2 0 O C TO B ER 2 0 0 9 i n t e g r at e d c a p s t o n e c o n c e p t Chief of Force Development Chef du développement des FOrces A-FD-005-002 AF-001 Integrated Capstone Concept Integrated Capstone oncept Copyright © 2010 Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence Chief of Force Development National Defence Headquarters 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa Ontario K1A 0K2 Produced for the Chief of Force Development by 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office WPO30557 NDID # A-FD-005-002 AF-001 Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Integrated capstone concept Produced for the Chief of Force Development by 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office Issued also in French under title Concept cadre intégré Available also on the Internet Includes bibliographical references ISBN 978-1-100-16456-4 Cat no D2-265 2010E 1 Canada--Military policy 2 Canada Canadian Armed Forces 3 National security--Canada I Canada Canadian Armed Forces Wing 17 II Canada Chief of Force Development UA600 I62 2010 Printed in Canada 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 355’ 033571 C2010-980199-7 FOREWORD I am pleased to present the Integrated Capstone Concept to the Department of National Defence DND and the Canadian Forces CF for general reference The purpose of this document is to provide the Defence Institution with an over-arching concept informing a body of operating integrating and enabling concepts that will shape how the CF will meet the challenges of the complex future security environment This document will underpin integrated CF Force Development and act as both a resource for CF Professional Development and other department needs Understanding the implications that complexity will present is essential to CF strategic success It is also fundamental to understanding the changing nature of our adversaries the domains in which we will operate and the types of operations that the CF will be tasked to perform In order to meet these challenges we will need to create an integrated multi-role and combat-capable military force that will be comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in the execution of national intent Force Development organizations will use the Integrated Capstone Concept to guide integrated capability development across the CF functions for the new expanded strategic environment Likewise the Environmental Commands are strongly urged to use this document as a starting point to inform their concept and capability development The ideas in the ICC have already stimulated both concept development within the different organizations and feedback for the next version of the ICC The next version will 1 Include a human “dimension” to replace the human domain 2 Clarify the intent presentation and explanation of the ICC Construct 3 Enhance the description of the strategic function concepts and 4 Expand upon the key ideas of Comprehensive Adaptive Integrated and Networked I encourage all members of the Defence Team to use this document to maintain a high level awareness of the capstone concept and how it may impact our ability to remain strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive in the years to come S A Beare Major-General Chief of Force Development iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CFD acknowledges the support and contribution from all Level 1 organizations within NDHQ all Commands and the concept development community writ at large through their membership in the Integrated Concept Working Group ICWG The contributions acknowledgement BGen MD Kampman BGen P Matte Col JK Tattersall Cdr KPL Hansen Cdr HJ Henderson Cdr NT Leak Cdr WM Mooz LCol FM Aubin LCol RW Bell LCol DJG Boucher LCol JF Castonguay LCol RW Clarke LCol GL Couch LCol SD Coveney LCol TA Gibbons LCol A Hirji LCol MS Kostner LCol JLD Lachance LCol JMS Larouche LCol JA Legere LCol SRS Murphy LCol JM Rettie LCol MA Rostek LCol RC Roy LCol K Schramm LCol RC Strum LCol KP Truss provided by the following personnel deserve special LCol JM Uchiyama MWO CC Deroche LCol WF Yee LCdr DJ Harnett MWO RP Nadeau Darren Baker LCdr JJ MacDonald LCdr MD McKinley Bill Bentley G Bergeron LCdr PR Moller LCdr ML Toth Jean-François Born Ann Bradfield Maj DE Allison Maj RJ Aucoin David Butcher Neil Chuka Maj MM Barbe Maj DF Ceniccola Kumar Dalvi Scott Davey Maj ML Evans Maj JT Fernandes Jamie Gibson Phillipe Hebert Maj BC Frandsen Maj DA Goldsmith Rachel Lea Heide Tony Humphreys Maj JDM Gratton Maj TR Gushue Maj CR Henderson Karen Lahaise Mazur Britton MacDonald Carol McCann Maj PJ Kendall Maj WK Little Brian McCarthy Charles Morrisey Maj JSA Rollin Maj MR Setter Maj GO Sherwood Maj JW Smith Maj JA Stewart Maj RD Trerice Maj WR Wallace Davide Pisano Regan Reshke Brian Staples Keith Stewart Tracey Wait v table of contents FOREWORD iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1 1 Challenge 1 1 2 Aim 2 1 3 Assumptions 3 1 4 Constraints 3 1 5 Section Highlights 3 2 COMPLEXITY THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and the CANADIAN STRATEGIC REALITY 5 2 1 Complexity 5 2 2 The Future Security Environment 7 2 3 The Canadian Strategic Reality 8 3 THE REVISED APPROACH AND THE FUTURE CF 11 3 1 Comprehensive 11 3 2 Integrated 13 3 3 Adaptive 14 3 4 Networked 15 3 5 The Revised Approach – Synergies and Inter-Relationships 18 4 THE NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT AND FUTURE CONDITION SETS 21 4 1 The Nature of Future Conflict 21 4 2 Conflict Model 22 4 3 CFDS Missions – Condition Sets 25 5 THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 27 5 1 The Strategic Environment Described 27 5 2 Three New Domains 28 vii 5 2 1 Space Domain 28 5 2 2 Cyberspace Domain 29 5 2 3 Human Domain 32 5 3 Relationship of the Domains 35 6 THE NATURE OF FUTURE FUNCTIONS 39 6 1 Command 40 6 2 Sense 41 6 3 Act 41 6 4 Sustain 42 6 5 Shield 43 6 6 Generate 44 6 7 Way Ahead for the Future View of Strategic Functions 45 7 CAPSTONE CONSTRUCT 47 7 1 Capstone Construct and Complex Systems 47 7 2 Relationship Amongst Condition Sets Domains and Functions 48 7 3 Conceptual Framework – Integrating Operating and Enabling Concepts 49 8 SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 53 9 REFERENCES 59 10 LEXICON 67 10 1 Terminology 67 10 2 Glossary 67 11 LIST OF ACRONYMS 71 12 ENDNOTES 73 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 CFDS Missions 8 Figure 2 Impact of Uncertain Future on CFDS Missions 9 Figure 3 Inter-relationship of CF Roles and the Future Security Environment 10 Figure 4 The Evolution of Conflict 22 Figure 5 Traditional Linear Model of Conflict 23 Figure 6 A Comprehensive View of Conflict 23 Figure 7 A Comprehensive View of Op Friction 24 Figure 8 A Comprehensive View of Op Kinetic 24 Figure 9 The Condition Set 25 Figure 10 Strategic Environment Domains Axis of Capstone Construct 28 Figure 11 Computer Network Operations Model 31 Figure 12 Psychological Aspects of the Human Domain 32 Figure 13 Relationship of the Domains Model 35 Figure 14 The Condition Set and Domains Axes of the Capstone Construct 36 Figure 15 The Capstone Construct 47 Figure 16 Analyzing Command in the Maritime Domain for CFDS Mission 1 48 Figure 17 Integrating Concepts 50 Figure 18 Operating Concepts 50 Figure 19 Enabling Concepts 51 ix INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1 Challenge There are numerous new challenges facing the Department of National Defence DND and the Canadian Forces CF such as the aging population demographic the emergence of non-state actors the access to disruptive technologies through globalization and so on Collectively these challenges manifest themselves as increased complexity in the modern security environment Critics will say that complexity in the security environment has always existed and in some aspects they are correct What are changing are the varying degrees of complexity that characterize the security environment and the interactions of the complex systems involved Since the mid-1970s the study of complexity as a science has made much progress in dealing with complex issues It is the contention of the Integrated Capstone Concept ICC that as the complexity of the security environment expands so will the magnitude and nature of strategic stimuli that affect our national interests Therefore in order for the CF to remain strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive in the future security environment it must rise to the challenges that increased complexity presents Analysis of current and future trends identifies that increased complexity will be at the core of nearly all future operations Broadsword or Rapier The Canadian Forces’ Involvement in 21st Century Coalition Operations investigates the challenges that military personnel are facing in current operations Through a process of interviews with a number of personnel1 with a variety of experiences and backgrounds the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Project Team reported that most of those interviewed “accurately described an operating environment of great complexity and unpredictability ”2 The findings from Broadsword or Rapier show the immediacy of the current challenge If there is a fundamental increase in complexity in our current operations what does the future hold If there is a fundamental increase in complexity in our current operations what does the future hold The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Current and Emerging Trends FSE outlines a wide variety of trends that will influence how DND CF will operate Specifically the FSE looks at economic social environmental resource geopolitical science technology military and security trends and concludes that the future security chief of f orce dev elopment 1 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT environment will undoubtedly follow the current trend of becoming increasingly complex 3 Therefore we must understand the implications of this paradigm and determine how to operate in this dynamic security environment insig ht 1 The strategic environment has always been dominated by issues of complexity However the number of factors and challenges resident in the future security environment will significantly increase the levels of complexity 1 2 Aim The aim of this paper is to describe the considerations that are strategically relevant to the Canadian Forces in the future security environment and to present the capstone construct required to inform capability development The governing thesis is that the increasingly complex security environment demands approaches that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in the execution of national intent These factors must become the tenets governing the nature of the future CF and the requirements for being strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive The increasingly complex security environment demands approaches that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in the execution of national intent The scope of the ICC is • To describe the considerations that are strategically relevant to DND CF • To identify four necessary attributes comprehensive integrated adaptive networked that future DND CF concepts approaches and capability development must incorporate • To propose an expansion of the understanding of the strategic environment to include the land maritime air space cyberspace and human domains and • To introduce the capstone construct as a tool to aid in concept capability and force development for DND CF 2 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 1 3 Assumptions • The three enduring roles of the CF as described in the Canada First Defence Strategy CFDS will remain unchanged Defend Canada and Canadians Defend North America and Contribute to International Peace and Security • Canada will remain a strategic ally with the United States and with a wide range of multi-lateral security partnerships • DND CF will continue to be relevant to the Canadian public the Government of Canada and the allies of Canada and will hence continue to be an instrument of national power • Organizational bias parochialism and institutional inertia will always be an impediment to transformation 1 4 Constraints • Military capabilities will continue to be commensurate with levels of government funding • CF operations will continue to be guided by the laws and the direction of the GoC the principles that guide the profession of arms in Canada and the expectations of the people of Canada • Tolerance for collateral damage will continue to diminish – therefore the requirement for greater precision which will place greater challenges on adaptability comprehensiveness and integration 1 5 Section Highlights Section 2 examines complexity theory and how it can be applicable to the study of the security environment The trends described in the FSE are examined and contrasted with the strategic reality of today as a means of hypothesizing how the future strategic reality may look Section 3 provides a concise discussion of the importance of having a comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked approach in the complex security environment chief of f orce dev elopment 3 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Section 4 discusses the nature of future conflict and offers a model to portray the application of the elements of national power in a complex strategic environment The section also examines the CFDS missions as condition sets within the ICC Construct Section 5 provides an overview of the future strategic environment The section advocates an expansion of the strategic environment to include three new domains space cyberspace and human A discussion of how technology and globalization have empowered adversarial actors state and non-state with instruments of national power and influence that were previously unobtainable is also included in the description of the human domain Section 6 examines the CF functions of Command Sense Act Shield Sustain and Generate with regards to being comprehensive adaptive integrated and networked Section 7 introduces the capstone construct and describes its purpose The information in the preceding sections is brought together and the relationships between condition sets domains and functions are examined at a strategic level The use of the capstone construct as a tool for capability and concept development is also discussed Section 8 articulates the strategic insights and impacts for DND and the CF in light of the central thesis that the increasingly complex security environment demands approaches that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in the execution of national intent Strategic Impact Complex future security challenges demand approaches that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked Therefore these attributes must become the tenets that govern the nature of the future force and the requirements for being strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive 4 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 2 COMPLEXITY THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE CANADIAN STRATEGIC REALITY This section of the ICC examines complexity theory and how it can be applicable to the study of the security environment The trends described in the FSE are examined and contrasted with the strategic reality of today as a means of hypothesizing how the future strategic reality may look 2 1 Complexity The international community and the inter-relationships amongst the various subcommunities clearly comprise a complex system Consequently the ICC contends that the study of complexity science is essential for any attempt to prepare DND CF for the challenges they will face on operations in the increasingly complex future security environment The term “complexity” can only be “situated in between order and disorder ”4 Complexity has also been called “the science of surprise ”5 and this alone should be something all military audiences can appreciate “Complex Systems is a new approach to science which studies how the relationships between parts give rise to the collective behaviours of a system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment ” Yaneer Bar-Yam Making Things Work p 24 This science does study complex systems their characteristics and their properties and behaviours A complex system is an aggregation of interacting agents 6 These systems are neither rigid nor fluid instead they are a mixture and balance of regular predictable random and chaotic behaviour The parts that comprise the complex system are connected through their interactions the sub-systems are simultaneously autonomous and mutually dependent Models of complex systems treat the constituent parts as agents “individual systems that act upon their environment in response to the events they experience ” There is an underlying assumption that agents are goal-directed and aim to act toward their maximum benefit Agents’ actions affect the environment which in turn will cause other agents to react Although interactions begin at the local level these actions can eventually cause global consequences 7 chief of f orce dev elopment 5 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT The interactions of complex systems are seldom linear there is no directly proportional and predictable cause and effect relationship 8 Nevertheless complex systems do have the tendency to self-organize “local interactions eventually produce global coordination ” and this structure is often a network 9 Agents within complex systems also co-evolve or adapt to one another’s actions and reactions while attempting to move toward a beneficial or stable state 10 The properties of complex systems cannot be deduced from identifying the properties of each unit part the whole itself has emergent properties which are derived from “the pattern of interactions or relations between the parts ”11 Because complex systems are constantly experiencing non-linear interactions amongst agents it is not surprising that these systems are unpredictable and uncontrollable in nature and “will never be able to be captured in a complete and deterministic model ”12 The relationship between parts can produce patterns or lead to self-organization These are the emergent properties of adaptive systems Emergent properties may lead to new organizations being formed or dissolved and could produce new behaviour locally or throughout the whole of the system Any action within complex adaptive systems may also produce undesired side effects 13 Since the security and operating environment is composed of an abundance of complex systems comprehending the science of complex systems to the best of our ability is essential to strategic success for DND CF in the future security environment Studying complexity theory is also fundamental to appreciating the growing number of agents impacting national and international security the changing nature of our adversaries the consequences of various groups’ interactions the unpredictable and non-linear nature of actions and behaviour the domains in which we will operate and the types of operations that the CF will be tasked to perform The existing linear tools and legacy constructs that we currently use for problem solving may be inadequate for the challenges brought about by future complex systems Evolving the Operational Planning Process OPP to include such tools as soft systems methodology or enhanced evolutionary engineering to address complex problems may be more appropriate in the future Insig ht 2 Understanding the implications that complex systems will present in the future security environment is essential to strategic success for the CF The future security environment will be influenced by an ever-expanding spectrum of dynamic complex and adaptive systems 6 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 2 2 The Future Security Environment The FSE document examines a number of trends that will impact and influence how our operations may be conducted Specifically it outlines trends in the economic social resource environmental geopolitical science technology military and security dimensions and it hypothesizes how the strategic environment may evolve out to 2030 Globalization is a predominant trend affecting the future security environment The proliferation of new technology facilitates and enables creative and dynamic means for people and systems to interact This interaction builds interconnectedness interdependence and relationships and it forms the basis of the complexity in the future security environment Many of the trends described in the FSE could generate indirect effects and give rise to conflict 14 Social and economic trends may generate tension and aggravate existing hostilities and problems in regions already experiencing discontent disparity and desperation Similarly economic inequality over-population migration urbanization disease poverty and extremism all have destabilizing effects Global population trends exacerbate the triggers of instability and conflict Urbanization trends towards mega-cities increases the probability of friction and allows previously disparate groups to interconnect for shared adversarial intent The same is also true for sharing of strategic resources and the obvious health and pandemic issues that arise due to urbanization Climate change and resource competition are also causing additional friction and population shifts Globalization or more specifically the interconnectivity and access that globalization provides empowers a wide range of actors with capabilities that were previously restricted to developed nation states Global access to science and technology such as space cyberspace and advanced disruptive technologies means military advantage can belong to whomever is quickest and best able to acquire and exploit new capabilities thus increasing the adversarial capability of non-state actors to levels that rival those of nation states These trends have serious implications for defence and security within the context of the Canadian strategic reality Insig ht 3 The dynamic and complex strategic environment will be further influenced by an ever-expanding spectrum of technically and socially enabled actors who will be more coordinated increasingly networked and who share adversarial intent chief of f orce dev elopment 7 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 2 3 The Canadian Strategic Reality The Canada First Defence Strategy CFDS describes three enduring roles for the Canadian Forces 15 1 Defending Canada – Delivering Excellence At Home 2 Defending North America – A Strong and Reliable Partner and 3 Contributing to International Peace and Security – Projecting Leadership Abroad CFDS MISSIONS CFDS Roles Defend Canada CFDS Missions Concurrency 2009 10 Major International Event in Canada Winter Olympics GX Summit Support to Civil Authority Natural Disaster in Canada Red River Flood Preparations Conduct Baseline Daily Operations Op NANOOK SAR A C Interception Fisheries Sp RCMP Sp CounterNarcotics etc Major Terrorist Attack CT SOF Readiness Major International Operation – Extended Duration Afghanistan Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 Op SEXTANT Respond to International Crisis – Shorter Duration Anti-Piracy Operations World Food Programme CTF 150 Defend North America International Peace and Security Figure 1 CFDS Missions When comparing the trends within the FSE to the roles of the CF a very demanding forecast for activity both at home and abroad becomes apparent Non-state adversaries empowered by modern technologies and possibly funded through 8 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT criminal enterprise will likely continue to be an issue State-on-state conflicts will continue to be a reality however the depth and breadth of these conflicts is becoming far more expansive Globalization will continue to affect intra-state relationships and new interdependencies will continuously manifest themselves within the wider strategic condition CFDS MISSIONS CFDS Roles Defend Canada CFDS Missions Concurrency 2009 10 Future Concepts Major International Event in Canada Winter Olympics GX Summit Futures • Trends • Surprises Support to Civil Authority Natural Disaster in Canada Red River Flood Preparations Conduct Baseline Daily Operations Op NANOOK SAR A C Interception Fisheries Sp RCMP Sp CounterNarcotics etc Major Terrorist Attack CT SOF Readiness Major International Operation – Extended Duration Afghanistan Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 Op SEXTANT Defend North America • Shocks scenarios • Condition Sets Concepts Nature of Future • Conflict International Peace and Security • Environments • Functions • Operations Respond to International Crisis – Shorter Duration Anti-Piracy Operations World Food Programme CTF 150 • Forces Figure 2 Impact of Uncertain Future on CFDS Missions The security environment as outlined in the FSE will be constantly dynamic and uncertain However the three roles for the CF defend Canada defend North America contribute to peace and security should remain relatively unchanged These roles must be fulfilled within the wider security environment and each role has its own requirements for being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked The combination of these roles and the security environment are referred to here as the problem set chief of f orce dev elopment 9 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Contribute to Int’l Peace and Security Disruptive Tactics Population Social Economic Religious Extremism Urbanization Personal Business Economic Economic Dispar Disparity Migration Reliance on Automation Competition Adventurism Climate Change Health Ageing S T S T Privatization Privitization Globalized Economics Fragile Failing States Water Food Defend Canada Regional Instabilities Metanational Transnational Balance of Power Oil Oil Energy Miniaturization Commercialized Cyber Weapons Attacks Globalized Communication Biotechnology State vs Non-State Diverse Partners Diverse Partners Defend North America Figure 3 Inter-relationship of CF Roles and the Future Security Environment Equally important are the conditions under which CFDS missions will be conducted as well as the expectations of the Government of Canada GoC The combination of each CFDS mission and the expectations of the GoC are referred to here as the condition set Each condition set will have unique requirements for being strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive With the aim of positioning the CF to operate successfully in the problem set the ICC will explain the relationship of the nature of future conflict the strategic environment and functions as they pertain to the condition sets Success in the increasingly complex security environment demands approaches that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked Strategic ImpactS It is fundamental to understand the growing number of agents affecting national and international security the changing nature of our adversaries the consequences of various groups’ interactions the unpredictable and non-linear nature of actions and behaviour the domains in which we will operate and the types of operations that the CF will be tasked to perform The linear tools and legacy constructs that we currently use for problem solving may be inadequate for to the challenges provided by future complex systems Global access to science and technology such as space cyberspace and advanced disruptive technologies means the military advantage can belong to whomever is quickest and best able to acquire and exploit new capabilities thus increasing the adversarial capability of non-state actors to levels that rival those of nation states 10 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 3 THE REVISED APPROACH AND THE FUTURE CF This section provides a concise discussion of the importance of having a comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked approach in the complex security environment There are methods to assist CF leadership in building a better framework within which our full capacities can be leveraged against a complex challenge To appreciate the thesis the idea of external and internal complexity must be clearly understood “The external environment of an organization can also vary from relatively stable to dynamic and complex If environmental complexity begins to exceed the internal complexity of the organization chances of failure will loom higher unless the organization can increase its internal complexity sufficiently to generate successful responses to environmental demands ” John Verdon et al The Last Mile of the Market p 54 In essence our ability to respond to issues of external complexity is fully dependent upon our ability to resolve our issues of internal institutional complexity Through CF Transformation we are addressing uncertainty and better utilizing the full capacity of all the components of DND in an integrated manner Nevertheless for defence institutions to improve their performance in complex environments issues of internal complexity must also be resolved through actions that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked Existing stovepipes may not be the answer 3 1 Comprehensive There are three different aspects of being comprehensive • a complete understanding of the strategic environment • an accurate definition of the problem s and appropriate goal-setting and • an ability to apply a multi-disciplinary approach Comprehensiveness must describe the complete strategic environment with all of the envisioned domains Careful consideration must be given to physical aspects chief of f orce dev elopment 11 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT such as temperature terrain and location However more important to understanding the operating space are human aspects such as cultural political and social belief systems Furthermore if the adversary has the potential to operate outside the traditional domains maritime land and air then the CF must also be prepared to function there as well Only by considering all of these aspects can a truly comprehensive understanding of the strategic environment be gained The second use of comprehensiveness relates to defining problems and goals Aspects of the problem may not always be obvious and consequently the problem may have to be continually redefined Goals may not be fully achievable and may initially be understated or unclear All actions to achieve goals must be constantly monitored and if necessary leaders and planners may need to reconsider problems goals and courses of action The unpredictable nature of the problem set means that decision support systems and operational planning processes cannot be linear The unpredictable nature of the problem set means that decision support systems and operational planning processes cannot be linear Finally comprehensiveness16 must describe a multi-disciplinary approach to resolve the challenges forecasted in the FSE document which are well beyond the scope and the capacity of the CF alone The CF is but one instrument of national power and influence available to the GoC Additionally non-governmental agencies may simultaneously be working in the complex space to solve other portions of a crisis and may or may not share the goals of the GoC To best resolve or manage complex situations a comprehensive framework is needed DND and the CF need to develop a full understanding of the shared strategic environment to set and modify appropriate and relevant goals to achieve the strategic intent of the GoC and to work in a multi-disciplined team construct insig ht 4 Comprehensiveness must describe a multi-disciplinary approach to resolve those challenges forecasted in the future security environment which are well beyond the scope and the capacity of the CF alone 12 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 3 2 Integrated The term integrated is typically used to expand the meaning of joint and combined to include other actors and organizations within a Whole of Government Approach For the ICC the term has three distinct meanings • the coordination of effort between and within DND and the CF for force development force generation and force employment • the ability for two or more distinct organizations to work together and • the level of interoperability The first definition of integration speaks to DND and the CF In order to resolve the issues of developing generating and employing military forces in support of national policy DND CF must integrate as force developers and force generators so that the CF can succeed as a force employer This does not mean organizational integration but rather integrating the effects required to achieve balanced and managed states of readiness Integrating the efforts of both DND and the CF is a key process that will allow the defence institution as a whole to overcome establishment-wide inertia and organizational parochialism The second definition of integration goes beyond military terms such as “joint” and “combined ” The term describes the relationships between DND CF and external organizations such as other governmental departments or allies Such integration allows a multi-disciplined approach to complex situations The most important relationships for DND CF will be with other government departments for the security and sovereignty of Canada Other transitory actors may include non-governmental organizations high-tech business and private military contractors The team or force is integrated only as long as necessary to achieve success the overarching issue is for all integrated partners to be working to achieve a common goal It is assumed that DND CF are always part of the integrated team or integrated force However it is not mandatory to be integrated from an organizational perspective in order to produce integrated effects The third definition of integration refers to the level of interoperability between the involved organizations that is needed to successfully achieve a goal The level of interoperability or integration or minimum level at which interoperability is a critical factor is dependent upon the mission Highly complex problems and situations may chief of f orce dev elopment 13 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT demand higher levels of integration to realize success Institutional culture language procedures equipment and legalities are all potential constraints to integration Building a Recognized Maritime Picture is an example of where integration is needed to contribute to good situational awareness Many assets including airborne or space-based sensors belonging to DND CF or Other Government Departments OGD can be integrated to provide information Conversely the requirement to conduct an expeditionary operation against a motivated opponent in a densely populated urban littoral area would require a much greater level of integration through all levels from the tactical to strategic and through all activities from conception through to execution Both DND and the CF will need to evolve from organizational silos to processes networks of relationships and capabilities that enable integrated operations Moreover the entire institution will need to integrate as required with other agencies or actors The aim must be to achieve a synergistic effect by exploiting the power of the whole rather than depending upon the sum of the parts insig ht 5 Integration within a multi-disciplinary approach will provide a greater chance of resolving the complex issues of the future security environment than will working independently 3 3 Adaptive Adaptation is the condition to respond to change and challenges in a positive manner and it is integral for coping with complexity and complex systems Understanding that complex situations and relationships are unpredictable or uncertain compels those coping with complexity to become adaptive or fail In the military this is reflected in the adage “no plan survives first contact with the enemy ” Adaptation also has a temporal quality Systems are evolving all the time The change may be very slow and unnoticed or it may be very dramatic and pronounced Slower changes are usually evolutionary and quicker changes are often revolutionary Evolutionary adaptation is normally based in the ability of an organization or individual to learn Revolutionary adaptation is rapid and innovative While learning remains an important component for an organization or individual the emphasis during revolutionary adaptation will be on responsiveness flexibility and agility which historically have been fundamental to successful military adaptation 14 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Adaptation has another quality known as co-evolution It describes where a system is evolving not in isolation but rather as a system of evolutionary systems that may be inter-dependent Each system or agent not only interacts with agents at its own level but also with superior and subordinate agents all of which are evolving HALLMARKS OF ADAPTATION17 Intelligent Context-appropriate behaviour decisions discovery and exploitation of advantages Resilient Able to recover or adjust from shock surprise damage or misfortune Robust Effective across a range of conditions Flexible Able to reconfigure Agile Ability to redirect swiftly Creative Process of generating novel and useful concepts solutions or product Responsive Speed of recognition and action Enduring Able to withstand prolonged strain The CF requires leaders who can discern the consequences of emerging trends and react to strategic shocks The CF also needs commanders who are not afraid to pursue innovative and unconventional solutions The CF requires individuals who like our adversaries can envision the use of equipment and capabilities in new and innovative ways We require people who can sense a change in the adversary’s course of action and exploit it to the benefit of the mission Failure to create this capability within our people and institution will handicap us to the adversary’s advantage In short the CF must be adaptive or risk failure insig ht 6 Adaptation is imperative to coping with unpredictable and uncertain complex challenges situations and relationships The CF must be adaptive or risk failure 3 4 Networked Networks are about relationships and interconnectivity Of specific relevance to the CF is the existence of national networks the nature of social networks the importance of organizational networks and the impact of technology on networks There are two types of networks human or social networks and technology-enabled networks Both are equally important and are not mutually exclusive Technological chief of f orce dev elopment 15 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT networks have created virtual social networks where distance is not a factor and where the boundary between a social network and a technical network is in some respects irrelevant Conflict is not merely between nation states it also involves the underlying interconnected networks of national power Traditionally these were diplomatic economic and military networks In a complex security environment other elements of national infrastructure and resources such as information financial intelligence and law enforcement18 may be applied to the task at hand These national networks may also be working with state non-state provincial local and other actors Social networks are defined by the relationship amongst groups institutions and individuals within a society Cultural networks have grown to include shared identities beliefs values customs and behaviours 19 In the future networks of state and non-state actors with overlapping interests may form partnerships act in cooperation and disperse when no longer required Human and social networks will be further discussed in the section on the human domain section 5 2 3 An organization’s structure or network is also important There are three structures that are of particular interest to the CF In hierarchical relationships information flows either up or down and decisions are made by the superior component This type of organization is a “weak” network because it can easily succumb to information overload and it has limited capability to deal with complexity More importantly hierarchical organizations are easily targeted Integrated networks are well connected and information is shared at all levels so that each node has decision-making capability These structures can be very complex but are also well suited for dealing with high levels of complexity An integrated network is more adaptable than a hierarchical one Hybrid networks are a combination of the two types of networks mentioned above There is a hierarchical component but decision-makers are empowered at various levels and communication is lateral as well as vertical A hybrid network may be suitable for a range of tasks from simple to complex This hybrid structure has historical military foundations described as “centralized command decentralized control ” Such a structure will increase in importance in the future complex security environment therefore the CF should explore more integrated or hybrid networks as opposed to hierarchical ones 16 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Network technology has become a critical part of modern life and an essential aspect of the work place The technological network includes the computers and information technology required for internal connectivity amongst all functions within the strategic environment External connectivity to defence and security organizations OGDs allies and partners will be required to the extent necessary and will be based on achieving goals Network technology is already embedded in each of the domains and in each of the functions Networks are instrumental to the integration of both of these groups In other words “network your networks” It must be remembered that there are limitations and constraints to networking • Although a highly integrated network can potentially share information and increase situational awareness it is inherently impossible to provide access to all necessary information to make the perfect decision • The need to share is severely constrained by the need to shield and to protect This applies within the CF GoC departments and partnerships • Creating ad hoc technical networks encounter the same problem as with creating ad hoc social networks trust and relationships remain important • Consequently while ideal technological network solutions may be a goal for the future “good enough” solutions may be the best result that can be achieved Nevertheless it is imperative that the CF continues to exploit technological and methodological advances in networking Adversaries are becoming more technologically advanced and will be fully capable of exploiting any hierarchical weaknesses Therefore adaptive social and technical networks will play a pivotal role in being comprehensive and integrated in the complex security environment insig ht 7 Both social and technical networks must be exploited by the CF across the strategic environment and within all domains in response to adversaries’ increased technically and socially enabled capabilities chief of f orce dev elopment 17 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 3 5 The Revised Approach – Synergies and Inter-Relationships The revised approach requires that the CF becomes comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in order to succeed in a complex security environment These separate elements of the revised approach overlap to an extent comprehensive approaches often lead to multi-disciplinary teams which are in fact human networks such teams and networks function best when integrated and adaptation is enhanced when there are many partners from which to select the best combination of team members for a specific solution More importantly though these approaches also provide mutual support to create a synergistic effect under all condition sets across the strategic environment and within the strategic functions Solutions to problems in the complex security environment will be a challenge Cause and effect relationships may be problematic at best since each action will have desired and undesired effects It is the unknown and undesired effects that are especially difficult Therefore to better assess solutions in a complex world a comprehensive view of the intermediate effects will need to be monitored continually and goals adjusted accordingly 20 These efforts will lead to synchronization of tactical effects to desired strategic effect A fundamental understanding of these cause and effect relationships is required if the CF is to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive 18 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Strategic ImpactS The CF is but one instrument of national power and influence available to the GoC Non-governmental agencies may also be working in the complex space to solve other portions of a crisis and may or may not share the goals of the GoC To best resolve or manage complex situations a comprehensive framework is needed Integration of DND and the CF must evolve from organizational silos to processes networks relationships and capabilities that enable integrated operations The entire institution will need to integrate as required with other agencies or actors To be adaptive the CF needs • Leaders who can discern the consequences of emerging trends and react to strategic shocks • Commanders who are not afraid to pursue innovative and unconventional solutions • Individuals who like our adversaries can envision the use of equipment in new and innovative ways and • Soldiers sailors and air personnel who can sense a change in the adversary’s course of action and exploit it to the benefit of the mission Our current hierarchical networks may not be conducive to succeeding in a future complex security environment The CF should explore more integrated or hybrid networks as opposed to hierarchical ones Based on goals to be achieved external connectivity with defence and security organizations OGDs allies and partners will be required to the extent necessary Both special and technical networks provide the means to be comprehensive integrated and adaptive so that the CF can meet the challenges of the complex security environment chief of f orce dev elopment 19 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 4 THE NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT AND FUTURE CONDITION SETS This section discusses the nature of future conflict and offers a model to portray the application of the elements of national power in a complex strategic environment The section also examines the CFDS missions as condition sets within the Integrated Capstone Concept Construct 4 1 The Nature of Future Conflict There are “two dominant contrasting styles in warfare regular and irregular including terroristic also classified by some today as symmetrical and asymmetrical ” Colin S Gray Another Bloody Century p 23 Globalization has played a role in the evolution of warfare It has provided adversarial state and non-state actors with off-the-shelf capabilities such as global telecommunications global positioning information intelligence cryptography remotely sensed imagery and weapons While such capability may not rival Western countries’ military forces for endurance and effects these capabilities are still strategically significant Recent conflicts have shown a shift from predominantly conventional warfare to asymmetric or irregular warfare which contains elements of terrorism and guerrilla warfare Figure 4 Although the number of interstate conflicts is nearly unchanged analysis shows that there has been a significant increase in the number and duration of intrastate conflicts The CF must be able to adaptively operate both proactively and reactively throughout the spectrum of conflict whether in a conventional or irregular manner In intrastate conflicts at least one party is characterized as an inferior non-state actor This asymmetry forces the inferior non-state actor to resort to irregular warfare The non-state actors constantly adapt their operations to new situations either to gain an advantage or to counter the superior adversary’s advantages in conventional capability The increased effectiveness of this type of warfare has been enhanced by the continuously decreasing gap between highly sophisticated military equipment and commercially available technology chief of f orce dev elopment 21 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Simple Difficult CompleX Past Contemporary Future Forward LINE OF OWN TRooPS FLANK Own Formation FLANK REAR AREA • Linear Open • State vs State • Non-Linear • State vs State • Asymmetric Threat • Omni-directional • State vs State • State vs Non-State peer Figure 4 The Evolution of Conflict We need to evolve from complex to omni-directional thinking since the number of potential fronts that can be opened by an adversary poses a threat that is omnidirectional Future conflicts involving failed states may require prolonged involvement by an intervening force to realize the desired results Tactics and doctrine will likely need to be adapted for these conditions When the CF is deployed in response to a conflict it will face a complex environment involving a range of actors The nature of future conflict must include a comprehensive appreciation of the evolution of future operations the diverse range of state and non-state actors and the elements of national power and influence increasingly available to all actors Differences in nationality language culture and motivation need to be understood in order to operate effectively in this environment In addition these conflicts often have no precise beginning and no clear conclusion In the future a Canadian response to complex situations in difficult environments will likely require a wide range of government and non-government organizations As the nature of conflict becomes increasingly dynamic the spectrum of actors and solutions also increases and may necessitate actions that are no longer the exclusive realm of military forces 4 2 The Conflict Model Figure 5 portrays a traditional conflict model displaying peace conflict and war as three separate conditions Such models also convey the sense that conflict is well-bounded and discrete and that a linear transition exists between the three conditions 22 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT CONFLICT PEACE WAR Operations Other than War Strategic military response Warfighting Figure 5 Traditional Linear Model of Conflict History has shown that conflict is not a linear process and is not exclusively the domain of the military Figure 6 provides a broader view of conflict which attempts to illustrate the application of the traditional three elements of national power – diplomatic military and economic It represents moments in time where many actions in differing degrees of intensity are required to deal with a conflict Conflict does not have to be violent and elements of national power other than the military may be used to resolve conflict situations Violent conflict should always be considered not as a necessity but as a potential outcome of escalation Canadian limit Offensive Action e lom Dip Computer Network Attacks Defensive Action Humanitarian Assistance ent lopm Deve Peace Enforcement Stabilization Capabilities CBRN Weapons acy De fe nc Intensity Use of National Power State vs State State vs Non-State Stability Action Peace Keeping Reconstruction Duration Figure 6 A Comprehensive View of Conflict What cannot be represented are the dynamic changes depicted by each line One must envision that each of these curves or waves will move depending upon the nature of the mission see Figure 7 and Figure 8 chief of f orce dev elopment 23 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Problem Space Op Friction Persian Gulf 1 CBRN Weapons Diplomacy and Deterrence Offensive Action Diplomacy and Deterrence Defensive Action Stabilization Humanitarian Assistance Peace Enforcement Capabilities Intensity Use of National Power Canadian limit Development Stability Action Peace Keeping Reconstruction Duration Figure 7 A Comprehensive View of Op Friction Problem Space Op Kinetic Kosovo CBRN Weapons Capabilities Intensity Use of National Power Canadian limit Offensive Action Diplomacy and Deterrence Defensive Action Stabilization Humanitarian Assistance Peace Enforcement Development Stability Action Peace Keeping Reconstruction Duration Figure 8 A Comprehensive View of Op Kinetic insig ht 8 The spectrum of future conflict is no longer a linear understanding of peace operations other than war and war 24 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 4 3 CFDS Missions – Condition Sets Condition sets include the variables that can be encountered by the CF in fulfilling its roles and missions At the strategic level the variables can be grouped in broad categories such as geography climate and socio-political Condition sets will almost never be the same for any two missions Techniques Tactics and Procedures used in similar operations or even at an earlier time in the same operation will rarely achieve the same outcomes or may in fact become counter-productive For the purposes of the ICC the six CFDS missions will be used as the basis for the condition sets Each of these missions will demand varying requirements for being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in order for the CF to remain strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive The Condition Set What effects are required to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive to lead a major international op The Problem Set Contribute to Int’l Peace and Security Disruptive Tactics Population Populat Social Ec Economic Religious Relig Extremism Extrem Ex Urbanization Personal Business Economic Economic Dispar Disparity Competition Adventurism Climate Change Health Ageing S T S T Privatization Privitization Globalized Economics Reliance on Automation Migration Fragile Failing States Water Food CFDS Msn 6 Deploy Forces in Response to International Crisis short CFDS Msn 5 Lead or Conduct a Major International Operation extended Defend Canada Regional gional Instabilities abilities Metanational etanational Transnational ansnational Balance of Power Oil Oil CFDS Msn 4 Sp Civil Authorities in a Natural Disaster Energy Miniaturization Commercialized Cyber Weapons Attacks Globalized Communication Biotechnology State vs Non-State Diverse Partners Diverse Partners CFDS Msn 3 Respond to a Major Terrorist Event in Canada Defend North America CFDS Msn 2 Sp Major Int’l Event in Canada CFDS Msn 1 Daily Domestic and Continental Operations What effects are required to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive in daily domestic and continental ops Figure 9 The Condition Set Strategic ImpactS The CF must be able to adaptively operate proactively and reactively throughout the spectrum of conflict whether in a conventional or irregular manner As the nature of conflict becomes increasingly dynamic the spectrum of actors and solutions also increases and may necessitate actions that are no longer the exclusive realm of military forces chief of f orce dev elopment 25 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 5 THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT This section provides an overview of the future strategic environment The section advocates an expansion of the strategic environment comprised of maritime land and air to include three new domains space cyberspace and human A discussion of how technology and globalization have empowered adversarial actors state and non-state with instruments of national power and influence that were previously unobtainable is also included in the description of the human domain 5 1 The Strategic Environment Described The strategic environment is defined as where the elements of power and influence are exercised The traditional elements of national power and influence are the diplomatic economic and military21 capabilities possessed at the national level that can be directed toward effecting change in the human condition in the pursuit of national policy and intent National policy and intent are those conditions expectations and desires set by government policy that direct the employment of the elements of national power The strategic environment is defined as where the elements of power and influence are exercised Non-state adversaries increasingly operate in the same strategic environment as DND CF Historically the traditional elements of power and influence have been restricted to the state In the modern security environment the elements of power and influence are no longer exclusive to the state and states no longer have exclusive dominion over the domains in the strategic environment Current and future adversaries whether state or non-state have the power to create strategic effects directed against Canadian national interests We must be aware that within states new elements of power and influence are coming into being that challenge conventional perspectives States no longer have exclusive dominion over the domains in the strategic environment chief of f orce dev elopment 27 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 5 2 Three New Domains Although maritime land and air are referred to as the traditional domains these three did not always exist nor is this number necessarily or likely to remain at three in the future Access to each of the traditional domains within the strategic environment can be traced to technological developments With the creation of sailing vessels military forces could then carry out warfare on both land and sea The advent of flight and subsequent technological improvements meant that conflict was extended there as well As these technological developments evolved military forces were able to devise strategic uses for the technology and then exercise power and influence from ships HUMAN CYBER SPACE AIR LAND MARITIME and aircraft The sea and air domains became part of the strategic environment when people developed the ability to generate national power and influence by accessing them Figure 10 Strategic Environment Domains AxIs of the Capstone Construct Recent developments of spacecraft communications computing technologies media and behavioural sciences are expanding the strategic environment and creating new domains space cyberspace human State and non-state actors are already demonstrating that elements of power and influence can and will be exerted by them in the evolving domains 5 2 1 Space Domain Space must be considered a domain within the strategic environment Technology continues to support growth in space allowing more access to space and for longer durations Space-based assets along with their respective ground components are part of Canada’s national infrastructure 22 Space is the medium for a number of communication facilities and supports many military and civilian 28 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT capabilities Space is also important from the aspect that an adversary can cause Canada serious strategic harm in and from this domain Space is not owned by anyone 23 which essentially makes it accessible by both state and non-state actors who are capable and willing to project capabilities in that domain Furthermore in the conduct of global military operations the availability of satellite services for DND CF will be vital In support of achieving Canadian strategic goals such as exercising sovereignty in the Arctic space-based assets are critical mission enablers The CF will need to expand its role in space to protect and exploit vital information and communication sources Space will continue to grow in importance as reliance upon space technology continues to increase However as recent examples have demonstrated these space-based systems are increasingly vulnerable to attack from various weapons platforms 24 This ability to destroy or disable satellites is currently limited to a select number of states but the technology to disrupt destroy or disable satellites will likely become available to non-state actors or rogue nations in short order Many air forces have championed the space domain but have viewed space as a subordinate part of aerospace 25 This subordinate relationship does not place enough emphasis on the rising importance of space Space has become a joint domain and must be considered in all levels of operation Space is a separate unique domain where elements of national power and influence are exercised 5 2 2 Cyberspace Domain Cyberspace enables networks both technical and social Communications and information technology are essential components of national infrastructures and are the foundations for Canadian economic and financial power Defence capability now and into the future is reliant upon the networks of communications and information systems that link sensors weapons platforms operators and decision-makers The cyberspace26 domain is also the virtual world where people meet interact exchange ideas and “network” without a definable physical space Military “communities of practice” and “communities of interest” already exist and use on-line collaboration and information sharing Collaboration with OGDs and other defence and security agencies is also technically feasible This access to data and information facilitates situational awareness and understanding which combined with human intuition leads to insights and creativity chief of f orce dev elopment 29 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT The marketplace drives innovation and technology within cyberspace All aspects of this domain – including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and software – are in a process of continuous change Trends such as media convergence of radio television and newspapers with the Internet only add to the shifting background With each new technology and trend new concepts terminology and jargon proliferate It will be a challenge for the CF to keep pace with the rapid cycles of innovation and to keep abreast of leading edge concepts that are quickly discarded or replaced by newer concepts The cyberspace domain will be a mechanism for integrating all of the domains at the strategic level resulting in one common operational picture This functionality will be complemented by the facility of the cyberspace domain to merge the strategic functions producing integrated effects Cyberspace may also be where the medium and the message are virtually inseparable Cyberspace has unique vulnerabilities Accessible and affordable technology has made this the easiest domain for adversaries to exploit In this domain the distinction between criminal activity and threat to national security can be difficult to ascertain Cyberspace recognizes no borders servers located in neutral or friendly nations can be used by an adversary to conduct cyber attacks The temporal aspects required to conduct cyber defence are extremely compressed A continuing challenge will be to ensure our policy and doctrine keep up with the pace of change in the cyberspace domain Regardless of technologies or methods employed the effects on national power and influence are governed by the nature of computer network operations CNO that can be conducted in the cyberspace domain Most nations classify these as computer network exploitation CNE computer network attack CNA and computer network defence CND Figure 11 These operations can be conducted at all levels of warfare and DND CF must concentrate on the effects produced rather than the means by which the operations are conducted By attacking or disabling our networks an adversary can readily affect command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in the maritime land air and space domains Furthermore an adversary can attack at the core of our national infrastructure and support systems 30 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Aggressive exploitation Covert Effects SIGINT Computer Network Exploitation CND-derived data on attacker capabilities Military Function Computer Network Attack Computer Network Defence All GoC Depts Defensive countermoves In response to attack or event Figure 11 Computer Network Operations There are challenges with cyberspace as a unique domain The current military definition and concept is a work in progress but this work is anchored to legacy concepts based on an “Information Environment ” This legacy concept was not well understood and was misapplied to psychological operations Further confusion is created because the military definition of cyberspace is limited to the physical communications and information technology while the more commonly understood usage in the public domain also includes a virtual social networking component Can the virtual world of cyberspace create physical effects Yes the bulk of all economic power financial instruments is transferred electronically and critical infrastructure relies on cyberspace Consequently it must also be recognized that cyberspace is becoming the predominant medium to influence the human domain The new question should be “Can the physical world create effects in cyberspace e g destroy information ” The answer is certainly “yes” since individual nodes sensors and hardware components can be effectively destroyed however once video imagery data information and misinformation are placed within cyberspace it becomes impossible to remove For these reasons cyberspace is a separate domain where elements of national power and influence are clearly exercised chief of f orce dev elopment 31 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 5 2 3 Human Domain The human domain includes individuals groups of individuals and all aspects of human endeavour Another method to describe this domain is a conflict-based view adversaries neutrals or friendly actors For the CF to succeed in the complex future security environment it must understand individual and group motivations technology as an enabler to human networks and adversarial intent Within the individual psychological realm perception decision-making and behaviour are the result of cognition thinking knowing perceiving emotive or affective feeling emotion mood and volition will striving motivation see Figure 12 27 It is important to understand these biases and emotions in order to both degrade the adversaries’ decision-making ability and enhance our own resilience 28 Cognitive Thinking Knowing Perceiving Af fe e iv at nn Co ill W ing on riv ti St tiva o M ct F iv Em eeli e n M otio g oo n d Psychological Figure 12 Psychological Aspects of the Human Domain Can physical and non-physical elements of national power be used to affect these things Yes they always have More to the point are these three psychological components relevant to national power and influence Yes absolutely since these components are fundamental in the “clash of wills” or conflict More social enabling technologies in the future will provide access to the individual psychological realm Within the socio-cultural realm there are several areas that are important for the CF with respect to networks their nature network analysis their capability to learn 32 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT and adapt their various characterizations e g organized crime and the nature of relevant cultural and socio networks Within the CF human domain there are three critical aspects the institutional human where military capabilities are generated the physical human who endures the challenges and dangers of the theatre of operations and is sustained in order to maintain operational capability and the warrior who senses acts and shields By necessity the CF human domain will become comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked and will be required to project effects in all the domains of the strategic environment The sociological and cultural or group networks that form are of particular interest because they are the basis for “other worldviews ” A broad understanding not only of adversaries but also of neutrals and potential friendly actors in the domain is required to be strategically effective The social and cultural networks that are of particular interest include • Family and tribal affiliations • Culture and language – shared identities religions beliefs values customs behaviours • Other categories – political influence criminal economic and • Organizational categories – military OGD business Adversaries neutrals or friendly actors can all act as separate lenses to view the entire human domain As an example examining local and national economies is one means to gain perspective on the corresponding human behaviour Each possible lens is a view of different complex systems comprising the human domain The key concerns within this domain are • How is the adversary creating effects that influence Canadian citizens the CF neutral actors combatants or non-combatants • Conversely how should the CF create effects that influence adversaries adversarial non-combatants neutral actors and our own citizens • What needs to change within the CF human domain to be able to operate in condition sets across the strategic environment and with the functions Note that this domain is ultimately the source of military power chief of f orce dev elopment 33 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT The ultimate target for the elements of power and influence has always been the human domain What is new is the capability to communicate ideas globally with words and powerful images in near real-time to create a strategic influence These capabilities to influence individuals and groups have dramatically increased Enabling technology provides individual actors the ability to shape and influence large audiences globally with propaganda and misinformation Such means were previously limited to state actors and the mass media EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES Digital imagery Still photographs and video Television 24 hour news cycle CNN Al Jazeera Communications Technology Cell phone Internet telephones Internet enabled activities E-mail banking procurement games access to technologies Web 2 0 Social networking Twitter Blogs MySpace YouTube Powerful imagery and words crossing international boundaries to reach global audiences can expand conflict beyond the actors directly involved More noncombatant state and non-state actors may become drawn into the conflict In addition global public opinion may transform into political influences within multinational venues such as the United Nations and NATO At the tactical level adversarial use of propaganda may influence non-combatants and thus create a strategic effect For example non-combatant deaths and destruction whether caused by adversaries or by the CF may be used to adversarial advantage The human domain is the vital ground within the strategic environment The human domain is the vital ground within the strategic environment The CF must understand friendly adversarial and neutral actors as well as the underlying factors motivating human behaviour The CF must draw upon knowledge from human and behavioural sciences to better position itself to counter and mitigate conflict to facilitate collaboration amongst all actors to understand how human networks form adapt and evolve and to facilitate threat assessment and threat reduction The CF must also understand the underlying factors that motivate individual and group behaviour and specifically better understand friendly adversarial and neutral actors Moreover we must understand the adaptive nature of the adversarial 34 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT human networks as well as the strategic effect of adversarial influence operations when combined with new technology-enabled human networks Consequently the human domain is a separate domain where elements of national power and influence are exercised to create a strategic effect Moreover failure in the human domain regardless of the level of success in the remainder of the strategic environment could result in national strategic failure insig ht 9 The strategic environment has expanded beyond the traditional domains maritime land and air and now must include space cyberspace and human The strategic environment will continue to expand which will place an even greater emphasis on issues of complexity and the need for being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked 5 3 Relationship of the Domains Figure 13 portrays the relationship amongst the components of the strategic environment The human is central the physical domains maritime land air and space surround the human More and more cyberspace can affect our perception of the physical world so in this depiction cyberspace surrounds the human Borders are blurring and perception can be enhanced or deceived by technology Cyberspace also enables many networks that are separated by distance in the physical world thus there is a direct relationship with the human SPACE AIR CYBER HUMAN Maritime LAND Figure 13 Relationship of the Domains chief of f orce dev elopment 35 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT CFDS Msn 6 CFDS Msn 5 HUMAN CYBER SPACE AIR LAND MARITIME CFDS Msn 4 CFDS Msn 3 CFDS Msn 2 CFDS Msn 1 Figure 14 The Condition Set and DomainS Axes of the Capstone Construct The organizational components of the CF Navy Army Air and Special Forces will continue to provide expertise and operate within their traditional domains and also contribute to realizing goals across the strategic environment The new domains do not imply ownership but rather demand leadership Integrating the capabilities of a wide range of organizations will provide a more adaptive set of tools to cope with future complex problems The new domains do not imply ownership but rather demand leadership As we proceed into the future we must maintain a progressive attitude towards yet-to-be-discovered domains where elements of national power and influence can be exercised Nano and quantum are distinct possibilities of future domains Our ability to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive within the entire spectrum of future conflict is fundamentally dependent upon our ability to project or to deny effects in all of these domains Commanders at all levels must be prepared to have adversarial effects projected at them from all six domains perhaps simultaneously Depending upon the nature of the mission commanders at all levels will also have to be prepared to generate effects in all six domains simultaneously and in an integrated and comprehensive manner Our ability to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive within the entire spectrum of future conflict is fundamentally dependent upon our ability to project or to deny effects in all of these domains 36 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Strategic ImpactS States no longer have exclusive dominion over the domains in the strategic environment Current and future adversaries whether state or non-state have the power to create strategic effects directed against Canadian national interests By attacking or disabling our networks an adversary can readily affect command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in the maritime land air and space domains An adversary can also attack the core of our national infrastructure and support systems Strategic failure in any particular domain could result in national strategic failure Failure in the human domain regardless of the level of success in the remainder of the strategic environment could result in national strategic failure The CF must understand friendly adversarial and neutral actors as well as the underlying factors motivating human behaviour By drawing from the human and behavioural sciences the CF can better position itself to counter and mitigate conflict to facilitate collaboration amongst all actors to understand how human networks form adapt and evolve and to facilitate threat assessment and threat reduction The CF must understand the adaptive nature of adversarial human networks as well as the strategic effect of adversarial influence operations when combined with new technology-enabled human networks These new domains do not imply ownership but rather they demand leadership Commanders at all levels must be prepared to have adversarial effects projected at them from all six domains perhaps simultaneously Commanders at all levels depending upon the nature of the mission will have to be prepared to generate effects in all six domains simultaneously in an integrated and comprehensive manner Space cyberspace and human are all separate domains where the instruments of national power and influence can be exercised with equal importance to the traditional domains Our ability to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive within the entire spectrum of future conflict is fundamentally dependent upon our ability to project or to deny effects in all these domains chief of f orce dev elopment 37 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 6 THE NATURE OF FUTURE FUNCTIONS This section examines the CF functions of Command Sense Act Sustain Shield and Generate with regards to being comprehensive adaptive integrated and networked The six functions describe what the CF does in the course of daily routines and contingency operations Failure in any one of the functions across the strategic environment may lead to strategic failure Our current view of the strategic functions is governed by our historical experiences and knowledge of the traditional land sea and air domains This planning for old battles may give us stereotypical views of the functions that may not necessarily speak to the future At best it may restrict us insofar as our ideas about future operations are governed solely by knowledge of current operations In the worst case it may cause us to plan for yesterday’s conflict To successfully carry out the direction of the GoC in an increasingly complex future security environment comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked approaches must be applied to the future functions The following table lists the proposed future definitions for the CF functions 29 Function Definition Command The creative and purposeful exercise of legitimate authority to accomplish the mission legally professionally and ethically Sense The acquisition and processing of information to enable commanders and authorities to understand the characteristics and conditions of the operating environment pertinent to military decision-making Act The military use of capabilities to achieve desired effects in support of national policy Sustain The provisioning of all support services required to maintain routine and contingency operations – domestic continental and expeditionary – including prolonged operations Shield The comprehensive approach to the protection of tangible and intangible elements through the integrating activities of detection assessment warning defence active and passive and recovery Generate The method by which DND and the CF recruits trains and develops personnel procures equipment infrastructure and services and all are made ready in order to meet the defence mission chief of f orce dev elopment 39 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Our current view of the strategic functions Command Sense Act Sustain Shield and Generate is governed by our historical experiences and knowledge of the traditional land sea and air domains In the worst case it may cause us to be planning for yesterday’s conflict 6 1 Command The future Command function is defined as “the creative and purposeful exercise of legitimate authority to accomplish the mission legally professionally and ethically ”30 Adaptive command comprises the toolbox that allows those in command positions at all levels to exercise mission command Adaptive command is the logical evolution of how this function is to be exercised in the CF in order to support the mission command concept If mission command is an extension of command intent through an implicit understanding of that intent then adaptive command comprises the toolbox that allows those in command positions at all levels to exercise mission command An ingenious and organized adversary can achieve levels of surprise by taking action contrary to what was predicted Conversely adversaries’ creativity can be mitigated and countered by those in command anticipating adapting and rapidly reacting to unpredictable adversarial action Adaptive command is characterized by the hallmarks of adaptation 31 The future Command concept needs to describe the comprehensive factors that assist this function Understanding the condition sets and the strategic environment will help commanders to define the problem and set or reset appropriate goals The future Command concept should engender a multi-disciplined approach to integrate forces into a larger organizational construct in order to solve manage or contain the many challenges in the complex security environment 6 2 Sense The future Sense function is described as “the acquisition and processing of information to enable commanders and authorities to understand the characteristics and conditions of the operating environment pertinent to military decision-making ” 40 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT The future Sense capabilities need to provide decision-makers with a comprehensive understanding of the information and intelligence that are required There is a need to examine the human domain and understand the many networks formed within the strategic environment This function must be integrated to a high level to produce the best results for decision-makers Information from a variety of sources – military and civilian networks – must be fused to provide situational awareness Sense capabilities must be able to mitigate challenges such as climate and weather terrain language beliefs and cultural sensitivities Nevertheless even with total integration of all actors perfect situational awareness is virtually unachievable The future Sense concept should employ highly integrated networks to share information in a timely manner but the function should also be capable of employing ad hoc or mission-specific networks Determining the organizations that form friendly neutral and adversarial human networks within the strategic environment will be difficult but is essential to strategic effectiveness 6 3 Act The future Act function is defined as “the military use of capability ies to achieve desired effects in support of national policy ” In the future security environment the CF must be able to act in a comprehensive manner as one of the national instruments of power Actions will produce a myriad of effects some expected some unpredicted and some undesired In a multidisciplinary approach not only our own actions but also the actions of all other organizations must be considered A comprehensive understanding of the strategic environment condition sets our actions and the actions of others will help to achieve desired goals and also mitigate side effects The future Act concept must encompass the notion of integration since the CF will be unable to solve complex issues in isolation It is highly likely that the future CF will need to operate with a variety of other nations other government departments and non-government organizations Integration of all participants at the appropriate level will produce convergent effects The forces directed to act need to be adaptive By demonstrating the ability to reconfigure when faced with a new threat flexibility to redirect effects swiftly agility to do all this quickly responsiveness and in a manner that can be sustained chief of f orce dev elopment 41 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT over a prolonged period endurance the forces will be able to thwart unpredictable adversarial action 6 4 Sustain The future Sustain function is defined as “the provisioning of all support services required to maintain routine and contingency operations – domestic continental and expeditionary – including prolonged deployed operations ” To meet the challenge of sustaining the CF whether at home or abroad it is imperative for decision-makers to have a comprehensive understanding of the condition sets the CF’s changing needs and the likely obstacles to be faced in addressing sustainment demands Sustain capabilities will also require cooperation amongst all potential contributors CF allies agencies industry academia and NGOs – both national and international Comprehensive sustainment will encompass materiel personnel and information Comprehensive sustainment will result in taking advantage of organizations capabilities systems and processes from around the globe and deliberately building partnerships Bringing together the capabilities in government federal provincial municipal industry NGOs academia and amongst allies will require a carefully integrated approach so as to work as efficiently and as seamlessly as possible These partnerships of people and organizations from across the country and around the world will need to be brought together through information-age networks Once such networks of contributors have been established and enabled the CF can reach back into the network as needed to access point-of-need sustain capabilities directly from the source-of-origin As threats evolve and change the CF’s Sustain capabilities and arrangements will need to be able to reconfigure reorganize and reprioritize to meet the demands In order to expedite precise delivery of sustainment decision-makers must be solutionoriented in creating anticipatory and predictive tools and in arranging collective agreements between the GoC and national and international partners Because of the wide variety of partners available to meet Sustain requirements these networks can more easily be adaptive by bringing partners together as needed when needed and for only as long as needed 42 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 6 5 Shield The future Shield function is defined as the “comprehensive approach to the protection of tangible and intangible elements through the integrating activities of detection assessment warning defence active and passive and recovery ” In order to successfully shield the CF in the future a comprehensive understanding of the strategic environment condition sets specific circumstances and especially the threats is required The CF must have a broad understanding of what exactly needs to be shielded this should encompass tangible defence assets capabilities platforms people as well as national telecommunications business transportation and energy infrastructure and intangible defence assets national interests culture values and will economic well-being public opinion A comprehensive appreciation of the best actors with whom to establish partnerships for optimum shielding capabilities is also imperative A layered Shield response will require the seamless integration of the relevant military civilian OGD NGO and allied actors Partners will need to depend upon each other for critical capability information and intelligence Facilitating such integration is the creation of networks amongst national and international defence and security agencies These human networks will be enabled by linking partner capabilities through information-age networks The Shield capability of the future must be more adaptive Not only must the response be rapid but it must also be able to re-scope re-scale and re-configure for any condition set and for any new or changing threat The level of shielding should adjust to the requirements of the critical node in order to provide what is needed exactly when and where this need arises Part of adaptation is the ability for Shield to take on the approach required at a particular moment deter prevent pre-empt or detect deflect counter-act The complex security environment has brought about an increase in threats from which Canada needs shielding individuals have access to capabilities that were once the sole purview of states and less-developed states have gained access to capabilities that once only rich nations could afford The complexity of the security environment has also exposed new vulnerabilities this includes the human domain and national well-being identity and unity A key question remains How do we shield within the cyber domain within a transparent society chief of f orce dev elopment 43 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 6 6 Generate The future Generate function “is the method by which DND and the CF recruits trains and develops personnel procures equipment infrastructure and services and all are made ready in order to meet the defence mission ” Generate is an institutional function The future Generate concept should describe adaptive and integrated capabilities The increasingly complex strategic environment highlights the requirement for Generate capabilities that are highly adaptive The CF must be able to adapt reconfigure reorganize and reprioritize a finite Generate capacity to meet everchanging defence requirements This will be accomplished by progressively implementing information-age technology in concert with organizational and process changes In order to be more adaptive DND and the CF must be able to recognize personnel with the aptitude to operate in a technically challenging environment where more networks both human and technical are pervasive These people – whether CF Regular Force Reserve Force or civilian – will require training education and professional development that enables them to exercise the hallmarks of adaptation This will provide the personnel needed to meet the expectations of the GoC as reflected in CFDS “To carry out these missions the Canadian Forces will need to be a fully integrated flexible multi-role and combat-capable military working in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence ” Canada First Defence Strategy p 3 Future practice may see all members of DND and the CF employed and rapidly deployed to positions based upon a competency match that moves beyond labels of Regular Force Reserve Force and civilian Integration becomes essential The establishment of a civilian Defence and Security Professional is an idea that highlights potential integration of DND Royal Canadian Mounted Police Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Canadian Border Service Agency civilian personnel 44 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT There also needs to be a more integrated approach to generating and developing capability that will be adaptive to new threats in a dynamic and uncertain future There is a need for strategic integration of force employment force generation and force development within a comprehensive managed readiness system that speaks to the complexity of all the condition sets domains and functions insig ht 10 The current view of the strategic functions is governed by our historical experiences and knowledge of the traditional domains The future view of the strategic functions must be governed by the attributes of being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked across all domains 6 7 Way Ahead for the Future View of Strategic Functions To avoid the pitfall of planning for yesterday’s conflict concept developers and planners must avoid the limitations of our traditional thinking in maritime land and air domains The future view of the strategic functions must be governed by the attributes of comprehensive adaptive integrated and networked Furthermore in order to remain strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive in the complex strategic environment a fundamental understanding of the effects required by each of these functions in each discrete condition set and domain is essential Nevertheless there are still fundamental questions that remain to be answered such as “how will the three new domains change CF functions ” chief of f orce dev elopment 45 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Strategic ImpactS Failure to understand the similarities and differences of the functions in relation to the expanding domains and dynamic condition sets will result in “planning for yesterday’s conflicts ” Future function concepts Command Sense Act Sustain Shield and Generate should describe comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked capabilities The future Command concept must understand the effectiveness of a multidisciplined approach to solve manage or contain many types of problems and to integrate forces into the larger comprehensive organization The future Sense concept should employ highly integrated networks to share information in a timely manner but the function should also be capable of employing ad hoc or mission-specific networks In the future Act concept forces must be adaptive The CF will be better able to thwart unpredictable adversarial action if they can reconfigure to a new threat flexibility redirect effects swiftly agility do all this quickly responsiveness and in a manner that can be sustained over a prolonged period endurance In the future Sustain concept a network of the wide variety of partners available must be more easily adaptive and brought together as needed when needed and for only as long as needed to meet sustain requirements For the future Shield concept the CF must have a comprehensive understanding of Canada’s vulnerabilities this should encompass tangible defence assets capabilities platforms people national telecommunications business transportation and energy infrastructure and intangible defence assets national interests culture values and will economic well-being public opinion In the future Generate concept there must be strategic integration of force employment force generation and force development within a comprehensive managed readiness system that speaks to the complexity of all the condition sets domains and functions To be integrated and adaptive both DND and the CF will need to generate appropriate personnel capable of operating in complex situations this implies the creation of the civilian “Defence Professional” and the possibility of an equivalent “Security Professional” for the GoC In order to remain strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive in the complex strategic environments a fundamental understanding of the effects required by each of these functions in each discrete condition set and domain is essential 46 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 7 CAPSTONE CONSTRUCT This section introduces the capstone construct and describes its purpose The information in the preceding sections is brought together and the relationships between condition sets domains and functions are examined at a strategic level The use of the capstone construct as a tool for capability and concept development is also discussed 7 1 Capstone Construct and Complex Systems HUMAN CYBER SPACE AIR LAND MARITIME A singular and shared construct that governs the relationship between condition sets domains and functions is fundamental to unity of thought purpose and action for integrated force development force generation and force employment COMMAND FUNCTIONS SENSE ACT SHIELD CFDS Msn 6 SUSTAIN GENERATE CFDS Msn 2 CFDS Msn 1 CON CFDS Msn 4 CFDS Msn 3 D SE ITI TS ON CFDS Msn 5 DOMAINS Figure 15 The Capstone Construct The capstone construct is not an attempt to model the future security environment and the CF nor is it an attempt to deconstruct the inherent complexity A true complex system by definition refuses to be defined deconstructed and bounded However there is a need to identify the range of conditions to be examined and the relationships in complex systems There is also the need to provide a comprehensive understanding and representation of interactions and inter-relationships of the chief of f orce dev elopment 47 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT condition sets domains and functions There could also be areas where we may be able to define the boundaries If we can we should do so The capstone construct fulfills these needs 7 2 Relationship Amongst Condition Sets Domains and Functions The capstone construct builds upon the analysis of condition sets domains and future functions to provide an understanding of the interactions between these three axes For a particular condition set each of the six CF functions can be analyzed in each of the domains within the strategic environment Each block of the construct can be used to describe a specific function within a specific domain for a specific condition set to identify what effects are necessary in order to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive The construct also serves as a framework for comparing similarities and differences HUMAN CYBER SPACE AIR LAND MARITIME What is found to be the case in one block will probably be different for an alternative condition set simply because condition sets have complex natures COMMAND SENSE ACT SHIELD CFDS Msn 6 SUSTAIN CFDS Msn 5 CFDS Msn 4 GENERATE CFDS Msn 3 CFDS Msn 2 CFDS Msn 1 Figure 16 Analyzing Command in the Maritime Domain for CFDS Mission 1 As illustrated in Figure 16 once the requirements for the Command function in the maritime domain have been identified for daily domestic and continental operations they can then be compared to the corresponding command requirements in the 48 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT other domains for the same mission Alternatively the requirements for the Command function in the maritime domain can be compared against a wide array of condition sets CFDS missions thereby allowing a comprehensive view of maritime Command capability requirements This process can be replicated across an extensive range of function and domain interactions For example how does command differ in CFDS Mission 1 between the maritime and space domains By using the capstone construct the joint requirements as well as the fundamental differences underlying a collective effort can be identified as can the common elements and the unique requirements for specific condition sets domains and functions Such comparative analysis will demonstrate what is common to all what is unique and what the collective requirements are for delivery of integrated effects By using the capstone construct the joint requirements as well as the fundamental differences underlying a collective effort can be identified as can the common elements and the unique requirements for specific condition sets domains and functions The capstone construct provides a common analytical framework for concept and capability developers and strategic planners A concept developer can use the capstone construct to determine the requirements for the Sense function in the space domain needed when responding to a major terrorist event in Canada Using the same construct the capability developer can study what capabilities authorities structures and processes are required for the Sense function in the cyberspace domain for the same mission The strategic planner can use the capstone construct to identify the requirements for integration and command and control for the Sense function across the missions 7 3 Conceptual Framework – Integrating Operating and Enabling Concepts The capstone construct also provides a framework for creating concepts and understanding a concept hierarchy By looking at the construct in three different ways integrating operating and enabling concepts can be systematically developed insig ht 11 Only by having a comprehensive view of the relationships between the condition sets domains and functions can we determine the requirements for being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked chief of f orce dev elopment 49 HUMAN CYBER SPACE AIR LAND MARITIME INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT COMMAND SENSE ACT SHIELD CFDS Msn 6 SUSTAIN CFDS Msn 5 CFDS Msn 4 CFDS Msn 3 GENERATE CFDS Msn 2 CFDS Msn 1 Figure 17 Integrating Concepts MARITIME LAND AIR SPACE CYBER HUMAN Maritime Operating Concept Land Operating Concept Air Operating Concept Space Operating Concept Cyber Operating Concept Human Operating Concept Integrating concepts can be developed by considering the collective relationships for a comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked application of national intent within a particular condition set COMMAND SENSE ACT SHIELD SUSTAIN CFDS Msn 6 CFDS Msn 5 CFDS Msn 4 GENERATE CFDS Msn 3 CFDS Msn 2 CFDS Msn 1 Figure 18 Operating Concepts 50 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Operating concepts can be developed to describe the requirements based on the six functions for a specific environment within a specific mission It comprises the collective relationship for a comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked application of national interest within a particular domain and a particular condition set ex space operating concept for CFDS Mission 1 The capstone construct can also be used to amplify methodological or technological enablers enabling concepts that cover a wide variety of missions domains and functions As an example the Comprehensive Approach is a methodological enabling concept Artificial Intelligence on the other hand would be a technological enabling HUMAN CYBER SPACE AIR LAND MARITIME concept that could result in a new range of impacts on being strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive COMMAND SENSE ACT SHIELD CFDS Msn 6 SUSTAIN CFDS Msn 5 CFDS Msn 4 GENERATE CFDS Msn 3 CFDS Msn 2 CFDS Msn 1 Figure 19 Enabling Concepts The capstone construct provides the tool for concept developers capability mangers and strategic planners to help set levels of ambition and assist in the analysis of risk In the future the capstone construct will expand as the number of factors and challenges resident in the future security environment will elevate the level of complexity Hence as the strategic environment continues to expand in the future more domains are likely to come into existence The same possibility of expansion exists for condition sets and functions chief of f orce dev elopment 51 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Strategic ImpactS A singular and shared construct governing the relationship amongst condition sets domains and functions is fundamental to unity of thought purpose and action for integrated force development force generation and force employment The capstone construct allows decision-makers to set levels of ambition and to conduct risk analysis In the future the capstone construct will expand As the strategic environment continues to expand in the future more domains are likely to come into existence The same possibility of expansion also exists for condition sets and functions 52 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 8 SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS Understanding the implications that complexity will present is essential to strategic success for the CF It is also fundamental to understanding the changing nature of our adversaries the domains in which we will operate and the types of operations that the CF will be tasked to perform In order to meet these challenges we will need to create an integrated multi-role and combat capable military force that will be comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked in the execution of national intent Insights Strategic Impacts Insight 1 The strategic environment has always been dominated by issues of complexity However the number of factors and challenges resident in the future security environment will significantly increase the levels of complexity • Complex future security challenges demand approaches that are comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked Therefore these attributes must become the tenets that govern the nature of the future force and the requirements for being strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive Insight 2 Understanding the implications that complex systems will present in the future security environment is essential to strategic success for the CF The future security environment will be influenced by an ever-expanding spectrum of dynamic complex and adaptive systems • It is fundamental to understand the growing number of agents affecting national and international security the changing nature of our adversaries the consequences of various groups’ interactions the unpredictable and non-linear nature of actions and behaviour the domains in which we will operate and the types of operations that the CF will be tasked to perform • The linear tools and legacy constructs that we currently use for problem solving may be inadequate for the challenges provided by future complex systems Insight 3 The dynamic and complex strategic environment will be further influenced by an ever-expanding spectrum of technically and socially enabled actors who will be more coordinated increasingly networked and who share adversarial intent • Global access to science and technology such as space cyberspace and advanced disruptive technologies means military advantage can belong to whomever is quickest and best able to acquire and exploit new capabilities thus increasing the adversarial capability of non-state actors to levels that rival those of nation states chief of f orce dev elopment 53 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Insights Strategic Impacts Insight 4 Comprehensiveness must describe a multi-disciplinary approach to resolve those challenges forecasted in the future security environment which are well beyond the scope and the capacity of the CF alone • The CF is but one instrument of national power and influence available to the GoC • Non-governmental agencies may simultaneously be working in the complex space to solve other portions of a crisis and may or may not share the goals of the GoC • To best resolve or manage complex situations a comprehensive framework is needed Insight 5 Integration within a multi-disciplinary approach will provide a greater chance of resolving the complex issues of the future security environment than will working independently • Integration of DND and the CF must evolve from organizational silos to processes networks relationships and capabilities that enable integrated operations • The entire institution will need to integrate as required with other agencies or actors Insight 6 Adaptation is imperative to coping with unpredictable and uncertain complex challenges situations and relationships The CF must be adaptive or risk failure • To be adaptive the CF needs • Leaders who can discern the consequences of emerging trends and react to strategic shocks • Commanders who are not afraid to pursue innovative and unconventional solutions • Individuals who like our adversaries can envision the use of equipment in new and innovative ways and • Soldiers sailors and air personnel who can sense a change in the adversary’s course of action and exploit it to the benefit of the mission Insight 7 Both social and technical networks must be exploited by the CF across the strategic environment and within all domains in response to adversaries’ increased technically and socially enabled capabilities • Our current hierarchical networks may not be conducive to succeeding in a future complex security environment • The CF should explore more integrated or hybrid networks as opposed to hierarchical ones • Based on goals to be achieved external connectivity with defence and security organizations OGDs allies and partners will be required to the extent necessary • Both social and technical networks provide the means to be comprehensive integrated and adaptive so that the CF can meet the challenges of the complex security environment 54 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Insights Strategic Impacts Insight 8 The spectrum of future conflict is no longer a linear understanding of peace operations other than war and war • The CF must be able to adaptively operate proactively and reactively throughout the spectrum of conflict whether in a conventional or irregular manner • As the nature of conflict becomes increasingly dynamic the spectrum of actors and solutions also increases and may necessitate actions that are no longer the exclusive realm of military forces Insight 9 The strategic environment has expanded beyond the traditional domains maritime land and air and now must include space cyberspace and human The strategic environment will continue to expand which will place an even greater emphasis on issues of complexity and the need for being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked • States no longer have exclusive dominion over the domains in the strategic environment • Current and future adversaries whether state or non-state have the power to create strategic effects directed against Canadian national interests • By attacking or disabling our networks an adversary can readily affect command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in the maritime land air and space domains An adversary can also attack the core of our national infrastructure and support systems • Strategic failure in any particular domain could result in national strategic failure • Failure in the human domain regardless of the level of success in the remainder of the strategic environment could result in national strategic failure • The CF must understand friendly adversarial and neutral actors as well as the underlying factors motivating human behaviour • By drawing from human and behavioural sciences the CF can better position itself to counter and mitigate conflict to facilitate collaboration amongst all actors to understand how human networks form adapt and evolve and to facilitate threat assessment and threat reduction • The CF must understand the adaptive nature of adversarial human networks as well as the strategic effect of adversarial influence operations when combined with new technology-enabled human networks chief of f orce dev elopment 55 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Insights Strategic Impacts • These new domains do not imply ownership but they rather demand leadership • Commanders at all levels must be prepared to have adversarial effects projected at them from all six domains perhaps simultaneously • Commanders at all levels depending upon the nature of the mission will have to be prepared to generate effects in all six domains simultaneously in an integrated and comprehensive manner • Space cyberspace and human are all separate domains where the instruments of national power and influence can be exercised with equal importance to the traditional domains • Our ability to be strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive within the entire spectrum of future conflict is fundamentally dependent upon our ability to project or to deny effects in all these domains Insight 10 The current view of the strategic functions is governed by our historical experiences and knowledge of the traditional domains The future view of the strategic functions must be governed by the attributes of being comprehensive adaptive integrated and networked across all domains 56 • Failure to understand the similarities and differences of the functions in relation to the expanding domains and dynamic condition sets will result in “planning for yesterday’s conflicts ” • Future function concepts Command Sense Act Sustain Shield and Generate should describe comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked capabilities • The future Command concept must understand the effectiveness of a multi-disciplined approach to solve manage or contain many types of problems and to integrate forces into the larger comprehensive organization • The future Sense concept should employ highly integrated networks to share information in a timely manner but the function should also be capable of employing ad hoc or mission-specific networks chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Insights Strategic Impacts • In the future Act concept the forces must be adaptive The CF will be better able to thwart unpredictable adversarial action if it can reconfigure to a new threat flexibility redirect effects swiftly agility do all this quickly responsiveness and in a manner that can be sustained over a prolonged period endurance • In the future Sustain concept the network of the wide variety of partners must be more easily adaptive and brought together as needed when needed and for only as long as needed to meet sustain requirements • For the future Shield concept the CF must have a comprehensive understanding of Canada’s vulnerabilities this should encompass tangible defence assets capabilities platforms people national telecommunications business transportation and energy infrastructure and intangible defence assets national interests culture values and will economic well-being public opinion • In the future Generate concept there must be strategic integration of force employment force generation and force development within a comprehensive managed readiness system that speaks to the complexity of all the condition sets domains and functions • To be integrated and adaptive both DND and CF will need to generate appropriate personnel capable of operating in complex situations this implies the creation of the civilian “Defence Professional” and the possibility of an equivalent “Security Professional” for the GoC • In order to remain strategically relevant operationally responsive and tactically decisive in the complex strategic environment a fundamental understanding of the effects required by each of these functions in each discrete condition set and domain is essential chief of f orce dev elopment 57 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Insights Insight 11 Only by having a comprehensive view of the relationships between the condition sets domains and functions can we determine the requirements for being comprehensive integrated adaptive and networked 58 Strategic Impacts • A singular and shared construct governing the relationship amongst condition sets domains and functions is fundamental to unity of thought purpose and action for integrated force development force generation and force employment • The capstone construct allows decisionmakers to set levels of ambition and to conduct risk analysis • In the future the capstone construct will expand As the strategic environment continues to expand in the future more domains are likely to come into existence The same possibility of expansion also exists for condition sets and functions chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 9 REFERENCES 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32a2fe5c- 7fab4fed-859f-d90466953618 US Department of Defense Doctrine for Joint Operations 3-0 Washington D C Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001 Verdon John LCdr Bruce C Forrester and Zhingang Wang The Last Mile of the Market How Networks Participation and Responsible Autonomy Support Mission Command and Transform Personnel Management Ottawa DGMPRA Draft Technical Memorandum 2009 chief of f orce dev elopment 65 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 10 LEXICON 10 1 Terminology The ICC defined the term strategic environment as “where the elements of power and influence are exercised ” The ICC also advocated an expansion of the how the strategic environment is traditionally understood since the elements of power and influence can be exercised in space cyberspace and the cognitive connective and affective aspects of the human condition – as well as on land sea and air These six divisions are not called environments in the present work because the term environmental command already refers to the navy army and air force in Canada styled Maritime Command Land Force Command and Air Command respectively Additionally these terms have particular organizational qualities There is also debate as to whether or not cyberspace and human divisions of power and influence are of the same physical nature as land maritime air and space We contend that from a strategic perspective the physicality of an environment may be only one way to identify major divisions of power and influence The term domain is defined by Webster as a “field of thought ”32 The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines domain as “sphere of control or influence ”33 Together these definitions form the basis for using the term domain in the ICC to describe the expanded strategic environment as being comprised of the land maritime air space cyberspace and human domains These six domains form the first of the three axes of the ICC The six CF strategic functions Command Sense Act Sustain Shield and Generate are widely understood and form the second of the three axes of the ICC 10 2 Glossary Term Usage Act The military use of capabilities to achieve desired effects in Canada support of national policy CFD draft 34 Adaptive Able to respond to change and challenges in a positive man- ICC ner includes the hallmarks of being intelligent resilient robust flexible agile creative responsive and enduring Command The creative and purposeful exercise of legitimate authority Canada to accomplish the mission legally professionally and ethically CFD draft 35 chief of f orce dev elopment Origin 67 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Term Usage Origin Complexity “Complex Systems is a new approach to science which Yaneer Bar-Yam36 studies how the relationships between parts give rise to the collective behaviours of a system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment ” Comprehensive Having a complete and broad understanding of the strategic ICC environment having an accurate definition of the problem and having set appropriate goals having the ability to apply a multi-disciplinary approach Condition Set Conditions circumstances resulting from the combination ICC of the assigned missions in CFDS and the of expectations of GoC Cyberspace Refers to hardware and social interactions that occur through ICC the virtual world Domain Major divisions within the strategic environment where the ICC elements of national power and influence are exercised maritime land air space cyberspace and human Enabling Concept Concepts that amplify methodological or technological en- ICC ablers and cover a wide variety of missions domains and functions Functions How the CF carries out its operations through Command ICC Act Sense Sustain Shield and Generate Future Security The projection of trends and shocks out into the future Canada CFD Environment Trends include economic social environmental resource geopolitical science technology and military security Generate The method by which DND and CF recruit train and Canada develop personnel procure equipment infrastructure CFD draft 37 and services and all are made ready in order to meet the defence mission Integrated Expansion of the terms joint or combined to include other ICC actors and organizations of the GoC beyond DND Integrating Concept Concepts developed by considering the collective relation- ICC ships within a particular condition set Interoperability The ability of systems to provide information and services Canada and to and accept information and services from other systems NATO and to use the information and services so exchanged Networked Relationships and interconnectivity of humans and or ICC technology 68 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT Term Usage Operational Art The employment of forces to attain strategic and or opera- Canada38 tional objectives through the design organization integration and conduct of strategies campaigns major operations and battles The skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations Operating Concept Concepts developed to describe the requirements based ICC on the six functions for a specific domain within a specific mission Problem Set The combination of the three roles of the CF defend ICC Canada defend North America contribute to international peace and security and the challenges of the future security environment Sense The acquisition and processing of information to enable Canada commanders and authorities to understand the character- CFD draft 39 istics and conditions of the operating environment pertinent to military decision-making Shield The comprehensive approach to the protection of tangible Canada and intangible elements through the integrating activities CFD draft 40 of detection assessment warning defence active and passive and recovery Strategic The level at which a nation or group of nations determine NATO41 national or multinational security objectives and deploy national including military resources to achieve them The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation of- Joint Operations ten as a member of a group of nations determines nation- 3-042 al or multinational alliance or coalition strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives Strategic Environment Where the elements of power and influence are exercised Sustain The provisioning of all support services required to maintain Canada routine and contingency operations – domestic continen- CFD draft 43 tal and expeditionary – including prolonged operations Tactical The tactical level focuses on planning and executing bat- Joint tles engagements and activities to achieve military objec- Operations 3-044 tives assigned to tactical units or task forces TFs Tactics The threat or use of any kind of armed forces An action or strategy carefully planned to achieve a specific Oxford end The art of disposing armed forces in order of battle and Dictionary45 of organizing operations especially in contact with an enemy The art of disposing naval land and air forces in actual Canada46 contact with the enemy chief of f orce dev elopment Origin ICC 69 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 11 LIST OF ACRONYMS Acronym Meaning ASAT Anti-Satellite CA Comprehensive Approach CAS Complex Adaptive Systems CBSA Canada Border Services Agency CF Canadian Forces CF OPP Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process CFD Chief of Force Development CFDS Canada First Defence Strategy CFLI Canadian Forces Leadership Institute CNA Computer Network Attack CND Computer Network Defence CNE Computer Network Exploitation CNO Computer Network Operations CSE Communications Security Establishment CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service DFSA Directorate of Future Security Analysis DIMEFIL Diplomatic Information Military Economic Financial Intelligence and Law Enforcement DND Department of National Defence DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada ICC Integrated Capstone Concept IED Improvised Explosive Device FSE Future Security Environment GoC Government of Canada MOU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OGD Other Government Department PSC Public Safety Canada RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police S T Science and Technology WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction chief of f orce dev elopment 71 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 12 ENDNOTES 1 Department of National Defence Broadsword or Rapier The Canadian Forces’ Involvement in 21st Century Coalition Operations Kingston Canadian Force Leadership Institute 2008 The personnel interviewed were from a diverse background and represented Canadian and foreign military and civilian personnel with extensive experience on operations over the past 15 years at all levels – tactical operational strategic and politico-strategic 2 Broadsword or Rapier p 21 3 Department of National Defence The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part 1 Current and Emerging Trends Ottawa Chief of Force Development 2009 p 91 4 Francis Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization” entry for Encyclopaedia of Library and Information Sciences Taylor and Francis 2008 pp 1-2 http pespmc1 vub ac be Papers ELIS-Complexity pdf 5 Dana Mackenzie “The Science of Surprise Can Complexity Theory Help Us Understand the Real Consequences of a Convoluted Event Like September 11 ” in Discover February 2002 http discovermaganize com 2002 feb featsurprise 6 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” p 1 7 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” p 4 8 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” pp 1 4 9 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” pp 1 6 10 10 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” p 8 11 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” p 9 12 Heylighen “Complexity and Self-Organization ” p 16 13 Interdependence is part of the study of complex systems that helps us recognize and understand indirect effects Yaneer Bar-Yam Making Things Work Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World Cambridge MA NECSI Knowledge Press 2004 pp 27-29 14 Future Security Environment pp 5-9 15 Government of Canada Canada First Defence Strategy Ottawa Department of National Defence 2008 p 7 16 Comprehensiveness is not to be confused with the “Comprehensive Approach” CA CA relates to another concept being co-developed amongst government agencies not yet published chief of f orce dev elopment 73 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 17 Paul Comeau presentation discussion on 14 May 2008 18 The list of national elements of power has been expanded in some circles to include DIMEFIL Diplomatic Information Military Economic Financial Intelligence and Law Enforcement 19 Jonathan Hearn Rethinking Nationalism A Critical Introduction New York Palgrave Macmillan 2006 pp 230 231 232 20 Dietrich Dorner The Logic of Failure Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations Translated by Rita and Robert Kimber New York Metropolitan Books 1996 pp 49-70 21 There have been some arguments that suggest that other capabilities can be included as an element of national power such as “information” and “legal ” In fact an expansion to seven elements of national power has been suggested DIMEFIL diplomacy information military economic financial intelligence law enforcement 22 The ten elements of critical infrastructure are Energy and Utilities Communications and Information Technology Finance Healthcare Food Water Transportation Safety Government and Manufacturing 23 Space Law is a component of International Law which is based upon treaties this means they are not considered law until ratified by the 200 member states of the United Nations 24 On 13 September 1985 the first and only destruction of a satellite by an American airlaunched missile occurred when an F-15A launched an ASAT against the solar observatory satellite “P78-1” in a 600 km 375 mile orbit On 11 January 2007 the Chinese government destroyed one of its own satellites 537 miles in space using a ground-based medium range ballistic missile system On 20 February 2008 the US shot an SM-3 missile from the USS Lake Erie to destroy a defunct US National Reconnaissance satellite at 133 nautical miles over the Pacific Ocean 25 The challenges of operating in space are far different than the challenges of operating in the air environment For example space is extremely hostile to human habitation Space flight is not in fact flight but rather ballistic in nature a satellite’s path is governed by orbital mechanics The rotation of the earth coupled with a predictable flight path means that any space activity anywhere can affect any country Space vehicles must be designed to endure the harsh conditions of space for a considerable period without repair or replenishment of consumables 26 The working definition of Cyberspace provided by ADM IM J6 is “A global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent network information technology infrastructures including the Internet telecommunication networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers ” LCol Kent Schramm “Cyberspace Computer Network Operations” Integrated Concept Working Group 25 Feb 2009 Information Environment is “the aggregate of individuals organizations and systems that collect process disseminate or act on information ” Additional explanation is that the information environment is made 74 chief of force dev elopment INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT up of three interrelated dimensions physical informational and cognitive Government of United States of America Joint Information Operations US Joint Publication 3-13 Glossary Washington Department of Defense 27 W Huitt “The Mind ” Educational Psychology Interactive Valdosta GA Valdosta State University May 2001 at http chiron valdosta edu whuitt col summary mind html accessed 5 May 2009 28 Perceptual bias includes expectation resistance to change impact of ambiguity centralized direction Cognitive bias includes evaluation of probability attribution of causality evaluation of evidence Richards J Heuer Psychology of Intelligence Analysis Washington Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency 1999 29 Directorate of Future Security Analysis DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Command ” CFD Concept Paper 29 February 2008 DFSA Capability Domain Concept Sense ” CFD Concept Paper 15 April 2008 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Act ” CFD Concept Paper 27 May 2008 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Sustain ” CFD Concept Paper 30 November 2008 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Shield ” CFD Concept Paper 17 April 2008 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Generate ” CFD Concept Paper 23 January 2009 30 Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann “Analysing Command Challenges using the Command and Control Framework ” DRDC Technical Report 2003-034 2003 31 See Hallmarks of Adaptation p 15 32 “Domain ” Webster’s English Dictionary Concise Edition Toronto Strathearn Books Limited 2005 p 84 33 “Domain ” Oxford Concise Dictionary 8th edition Oxford Oxford University Press 1990 p 347 34 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Act ” CFD Concept Paper 27 May 2008 35 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Command ” CFD Concept Paper 29 February 2008 36 Bar-Yam Making Things Work p 24 37 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Generate ” CFD Concept Paper 23 January 2009 38 Defence Terminology Bank 39 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Sense ” CFD Concept Paper 15 April 2008 40 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Shield ” CFD Concept Paper 17 April 2008 41 AAP-6 42 Government of United States of America Doctrine for Joint Operations 3-0 Washington D C Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001 chief of f orce dev elopment 75 INTEGRATED CAPSTONE CONCEPT 43 DFSA “Capability Domain Concept Sustain ” CFD Concept Paper 30 November 2008 44 Joint Operations 3 0 Chapter 2 Section 2 Levels of War 45 Concise Oxford Dictionary 46 Government of Canada DND CF Manual of Abbreviations Ottawa Chief of the Land Staff 76 chief of force dev elopment 2 0 O C TO B ER 2 0 0 9 i n t e g r at e d c a p s t o n e c o n c e p t Chief of Force Development Chef du développement des FOrces A-FD-005-002 AF-001 Integrated Capstone Concept