AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY IS IT TIME FOR A US CYBER FORCE by Corey M Ramsby Lieutenant Colonel United States Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Advisor Colonel Charles F Spencer Jr 17 February 2015 DISTRIBUTION A Approved for public release distr bution unlimited Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188 Report Documentation Page Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response including the time for reviewing instructions searching existing data sources gathering and maintaining the data needed and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 1204 Arlington VA 22202-4302 Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number 1 REPORT DATE 3 DATES COVERED 2 REPORT TYPE 17 FEB 2015 00-00-2015 to 00-00-2015 4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a CONTRACT NUMBER Is It Time For A U S Cyber Force 5b GRANT NUMBER 5c PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6 AUTHOR S 5d PROJECT NUMBER 5e TASK NUMBER 5f WORK UNIT NUMBER 7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 8 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Air War College Air University Maxwell AFB AL 9 SPONSORING MONITORING AGENCY NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 10 SPONSOR MONITOR’S ACRONYM S 11 SPONSOR MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER S 12 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release distribution unlimited 13 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 ABSTRACT With the doctrinal designation of cyberspace as an operational military domain comes significant implications that include defending exploiting and evolving capabilities in pursuit of national objectives The designation also raises a debate on US military force structure needed to realize its full potential and whether the current construct can support its development Can the current Department of Defense establishment meet the demands and potential of the cyberspace domain Or is a separate force independent of the other services and agencies needed to project and protect vital US cyberspace interests 15 SUBJECT TERMS 16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF a REPORT b ABSTRACT c THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified 17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18 NUMBER OF PAGES Same as Report SAR 26 19a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 Rev 8-98 Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government the Department of Defense or Air University In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303 it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government Biography Lieutenant Corey M Ramsby is a student at the Air War College Air University Maxwell AFB AL Lt Col Ramsby is a graduate of Purdue University Bachelor of Science Electrical Engineering and the Air Command and Staff College He has served at the squadron group major command center Air Staff and Joint Staff levels with multiple deployments to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM His most recent assignment was as the squadron commander for the 375th Communications Squadron at Scott AFB IL Abstract With the doctrinal designation of cyberspace as an operational military domain comes significant implications that include defending exploiting and evolving capabilities in pursuit of national objectives The designation also raises a debate on US military force structure needed to realize its full potential and whether the current construct can support its development Can the current Department of Defense establishment meet the demands and potential of the cyberspace domain Or is a separate force independent of the other services and agencies needed to project and protect vital US cyberspace interests Using the US Air Force’s path to independence as context for an analysis of cyberspace force capabilities this essay explores whether the services and combat support agencies can meet strategic national objectives Or as suggested by retired Navy Admiral James Stavridis is an independent US Cyber Force needed Specifically the existence of four criterions are explored a unique strategic military capability unachievable by any of the other services and agencies corresponding technological advances an unrestricted battlespace to develop test and refine theories weapons and tactics and political champions to maneuver the bureaucratic and legislative terrain needed to pass legislation to create a separate military service Introduction These days cyberspace is doctrinally designated as an operational military domain 1 With this designation come significant implications that include defending exploiting and evolving capabilities in pursuit of national objectives The designation also brings with it a debate on how to structure US assets to realize its full potential and whether the current military construct can support its truest development Can the current Department of Defense establishment meet the demands and potential of the cyberspace domain Or is a separate force independent of the other services and agencies needed to project and protect vital US cyberspace interests In a January 2014 Proceedings magazine article “Time for a US Cyber Force” retired Navy Admiral James Stavridis and US Cyber Command planner David Weinstein call for a separate and independent cyber force to fully develop defend and exploit America’s newest warfare domain 2 Using US Army Brigadier General William ‘Billy’ Mitchell and his quest for a separate US Air Force following World War I as a historical contrast Stavridis and Weinstein build a case of ‘been there done that’ and recommend we learn from our lessons avoid the bitter debates of who and how cyberspace should be managed and realize a new contested domain requires a separate force free from the other services internal influences biases and priorities In their words “we are once again on the beach of Kitty Hawk” and “we should not wait 20 years to realize it” Their position is compelling but the 20 years of debate they prefer us to avoid actually provide a richer historical context to analyze the touchstones necessary to sway lawmakers military leaders and the American public to the idea of a separate force to pursue US military interests in cyberspace In a sense proof the other services cannot provide the capabilities a separate armed force can with regards to national defense in the cyberspace domain must be presented The time between the creation of the US Army Air Corps in 1926 and the end of World War II framed the air power debate tested its major concepts and theories developed distinct air domain technologies and set the conditions for a separate air force to further US development and exploitation of the air domain In this context one can imagine and correlate an analogous path to an independent cyberspace service Specifically establishment of a separate cyber force will require at least four criterions a unique strategic military capability unachievable by any of the other services and agencies corresponding technological advances an unrestricted battlespace to develop test and refine theories weapons and tactics and political champions to maneuver the bureaucratic and legislative terrain in the face of extreme scrutiny opposition and political parlay For the air domain the unique capability developed into strategic bombing and the capacity to strike at an adversary’s homeland without the need for land invasions or sea battles 3 The corresponding technological advancement that realized the capability was the long range bomber such as the B-29 with its unrivaled range and delivery of atomic weapons 4 The battlespace was World War II and the European and Pacific strategic bombing campaigns And the leadership and proponents for a separate air arm included the likes of Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman Army Generals Dwight Eisenhower George Marshall and Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold and Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A Lovett among others This is not to say these were the only criterion just that without them the case for an independent air force would have certainly lacked rationale And even with the fleshing out of the strategic bombing theories the advent of long range bombers World War II and top US leaders who backed a separate air force competing visions and inter-service maneuvering won the day in carving the responsibilities of the air domain amongst each of the combatant arms The emergence of a separate cyber force may be as difficult As Stavridis and Weinstein point out each of the armed services currently have significant equity in the cyberspace mission The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review further entrenches this commitment with the requirement for Cyber Mission Forces sourced via the services 5 Additionally the Department of Defense includes the National Security Agency and Defense Information Systems Agency whose missions heavily reside in the cyberspace domain and in most cases outpace the services capacities and capabilities The debate for a separate cyber force should not center on whether the cyberspace arm is subservient to the other services similar to the air force debate The debate should focus on whether or not a separate cyberspace arm can match and exceed existing services and agencies' capabilities without degrading core missions at a resource savings that can overshadow the disruption disconnection and overhead costs of establishing a new military branch Our service creation past suggests these questions will not be answered in the status quo Altering the nation’s military establishment is difficult by design So much so a change on the scale of creating a new US military service has occurred once and was preceded by the largest war ever known to mankind History shows that the United States rarely built up its military prior to war even in the face of menacing threats e g Germany and Japan prior to World War II 6 This would indicate the US will unlikely consider such a drastic change to its military force structure that creates a separate cyber force prior to an armed conflict that fully includes cyberspace And that’s assuming cyberspace experts rise to the influential ranks and positions to champion legislation that passes into law Until then chances are we’ll continue to theorize debate and hypothesize the potential effects of cyberspace power defend our infrastructure to the best of our abilities develop and test tactics and techniques short of war surveille and collect intelligence and deter others from doing the same to us The technological advances will also likely lag Ultimately nothing shapes and evolves military capabilities like war Thesis This research paper uses a historical case study of the development of a separate US air service after World War II to assert the establishment of a separate US cyberspace force requires at least four criterions a strategic military capability unachievable by any of the other services corresponding technological advances an unrestricted battlespace to develop test and refine theories weapons and tactics and political champions to maneuver the bureaucratic and legislative terrain in the face of extreme scrutiny opposition and political parlay Cyber What Understanding the origins of the term “cyber” help to deconstruct some of its complexity Today the term cyber is regularly followed by a pessimistic connotation – attack warfare fraud piracy espionage bully theft weapon – but can also carry more unexceptional descriptors – café law media shopper frontier freedom The point being “cyber” is best suited as a prefix What follows the term “cyber” matters and puts the topic into context If used alone “cyber” can and often means everything and nothing and complicates the ability to conduct an informed discussion of substance 7 Cyber in its contemporary usage is a derivative of the Greek word κυβερνητικός kybernutos whose meaning relates to government and governing 8 and first popularized by Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathematician Norbert Wiener in his 1948 seminal work on self-regulating mechanisms Cybernetics Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine 9 The book introduced among other things the theoretical foundation of automata the principles of digital computing and the benefits of the binary numerical system the “automatic computing machine” and feedback mechanisms and processes Wiener’s juxtaposition of automata and the human central nervous system foreshadowed today’s interconnected world decades before its reality Wiener wrote “…automata whether in the metal or in the flesh is a branch of communication engineering and its cardinal notions are those of message amount of disturbance or noise…quantity of information coding technique and so on ” Additionally “They contain sense organs effectors and the equivalent of a nervous system to integrate the transfer of information from the one to the other ” 10 In the early 1980s cyberpunk science fiction writer William Gibson coined the phrase ‘cyberspace’ in his short story Burning Chrome and follow-on novel Neuromancer In Burning Chrome Gibson introduced the term as the name of a computer hacker’s simulator the Cyberspace Seven used to access the “colorless nonspace of the simulation matrix the electronic consensus-hallucination ” 11 Gibson furthers the concept of cyberspace in Neuromancer where he develops it as a “Consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators in every nation” and a “graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every computer in the human system” with “unthinkable complexity” 12 Both Wiener and Gibson theorized the military uses of both cybernetics and cyberspace well before the capabilities existed Fast forward to the present and joint doctrine is catching up to those realizations Take for example the definition of cyberspace as published in Joint Publication 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 5 February 2013 … Cyberspace the global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology IT and resident data including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers 13 JP 3-12 further goes on to explain cyberspace in terms of three layers physical network logical network and cyber-persona 14 For the purposes of this essay this is the definition that will be used to assess and analyze the merits and challenges of establishing a separate US Cyber Force 15 Criterion #1 Strategic Capability Strategic Paradox Because the missions of the services and the combat support agencies are so ingrained and dependent on cyberspace the first criterion to be met in the discussion of a separate cyber force is that of a distinct strategic capability unique enough that only a separate service could provide it Otherwise a separate cyber force would require a profound cost-benefit analysis so monumental in savings and mission advancement the services and agencies could not refute dispute or refuse its potential At the present neither exists If the former did exist would we know what it looked like Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Mark Welsh provided a potential view during his Air Force Update speech at an Air Space Conference and Technology Exposition in September 2014 General Welsh stated the Air Force needs “an air component commander capability to sit in the Air and Space Operations Center when the big fight starts hit the cyber easy button and watch the enemy RPAs remotely piloted aircraft pool at his feet Or when the enemy starts to shoot missiles toward friendly forces employ a tool that allows these missiles to sit and sizzle on the pad or go half way turn around and go home ” 16 He followed the comment with the question of who might be working the solution and how it could be expanded “in a big way ” Meant to be forward leaning and thought provoking Welsh’s comments fortuitously highlight two existing aspects of cyberspace cyberspace power theories are primitive but evolving and much like the early theories of air power can be perceived as a panacea above existing weapon capabilities and strategy These perceptions of cyberspace seem eerily reminiscent of the interwar air power theories developed by Giulio Douhet and Mitchell David MacIsaac provides a treasure trove of intellectual analysis on early air power theories in his influential essay Voices from the Central Blue The Air Power Theorists 17 One of MacIsaac’s more interesting cogitations is the visions of air power “invariably outran the reality of the moment” clouding the debate with disappointment and derision based on aspirations that air power could “provide quick clean mechanical and impersonal solutions to problems which others had struggled for centuries ” 18 The “cyber easy button” proposed by Welsh bears similar resemblances and therein lies a strategic paradox the vision of a great capability beyond the means of the services but dependent on them to develop it Douhet and Mitchell well understood this paradox and the reliance on biased army and naval officials to advance air power’s role strategy doctrine and capabilities Though for dissimilar reasons both surmised air power could not reach its potential while dependent on another service for its development - Douhet called for an “independent air force armed with long-range bombardment aircraft” while Mitchell less concerned of the particular delivery vehicle focused on “centralized coordination under the control of autonomous air force command ” 19 During their time both men’s ideas eclipsed the strategic utility of the air domain and the airplane remained deferential to land and naval forces Cyberspace visions appear on a similar track Evolving cyberspace capabilities exist today but rely on the services and support agencies for their development and thus remain constrained by each accordingly Additionally cyberspace maneuvers are largely tactical precisely targeted and or so shrouded in secrecy they remain useless to the public debate of establishing a separate cyberspace force Thus the creation of a separate cyberspace force will unlikely precede the development of a unique strategic cyberspace capability Criterion #2 Corresponding Technological Advances The theory of strategic bombing required technological advancements and weapon systems to progress it from thought and debate to reality Long-range bombers advanced bomb sights and atomic weapons all contributed to its evolution Strategic cyberspace development must include similar technological advancements whether it be software hardware or human presence in the battlespace Again looking at the path to US Air Force independence the long-range bomber underpinned the ambition and premise for service equality The ability to attack an enemy’s heartland without a land invasion fundamentally changed America’s strategic approach to war and the role of the B-29 Superfortress cannot be overstated in this regard Considered the “greatest gamble of the war” the $3 billion development and subsequent deployment of the B-29 to the Pacific theater in 1944 marked the point where air domain technology converged with interwar theory and propelled air power into an independent rather than a complementary role in World War II 20 Commanded by General Arnold and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington DC the B-29s were organized under the Twentieth Air Force and remained autonomous from the three Pacific theater commanders – Admiral Chester Nimitz General Douglas MacArthur and General Joseph Stilwell 21 To put the strategic impacts of the B-29 into perspective “with high explosives alone the 20th Air Force levelled 2 333 000 homes in Japan and most of the business and industry in sixty cities ” 22 The conventional bombing campaign killed “at least 240 000 and wounded more than 300 000 ” 23 In March – June 1945 alone Japanese deaths reached 127 000 in its six largest cities 24 By any measure the devastation produced by the B-29 produced strategic options and effects not seen prior to its arrival in the Pacific Coupled with the atomic bomb the B-29 provided President Harry S Truman with a one plane one crew one bomb one city capability that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki culminated Japan’s unconditional surrender and averted a difficult and costly land invasion In his words air power had developed to a point “equal to those of land and sea power” and its contributions to strategic planning was as great 25 Technological advances in cyberspace pale in comparison with regards to the overall devastation and political impact of the B-29 However cyberspace weaponry evolution is well underway with the standard bearers being the precision guided malicious software malware of the Stuxnet Duqu and Flame viruses All three employed multiple previously unknown zero day vulnerabilities against Microsoft operating system code using trusted hardware vendor certificates to cloak their presence Though not publicly attributed to any nation many believe the US developed Stuxnet in an effort to stem suspected Iranian nuclear weapons efforts at the Natanz nuclear facility 26 The code so precisely written activated only after verifying it was indeed in the Natanz internal network by comparing the exact size and number of centrifuges operating in the facility and has been tagged as the first specifically designed cyber weapon ever deployed 27 Stuxnet set the Iranian nuclear enrichment program back months to years and accomplished what was only militarily possible via kinetic means prior to it The challenge with Stuxnet and other similar cyber weapons is discovery leads to obsolescence and the designs unlock to anyone with the skill set to reverse engineer them Additionally secrecy and nonattribution prevail as essential aspects in their development and deployment These factors highlight the juvenescent state of the cyberspace battlefield prevailing technologies and the current capacity of the services and combat support agencies to meet national requirements Therefore the impact of creating a separate cyberspace service has not reached a point technologically where the benefits can outweigh the costs in terms of disruption and disconnection from the current service and agency structure That is not to say cyberspace is uncontested or the US is not dangerously vulnerable Rather the risk-benefit analysis especially with the standup of US Cyber Command and the Cyber Mission Forces remains in favor of the current military service construct Criterion #3 Unrestricted Battlespace Over 45 years since researchers at UCLA first connected to a computer at Stanford and two decades since the explosive internet expansion of the early 1990s global interconnectedness has literally changed the political and social fabrics of every developed nation Today modern society relies on cyberspace for everything from commerce to education to social networking to as noted national security and diplomacy This interconnectedness has fundamentally shifted the way nations and societies conduct and resolve conflict because it provides a level of engagement good or bad at speeds and depths not previously known Militarily speaking however those speeds and depths remain largely undeveloped and untested As an example Stuxnet only introduced us to the fringes of what is possible As best-selling author and cybersecurity researcher Peter Singer puts it “Yet for all the ways it could change how we engage in military operations cyberwarfare’s greatest legacy may not be any single capability or function More likely it will be how this new form of engagement mixes with other battlefield technologies and tactics to create something unexpected The airplane tank and radio all appeared during World War I but it wasn’t until the Germans brought them together into the devastating blitzkrieg in the next global conflict that they made their lasting mark ” 28 Stavridis and Weinstein correctly contrast this state as the “beach of Kitty Hawk” with respect to the first powered controlled and sustained heavier-than-air human flights by the Wright Brothers in December 1903 Few if any could have forecasted four decades later a nation would lay in both physical and political ruins primarily as the result of the weaponized evolution and employment of the air domain That evolution did not come easy as it covered two world wars countless billions of dollars of investment and incredible loss of life Put another way the utility and lethality of the airplane of the mid-20th century existed because of the merger of resources science and technology courage and experience underpinned by the political will to push its capabilities through an unrestricted battlespace This is not unique to the air domain and one can draw similar analogies to the sea and land domains Examples include the aircraft carrier submarine tank rifle and the forces organized trained and equipped to operate them All earned their place in America’s arsenal through the crucible of war Enduring forces technologies tactics techniques and procedures in cyberspace will likely travel a similar path The difference between cyberspace and the other domains resides with the direct access to a nation’s cities and its people who rely on and share the same infrastructure as military forces Again looking to Singer “By the end of World War II all sides were engaging in strategic bombing against the broader populace arguing that the best way to end the war was to drive home its costs to civilians As cyberwarfare becomes a reality the same grim calculus will likely hold true ” 29 This calculus reflects political will more than technological advancement although each requires the other When the political will to strike a nation’s centers of gravity through cyberspace emerges so too will the reality of its strategic effects and weaponry and with it the competency to engage in an informed dialogue on how best to man train and equip US cyberspace forces Ultimately much like air power cyberspace power may not achieve rapid and unrestrained growth without an unrestricted battlespace Until then the true effects of a separate cyber force will remain as controversial as Douhet’s and Mitchell’s prophecies during the interwar years emotions will play a significant part in the conversation and the need for a separate cyberspace force will not extend beyond the abilities of the services and agencies to meet US national interests and objectives Criterion 4 Political Champions Assuming there existed a unique strategic capability in cyberspace with corresponding technologies proven in an unrestricted battlespace the emergence of a separate force still requires leadership to maneuver the political and bureaucratic terrain Because of the many actors and processes that shape force structure decisions political champions are necessary both inside and outside the military establishment In what Air War College Professor David Sorenson classifies as the national interest paradigm choices about military force levels “stem from strategic assessments guided by a combination of national interests and international threats to such interests ” and ultimately competing priorities shape military investment decisions 30 Simply stated resources are finite competition for them is intense and compromises matter Generals Marshall and Arnold fully understood the nation’s political and bureaucratic environment With the advocacy of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman they built an air force numbering just over 1 200 mostly obsolete aircraft in the Army’s smallest combat arms branch at the outset of World War II to its largest by the end – a first in American military history 31 Along the way they created equal status of the air arm with the publishing of the War Department Field Manual 100-20 Command and Employment of Air Power and gained a seat at the table in the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Arnold the nation’s top Airman 32 But it didn’t come at the expense of the other forces as Marshall was keen on building a balanced force While building the Army Air Forces AAF he also built the largest Army in US history and reorganized the War Department from the “fiefdoms of the chiefs of infantry cavalry field artillery and coast artillery” into the three commands – the army Ground Forces the Services of Supply and the AAF 33 The reorganization streamlined the Army while also providing the AAF with “sufficient clout to move their requirements with dispatch through the War Department General Staff ” 34 While building the AAF Marshal and Arnold had to “continually fend off congressional demands on the question of an independent air force” a trend originated in the interwar years that gained additional traction during the war With an eye to the future they successfully deferred the discussion until after the war and concentrated on victory and building the legitimacy of air power and the nucleus of Airmen needed to sustain it 35 As previously noted this included the high-risk development of the B-29 the autonomous standup of the 20th Air Force and the fusion of the bomber and the atomic bomb that pushed the world into the nuclear age The underlying goal was not just air force independence but to establish a United States Air Force in the postwar national security reorganization that allowed for its own budget and to seamlessly fit into a “coordinated organization of ground air and naval forces in operational theaters each under its own commander and each responsible to a supreme commander ” 36 The push for a unified integrated defense establishment supported by Truman General Eisenhower and many others became part of the National Security Act of 1947 that established the National Military Establishment later to become the Department of Defense Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency in addition to the United States Air Force 37 Air Force independence was established but in the context of much larger national security changes to deal with the postwar world order With the exception of Stavridis there does not appear to be many leaders military congressional or otherwise backing the formation of an independent US Cyber Force Most agree the US is dangerously vulnerable in cyberspace but do not look at it as a purely military problem that a separate force could solve From a military perspective the standup of US Cyber Command as a subordinate unified command under US Strategic Command seems to satisfy the current appetite for restructuring Looking to the future the next logical step as Stavridis points out may be a modification to the Unified Command Plan UCP raising US Cyber Command to full combatant command status 38 In fact it’s a question the Senate Armed Services Committee asked of Admiral Michael Rogers current US Cyber Command commander as part of his confirmation process in March 2014 39 The question asked “What are the best arguments for and against taking such action now ” Admiral Rogers stated there were no impediments to an elevation in status other than an increase in staff to accomplish “administrative functions” such as budgeting and force management at that level As for the benefits Admiral Rogers stated “Elevation to full unified status would improve resource advocacy allocation and execution by improving input to Department processes and eliminating competition in prioritization Additionally alignment of responsibility authority situational awareness and capability under a single commander would improve cyberspace operations and planning ” 40 Though this would suggest a change to the UCP it does not advocate a separate military service Furthermore throughout the 2015 Air War College academic year influential congressional government military and industry leaders presented numerous views on the threats posed by nations and actors in cyberspace even suggesting the existence of an ongoing 24 7cyber war However not one proposed the need for an independent US Cyber Force to counter the threat This does not prove one is not needed Merely it speaks to the lack of political champions for such change to the military establishment In fact when the specific question of a separate force arose several pointed to the same debate calling for a US Space Force that’s existed the past three decades This common comparison indicates an independent US Cyber Force currently lacks sufficient backing from legislators and military leaders whose support is necessary to draft and pass legislation into law Conclusion Without question the United States faces unprecedented threats in cyberspace and the military services and combat support agencies continue to feel their way around the terrain developing both offensive and defensive capacity Because of these threats and the uneasiness that accompanies them initial requests for changes in the military force structure have surfaced to include Stavridis and Weinstein who call for a US Cyber Force independent of the other services The basis of their argument is the US traveled a similar path in creating an independent air force and contrasts the crusade of US Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell following WWI as a historical context However an alternative framework to assess whether the threats warrant a separate cyber force is to analyze key criterion illustrative of the Army Air Forces following World War II These criterions helped persuade legislators military leaders and the American public in justifying an independent air force Specifically a unique strategic military capability with corresponding technological advances honed in an unrestricted battlespace and championed by influential leaders who understood the US government and its bureaucratic and legislative processes Using the US Air Force’s path to independence as a basis an analysis of US force structure reveals that the services and combat support agencies currently meet existing national requirements in cyberspace Also cyberspace technological advances continue to evolve but remain largely tactical secretive and essentially useless in any public debate calling for a change to US military force structure Finally though contested cyberspace remains bound by political will has not evolved to an unrestricted battlespace and champions calling for a separate US Cyber Force just aren’t very vocal at the present time Unfortunately these criterions will likely not be reached until after the first overt nation state war that extensively includes cyberspace Much like WWII that war will look different than anything seen to date but surely won by the nations who can control cyberspace in a way the Allies ultimately controlled the skies in Europe and the Pacific Bibliography Clark Richard A and Robert Knake Cyber War The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It New York Harper Collins Publishers 2010 Coffey Thomas M Hap The Story of the US Air Force and the Man Who Built It New York The Viking Press 1982 Cray Ed General of the Army George C Marshal Soldier and Statesman New York WW Norton and Company 1990 Frank Richard B Downfall The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire New York Penguin Books 1999 Gibson William Burning Chrome can be accessed at http mith umd edu digitalstorytelling wp-content uploads GibsonW_Burning_Chrome pdf Gibson William Neuromancer New York NY ACE 1984 Glosbe Greek-English Dictionary https en glosbe com Greenert Jonathon Wireless Cyberwar the EM Spectrum and the Changing Navy Breaking Defense Online 3 April 2013 http breakingdefense com 2013 04 adm-greenert-wirelesscyber-em-spectrum-changing-navy Healey Jason A Fierce Domain Conflict in Cyberspace 1986-2012 Washington DC Atlantic Council 2014 Hurley Alfred F Billy Mitchell Crusader for Air Power Bloomington Indiana University Press 1975 Joint Planning 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 5 February 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations Washington DC DOD 2006 http www dod mil pubs foi joint staff jointStaff jointOperations 07-F2105doc1 pdf MacIsaac David Voices from the Central Blue The Air Power Theories in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age edited by Peter Paret Princeton New Jersey Princeton University Press 1986 Newitz Annalee The Bizarre Evolution of the Word ‘Cyber’ iO9 13 September 2013 http io9 com today-cyber-means-war-but-back-in-the-1990s-it-mean-1325671487 accessed 10 October 2014 Singer PW and Allan Friedman Cybersecurity and Cyberwar What Everyone Needs to Know New York Oxford University Press 2014 Singer Peter W The War of Zeros and Ones Popular Science online posted 8 September 2014 at http www popsci com article technology war-zeros-and-ones Sorenson David S The Politics of the American Weapons Acquisition Process in The Process and Politics of Defense Acquisition Westport CT Praeger Publishers 2009 Stavridis James and David Weinstein Time for a US Cyber Force Proceedings vol 140 1 1 331 US Naval Institute January 2014 http www usni org magazines proceedings 2014-01 time-us-cyber-force Stavridis James The New Triad It’s Time to Found a US Cyber Force Foreign Policy 20 June 2013 http www foreignpolicy com articles 2013 06 20 the_new_triad Truman Harry S Memoirs vol 2 Years of Trial and Hope Garden City Doubleday and Co Inc 1985 US Department of the Air Force Cyber Vision 2025 AF ST TR 12-01 13 December 2012 US Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace July 2011 US Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Washington DC Office of the Secretary of Defense March 2014 http www defense gov pubs 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review pdf US Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S Rogers USN Nominee for Commander United States Cyber Command Washington DC 2014 http www armed-services senate gov imo media doc Rogers_03-11-14 pdf Wiener Norbert Cybernetics Or Control and Communications in the Animal and the Machine 2nd rev ed Cambridge MA MIT Press 1961 Williams Brett Cyberspace What is it Where is it and Who Cares Armed Forces Journal 13 March 2014 http www armedforcesjournal com cyberspace-what-is-it-where-is-it-andwho-cares Welsh Mark Air Force Update speech at the Air Force Association’s Air Space Conference and Technology Exposition September 2014 http www af mil Portals 1 documents af%20events Speeches 16SEP2014-CSAFGenMarkWelsh-AFUpdate pdf timestamp 1410982866264 Wolk Herman S Reflections on Air Force Independence Washington DC Air Force History and Museums Program 2007 Yannakogeorgos Panayotis A and Adam B Lowther Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace The Challenge to National Security Boca Raton Taylor Francis 2014 Notes 1 Joint Publication 3-12 R 5 February 2013 p I-1 James Stavridis David Weinstein Time for a US Cyber Force Proceedings January 2014 http www usni org magazines proceedings 2014-01 time-us-cyber-force accessed 15 October 14 3 Herman S Wolk Reflections on Air Force Independence Washington DC Air Force History and Museums Program 2007 p 55 4 Wolk p 67-68 5 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 p 41 http www defense gov pubs 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review pdf accessed 14 Oct 14 6 David S Sorenson “The Politics of the American Weapons Acquisition Process ” in The Process and Politics of Defense Acquisition Westport CT Praeger Publishers 2009 p 91 7 For a more in-depth view on this see Maj Gen R Brett Williams’ article published in The Armed Forces Journal in March 2014 http www armedforcesjournal com cyberspace-what-is-it-where-is-it-and-who-cares 8 Glosbe Greek-English Dictionary https en glosbe com el en κυβερνητικός accessed 13 Dec 14 9 nd Norbert Wiener Cybernetics Or Control and Communications in the Animal and the Machine 2 rev ed Cambridge MA MIT Press 1961 10 Ibid pg 42-43 11 William Gibson Burning Chrome p 197 http mith umd edu digitalstorytelling wp-content uploads GibsonW Burning Chrome pdf accessed 13 Dec 14 12 William Gibson Neuromancer New York NY ACE 1984 p 67 13 Joint Publication 3-12 R p I-1 14 Ibid p I-2 15 A differing view and one the author subscribes to characterizes cyberspace as not the domain but rather the tools and platforms used to operate within the domain of the electromagnetic spectrum Some current senior military leaders such as Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathon Grennert share a similar perspective Admiral Grennert published his viewpoint in an Op Ed titled “Wireless Cyberwar the EM Spectrum and the Changing Navy” which was posted on Breaking Defense website on 3 April 2013 and can be found at http breakingdefense com 2013 04 adm-greenert-wireless-cyber-em-spectrum-changing-navy 16 Mark Welsh chief of staff US Air Force address Air Force Update speech at the Air Force Association’s Air Space Conference and Technology Exposition Washington DC September 2014 http www af mil Portals 1 documents af%20events Speeches 16SEP2014-CSAF-GenMarkWelshAFUpdate pdf timestamp 1410982866264 17 David MacIsaac Voices from the Central Blue The Air Power Theories in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age edited by Peter Paret Princeton New Jersey Princeton University Press 1986 p 624-647 18 Ibid p 626 19 Ibid p 631 20 Wolk p 45 59 21 Ibid p 48-49 22 Coffey p 374 23 Ibid 24 Richard Frank Downfall The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire New York Penguin 1999 p 334 25 Harry S Truman Memoirs vol 2 Years of Trial and Hope Garden City Doubleday and Co Inc 1956 p 46 26 PW Singer Allan Friedman Cybersecurity and Cyberwar What Everyone Needs to Know New York Oxford University Press 2014 p 114-118 27 Ibid p 118 28 Peter W Singer The War of Zeros and Ones Popular Science online posted 8 September 2014 at http www popsci com article technology war-zeros-and-ones accessed 13 February 15 2 29 Ibid Sorenson p 90 31 Wolk p 3 32 Wolk p 30 Coffey p 259 33 Ed Cray General of the Army George C Marshall Soldier and Statesman New York and London WW Norton and Company 1990 p 279 34 Wolk 27 35 Ibid 36 Wolk p 78 37 Wolk p 96-97 38 Stavridis Time for a US Cyber Force 39 Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S Rogers USN Nominee for Commander United States Cyber Command http www armedservices senate gov imo media doc Rogers 03-11-14 pdf accessed 15 Feb 2015 p 29-30 40 Ibid 30