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PN t 1010 eJrft Oflf t Mlfo iwamnt B JI Yif ltUttHl-Ut DHml't P$60 'fH1 XOlfi l O opo mawsa ll noc ne ftJI Oa AQnOJffli TeJrt ewe KP M - ' ntl Jtr'u emte P - a 6 rrPQpaCSortaHo Be eM onepan11KW - a JOv pa i1t Ae 'f HW8 o aemur f cood pueKJtt peaKael l l M$ xwt tteHtp JI J 3l Nl iJ ClftraJti HO Vf 4 lrflf8HOt Jta10JUt4tHiffJ Jf OJ O- 983 roAa o 3HAeRra ' llPIJIOl lUI t o 21 T fJ Sr tret Copy No 1 No 373 PR 52 17 02 83 London Per nanent Con1r a del Yermakov A V Guk str'ictly personal operational assignn1ent to uncover NA TO preparations for a nu lcar missile attack on the USSR In view of tbe growin urgency Qf the task of discovering promptly any preparafiQns by the adversary for a nucle tr missile attack RYAD T on the USS n n ma nJ tl tlV ru L l't l l i -1 -utt assignment and - brie Carrying QUt ortant one of the e t eit nn nre idency s activ in ' con nee m tt t52 of m1Jllta t1 r str Work in this sector must carried Q1J s by er tasks premously set f9r obtaining mation on milit ry stilto rmatio is on the q e stian of RY z 1 to suppd tn e nt - J1lia oeDt assignnl ent a cco roi InformatiQ n ned by th si ay rel tin g t the as sigmnentS' in sec ' tc1 tion l I II ilnmediate and future tasks is to he sent to the Centre ' t- 'I- TN' wh vill pro e distribution oftele- foraphic in ation as mar to he a da ofsenice s se cfionai inf n t ttation service and see that AJ U V lJ J 'V Hi b is tr-ansmi ou t il to information semc e In order to Of the o cia by ' vbom the it1 ritn ttion ras obt ' ed1- additional ra rtsi' cv KR X and SO on may be shown aftet Iett ers '' e penmtnent op eration al assignme nt P i ment 'No 1 must s rodic'd by o ration aJ staffofth r e ncy Specilic suggestions atldid evolved by t R -dency W'i a vie to carrying out a ssign ment as effici en 1$ p ossihle sb ould reach CeJltr e by 31 la rch 19 At the Residency the POA must aJwa ys bEJ kept in the Resident's sp ecf f Jiill i' l l ii s lc o - - - Q IJ 'Vj A 1 ''' i i 1 file Attachntettts 1 No 3 74 PR 52 4 pages rfop Secret1 PN 102 2 No 6 2 PIU5 2 9 pages rfop Secret PN 103 Reference No 373 PR 52 Top Secret Copy No 1 Attachment 1 p ermanent Operational Assignment to discover NATO Preparations for a Nuclear Attack on the USSR Section 1 - Immediate tasks of Residencies for Collecting Information and Organising their Work 1 Collect data about places where Government officials and members of their families are evacuated Identify possible routes and methods of evacuation Make suggestions about ways of organising a watch to be kept on preparation Time limit 3rd quarter by 30 September 1983 and actual evacuation 2 Identify the location of specially equipped Civil Defence shelters or premises ' which could if necessary be used as shelters underground garages and depots basements tunnels and arrange for a periodical check on their state of preparedness to accommodate the population at a particular time Time limit 3rd quarter by 30 September 1983 Report to Centre immediately if shelters are being taken out of storage or a start is being made on preparing certain premises for accommodation of the population 3 One important sign that preparations are beginning for RYAN could be increased purchases of blood from donors and the prices paid for it and extension of the network of reception centres since the treatment of burns the most widespread injury in a nuclear explosion requires blood transfusions in very considerable quantity In this context discover the location of several blooddonor reception centres and find out how they operate and the price of the blood donated and record any changes Time limit 2nd quarter by 30 June 1983 If there is an unexpectedly sharp increase in the number of stationary and mobile blood donor centres and in the prices paid report at once to the Centre' 9 Put forward Justallations proposals for organising a vatch on individual civil defence Time limit 2nd quarter by 30 June 1983 5 Identify several places which are most frequently visited outside working 1lours by employees of institutions and installations connected with taking and implementing decisions regarding RYAN including military personneL Put fonvard your selected _ _ _ __ f i A the possibility of regular Time limit 2nd nnc t to u nr n of the DUl CeSt by 30 June - f Keep under regular observation the most important nrn't i 't'1 n nt on o-ru '1 1ln'li'u F headquarters and other installations involved in preparation for RYAN S a list of immediate of observation to the Centre the nn f f niiir level of activity of these targets in and out of working hours the o signs of their daily activity in a normal situation differences in the number cars collected there in the daytime and the evening and in the number lighted windows in and out of working hours and activity round these tars ets on non-working days Find out on the basis of the 'normal level' asce1 T l 1' At'F any changes in the indicators during special conferences hen there is a situation cars collected there out of hours an increase in the number of windows at night in comparison with the 'normal level' or increased on non working days 7 Set a regular watch for any significant changes in the police adminis system and the activity the special i e security and intelligence servic regard to Soviet citizens and institutions vhich may be associated with aration for RYAN On points 6 and 7 intonn Centre of the existence or absence of any of this kind regularly - once every two Veeks 1 ftN'tSMo ' Section II - Principal Prospective Directions for the Residency to Pursue its Work of Collecting the Information Needed to Discover the Adversary's Preparations for RYAN 1 Detailed description of the nature of measures being carried out in country of residence by NArfO headquarters and agencies A meric n -rP nrPfitflln tations and military installations located there at a time of immediate aration by the USA and NATO for RYi N 2 0 Analysis of the possibility of co-opting existing agents to vork on preparation for RYAN and of using all available resources for this purpose 3 Identifying' and studying with a view to subsequent cooption for v _ ' ' ation a cadre of people associated Vith preparing and implementing decision about RYAN and also a group of people including service and cal personnel who might be informed of the fact that this or that measure being taken in preparation for RY1 N even if they do not know its objective purport the official chauffeurs of individuals involved in the decision o'lnrnt' '' RY AN those working in the operating services of installations connected processing and implementing the decision about RYAN and communica staff involved in the operation and interaction of these installations 1 f't lll f t'f' 4 Studying the v v '1-J' VJLAI 1 A'i vi J of organising systematic observation of r o ot o l' -t u o ' as ociated with informed of the about RYAN and those who might be of such a decision ' 1A' w u '11 1 11i'A'IMI rt' l ' hlf'l il ''l 5 Uncovering the lines communication used for preparing for their terminal points switchboards and system of operating in normal conditions and in an emergency situation technical characteristics and the possibility of interception ' 6 Assessment of opportunities for keeping Vatch for changes in the pattern of operation of government institutions which are involved in taking political decisions regarding and are responsible for the country's military pre- paredness and for contacts with NATO allies 7 Collecting data about plans for preparing the special intelligence and security services for a particular time and for possible action at that time Studying facilities for organising a systematic watch to be kept for changes- in the operating routine of the central establishments of the special services 8' ' Identifying the places where the country's leading military and political figures and state institutions including personnel from the central apparatus of the special services are to be evacuated 9 Identifying possible routes and methods of evacuating military and political leaders and state institutions Studying the possibilities of discovering promptly when evacuation is in progress 10 Gathering data about the location of control centres and headquarters of civil defence forces shelters depots and training posts of the civil defence system Assessment of the possibilities of discovering immediate preparation of the civil defence system for war 11 Defining the possibility of finding out with present resources what measures are being taken to bring military installations which are accessible to our observation into a state of hei ened operational preparedness Collecting information about the main residential and recreational centres of the services hospitals and other installations closely connected with military bases and headquarters 12 Assessing the degree of likelihood that the heads of national churches and of international church organisations and the leadership and institutions of the Vatican abroad would be aware of preparation for a nuclear attack and clarifYing possibilities of obtaining information about RYAN from these circles 13 Bearing in mind the very considerable knowledge possessed by the heads of international and the larger national banks examine the possibility of obtaining information about RYAN from such circles The Residency must organise its work in a planned manner on the questions which have been enumerated Please keep the Centre regularly informed as information is obtained No 374 PR 52 Secret C No 1 Attachment 2 The for a of Preparation rv HssUe Attack on the USSR in which the main adversary the NATO PRC tempo and scale of military preparations the to deal vith the as ignment of the foreign intelligence a t the present stage -not to overlook the imm ediate threat of a nuclear attack RYAN on the Soviet -l1as an especial degree of urgency This task lies at the core of military strategy It was etnphasised the instructions from the heads of the chiefDi rectorate that contemporary cnndi tions 'the need to discover ecific pla11s and actions by our-adversary connected with his preparation for a surorL e nucle-ar missile attack on the USSR and other soc hdist countries is now of particularly grave importance In this context the primary task is to obtain reliable documentary and advance information about i tll aspects and details of onilitary political attd activity of the main adversaiy reve ling his secret preparations for war The ins trUetion defines in practice the main ways of dealing with our chief task i e the need to uncover the adversary s plans and measures he is taking in preparation for a nuclea r missile attlck above all exploiting and expanding agent cce ss t9 the adv rsary's installations where secret information about military is concentrated Infol'nlation about and operational plans to use nuclear weapons in war -with Soviet is of serious and urgent significance for covering adversary's plans promptly or This would include for instanct such documents as 'Single Integrated Operational Plan - SIOP' of USA wtging a war the Gener d Defenct Plans' the NATO strategic and sub erdinate joint commands 'Nuclear Support Plans - Supplan' and a number of 'Contingency Operations Plans - COP' whi h antidpat deplo Tjng utilising various types of armed forces and anns of service in operations zones in periods of tension or cris es at r nr HC stages of including components forces The intelligent v alue of the adver sacy's plans Ues in fact that it enables 'us to get well madvance the of his possible military operations against the USSR and nther countries of the soclnUst conmnmity and his preparations for a missile An important of the adve s3 rts preparation foris specific action to bring th lll'Jned and the ivilia n sector from a peacetime on to a wartime which is seen in implemen ttibn of measures which were planned in ad l'a n e and subsequently ratified At the stage when measures are implem ented1 the most important section of which comes into effect th adversary has taken the political decision in principle to go to war he begins to step up his activity in both militat r ild etvilian ectors Notwithstanding the fact that in order to make sure a sudden attack the adversary counts on maintaining ab ut his preparatory measures the scale activity invol ed in bringing military and sectors from a peacetime on to a wartim et footing entails appearan e of a whole series nf rt VeaHng signs regarding the nature of the adversary's procedure Therefore one ofthe chief directions for activity the KGB's foreign t 'P is to detection and ttssessm ent of of preparation for RYAN in ali possible areas political economic military sectors ci vil defence and activity of the spe ial services Our military neighbours the GRUl are actively engaged in simUn r work m relation to the of the adversaljs armed t-Iowever the fact tha the ad v ersary a considerable part of his strategic in a state of nperational readiness capable of proceeding to execute assignments in the shortest time instance an American hntd based inter- of their on duty as duty forces 20o o ' ' ' ' ' ' essential discover l very early before the order is faci lities are preparation for RYAN troops of the ifn'f lll11 10 nuclear 't'ltr if' n C Uncovering the process of prepar tion by the adversary take J he xdecis iol for a riucle r ittack an rme supsequentmeasureS to pre pare the country a nuclear war would enable us to increase sg -called period of anticipation essential for ille Snvi t Union to take retalia torx measures teprisal titne Vould be extremely limited instance' noting the lau11c ing of strategic mi siles from the CQfiUnEURntal rt oftlle USA and taking into account the tim e re ' ed for determining the' dire ction their flight in leaves roug 20 minutes reaction time This period 'Will considerably urtailed after deployx ment the Persh -2' missile in the FRG for which the g time to reach Jong range targ ets Sov et is calculated at 4-6 minutes It is thus nt that the problem of uncovering the threaf of RYAN must be dea lt vith without delay Immediate preparation- for a nuclear attack begins at the moment when the othe polidc l leadership the on sion that it expedie nt to use rpiljtaey force the international situation becomes progressively more acute an J a pre irnitttl ry decision to launch an attack on the Soviet Union Analysis of NATO's Ideas on strategy and the organisational' p roced ures a ted in the North Adantic reaty Organisation point to the fact that Bo c alled nuclear cot sultations in NATO are ably one of the stage of imm diate preparation by the a dvEURrs ty for RYAN Tn as ertain in good time the moment when nQcle r cons ult rlons begin inside NATO is a tnost'importantpro'blem for theinfQnnation-gatherin g itppar atus Soviet intel ence tog iher' with discovering the specific plaits for RYAN of the 'i vidual powers constituting t e main adversary and in the of first place USA Nucleaf consultations begin after NATO the Planning Counc il Committe e have received notification front a nuclear power belonging to the grouping of intention use nuclear weapons or' a request from a non -nuclear co untcy in NA'I'o or one of the main commands of the bloc Supreme Command of NATO forces Europe reme Command of NATO Forces fu Atlantic or the NATO Command in the Channel for the of nuclea r weapons The aim of these consultations to convey to the nuclear powers concerned the views of the othe r members of the bloc on the questions of launching a nuclear att ack so that it should take theJII into account before taking its o vnfinatdecision NATO attaches hnportance to beginrung nuclear consultations at the earliest possible stage of a political crisis in East West relatipns vhich is threatening to d velop into armed conflict The forum for consultations including nuclear ones would be a meeting of ' the NATO Councii D'efence Planning Committee the level of permanent Evere the of ambassador meetings may called Council Defence Planning Committt e and Military mittee ofNATO attended by military of the member countries of the bloc The alert system serves to ensure military preparedness and provide for the ttansitiotl of NATO armed forces and th civilian sector from a peacetime a vvartime footing embracing a series me sures military and civilian areas which must be implemented according the d grt e pf world tension and threat of the outbreak of wat NKf0 1s alert system consist ofthree mutually dependent and complementary compot ent$ - a state of tary ale rf preparatory measures of f military nature -- a battle alarm system an emergency 'system of military measures to forestall a nd break u p a possible attack' -- an official alatn t systent for putting on a war fQoring not only the armed forces hut also the NATO countries as a whole The statt 'military alert' includes pr pa ratory and preliminary measures of a military natq re vvhich may he implemented ovet a considerable period oftime Itis designed to simplif ttbe transition to a higher degree of preparedness and need not entail aggtava tion of international tension since the corr esponding measures must be carried out in maximum secrecy A state of' military ale rt' and the corresponding measures which form part of it are not in themselves indicatiort s of prepa ration for RYAN but are larg ly 3 reaction the beginning of complications in the -international situation and are countermanded when is an improvemei1 t in this $itttation At the same time it is essential to discover what measures have b en taken under the 'military alert in order to miss the tilJ t lent of transition to a higher degree of readiness constituting a threat of RYAN lhe battle al4rnt systenz is _a of purely military m a sures implemented Vlithin an extreme ort time ill order to withdraw NA TO a rmed forces from being under attack and maintain their fighri g fficiency for action to carry out a surprise or retaliatory attack This system comes into operation when owing to increasingly complic ted circumstances mea$tires cannot be implemented official alert systel fl and the 'enemy attac k has already begun or part of 111ay begin in the immediate future ' It determines the order 'in which specific measur' s com e operation after re eiving the warning signal of a 'possible attack' 'fhe battle alarm system envisag es rw-o sta-tes of readiness for action an 'Orange' and a 'Scar lee alert 'State Orange' declared when ' il a ttack may expected' the immediate future withir1 hottts and 'State Scarlet' when military action has already has must particularly if - - tem ii 'Ut i a implement In view fact that me asures involved 'State Orange have to be carried out 'vith the utmost secrecy under the of manoeuvres training etc in the shortest possible vithout distlosing the conten t Qf operational pl ns it is highly Probable that battle alaflll may be used to prepare a surprise AN in peacetime Following on from this appears that the discovery that steps are being taken under a military alarm system and there is a corrcesponding state of readiness a tion in NAT O arm d for ce$ may 11 cQmbma tion with a ttU111ber of other factot s point to the conclusion that RYAN is in preparation Tile official alert system a series ofcivil military measures aimed at switching the armed and the NATO me mber countties a whole from a peacetime to a war an4 affects allipotentit l fields of prepa rf tion for a nuclear attack military political economic iyil defen e special servjee actiVity The official system consists of three states Sirtrple alert which is introduced in the initial stage of deterioration in the international situation but there no 'immediate threat of attack' in the very ne ar future Jh steps under a simpl 3rlf rt are aimed at ensuring that the armed forces are eady for action irt o rder that necessary measures can be speeded up under a heightened alert and preparation completed to enga ge without delay in military' operations At this stage inunediate Preparati n begig s to oswitch the civilian s ector ta a footing D iscovery of this stage represents an extremely serious development from the point Qfview of early warning of immediate preparation for The _measures taken at this stage are kept secret but their scale and gravity enable signs of implementation be detected Maximum attention ffilJSt be devoted to ascertaining in time that a state of simple lert has been introduced A heightettetl alert-is d eclared in order to ensure that the NATO armed forces a re in a state of maximum readiness and fully deployed in accordance with operational ans At th t here Js a large oscale operation to Put the country on a war fofJting such m asures can no longer be concealed They will clearly indiGate preparation for military operations If me heightened alert is not called off and is follo ve d by proclamation of a general alert then this will indicate the commencement military action o It is a mattet of particulady grave sigrdficance that a general alert may be det lated without previously intro clueing the first and second stages of the official alert system ln the period when states 'Orange' and 'Scarlet are in operation The NATO alert system thus envisages measures to put not only the armed forces but the country a s a Vhele on a war footing Opportune discovery of sigp s indicating impl mentation of a series of ueh measures especially in conjunction vith nuclear consultations provides grounds for giving the Centre early warning of the possibility of 1 YAN T'he USA bas its own syste111 of tnilitary preparations for S vitching the American rmed forces to a Vartime footing This sy te1n may be us_g US armed f orces deploy d in Ni TO countries Jt consists of five stages any of which xnay be introduced according to the actual situation It is also possible to S Vit h the a tned forces urgently tQ a heightened State of readiness bypassing the intermediate ones OperationaJ readinessNo 5 is the normal state of the armed forces h1 peacetime conditions Operational readiness No 4 may be introduced if there is tension in certain parts of world Intelligence and counter-intelligen e operations may be stepped up with preparation for combating possible sa bot11ge AU measures ate carried out in secret with no ' cancellation of leave for personneL Operational readines$ No 3 is declared if tension in a particular part of the world ma y aff ct J merican interests and requires interven_tioti by US armed forces f sp cially detailed con tingent of the armed fQtces is put into this state of readiness Secret measures are carried out in tlle guise of tr ining a nd manoeuvres to 'r info rce protection of installations and prepare military equip ment and weapqns for possible use and inteUigenc e and counter intelligence is stepped up Personnel are allow d leave or passes at the decision of the me comm nd This stage of readilJ' S corresponds to that of 'military alert' in NJ TO's alert system Operatiotzttl readiness No 2 is introQ uced when a threat Qf conflict develops which seriously ects the interests of the USA o itS allies The emerging situation is fraughtwith possibilities af military action Operational deployment bf s elected contingents of armed forces begins Arms and nulitary equipment ar put in a state of ' artime readiness Controls are instituted over the activity of the civilian JUtbQtities shipping and iriines Censorship is introduced with saf guards fot security of communications and leave is cancelled This stage of readiness corresponds in general to that 1 0f simple alert in NAT s official sy tem including also a t1umber of elements of a heightened alert Opera tiondl readl 'ttessi No 1 is declared when tlte re are obvious indications of preparation to begin military operations It is considered that war is inevitable an d m ay start atany moment rfhe armed forces re put into a state of complete preparedness for military action- to e ecute operational plans A1l activity of civilian agencie5t and undertakings is subordinated to military interests This stage of readiness corresponds in general to th 'Stage Orange' and a heightened alert in NATO s alarm system with elements of the 'State Scariee and the general alert It bnmediately precedes the proclamation of a state of military emergency in the USA or the 'State- Scarlet' or a general alert in NATO signifying the start of military action ' '' ' ' - '' ' is up on in$ttucti uis Corn mittee of the and also on orders the com rnanders-in-cbief of the armed in the theatres military operations the agreement of the Comm ittet signals introducing the correspon degree of readiness are on c ommittee rs instructions through the main nd reserve command centres and points ofthe armed forces Vv hen a of heightened readiness is introduced in the armed forces or the alert syst n l into operation in NATO this must be accompanied also by a se rie s 9fmeasures in the civilian sector of the unit d State s to ens'Qre that the co untcy put on to a war footing and number of victims of a retaliatory attack is k pt clown One of important mea ns of safeguarding the process of preparing the decision tQ use nucl ar Y apons and controlling their is provjded by the va tious systems of communications communication$ networks of the nuclear powers and combined systems of communication From a functional point of view the adversary's existing communications $ystems can be di'Vi de tinto general and military systems However irrespective of th distirictio ns laid down for the channels allocated their' subordination degree ofsecrecy and the specified subscribers bpfh typ s of communications are nuclear cpnstlltation Intelligence work carried out agc 1inst the mairr cotllltlunications agencies could make it postiible to discover the adversary s overall plans for preparation for war If infonnation is obtained promptly about the activity of executive age ncies at headquarters itl carrjri lg out these plans this serve as an 'indication of erihanc d readiness Qn the adversaryls part for military action ' Any i t sttti ctions which are discovered about rules for using th coromunir tion n tworks and their method ofop rating are also ofpractica l significance In an emergency situation and vhen military exercises are taking p lace operation of lines communication may be S vi ed to the 'minimise J systertl in which the VQlUQle of ordinary tel one calls and telegraphic messages is sharply curtall d and channels of commun'ic ation clt ated for tran smitting 'urgent 'Jlle ssages The minimise' system m l y be introduced selectively in certain countries for example 'ifthere deterioration in their internal situation or it may apply to and NA communications' systems If thi system is institutt d in countries which have nuclear 'veapons especially if ott a global scale1 this may provide a serious warning signal t hat the adversary is preparing for RYAN ' fh e fact that 'minimist ' had beell introduced could only be discovered by means of hitetcept faGilities is oof the est importance to keep a watch on the functioning of commu riica ns networks and systems since through them information passed about the adve rsacy' s- intentio and above all about his plans to use nuclear Veapons and practical implementation of these_ In addition changes in the method of ro operating communications ms and the o fmanning may indicate the start of pre p atatibn for RY Al 1' lnformatio n must aine d t tJcation and function of of communications ich allocated bv - the ffipr ' 0 mechanism ' '' a for p rocess of pr paring n uc lea r war This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu