway Display During FOT E 2 the CNR Gateway provided a useful capability to commanders to monitor distant CNR networks By using the CNR Gateway brigade and battalion commanders can obtain situational awareness from the forward areas of combat The CNR Gateway was not as useful for company commanders who were located near their company platoon operational areas Figure 3-23 shows the mixed opinions on the capability provided by CNR Gateway in rating the comment I was able to bridge my unit network with external units with the CNR gateway Although some Soldiers were positive there were negative comments and some NIA comments indicating that some respondents never used the CNR Gateway during FOT E 2 Figure 3-24 s hows the Soldiers' assessment of CNR Gateway phone calls which were positive I was able to bridge my unit network with external units with the CNR gateway 3 4 2 1 Ni'A Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Figure 3-23 Responses to the Survey Question on the Capability of CNR Gateway to Bridge Networks 42 100% HO% l 2 5 'c 60% ' i 6 10 l i 18 40'Mo 3 7 i 4 20' 0'% 1-l CA ' 1 4-17 SBC f 4-27 FA BSTB 2-t BDE l nit o Bad Poor Fair Good GBPxcdknt Figure 3-24 Percentage of Calls Rated Bad to Excellent by Unit Stryker Integration The Stryker PoP and SNE were operationally effective and similar to the effectiveness demonstrated by the MATV PoP and SNE Stryker SNEs exhibited a higher rate of satellite acquire and align states than MATV SNEs This may have been due to the limited number of Stryker SNE and Stryker PoPs and the differences in mission location and usage Suitability problems described in Section Four interfere with the unit's employment of the Stryker PoP and SNE 43 This page iniemionally left blank Section Four Operational Suitability The WIN-T Increment 2 suitability evaluation for POT E 2 focused on those items that were not operationally suitable during IOT E and FOT E 1 During IOT E the WlN-T Increment 2 system was not operationally suitable During FOT E I the Tactical Communications Node Tactical Relay-Tower and Network Operations and Security Center were operationally suitable The Vehicle Wireless Package VWP was operationally suitable as it was reliable but not maintainable The Point of Presence PoP and Soldier Network Extension SNE on-the-move platforms were not operationally suitable because they were not reliable not maintainable required frequent reboots and startup shutdown procedures were far too complex During FOT E 2 the Army measured the reliability and maintainability characteristics of the following five WIN-T Increment 2 configuration items o VWP o Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle M-ATV PoP o Stryker PoP o M-ATV SNE o Stryker SNE During FOT E 2 the VWP the M-ATV PoP and M-ATV SNE were operationally suitable The Stryker PoP and Stryker SNE were not operationally suitable As shown in Table 4-1 the WIN-T PoP met reliability requirements for both the M-ATV and Stryker variants The M-ATV SNE met reliability requirements but the Stryker SNE did not meet reliability requirements The Stryker SNE met the 30-minute maintainability requirement Neither the MATV PoP Stryker PoP nor M-ATV SNE met the maintainability requirement and the maintainability of the VWP could not be assessed no failures were observed in the test The Army reduced the complexity of PoP and SNE operations and troubleshooting and reduced the time required for startup and shutdown of these configuration items The Stryke r PoP and SNE presented Soldiers with significant human factors engineering and integration issues that interfered with the unit's performance of mission ope rations These Stryker WIN-T deficiencies include o Position of WIN-T displays in front of gunner position o WIN-T antennas prevent 360 degree gun coverage o WIN-T operations with engine off can drain batteries to level that they must be replaced o Operating WIN-T on vehicJe power does not aJlow Silent Watch operations 45 Table 4 1 FOT E 2 WIN T Increment 2 Operational Suitability Configuration Item Suitable Maintainable Reliable VWP Yes Not Assessed 1 Yes M-ATV PoP Yes No Yes Styker PoP No No Yes M-ATV SNE Yes No Yes Stryker SNE No Yes No Wrth one 3-mmute maintenance action not able to assess VWP Mean Trme To Repair MTTR PoP- Point of Presence SNE- Soldier Network Extension VWP-Vehicle Wireless Package MATV - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles M-ATVs Requirement Changes The Army modified the Mean Time Between Essential Function Failure MTBEFF reliability requirements for WIN T Increment 2 three times since the publishing of the original Capability Production Document In most cases these modifications reduced reliability requirements and were based upon changing three variables that detennine MTBEFF o Mission Duration - length hours of projected unit mission o Mission Reliability - probability percentage that system will complete mission without failure o Utilization Rate - percentage of system operation within mission pulse duration Prior to the May 2012 IOT E the Army reduced the mission duration from a 96-hour division value to the 72-hour brigade value Prior to the May 2013 FOT E I the Army reduced mission reliability from 90 percent to 80 percent Prior to the October 2014 FOT E 2 th e Army modified the utilization rates for the WIN-T configuration items based on usage rates observed at the May 2012 IOT E Table 4-2 shows the MTBEFF requirement changes that resulted from the Army's modifications of the WIN-T Increment 2 reliability variables Lower reliability requirements result in increased life-cycle support costs through the increased number of required repair parts maintenance man-hours and a larger logistical footprint 46 Table 4-2 Historical MTBEFF Requirements in Hours Mission Duration Adjustment Mission Reliability Utilization Adjustment Adjustment November 2008 February 2012 May 2013 October 2014 TCN 900 664 314 303 PoP 900 385 182 144 SNE 300 529 250 184 VWP 900 94 45 97 TR-T 900 308 146 142 NOSC 900 463 219 216 Original CPD TCN - Tactical Communications Node PoP - Point of Presence SNE - Soldier Network Extension VWP - Vehicle Wireless Package Tactical Relay- Tower NOSC - Network Operations and Security Center Reliability During FOT E 2 the M-ATV PoP Styker PoP M-ATV SNE and VWP were reliable The Styker SNE was not reliable The Stryker SNE did not meet its MTBEFF requirement but it demonstrated borderline results compared to the requirement Table 4-3 provides the point estimates and the I-sided 80 percent Lower Confidence Bounds LCBs for MTBEFF for the four WIN-T Increment 2 operational tests During FOT E 2 the Stryker and M-ATV PoPs met the Army's revised requirement of 144 hours MTREFF at the 80 percent LCB The M-ATV PoP demonstrated sufficient reliability to meet the MTBEFF requirement assessed during FOT E The M-ATV SNE met the Army's revised MTBEFF requirement of 184 hours at the 80 percent LCB but the Stryker SNE did not meet the requirement The M-ATV SNE demonstrated sufficient reliability to meet the MTBEFF requirement assessed during FOT E The VWP had no failures during FOT E 2 A point estimate cannot be calculated During FOT E the VWP met its reliability requirement Reliability assessments were performed using the 80 percent LCB to maintain consistency with the IOT E and POT E 1 assessments Table 4-3 Point Estimate and 80% Lower Confidence Bound MTBEFF Point Estimate 80% Lower Confidence Bounds MTBEFF FOT E 2 MTBEFF Requirement LUT M-ATV IOT E M-ATV FOT E M-ATV FOT E 2 M-ATV FOT E 2 Stryker PoP SNE 1 HMMWVVWP PoP 144 87 73 167 128 112 83 377 238 307 167 SNE 184 49 45 156 137 230 195 519 424 183 144 VWP 97 226 143 238 157 304 165 - I 2 1 158 _ 624 This column has the Stryker values for the Point of Presence PoP and Soldier Network Extension SNE and the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HMMWV values for the Vehicle Wireless Package VWP 2 The VWP had no failures LUT - Limited User Test M-ATV- Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles 47 Table 4-4 shows the mission reliability estimates and the two-sided MTBEFF confidence intervals and point estimate for each of the configuration items compared to the requirement which is based on an 80 percent 1-sided lower confidence on the mission reliability Mission reliability is the probability that a unit could complete a 72-hour brigade-level mission using a WlN-T Increment 2 configuration item without incurring an EFF The formula used to calculate mission reliability is R x exp M FFJ Where x is the mission duration and U is the rate of utilization Table 4-4 includes the mission reliability calculated using both the October 2014 reliability requirement utilization rates and the utilization rates observed during operational test Utilization rates demonstrated in FOT E 2 were higher than those used to modify the rehability requirement based upon IOT E as shown in Table 4-5 48 Table 4-4 Mission Reliability Estimates Operating Hours Essential Function Failures FOT E2 Requirement OMS MP 2014 FOT E 2 2 3 MTBEFF 1-sided 4 80% LCB M-ATV 1 885 5 144 377 203-775 92% 85%-96% 90% 82%-95% 238 Stryker 921 3 144 307 1 38-836 90% 79%-96% 87% 74%-95% 167 M-ATV 11 417 22 184 519 389-703 92% 90%-94% 89% 83%-92% 424 Stryker 2 921 16 184 183 130-282 80% 73%-88% 73% 64%-81% 144 M ATV 1 863 0 97 - - - 1 158 HMMWV 1 005 0 97 - - - 624 POP SNE VWP Mission Reliability Point Estimate two-sided 80% Cl MTBEFF Point Estimate two-sided 80% Cl 1 l As 1t had no failures the Vehicle Wireless Package VWP Mean Time Between Essential Function Failure MTBEFF point estimate two-sided confidence interval Cl and mission reliability cannot be calculated 2 0MS MP - Operational Mission Summary Mission Profile M-ATV- Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles PoP - Point of Presence SNE - Soldier Network Extension 3 FOT E2 mission reliability was calculated using the observed utilization at Network Integration Evaluation NIE 15 1 Values are given in Table 4-5 4 The MTBEFF 1-sided 80% lower confidence bound LCB is provided for comparison to previous test reports 49 This page intentionally left blank 5f Table 4-5 Reliability Requirement and FOT E 2 Observed Utilization Rates October 2014 WIN-T Configuration Item Reliability Requirement Utilization Rates FOT E 2 Observed Utilization Rates PoP 45% 56 3% SNE 57 6% 60 9% VWP 30 5% 59 6% PoP- Point of Presence SNE - Soldier Network Extension VWP - Vehicle Wireless Package Reliability and mission reliability are based upon WIN- Increment 2 hardware and software failures Support equipment failures are not included in the MTBEFF estimates above consistent with the Army's failure definition scoring criteria and with the IOT E and FOT E assessments Table 4-6 shows MTBEFFs and mission reliability for PoP and SNE when the failures associated with the vehicle and other support equipment are included e g a vehicle problem causes WlN-T to fail using observed FOT E 2 utilization rates Soldiers idle M-ATV and Stryker vehicles to provide power and coolin g for operating WIN-T Increment 2 configuration items Excessive at-the-halt idle time increases vehicle failures Table 4-6 provides a representation of the commander' s experience with WIN-T Increment 2 by including vehicle and support equipment failures When vehicle failures are included the PoP and SNE systems' mission reliability is lowered Table 4 6 MTBEFF and Re1a1 r bTt1 y Esf1mates w1oth support E qmpmen t Fa1 1 ures - WIN-T Vehicle Op Hours WIN-T EFFs Vehicle Support EFFs MTBEFF PE Mission Reliability 1 PE M-ATV 1 685 11 2 111 69% Stryker 921 4 7 62 51% M-ATV 11 417 32 1 294 82% Stryker 2 282 22 5 112 59% PoP SNE Mission rehab1hty calculated using FOT E observed ut1hzabon rates PoP - Point of Presence SNE - Soldier Network Extension EFF - Essential Function Failure M ATV - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle PE - Point Estimate Maintainability During FOT E 2 the Stryker SNE met the 30-minute Mean Time To Repair MTTR requirement Table 4-7 summarizes the MTTR point estimates for the configuration items evaluated during FOT E 2 compared to previous operational tests FOT E 2 repair times were consistent with values from previous tests The confidence interval shown for FOT E 2 is based on a log-normal distribution assumption The Stryker SNE point estimate met the maintainability requirement of 30 minutes Because there was one 3-minute YWP event that required maintenance action MTTR could not be calculated 51 Table 4-7 Mean Time to Repair MTT R Point Estimates 80 o confi1d ence IeveIs are prov1 de d f or the FOT E 2 resu It s FOT E Point Estimate M-ATV 105 35 87 33-203 Stry ker N A N A 41 23-83 M-ATV 57 49 44 27-62 Stryker N A N A 25 19-42 all variants 43 119 N A Requirement 30 Minutes POP SNE VWP FOT E 2 Point Estimate IOT E Point Estimate 80% Confiden ce Bounds PoP - Point of Presence SNE - Soldier Network Extension M-ATV - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle M-ATV 25 Troubleshooting 20 15 JO 5 0 I I 11 - Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Disagree o I prefer the new WIN-T Inc 2 troubleshooting procedures instead of the old WIN-T Im 2 troubleshooting procedures o The SNE PoP WIN-T Display provides adequate information for troubleshooting Figure 4-1 Troubleshooting Survey Qnestion Results The Army improved the PoP and SNE Multi-Display Atlas MDA display to provide both an improved user interface and easier-to-use troubleshooting procedures to assist the crew identify as we as respond to failures Soldiers found the troubleshooting procedures easier to use compared to the previous procedures used during POT E I While the new troubleshooting procedures were preferred to the previous ones Soldiers stated that the new procedures provided less troubleshooting options for the advanced user compared to the previous procedures Figure 4-1 shows the Soldiers' views on the new troubleshooting procedures During FOT E 2 Soldiers' success in troubleshooting WIN-T problems without a Field Service Representative FSR improved compared to IOT E yet remains comparable to FOT E Table 4-8 shows the unit success rate for lOT E FOT E 1 and FOT E 2 With a 52 unit success rate similar to FOT E I the Army remains dependent upon contractor FSRs for maintenance when deployed to combat operations Table 4-8 Unit Success Rate Troubleshooting WIN-T without FSR Support Unit Success Rate IOT E FOT E1 FOT E2 POP 42 8 71 6 78 8 SNE 53 3 73 3 66 7 PoP - Point of Presence SNE - Soldier Network Extension Human Factors M-A TV PoP and SNE During FOT E 2 the M-ATV PoP and SNE provided commanders in the front seat with a Joint Battle Command - Platform JBC-P Smart Display Unit while a Soldier in the back seat operated the WIN-T MDA for voice over internet protocol phone calls and WIN-T chat and mission command applications The FOT E 2 configuration was reversed from the majority of FOT E 1 vehlcles which provided the commander with the MDA and the rear-seated Soldier with the JBC-P During FOT E 1 DOT E found that commanders wanted to focus on leadership and fighting the battle not on operating WIN-T JBC-P provides the commander with a situational awareness map display to conduct on-the move operations During FOT E 2 commanders preferred having the JBC-P capability but commented they could not use voice over internet protocol phone calls or WIN-T chat without the assistance of the rear-seated Soldier manning the MDA Stryker During FOT E 2 the physical configuration of the Stryker POP and SNE interfered with leaders' and Soldiers' ability to accomplish required mission tasks Soldiers preferred the improved performance of a JBC-P display separate from the WIN-T MDA but the placement of the equipment interfered with crew operations inside the vehicle The Stryker WIN-T display is located in front of the gunner This location did not allow the commander or other staff officers to use the WIN-T display during mission operations because the equipment is located in the constrained crew space of the Stryker gunner The physical configuration of the Stryker PoP and SNE do not support unit operations The external placement of the Stryker PoP and SNE Net Centric Waveform satellite antenna prevents the Styker's 50-caliber machine gun from rotating 360 degrees and the high profiJe of the antenna blocked the crew ' s vision of the vehlcle' s rear flank These deficiencies made the Stryker crews more vulnerable and susceptible to attack Stryker PoP and SNE crews rated the internal and external placement of WIN-T equipment as inferior to the M-ATV PoP Figure 4-2 shows the distribution of Soldier responses to the placement of 'W IN-T equipment for PoP and SNE by vehicle type M-ATV operators provided a median agree positive response to the questions as to whether WTN-T does not interfere with mission activities Stryker operators provided a median disagree negative response to the same questions 53 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 12 10 I o Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Agree The placement of the WIN-T Inc 2 antennas does not interfere with external activities o M ATV Stryker L Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Agree The placement of the WIN T Inc 2 antennas does not interfere with internal activities o MATV Stryker Figure 4-2 Survey Results on the Internal and External Integration of WIN-T Increment 2 Equipment on the PoP and SNE Complexity During FOT E 2 the PoP and SNE were less complex to operate and troubleshoot and demonstrated a faster startup and shutdown time During FOT E t the test unit experienced difficulty with the complexity and lengthy startup shutdown times of the WIN-T Increment 2 During FOT E 1 when the PoP and SNE failed the operators needed to complete a complicatec I and order-sensitive restart A single mistake during this process often required returning to the beginning of the process Frustrated Soldiers would often turn off power which would further extend their restart times and produce equipment failures Since FOT E 1 the Army improved WIN-T Increment 2 to simplify operation and troubleshooting and reduce the amount of time needed to start shut down and reboot the PoP or SNE While the previous procedures were geared towards a Signal Maintainer the new procedures are intended for the general purpose user The Army published a step-by-step troubleshooting guide available oo the MDA The revised MDA user interface provides an increased viewing area and simplifies the user' s experience for operating and troubleshooting WIN-T Increment 2 Figure 4-3 provides the previous and revised WIN-T MDA user interfaces The revised WIN-T interface simplifies operations but limits the user's view into the network and options available during troubleshooting Figure 4-3 Previous left and Revised right WIN-T IDA User Interface 54 During FOT E 2 Soldiers experienced faster startup and shutdown times than those assess during FOT E 1 Figure 4-4 compares startup and shutdown procedures using WIN-T software employed on the MDA during FOT E I and 2 as measured during developmental testing As shown in Figure 4-5 Soldiers view the user interface as improved in its ability to provide a simplified startup shutdown and reboot operation compared to that experienced in FOT E I This is a major improvement E- 14 0 12 c - 10 3 8 - 4 8 6 ' 5 -s E 2 I 0 f o Kiosk Available I JnNCW Network I I SIPR App A vailahle VoIP Available o FOT E version o FOT E2 version 'igure 4-4 Develo1 me11tal Test-Measured Times to Obtain Services on WIN-T SNEs and PoPs used during FOT E green and FOT E 2 blue WIN-T Startup Shutdown Procedures o 1 prefer the new WIN-T Inc 2 stall up reboot procedures instead of the old WIN-T Inc 2 stall up reboot procedures 40 30 OJ i 0 20 0 cu Cc 10 0 NIA - I Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Agree o The WIN-T Inc 2 system shutdown procedures are easy to execute The WIN-T Inc 2 system start up reboot procedures are easy to execute Figure 4-5 Survey Results on the Shutdown and Reboot Procedures at FOT E 2 55 Failure Modes Figures 4-6 and 4-7 show the PoP and SNE failure modes by vehicle type Each section represents the fraction of failures that were Essential Function Failures EFFs attributed to WIN-T EFFs attributed to support equipment non-EFFs attributed to WIN-T or non-EFFs attributed to support equipment The WIN-T EFFs are further divided by hardware and software failures Non-EFFs degrade the capability of the configuration item and require maintenance The equipment can function in its degraded state until maintenance can be performed As shown by the EFF grey blue pie charts below the majority of WIN-T EFFs are due to software failures For the PoP support equipment EFFs provide the majority of WIN-T failures in both the Stryker and M-ATV variants For both the Stryker PoP and Stryker SNE EFFs outnumber non-EFFs Figure 4-8 shows the average failures per configuration item number of failures divided by number of configuration items for the Stryker PoP M-ATV PoP Stryker SNE and M-ATV SNE POP Stryker POPMATV WIN-TN01 - EIF i WUll-Tm' 19' WIN lNon Hf Support Eq 11'1l WIN THF 21 EH Han jw ro 7 so Figure 4-6 Stryker and M-ATV PoP Failure Modes SNE Stryker SNEMATV Suppor1 lq Non-Hf 11 WIN- Non Hf 17 WIN-TFlr ftw ttf' WIN-fHF 4 $up or1 m fq WIN-Hff Hird wore S pl Ol1 JO' Q EFF WIN-T IJf 19 Hardw te 3 Figure 4-7 Stryker and M-ATV SNE Failure Modes 56 9% Average Failures per Configuration Item 3 2 5 2 1 5 1 0 5 0 Io I o Support Eq EFF WIN T Non-EFF Stryker PoP 3 II Support Eq Non-EFF o MATV PoP 6 o - o WIN T EFF Hardware StrykerSNE 7 I WIN-T EFF Software o MATVSNE 27 ft'igure 4-8 Average Number of Failures per Configuration Item During FOT E 2 the Army reduced the frequency of recurring WIN-T Increment 2 failure modes and experienced new failure modes During FOT E 1 the PoP and SNE MDA and the Microwave Power Module -1000 MPM-1000 produced 63 percent of EFFs for WIN-T configuration items During FOT E 2 the MDA and MPM-1000 accounted for 39 percent of PoP and SNE EFFs The MDA was the cause of 5 of the 15 PoP EFFs and 14 of 41 SNE EFFs In cases of MDA failure the MDA would freeze restart or stop servicing peripheral devices and require reboot The MPM- I 000 modem was not the cause of any of the PoP EFFs and 3 of 41 SNE EFFs Five of the fifteen PoP EFFs were associated with new failure modes related to the line-of-sight Highband Networking Waveform radio Datron Antenna During FOT E 2 the SNE Datron antenna internal Global Positioning System GPS drifted which caused navigation errors that led to loss of satellite signal The Army detennined multiple causes for such loss including alignment through a side-lobe during or after blockage a software bug that caused the antenna to stop accepting GPS data and problems updating GPS during high-angular momentum turns The system could not automatically reacquire the sateJlite and had to be rebooted to regain connectivity The Datron antenna caused 40 percent of Stryker SNE EFFs Following FOT E 2 the Army implemented a Datron antenna fix and demonstrated the correction during two developmental tests in November and December 2014 The revised software includes an updated Kalman Filter Doppler shift corrections and revisions to how the GPS updates during at-the-halt to on-the-move transitions and on curved trajectories Stryker Batteries Strykers commanders reported that WIN-T Strykers required more battery replacements than Stryker without WIN-T In a focus group one commander stated that he believed every WfN-T Stryker had at least one battery replacement The 4-17 Infantry Battle Captain identified 28 battery replacements on four SNE and PoP Strykers Table 4-9 summarizes this information 57 Table 4-9 Summary of 4-17 Battle Captain WIN-T Stryker Battery Replacements Cl SNE User Date Replaced Notes 4-17 Platoon Leader Oct 28-29 8 Two full sets of 4 replaced no charge from alternator Stryker Team Chief Oct 17-18 2 Batteries were drained below the threshold to be recharged Oct20 4 Batteries were not receiving charge Oct 9-10 8 Two full sets of 4 replaced no charge from alternator Batteries were drained below the threshold to be recharged Visibly damaged noted Oct 9-10 4 Four batteries were replaced Batteries were drained and operator systems were not able to turn on Oct 17-18 2 Two batteries were replaced Batteries were drained below the threshold to be recharged 4-17 CDR POP 4-17 53 Cl - confidence interval SNE - Soldier Network Extension PoP - Point of Presence CDR - Commander $3 - Battalion Operations Officer The WIN-T Program Manager states that WIN-T has high power requirements that can drain the batteries of a Stryker vehicle below their charge threshold when the engine is not running The WIN-T PoP and SNE are not fielded with an onboard generator and rely on either vehicle engine power or the vehicle batteries to operate Once the Stryker battery has been drained below 20 Volts its abiJity to be recharged is diminished and the battery must be replaced In additjon to damaging batteries when not using engine power Stryker vehicle batteries do not supply sufficient power to support Stryker Silent Watch operations vehicle performing operations without the engine running for the required four hours with WIN-T equipment in operation Soldiers attempted to use the primary and auxiliary batteries at the same time using an interconnect feature in an attempt to extend Stryker WIN-T operations without engine power Engaging the interconnect switch to join the two auxiliary and two primary batteries to extend the operations of the WIN-T PoP and SNE without engine power caused the failure of both the WIN-T Stryker primary and auxiliary batteries 58 Section Five Recommendations The Army should take the following actions to improve the Warfighter Information Network - Tactical WIN-T Increment 2 system o Improve employment of Highband Networking Waveform HNW with Tactical Relay -Tower TR-T and Range Throughput Extension Kit RTEK Provide tactics techniques and procedures with improved training to employ the HNW network to take full advantage of range extension capabilities provided by the operation of the TR-T and RTEK o Improve Net-Centric Waveform NCW Determine the cause of momentary NCW link outages and provide a fix for this problem o Reassess the TR-T The Anny should assess the fielding quantities of TR-Ts to support brigade operations o Improve Network Operations Tools The Army should improve network operations tools to better support the Soldiers' ability to install operate and maintain HNW Tools should support planning and execution of HNW networks optimizing employment of the TR-T RTEK and use of terrain o Improve Stryker WIN-T Integration The Army should improve the integration of WIN-T into Stryker vehicles - Integrate WTN-T to afford better use of interior and exterior space to allow more user access less mission interference and improve Soldiers' field-of-view during operations - Improve Stryker WlN-T operations to allow support of all mission environments including Silent Watch o Improve Suitability with an Alternative Power Source DeveJop an alternative atthe-halt power source for WIN-T Increment 2 and its required air conditioning to eliminate the need to run Point of Presence PoP Soldier Network Extension SNE and Vehicle Wireless Package VWP vehicles 24 hours a day This capability is required for both Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle MATV and Stryker variants o Improve survivability The Army should address the deficiencies aod recommendations listed in the classified annex to this report and the Army Research Laboratory Survivability Lethality Analysis Directorate report 59 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu