a a We is document cor ts c- 1 ans bar of iez Series 12 9 8 21 62 Approvggag nsm o #17 0385 RELEASE DECLASSIFY I r EXCISE DECLA IN PART th Non-Responsive Info TS so any August 9 1962 9 FOEA Exemptions as 5 4 PA Exemptions 154 Sor Secretary's Conversation of August 8 with i Ambassador Dobrynin See attachment SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION 10 Amembassy Moscow London I Bonn w EUR Paris 11 43 US Mission Geneva for TODIS Del I ACDA - on his conversation of August 8 with Ambassador Dobrynin He said he could report brie because no perceptible business a a was transected lpparen t 2' had no from memos- e tions on any subject that came up and the conversation did not I advance any of the issues discussed The Secretary said he had mentioned three subjects The Secretary stated that he would like to report briefly 1- W- The Secretary said that he i had told Dobrynin that Ambassador Dean had gone back to Geneva i prepared to take up seriously with the Soviet union and others I the urgent matter of concluding a nuclear test ban treaty Hr Dean was also prepared to discuss improvements arising from new technical data This new information would permit a sharp reduction in the world-wide number of control posts from the range of 180 stations to a range of 80 he had not found any way however to avoid the necessity for on-site inapection With an improved capability to reduce the number of suspicious events which could not be identified it might of course be possible to talk about the numbers of onasite inspections He commented to the group that we believe we should not I talk about numoers so long as the Soviet number is zero he see no poiht in negotiating with other peeple on numbers He had observed that there were pressures to put forward a very low SECHET 960330 if 46 instrumentsguhich could do 'l and attractive number and that even when this is done the number becomes subject to erosion This happens Just as a result or a passage or time There can be ere-ion Just by reconvening the conference after a recess even though nothing has changed in the meantime Peeple expect something new We will not subject ourselves to this process unless the Soviets accept in principle the idea of onesite inspection The Secretary said he had pressed the Soviet Government through Dobrynin to look again at the question of I test ban He had told Dobrynin we cannot understand their professed concern over espionage and cannot see any reality in it We all know enough about each other to inflict massive damage in case of war The kind of espionage they seem to be fretting about has no real relevance to that capability The Secretary said that Dobrynin had indicated that Soviet opposition to inspection was flat and firm The Secretary commented that Gromyko had said at Geneva the Soviet attitude on inspection_would not change Dobrynin had said the Soviets believed that we could detect all nuclear explosions by distant instrumentation so when we press this matter of inspection the Soviets consider our purpose to be espionage The Secretary had replied to Dobrynin that we could not say the Soviets had no - i h05 49-39 do have such instruments they should show them to us an enter into objective scientific talks which might Open new avenues to agreement Dobrynin had replied that the linkage was tight in the Soviet position between an atmospheric ban and a comprehensive ban and that he did not believe the Soviet Government would move on this question The Secretary had told Dobrynin that the United States would be prepared to move to an atmospheric ban We could not say however in advance that at the end of the Soviet test series we could at that moment accept an atmospheric ban The Secretary commented to the group that he got no impression that we would be able to make any progress on either a comprehensive or an atmospheric treaty r f 1 i 2 The Secretary said that he had discussed another point in connection with the Irish Resolution a matter which Iguld be coming up shortly'hoth at Geneva and at the General Assam the Secretary recalled that he had told Gromyko at Geneva that he thought the Soviet Union was making a mistake in injecting the question of multilateral arrangements into the question of preventing the develOpment of new national nuclear capabilities Their insistence on this point could only mean there would be no progress on a point in which he would suppose to be in our common interest The Secretary said he had told Dobrynin that we considered it desirable to move ahead in accordance with the Irish Resolution by means of arrangements whereby existing nuclear powers would not transfer nuclear weapons to other nations and others would not develop nuclear weapons of their own The Secretary had told Dobrynin the Uhited States feels that in the next several years up to 20 countries will be technically'and scientifically able to produce nuclear weapons provided they are willing to devote suffi cient effort to it This figure includes the four who aheady are doing so He said the extent of effort required was being constantly reduced as a result of technological advance He had told Dobrynin 1_ the roostinn movement in the prob em or 31 ant and increase'the danger oT'hncTEar war The Secretary said he had told Dobrynin that the Soviet Uhion had a misconception in considering that a multinational capability was the same as the extenmion of national capabilities He had further told Dobrynin that since there was no consensus in the West yet as to the type of multinational defense system envisaged that a speculative element necessity enters into Soviet Opposition to multinational arrangements He had told Dobrynin that it seemed desirable to leave this question aside and move in the direction envisaged by the Irish Resolution The Secretary reported that Dobrynin then came to a point which we had turned down several times already Dobrynin said he wanted to deal with the question specially in the case of what he called the two Germanies Dobrynin had said that wider arrange- ments would involve excessive delays The Secretary had told Dobrynin that we were interested in Mainland China and that we should not pick out individual countries on a discriminatory basis but should move on a world-wide basis Dobrynin had repeated that wane was 4 as II I this would delay The Secretary had told Dobrynin that if militarily significant countries in which we were interested were not in the Treaty there could be no rights The Secretary commented to the group that Dobrynin probably has serious doubts about the possibility of China coming in He speculated that these doubts might lie behind Dobrynin's assertions that delays would be involved in proceeding on a world-wide basis Dobrynin had agreed to report the Secretary's remarks to Moscow but had said that Moscow would have great difficulty with them 3 3h fr 3 The Secretary recalled that the question of a Deputy Foreign Minister's forum had been raised with Gromyko as early as the previous spring The Secretary had asked Dobrynin whether he had instructions from Gromyko on the question of establishment of a Deputy Fbreign Hinister's forum for discussion of matters relating to Germany and Berlin Gromyko had said at Geneva that he would have word for us to whether the subject would be dealt with in this way Dobrynin replied that he would mention this question to Moscow but observed that Khrushchev and Gromwko were on vacation nowThe Secretary said the question of the UN delegation had come up and that Dobrynin had said nothing about Khrushchev's coming He had said the Soviet delegation was usually decided upon around the first of September and had predicted that Gromyko would probably be there The Secretary invited comments or questions Lord 590g said it was a rather depressing story be safe for him to take a vacation in August but Dobrynin had not been responsive The Secretary agreed He had asked Dobrynin whether it would asked what impression the Secretary had as to the next move The Secretary said he thought that exploratory talks and probes have about run their course For some time both he and SE A gsgaem Dobrynin had been repeating themselves The Secretary stated he had been as long winded and repetitious as the Soviets He said that unless they have something new to offer he does not see much coming out of the bilaterals He felt that they might seeksa different forum or might have something to say to some other member of the western group He recalled that Gromyko at Geneva had indicated that he was glad to pursue bilateral talks but had referred to talks with the Western Four as ubetter still The Secretary recalled that he had emphasized to Dobrynin that we could not accept charges that we have delayed If we had delayed a year and a half in agreeing with them they have likewise delayed that long in agreeing with us He had told Dobrynin however that we can always rush to a crisis while a resolution of differences must necessarily proceed more slowly As to what the hassians are going to do the Secretary said they seek to leave the impression with us that something is going to happen We are not inclined to think they will announce the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany overnight They will probably take some action with other governments of calling a conference first Next Monday will be the anniversary of the wall andathe Soviets might be inclined to celebrate it with harassment Orknew move The Secretary said he did not know what they will do missehygofmansgcertaia they had themselves decided He men- tioned it was'about time for another Soviet space spectacular i u Logg good said they probably have not decided what to do but that one idea in their minds is probably to sign a peace treaty The Secretary recalled that he had not had reactions from all of the Western Four on whether if the Soviets called a conference we should propose a meeting of Foreign Ministers or Deputy Foreign Ministers in response As to the coming debate in the Uhited Nation s General Assembly the Secretary thought the introduction of specific substantive questions could lead to confusion He thought however we would find wide support for the idea of talking instead of shooting for the idea that neither side should take any action which would aggravate tensions He thought however that a number of solu tions on the question of troops or of access would look easier to the UN membership than to those of us who bear primary responsibility SEQRET m swam Lord Hood said he had received comments from his government on a number of papers but not on this specific proposal regarding Western responses to a Sovkt call for a conference Mr veg Lilieggeld said that he had received and transmitted to us comments on the conference question but not on the related papers He commented that we should do something to regain the initiative of action on our side The Secretary said he did not know how much we could rely on Soviet advance planning but that they wanted to send their Minister of Agriculture in September He said if we were expecting to precipitate a crisis with another state we would certainly not be sending one of our cabinet members to visit the state at the time asked whether we thought the Soviets if they decided to go ahead with a peace treaty might not want to minimise the awkward consequence by compensating gestures well be interested in a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers and propose that we seek to agree on how to handle our disagreements The Secretary commented that this might be a rational reaction but if the Soviets were not pressing matters to a crisis it seems they wm d lmwe desired to pick up various opportunities which have been before them to avoid a_crisis In recent months they have increased their public comitmnt to action have increased for themselves the prestige problem involve in not doing anything Mr 105 piliegfelg commented that they had in several ways however seemed to accept the idea that the Nest would still be in Berlin in the future asked whether they would be likely to precede a move in Berlin with a move in the UNGA rhe Secretary replied that he would feel more relaxed if he thought Gs action would necessarily be their first move Lord Hood raised the question whether they could get the united Nations to approve the idea of a peace conference The Secretary said that we will be in a powerful position in the United Nations if we say to the Assembly in effect Ask the Berliners and ask the Last Germans what they want to do This 1361 33 47- ifact may give the Soviets some pause in deciding what to do in the Uhited Nations He asked if anyone had any doubts as to what the sentiments of the Berlin people would be 0 enfe recalled they had made their views clear in every case where they had had an opportunity to do so He added that there had been indications that the Soviet test series might be concluded by October and might have a bearing upon Khrushchev s attendance and Soviet strategy at the Assembly fhe Secretary said there are enough hints and noises around to indicate that the anniversary of the wall may take on some significance to the Soviets We do not however expect a move of the kind that would precipitate a military crisis commented there may be harassments The Secretary and Mr Hinenbrand recalled that our mission in Berlin had sent a message indicating the possibility of harass- iments at and possibly a move to cut off access to East Berlin Mr Hillenbrand said we haVe contingency plans for this possibility but that they should be reviewed The Secretary commented that we could well have some move of jmt 9 Mr 19g Liliggfelg asked if there had been any shift in emphasis by the Soviets from the question of the presence of Western troops to the question of sovereignty of the i The Secretary said not really If this were the Soviet intention they had overlooked opportunities to make it clear The Secretary recalled that the only stiff talk by the Russians to him was on the first day of his recent Geneva meeting with Gromyko Gromyko had read from a paper on that occasion and the rest of the several days of conversations appeared to be an effort to soften 5th impact of the prepared statement Lven as Gromyko was reading it he pointed out that the statement did not take into account tthings which he had already said that same day Mr Hillenbrand in response to the Secretary's question said he considered the difference between Gromyko's statement on the first day and on subsequent days to be more a difference of tone than of substance SECRE The Secretary recalled that when he had rejected Gromyko'a threat Gromyko had not come back and redoubled it The Secretary stated he supposed that all intelligence services were alerted with their antenna out to sense any indica tions of a new Soviet move Our intelligence service had been alerted Lord apog asked what was next as regards the exchanges with Dobrynin The Secretary said that they owe us comments oniwo proposi- tions namely the proposal regarding a Deputy Foreign Minister's forum and the matter of non-dissemination involved in the Irish Resolution He did not expect that Dobrynin would be giving us further comments on the test ban question in the near future - A 0 The Secretary Lord Hood Minister British Embassy Georg von Minister German Embassy Schnippenkoetter Counselor German Embassy Hans-Georg Wieck Second Secretary German Embassy Claude Label Minister Counselor Embassy of the French Republic Pierre Felon Counselor the French Republic william R Tyler Deputy Assistant Secretary EUR Martin J Hillenbrand Director GER Jacob D Beam Assistant Director Vincent Baker Deputy Director Political Affairs fay 4 - 71 92 5 l0 of jfg' 235 3566 fit This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu