C00638425 proved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 r 'Gtf3 D'uector of Central Inteffigence Top ee 3 5 c EO 13526 3 3 b 1 25Yrs 46 If i Yi4 on W Imm t9Bf c w88 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved WNINTEL NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORNNOCONTRACTPROPIN- Not RoUpsable to fonoign Nationals Not Releasdsle to Contractors or Controctcr Consultants Gautipc-- ProprSetar information Involved RK - WiB Departments Only Dissemination and Extraction of Information ConfroW Sy Originator This Information Has Gaon Authorized for FGI- Foreign Governor a Information NFIBONLY- ORCON- Reieaso to Cl #Y 71W Rule i ON O-M14R Rmoftom CEk1YATM 3 5 c pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c NIE 4-1-84 WARNING CAF WAR IN EUROPE InformaUOA AVA60blO AS of 31 MAY 198t was umd 10 the DrapMWn of this 1 oMatC 3 5 c 4w 1 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS The following intelligence organisations participated in the preparation of the Estimate The Central Intelligence Agency the Defense Intelligence Agency the National Secwity Agency and the intelligence organization of the Department of State Also Participating The Auhtant Chief of Staff far inteNipace Aapartaned of the Army The Director of Naval intepipence OVartcnent of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff lntelrigsnce Department of the Air fora The Director of Inte rWww Idead Varfom dl whw Corps Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 I I C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 CONTENTS Page PREFACE 1 SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FROM NIE 4-1 78 3 SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS 5 DISCUSSION 23 I BACKGROUND 23 A Scope of the Estimate 23 B Definition Warning of War C The Warning Process 23 23 D Recent Intelligence Community Studies 25 E Significant Events and Developments 25 II CONTEXT OF A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR 29 A Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO's Military Capabilities 29 NATO Mobilization Reinforcement and Deployment Capabilities Capability of NATti-'s Air Forces NATO Nuclear Capabilities Risks Involved in a War With NATO- B ' Military Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Fiances C Warsaw Pact Military Obiectives In a War With NATO Warsaw Fact Military Ob3e ctives on NATO's E n ts D Likelihood of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Warr Chances of War Under Present Cireumstanees 29 29 30 30 31 32 33 34 34 Likelihood of 'Ul--ar Under Near-Term Cinc stances 34 E Warning Implications for NATO A USSoviet Confrontation in the Mrsiara Culf 35 III WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND R EADIIZSS 37 A I Wmal PreM U 37 I3 Readiaa Fhilosoplw 38 C Readiness Control Systems 41 3 5 c fi Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Page National Readiness Control System Military Readiness Control System Critique 41 42 43 IV HOW THE WARSAW PACT WOULD GO TO WAR 45 A Political Preparations 45 The Decisionmaking Process Warsaw Pact Consultations 45 45 Psychological Preparation of the Population 46 International Propaganda and Diplomatic Initiatives 46 B Economic Preparations 47 C Civil Defense Preparations D Military Preparations Employment of Warsaw Pact Forces Warsaw Pact Wartime Military Control Structure Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute Warsaw Pact High Commands of Forces 48 48 48 49 49 50 Command and Control Enhancements 53 Warsaw Pact Fronts 53 Warsaw Pact Force Generation 53 E Attack Options 55 Option I-Attack From a Peacetime Pasture Option 11-Attack 'with T vo Fronts Option III---Attack With Three Fronts Option IV- Attack With Five Fronts F Variations in Attack Options Forward Deployment of Farces in the Western USSR Gradual Buildup V 56 57 60 60 62 62 63 WARNING OF WAR 65 A Indicators of War Preparations 65 The Decision To Go to War 65 Civil and Fxoonomtc Prepamdons 66 Indicators oaf Military Preparations 67 B Security Concealment and Decept on 68 C Detection Capability a Option I-Att ek From a Peacetime Posture B Option H Aftck With Two Fronts 71 0 4W Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 0 3 5 c Page Option III-Attack With Three Fronts Option IV--Attack With Five Fronts 71 72 D A Gradual Buildup 73 E Warsaw Pact Exercises and Training Patterns 73 VI LOOKING AHEAD 75 ANNEX BIBLIOGRAPHY 77 3 5 c 0 Tam ' Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 00 0 638425 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Ion PREFACE This Estimate takes into account a number of significant international events and military force developments that have occurred since the Intelligence Community's last European warning Estimate was published in 1978 ' It draws heavily from recent interagency and departmental studies that have sharpened our understanding of the Warsaw Pact's preparedness for warF_ 1 1 The Estimate summarizes the Intelligence Community's view of how the Warsaw Pact would prepare for war including political economic civil dsfense and military preparedness measures that are likely to be implemented as the Pact moved to a wartime posture It also describes Fact doctrine and readiness for war the range of force options available to the Pact and our ability to detect and interpret Pact war preparations Finally the Estimate describes a warning process that would probably be characterized by ambiguity continuing reassessment and incremental warnings to polieymakers The critical role played by policymakers in the warning process is addressed The Estimate was produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for CGeneral Purpose Forces Principal drafting was done by the Directorate for Research Defense Intel i- 3 5 c I 3 5 c 3 5 c gence Agency ' ME 9-1-78 Warmw Pact Cbrimpts and Co abdiliea d Garin to War in Europe imejesotiom for 3 5 c NATO Wamtny of War 14 April 1978 3 5 c 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 1 38 425 5 2 - pproved for Releasez2016103 28 C00638425 r - Approved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FROM NIE A-1-78 The central conclusions oGBP the Intelligence Community's last European warning Estimate have generally remained valid Nonetheless since its publication in April 1978 a number of significant international events and Warsaw Pact military force developments have occurred which have potential impact on warning of war in Europe Moreover a number of national and departmental studies have increased our knowledge of the readiness posture and capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces Unlike the earlier document this Estimate discusses the warning implications for NATO of potential US-Soviet conflict in the Persian Gulf region It also contains a discussion of the warning process and the key role played by policymakers and places estimates of warning times for various Warsaw Pact attack options in better context with likely developments during a period of increasing tension and crisis leading to war The Estimate describes the warning function as a continuous process rather than an event The process would probably be characterized by some initial ambiguity but thereafter by a continuous flow of reassessments and incremental warnings to palleyrnakers The Intelligence Community has a greater capacity for assessing potential enemy capabilities than hostile intent it therefore may be relied upon to keep policymakers informed on developing crises but it may not speak with unanimity on the likelihood of war at the moment when prudent actions by policymakers night be particularly appropriate Policy decisions can affect the course of events and only polieymakers can determine what actions should fm should not be taken an a crisis and when In essence the capstone of the wa ug process is a policy decision not an intelligence one It is root possible for the Intell ence Comm ratty tai foretell when poheymakers will consider that dwy have been adequately warned of war Should war never occur in Europe it as likely that there will be many warnings issued by the llnteel4ence Community in many forms but only Wicymakers cars decide when the evidence is sufficient in their own minds to oreactF_ I With regard to the traditional extarecslon of warning times for various Warsaw fact attach cations we gave had a troubling inconsistency inn past estimates We believe it unlikely that the Warmw Pact 40 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 rcp would decide to go to war without severe deterioration oGBP East-West relations and probably a crisis giving rise to fears of war We also believe that the Soviets would probably raise the readiness of their forces during such a period However we have traditionally estimated the amount of time required for Pact forces to prepare to execute specific attack options on a crash basis from a normal peacetime readiness posture This artificial construct resulted in a worst case analysis for NATO in terms of warning time These judgments have been considered the bottom line of our warning estimates even though we considered them to have little relevance in a crisis We consider a crash effort by the Warsaw Pact unlikely under any of the attack options discussed in the Estimate except possibly in regard to the final preparations necessary to achieve full readiness for war Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 To 3 5 c SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS The Warning Process The primacy of Europe to the national security interests of the United States and the presence of large Warsaw Pact military forces in Eastern Europe place a premium on warning of Warsaw Pact war preparations and intent to attack NATO The US warning system seeks to provide early notice of events that might presage Pact offensive operations however ambiguous such notice might be As additional events transpire and tensions increase the system is designed to indicate greaater likelihood that war is in the offing However there is no finite point at which the warning system can foretell with certainty that war is imminent It can assess potential enemy capabilities it is less reliable for forecasting hostile intent which might become apparent only in the act of war itself This is due partially to the nature of the system which must rely upon human judgment and partially to the dynamics of crises in which the reactions of US policymakers to early warnings may affect the development of the course of events 3 5 c There are frequently differing interpretations of the causes or reasons for observable activities which tend to delay the development of a consensus within the Intelligence Community regarding the likelihood of war As early and ambi guous warnings are received-most likely without consensus as to the imminence of war-W-policymakers way or may not be inclined to take prudent actions neither from skeptidssm of the more pessim istic interpretations of events or fur concern that their actions might intensify the crisis and perhaps precipitate hostilities Such warnings will continue past any paint or points of policy decisionmaldn to the actual outbreak of hwtllities or other rm lution of the crisis Accordingly worming of war should lie viewed nm as a single event but as a pmcess of communicating wamings of ancreused threat The warnings tray be emneted to develop from various sources and with various Interpretations before a munity e m mus is achieved We am vonfident tGBPtat the tntuUigence Community is capable of detecting and eorreetly r# mains Waanaw Paa capacities and madtrtess fir war lenoe we Mane that wnse'mus an these rrwtters would be a continuing stwngth atwwghout any periad of crisis Hoummr Community aonsen regan hn g Pact hostile inmut could ber a late rlevdmmwntF__ intemaditanal tsnsicm or s ' Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c C00638425 proved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 o t 3 5 c It is within the foregoing context that we define warning of war as the communication of intelligence judgments to national policy- makers that a state or alliance intends war or is on a course that substantially increases the risks of war and is taking steps to prepare for war While concern for attack by a hostile power is the ultimate purpose of the warning process this Estimate does not focus upon the specifics of warning of attack the communication of an intelligence judgment to national polieymakers that an adversary is not only preparing its armed forces for war but also intends to launch an attack in the 3 5 c near future The strength of the warning system for discerning increased capabilities of the Warsaw Pact to initiate hostilities 'should not be construed as a capacity to foretell with confidence the course of subsequent events Nor should recipients of warning expect that definitive thresholds at which decisions should be made will necessarily be identified While the process of information gathering and assessment is continuous policy decisions to react or not react to the flow of advisories are the principal determinants of the success or failure of the warning process F-1 The Intelligence Community has never observed the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact making preparations of the magnitude and duration necessary to go to war with NATO However we have observed Warsaw Pact exercises and Soviet preparations for military intervention in neighboring countries--most recently Afghanistan and Poland Our observations give us confidence that while we might not recognize war preparations in their earliest phases we would soon detect many indicators that such preparations were under way Military preparations are the least equivocal events leading to war readiness and would constitute the principal events upon which our warnings would be based From these we believe that we could provide timely notification that the Soviets and their allies were converting to a wardme posture and were risking war lay their behavior F___ We amot die absolutely certain that we would be able in every indistinguish between preparations for an exervise and similar activities and Prepparatiom for war However we believe flat the context cif Soviet actions and their scope and intensity would provide rea able insight into Ow liked ed of war stance to Warsaw Pod fercep lons of NATO's N4i Rmy Cvpab lities fact planners see a serfus 06 t to lk1ATO's aWity try Wv exand ae d standing form by irttxlrrt ire zwope its ton C Il bt nJomemmt from outside Eumpe The fact believes that the United States could reinfurme Europe with six dividow and 60 squadrons f combat Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c J C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Top 3 5 c aircraft within 10 days Additionally Pact planners believe that within 30 days NATO is capable oGBP increasing the number of aircraft in Europe by 900 and increasing its ground forces by about 50 divisions 3 5 c The NATO theater nuclear capability is perceived as a profound threat and dominates Pact strategic planning for war in Europe Pact planners are convinced that NATO would be likely to employ nuclear weapons 'in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict Accumulated evidence reveals considerable Pact anxiety over the formidable difficulties inherent in locating and destroying NATO nuclear warheads and delivery systems Moscow also recognizes that NATO's planning and capability to implement limited nuclear options could initiate an uncontrollable chain of escalation 3 5 c Risks Involved in a War With NATO NATO has a large diversified array of tactical nuclear- capable weapons which the Pact believes would probably be employed against it The existence of the separately controlled US British and French strategic nuclear strike systems increases Moscow's uncertainly about nuclear escalation The Soviet leadership sees war in Europe particu- larly nuclear war as holding its territory at risk from strategic nuclear strikes NATO's nuclear deterrent capability would seem to make nonnuclear war the most rational option for the pact 'T'he Soviets' dilemma is that successful Pact nonnuclear operations would probably lead to the use of nuclear weapons by NATO F----l 3 5 c The Military Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces Soviet dependence on its allies especially in Central Europe is so great as to make their participation crucial to prospects for success on the battlefield We believe the Soviets would be unlikely to initiate hostilities against NATO unless they had remonable expectation of participation by most Paot fvrres j 3 5 c Soviet control over the East European forces-and Soviet confide-ice in such control-would be at its biemA during prepamuens for hostilities as Pact forces were tieing alerted mobilized surd dejloyad far combat and during the initial stages of war as Pact forces were advancing We beiteue that military discipline rind established contml raechanums are Wy to asset the initial arehable nwonse of must Pact form The military reliability of NSWP formes however could be degraded as hmtilitles tmogres W this would be especially kkeiy in the case of a stalernate or slgrdfleant Pact failures on the batilefeld l 3 5 c 3 5 c I Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c Warsaw Pact Military Objectives in a War With NATO A Warsaw Pact strategy for military victory in Europe almost certainly would have to meet three requirements First it would have to result in the destruction or seizure of key military political and economic objectives the loss of which would virtually eliminate the utility of continued resistance by NATO Second these objectives would have to be destroyed or seized quickly before major NATO reinforcement could occur and certainly before NATO could divert its considerable productive capacity to wartime purposes Third and perhaps most important these objectives must be accomplished in a way that would minimize damage to the Soviet homeland 3 5 c Likelihood of a NATO-Warsaw Pact War We believe it highly unlikely that the Pact would attack NATO under present circumstances And despite shrill rhetoric about Washington's militaristic ambitions and US efforts to achieve military superiority and a general erosion in East-'West relations since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it is unlikely that fact leaders believe that NATO wants war or would seek it as a deliberate policy We believe war in Europe would become likely only as a result of profound political military economic or social changes--or a serious miscalculation-and would be preceded by a period of growing tension resulting in a crisis of great severity 3 5 c The Soviets see a costly and-to some extent---more perilous strategic and political swWe over the rest of the decade Nevertheless we do not now foresee in the near term the next three to five years development of a kend that would make a NATO-Warsaw Pact war liky Differences of view exist in the Politburo and Pant mhag elites with respect to policies inward the Walt but these differences are not likely to center around the advisability oaf war with NATO sinless extraordinary change s occur that would threaten the vital interests of the Soviet Union Changes in the NATO-Pact mifltaay balance and alterations In the Pact's Perceptions of NATOs strengths and weaknesses could of course i lueuce the P arsts as rent Cf potntial gains versus risks in a crisis situation A p eption that NATO's military capability or its unity err resolve to resist had deteriorated wwAd probably encourage Moscow and its allies to try to emulse more Influence inn Western Europe and would Probably mutt lira threats and Pressure tactics being applied Vi'e do runt beftem however that charm s in the NA -Pact mfkm balance in themselm would dad to war as tons as Moscrrw peredved that its Imses would he heavy and i _NPOWIV 0 qV Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Top that the risk to the Soviet homeland would be high Despite the potentially catastrophic consequences of a NAT04 pct war the Soviets would consider initiating hostilities if they perceived a situa- tion which threatened the integrity of their security system or other vital interests A scenario for war in Europe might involve an attack to destroy a NATO Alliance which the Soviets sensed had become demoralized and seriously weakened internally Such an attack might be designed to takladvantage of internal dissent economic stagnation or social upheaval in the NATO countries A possible catalyst for war in Europe could also be the development of a crisis in one or more Pact countries or Yugoslavia This might take the form of an internal upheaval or some chain of events which threatened a political disintegration of the Pact An additional possibility is that a future Soviet leadership--faced with an increasingly adverse international environment and grave internal problems-might lash out at the West in a desperate attempt to prevent an eventual collapse of the Soviet regime and the Pact alliance due to extreme international and internal pressures In this scenario future Soviet leaders could perceive that time was working against thetas and they might opt to set a timetable to launch a sudden attack against NATO and or the United States We have high confidence however that these scenarios have little chance of occurring during the period of this Estimate We do not foresee NAT becoming seriously weakened as a result of social upheaval in Western Europe or any internal Soviet problems that could develop to the point of threatening the collapse of the Soviet regime Moreover even if such events slid occur we do not believe that the Soviet leadership would deliberately initiate a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in response to these events Warning Impii coflons for h1AT04 A US-Soviet Confrontation in the Persian Golf The warning implications for NATO of a VS-Soviet military confrontation in the Persian Gulf area acre centered around three key considerattonm - The diversion of attention and resources from Europe such a C Met could cause -- The possibility that a Soviet move into the Gulf area ld be designed as a stmteec feint to draw US fmxvs to Nbe rxgion as a prelude to a W w Fact mil Lary initiative in ape -- The possibility of a willover into Europe of a US-Soviet I confrontation in the Oulf 1 9 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 JIMEApproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 _0 T 3 5 c We believe it unlikely that the Soviets would deliberately commit their forces in the Gulf regionfor example in Iran or Pakistan-as a strategic feint designed to draw US forces to the region as a prelude to an attack against NATO Nevertheless the possibility of a conflict in the Persian Gulf area as a precursor and catalyst for war in Europe can- not be dismissed A US-Soviet confrontation in the Gulf region would not necessarily provide Moscow and its allies with increased opportunities for masking preparations for war in Europe It is more likely that a conflict in the Gulf would heighten NATO vigilance in general and could result in an increased readiness posture being ordered for at least some NATO units F_____1 3 5 c The principal problem for US intelligence with regard to the security of Europe in the event of a Persian Gulf conflict would stem from probable increases in the readiness posture of at least selected elements of Pact forces facing NATO to guard against a possible NATO reaction Manifestations of heightened readiness could include expanded command and control activity limited mobilization increased alert posture and logistic preparations and changes in the disposition oGBP air air defense naval and ground forces Such variations from normal peacetime posture would probably be pronounced in the event of a direct US-Soviet confrontation Depending on its scale increased Pact readiness opposite NATO as a result of a crisis in the Persian Gulf could shorten the amount of time required to make final preparations for war and in any case would introduce additional ambiguity complicating the problem of assessment of some military warning indicators and Moscow's intentions in Europe FI 3 5 c Warsaw Pact DoOrine and Readiness Decisive offensive action is the hallmark of Soviet military doctrine It provides the impetus behind Soviet emphasis on combat readiness early seizure of the initiative preemption and surprise a combined-arms approach to warfare and the requirement for force superiority In the main battle areaso--backed up lay strong reserves to assure the momentum of the attack Soviet anal fact operational and force developments reflect a systematic effort to meet these doctrinal requm- meII 3 5 c 't'he Warsaw Pact's war-fighting concepts -ale fold and aggressive but the execution of these c onmpts presents several pmblerns The preparations cwrd1natiors - and maneuvers dictated dry doctrinal concepts are extremely ambitious and complicated rand would severely test the abilities of both commanders and troops Ukewise Fact planners r llze that there Is usually a trade-off between inewasing force readiness car superiority and the likelihood of achievirrs surprise -- 3 5 c 3 5 c 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 2016 03 28 000638425 Top 3 5 c Emphasis on combat readiness is a constant theme which supports Pact's the war-fighting doctrine In particular Soviet military thinking is still heavily influenced by World War II experience when the lack of preparedness and initiative resulted in devastating losses The Soviets intend to fight any future European war on the territory of their enemies This requires that large combat-ready forces must be in place at the beginning of hostilities 3 5 c Pact planners believe that full military readiness in peaceti-aw is not necessary or realistically feasible Their perception of the threat includes an assessment that NATO's military forces are not maintained at full readiness for war They expect that war probably would occur only after a period of heightened tension the peacetime posture of Pact forces reflects the belief that this period would provide warning thereby enabling the Pact to increase the readiness of its forces prior to hostilities The Pact's overall readiness philosophy is to maintain sufficient forces in readiness to deter attack to protect perceived national interests including the containment of nations in the Soviet sphere of influence and to defend home territories 3 5 c The Pact national and military readiness systems together provide for the control and coordination necessary to take a country or the Pact and its armed forces from routine peacetime readiness conditions to readiness for war The two systems are extremely flexible and are designed to interact and complement one another but they are not necessarily intended to be totally consistent The military readiness system is Pact-wide while the national readiness system is not Neither system has been fully tested on a national or fact-wide basis We believe however that these systems provide the Prat with the necessary mechanisms to move their nations and military forces to a wartime postur F_ 3 5 c How the Warsaw Pact Would Go to War Felitical Preparations anti Warsaw Pact amsuftafions The decision to prepare for or to initiate war with NAT13 would be made by tale Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union pwbably on the recommendation of the USSR Defense Council The decision Proem troNbly would involve wares of supporting high4evel party government and rm1 itarp officials although the security measures surrounding these deUberations would bye extratardinary The decision shire would be Affimit con tentdvsm rand wbably prolonged The reliability of Me ws ales amuld almost certainly be among the matters discussed by the Politbura at this tisane Tice initial i'rilitburo 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 3 5 c Defense Council decision probably would establish the intent to prepare for war and the degree of urgency required but it probably would not establish the specific date and time of a Pact attack or irrevocably commit the leadership to war We believe the final decision to attack and the timing of the attack might not be made until hours before its execution Whatever the circumstances of war initiation the Soviets' military dependence on their allies would be a critical factor 3 5 c Although the Soviets undoubtedly would withhold from their allies certain aspects of their own deliberations and perceptions of the crisis actions and decisions affecting the preparation of the Pacts Combined Armed Forces could not be withheld without seriously risking Moscow's war plans The Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute provides legal and technical means that would allow for a virtual automatic response by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact NSWP military units to orders initiated in Moscow without further consultations with East European national authorities In short during periods of crisis Soviet legal authority would essentially abrogate the sovereign rights of the East European states by assuming control over at least some of their armed forces The Statute does not reveal the nature or extent of political consultations prior to Implementation of the statutory mechanisms 3 5 c 'Militarv Proparations The manner in which the Pact prepared its forces for war would depend largely on the speed urgency and intensity with which a war-threatening crisis developed Pact planners have identified two approaches to achieving full combat readiness in a slowly developin gg crisis we believe the Pact nations would probably take a deliberate time-phased approach initiating increased combat readiness for portions of their armed forces This wQUM accomplish a number of precautionary measures but would fall far short of placing the Pact's military forces on a full wartime posture This approach would permit the achievement of full readiness in an orderly and systematic manner While allowing oxwtunit ies to avoid hostilities If a crisis deepened the fact could move to threat of-war readiness The Pact's final military vvepatsanow would be initiated by a Jecisim to implement full combat readiness - With this decision preparations for war would move rapidly and continuously The full combat readiness condition however is riot a declamt1on of war and it does not order the commitment of units try combat 3 5 c Another approach to aahi evmag ill readiness--the camprmsed amapr moh--would be emplowd der the unantidpated outbreak of lece URttcs or when the Pad bdieued weer was unavotdaMe sand 12 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c imminent and there was no time for deliberate time-phased preparations Under this option military forces would be readied simultaneously and as rapidly as possible Under extreme circumstances units could be ordered to move directly to full combat readiness from their normal peacetime posturel 3 5 c _ Other Preparations Assuming a decision to prepare for war an immediate concern for the Soviets and the Pact would be to maximize internal security and assure the support and stability of the population of the USSR and the East European nations It is virtually certain that the Soviets and the Pact would develop in their domestic propaganda the theme of a heightened threat from the West and would seek to justify an appropriate military response Prior to the initiation of hostilities against NATO the Pact-and the USSR in particular-would seek to exploit to the fullest the potential of public statements and diplomacy as an instrument of policy Moscow and its allies could not be certain whether such a war would be short or long nuclear or nonnuclear As a matter of prudence the Pact would have to consider a full range of economic preparations Changes would occur across all economic sectors and would be pronounced in manufacturing labor agriculture construction trade and finance and transportation systems If these measures were initiated they would suggest serious concern over an increasing danger of hostilities The Soviet Union clearly leas the most extensive civil defense program among the Pact nations The primary purpose of this program is to protect essential enterprises leaders and institutions and to a lesser degree the population in general The USSR's civil defense program is designed to assure the survival of a functioning wartime management system 3 5 c Attack Options and W grning Any Pact decision bearing on when to attack would be influenced by a set cif sometimes contradictory military factors including its own preparedness in relation to its perception of the status of NATO preparations and the desire to achievc surprise as well as to maximize force superiority Tire final decision on an attack opUm however al-host certainly would not be based on Vurely milstary factors but rather en a combination of military and political vandderations The mafrrr dilemma facing Fact leaders uld fee the de a to which dwy would care to trade riff Pact p parednecs -and the fiuU combat polenlfal stipulated by d V doctrine Ar a greater degree of surprise Wdoh might be achfeW by a smaller but oufcker attach desigm4 to preempt mobilization rein vement and the estaUufi team of an organized defense ly NATO in the Wowing evAuation of the risks 13 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 Top 3 5 c and benefits of alternative options for the initial attack we have defined four basic options for the Central Region as well as possible variations It should be emphasized however that these options only represent certain phase points during the Pact's force generation process at which Pact planners could choose to launch an attack variations and other attack options are possible 3 5 c Our assessments of the time required for the Pact to complete the military preparations required to execute various attack options begin- ning from a peacetime posture include a minimum time and a more realistic time The minimum time reflects our assessment of the Pact's ability to accomplish complex preparations under the most time- constrained conditions with no major problems The difficulties inherent in coordinating controlling and executing these Pact-wide preparations would be enormous however with many opportunities for major mishaps confusion delays and even chaos The more realistic time estimates allow for the human mechanical and climatic difficulties which would probably characterize such an undertaking Neither the minimum time nor the more realistic time includes specific time allocated for the training of freshly mobilized units Such training would enhance the combat potential of the mobilized units as well as assure a greater degree of preparedness in other important respects but at the risk of lessening surprise 'c'hose Pact divisions opposite the Central Region that would benefit the rabst from postrnobilization training would include three Czechoslovak and five Polish lowstrength divisions and almost ail Soviet divisions in the three western military districts of the USSR The availability and performance of the Soviet not ready divisions would be most critical to the Pact's ability to sustain offensive operatlons agaio6t strong ear protonged NATO resistance Moreover many Fact nondivislonal units arc maintained at law strength in peacetime and would be much better Prepared to perform their emissions after conducting a period of puss biili tion training Our t tssessament of the time requited for thew low-atreng b units to train up to a standard we judge to lie the minimum p Jidency necessary to conduct effective offensive operations ire t entn d F-urnpe wottld emend their Ipnepar nan tierces to abwt 3o mays pho the time required far movement In any event -we omsider it Ady that War w fact form would anderga same mpbllizaton before a de vn um made ca mare to a condition of fray combat ioadiness This would in all lilueldwod occur dudng a period of increasing international tension extending over a number of weeks or months before the Pact decided to initiate bW ities 3 5 c 14 3 5 c IV Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 D Fob 3 5 c Option I--Attack From a Peacetime Posture There is no evidence that would indicate that the Pact might launch an attack on NATO from a peacetime readiness posture In fact Soviet military strategists have explicitly stated that a European war would be improbable without some political warning and a degree of prehostilities mobilization by both sides The Pact however does have some capability to attack NATO on short notice using ground and air units garrisoned near the East-West German border and the West German-Czechoslovak border F----7 3 5 c A few divisions might be capable of initiating an attack-possibly directly from their garrisons-within about 24 hours after their commanders received an attack order depending on specific conditions within individual units An attack mounted on such short notice however could easily result in chaos as unit commanders their staffs and troops would have had no forewarning of an attack order and-by definition-made no preparations for an attack Under normal peace- time conditions units usually take days weeks or even months to prepare for scheduled major exercises division level and higher Pact divisional units in East Germany and Czechoslovakia are not fully manned in peacetime and their higher level communications structure and logistic support systems are not postured to support a standing-start attack Given 48 hours' notice Pact divisional units could only marginally increase their ability to mount a coordinated attack and would still lack a command control and communications and logistic structure that could effectively support their attacks F__ 3 5 c As a means of initiating a large-scale war with NATO an attack from a Peacetime posture would probably give the advantages of oLerational and tactical surprise to the fact By dint of surprise and Perhaps local forces superiority Pact planners would -eat- and might get some early ground and air victories These initW successes would probably be the only advantage that would acme to such an attack There are many considerations that would weigh against the Pact opting to initiate a war with NATO from a peacetir a posture loss of mobilization advantage insufficient ttime to establish a front-level command control anti communications structures insufficient time try mobilize and move forward rear service units lack cif time to permit preparation of the Pact's populace or national economics fair war rbk of escalation to nuclear war when Pact forces and installations would be especially vulnerable to nuclear auae In and the raj U of unpmparedness and surprising their own taps and commudem These orguments laud as to amed dude that 0wrae is littl'e c cv chart the Praot umdd iniffa ta war sr tst NATO Porn a peavetinw PwtoreF__1 3 5 c 3 5 c I Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 3 5 c Accordingly in the extremely unlikely case of a sudden attack on NATO from a peacetime posture we judge that US and NATO intelligence could detect and would report 3 3 b 1 increased activity by units and dispersion and or movement within a few hours after the initiation of this activity Such reported activity would provide sufficient information for Allied commanders and policymakers to take precautionary steps Because of the extremely unlikely eventuality of such an attack however interpretation of the purpose of this activity could be ambiguous and contentious and a final judgment that an attack was imminent might not be reached before 3 5 c hostilities began Option II--Attack With Two Fronts Analysis of Pact exercises and doctrinal concepts leads us to conclude that the smallest force the Pact might use to initiate offensive operations in Central Europe would consist of two fronts This force would consist of Soviet anal NSWP ground and tactical air force units in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and Possibly Soviet units in Poland -a total of some 44 ground divisions plus support units 3 5 c In the most urgent circumstances the Pact would creed at least five to six clays to prepare and position a two front force-assuming that this farce had been maintained in its normal peacetime readiness posture Initiation of a two-front attack in slightly less time four to fine days might lie possible but without several less ready andlor more distant divisions in eastern Czechoslovakia The complexity and magnitude of the reQuired preparations and the risks involved in insufficient preparation would probably cause or reQuire the Pact to take longer than five to six days to prepare this force adth sewn to 10 days being a more realistic time frame The Pact might elect to rapidly launch a two-front attack in order to minimize warning time to the West but it is more likely that the Paat uvuld gradually raise the readiness of its form during a period of tendon --- The initiation of hostilities after only five to six days of preparation with a two-front form would entail serious risks for tae Past The attacking force might lack some frontleveJ elements anal its initial combat potent would be less than could be achieved vA addi#imal preparation tiime moreover forward deployed Soviet and East German forces would have to awe rapandbility fear Initial op tioins is northern West Germany and along the EWttic coast hecause of the unavailability of fortes-primary i sli hat would nomally constitute the Pact's Northern From Command and contral structaurm tip Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 N 3 5 c particularly at the theater and national levels would remain incomplete More important the mobilization and forward deployment of Soviet forces in the western USSR could not be accomplished these units therefore would not be immediately available to reinforce or sustain an attacking two-front force Furthermore effective participa- tion in the war by major forces in other areas would be limited particularly in regard to coordinated naval actions and ground and air offensives on the flanks-due in part to the lower peacetime readiness posture of these Pact forces We believe that the Pact would be unlikely to attempt to initiate war from a twofront posture after only five to six days' preparation in other than extraordinarily urgent circum- 3 5 c stances 7-1 However if the Pact did select this option indicators of such preparations would be observed assessed and reported to policymakers within 24 hours after activity had been initiated We have assessed that the Pact would require a minimum of five to six days to prepare for a twofront attack US and NATO military commanders and policymakers could expect to have four or more days to make decisions and counterpreparations These times do not take into account the likelihood that the forces would be raised to higher levels of readiness during any period of tension or crisis that would probably precede a Warsaw Pact decision to move to a full war readiness posture Assuming that the readiness of the forces had been so raised the amount of time required to reach full combat readiness could be greatly reduced In this case some warnings however ambiguous would already have been given The Intelligence Community would continue to assess the fact's war preparations and issue additional judgments regarding the nature and extent of these preparations 3 5 c Option 111-Attack With These fronts Under this option Pact planners could elect to prepare for war via a more phased approach and attack when they had prepared a threefront force We believe that the Pw would require at a minimum about eight to mine dins to prepare and position a threefrt- nt force for t t attack-assuming- that this force had been Maintained in its normal Peacetime readiness posture A more realistic time frame for these preparations might be 10 to 12 Clays fmm a cold start Howemr follow-on form from the western USSR consisting primartty of not madly ditwom would rapt fie aide to effectindy supp t and sustain such an attack - 3 5 c The mare complft national and military preparations perrnitted under the three-front option would assure the avaiU1lity of a larger ly L Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 p roved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 TOE 3 5 c and better prepared force and provide for more efficient joint action by all forces In this option those ground maneuver units readied for offensive operations would include all forces in the two-front option described above plus Polish forces and possibly a Soviet army four tie or Belorussian Military District a total of divisions from th about 60 divisions 3 5 c There is evidence that Pact planners would want at least three fronts available for initial operations in Central Europe with assurance that at least one additional front would be available for reinforcement soon after the initiation of hostilities This option also is more consistent than shorter preparation options in regard to Pact doctrinal preferences for force superiority national and Pact-wide preparations combined-arms operations and the Pact's appreciable respect for NATO's war-fighting capabilities Moreover it would offer better prospects for sustaining fact forces and allow additional preparations to guard against nuclear escalation Accordingly we judge that except under extraordinarily urgent circumstances the Pact would prefer to prepare at least a threefront force before initiating hostilities-F___1 We estimate that we could provide warning to national policymakers within 24 hours after such Preparations were initiated The United States and NATO would have seven or more days of decision and Preparation time if there had been no Previous effort of the part of the Warsaw Pact to raise the readiness of its farces if the Pact had already gradually raised the level of readiness of its forces during a period of tension as we would expect the time required for final preparations would be shorter In this case some warnings however ambiguous would already have been given in any case the Intelligence Community would continue to assess the steps being taken by the Pact to prepare for war and would issue additional judgments regarding the mature and scope of the preparations Option M Afteok Mrith R Frrnh Cireunstunces permitti the Pact cmdd build up even lacer forces before initiating hostilities against NATO A dive-froa attack pwr4ra would largely MAU the Pact's conservative ctrfnal preferences to regard to lotce superiortw and wo ld take at lust is clays to achterae including fom d nwv meret of Soviet 1mves ice the westem USSR f the PW u watteraapt to atshu it ftmn a old start The d fikultin involved in rapidly deeming ae frilly mobilized aced deplcayad fiamv Ipm a peavet3ms posture acre sash that terse prepamnons rm1ft icaUv mW take up to three wets In this coptim 1'8 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Soviet ground forces in the three western military districts of the USSR would be available for early reinforcement of Pact forces in Central Europe As discussed in Option III-the three-front attack-the Soviets could choose to move limited forces from the u - stern USSR to join Polish forces in forming a Polish-Soviet Front At least some of the remaining forces in the western military districts-some 30 divisionswould probably be organized into at least two additional fronts-the Belorussian and Carpathian Fronts-and forward deployed in Poland and Czechoslovakia before the attack thereby substantially adding to the momentum and sustainability of a Pact attack With these forces Pact ground forces available for operations against Central Europe would total 85 to 90 active divisions plus support units - I 3 5 c This attack option would reduce the Pact's chances oGBP achieving surprise while maximizing the weight of the attack This option also would increase the ratio of Soviet to non-Soviet Pact forces It would offer much better prospects for sustainability the most complete command control and communications network and would allow for additional measures to prepare the Pact's populace economies and transportation systems for war However due to insufficient training time not ready divisions would have only a marginal capability to conduct effective offensive operations 3 5 c Should the Fact opt for a full fivefront attack from a cold start we judge that we would be able to provide warning within 24 to 48 hours after preparations began US and NATO military commanders and polioymakers would have at least d3 days of decision and preparation time provided that they reacted expeditiously to the initial warnings If as we would expect final preparations were made after Pact forces had already gradually increased their readiness during a period of increasing tension the large4r k rnobiltzation of Soviet forces in the western USSR and their Jbrward deployment would still provide timely notice that the Soviet6 were taldog stm that would enable them to execute this attack option Du4 this Period the Intelligence Community would continue to assess the steps brie taken by the Pact to prepare far war and would issue additional judsments regarding the nature and scope of these prepmtionsF 3 5 c VariQ ions in A axck Options iFcamm rd Deployment of F'or'ces in the We-stern i jSSIL Th6 Soviets could thowe to mobilize anal forward-deploy selected -veadyunits from the western USSR prior to the complete preparation of the remainder of these form most of which aria maintained in a pease 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 ro 8 3 5 c not ready posture The Soviets notionally practiced the forward deployment of some forces in the western USSR prior to D-day during several major exercises in 1982 and 1983 While such a forward deployment would provide the Pact with additional early firepower and better prospects for sustaining its attacks it has the significant disadvantage of possibly providing clear and highly detectable warning 3 5 c indicators to NATO Soviet air forces are not maintained at full wartime strength or readiness in peacetime We believe offensive forces would require about 48 hours to prepare a command and control structure for frontlevel operations Strategic aviation forces probably would require an additional 24 hours to complete more extensive command and control arrangements Thus within 72 hours the Pact could mount a largescale air attack throughout NATO's Central Region However we believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets would mount such an air attack against NATO independent of a combined-arms offensive Rather the Soviets would prefer-and generally plan on-first completing logistic preparations and expanding their rear services as well as completing mobilization of air combat units Such preparations would require seven to 12 do s at which time Soviet air forces would be fully combat ready I Gradual Buildup The Pact could initiate gradual war preparations-implemented over a period of many weeks or months- either in response to a prolonged crisis or as a result of a deliberate decision to secretly prepare for war and launch a sudden attack We judge that the gradual approach to achieving full readiness in remion to a developing crisis would be the most Itkely coarse of events if the Pact were to prepare for war against NATO Steps to increase the readiness of elements of the f'act's military forces could be taken selectively over a period of many weeks or months such as the mobilization oaf certain low-strength units that is gradually converting them from a not ready to a ready posture Many prepaxation % which in timesensitive circumstances might be initiated by a declaration of a co bat alert an order requirim immediate departure frem gantsons or the declaration of threat-of-war or full readiness could be accomplished incrementally without terra dee laration of an alert ear the formal implementation of an increased readiness posture SwI deWations from normal peacefte Patterns lever would be deter by US and NATO intelligence particularly if implemented on a km scale and would be interpreted as u modification of the Fact's mtittary posture Such activity would certainly intensify M and NATO intelligence collection efforts and might also initiate similar vreparamu wy actions by Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 To 3 5 c NATO Although the Pact's efforts to gradually increase preparations for war might reduce the time necessary to make final preparations for war discussed in Options II III and IV they would be taken at the risk of exposure and NATO counterpreparations 3 5 c We judge that we could recognize large-scale nonroutine activities such as the following - Shortened or intensified training cycles -- Large-scale mobilization of reservists in Eastern Europe or the western military districts of the USSR - Widespread or unusual military training on weekends or holidays - Major changes in training schedules or procedures - Major increases or decreases in manning or readiness posture Because of the high risks and posts involved-including NATO counterpreparations and the risk of miscalculation-the fact would probably defer overt and large-scale mobilization major force deployments and other highly visible and provocative measures until the final transition to full readiness for war We judge that even after some weeks or months of gradual preparations there would still be a discernible difference in the nature scope and pace of Preparedness measures that would enable us to provide warnings that the Pact was initiating the final steps that would enable it to go to war Pact deception measures and conditioning bowel ver could shorten the tine available to defuse a crisis or to take countermeasure - particularly if policymakers delayed action while awaiting unambiguous proof of fact intentions Nevertheless use are confident that we could inform policumakers that the fact mvs initiating the final steps that uvuld enable it try go to war within 24 hours after the beginning of the activfties associated with the trtiansition to c -fall retadined' condition We would already have Issued wumings- proba btp rapeateft--of tie m'3itary mea ores being tr by the Poet and of a growing danger of hostilities 21 top Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 0 0 - pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 proved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c DISCUSSION 1 BACKGROUND t A Scope of the Estimate 1 This Estimate examines how a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe might begin focusing on the preparations the Pact would make under various attack options and when US intelligence would probably detect and report such preparations for war Warsaw Pact perceptions doctrine readiness and objectives during a war with NATO as well as the likelihood of war under present and near-term circumstances the next three to five years are also addressed Judgments focus on Europe but certain events-namely the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and developments in Iran--have increased the poten- 3 5 c tial for a confrontation between US and Soviet forces in the Persian Gulf region For this reason the Estimate discusses the warning implications for NATO of a conflict in the Persian Gulf involving US and Soviet forcesl B Definitions Warning of War 2 For purposes of this Estimate we define warning of war as the communication of intelligence Judgments to national swlicymakers that a state or alliance intends war or is on a course that substantially increases the risks of war and is taking steps to prepare for war Ors initial warnings may not fulfill all of the elements of this definition particularly specific J udgments regarding enemy intent but these warnings could be provided to poiioymakers relatively early and would provide a basis for decisions concern- ing options and appropriate countermeasures We would be unlikely in our initial warnings to be able to foretell when or where the enemy will attack or if an attack will occur at ail The warning tproceA howover is continuous The e wandw would be followed by further assessments and warnings as ne ceSSm until the outbreak of hostilities or the end of the atisis While concern for attack by a hostile itowgeC is the ultimate Purpose of the waning prc-cm this E iniate does not focus upon the specdlim of waning of attack the communication of art iatelli lr ment to national polfcyt kmrs drat an adoermy is not only prepartn g its armed farces hr war but aho intends to launch an attack in the near future The information conveyed in warning of attack would be more precise than that communicated in warning of war including-to the extent possible-when where and in what strength the adversary will attack Under most circumstances these specifics could be provided only late in a crisis 3 5 c C The Warning Process 3 Warning is the communication of dangers implicit in a wide spectrum of activities by potential opponents ranging from apparently routine defense measures to substantial increases in readiness and force preparedness to acts of political economic terrorist or military aggression A political or economic crisis is often a precursor of military events Such a crisis would be reported as it developed thereby providing the earliest warning that military events may occur -I 3 5 c 4 The primacy of Europe to the national security interests of the United States causes the US Intelligence Community to strive for a warning process that trades certainty for time The US warning system seeks to provide early notice of events that might presage Pact offensive operations While tentative and ambiguous early warning would provide time for developing and executing courses of action by policymakers which are low in costs and high in impact on crisis deterrence As additional events transpire and tensions increase the US warning system is designed to indicate greater likelihood that wax is in the offing As warming assessments become snore certain mhwmakers may continue to focus on crisis avoidance or containment but emu increase and appod unilks are tact However there is no finite point at which the warning system scan foretell with certainty acct war is imminent It eon assess potential enemy capabilities but it is less Miable for forecasting bosdle intent which nitgtht become Pparexrt only in the act of war itself 71his ds due patAhr to the nature of the system which must MY um human ludt mma mid partially to ithe dynamics of atm in which the reactions of US polievana kess to early warnfugs may affect the development of the cmirse of eveft in die anost unambiguous warattng--an ruck is being executed-- demons 3 5 c 1P Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 o t 3 5 c 3 5 c are limited to a reactive set and the consequences of mistakes may be extreme 5 The policymaker is the critical focus of the warning process This process is oriented toward advising the policymaker that a situation is developing that might require prudent actions to balance the chances that the opposition is on a course that may culminate in an attack on the United States or its Allies The policymaker must be aware that action-or inactionon his part may affect the likelihood of war that is 3 5 c the adversary may key his resolve for war in part on actions taken-or not taken-by the United States Intelligence Community Warning Vehicles ered with varying interpretations of cogency Accord- ingly warning of war should not be viewed as a single event but as a process of communicating warnings of increased threat Only when the predominantly mili- tary phases of preparation were well under way would the climate for coordinated warning communications be established 3 5 c 7 When issued the initial warnings would provide Within the Intelligence Community each analyst is responsible for providing warning through the chain of command of individual agencies via current intelligence reporting and briefings as well as various departmental intelligence products At the national Intelligence level there are a number of products and mechanisms for disseminating warning judgments Products include National Intelligence Estimates NIEs Special NIEs and Watch Committee Reports In addition monthly warning and forecast meetings are hosted by National Intelligence Officers responsible for regional areas Their reports are forwarded to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning who provides warning advisories to the Director of Central Intelligence MCA as appropriate Formal Alert Memorandums or Warning Memorandums have not been used since the early 1980s Instead informal typescript memorandums to the DCI-both coordinated and un- coordinated-have become more common due to their unstructured lens restrictive nature Moreover an informat muttilevel old boy network operates to provide warning or to present alternative vlews The essential point is that there is no single recognized document or method through which the Intelltizence community would be expected to convey its consensus that wxr was likely with the Soviet Union Warning of war would probably develop in many wam thmutdt marry chan- nels with vaTlow shades of vvinton indicating ttiffexent Interpretations of the zb mmble facts and indicators as they became knawm significance of these developments would be tentative and uncertainties would be relatively high Community agreement might be slow to develop regarding the purpose of the early preparations While representatives of the various intelligence agencies would inform their principals regarding the developing situation it is quite likely that the warning aspects would be deliv- evidence on the nature of the decisions taken the extent of measures under way an estimate of when preparations would be largely completed and a judgment about when the Pact would be ready for hostilities The intelligence Community however could not be certain that the Pact would attack as soon as it had taken the requisite steps to do so The strength of the warning system for discerning increased capabilities of the Warsaw Pact to initiate hostilities should not be i construed as a capacity to foretell with confidence the course of subsequent events Nor should recipients of warning expect that definitive thresholds at which decisions should be made will necessarily be identified The provision of warning cannot be based on Instantaneous assessments Warning must be grounded in trends military growth over time and developments that could possibly forecast intent to act Even with relatively specific and quantitative force judgments warning of sear would still be an ambiguous iterative process see inset on page 25 F I 8 The Intelligence Community has never observed the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact snaking preparations of the magnitude and duration necessary to go to war wa NATO Nonetheless activity shish we have observed-Hungary %95% CCzedhodevakia 1966 Afghanistan IMX and Poland if38D-$i plus analysis of exercises over the years---tics given us confidence that while we might not mcogniae war preparations in their ear diest iphaws we could provide tamely warnings that the Soviets and the Pad member states were adwl eonv9erting to a wartime posture and were aisking war a war praparsadws could Wed the civilian man before mIRMY farces WM jolly trmpamd And deployed for war 4bzw owly preparations would be' reimled lucreitentally AMR v4th- any military aetlvity liaw -aimm owunmr4ty iudemenu amardin the by tbslr behtavior r 1 9 A manning that goes stet spproximate the expectations of the mcipient Mould meet with resistance anti pressures to dbregard the early and tentative evidence of the sossibr'lity tar likelihood of war would 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Ta Community Warning Performance in Two Recent Crises During the Polish crisis in 1980 four separate Alert Memorandums were issued The last Memorandum In 1980 issued on 2 December stated that the Soviets are readying their forces for military intervention in Poland We do not know however whether they have made the decision to intervene or are still attempting to find a political solution A final Alert Memorandum on the Polish crisis was issued on 2 April 1981 It stated that Soviet leaders have been convinced by the evident impotence of the Polish party and government that military intervention is necessary The Memorandum added however that We do not know if the decision to intervene in Poland has been made but the Soviets now are capable of intervention with little further warning The crisis ended without Soviet military intervention Three Alert Memorandums were issued during the crisis in Afghanistan The first two Memorandums issued on 14 September and 19 December 1979 suggested that the Soviets might be willing to intervene militarily The third Memorandum issued co 25 December reported that the invasion had probably begun and it had In these two crises the Intelligence Community did not make unequivocal judgments concerning the likelihood of Soviet military intervention 3 5 c 3 5 c 10 Acceptance of the warnings that are given is the final step in the process which draws upon the information-gathering machinery of government to develop coherent evidence of the likelihood of an event of great concern to national policymakers Early warning judgments while tentative and ambiguous would become more specific and alarming as a crisis deepened The process culminates in the mind of the policymaker when he is persuaded that the likelihood of the event is so high that considerations to the contrary should be set aside and action taken to counter or to mitigate its consequences F-1 D Recent Intelligence Community Studies 11 1n recent years a number oGBP national intelligence and departmental studies have increased our knowledge and understanding of the readiness posture of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces their force generation capabilities alert procedures and systems opera- tional and employment concepts command structure the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact NSWP forces for coalition warfare and Soviet capabilities and contingency planning for fighting a war in the Persian Gulf This Estimate draws heavily from these and other studies cited throughout this document and in the Bibliographv F-7 be great First there is the genuine risk of setting in motion precautionary measures that mlttht be misinterpreted as hostile acts and further aggravate the Second and third are the economic and political costs of ordering the mobilization of military forces and national re- situation or even precipitate the conflict 3 5 c 3 5 c sources for an event that might not occur or could be long delayed 1 3 5 c E Significant vents and Developments 12 Significant events and developments occurring Etunpean warning Estimate was published in 1978 are discussed in the inset on pages 2 28 some are discussed fin more detail in the Estimate and others are addressed elsewhere in intelligence Community studies refer to the Bibliography n since the last 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Recent Significant Events and Developments Pertinent to Warning of War in Europe Event Development Significance Instability in the Persian Gulf region Increased US and Soviet interest and planning emphasis on the Persian Gulf region increased potential for US-Soviet military confrontation in the region with potential for spillover into Europe or for diversion of attention and resources from Europe Soviet General Staff exercises in the southern USSR since 1980 have provided insight into how the Soviets might prepare for and execute a major campaign in the region Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Provided Insight into the deliberate and time-phased approach with discontinuities the Soviets took in reaction to a simmering crisis on their border contingency plans and preparations for possible military intervention began months before the invasion early preparations were unobtrusive or ambiguous while final preparations in December 1979 were more obvious and threatening The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has increased the potential for future military operations in the Persian Gulf area partic- ularly against southeast Iran and Pakistan with possibilities for conflict with the us The Polish crit4t 1980-81 Provided insight into the deliberate and time-phased approach the Soviets took In reaction to events in Poland featured selective mobilization and exercising of a potential intervention force Manpower shortages in Soviet maneuver divisions in Eastern Euraper A growing body of evidence indicates that -a significant disparity between peacetime and warauthorized manning has existed since the mid-19705 and has increased since 197% piinefpaliy due to the reorganization and expansion of motorized rifle and tans divisions Soviet motorized rifle divisions are crow assessed to be manned betwmn 80 aml 85 pmvnt of waraut wdu d strength some motorized rifle battalions are manned at Manning is one of the most important determinants of unit readiness These units would depend to a greater extent than previously estimated on augmentation to achieve war-authorized strength Their readiness posture can be assumed to be within Moscow's perception of acceptable risk under present circumstances Although the proficiency of these divisions would be increased if oowmitted at warauthorized strength we assess that they are capable of initiatins and conducting offensive operations against NATO at them ee-authorized strength Accumulated evidence however indicates that the Soviets plan to averment mannin in these writs prior to hostilities by several methods mobilizing civilian reservists employed by the Snvlets In Eastern Europe cross4uvelmg within emits in Eastern Europe that is transferring unovs faom less carnival veaeetime tabs and Ong significant members of troops fnam the X11 about 70 pemettt of war-authoftW str na Tank divio sions are assessed to be manned betvraen 83 and 90 Vent of wartime authorizattom Frevioua assessments had estimated that wacedine manninz authorisations in these divisions were 93 V est or more of mar authorimtions Warsaw fPttet Sty WM for 'itzhrtime t'pornatsntll and tree Tim Statute and adbseuurml protocols in effect give the Soviet General Staff a legal basis for alerting mdhilWng And orgunt 4 for combat NSWP forum emcept Roman the Manument communication procedwe anavides a imolerrtetttation of tics 7itonttt5tartt cavtmtanivirtion trrocs thsre Formally ratified In early lei by A11 Pact nations except Romania more tWd aced tell command aW canud disseminatieu trracedure for dierma Pact forces 26 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 1 C00638425 3 5 c Recent significant Events and Developments Pertinent to Warning of War in Europe Continued Event Development ' Significance Exercising of Warsaw Pact high commands of forces opposite NATO's central and southern regions The temporary activation of these headquarters has been featured in exercises since the late 1970s and the Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute provides for their establishment in a crisis These wartime commands would facilitate centralized continuous and reliable command and control of Pact forces opposite NATO through the Soviet General Staff thereby improving Moscow's ability to direct integrated Pact operations Peacetime execises reduce the time required to achieve high levels of operational efficiency Reorganization Rf Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces Facilitates rapid transition to wartime organization pro- vides greater operational flexibility through centralized control at military district front and theater of military operations levels enhances offensive air operations in support of theater operations in Europe and Asia Reorganization of Soviet motorized r le and tank divisions and the reemergence of army aviation as a type oc aviation in the Soviet Air Forces This has entailed the augmentation of divisions with additional artillery tanks infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters Army aviation consists primarily of helicopters at MD front army and division levels that perform tactical Increased firepower mobility tactical flexibility and over- all enhancement of combined-arms capability Improved prospects for executing doctrinal requirement for highspeed offensive and operations in depth by combined-arms formations Increases the threat posed by forward deployed forces missions for combined-arms commanders Concept of ecnplaying a tailored hiah psed deep Desiened to increase battlefield tempo by early and deep exploitation force tit arrrstt andlront lopel fGperational Maneuver Grow-OUGA and the creation of a new army corps structure M least two Soviet divi- commitment into enemy rear areas to seize or destroy key facilities and obiectiv4m disrupt lateral movement and support units reinforcement and in veneral destroy the integrity of enemy defenses The new army corps structure appears Krell-suited for the OMG role and was probably tailored for this vurpose it features more firepower flexibility and a better combined-arms mix Vreroise theme Forward deployment and Incorporation of some Soviet forces from the western VSSH into first operational ectelon fronts prior to D-day observed in a few exercises in 1888 and GBP883 Should Soviet preparations for war in Europe include the forward deployment of forgo from the western usm prior to D-day this movement court provide NATO with clear and highly detectable warasing indicators lntroduction of atuctirw capaVc artillerv in the for Board area The MS 152-mm self propellcd SP gun March 19811 the M-1978Mum field wm December 104 and the M-3875 203-mm SP howIbrer Mooeember 19UI Based an a resesmant of Soviet rtiilary awabilities older 1y-mm artillery vleces in the forward area snag also have a nuFalaar capability Tltm UrOerv systems vrcw4e greater ammuev and Iower sions--including one in the western UM-lieve been reorganized into a new type army corps each consisting of four to five mechanized and armored brigades and yields than existing namt and missile astem and dMe fore give vaouni ndm a mare flexible forward deployed nuclear delivery option Degrades warninc indicator that might be forward deployed only during a Crisis Lath weapons Forward dephveiient o1 SU ll t Fencer bontbma Degloved in am Cexuam Pobutd aced Slutis V since 1881 Assessed to have an # weatther Interdiction capa- provides enhanced tesetion vostureduring a crisis as well as dm wading an Imporair-t warriing indican also provides greater radius of action and a snore vrrsatile koad-carrying bility Putty Forswtrd deplowment of ithorUiense bellistle abriilea S3t8Nsk The SSA yeas deldavod 1n the t rtaap aGBP Soviet Fame in Germany G Fared probaw diovakta Tlmtens among other tbu g NATID Fatrfidlds A US 3taternae8iaUXratute t-udew aadasflec Dees on impca- rrmt wsralm andioatar in early 1@8d 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Recent Significant Events and Developments Pertinent to Warning of War in Europe Continued Event Development Significance Formation and deployment of air assault brigades and battalions at the front and army level respeetivelu Nine air assault brigades have been formed since 1980 including one in GSFG All GSFG armies have had air assault battalions assigned since the early 1980s Provides theater front and army commanders with a flexible well-armed force which could be employed early in a conflict against targets in NATO's tactical depths Likely targets for seizure disruption or destruction are nuclear weapons and delivery systems command control 'communications and logistic facilities and key terrain features Air assault operations are designed to facilitate rapid penetration of first-echelon formations through NATO's forward defensive zone as well as directly support the high-speed maneuver of large exploitation forces such as OMGs Soviet logistic capabilities in East Germany are much greater than earlier estimates have indicated Currently available rear services equipment and depot stocks of ammunition and fuel are adequate to support at least This stockpile is adequate to support a 90-day war reserve requirement for about two fronts Forward deployment of logistic elements as a warning indicator has been degraded twice as many Soviet forces than are currently located in East Germany The extent of logistic capabilities in other groups of forces is less clear Deploument of SA-5 Gammon strategic long-range SAM# in Eastern Europe At least six sites are under construction in Easi Germany Czechoslova'ida Hungary and Bulgaria construction of additional sites-including some In Poland--is expected The SA4 has a range of 278 kilometers and operates to an altitude of 30 500 Will extend Pact air defense capabilities over the forward area Degrades an important warning indicator meters Most of the sites to Eastern Europe are likely to be manned and controlled by national farces Soviet naval exercise in Print IOU This krge- scalv mobility exercise of the Western Elects featured deployment of stratWe And general purpose naval units to dtwersal and operatfne areas followed by notional conventional and nuclear combat operations In the absence of a gradual force buildup through a period of increasing tendon the sudden deployment complicated the wvarning problem for naval forces Curtailment ' SoWel militant hanmt wpport Re cent informatfan sumsts that the use of mflitary trupks and perdonrtel for $rrvest support will be sharply ca tailed if not terminated This move is probably designed to assure the snore efficlent sue of resources in the civil sector as wag as to improve military txatuins said readiness thwades the utility of a seasonal W rntm im dicattor d normalcy 3 5 c 3 5 c MW Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 To 3 5 c 11 CONTEXT OF A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR remaining nuclear-armed aircraft are Judged capable of taking off with six to 12 hours' notice Fifty percent of NATO's tactical aircraft armed with conventional A Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO's Military weapons are judged ready for takeoff with six hours' Capabilities 13 Warsaw Pact perceptions of NATO's capability to wage war undoubtedly play a major role in shaping the Pact's strategy for war with NATO Significant aspects of the Pact's view of NATO's capabilities have been gleaned from a variety of sources This material 3 5 c indicates that the Pact has substantial and generally accurate knowledge of NATO's organization force structure alert procedures and reaction times equipment tactics and strategy and mobilization and reinforcement cavabilities F__7 14 Available evidence indicates that Pact assessments tend to maximize or even exaggerate NATO capabilities This tendency toward worst vase analysis may be indicative of uncertainty and or respect for NATO but in any case is generally consistent with the prudent manner in which Pact planners assess the military capabilities of potential adversaries and the risks involved in war Three perceptions in particular illustrate the Pact's respect for NATO's military capa- bilities and have significant implications for Pact strategic planning NATO Mobilitation Reinforcement sand Deployment Capabilities 15 Pact planners see a serious threat in NATO's ability to rapidly expand its standing forces by mobilization in Europe and by reinforcement from outside Europe urjng the early 19M e it NATO wit a gout 80 ground divislous Including French forces plus mome than 100 separate infantry armor and airborne brigades and regiments These assessments indicate that the fact laeiieves that the United States could rehJonce Eumpe with six divisions and 60 squadrons of vombat aircraft within 10 days Additionally Poet platners believe that within 80 rays NATO is capable of Increasing the number of aircraft in Europe by goo and incraeastns 3 5 c I 3 3 b 1 its ground forces by about Tao dividmas Inching rein rcins units from the united Stan and this mobilization of units within Eumpe I6 NATO wound and air teactlon turd detsla marat times have received eaxeeltent grades NATO mtvleu-Wmed ftWOd a- t malwain 4 on aalert AM an believed cAvable of taking off within IS minute trod ever one4aalf of the notice In regard to ground forces Pact planners believe that some NATO tactical units garrisoned near the East German and Czechoslovak borders-particularly reconnaissance and covering troops and missile and air defense units--could occupy their operational deployment areas within six to 12 hours opined that the readiness of NATO forces a reac ed the highest level in history-particularly in regard to US and West German forces-and that the morale and discipline of NATO troops were much improved 3 3 b 1 3 5 c Capability of NATO's Air Forces 17 The Pact recognizes that it would have to use its air and air defense forces to attempt to achieve air superiority early in a war or face the prospect of NATO's use of airpower to offset the Pact's quantitative advantage in ground forces The Soviets consider NATO's air forces a major military threat to Pact forces in aCentrA Europe and project a 150-percent increase in the capabilities of these forces during 198085 This growth results from the deployment of the F-15 F-16 F-18 and Tornado-aircraft that the Soviets judge to have significantly higher combat capabilities than the aircraft they are replacing The Soviets are also concerned about the enhanced command and control capabilities offered by such aircraft as the E-3A AWACS and the expanding NATO ability to conduct airborne radioelectronic warfare 3 5 c 18 The Soviets expect the new-seneration NATO aircraft to degrade the effectiveness of Pact air defenses One estimate fur example concluded that the capabilittes oGBP Warsaw Pact radars to detect and track targets would drop by 50 percent or more the vrobaWlities of kill for surfave4o vir aaissiles SAMs and aircraft would decline mecipitaidy and 'the cepabtTities of fire-conud aradars nbcaard aircraft would be cut In hrdf 3 5 c 19 Aerceptions by the %vlets of the a Wor problams ffaainaz ateirr air defense fences are dear In the tactical acrena the g 8s about aircraft mh its tbv gas A-10 and hacoiaters opera bw at low altltudts under Vover of fatense dectronic 00unteraneasuraes The deployment by the Unitxed Staff of longraRrw cruise mks and the prospect of advanced penetrating bombers Such as the 8-1 cme the Sr viets 3 5 c 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c much concern as these weapons would be difficult to defend against because of their low flight profiles and small radar cross sections NATO Nuclear Capabilities 3 3 b 1 20 The NATO theater nuclear capability is perceived as a profound threat and dominates Pact strain a tannin for war in Europe credited NATO with 8 000 tactical nuclear war ea and 3 000 aircraft artillery pieces and missiles capable of delivering nuclear munitions Moreover Pact planners are convinced that NATO would probably employ nuclear weapons in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war Accumulated evidence re- 3 5 c veals considerable Pact anxiety over the formidable difficulties inherent in locating and destroying NATO nuclear warheads and delivery systems ' 21 Moscow also recognizes that NATO's planning and capability to implement limited nuclear options could initiate an uncontrollable chain oGBP escalation Should NATO initiate the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons Moscow sees itself faced with several sobering choices continue fighting with conventional weapons only respond in kind or escalate to massive theaterwide or even strategic nuclear strikes The Soviets havta described in their literature the concept of limited or selective use of nuclear weapons and have played such options in some exercises However both doctrine and exercises suggest that the Soviets remain highly skeptical of the chances for controlling escalation at this level Furthermore once the nuclear threshold is crossed the Pout's conventional force superiority would lose mucli of its signifi- cance From Mrucow's standpoint the NATO deployment of Pershing 11 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles OL Ms makes It even more difficult to control escalation of nuclear war in Europe NATO deployment of these long-range theater nuclear systems is seers as Increasing the risk of strikes on the USSR during theater nuuclrar ages thus obfuscating the threshold beetw een theater nuclear and strategic fintercantlnentull nuclear war These 3 5 0 r - -4as reduce warning time present anew problems and uncertainties for Moscow in anessim the scale and oblectives of a NATO nuclear attitdt and twW to reinforce e bias far large-scale nuclear attwi plarMI Rbks lnvts W in a War With NATO ilk Pact awsssments c wdy show a conceal for NATO's ability to atuJOW mobilb amid deploy fts 121- theater forces as well as to bring substantial reinforce- ments from outside the theater within 30 days The obvious strategic implication for the Pact is that even in the short run NATO could field large and powerful forces These forces might offer sufficient resistance to prevent the Pact from gaining a quick victory thereby providing NATO time to bring its larger population greater industrial base and superior technology to bear Emerging Western doctrine and technology for placing Pact follow-on forces at risk might disrupt the momentum oGBP a Pact conventional offensive Furthermore NATO has a large diversified array of tactical nuclear-capable weapons which the Pact believes would probably be employed against it The existence of the separately controlled US British and French strategic nuclear strike systems increases Moscow's uncertainty about nuclear escalation The Soviet leadership sees war in Europe particularly nuclear war as holding its territory at risk from strategic nuclear strikes NATO's nuclear deterrent capability would seem to make nonnuclear war in which NATO's theater nuclear capability would be attacked with conventional armaments the most rational option for the Pact The Soviets' dilemma is that successful Pact nonnuclear offensive operations would probably lead to the use of nuclear weapons by NATO In sum the size and flexibility of use of NATO's nuclear weapons pose extraordinary threats to the Pact's warn fighting 1 capabilities home territories and viability a Other factors that Soviet and Pact planners would take into account fn assessing the risks of war with NATO include -- Prospects far external assistance far NATO - Passibility that Cl9s-na might attack in the Soviet Far East - Confidence by the Soviets in the reliability and war-ftthing effectiveness of their Pact allies The Pact -fide noting NA7Vs Vwn impressive potential far I bdm a trotraoted war believes that NATO wound probably mceive assistance from other Eurapean oanmtries--spa aularlY Sweden The Pact probably sees many non-European cations as favoring NATO end behevos that same -of these countries would support or tloin NATO in a ppMomd war Moreover the Soviets fear dat a vnAmc W conflict with NATO could apt wage Chbu to a ttaci atom the Um's Cate borders and some Saviet a mises Bove fea- W d simultttrwo ar mfhcU In Europe acrd Asia rFinti'8y 4riy douW about As allies willingness yr ability to l'ig'ht NATO would emuWy constrain quay aentlrudssm Moscow might have for war An attack against Tap Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 To 3 5 c NATO must be mounted from East European territo- ry and the lines of communication to support such an attack transit through Eastern Europe The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries are largely responsible for operating and maintaining the ground transportation systems linking the USSR and Eastern Europe and for providing critical rear area defenses and security Moreover more than half the Pact divisions and aircraft now in Central Europe are East European and they have been assigned important combat roles of in the initial stages of war The military re below' the Soviets' Pact allies is summarized B Military Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces s 24 The Soviet Union is concerned about the military reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies in the event of war with NATO and is apprehensive regarding initiatives NATO might undertake in a crisis or war to decouple Moscow from them Soviet dependence on its allies especially in Central Europe is so great as to make their participation crucial to prospects for suc- cess on the battlefield In fact we believe that the Soviets would be unlikely to initiate hostilities against NATO unless they had reasonable expectation of participation by most Pact forces Although the Soviets have taken a number of political and military actions to try to assure their allies' cooperation the wartime reliability of the non-Soviet members of the Pact would depend in part on developments which the Soviets could not entirely control These include the circumstances of the outbreak of hosdlitles possible 3 5 c NATO actions to try to induce disaffection nonpai'ticipation or defections by Pact members and the outcome of initial battlefield engagements 25 Prior to a final decision to go to war ilsast European leaders whose countries have the roost to lose in a war with NAM are likely to use whatever influence they may have to attempt to moderate Soviet decisions Mosww's willingness bowover to do whatever is Syr to ensure compliance with its decisions is an accepted feet by its a%% and onoe the Soviets decide to to to war Past Europotm ImAers era likely to tailor their aetim with this in mind The aaneral outlook of baw leadda rshiyp crow vend their iolitical 4evendencv on the Soviets wmdd proba result in most members of these elites awning their interests during at cxi4s as vangruent with tlem of the Soviets in to nt cesveft This would trot venessa be 3 5 c - A b A ftmw of k sued # fmw in XM 1211143 fietiddft 04 60 sarAfft am se Iane 194s atttrr true of all members of the various NSWP leadership groups and the behavior of lower level military officials and populaces in general would be less predictable 3 5 c 26 Soviet control over the East European forcesand Soviet confidence in such control---would be at its highest during preparations for hostilities as Pact forces were being alerted mobilized and deployed for combat and during the initial stages oGBP war as Pact forces were advancing We believe that military discipline and established control mechanisms are likely to assure the reliable response of most Pact forces to initial alert mobilization and commitment orders The military reliability of NSWP forces however could be degraded as hostilities progressed this would be especially likely in the case of a stalemate or significant Pact failures on the battlefieid n 3 5 c 27 The Soviets have continued to effect more extensive control measures such as the recently introduced Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute which legally centralizes command and control of Pact forces in Soviet hands Although not all senior NSWP political and military authorities would necessarily comply with a Soviet order to take their forces to war Soviet control measures would limit the ability of the NSW political or military leadership to ignore or countermand alert mobilization and deployment orders We believe the following four factors would affect NSWP reliability -- Circumstances surfounding initiation of hostilities from the Soviet perspective the war would be portrayed as defensive in nature for the Pact - Personal motivations and opportunities Of NSWP leadersbip elites possibilities and inclinations for shirking responsibility procrastination nor avoid- ance would vary %ready -NATO initiatives surh as declarations of support for abstaining Mast European countries targeting volicles aW UAldield tactics aimed at inducing neutrality or assurance for NATO -- Most fiupwuSiaat early successes nor defeats on the battlefield wov4d probably be the mot critical favor for the Pact once hostilities besan 3 5 c 28 The Soviets PvUbiy percelve that the military foram of the NSW gauntries would be odW le during 9muil hos0 ies Albeit in dffkd dv%rm and awwuacm in flee foltowin order hount to lowest osloualaa rdta'bilx Bul' wja Past Germanv Ht rwXV Pelaaed and Romania fro VM04 to Pjand 3 5 c 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 3 5 c 3 5 c Soviet confidence in the near-term reliability of the Polish armed forces had been eroded in 1980-81 because of widespread social unrest disorganization of the Polish Communist Party and severe economic problems While the extent of current Soviet confidence in Poland's military forces is in question the majority view within the Intelligence Community holds that Moscow believes that the Polish armed forces would obey Pact wartime orders Romania is undoubtedly perceived by the Soviets as their least reliable ally in part because of its limited participation in Pact exercises and its refusal to integrate its forces formally into Pact command and control systemsF- 3 5 c 29 A Warsaw Pact strategy for military victory in Europe almost certainly would have to meet three requirements First it would have to result in the destruction or seizure of key military political and economic objectives the loss of which would virtually eliminate the utility oGBP continued resistance by NATO Second these objectives would have to be destroyed or seized quickly before major NATO reinforcement could occur and certainly before NATO could divert its considerable productive capacity to wartime purposes Third and perhaps most important these objectives must be accomplished in a way that minimizes damage to the Soviet homelandF-1 30 Criticality of the NATO Central Region Western Europe's greatest military manpower industrial and technological resources lie in the Central Region The rapid and decisive defeat of NATO forces in the Central Region would prevent NATO from realizing its long-term potential for war Warsaw Pact military literature and exercises clearly indicate that the primary objective of Pact military operations against NATO would be a rapid and total victory in Central EuroxF__1 31 united lOttarmtfons for Limited aOb ectiaes Pact military literature and exercises hpwre planning for limited operations and we consider it extremely unlikely thbt the Pact would attack NATO with limited forces to achieve linnited rbjectivs Nevertheless the Pact has the capability to initiate military operations In Europe on a limited scale to atteutpt to quickly seize a A te mUy important teraitvey or city Far more detail on Pact wartime c Merttvaa mitr to NW 11-1481 Womw Pact Fames m RAW 9 iuty 1981 Yn m Der IntdMeem memami dum UM 8340 Atatng NATO My IM 3 5 c terms while avoiding large-scale war with NATO 3 5 c 32 We see no advantage for the Pact in beginning a large-scale war with a limited-objective attack By definition such an attack would have little or no military value in destroying NATO's short-term warfighting capability or seriously interrupting the development of its long-term combat potential In fact it would sacrifice strategic surprise and ensure that NATO mobilization would not lag far behind the Pact 3 5 c objective-such as control of West Berlin or Hamburg-while attempting to avoid a wider war with NATO a limited-objective attack would have serious flaws from the Pact perspective Theoretically such an attack would attempt to present the United States West Germany or NATO with a military fait accompli by seizing the objective quickly with minimum resistance while less ready elements of the Pact force structure mobilized The Pact could then seek a negotiated settlement while deterring further NATO military action by threatening to unleash a fully prepared force The Pacts perception of NATO's military capabilities and Moscow's overall assessment of the 'c orrelatiou of forces ' however indicate that the risks of limited-objective attack far outweigh any potential short-term gains The most serious risk for the Pact would be the expansion of armed resistance and its escalation to large-scale war In short the Pact could not be confident that a limited-objective attack would succeed quickly without expansion of the conflict including the use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO The grave oowequenaes of miscalculation and first use of NATO nuclear weapons in response to such an attack however slight the chances would seem to far outweigh any potential gains Moreover even in the absence of an Initial forceful NATO military response such tut attack would Inevitably cause NATO to beglp serious preparations for war Pact planners given their respect for NATOs short-term mobilization and war-ffdAting capabilities and the prospect of activating NATO's much greater fndustrial manpower and economic 13mteUW in the longer run could foresee an increasingly adverse balance of forces The Wi s veradved by Moscow of beginning a war with NATO without wxoxrip dit the military ' 3 5 c with NATO or an attempt to settle a crisis on Pact 33 As a stratagem to secure an important political C Warsaw Pact Military Objectives in a War With NATO 3 3 5 c Such an attack could be a first step in going to war 1 preps ions it 4e'ems necessary to sustain the attack achieve theater objectives and guard against nuclear e5mlatiion all crake a Pad attack too gain limited objectives vary unlikely r__1 3 5 c 32 3 5 c 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 0 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 To 3 5 c 34 The Key Decisive Defeat of NATO Forces in the Central Region If the Pact decides to go to war with NATO for whatever reason its principal military objective would be the rapid and decisive defeat of ail NATO forces in Central Europe Whether or to what extent Pact military operations would be directed against France Spain and Portugal would be determined largely by the role these countries played in the conflict The requirement to rapidly engage and into southern Finland in strength they could then move north to support attacks into northern Norway 3 5 c 37 The Soviets probably would not attempt major ground offensives into central or southern Norway during the initial stages of war due to restrictions that terrain places on the employment of forces the potentially strong NATO resistance south of Finnmark and extended lines of communication Moreover the better defended-and more defers ble--Norwegian territory south of Finnmark is at the extreme limits of destroy all NATO military forces in Central Europe and to occupy NATO territory is driven by the Pact's high regard for NATO's great long-term war potential The Pact clearly expects Central Europe to be ein Soviet home-based tactical aircraft decisive arena in a war with NATO Pact military 3 5 c writings and exercises focus on operations designed to achieve a rapid total victory over NATO forces in this area and the Pact assigns the highest priority to the allocation of resources to its military forces opposite ern Italy Turkey and Greece Initial Pact military operations would probably focus on the Turkish Straits Austria and possibly eastern Turkey In addition air and naval attacks almost certainly would be Central Europe Warsaw Pact Military Objectives on NATO's Flanks 35 Pact writings and exercises indicate that military operations are likely on NATO's northern and southern flanks Although Pact military initiatives on NATO's flanks would have significant strategic and operational implications the success or failure of such operations would not be immediately critical to the 3 5 c outcome of hostilities in the Central Region We judge however that the Pact would be unlikely to go to war in Central Europe without also conducUng operations on the flanks n mounted against NATO forces in these areas and against carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean 1 3 5 c 39 It is likely that Hungarian and Soviet forces in Hungary organized into a Soviet-Hungarian Front would attack through Austria into southern West Germany or northern Italy Any move into northern Italy would be designed to prevent Italian forces from putting pressure on the Pact's flanks in Austria This operation however would not be essential to the success of the initial campaign In Central Europe 4 3 5 c 40 The Soviets view the early seizure of the Turkish Straits and securing the northern Aegean Sea as very important to the success of their maritime shutegy in this region Control of the area would be vital in order to block access to the Black Sea by NATO forces and to allow for the massage of Black Sea Elect elements to and from the Mediterranean Before Initiating an assault on the strau the Soviets would probably move ground and air forge from the Odessa Military District through Romania into Bulgaria Tbese forges could be augmented by some Bulgarian forces to foram a front The front's objectives would be to defeat NATO forces in eastern 'Mram break throuA the fortifications protecting the land apprombes to tfre Strat% d seize the strategic waterway Amphibious and ahborne operations would be mducted to support a forced ermine or lateral attack at the Bosporus Soviet forces in the Kiev Military 36 The Northern Flank The mast important military operations in Scandinavia would tie Soviet naval and air actions to gain control over the Barents and northern Norwegian Seas in w4er to protect their ballistic missile sutraarives and prevent NATO from using the area to conduct attacks against the USSR Any Soviet ground am iAdblous airborne and air actions would be mounted from the Irenfrwad Miljtary District to seize or neutralize NATO Installations in northern Norway that could threaten Soviet naval and air def use operations Soviet military actions directed against northern Norway world Probably involve ground operations through northm RnaM territory Attacks into southern inland toward Helsinki might alm be undertaken to prevent NATO from att ekkm the all antis If Soviet frames moved 3 5 c 3 5 c 38 The Southern Flank Pact contingency plans provide for military operations against Austria north- ' yyww f'oic4 aaremism Ct' t pdavia n a neaml oration in a NATO-9 mw Paat W W tomm boweser could smewo to Veal th VVA slimier Imosd cumtnrudcatian in Yaeaslavia 40 MA nor hau ttaty We 40 tt u 01MY dw Tu oal eM VRV1 ptlr kWon for a Pa tt Umuit d du teattorr w dw the t'm would an-m to forve its a tt t tlmooo Taw slavin F__ ' Fur an rntlepth ahmnko a3 Pact ot$oatloes aid V%VM w fad ma for camv i m on NATO's ft-nh refer tv Nr 11M 63-3W M LoadOMWM of Wa s Rad FaWes Ace ter NATO hay 1%% 3 5 c 33 t 3 5 c '' Wsvcw 4 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 t Top 3 5 c District could have a contingency role as secondechelon forces or they could be committed to operations against the Central RegionF_ view of the dangers of a war with NATO Moscow would pursue alternate solutions to a crisis which threatened war n 41 Bulgarian forces-perhaps with some Romanian participation-would form a Bulgarian Front for operations against Greece The mission oGBP this front would be to engage Greek and Turkish forces in Thrace secure the western flank of the Odessa Front and advance to the Aegean Sea and into the Greek heartland Elements of this front would probably also assist in efforts to capture the Dardanelles However considering the relatively small size of the force structure likely to be committed the difficult terrain 45 During a period of extreme tension when neither side wanted war there would probably be moves and countermoves in which cause and effect became ambiguous with each side believing that time and developments were working against it Under such circumstances there would be considerable uncertainty in predicting Soviet behavior We believe it unlikely however that Moscow would allow minor hostilities to evolve into large-scale war We judge that any In Greece and the questionable commitment of Ro- preceded by some sequence of events including military preparations and possibly miscalculations in crisis management by both sides F-1 manian forces to the offensive it seems likely that the front might confine its actual operations to engaging Greek and Turkish forces in Thrace and by seeking to reach the Aegean secure the western flank of the Odessa FrontF_1 3 5 c Soviet decision to go to war would probably be 3 5 c Likelihood of War Under Near-Term Circumstances 46 The Soviets see a costly and-to some extentmore perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade Nevertheless we do not now foresee in the near term the next three to five years development of a trend that would make a NATOWarsaw Pact war likely Differences of view exist in 42 The Soviets could opt to conduct limited operations into eastern Turkey from the Caucasus region in conjunction with the military initiatives described above The primary objective of such operations prob ably would be to tie down sizable Turkish forces to prevent them from being used in western Turkey this objective might be accomplished however by merely mobilizing Soviet maneuver formations in the Transcaucasus Military District F__ the Politburo and Pact ruling elites with respect to policies toward the West but these differences are not likely to center around the advisability of war with NATO unless extraordinary Amuses occur that would threaten the vital interests of the Soviet Union Changes In the NATO-Pact milltary balance and alterations in the Pact's perceptions of NATO's strengths and weakumes could of coarse influence the f'act's assessment of potential gains versus risks in a crisis situation A perception that NATO s military capaUhty or its unity nr resolve to resist had deteriorated would probably encourage Moscow and its allies to try to eaercise more idhwm in Western Eunppe and would probably result In tbrmts and pressure tactics being applied We do upt believe however that Imnsm In the NATO-Pad military balance in ithemselves would lead to war as Iona as Moscow Perceived that its looms would be heavy and that the 4A to the Soviet h meland would be hiiA Despite the potenualIV catasUcpbie iconsequenomof a NATO-Pad guar the Soviets would consider Initiating hostilMes if they peeved a situation which threatened the Integrity of D Likelihood of a NATO-Worsaw Pact's or Chances of War Under Present Circumstances 43 In light of Warsaw Pact assessments of the risks Involved In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war see varat- graphs 22-23 we believe it highly unlikely that the Pact would deliberately decide to aattac k NATO tinder present oircumstanom And despite aluiU rhetoric about Washington s tullitarlsdo ambition and US efforts to achieve military superiority and a veneral erosion in East-West relatiom since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to bate 1876 it b un y duct Pact leaders beliew that NATO wants war or would seek it as a deliberate policy War in Europe would become likely only as a nwh of profound politteA military economic or social changes--or a seriam rat Wculation during a cddsi_7 4h secu ts system or other vital ink-I 44 We believe that a wtr in Isurape would be preceded by a period of vowin tension resulting In az 47 A scenario for war in Europe might involve an anaA to destroy a NATO Alliance which the soviets swood Quad become demaradiud and sarioudv %vakened internally Such an attack might be designed to crisis of xmt severity wlet writings and exerdso indicate that M amw and Its dies ho anUcipate a vedod of Increasing tension prior to war In Europe to 34 0_0 40 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c take advantage of internal dissent economic stagna- rations for war in Europe It is more likely that a tion or social upheaval in the NATO countries A possible catalyst for war in Europe could also be the conflict in the Gulf would heighten NATO vigilance in general and could result in an increased readiness posture being ordered for at least some NATO units the Pact would also probably place at least some of its own units in an increased readiness posture Both development of a crisis in one or more Pact countries or Yugoslavia This might take the form of an internal upheaval or some chain of events which threatened a political disintegration of the Pact An additional possibility is that a future Soviet leadership-faced 'with an increasingly adverse international environment and grave internal problems-might lash out at the West in a desperate attempt to prevent an eventu- al collapse of the Soviet regime and the Pact alliance due to extreme international and internal pressures In this scenario future Soviet leaders could perceive that time was working against them and they might opt to set a timetable to launch a sudden attack against NATO and or the United States We have high confi- dence however that these scenarios have little chance of occurring during the period of this Estimate We do not foresee NATO becoming seriously weakened as a 3 5 c result of social upheaval in Western Europe or any internal Soviet problems that could develop to the point of threatening the collapse of the Soviet regime Moreover even if such events did occur we do not believe that the Soviet leadership would deliberately initiate a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in response to these events-F-1 E Warning Implications for NAT04 A US-Soviet Confrontation in the Persian Gulf 6 48 The warning Implications for NATO of a US Soviet military confrontation in the Persian Gulf area center around three key considerations -- The diversion of attention and resources from Europe ruck a conflict could cause - The possibility that a Soviet move Into the Gulf area could be designed as a strategic feint to draw US forces to the region as a prelude to a Warsaw Pact military initiative in Europe 3 5 c - The possibility of a spillover into Europe of a USSoviet confrontation in the Gu IEUR F-1 49 A US-Soviet confrontation in the Gulf redoN while certainly focusing the world's aitentlon n that area would not necessarily provide Moscow and its atlim with increased opaportunities for nntisleing lama- 3 5 c ' For a falter discmdm of tasuw aurmm hoe taae Ok Soviet mthtano oaetatiM in this stew tefx to NIE 2AP4 83 SaaitR Fares and c mabamn in the Sts A -M 9tLerrer n it t' rsattata t NoverAn i NATO and Pact intelligence collection efforts in Eu- rope would intensify with each side trying to determine the other's intentions In short a US-Soviet conflict in the Gulf would probably result in an increase rather than a decrease in NATO readiness in Europe and an increase in tension ambiguity and opportunity for miscalculation The serious problem for NATO would arise from the dispatch of US units and strategic lift assets earmarked for NATO reinforcement to the Gulf region to counter a Soviet military initiative there 3 5 c 50 We believe it unlikely that the Soviets would deliberately commit their forces in the Gulf regionfor example in Iran or Pakistan-as a strategic feint designed to draw US forces to the area as a prelude to an attack against NA'T'O even though they might achieve a favorable trade-off of forces from such a move ' Such an attack would mean that Moscow considered war with NATO as desirable or inevitable and could tae eounierproduetive or ill conceiveddepending on what actions NATO or the United States might take Moreover the Soviets have always been fearful of the possibility that they might be forced to fight major wars in widely separated geographic regions Soviet exercise scenarios do not appear to project operations in axis region in isolation from a major worldwide confrontation The exercises give no indication that Moscow expects a conflict with the United States to begin in the Gulf region or that the Soviets would view their own rnllitary operations in the area as a feint desisaed to dived US forces from Europe The poAs ba79ty of a conflict in the Persian Gulf area as a precursor and catalyst for war in Europe however cannot be dismissed 3 5 c ET We believe the Soviets are conservative and thorough planners who would appredate the A involved in mounting military operations In the Gulf regionw9arly fuu-maie operations against iran or Pakistan hmH them curaider milavy gvetaations ' jet wound nmri a m Iwmattom in the Caucmu Casa are amaw the ten WD svniamed and twmd to tiro kwk and 6 dove dy aparq f xn1 w e t1mca9 warume udW m Psd art NAM Hmem swa thew form be committed to the Souffim 1% - aitet tine dJ5 Sotoestinrt migta 4redea iovcd to atsyaee siren a ila tae among the ben the to hn to offer thv c awh the soviets a tavarltte trade-aTf d secwna c te domes Inc fud-rate NATOe Malked anti s 3 5 c I Ll Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 of 'u9esret 3 5 c 3_5 c in the region in isolation from other areas their planning considerations would allow not only for the possibility of a confrontation with US forces but also the possibility that such a confrontation could spread to other areas-particularly Europe They have taken and we expect they would take other prudent measures to assure that their military forces were prepared to deal with contingencies opposite NATO and China 52 The bulk of the Soviet ground and air forces required for operations against Iran would be drawn from the Transeaucasus North Caucasus and Turke- stan Military Districts and possibly Afghanistan but some augmentation of air units from elsewhere in the USSR could be required for maior operations A fullscale campaign into Pakistan would primarily draw upon Soviet forces in Turkestan Afghanistan and the Central Asian Military District None of these ground forces would be critical to a campaign against NATO Some units in the Caucasus region are earmarked for possible wartime use against NATO's southern flank that is eastern Turkey but the Soviets could choose to initiate no more than a holding action by several divisions in this area during a NATO-Pact conflict Warsaw Pact forces earmarked for operations against NATO are located in Eastern Europe and the western military districts of the USSR Consequently the military warning indicators for a Persian Gulf versus a European campaign would be largely exclusive in terms of geography and ground forces However Soviet air forces in the southern USSR might require reinforcement drawing upon assets of VGK-controlled air armies and military transport aviation divisions Such allocations could draw off combat aircraft and strategic lift forces that would potentially be used in a European campaign 3 5 c 53 The principal problem for US intelligence with regard to the security of Europe in the event of a Persian Gulf conflict would stem from probable increases in the readiness posture of at least selected elements of Pact forces facing NATO to guard against a possible NATO reaction Manifestations of heightened readiness could include expanded command and control activity limited mobilization increased alert posture and logistic preparations and changes in the disposition of air air defense naval and ground forces Such variations from normal peacetime posture would probably be pronounced in the event of a direct US-Soviet confrontation Depending on Its scale increased force readiness opposite NATO as a result of a crisis in the Persian Gulf could shorten the amount oGBP time required to prepare these forces for war and in any case would introduce additional ambiguity complicating the problem of assessment of some military warning Indicators and Moscow's intentions In Europe 3 5 c 3 5 c 0 qW Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 Ill WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND READINESS Warsaw Pact Doctrinal Concepts A Doctrinal Precepts e 3 5 c Seizing the Initiative and the Offense The Only Wav To Win a War The predominant tenet of Soviet doctrine is that decisive defeat of the enemy can only be achieved by seizing and maintaining the initiative through offensive operations 54 Decisive offensive action is the hallmark of Soviet military doctrine The Soviet war-fighting strategy that supports this doctrine dictates that the East European countries provide a buffer to protect the Soviet homeland so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be successfully mounted and prosecuted This philosophy provides the impetus behind Soviet emphasis on combat readiness early seizure of the initiative preemption and surprise a combined-arms approach to warfare and the requirement for force superiority in the main battle areas-backed up by strong reserves to assure the momentum of the attack Soviet and Warsaw Pact operational concepts and force developments reflect a systematic effort to meet these doctrinal requirements The reorganizations of Soviet air air defense and ground forces since the late 1970s are Indicative of continuing efforts to achieve doctrinal goals See Inset n Preparedness To Fight Nuclear War The Soviets believe that nuclear weapons will have a decisive impact in any future war This attitude is based on the notion that the existence of nuclear weapons shapes how a war must be fought regardless of whether such weapons would actually be used Force Superiority and Massed Firepower For the Pact this translates into selecting the principal enemy objectives to be seized or destroyed determining the most critical direction s along which to attack these objectives and making a decisive concentration of essential forces at the critical time on the direction s selected The Soviets stress the need to mass fires nonnuclear and nuclear ' rather than troops and equipment 55 Apart from the purely military aspects of doctrine the Soviets have long emphasized the impportance of moral-political preparation or stability of the rear during a war The Soviets view such preparation-not only of troops but the population as a whole-as very Important if not essential to the conduct of war and they put equal emphasis on the Combined Arno The Soviets believe that successful military operations require closely coordinated joint action by all components of their armed forces SurXarise The Soviet concept of the offensive is based an the attainment of at least tactical surprise The Soviets believe that technology has Increased the importance of surprise in modem warfare and that under present conditions the achievement of surprise may greatly influence not only the outcome of initial enPgoments but also the course of military operations In the Initial phase of a war effective functioning of political and economic institu- tions They believe that weapons of modern warfare would blur any distinction between front and rear in a future war Although the Soviets do not profess to have the ability to guarantee high morale particularly during nuclear attack they do recognize the steed to attempt to increve the psycbolo tit a3 press pEUR the general population and their mflaw forces to particular they believe the effectiveness of their vivil defense system in a nuclear war would depend heavily on the courage determination mid stamina of the Soviet population In uprd to their a ctattmy t' my believe that production facilities may be sublected to large-male destruction at the begirtntag of hostilities This means that it may not be Possible to rely tan the mobillution of emnomic resources as the war vro -CWHOULIdl orov dons far the r 10 rawal of manpower and equipment mecjaily vehibles from the economy to support the military mA t on to military control of large elements of the USSR s transportation and communicariow aystents n S6 7%e Warsaw Maws war-fighting concepts atae hold And aggressive but the exacution oaf tftese caunstmb guesents several problem 11e Vreparations coordinaticm and snaaetvcrs dtoUW by dogma mceots sye exraaaly ambitious rived onuplirated and wouldwvaerdy test tie aabliiites of both commandto and uwpx 'tike complexities axed imoortamues tavWvW bin rencuthm m concepts tin ilia battlefield would leave nanny apppatttanm for miscalcootitm index tivve mm in fudommdt delays Acrd coadriaiimt More the FaWs dodlind concepts are 3iot ttstaily wrnpaldble if rats vUn 3 for example grass for this reason supplies of weaporir Ammuni- tion equipment and food must be stot lupiled before war beans Then Soviob leave in place tl gxi wmd mechanisms to tmnsform the economy frogs a pear tithe to a wartime vo ture 'i9scste mmharitsms iaelntle 31 c tt ' tros a detailed tte tmeat d thts ad d Mto to VIA VdCM tntelli em DMMOK wI7B-it41 tst A difew Vad e and Stmtrm April l48a 3io 10--m - Vo Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c adopt an attack plan which puts top priority on speed in mobilizing deploying and committing their forces to seize the initiative and achieve tactical and operational force superiority they presumably could accomplish this only at the expense of failing to achieve full readiness of their forces populations and economies for war Likewise Pact planners seem to realize that the readiness or size of their military forces could only be increased at the risk of lessening or losing some degree of surprise Force superiority is tangible can be measured quantitatively and affords advantages that 3 5 c are more certain than those offered by surprise which could be compromised or lost at any time The Soviets accept the likelihood that under modern conditions strategic surprise may not always be attainable However they believe that extensive camouflage concealment and deception can enhance tactical or operational surprise under most circumstances even while striving for force superiority nl 57 Emphasis on combat readiness is a constant theme which supports the Pact's war-fighting doctrine It is a logical result of Russian and Soviet historical experience characterized by numerous Invasions and defeats by hostile neighbors In particular Soviet military thinking is still heavily Influenced by World War II experience when the lack of preparedness and initiative resulted in devastating territorial human equipment and economic losses The Soviets intend to fight any future European war on the territory of their enemies This requires that large combat-ready forces must be in place at the outset of hostilities Each component of the armed forces is considered to have a role-4f only a peripheral or contingent one--in anv major operation An increase In readiness by ground and tactical air units for example alight be paralleled by naval and strategic attack and defense forces even if the direct participation of thew forces tivas not anticipated ' From the Soviet verspactive foreewtdc or regional readiness could be extremely important since any conflict has the potential for expanding unexpectedly particularly in regard to the use of nuclear weapons 88 In the Soviet view mdiness is measured in two parametcra IFIM there u a need for powerful military farces in being a lairga weli-ettuipwd and W02trained militstr3t estpblubment bacsked up by strong 11IU S Vkh 41nd tim gaol nations ttoarever wopkl oat axomt ty W rMdiM ai 4111 Cl their fotsxa to 1118 MW tevta dm t It afau Pact k dm Lave the warm tocaat A the to mrt mW wme at f m res Ib by WkeuveN bmt aim M MM mi tow toady racUM AY or f to accomplish their missions regardless of the condi- tions under which war begins or is conducted Theoicetically full military combat readiness in peacetime requires all units to be completely manned equipped and thoroughly trained Pact planners however believe that this degree of readiness is not necessary or realistically feasible They expect that war probably would occur after a period of heightened tension called the period of threat The peacetime readiness posture of Pact forces reflects the bwlief that this period would provide warning thereby enabling the Pact to increase the readiness of its forces before -hostilities begin 10 Moreover Pact leader recognize that the economic cost of maintaining their military forces on a war footing is prohibitively high The Soviets' overall readiness philosophy therefore is to maintain forces in sufficient readiness to deter aggression to protect perceived national interests including the containment of nations in the Soviets here of influence and to defend home territories B Readiness Philosophy retttatt reserves Second the armed forces must be prepared 3 5 c 59 In general Pact units opposite perceived highthreat areas such as Central Europe as well as highly technical or critical forces such ascertain missile and signal units are kept relatively highly manned equipped and trained in peacetime but they are usually not manned at full strength Most Soviet forces in the USSR however are maintained at lower levels of manning equipment and training These units are the peacetime nucleus of large wartime forces that would be mobilized in an emergency The Soviets maintain most of their strategic nuclear forces in a high state of readiness in peacetime while only a small part of their national air defense forces are constantly maintained in a high readiness posture Provided below is a brief description of the readiness posture of Soviet strategic forces and fact general purpose forces I 3 5 c 60 SovW Stratt Anack rem Most Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile OCOM forces are rna atained at a high State cf alert by rotating alert status in individual units to alow for maintenance crew rest or change and pother needs Those missiles Atttou h some warutng time is ezp xutt pad f4mum are umlertata AM fmw WMh time wood be smastdee to matte war vrvparatmw They tmovdze as enemy eoWd aomeiwa taunrlan attic dh lit 4M 7'1xitr yciueyt6 d the thmo baw evsr enotodm anahermain dw NAws enmwY Ew m v a of cnaira4ned at toll seadt w for _C N Fm additimuf dnfammanm on she meadts ess 4 savkt strategic t7acm refer to WE id-3 66 a yobttfW for stray r hroracrCJMfitat 103 g9 1asiuara asq ct-sriute 0 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Too 3 5 c maintained in a high alert posture could probably be launched within five to 15 minutes following initiation of launch command transmission Online ICBMs are technically capable of being launched within one to three minutes after launch commands are received Tyuratam during the first 24 hours of ASAT operations - 62 Warsaw Pact Ground Maneuver Formations The Soviets make a clear distinction between ready and not ready portions of their ground maneuver forces Ready units are the most highly manned and the best equipped and trained and are at least minimally prepared for combat with little or no mobilization The most combat-ready Soviet forces are airborne divisions and units in Easteni Europe where Soviet interests are critical and a large Soviet population base is unavailable for mobilization Not ready units require extensive mobilization and probably would not be available for immediate combat operations These units are found exclusively within the and authenticated SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles ICBMs on alert possibly up to 90 percent of the force could probably be launched within seven to 5 minutes following initiation of launch command 3 3 b 1 transmission Those SS-20s not on alert status--eitlier in-garrison or a _____7launch areas in the field- could launch th eir m issi es between 30 minutes and two and a half hours depending on missile accuracy desired The Soviets do not maintain their strategic bombers on runway alert We believe that from a normal peacetime readiness posture 50 percent of USSR In the western USSR a mixed readiness posture these aircraft could be armed and launched in about is maintained around a small nucleus of ready units and a far larger number of cadre or not ready units 12 hours Twenty to 24 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines SSBNs typically are maintained at high readiness while in port or at sea Of these eight to 12 SSBNs are normally on patrol or in transit to patrol In general Soviet divisions in the western USSR are equipped with older models of equipment and may lack major items of equipment such as trucks and armored personnel carriers Further they are unable in peacetime to maintain a high level of combat capability clue to their lower level of peacetime manning and training Overall more than one-half of all Soviet divisions as well as many nondivisional support units are maintained in a not ready' posture in peacetime This large skeletal element of the force would require substantial preparation to overcome deficiencies in peacetime manning equipment and training '' Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact NSWP military planners use their own national classification schemes that differ in terminology and detail though not in areas SSBNs on patrol and some in port are capable of 3 5 e attacking targets in North America within 12 hours or less during normal peacetime readiness conditions and in considerably less time if they are monitoring communications more frequently than the normal twice daily as would be expected during a crisis 61 Soviet Strategic Defense Forces The Moscow antiballistic missile ABM system operates continuously and its radars are calibrated frequently by means of radar support satellites We believe that the ABM weapons complexes and supporting units are manned at nearly full strength using rotating shifts About 75 to 80 percent of the operational launchers have interceptor missiles mounted A small portion of the national air defense forces is mai ritained in a high state of readiness Air defense command posts and 11 Heowt Intelligence Commmtity assessments indicate dot Srnfet maneuver divisiom in Eastern Eume are manned at lower levds than previously emouted Soviet motorized rifle divisions are cow tamed to toe manned betwem 80and 85 peraeat of war authcdzed dreuatb -able tank divisions ate anus ed to ba mane betwEea a5 and 90 yemot of walime authmiaatiom nose divisions are still aaesmd to tee capable of irdttating and condmung offensive operat''nrts ncafrtst NATO 8 efrs to the btu VMW bAd i4enoe Memotsndum NI IN 844MI Amerind Maapdwer of War aw Pact Fwm in the NA70 Gufddenea Area FMn drmuarv 1984 and CIA R awh Paper 900 64-IOD88i 'x Manna L eh Soutat Graurrd F vxo14411 iCeramf fmrnire Iune I early warning and gerund-controlled intercept sites are manned continuously Each aviation regiment usually has several aircraft on sMp alert that jean be airborne within a few minutes after receipt of an order to launch Surface-to-air missile SAM re iments and brigades rotate alert responsibilitles among their battalions and within battallow among laurmh tnmm We do not know the specific readiness status of tiro orbital antisatellite system ASAP' interceptors at the Tvuraxam Missile Test Center or of the other systems that have the potential to interfere with Us satellite Gaun ready intenntars however r cold be moved to a launcher and fired within one to two boom Vile believe the Soviets probably cmld launch three to five orbital ASAT interceptors from each of the two pads xt 3 5 c I ei Fat a detafled Aiseossfon 4 maamimt vracth in Soviet gonind tadta rater m the CtA I2asezttrdt diaper StIV 63-10148M Manning FrocttMturd Pamraa m SWW Ground Fbrne t7rrets AuW 1983 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c Far a 40w3ted acwMitift'ef the ready nor soviet Gmund Farces inlet to the IatrMMCY rata11 am Memorandaar NI HM 63 30618 Th fnmrgf Socfet Gn 4 Vow% blweniber INN 3 5 c 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 00 0638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 I 3 5 c principle from that of the Soviet Union The NSWP ground forces would constitute important elements of the Pact's first-echelon forces earmarked for early ed at-sea operations Even Soviet naval units deployed out of area spend much of their time at anchor or in commitment against NATO For this reason the more important to be ready to go to sea than to be at sea Under this system operational experience and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificed to achieve high materiel availability As a result of this readiness philosophy the Soviets probably would have more than half of their submarines and major surface combatants available for combat within a few days NSWP nations maintain the bulk of their maneuver forces as ready units comparable to Soviet forwarddeployed forces ' 3 5 c 63 Warsaw Pact Air Forces Pact military plan- ners expect their air forces to be ready to launch a massive coordinated air campaign at the beginning of hostilities Soviet air defense interceptor units are maintained at a high level of readiness and could mount air defense operations within a few minutes of alert Soviet offensive air forces would require about 48 hours to prepare a command and control structure for front-level operations and 72 hours for theaterlevel operations We estimate that Soviet air forces including their logistic systems could be fully combat ready within seven to 12 days after a decision to mobilize Although some coordinated combat operations would be possible before completion of mobiliza- tion the Soviets would prefer not to begin major air operations without full preparations We judge that the NSWP air forces are maintained in a somewhat lower readiness posture than Soviet air forces Aircraft and crews drawn from the Soviet and NSWP training establishments would need at least 30 days to mobilize and might still have limited combat effectiveness withdut additional refresher training F-1 64 Warsaw Pact Naval Forces '' Generally speaking the Soviet naval readiness philosophy stresses readiness to deploy for combat on relatively short notice rather than routine deployment of large forces To achieve a maximum force generation capability in times of crisis thr Soviet Navy empholzes mainte- nance and in-port in-area trainino rather than extend- Fo r additional details nfer to the DIA drift Delaw tat haence Document DOWHOMMI 77re Readings a thv Nanswitt Warsaw Pact Grassndfnrdaa id Refer to the fa tmvfsra strsdies for ttre ter W an the rauilam of Warsaw ftet V_XA doves CIA Yieae rvh Firer M40a tny end Morrttdtr rig area um to TAO TY4n Pact Ground Fmvm SOV 88-I02Ott 7t Desem' fr INX SC OOM 89 as Car rvr Zc oc C ara I CIA tuteiiiaonce Assessment 9av 89-IOMI Ground Forms araernr spatrpm Marvb IB i wmw Faer adder to the fouawbg studr MGM detail dm Sovi t adr tmdhra tmemsemy tnWham a Memorandum Nil IWQIJ TU Rradirress 411 Soviet Air FwM AwO ton ' 'ells wte neet to warrtime tvoto kmw a anmsbtrrnB lV armrw fad fleet satssis t dd SMO #t bdk and W i erT hiro s The beset % meat would bm me wonme votat ived Poet wWke of SiavK 8uftraSuu and PM94 amunian forger port From the Soviet perspective it is apparently and some 70 percent within two weeks In a recent exercise a high percentage of surface combatants and submarines from the Baltic and Northern Fleets deployed within 48 hours Given several days' warning we estimate that Soviet Naval Aviation would have more than 90 percent of its aircraft available although this percen a e could be sustained for only a short time t9 3 5 c 65 Warsaw Pact Rear Services Soviet logistics doctrine generally requires that rear service elements must be as combat ready as the forces they support and that logistic preparations for war be accomplished prior to or soon after the beginning of hostilities During the past decade the Soviets have methodically improved their capability to support forces in East Germany A buildup of logistic stocks which once might have been a key indicator of impending mili- tary operations now probably has little potential to provide such warning Many rear service units are manned at reduced strength in peacetime however and would require mobilization Some rear service units do not exist in the military peacetime force stracture Certain elements of the rear services strueture such as medical and transport units would be mobilized from the Pacts civil economies The Pact stations have stockpiled large quantities of ammuni- tion POLb spare parts and other supplies that could be used by existing rear service units in the initial period cif war until the rear sec Aces structure was fully mobilized The Pact nations would also institute vuhtaary control over kern transportation lines GBPn order to have responsive #mnszaorfation syswm end assure that supplies from rear areas could be moved when and adhere netted Thnagh GSFC elements have substanttal nandtVbI W motor transport capability other fronts would require a large influx of national transDattation assets to meet warxime requirem nts F'dnd Fbraddttivu daa dm ffia ttadtnassaif Soviet draval4prpn cdrr tunml Shate and Fa7 elms Sib trA OW 3$8tk 28 Cotdber tONE7 to the fO%wtna dowmentr ME I-TNM SovW _irrd imetsaetrw inte4taenoe N den NJ UM %tOO OM V Iteadbu ed SMW Natd Form Yon t9w q Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Tom ly the Soviet and Pact practice of limiting the use of most equipment in peacetime means that they would enter combat with a relatively new and reliable fleet of combat and support vehicles c0l 66 Warsaw Pact Command Control Communications and Intelligence The transition of the Pact's command control and communications structure from a peacetime to a wartime posture would involve the formation of national- and theater-level commands and the activation of additional command control and communications facilities that do not exist on a permanent basis in peacetime Moreover this conversion process would be accompanied by intensified intelligence collection to determine the activity location and status of enemy forces and installations Among the measures required to bring the Pact's command control and communications structure to a wartime posture are - Assumption of direct operational command and control of Pact military forces by the Soviet Supreme High Command - Establishment of extensive communications and data transmission networks citizens -Compulsory military or civil defense service for adults -Requisition of privately owned property espe- cially vehicles - Suspension of normal rights of workers and enforced labor - Resubordination of paramilitary forces to the armed forces - Restriction oGBP travel closure of public institutions banning of public meetings censorship banning the use of radios restriction on all forms of communication confiscation of firearms evacuation of specified danger zones - The granting of extraordinary powers to National Defense Councils the transition from peacetime to wartime readiness These control systems are designed to assure appropri- The actual time required far the transition from a peacetime to a wartime Pact command control communications and intelligence system is not known During peacetime however command and control preparations are usually under bout 10 days before major exercises begin 67 All Pact nations have stational defense laws which define the towers of the state in an emergency and the legal procedures for converdou to a wartime posture Among the measures which these laws empower the star to accomplish are -- Proclamation of a state of emergency or special period in the event of a thmtened attack or in fulfillment of fact treaty obligation M wu % cdW em mvauan 4km n AVO u denlsaed to W mit fieia t of the maxim arm Uw d aombat-readr equWmew -ad n jw mmluamem and ceuatr Mau cemr7trscams ant Pal CWXMapuoa to peaasY m Far Uik cder to OU dmw IaUN4w Ocewnctk IDDB- i woks t MW4 Form Ofti ertnam low 1964 a NV 3 5 c 68 The Pact elation have established dual national and military readiness control systems to facilitate the implementation of their defense laws and to manage sonnel between major Soviet and NSWP commands C Readiness Control Systems 3 5 c - The suspension of normal constitutional rights of -- Exchange of operations groups and liaison per- --- Review and update of war plans and issuance of combat orders 3 5 c 3 5 c ate reaction to international or other situations while minimizing to the extent possible disruption of normal activity The Pact countries have defined several stages characterizing the international environment normal peacetime conditions a period of threat involving two phases increased tension or xhreat and increased tension with immediate threat of war and war Fact leaders believe a period of increased tension or threat could last for several wadm or months while a period of increasW w sion with immediate threat of war would vrobably be a much shorter periodperhaps several b ours to several days $petcffic roadiness measures and procedures have been established ctenerally corresponding to these stages for ss %taty and security forces the economy and civil defense F 3 5 c Natiomtl Readiness t3o rtr01 System % The stational control system is called the National Defense R diness Plan W aystemp it provides for the mobilitatlon v%diness of each nation's tovulaUON economY Qrd 8vveratment hUdtt UQM fxtc'Ita rig the mouliaation of remVists am eQuipment aeQufti ed fia milftty vwpoma Ism dust an page 42 Unlike the military counterptut wAem which Is faequen ly mardally bested fn exercises there has been We testing of 3 5 c V pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Warsaw Pact National Defense Readiness Plan or System Peacetime al reserves together with limited numbers of reservists might be called up Movement restrictions would be placed on vehicles in use in the economy that have mobilization assignments The duration of the period of Increased readiness would be determined more by the nature of the crisis than by the time necessary to complete preparatory measures Measures a wof-ted with this readiness condition could be implemented nationwide or selectively immediately or on a gradual basis The counterpart military readiness condition is increased combat readiness The economy satisfies routine requirements for the armed forces and creates the necessary stockpiles of supplies required during mobilization and the initial stages of war Party and government officials perform normal duties The nation is maintained in constant national defense readiness while the equivalent military readiness condition is constant combat readiness Period of Threat Increased international tension would initiate an' evaluation of the situation If it is determined that a significant threat exists measures would be taken to increase readiness to rapidly convert to a war posture These measures could range from a Iimited'eallup of men and equipment to a full mobilization of the population economy armed forces and civil defense establishment These measures would be designed to assure the mobilization and availablllty of required resources prior to the outbreak of hostilities During a period of gradually increasing or fluctuating tension - Threal-ofwar National Defense Readiness includes measures leading to a definite transition of the population economy and civil defense organs to a war posture Government ministries and state administrative organs begin to assume their full wartime organizations and provide additional mobilization support to the armed forces More intense but still selective mobilization occurs The preparations could be divided into a number of phases to appropriately respond with each stage of the devel- corresponding military readiness condition is threat-of-war combat readiness oping situation while avoiding unnecessary disruption Although the actual number of Phases would probably - midi National Dgfewe Readiness Final and vary with particular circumstances preparations gener- full-scale preparations for war Including largescale or national mobilization conversion of industry to wartime production schedules and assumption of a full wartime posture by government agencies and administrative organs Ideally measures associated with readiness condition would be implemented prior to hostilities The counterpart military readiness condition is full combat ally would fall Into three subdivislow - Increaaed National Defense Readinerai Characterized by measures intended to assure tire ability of various components to mobilize rapidly if required and to increase the likely efficiency of the components once mobilized These measures would not result in major changes in the national economy Equipment and supplies field fn nation- readiness civil economic Administrative readiness promdures and comparatively little is known about theta 7Mey apparently parallel millwy readiness procedures and war stational defense readiness and full national defense readiness would be hWY dbnwtive difficult to conceall and would be a strong indication that the Pad snetions believed war was Iikeiy or imminent re dVO1yF7 conditlom% although there is tome variation in torminoloity arum the Pact countries The procedures and preparations cited in oational re4lness darts would ultimately ctt ndum e in a nation achieving as wait me posture with production manpower mateshtl and Miiltory $eit 4noss Contrdl System 7D 7be trunwort resources ores dzed to suppport e armed forces Preparatory measures associated with the vari- military erentrral system is the Pact-wide SwWnt of OornW Readies which stipulates rea h ness alert and mobiiizaUan mmulternents and vwcedures for the armed form seal iarset on sage 4% The ous national readlim emAitins could be irtftmed immediately on a larues or atatiamid scalp err tribally four re sites emstditi w Vrodde for art orderly man- and wlecOmly as the nltuation may dioute Somme gget W tea anion froxm a normal teacetime po tum to fall tnobiilt attoon mad motion for war Commanders Rave detafled instructitrrts ealinini Che steps and Precautionary racasures--trart y those indtlaw dtuinyl increased natlmW defense nearli - xrttld be acvmw1 shad covertly enedAy if bdtb trBd wadu- vrocedures that awn fie accomplished to move through the fattr levels and these measures are Ere- Ally 1'rcvmtwv mwtstwm assocEated with ewmi-af42 TIcP it Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 To 3 5 c Warsaw Pact Armed Forces Readiness System a Threat-of-War Read Hess b Combat alerts initiate movement of ground and air units to dispersal areas airfields Naval units continue to disperse Selective mobilization continues Some specialized units signal electronic security reconnaissance may be mobilized #o wartime strength Control of ground maneuver divisions is transferred from the garrison command center to a field command post Communication systems in command posts are set up for full-scale operation and Constant Combat Readiness Lowest level of readiness signifying routine planned training and activity It is not prescribed by special order but is a standard term designating normsl peacetime posture Leaves and passes may be granted at commanders' discretion but weapons vehicles and equipment are required to be maintained in such condition that they can be used on short notice Increased Combat Readfneae Unit personnel are recalled from leave or temporary duty and units conduoting field training return to garrison Preparations would normally be largely confined ka garrison locations Officers and troops may be confined in garrison Mobilization and contingency plans are reviewed and updated by staffs Unit personnel remove equipment from storage and additional communication channels are requisitioned from the state-controlled network Operations groups with communication facilities are dispatched to allied nations Reconnaissance of the enemy is intensified without violating national borders Personnel are equipped according to wartime authorizations Missile units move to siting areas Air defense attire are deOwed to cover troops during movement from garrison Some air defense forces are dispersed and brought to higher levels of crew and missile readiness tmderstrength units prepare reception points for reservists Field command pasts are deployed and partially manned Security measures are increased and selected reservists with special skills maybe called up Reservists already an active duty are retained and scheduled demobilization of conscripts may be Postported Repairs on equipment are accelerated and completed Alt defense missiles are transferred to launchers Selected strategic and General purpose naval forces deploy to dispetrsalioperating areas Pined and FuIL Combat Readiness Felt mobilization takes place with tutderstrength or newly activated units receiving tall wartime authorizations of personnel and equipment Ground maneuver units move to their primary secret' dispersal areas if thls leas not already occurred A wartlnse command structure is activated Reconnaissance of smites and deployment lanes is eon- rotary wing aircraft are tamed and preFPned for takeoff and dispersal airfields am Prepared to receive aircraft Fn certain uses units may etigaylo in training in or near their 8arrtsatu after all preparatory measures rave been taken Such a readiness condition could be in effect far hours days or waeka ducted and traffic control units are augmented By special order units caverirtc state borders could be reinforced Air defense fames sire -in readiness to repel IIttaC1U and AltrfJrAft am hi readiness for Ukeoff 1 The t'ad mtioas iomtaliv adanW this level d ne dinesr in 1819 'ihe paraose of this relatively nesv toed of rexdlaeaa araunnuy 8 to etinit s i4eightear9 Exrt susrainabk lave of manutand fiw w4 force rwdiabss to occommadnte o tprdamped t enod of WWe%tdq Vet owed thrat o Measures cited am tlluArative rather t4aa rtliavstive ia pddttton to those eondlt ona died the Sovkb apparentiv iv tntrodudwt a aerr teadirwas condition to alert tames that a suttprhe many strode win froapomi of mass destruction kskn oauatas 3 5 c practiced taY staffs and units in mmurne AddittonallY tlto Pact Warome Command Statute and itnilitary disWats apt t ven acne UCtW ftsrukatitnit Kin the thsaeat vaxiotss uxw wsodataaf width zcadir m catttdtl9ons m1d be flttftiated o pitily or gradually litiaas are AeSisncB to pDavSde a The reltdiim alelfberate am segtueratfai aotppzr aclt sc ' aVltievir-g iFoIl t mdhm for zvar Vtxler ad dxctttrlataraam how sue car bolh 6ntmwdiate 1$ of readiness couM be Oftea that fi form AM irttoye to full combat mdiness s9isn fiSrm ith R br Prizaat peavehiure Post car inch t readiness quently subsequent VWtooob iide the Soviet Staff with r It basis and tt commtuticaYlons prxloedurc for alexft NSW orrice rrtd dictating their Ceadirim iaostw The sYstsam is extremely flsale Sh otdd iatetupttinttttl hktsttut iise or argl3ciinal dlsttub ltncres our the xtt7tdlncxEUR siosture of an aplmNigt r Pardon 0' d the Pict's titrnitccf ftaittm could he sERetivCY akltttl witltatlt inlt3atit taisrnpttve and apiGtdvie ftlxtGmSde mtum Depead3nai on rile sxllftlcvl and militxt3r sltttnti uu ilia vttritiwAt YeukblEtcis a rtllitxas tasuld des UAW m ar li militsrar fords in r s9t4le tstxmbrV or all i'uh atttion% toile kWh of MVIM me or More Gttigtte tsys7L 79te lister ta POarut'l auatt artilittcry neaciir ttems together iproaide dmr the trorttrol and aoora9inaRSon d13 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425_ C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 Tan-s Wt necessary to take a country or the Pact and its armed forces from routine peacetime readiness conditions to readiness for war The two systems are extremely flexible and are designed to interact and complement one another but they are not necessarily intended to be totally consistent for example the readiness posture of the armed forces of a nation may be higher than the readiness of the nation or the Pact nations as a whole Moreover the military readiness system is Pactwide while the national readiness system is not Neither system has been fully tested on a national or Pact-wide basis but we believe these systems provide Pact leaders with the necessary mechanisms to move their nations and military forces to a wartime posture 44 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 IV HOW THE WARSAW PACT WOULD GO TO WAR 72 We believe hostilities in Europe would more likely result from an escalating political crisis than from a sudden decision to go to war Understanding the great risks involved in a war with NATO Moscow 3_5 c probably would make a major effort to resolve such a crisis peacefully and might exercise some care to attempt to assure that its actions were not mistaken for hostile intent On the other hand Moscow would actively pursue almost any means short of war to secure an advantage in a crisis including diplomacy pressure tactics and threats involving genuine military preparations 73 Under all foreseeable circumstances the Soviets and the Pact would recognize that war with NATO in Central Europe would require an enormous coalition effort that entailed great risks both of uncontrolled escalation and destruction as well as serious adverse repercussions elsewhere The following discussion de- scribes how the Warsaw Pact might prepare for war with NATO from Its current political economic and military posture If over a period of months or years relations between Western and Pact nations deterio- be extraordinary The decision process would be difficult contentious and probably prolonged The rehability of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies would almost certainly be among the matters discussed by the Politburo Defense Council at this time The decision probably would establish the intent to prepare for war with NATO and the degree of urgency required but it probably would not establish the specific date and time of an attack or irrevocably commit the leadership to war The final decision to attack and the timing of the attack mi ht not be made until hours before its execution Warsaw Pact Consultations Ili The point in the decisionmaking process at which the Soviets would begin discussions with their Pact allies might depend largely on the circumstances of war initiation In their military exercises and propaganda the Pact generally assumes a NATO attack and that a period of threat would precede hostilities Intra-Pact consultations would have to occur during this period given the degree to which Soviet planning rated badly the political economic and military posture of both alliances would probably change If this were to occur the Judgments in this Estimate depends on coalition approach to fighting a war with might no longer be valid Nevertheless the contingencies described in this chapter could possibly result from a severe crisis developing from an extraordinary concern about the passibility of a bolt from the blue attack 'by NATO They believe however that the event such as a confrontation over Berlin Yugoslavia the Middle East Persian OX oil or a nuclear acci- 3 5 c government and military officials although the security measures surrounding these deliberations would dent Pact war preparations-- although interrelated-have been categorized into four separate pros for discussion purpa political economic civil ddwxse and mihtary n A Political Prelmotions The Doclslwanakinq ftocass 74 The desisiunn to prepare far or initiate war with NATO would lx wade by the Politburo of the t cunnmunist Party of the SWet Vnion probably on the recommendsitlon of the USSR Defense Council The Soviet Defense Minister and other Sodet military leaders induding at least the clof of the G 4 Staff and the Commander to Chef of tho Warsaw NO GDni wined Ajrmad F urccg probably wry puticWU in the deliberations that would precede the ably 1 atburo s decistam The decision p would involve scores of supponing h1gh40v%4 VWy NATO 76 In their military literature the Soviets express escalation of some regional crisis would be the most likely circumstance four war initiation following a period of political warning heightened tension and orewar mobilization In arty vvenL the standard fact exercise scenario which generally involves reaction to a NATO attack is untended lay commanders to test theft for olzations der Less chain Weal conditions rand does not n e oWy reflect accurst Soviet or Pact veremmons of wait initiaaltim NSWR officers do to ai dilate an attack art bigim t NATO i We believe the Soviet vo'li and wear generally BUM this view altbouOh we have little information oat the vercemons of ft Soviet W dership in this revard x houvisr dw chovunstances of war initiation howe Reir the Soviets' military dependence on heir stiles would be at criftl factor Although Tire Soviets amtWbterlly mild wJth WM how their allies certain Atinrur WA Per azsMts of then' owe d ms of the aalsis auctions and decisions sfftams fthe sum aw of the Fia 6 OvrnbkW AceaW Forms a ouhl rant be witbheM without shy ais'king 9i w's war IM Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 ' 3 5 c plans The Soviets however would certainly seek to ensure the tactical surprise and integrity of their attack plans by maintaining tight security over certain response The East European leaders should they believe that war was likely to occur would begin to operational aspects of their planning for war Measures to suppress and control potential dissident elements would almost certainty be taken in most or all Pact nations Circumstances permitting Soviet and Pact leaders might take weeks or months to 77 Recently acquired information on the Warsaw Pact Statute for Wartime Command indicates that it provides mechanisms which would allow for a virtual automatic response by NSWP military units to orders initiated in Moscow without further consultations with East European national authorities In short during periods of crisis Soviet legal authority would essentially abrogate the sovereign rights ofo the East European states by assuming control over at least some portion of their armed forces The Statute does not reveal the nature or extent of political consultations prior to the implementation of the statutory mechanisms although the Pact has a central polieymaking body-the Political Consultative Committee PCC The peacetime process of decislonmaking and implementation in the Pact is closely controlled by the Soviet Union through ostensibly multinational bodies such as the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces East orchestrate a massive propaganda campaign to motivate the Pact populace to support a decision to go to war In the event of a decision to go to war only after a short period oGBP preparation the Soviets would have to accept the risks of uncertain support for their action particularly from the NSWP nations They might however be able to gain cooperation initially through information control and portraying the Pact as the threatened party 79 Prior to initiation of hostilities against NATO the Warsaw Pact--and the USSR in particular--would seek to exploit to the fullest extent the potential of public statements and diplomacy as an instrument of policy The fact would avoid conveying specific infor- forces other than their own The personal intervention mation regarding an attack but Presenting a public of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces is often decisive in the pursuit of Soviet objectives during peacetime and we believe the Soviet political and military leadership would likewlse domtnate dechionmaking during a crisis with NATO In sum although pee cannot Judge to what extent the counsel of East European lenders would be sought in rationale for it would be essential to the Pact's efforts to convey to NATO Its concerns to seek a solution short of war if possible and to prepare its population for the possibility of major hostilities Depending on their own perceptions of the situation and the threat some East European leaders aright well make public statements independent of the Soviets to clarify NATO intentions verify the nature of the ducat and seek anurances fr4ma the Soviets and other Pact leaders that a de don to prepare for or initiate hostilities was a proper and necessaw nxvonse Pact public and private pronouncements and diplomatic Initiatives would be designed to amomplish the fohlowbr making the Initial decision to prepam for or Initiate war the anticipated reactions of the principal Pact political leaders would almost certainly weigh heavily In the decatsiom Sooner or later the commitment or at least amAesaence of the aprincipal East European leaders would be mQulred for the Soviets to effectively execute their war plans apW NATO hgl4cal Pr praration of 11w Populatian 78 A ssuminat a dedston to prepare for wax Immediate camcera for the Soviets would be to maximtze Internal security and aggro the support and stsbFility of the populations of the USSR and the l European ttatloa ff the Soviet It aderablp atariouAy contemplated war with NAM it is virtually c wwn tbat the Sovlets would dez tit tlt domestic propagiaY h the shame of a beiglaftW threat ham the West and would Seek to Justify an a wropriate military 3 5 c International Propaganda and Diplomatic Initiatives Europeans assigned to the Staff do not hold positions of real authority and are denied knowledge of any the process of 3 5 c take steps on their own to prepare their populations -- Inform the NATO Reveernments of the not and extent of Pact voncern and exert pre mm far a suitable solution short of war ExVmt any differences among NATO member staters o-- Isolate the United States from China and Mun -- Attempt to 1aew neutral nations oat Hof a war ljparticularly Swrnden lE Inlands Austria Swttatulaaads amd Y ugaslwftA - - Id VaWble satin active or vasslve assistance of neutrA mu ms 3 5 c 0 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 moo- ' dot - Inform and convince the Pact leadership elites and populace of the threat and prepare them for possible hostilities - Convince the world community of the validity of Pact concerns justify Pact military measures and warn of the dangers of support for NATO - Secure support from non-European Communist countries and the Third World 3 5 c The Pact's propaganda campaign would probably intensify over time as Moscow grew impatient for a satisfactory solution short of war or saw the situation worsening This media blitz however would not necessarily show a steady progression in form or substance Temporary lulls in militant statements are possible perhaps related to new diplomatic efforts but would not necessarily indicate any fundamental change in the Pact's contemplation oGBP a military solutionF__1 tary requirements and changed economic priorities Provisions also have been made for civil enterprises to rapidly deliver vehicles to the military during an emergency The drivers of these vehicles are reservists who along with their vehicles ore organized into quasi-military units called awokolonny In peacetime these units are periodically called up to support military exercises and they would be mobilized on a much larger scale to support wartime military requirements 3 5 c 81 The Soviets have made provisions for virtually all segments of their industry to support wartime military operations Comprehensive planning detailed mobilization plans the maintenance of excess production capacity and reserve stocks of raw materials and components are among the extensive preparations and B Economic Preparations 80 All Pact nations have plans that provide for the conversion of their economies to a wartime posture refer to paragraphs 68 and 69 and inset referenced therein In preparing for war with NATO Moscow and its allies could not be certain whether such a war would be short or long nuclear or nonnuclear As a matter of prudence Pact leaders would have to consider a full range of economic preparations They have already stockpiled large quantities of critical commodities and would consider additional stockpiling The process of converting transportation industdal and agricultural systems to a full wartime posture would be disruptive time-consumins aW observable Changes would occur across all economic eecstors and would be observable in manufactarin% labon agriculture construction trade xnd finance and distr3lbttion systems Such a process would require months to complete In its entirety thoush it need no be camoapleted prior to war initiation At soma paint the Soviets would w4bably halt Ilse flow of their 0 and gas resources to West European countrtm Some ensures would require esrly implementation such as military aonuol over tramportolon syamm The readying of tr ovartiatiom facilities to support Pact military operations would be me of the mot essenttal as well u disruove anti chsrrmble Pact war pia The wtority availa'btlft of sy -railroads civil aviation mervbxnt fleet hfdways Inland waterway transpart-ts an rate pad cif Pact tivria military logistic plans and military control would be implemented at least selectively prior to during or soon after the initiation of military mobilization Considerable time probably weeks would be required to reorganize transportation systems to meet both mili- measures designed to accomplish the conversion of industrial facilities from peacetime to wartime production In peacetime most defense plants produce bout civilian and military goods Mobilization plans for these plants call for increasing military production by curtailing civilian production consolidating mili- tary production lines relaxing a uality standards for certain products increasing work shift schedules expioitin exeess production capacity and usins machinery more intensively Many Wants are scheduled to vonvert to military production in wartime for example civil producers of precision instruments electron- Ica aircraft and shops At least some of them plants maintain riaobilimtion stockpiles-eguipment and tooling raw vnterbN and other supplies necessary to convert to production of aMary goods Most NSWP dderase ploots attd vmny civilian enterprises appear to have wartime omvcrsion plans that are similar in mew and content to soviet plans n 82 Tim Sovkb apw rently expect to accompUish essential conversion to wartime production over a period ch throe to sic months Sam modurtion in existing defense plants could be aocamoUshed warm a few 403 to several weeks GDOVersion of civilian plants to military moduovon could be aopornplished wlthtn sevex 1 wecU 9 the rosary eWpment is sicced or inrmlled art the pkrft Modest adoolin if rem vd could talrc iv to aseveral m major zooiirg and construction to ex d production of military goods to rcew plarits aordd take from aeverail IV qo roved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c months to well over a year for complex products Relocation oGBP selected plants required by civil defense plans could extend the conversion process by several weeks to several months U 85 With adequate warning time the USSR's top military and civilian leadership would be relocated in hardened exurban fixed facilities or mobile command posts CPs Most party and government agencies and many industrial enterprises have one or more exurban CPs and or relocation facilities Military district commanders would assume direct control of local civil defense activities through their deputies for civil defense The Soviets plan to employ a combination of 83 The Soviets have made considerable preparation for converting economic sectors to a wartime posture Despite these preparations however converaicn world require extensive and expensive changes in priorities resource allocation production and foreign trade and therefore could not readily be fully accomplished in the short term If these conversions were initiated however they would suggest serious concern over an increasing danger of hostilities over the long run or perhaps deliberate sheltering and evacuation to protect the general popu- lation of cities the consider likely targets during a nuclear attack 86 Civil defense measures would be initiated according to military and national readiness conditions as the situation may dictate During a period of increased readiness evacuation plans would be updated maintenance performed on equipment designated for use during evacuation and postattack recov- tanning to initiate war at some time in the future C Civil Defense Preparotions 21 84 The Soviet Union clearly has the most extensive and effective civil defense program among the Pact nations The Soviets believe that a future war with NATO would place extreme demands on their homeland Civil defense measures are designed to counter the destruction and disruption associated with the ery shelters prepared for occupation and preparations made to distribute supplies of food medical equipment and protective clothing During threat of-war readiness ' exurban CPs would be activated and at least partially staffed dispersal or evacuation of selected officials and enterprises probably would occur and officials would begin functioning in their wartime worst eventuality-general nuclear war Civil defense measures could be Initiated in the early stages of a weesement roles During the 'full readiness ' condi- crisis and integrated with political economic and military preparations The primary purpose of these tion dispersal and evacuation could be implemented measures would be to protect key party government homeland were anticipated We are uncertain when the Soviets would declare a special period or whethcr this condition is essential for implementation of the more disruptive civil defense mwureoF___ on a large or national scale if nuclear attacks on the military and economic leaders institutions and to a lesser degree the population in s eneral Soviet civil defense measures however encompass far more than humanitarian considerations they are designed to provide for the survival of a functioning wartime D Militm y Preparations management system Specifically these measures are EnVtoyment of liitaxr w Poo Ponces intended to provide 87 The Warsaw Pact has developed contingency plans for military wratiow am all of its land and MATT ime frwr-tiexa 1P4d VbMners clearly expert CenUO lEwwe to be the decbtm arena in a war with NA vO fiat thhev slap have Plans for offeasive action mglm tflsmlring Cientral Europe i1Ve an the NA have little direct ev1llenac tnt the Pact's view of the ttmtmt of attacks on NAWs flanks In viWon to an ion Cruel FWropa The aped for tuilftilexed oGBPfsr wwJ opezutiotss from their 1Nmthern Fleet bases would almost certaiAv cause the Soviets to atn-ke -- Continuity of party government a am4c Arid military leadership at all levels -- Mobilization of human and material sesaurces -- Support of military operations -- Continuity of essential onomte ataivtty --Ounduct of postattack recovery operations e Fora deustecl treatment al thueubiect refer m t ee trmeretaetxv Intellto hl A MntIMU KI UM sa-1mm SMAK'tetra mu gt meett Va h4 c Vdi t ere er00p Cbn04W4 Dmembe r 1% duewtM4 the Inaa Ua of a rou tip trtct wn ap 0 otAar eaoa Wultme poatnrra mia to tuA #ktaoao ttaeipaence t-1 8 t-tA L1SSt6lrM F i baa aa iYaowt 14 #dttarv Aatrtxtfr#Lbttt - 41 A ispeaW period b a sbtnt am w cre tgOw wbkh would afte tzar a detd9 tteiusneat to the OMOYTumft d Pnot fora-% ror to dho toter b t term NemaramAm NI HM 83t x NAM div Muld 9 100 may i A 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 NATO facilities in northern Norway and probably attempt to occupy territory there The urgency of this need would probably lead them to take action concur- Politburo would probably be limited to only the most crucial military decisions The Defense Council a group made up of selected members of the Politburo establishes military policy and provides broad guidelines for the employment of military forces In wartime we believe the Defense Council would form the nucleus oGBP the national defense command organization see figure 1 on page 50 n rently with an attack in Central Europe We would also expect attacks on NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean to occur concurrently with operations in Central Europe None of the other potential flank offensives would appear to have this degree of urgency although the Pact would probably move against the Turkish Straits early in a war We judge that the Pact would be unlikely to initiate war by mounting would be designated Supreme Commander in Chief CINC in wartime and would head the Supreme High Command Verkhmmove GlavnokomandovaniyeVGK of the Armed Forces of the USSR The VGK may be controlled as it was in world war II by a senior internal command group called the Siavka In addition to the party General Secretary VGK membership probably would include the Minister of Defense as the Deputy Supreme CINC the three first deputy ministers of defense the Chief of the General Staff the First Deputy Minister for General Affairs the CINC of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and the CiNCs of the five services of the Soviet armed forces-who also are deputy ministers of defense The Soviets make no allowance for East European participation in the VGK simultaneously but the Pact almost certainly would conduct secondary offensives or holding actions to keep NATO from shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe to compel commitment of NATO reserves and to weaken NATO forces on the flanks in anticipation of further operations 3 5 c a war with NATO is the attainment of air superiority and the early neutralization of NATO's theater nuclear forces The Pact would probably attempt to achieve these objectives in a nonnuclear offensive by means of a massive air operation Aircraft involved in the air operation would attempt to establish three or more corridors through NATO's forward air defenses by saturating and destroying the air defenses is and around the air corridors The primary targets of attack would be NATO's Pershing 11 and ground-launoW cruise missile GLCM bases airbases where nuclear capable aircraft are located nuclear weapons depots other tactical nuclear weapons delivery systems and key command control acrd communications and logistics facilities and Interceptor brm F_ 3 5 c 90 The General Secretary of the Communist Party major ground offensives against all NATO sectors 3 5 c 3 5 c 88 The Soviets believe one of the critical factors in 3 5 c Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute 81 The Soviets increased their control measures over the Pact's military form In 1980 when the Pact stations except Roumania formally ratified the Statute for the Wartime Command of the Combined Armed Form of the Warsaw Pact The Statute and subsequent protocols in effect give the Soviet General Staff functioning as the executive arch of the Supreme High Command of the Pact's Combined Armed Force a legal basis to exercise total operational contrd over the armed farces and natianO vesw of the Pact met Warsaw Pact Wartime Military Control Structure 89 Moscows success in achieving its wvAlme ob- 'leer states except i o ann Implementation of the jectives would depend largely nn the Soviets' ability to control and coordinate multinational combined-arms operations of great sCoyae and connpl Aty A ircWW0ters of the Warsaw Pact Ombined Armed Forces operates in V 4cow in peacetime but does not cormtrcl the armed forams of member states Fa-ch m try exercises such Contra through Its natimw Command authority Overall ddense plamUm b awdinataeil among the Pao nations but the proven is driven by Soviet deddom nom Tice cbramande r in Mot SW Chief of Staff of the Pod's Combined Armed Farr have always beers Soviet germrarl affiaars Tim alamate monument communlrallons mocedure provides the Soviet General S4ff Valb at more ratsid and reliable system to Vontrrol the m4pass posture of Pact fon m Incla alertins mobs and organizing Volts for combat At presunt these arlert messages would be uansnat%4 by 3ite'Sovhtt Gemal staff to dw NSWP General SUM vxcept Romania and them be immediaWv retransmitted Without the requirement far f'rnr 'We V 0 Wart ma $UWa ds aftemd 1n dmn in NEE 11 dl53 ttrlfa tba Soder Uafons Wam Fact MUM a 3 3983 octet Amt u w w fta Famm apmba am authority for the ditection of am Stroh rdutary eem with the Politburo but the wartime rok of dw od CAR imdiice s Cw d of die I 49 0 I Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 To n f 3 5 c Figure I Soviet Command Authorities Transition to Wartime U hied X u ear ther approval by NSW-' authorities down to regimental and independent battalion level These alert mes- advance of hostilities these provisions do not specify the tune for manner in which this assumption of control would occur There are three basic ways in which the provisions of the statute could be activated sages constitute a legal order to take stipulated reads ness-related actions without further instruction or approval from NSWP authorities Moreover the Sovi- -By a oalleetive decision of the Pact member states ets plant in the near future to link all of the national automated alert systems Into one Warsaw Fact-vide automated alert system in which alert signals initiated by the Soviet General Staff would toe transmitted directly to the regimental level throuahout the Combined Armed Forces without the necessity of mummission at the national level The WN to also provides that on a sisnal from site Suprehne Kish Gommand the Soviet General SbM the staff of the CombinW Armed Florces would be dissolved and replacod witty two Soviet-mmmarnded theater-ravel commands Bad European form iaeludiou fleets omd homelnd air -By request of a mingle member state to the Soviet Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed F'oraes who would then notify the SuHkb Ckunmpud and die member states that Provisions of the Statute were being 3amp mentetl pme aae -- By tie Soviet Supreme BRA Command notiFvWz the tni ber states Although the provisions of the Shute would arot nay assure full fte copperatim the approval and ra'df udion of tine Sts flu by all but one Hach nallou re limits sirs tare ability of NSWP v ticd lad ar d tahv lmders to ftnore or Viand Hs provHsYans defenses would operate under the direct control of these commands 3 5 c 9t The SovieWaspirea Statute b rely dedgned to provide Mosaaw with the neoeuary and technical means to Gain Centralized Control of tine Pacts armed forces anti tmpk mrct Sovld4lradO war islnns Ae rding to the provisions of thu WWAM Statute the Soviet Snoreme HUb Cnoatr mmd would assume control of the Combined Armed Fbwes well in Wcrrsr w Poo W%b C 3 5 c ads of fWC % Oundd was tin the Warsaw Pact and NATO appear IUY intermediate commands would Iq Zrap 0 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c 95 Pact strategists apparently envision the need for probably be established between the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and field forces earmarked for commitment against NATO These commands would exercise direct operational control over Soviet and NSWP general purpose forces and at least coordinate the operations of those strategic forces allocated to support a European campaign against NATO The Soviets refer to these commands as High Commands of at least five TVDs to control operations against NATO see inset and figure 2 Although commands would almost certainly be established in these theaters in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war they could also be activated in other circumstances such as during exercises or in a period of extreme international tension Soviet officers assigned to the peacetime headquarters of Warsaw Pact military forces along with officers from the Main Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff would be reassigned to staff positions in the high commands NSWP officers assigned to the Pact's peacetime military headquarters would be reassigned to high commands in TVDs and possibly to positions in their national forces Soviet General Staff elements operating from hardened fixed communications centers and mobile command posts would support the high commands of TVDs We Forces In late 1978 or early 1979 a permanent headquarters of this type--designated the High Com3 5 c mand of Soviet Forces in the Far East-was estab- lished in the eastern USSR e6 94 The High Command of Forces in the Far East is 3 5 c the only permanently established high command in peacetime but two similar commands have been temporarily activated opposite NATO's central and southern regions during peacetime exercises the High Commands of Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operation TVDs - see inset for a description of Soviet theater warfare concepts Furthermore since 1980 a third temporary commanddesignated the High Command of Forces in the Southern TVD-has been activated opposite Ira and neIgh- Potential European Theaters of Military Operation The Western TVD This TVD would include Soviet and NSWP forces in East Germany Poland and Czechoslovakia and Soviet forces in the western USSR Pact forces including the Combined Baltic Fleet would be under the direct control oGBP the High Command of Forces in the Western TVD boring countries during exercises Soviet Theater Concepts 3 5 c The 6outhwertern TVD This TVD would include Soviet forces in Hungary and In the southwestern USSR plus Bulgarian Romanian and Hungarian forces it would also Include forces of the Combined Slack Sea Fleet in the Black and Mediterranean Seas Forces in the YTVD would be under fire direct control of the thigh Command of Form in the Southwestern TVD The Soviets define a theater of war Nair ooyny-TV as the territory of any one continent together with the sea areas adkrining It and the airspace above it on which hosUlIttes array develop-for examble the European Theater of War The Soviets mnot established any TV-level command authorities ' A TV usually Includes several theaters of military 3 5 c the iVa tl-rrreartern TM In wartime the form of the Leningrad Front and elements of the Northern vleet under the direct control of the Soviet General Staff would operate in this TVD A hibh command for this TVD has weever been detected in exercises Tire TVD would encorrtvass Finland and the Scandinavian Peninsula and as toomediaWy adjacent waters operations teoir oowrinuM dtys1ut1 ---TVV1 A TV is defined as a Ira acular territory taszet w with the associated airsp ee and am areas irtt ludjmg Isltwds archipelagos within whose limits t Ite ananl forces of the country or coalition operate in wartinae as a military oritanization engaged in stmte missions which ensue from ruttiond or Pact war pUM A TVU may be ground maritime or intercontinarttatl Accmrdins to their military-political and eco f tanon TVDs art classified as main or wearrdray l Fat fwt% dbe'au4oan of ilia soviet tear FAA Rub command reet to TIE II-ieJ t 813E Sant 1W I Srr taxnber iii Sill ftSSR M oetilFtb rn e n a 1 to tiro Fu Fit September Am%9dV UR100 8bto s Flan uritam darn rAa d thb Hitt Com mA 19a to NU 111a 881 Ss aiet fortes card evalkl0w se eft L Tw 01 Mtdrrrar t9yeratwm I Navember t 77ne 44antte and Anat Vii Tile Soxleu also expect major nawd operations against NATO in the N%th Athotlc viattedlarly in the NoragSan sea to occur in nJi etion with a conflict fn Evrom MariUntet TVDs for the Arxtio--gall sea areas math of the Gzueniand-lodand-United moan G4-UK gap-and the Atlantic Mild constitute eopemUng areas of forces of the Sovid Northern Fleet We believe the Northern vkd fonder the direction of she Soviet General Staff yvuald aoatnai ail acmes purpose rnr-fitary opera tiasns In Abe Mantic wA Arctic TVM 3 5 c so 7'op pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 Tom 3 5 c Figure 2 Possible Warsaw Pact Theaters of Military Operations TVDs in Europe The UnMd S4No tipvermm n hu rq r eo0f nd 1 IM rmu 1p 1 not EcI 4Na and 41huonu ni0 tk aw Wtat Oth r bwmtory r pt oMNIton r n ot tNCe xonry ufhaA xw c rway T swedl j s Soa ynftatl tL RpdPm #-otand FntrtC AAlooda Rtadamn can Sire r02275 5-84 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 006 t To anticipate that the CINC of the Combined Warsaw 3 5 c Pact Armed Forces would command the High Command in the Western TVD and that his deputy would assume command of the High Command in the Southwestern TVD These two commands would actually become high commands of the Combined Armed Forces of the Pact since they would include nonSevict as well as Soviet forces F Command and Control Enhancements 96 Since the late 1970s the Soviets have been implementing extensive command and control changes that are designed to provide in peacetime the infrastructure for the wartime formation and control of high commands in TVDs One such measure has been the creation of separate West and Southwest staff elements in the Pact's peacetime headquarters in Moscow to facilitate the formation of High Commands of Forces in the Western and Southwestern TVDs In addition the Pact has been developing an integrated communications system that by the mid-1980s would enhance the Interoperability and communications capacity needed to support Pact military operations in the TVDs Other changes have increased the day-today responsibility and authority of Soviet military district commanders The establishment of the positions of Commanding General Air Forces of the Military District Commanding General Air Defense of the Military District and Commanding General Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Military District-as well as their appointments as Deputy Military District Commanders-have streamlined command relationships and eliminated unnecessary staff functions Tactical air armies of Frontal Aviation have been disestablished with mast of these assets being integrated into Air Forces of the Military District or 3 5 c assets provide greater operational flexibility to commanders through centralized control at both the military district front and TVD levels while facilitating a rapid transition to a wartime organization Warsaw Pact Fronts 97 A front would be the largest field force within a land TVD Although not directly comparable to any Western military organization a front would be similar to a NATO army group and its associated allied tactical air force in size level of command and function A front is a wartime structure for which there is no standard organization It usually would be composed of three to five tank or combined-arms armies each consisting of three to five tank or motorized rifle divisions and air forces with as many as several hundred tactical aircraft The forces of a front would also include numerous separate combat elements such as artillery missile helicopter and air defense units A front could also have an airborne division resubordinated from VGK control Most fronts would have an air assault -brigade capable of conducting airborne airmobile and airlanding operations Combat support and combat service elements would be attached to a front as necessary and provide transport maintenance engineer supply and medical support- A Front operating in a maritime sector might also Include naval elements The size of a front would depend on the mission assigned but could range between 300 000 to 400 000 men The Soviet-East German Front which would be formed opposite the NATO Central Region however could total some 700 OW men after full mobilization n encompassing stmteatc surface-to-sir amissilm SAMs and assoclated radars as well as the SAW antlaimmh artillery AAA acid radars subnadinato to ground maneuver faaranattoma 'Phase tharrm resukin in the me ror of strate sic and taedW air and air defense t ernauc manner briraing varlous form dente to which were previously subordinated to the National Air Defense Forms PVO Stranyl Some aircraft formerly In Froutal Aviation-v erily lt encar--have been inter mated into Air Armies of the Sum me Mob Command vGKX along with strategic bombers which were formerly orpmized in a sepuee command--Llaus Ramat Aviation Similarly a new command structure called Air Defense of aloe Whim District or Gnaw of Forces bas been created 3 5 c Warsaw Pact Farce Gancration il1L The ananner in whicb the Warsaw Pact premed its form far war would depend lamely on the need errgenu W Intensity with bwb a waribrea mums crisis dev 1tped Pact planners bare identified two basic Awnaw 4um to achieving full combat readiv ss In a dowly developing crisis the Pact stations would oar baibly take a deliberate titre-phased approacb initiating 'increased maba# readiness for Vortiuns of their atoned forces see inset mentioned in paragraph 70 This would permit the accomplishment of a number of pn utmnary antensures but would fall fat Aim- oaf placirut dhe facts m litary forces an a full vyarome posture Ibis approach would verwtt the arblewem nt of full readiness in an orderiy and sys- Group of Forces ataau with interceptor regimem 3 5 c Ted Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 o t 3 5 c full readiness sequentially while allowing opportunities to avoid hostilities 1 If a crisis deepened the Pact 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c could move to threat-of-war readiness The Pact's final military preparations would be initiated by a decision to implement full combat readiness With this decision preparations for war would move rapidly and continuously The full combat readiness eonditian however is not a declaration of war and it does not order the commitment of units to eombat n 99 The gradual conversion from a peacetime to a wartime posture need not be continuous or sequential The process could be interrupted at any time depending on the Pact's perception of the threat or other factors The Pact's four-tiered readiness control system allows for a deliberate approach to Increasing readiness and war preparations as well as the holding of units at interim levels of readiness short of full readiness Moreover readiness conditions could be relaxed or returned to normal at any time 100 Another approach to achieving full readiness-the compressed approach-would be employed after the unanticipated outbreak of hostilities or when the Pact believed war was unavoidable and imminent and there was no time for deliberate time-phased preparations Under this option military forces would be readied simultaneously and as rapidly as possible Under extreme circumstances units could be ordered to move directly to full eo bat readiness from their - Training and preparation the process of training mobilized personnel and preparing units to conduct combat operations Time allocated for this process would depend on circumstances If deemed necessary some units would be committed immediately while other units might have weeks or months to prepare for combat - Movement the process of moving units from alert dispersal areas to concentration or assembly areas in a theater of operations including the loading and unloading of units as well as transit time - Final preparation for combat includes replenishment of ammunition and fuel consumed dur- normal peacetime posture 101 The process of mobilizing and deploying Pact ground formations consists of six basic steps as described below ing movement replacement of equipment and - Alert and dispersals the alerting of units and personnel recalling personnel returaing units to personnel losses suffered during movement smaintenanc - and the integration of units into the command structure of the theater front and army in which they are to serve garrison froth training sites making preparations -- Pepiioymept to trot includes movement of within garrison and moving to dispersal areas Activities include removing equipment from units from concentration or assembly areas to attack posltionsF7 storage loading of supplies preparing for cAlhAR 3 5 c 1% The prirrolpal discretionary activity for Warsaw fact planners and smmmanders would be training particularly p dmobilivation training 71he Pact has two h%de options in preparing its forces for combat Between these lie a range of Potential trade-offs between combat Proficiency rind force availability up and receiving reservists and mobilized trans- port vehicles tit requireft receiving reviewing and or updating operational and movement plans and in some cases seleeOviR small-scale mobilization of reservists with speoinlized shills -- Mobilization the proem of calling up rmdving and integrating reservista and equipment to achieve wartime v arming and equipment authoriazaUM to art emergency this EURtrocess 3 5 c could be accomplished rapidly and overtly after units had vacated their garrisons and moved to field dispersal locations In a situation in which the Pact had some control of events however incremental or phased mobilization could occur within garrison over a period of weeks or months Reservists called up for training and subsequently released would be subject to immediate recall Mobilization might or might not be readily discernible depending in part on its scale location and whether it was accomplished rapidly or incrementally The Pact would probably attempt to accomplish large-scale mobilization covertly in the guise of routine reservist training and exercises The f otocould oltmw to commit forces as soon as then have cem Pleted the alert and mobilization process Should it orxt for ibis appmadb a number of units woidd not have received a level of traitang equiva9ent to that of the ready units sand the Pact wood have to accept a iteic- to DIA DD t10D %W K 17 e SOM lance GsrtrmUmn P oom Ove vatumesk tNovmtm r tnk 34 3 5 c 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 0 To 3 5 c degradation in the combat potential of the mobilized force - Alternatively the Pact could take a more deliberate phased approach allowing time to more fully prepare and train its forces thus increasing their combat potential 3 5 c - Although circumstances would determine which option the Pact would choose we believe it woulu opt for the more deliberate process when the Pact had some control over time and events n 103 Training however would extend the time required for the buildup process and could provide additional warning indicators to NATO thereby jeopardizing the Pact's ability to maximize surprise Pact leaders would vary the scope and duration of any training in accordance with the situation their plans and perceptions and the peacetime readiness posture of individual units and formations If Pact planners chose this option they would probably sequence their preparation activities and almost certainiy implement 3 5 c deception measures designed to confuse NATO Well gence organizations as to the scope duration and purpose of the activity E Attack Options 104 As Pact leaders considered the preparation of their forces for war they would be faced with deciding the location timing and size of the initial attack on NATO This decision would be made against the background of those factors addressed in chapters II and III of the Estimate Pact perceptions of NATO's military capabilities an assessment of the risks involved in a war with NATO the reliability of the NSWP milttary forces and the Pant's military objec- tives and concepts for employment of forces doctrinal 3 5 c concepts and peacetime readfiitess posturee The major dilemma facing Pact leaders would be the degree to which they would carp to trade off fact preparedness and the full combat tpotentlal stipolntezl by Awir doctrine for a mater degree of surmise which might be achievers by a smaller but quicker amok designed to preempt mobilization reinforeemem auto the establMntent of an organized defense blr NATO IDS Any fact decision bearhts an when to attack would tie inflummed by a set of Sometimes cord diotmp military Rialto including its ova wparedness in relation to its ' ception of the status of NATO Wepao mHom and the desire to aclAm surprise as well as to maximize force supedtaft The final decision an an attack option however almost certatrdy wmtld not be based on purely military factors but rather on a combination of military and political considerations 3 5 c 106 In the following evaluation of the risks and benefits of alternative Pact options for the initial attack we have defined four basic options as well as possible variations The first-attack from a peacetime posture-is not reflected in Pact doctrine or exercises but is included to present a more complete range of Pact capabilities The other or tiorc have been selected on the basis of evidence from Soviet and Pact military 3 3 b 1 writings exercise scenarios and-reporting It should be emphasized however that these options only represent certain phase points during the Pact's force generation process at which Pact planners could choose to launch an attack variations and other attack options are possible Pact contingency plans for war in Europe appear to envision the establishment of a first echelon consisting of three fronts in the Central Region with at least two additional fronts moved forward from the western USSR to form a second echelon This general concept is reflected in Pact exercises doctrinal literature and other documentary evidence The Pact probably would begin to organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe regardless of what forces would be committed in the initial attack Three fronts would be formed from Soviet and NSWP forces already in Central Europe and two or more fronts would be formed from forces garrisoned in the Baltic Belorussian Carpathian and possibly Kiev Military Districts Forces in the western military districts of the USSR are primarily intended for commitment to combat at various time intervals after the initiation of hostilities but some may be assigned 3 5 c to first-echelon fronts prior to oo mnitment 107 Vreparmfion Ve Our assessments of the time required for the Pact to complete the military See Odense lrute3h we Document fDDB-1 1o0401-88-SL SeeondOperationf'6ohafar Frontal Form in the western 77reater of IlfilfMUOVrratlorta Manh am -stn UM 8a iForuars Croo November 198 Provides the basis for the dntelliaence Community's estimates err dw tirne required for soviet around units to ewwkte the dart disparA and mahilization proems This doovmerrt also t nUfias the range of partentW tradeoffs tWeen c Ut proi kkeenev tdevrloped by tcamuW and force availability Defense Inteltseam Docamrent DDB-J#o i 84 Vw 8wdinew of tU Non4mriet W w Fact Ground Forum tdraftl pravides a surtlgr imalysb for NSWP around units 71rglamtion tam Cited a n r emih attack option in this Faimate indude time allocated for the movemant r f units to omanadk postu movmnent times were determined try cmW%gna the summits- automated nmvemetet model developed by the General tleseatcb Cerrrerattan under contract for the Office of du Secretary ided by 41e MovVineut modd of Defsnm The amvengna times are based mi idezd armdti 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c P Vo Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 F 3 5 c preparations required to execute each attack option beginning from a peacetime posture include a minimum time and a more realistic time The minimum time reflects our assessment of the Pact's ability to accomplish the preparations under the most timeconstrained conditions with no major problems in planning and execution The difficulties inherent in coordinating controlling and executing these complex and Pact-wide preparations would be enormous however with many opportunities for major mishaps confusion delays and even chaos The realistic time estimates allow for human mechanical and climatic difficulties that would be likely to characterize such an undertaking Neither the minimum time nor the more realistic time includes specific time allocated for the training of freshly mobilized units Such training would enhance the combat potential of the mobilized units as well as assure a greater degree of preparedness in other Important respects even at the risk of lessening surprise and allowing NATO additional time for counterpreparations Those Pact divisions that would benefit most from Postmobilization training are not ready forces including three Czechoslovak and five Polish low-strength divisions and almost 30 Soviet divisions in the three western military districts of the USSR The availability and performance of the Soviet not ready divisions would be most critical to the Pact's ability to sustain offensive operations against strong or prolonged NATO resistance Most of the Soviet not ready forces are probably planned for commitment at various time intervals after D-day as follow-on forces to maintain the momentum of the attack As a result some postmobilization training could be accomplished after initiation of hostilities In addition many Pact nondividoual units are maintained at law strength in peacetime and would be much better prepared to perform their missions after conducting a period of psstmobilization traininna Our assessment of the time required for these low-atrength 3 5 c units to train up to a standard we fudge to be the minimum necessary to conduct proficient offensive operations in Central Europe could extend their prep aration times to about 80 days plus the time required for movemt'nt would require seven to 12 days at which time Soviet air forces would be fully combat ready F_7 3 5 c Option I-Attack From a Peacetime Posture 109 There is no evidence from Soviet or Pact military literature doctrine or exercises that would indicate that the Pact might launch an attack on NATO from a peacetime readiness posture In fact Soviet military strategists have explicitly stated that a European war would be improbable without some political warning and a degree of prehostilities mobilization by both sides The Pact however does have some capability to attack NATO on short notice using ground and air units garrisoned near the East-West German border and the West German-Czechoslovak border as well as short-range ballistic missiles SRBMs Less than a dozen Soviet and East German divisions in East Germany within 50 to 60 kilometers of the West German border -plus several hundred tactical aircraft-as well as a few Czechoslovak divisions near the West German border could mount a largely uncoordinated and fragmented attack on short notice A few divisions might be capable of initiating an attack possibly directly from their garrisonswithin about 24 hours after their commanders received an attack order depending on specific conditions within Individual units time of day weather conditions and a host of factors determined primarily by the cyclic nature of the six-month training cycle An attack mounted on such short notice however could easily result in chaos as unit commanders their staffs and troops would have had no forewarning of an attack order and--by definition--made no preparations for an attack Under normal peacetime conditions units usually take clays weeks or even months to prepare for scheduled major exercises division level anti higher Pact divisional units in East Germany and Czechoslovakia are scot fully warmed in peacetimm and their higher dean communicaUons structure and logistic support systems my snot postured to support a standing-start attack Given 48 hours' notice Pact divisional units mil8 only wargttually increase their ability to mount a oaordinatcd attack and would still lack a command cmft 1 amd coammi nicatiorns and logistic structure which could dTec uvdy command coutrok and support their attadk F-1 IOti We assess that within 72 hours the Pact could mount a large-scale air attack throughout NATOg Central Itegion However we'belime it highly unlikely that the Pact would mount such an air attack asainst NATO independent of a combined-ano offensive Rather the Soviets would vrafer-and generally plan on -GBP'i st Completing togistac Preparations and expanding their tear services as well as comphAing mobilization of air combat units Such oreparatlons 3 5 c 110 As a means of Switiating a large-scale war wtth NATO an attack from a peacetime posture would prolsably give tine advarbwes of operational and tacdtwl surprise to tine Pact By dint oaf surprise and perhaps local ferns ammiorRy the fact naigbrt gain some early vwmd sand air victories These initial 56 I 3 5 c 0 'W Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 h 3 5 c successes would probably be the only advantage which would accrue to such an attack Many considerations would weigh against the Pact opting to initiate a war with NATO from a peacetime readiness posture - Loss of Mobilization Advantage The Pact would have to anticipate that an attack from a peacetime readiness posture would cause NATO to initiate rapid and large-scale mobilization almost simultaneously with the Pact The possible local force superiority gained by such an attack might not be maintained if NATO forces responded effectively Pact planners considering their great appreciation of NATO's rapid deployment and mobilization capability might well conclude that their attacking forces could face an adverse force ratio before substantial Pact reinforcements could be committed forces unprepared for hostilities In particular the Pact would have to accept the risk of NATO escalation to nuclear war at a time when Pact depots transportation facilities industrial enterprises and uncommitted forces would be especially vulnerable to nuclear attack - Surprise A Two-Edged Sword Soviet planners and commanders have been conditioned to leave little to chance in prepatirg for military operations By temperament inclination and doctrine the Soviets are conservative in assessing force requirements and thorough in planning Although an attack from peacetime posture might offer the advantage of operational and tactical surprise to the Pact other options requiring -- Command Control and Communications The Pact would not have time to establish a frontlevel command control and communications longer preparation times would almost certainly offer a measure of tactical surprise as long as the Pact had the initiative In ordering an attack from a peacetime posture Pact leaders would have to accept the risks of unpreparedness and surprising their own commanders and troops structure before hostilities commenced The Soviets consider a functioning and effective com- chance that the Pact would initiate war against NATO mand control and communications system a critical factor In successfully controlling their armed forces on the battlefield and managing the use of nuclear weapons - Boar Service Support Forward-deployed divi- sions have three to five days of supplies on -hand however many nondivisional rear service support units arse manned at reduced strength or do not exist in the military peacetimp force struc- ture An attack from peacetime posture would not allow time to mobilize and move rear service units forward Moreover the military would not have time to uaiu full control over critical lines of communication---especially highways in the for- These arguments lead us to conclude that there is little from a peacetime readiness posture n Option 11---Attoa With Two fronts 111 Analysis of fact exercises and doctrinal concepts leads us to conclude that the smallest force the Pact might use to initiate offensive operations in Central Europe would consist of two fronts This force would consist of Soviet and NSWP ground and tactical air force units in Pest Germany and Czechoslovakia and possibly Soviet units in Boland--a total of some 40 active ground diivislons plus support units see figure 4 While organizing the initial two-front force the fact svould ip vbably begin the preparation of other general purpose and strategic forces as wall as the ward area---as well as railroads for the movement of reinforcements forward faces populace and national economies for general war and the rtsim of nuclear aescalation F --Uitleat EconmWe atnd Civil Defense fcepa- 112 Our estimates of Pad preparation times are leased on extensive sWdv of Pact contingency plans and exercises along with analysis of the Pact's tbeoretlad capability to prepare organize and deploy forces for war in Europe Key to our fudgments is our assessment of the peacetime readiness ponwe of the Parts aimed forces We believe dial in the most tugent a iroumsWaces the Pmt would need at least five to six days to prepare and position a fill two-front #s rae - a g that this force flail been maintained in fits mormial peacetime readiness posture Units comprising this forte would require some aersonnel aug- ratio- s An attack from peacetime posture would not permit the vreparation of the f'act's popu- lace national economies and civil defense oratanizatlons for war as stipulated by doctrine Moscow would be forced into heavier initial mllance on IMWP forces and would be dented suf tent time too psychologiWlly condition its troops fur war - Vulnerability and Wilt of Escalatlorn An attad fmm pencedme posture would leave other Pact 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Figure 3 Warsaw Pact options for Initial Attack Force in the Central Region Attack With Two Fronts theMrarpwe0anUnh110 ramn n11u n t tecernwed the Oi E fanla Letw nd Irihuonr Mto fit BMiYI Unipn Olhx bwndep tlpfeeeMoibn k not nenn riy uihontatiroo 702279 5-94 3 5 c ensive operations probably would consist of two fronts-a total The smallest rorce the Pact might use to initiate theat of some 40 divisions plus support and tactical air units mentation to achieve war-authorized strength Initiation of a two-front attack in slightly lt% time four to five days might be pass ibk but without several less ready and or more distant divisions in eastern Czechoslovakia The complexity and magnitude compressed approach to force generation would yield units especially nondivisional units which--at least initiallywould 14elt their frail potential to undertake or sustain combat operations Before ameking the Pact would probably take the following actions- of the re- quired preparations and the risks involved in insufficlent preparation would pmbablY cause ear require the Pact to take louw than five to six days to prepare this force with seven to 10 days being a more realistic time frame if the I-act atternptexd to rapidly launch a twofront attack from a normO peacetime readiness pm ture Preparations for a two-front attack within five to six days would require employing a - Declare a state of Full stational defense read um for the Past natiow possNy without tine decularation of intermediate fevels of readiness Such a declaration could be overt or secret but the war preparations whim it would initiate could not be concealed -- Declare a state of frill a moat madiuess for Pact fumes with or wilbout the decdaratioa of intermediate levels of readiness i'11tis could be opera or secret brit the pmparations could not be compressed time schedule which would exacerbate the confusion and disruption inherent in a raid transition to a wartime posture acrd the requarement to move some large military formations several hundred kilometers an short notice Prepatations would occur siren usly rather than in a Phased or mqueatal pattern This - MdWtm assemble and prepare for cwmbat the I art eking force-a multinationdl form of almost S 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 3 5 c 1 million men about 40 divisions and several hundred thousand major items of equipment Some units would have to move several hundred kilometers to their initial combat positions - Begin to mobilize and prepare other general purpose forces in the theater for commitment as second-echelon or follow-on forces - Establish control over key transportation systems and transport means required to move units - Establish at least minimal national systems of logistics particularly supply lines that could provide some reinforcements and resupply the attacking forces - Deploy and establish a theater-level command and control structure that would enable Moscow to adequately control a two-front offensive This structure would include at least some links to supporting strategic forces and to forces in other areas -Prepare the Pacts tactical aviation units to exe- cute large-scale offensive operations at the beginning of hostilities -- Prepare air armies of the VGK to conduct thea- terwide operations - Prepare and deploy strategic offensive and de- fensive forces to support the attack defend home territories and guard against the possibility of rapid escalation to nuclear war Including strategio nuclear exchanges - Prepare and disperse as many submarines and naval surface vessels as possible to prevent them from being destroyed in port and enable them to perform their assigned missions - Begin civil defense preparations and the process of converting national economies from a aaearetime to a wartime Posture 3 5 c -- PsychoWcalltr prepare the Past's populace rand armed forces for WVF 113 By waiting to a tablts'tt a twofront attaddog force the Pact would dimlabb many of the critical defteloncires Whereat in mountiratt an attack from a peramtime reaafimsss posture The Paaotls um-faEgltting capability would N ippmed in all smix but Particularly in regsund to V VAt csapibllitles AW the establishment of t leto the essentials of a functioning frant4m cetnmand and ao IVA system Mareovar even witty no prettaaaimV Vrevar au am this aattwa option might give NATO only a few days to prepare for war Although we assess that Pact planners would expect to achieve more advantageous force ratios by building up a larger force the suddenness of a twofront attack could reasonably be expected to provide advantages by creating confusion and limiting NATO's preparation time The Pact's supply system could support at least early successes 3 5 c 114 Notwithstanding'the provision of some advantages the initiation of hostilities after only five to six days of preparation with a two-front force would still entail serious risks for the Pact The attacking force might lack some front-level elements and its initial combat potential would be less than could be achieved with additional preparation time Moreover forward deployed Soviet and East German forces would have to assume responsibility for initial operations In northern West Germany and along the Baltic coast because of the unavailability of forcesprimarily Polish-that would normally constitute the f'act's Northern Front Command and control structures particularly at the theater and national levels would remain incomplete More important the mobilization and forward deployment of Soviet forces in the western USSR could not be accomplished these units therefore would not be immediately available to reinforce or sustain an attacking two-front force Furthermore effective participation In the war by major forces in other areas would be fimited particularly in regard to coordinated naval actions and ground and air offensives on the flanksaiue in park to the lower peacetime readiness posture of these ract forges - 3 5 c 115 We believe that the fact would snot be likely to attempt to engage in hostilities from a two-front poslture after only five to six days' preparation In other char extraordinary tim rgent eireaamstances One possible reason for the Pact opting to engage in hostilities aandea these Circumstances mod ire a perwDition that as NATO attack was irmninent Although NATO artobft tioa would be viewed as a unious thmat and almost manly would cause the Pact to Make 00unteMnpard1104% the Pact wa3utd nOt avnduct hostilities with a force arot fully vrepared against NATO forces that enjoyed some advantages of prior preparation or wabilization unkss Rho threat of imminent NATO attack weave fir Another rugcaat continaency could occur durirtg a w dow East-West Political dimate when the NATO agu rt tcaalarly the arndertake a United f4tAte d Vest rrraany dev eeof anobilizatixan and rather milw v preparations to imprwm heir ddadw posture and to demoastsaw r esdive in m poA of ftdontgUe anevatimdon bbscow 3 5 c V 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Top et 3 5 c might see this as weakening its own bargaining posi- 3 5 c system would be established at the front theater ' advantage afforded the Pact by superiority in forcesin-being in Central Europe In such a contingency and if it perceived truly vital interests at risk Moscow might set in motion the rapid buildup and early attack option offered by the two-front force Such an attack action would be designed to preempt NATO defensive and diplomatic preparations rather than an immediate and national levels Communications capacity threat of NATO attack n Option III-Attack With Three Fronts 3 5 c - A more extensive Pact command and control tion especially by threatening to upset the political 116 Under this option Pact planners could elect to prepare for war via a more phased approach and attack when they had prepared a three-front or larger force Analysis of Pact exercises and contingency planning as well as our assessment of the f'act's ability to prepare its forces leads us to believe that the Pact would require at a minimum about eight to nine days to prepare and position a three-front force for an attack-assuming that this force had been maintained in its normal peacetime readiness posture A more realistic time frame for these preparations might be 10 to 12 days assuming a cold start However followon forces from the western USSR consisting primarily of not ready divisions would riot be able to effectively support and sustain such an attack n 117 The more complete national and military preparations permitted under this option would assure the availability of a larger and better prepared force provide for more efficient joint action by all forces enhance command and control capabilities provide a better ability to sustain the attack wW permit additional measures to guard against escalation to nuclear war In this option -- Those ground units readied for offensive operations would include all forces to the two-front option e-scribed above plus Wish forces and possibly a Soviet army four divisions from the Wtie or lielmasion Military Vlstrict a total of about Bit divisUm see figure 9j -- Additional tactical aircraft cmAd be prepared perhaps indoding deployment of carne almeft fmm the western USSR and the overall csavAility to mount and sustain lerao-scale offeadve air operations %wdd be improved would be increased and redundant channels de- veloped to guard against disruption - The ability oGBP Pact civil and military defenses to withstand NATO counterattacks would be im- proved as would the transition of the economy to a war posture - Additional Soviet ballistic missile submarines could be readied and deployed thus enhancing preparations for nuclear war - Naval forces could reach wartime operating areas in much greater numbers for operations on the flanks support of strategic missions and support of the offensive in Central Europe --- Preparation of ground forces would continue throughout the Pact thereby facilitating a capability to undertake early action on the flanks while Pact tactical air capabilities to support flank operations also would substantially increase i 18 A preference for an attack with more than two fronts is well supported in Pact writings and exercises There is evidence that Pact planners would want at least three fronts available for initial operations in Central Europe with assurance that at least one additional front would be available for reinforcement soon after the initiation of hostilities This option is more consistent than shorter preparation options in regard to Pact doctrinal preferences for force superiority national anal Pact-wide Preparations combinedarms operations and the IPaot's appreciable respect for NATO's was-fighting capabilitlea Moreover it would offer better provects for sustaining Pact forces and allow additional Pm Parations to guard against nuclear escalation Acootdingly we Judge that awnt under extraordinarily ursest circumstances as described in parsezapb 115 the Pact would prefer to prepare at Isast a three-front force befWe initiating hostilittcs 7 Option W- -A ack 'With Fm Fir nts 119 Circa stances perrmitting the Pact could build tip even larger forces before irritaating hostilities aphist NATO A five4mut aritack posture would largely fulfill the Pact's motive dortrt W Preferenoss in regard to fmce superiority and wood take at leag 13 days to pnepare including the forwazd movememt a Soviet forces in the west EWWR--zsumfng 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Figure 4 Warsaw Pact Options for Initial Attack Force in the Central Region Attack With Three Fronts Th u A d 81 160 corm -d N r 1' - b Ip NCdppd Ibn 01 E lo k I IN ad Uthu M 'nln N eori l Unfon OlNr 6oundur np nhuon 4 nol n q Wi'J Whoril dn Hannover WARSAW Baud Poland oerrtmally Nom'' RO- Monle 7022806-84 3 5 c There is evidence that Pact planners would want at least three fronts available for initial operations in Central Europe wi assurance that at least one additional front would be available for reinforcement soon after the initiation of hostilities that all of these form had been maiatairted in their normal Macetime readluess pasture More realWeal ly these preparations might take up to three weeks if initiated from a cold start In either case slue to insufficient traWhig time not rcadv divisions wound still have onto a mat%W awaulty to conduct effec' tive offensive overatitam lu this Wiinn and forward deployed in Poland and C ovatlla before the attack thereby substantially adding to the momentum and sustainabSlity of a PRO attach see 5 on page 62 With these form pao amd fawns available for operatium rtgamg Coal Europe would wtA 8 5 to 90 acu dlvisicns On svipport toots --soviet ttmttnd forces in the three wit tuttli- -Additional sueral popose naval strategic tad tary %aiots of the UM would be avvailahle for early reinttttacrtnnenit of Pct forces in Canted htrtt et its dismissed in Outhm tU tire thmefrout attack the Servtetts could amm to amm limited turves from the wa gern USSR to loin ftAsh foes in fortnitttt a pttlsh4wiat Faronni At Ieast moron of the re mating foul in the WC tt M military distracts some so dtv xg aa tltl pmt ably be u u lwd boo at least twin tit hlt atttrutl fronts the Sa1m ud loci cmwthm Fronts iaational ddt rnse vcparations could be uu %uk en prior to at P a atta 'ilhe s e in Pact strewth wpafd be cwgSrruouss anti the Pact wwAd oaaintain ft eRmbilitY to attack at any time 8 if lm Tus attach apha n would reduce fire Pact's altusaes of adti vIvg surprise- wMe sna Mmidm the v fight of the attstclL Ibis VOU0 a aim woa4d increase cite ratio of Stsviet to wo6niet Pact ford in the 61 ro 02- IV Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 3 5 c Figure 5 Warsaw Pact Five-Front Attack Force in the Central Region iM Vow EuH ua wn n n nw cognu m incap bn H E ni uh oe 4mmn m e w vnro om r b we0 ry Wore u u w ua n en w o m n w Firot- 0 19 front Second-echelon front an 3 5 c 3 5 c 1 702081 6-a4 A five-front attack-including some 85 to 90 divisions and support units-would largely fulfril the l'ad's conservmtive doctrinal preferences in regard to force superiority Western Theater of Military Operations It would offer much better prospects for sustatnabiiity the most complete c marnand control and oommuntcations net work and allow for additional measures to prepare the Pact's populace economies and transportatiion systems for wart _1 F Variations in Attack Optl ms 181 A number of Vartations to the attack options discussed above are Pwdble% partimlariv in rem to the possible forward deployment ref some forces in the western ttSBR ZdOr to the initiation fA hostiuties its well as the amount of tithe the Pact ant A re into or allow for near vteMrattama Several of these wa Utiains 3 5 c are discussed below Farwaird 00p$4yawd of F USSR in fits Weird n in it is clear to wdoat extent tf any the Soviets miAt forwa d deploy selected around maneuver for- the western USSR prior to the initiation of hostilities such as an army from the BalUe or Wjorassian Military District as described under Option al Tile Soviets in fact notionally practiced the forwW deployment cif some western military district forces prior to 04 dutm sev 1 rotator exercises m 1982 and 1M F___1 orations from 123 The Saviets could choose too mobilize and foavmd deploy tllae sift really motorized rifle and bank divisions and the am type army riorips from the western USSR prior to Otte uompleir preparation of the trtartaittder of these twm angst of wbkb am ma nttdtw4In a pelretalme not steady posture The princi1W Umneuver Units of the stew type army Corps arse four fposslh five to and mechanized brigades Thlscorm ordba wintld be used ss an operational maneuver group to Ommute rapid caladtation deep in tare vwmy's ricer very early in an effe ve Thu month subaf ly requite the Soave mobilm and min moving forward prior to the inftiatim of hostirl- 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C0 0 638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 i To 3 5 c Hies and well in advance of the forward deployment of the bulk of the Belorussian MD forces While such an action would provide the Pact with additional early firepower and better prospects for sustaining its attacks it has the significant disadvantage of possibly providing cleaFAq highly detectable warning indicators to NATO Gradual Buildup 124 As a modification to the options previously discussed the Pact could make gradual preparations for war over an extended period The estimated preparation times associated with each of the attack options discussed above assumes that the preparations commence from a normal peacetime readiness posture that is from a cold start 't'here are many changes that the Pact countries could make in their political economic civil defense and military posture that could be accomplisbed gradually or piecemeal The changes might occur in response to a crisis a series of crises or as a result of a deliberate decision to prepare for war for whatever reason Steps could be taken selectively over a period of many weeks or months such as the mobilization of certain lowstrength units to increase the readiness of elements oGBP the Pact's military forces that is gradually converting them from a not ready to a ready posture as was done with two Soviet cadre divislons prior to the invasion of Afghanistan Many preparations which in time-sensitive circumstances might be initiated by a declaration of a combat alert am order requiring immediate departure from gatrisoro or the declara- tion of threat-of-war or full readiness could be accomplished haamtentally without the declaration of an alert or the formal implementolon of an increased readiness posture T estaln units could be brought to readiness for war aver an extended period without movement frortr garrism normally rMutred Burins a combat alert or the tbaeat trF-war mdIness eondi tion Such deviatiam fmm rwamal vearaetime patterns however would be dettsot esl by Us wd NATO atftlligence iRarticularly if implemented on a km scale and would be interpreted as a modlGBPicatton of the Pact's military poatum Sob activity vortd omuimly intensify CIS and NATID intelligmw cdh oa effixts and might also initiate similar preparatory actions by NATO Although the Pact's efforts to gradually increase preparations for war might reduce the time necessary to make final preparations for war discussed in Options II III and IV they would be taken at the risk of detection and NATO counterpreparations 3 5 c 125 Some measures which the USSR alone or possibly in concert with its allies might gradually undertake could include less provocative civil and military measures such as the following -Staffing of wartime headquarters - Intensified planning and rehearsal of mobilization plans - Partial takeover or preparation for takeover of transportation facilities by the military -Increased civil defense planning construction and training -Increased production of military equipment cutback of production of goods for the civil economy - Increased recalls of reservists for training - increased intelligence collection -- Significant increases in the military portion of the national budget - Buildup of strategic reserves of essential com- modities These types of measures would only marginally improve the ability of the USSR or the Pact to move QuIMY to a full readiness posture The Pact would probably defer ale mobilization major force deploymeuts and other highly Visible and Provocative meamm until the final transition to full readiness for war A vx ticular vmblera for the Soviets should they desire dmilar gradual preparations by their Pact allies worsld be to convince tbem that such measures were soetemm espesblly in the Azeum of some expression of bmsule interit by NATO Moreover once a snultrnatt d dialogue bed it would tae snore difficult or the Soviets to preserve the secrecy of their plans clod pwaraufts n I Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 000638425 44 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 CO 06 38A 2_ pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 C00638425 d for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Top Zftft V WARNING OF WAR were willing to accept would be based primarily on 126 A warning should communicate an enemy's 3 5 c 130 We judge it extremely unlikely that the Soviets would initiate an attack against NATO without the cooperation of their allies whether volunteered elicited or forced Evidence that critical decisions were is planning the size and mix of enemy forces the being made or approved including an agreement on ttack and the direction and timing of probabilit the attack the conditions for going to war could be suggested by anomalous activities such as 127 Soviet and East European behavior in peace- time serves as the reference point for detecting and recognizing deviations from established patterns that might signal the Pacts assumption of a warlike posture In its progression to war the Pact would almost certainly make major changes in its pattern of political deliberations In industrial and other economic activities in internal security and disaster control procedures and in the tempo and scale of military activity Although improvements in national abilities to prepare for and sustain war_ would be detected recognized and reported quite early the perceptions which prompted the decisions to prepare for war and the ultimate intentions of Pact leaders would remain elusive and most like ntroversial within the Intelligence Community The Decision To Go to War 3 5 c 128 Before issuing the final order to go to war Soviet and Pact leaders probably would have completed a large number of incremental decisions to prepare their nation and armed forces These decisions would constitute the determinations and actions enabling the final decision to begin hostilities These dmislons could and Probably would remain contingent and thus reversible until very late Sven jter military prepara- tions had become al minns 129 Although we lenmv the swmW stratum of Pact dech'onmakins for war the content send timing of the deliberations would probably be secure from timely detection Gommuently our awmimem of the nature of deewom reached and the ris3s Pact leaders 3 5 e ' FW deta d tEsttaas and deaarivttow of tnttiaams far war uupa atom ofm to the faiE vim dommmti Stgtte Oc W ndm RM twft wwr w Fact t eneret Indwor Ltai k ratrn leas 8A-essi Wwfd- tmdt ULA ar W 54 Mm m lestar iS#nimw Spam 3 5 c inferences from the observed actions resulting from these decisions intention to go to war the enemy's capabilities and resolve and opportunities for the application of the enemy's capabilities-all in sufficient time to avert war or at least frustrate the enemy's Intentions It should also define the nature of the conflict the enemy A Indicators of War Preparations 30 3 5 c 3 5 c IrItV4tw Vwft a m Sn Lwmbw r tm Gwww 3 5 c - An increase in high-level meetings or unusual timing oGBP meetings between Pact leaders among the leaders within a Pact country and between Soviet and East European political and military leaders -Cancellation of announced schedules for senior party and government functionaries - Changes in Soviet and Pact intelligence collection In the context of a developing crisis intelligence analysts might not recognize or interpret accurately such activity as evidence of deliberations for war Past crises including some which did not result in military action have featured such activities but their significance to the crisis at hand was often misunderstood or became clear only long after the occurrence Nevertheless anomalous behavior by the Pact leadership at multiple echelons would certainly result in increased watchfulness and intensified efforts to find less ambigaous evidence of Pact intentions 3 5 c 131 Persuasive reports or deliberate signals that the USSR and the fact were considering war prepara- tions or war itself would almost certainly be channeled to the Limited States or one of tine NAM diplomatic or intelligenoe services Even with the firsthand reporting of important Pact decisions the coneeat of the information would be difficult to evaluate Such aommts would probably describe a contingent decision or azroemettt Possibly acoampaniad by blased or sdfserving aonnmentary The value d such reporting would be further attenuated by suspicioms that it was deliberately com9nautsed as a pressure tactic or deeepum 40y 'S b information by itself --aid embassy wl suppm a firm la4grment or nurture a consensus within the Inte'liigence Community that the Pact 3 5 c had deci d to so to avar l In Considering the 4naior disruption occasioned by a full conversiun toa wartime posture Pact leaders 3 5 c 63 -Ursowd 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 00 0 63 8425 gpproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Top 3 5 c would not take such decisions lightly nor-under most 184 The foregoing examples are representative and foreseeable circumstances-without elaborate conditioning of their populace for the possibility of war A coordinated intensive Pact-wide campaign would probably be designed to inculcate the need for greater sacrifice vigilance against spies intensified loyalty and increased output at the workplace The similarity of content and tone throughout the Pact media would signal that such a campaign had been directed While these indicators might be of dubious value in predictIng the ultimate course of events they would remain outline a framework of actions that would be without precedent in postwar Europe Possibly the most diag- nostic indication that war preparations bad begun would be the sheer magnitude of the undertaking These measures would be so costly to the economic and social fabric of the Pact nations that only the most serious conditions would warrant their implementation and full execution rations discussed in paragraphs 138-142 we would also expect to observe and report other activities such as the following 135 At some point in Pact preparations for war civil defense measures could provide particularly salient indicators of the likelihood of hostilities These measures most likely would be phased to minimize internal disruption until additional measures became essential These measures might include - An increase in internal population controls and surveillance of dissidents and foreigners - Extensive domestic media treatment of civil defense preparations -A media campaign which forecasts a final showdown with imperialism and raises war expectations - Activation of civil defense leadership authorities followed by indoctrination sessions and administrative preparations for mobilization of civil de- an important sign that at least early war preparations were under way Apart from specific military prepa- fense cadres - Planning and coordination meetings throughout the Pact involving leaders from a wide range of sectors often in unusual mixes 3 5 c - Withholding of critical commodities such as food and fuel from distribution and stockpiling in unusual quanntities -- Fluctuations in diplomatic behavior and activi- -Stockpiling of medical supplies ties abroad without apparent explanation F-1 - Changes in transportation schedules and activity Civil and Econamit Preparatigm 3 5 c 3 5 c - increased shortages of all types of materials in both she military and civil industrial sectors r- 133 Virtually every sector of national life would be affected by the transition to a wartime pasture Some early preparations might not be detected or recognized as war-related but generally those civil and economic activities observed first would occur in industry and labor trade and other relations vdth the West sand trauspartatian rind civil defense industrial plants would cytmvert to weapons munitims and sears parts production far the armed forces This ocmverston mtcht be hindered by a shortage of specta%tsindustrial construction and dew engineers techwcians surd me xn#cs- ed for m9itary dut Work hours would be modified to spowt iced levels of euitnut Soviet and li set Europm behavior in International nivAets such as ureolous snouls aW grain would fluatua te aontrw nmotit vans could terminate abruptly or Include vrnaW f%turtss and the Pact nations would try to Move assets from western financial Institutions itY abangm would oc in trarrsportation wtons sod the huge dvd defense mwhinew would siequire eerivation before military sprcpausetiorn Vern we'll adva n 3 5 c 136 The declom ion of a state of increased national defense readiness would be a critical step in pxeparks the Pacts populace and national economies for war This declaration even if not publi her3 would be widely mumuntcated and would in itself be a finis indication that the Soviets acrd their allies were Preparing for war Actions associated wah this state of national readiness would probably include - Anomalies in the dvil defense staff communications network -- mere aced activity at dull clefeaose headtauarters t witartr aomtnol of ended commodn --Closure of sauna Pub ftwduttons --- SCtifiOM dha m In aw al srrsnspomdon air sivdty or sd et9uting -RrQutsitt AM VtUtIM of equbmieat supplies and 66 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 P 3 5 c - Restrictions on civil gatherings and travel - Civil defense shelters readied for use - Partial mobilization of military civil defense units 137 Similarly the declaration of a state of threatof-war national defense readiness even if not published would be widely communicated and would in itself clearly signal that the Soviets and their allies saw the situation deteriorating and were more serious in their efforts to prepare for war Measures initiated under this readiness condition would be more difficult to conceal and could Include the following key step in beginning the process of preparing military forces for war would be the declaration of increased combat readiness Preparatory measures that would be associated with this level of readiness only some of which may be detected include -A communication to military units ordering them to increased readiness - Establishment of at least partial military control over some key transportation systems -Recall of personnel from temporary duty leave - Closure of additional public institutions - At least a temporary termination of normal training and other routine activities - Issuance of mobilization orders to large numbers of reservists and selective callups of reservists - Dispersion and evacuation of at least selected officials and enterprises - Exurban command posts activated and at least partially staffed s 138 The declaration of full national defense readiness would indicate that Moscow believed that war was likely and perhaps imminent Measures implemented under this readiness condition could not be concealed and would include the following - Closure of many public Institutions or nonessential duties - Return of units to garrison - Restriction of officers and troops to garrison -Review and update of mobilization and contingency plans - Removal of equipment from storage and prepa- ration for use accelerated repair of equipment - Increased security measures and intensified reconnaissance - Possible limited callups of reservists with special skills - F uU mobilisation of military civil defense units - Field deployment of divisional cmnmand posts - Marked curtailment of normal civilian activities -'SeWuled odease of reservists or conscripts field - Large-scale mobilization of dvll tranuxuUtion assets particularly trucks -- Initiation of frill military eoantrxtl over key transportation systems - Larne We or national cantos of reservists - D14erslon and evacuation of key leadership elites 3 5 c selected military forces at comparatively high levels of manning and preparedness while many units are maintained at low strength and would require largescale mobilization prior to undertaking major offensive operations The normal peacetime posture of Pact forces Is referred to as constant combat readiness A in abeyance -- hasxeased amity in military installations rag- road yards and depots -- MarkW iincreaw in weather reporting -- Activation of high4evd military command posts -- Alerting d railroad troops Uuusaal lag@evr I command activities or move- - L argeooscale evacuation of the aupulotion EUR v m selected hue cities if authms stripes on the bomel A wexe Officipated fr4coon vt ii lflittWt Prappttrtiatit I% As discumd in chsl w tQ of 7tbts ate in peacethim the USSR agd its Airs amintain only ments -- Abum mall activity by submarines mdace ships or srienelireatpptng 3 5 c on their perception of the threat and the 140 li bkehlhssad of var Pj4 lleaders Dint dense to dar e -ibreat-oEUR- ar na auesa for some cur all of rtlaeir monied EURon es Some rruaMM initiated and imple- 3 5 c P Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 mented during this readiness condition would be highly visible if undertaken on a large scale including the following - Communication of the necessary command to military units - Movement of ground units from garrison locations to field dispersal areas - Selective mobilization of reservists - Increased reconnaissance - Mobilization of some specialized units to full wartime strength - Possible activation of some wartime command control and communications structures at front and theater level - Transfer of control of divisional units from garrison command centers to field command posts - Movement of command staffs to field command posts - Equipping of personnel according to wartime requirements - Dispatch of operations groups to allied countries --Movement of aircraft hellcopters from airfields without shelters to dispersal airfields 3 5 c - Extraordinary levels of air defnnsa preparedness -Activation of or preparations to activate sabotage and special operations tams in NATO countries - Preparation and expansion of military medical facilities - Preparation for employment of electronic countermeasures units against NATO forces -- Additional dispersal or deployment of submarines naval ships and merchant vessels - Movement of ground units to primary secret' dispersal areas if not previously ordered 142 The initiation and implementation of measures associated with increased readiness tbreat-ofwar readiness and full readiness' would not necessarily signal that a decision to go to war had been made or that war was inevitable The implementation of these conditions however would indicate that the Soviets and their allies saw a growing likelihood of war and were preparing for it the declaration of full combat readiness' could indicate that war was believed likely or imminent Various measures could be initiated either immediately on a large scale or gradually and selectively affecting only rtions of the armed forces and national e conornies F -- Movement of missile units to siting areas B Security Concealment and Deception -- Continued dispersion of naval units from port 143 The Warsaw Pact owntries--Particularly the Soviet Union have the experience doctrine capability and intent to employ many techniques to interfere with our ability to collect intelligence information and to manipulate our perception of the meaning or umpose of detected activities Their experience has Convinced them of the vaJue of deception as an essential farce multiplier and condition for achieving surprise We would expect them to use the full range ea demAon teehniques to guard their Intentions by 141 If a crisis deepened and war seemed more likely or imminent Prot leaders would declare full combat readiness to initiate final preparations for some or all of their armed form Measures impit mented would include the following --- Communication of the command to military units - Initiation I large-scale or general rmolaibution -FUR establishment of an active wartime comMarAL curl and sonnmuBICU iotrs aetworrk Ott the front theater and national level -- Extensive and abnorxaal effects to reset da oeiv% or interfere w1% US mind NATO Intsllicenae collection effaft - Estmaudtnary llavab of inulligenae collection aWast the Ut ited Statm and NATO shaping Weftm perceptions Although vw judge that the Pact would be wmble to prevent as from makes timely IntAPr mtotlons of the sum of detecW activities as war Vxep axi tticros we are Jess confident about our ability to interpret Pact actions as ive%ffensive or reactive defensive mod Still Hess certain as to how piamsive any warg tT$ mWa be on file vital issue of Inlteut F 144 SecurOv The Pad would enforce rigid secudty measurm to assure the secrecy of Ito war plans Contral measures would include tare followbw rnshio- i9 U-P-SIVIRL 40 V Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Top 3 5 c 3 5 c tion of planning and access to plans to a minimum number of people total control of the media strict counterintelligence and political control over the populace and members of the armed forces denial of travel by foreigners as well as most citizens the conduct of military activity and troop movements at night and strict communications security n - Electronic emission control - The manipulation of true distorted or false 3 5 c information to misleadF I 146 Deception measures must be carefully and extensively planned and tailored to a specific situation if they are to be effective This would weigh against the elaborate use of deception in a hastily prepared attack while an attack prepared with more delibera- 145 Concealment and Deception The Soviets and their allies are aware that the United States and NATO possess sophisticated intelligence collection means which would prevent the Pact from concealing all of its preparations for war The primary purpose of Pact concealment and deception measures would be to mislead and confuse NATO as to the timing scope and purpose of the preparations and reduce NATO's warning time The Pact could institute some or all of the following political and military deception propaganda and disinformation tactics tion would offer greater oppoitunities for employing an integrated deception plan n 3 5 c 147 The primary target of Pact deception measures would be senior US and NATO decisionmakers whom the Pact would hope to condition mislead and confuse until insufficient time remained for an effective response to Pact military moves The fundamental objective of these Pact efforts would be to convince US and NATO decisionmakers that the Pact's intentions were peaceful Conditioning and confusion would be the key methods in achieving this strategic goal An impportant part of the conditioning process would be the feedback link-the use of the Western press leaks from controlled sources plus in-place agents to provide the necessary feedback which would enable fine-tuning further conditioning and maximum persistence and dissemination of erroneous beliefs Pact planners believe that these techniques could be successful even if US and NATO intelligence agencies - Increased emphasis on the espousal oGBP peaceful intentions while citing the need to make additional defensive military preparations - Increased efforts to induce tension and disagreement among NATO countries by feeding contradictory information to individual governments - Creation of a diversion in another part of the world - Attempts to mobilize some military forces covertly properly identified and Interpreted Pact activities as -- Attempts to conceal or delay as long as possible 148 Once the Pact had made a decision that war was inevitable or even hig#dy likely it would sanction at least selective interference with SUS and NATO intelligence calle on forts including space-based systems The Soviet Union has a variety of capabilities to butler Western intelligence colleODn efforts such as selective Jamming of militarv communications links ad radutTS tip destruction or blinding of intelligence ilection satellites While such interference would degrade US and NATO inteMsencse collection efforts It would in itself provide a strong warning indicatm arts might well be onsid erred an act of war war preparations n the final preparations and deployments for attack -- The use of exercises as a cover to mask military preparations The Soviets believe this is dice saost feasible way of rationalizing extensive military activity - The use of darkness and adverse weather conditions to wooed preparations and movement -- The sxpi Ration of terrain to take advantage of its cameealina features -- The use of camaufw materials to disguise conceal or distort 3 5 c C @eQection Coqpabilily 148 We are confident of the ability of NS and NATO hitelkence arganizWons to d a large number of indtomm # tree Warsaw Pact prepared for a large- Ae war with NATO' While we bdieVe that the scale of such indiestm would be such as to dearly indicate an Intent on the Soviets' part to enhance their --- The use of dum mylzlewy equipment and radar reflector -- Activation of dummy communimnon wets - T4 us0 of bum eons Wand masking 69 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c readiness for war we cannot be confident that we would have a consensus within the Intelligence Community regarding Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities It is likely that many indicators might be attributable to the precautionary actions of the Soviet leadership in time of great international stress or crisis To the extent that such precautionary actions engender-A counterprecautionary actions on the NATO side the Soviets might feel driven to take further preparatory measures which would be detected and possibly construed as additional evidence of hostile intent toward NATO Nevertheless confidence in our ability to detect the indicators of Soviet preparations is strong This confidence is based ow precautions as they saw fit As Warsaw Pact capabilities grew the potential remaining warning and decisionmaking time would diminish The times indicated below are the minimums that might be expected for US and NATO commanders and policymakers under the unlikely circumstances of a Soviet decision to go to war from a cold start having taken no special military preparations prior to the initiation of mobilization plans These times would be operative only if timely decisions were made by L'3 policymakers to react appropriately to the rapidly developing or imminent threat If decisions were postponed and Warsaw Pact preparations were to continue the preparation time available to NATO would be reduced Recipients of warning should understand that while it is the principal function of the warning system to keep poncyrnakers informed of potentially explosive situations and changes in the capabilities oGBP hostile forces the system is not designed and should not be expected to notify recipients when prudent measures should be initiated The timing of such decisions like the decisions themselves are policy matters not intelligence - Oar ability to provide reliable and time infor- mation derived from intelligence on a broad spectrum of Soviet and East European political military and economic activities responsibilities n 3 5 c 151 Warning recipients should also be aware that if possible the Warsaw Pact would probably take more time to prepare to execute an attack option than 3 5 c Indicated below-anywhere from one or more days up to many weeks If this were to be the case the potential for additional US and NATO decision and counterpreparation time would exist provided policymakers reacted expeditiously to the initial and continuing warnings provided by the Intelligence Com- - Our ability in a crisis to augment and shift collection capabilities and shorten processing time F_-I 3 5 c munity 150 Discussed below are assessments of our ability to detect and interpret the preparations necessary for the Pact to Initiate the various attack options discussed in chapter M The warning assessments for a standingstart attack as well as the twm three- and five-front attacks are keyed to the minimum time we assess would be mouired far the Pact to complete the necessary miparations in a time-constrained dot is crash effort It should are recognized that such a crash effort is unlikely under any of the options discussed below except possibly in regard to the final preparations necessary to achieve full readiness for war ft is snore likely that this Pact would gradually irmease its m6rrm and s Mabilities flit war as it vercelved the development of a crisis These increases to tesdiness and crmpahilittes would be duly n moned affording US ant NAM mlicymakers time to take Option i-Attack Tram to Peacetime Posture 158 As a theoretipal construct a Poet attack on NATO from a peacetime readiness posture would be planned to provide as little warning to NATO as p 'ble In Initiating such an attack the Prix would forgo lengthy Political and economic as well as extensive mnilitarv iwparations for war which would warn NATO Norwtbaless the Pact could not prepare for this attack without at least alerting the forces to be initially cow and bringing them to the full combat readiriess condition This readiness condition would probably be initiated directly foram tare normal constant combo readiness amdfinon w2n signifies o routine readiness Posture in mcetime its declaration could be avert or secret The USSR and other Pact nations would also probably declare full national 70 Iftsuval- Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c defense readiness simultaneously with or soon after we would detect the widespread dissemination of these commands although their significance might not be immediately understood Even if the commands to convert to full readiness were disseminated without our direct knowledge a host of indicators that a full readiness posture was being assumed would be available Pact political leaders and military commanders would then begin a wide range of actions-taken on a compressed time schedule-to complete preparations of the populace and military forces for war refer to paragraph 112 chapter IV If initiated from a cold start these preparations would be obsen-d assessed and reported to decisionmakers within 24 hours after activity had been initiated We have assessed that the Pact would require a minimum of five to six days to prepare for a two-front attack from a cold start and more realistically seven to 10 days if it had not taken the declaration of full readiness for military forces In addition the Soviets would not attack without first 3 5 c 3 3 b 1 alerting their strategic forces and initiating the mobilization of at least some other general purpose forces Minimum preparation and movement time for some of the dozen or so Pact divisions garrisoned near the Past-West German border and the West GermanCzechoslovak border would probably be about 24 hours n 153 It is quite possible that we would detect the order to go to full readiness If not the passing o t e orders an the activities required to move to full combat readiness could be the first indicator of military preparations Some efforts would be made to recall personnel from local leave or temporary duty and nonessential duties and some local mobilization might be evident Activity levels within garrisons would be abnormally high and the dispersal and or forward movement of the attacking forces would be unprecedented and impossible to completely conceal 3 5 c any previous preparations during a period of tension If the Soviets began their preparations from a peacetime posture US and NATO military commanders and declsionmakers could expect to have four or more days to make decisions and counterpreparations provided that they reacted expeditiously to the warnings issued These times do not take into account the likelihood that the forces would be raised to higher 154 Accordingly in the extremely unlikely case of a sudden attack on NATO from a peacetime posture we judge that US and NATO intelli ce could and would report unusual an Increased activity by units an dispersion and or movement within a few hours after the Initiation of this activity Such reported activity would provide sufficient information for Allied commanders and decisionmakers to take precautionary steps Because of the extremely unlikely eventuality of such an attack however inte vretaton of the purpose of this activity could be ambiguous and contentious and a final Judgment that an attack was imminent might not be reached before hostilities began levels of readiness during any period of tension or crisis which probably would precede a Warsaw Pact decision to move to a full war readiness posture Assuming that the readiness of the fords had been so raised the amount of time required to reach full combat readiness could be greatly reduced In this case some warnings however ambiguous would Aready have beers given The intelligence Community would continue to assess the Pact's war preparations and issue additional tudgments regarding the nature and extent of these preparations 3 5 c Option lII-- itxaclc Wth Three fronts 156 If the Warsaw Pact bad taken no Previous measures in time of orhb to improve Its readiness over Option 11-- Alt nth Two Fronts 1n it Is not likely that the Pact would Prepare a two-front a rack farce on a crash basis from a peacetime readiness posture It is mt likely that maraud peacetime conditions we assess that it would reequire a minimum of night to nine dams and more realistically to to 12 days to make preparations for a Wee-front attack These pzevarnZlons could be initiated by a sequamat declaration of the various readiness owcUtiorm or am or both of the intermediate levels of readies for the arznecd f6ims acct the Patsy nations could tie skipy ed Preparations would have to be during a period of tension it would gradually raise the readiness of its fones through the implementation of the increased and thrwt-of-war aeutdiuess conditions if in the process regional or vWW conditions elated to the crisis level the smiets wodltl b My bring the Warsaw Pact forces to hil combat readiam rapidly Fall national defense readiness' would probably also be declared There is a gmrd chance that aoacmAdwd using a s aupremed-buildup and a pro approack tglrJus o fort would be requiried to complete dm preparations within eight to rune days 'i'bis 71 e Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 ENMEApproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Is 3 5 c would include the mobilization of over 300 000 reservists in East Germany Poland and Czechoslovakia to bring understrength divisions and nondivisional units to war-authorized strength the forward movement of forces the activation of wartime command control and communication networks the psychological preparation of the Pact populace by domestic propaganda 3 5 c broadcasts and the establishment of logistic lines of communication Moreover the Pact would of necessity begin the simultaneous preparation of other forcesboth strategic and general purpose-to allow for nuclear escalation and timely reinforcement of firstechelon attacking forces The mobilization of well over 400 000 troops would be required for example to bring Soviet ground formations in the Baltic Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts to war-authorized manning levels F-1 157 As in the case of Option II the chances are good that we would detect some of the widespread commands to move to higher levels of military and national readiness including full readiness and this alone would provide a strong indicator that the Pact was preparing for war If not the urgent and widespread activities that would occur as a result of these commands would certainly lee detected and reported and would alert US and NATO intelligence orsanizations that the Pact was vigorously taking steps to go to war A judgment that these activities signaled war preparations could be provided to national pahoymakers within 24 hours after they were lnitiated thereby providing US and NATO volloyrnakers with seven or more days of decision and Preparation time provided that they acted expeditiously if on the other hand the Pact had already gradually rats ed the level of readiness of its forces durins a period of tension as we would expect it to do the time a'equired for final preparations would he shortcnr In dais case some 3 5 c warnings however tambisaous would already have been liven Pstllowkm Its Initial warnings the Weillhence Community would continue to assess the steps belay taken by the PW to prepare four war and would Issue aduitional itrdsxam u regarding the nature and scope of the vre taratiotts __7 Option 1Y-- A With five Prvrah 158 The vattexn of urgent anti wldespread activity involved in vrepatinq a full five-from Psaa attacking farce wound be slmtlaar to dart of a thme4run t EURorce but the mom and cou pplaxity of the prepazstlons would be ama a wsr Wltlle we do cot believe drat the Warsaw Pad would be fttelr to seals to achieve a five-front attack posture without gradually implementing some readiness measures during a period of tension we assess that a minimum of about 15 days would be required to alert mobilize move and otherwise prepare the forces-assuming the transition to full readiness was initiated from a normal peacetime readiness posture More realistically such an effort might require up to three weeks if initiated from a normal peacetime readiness posture n 3 5 c 158 The Pact could initiate military preparations by sequentially declaring increased combat readiness threat-of-war readiness and finally full combat readiness or it could skip one or both intermediate readiness conditions We would have a good chance of detecting some of these commands The USSR and other Pact nations at some point would declare full national defense readiness with or without declaration of the intermediate levels of national defense readiness With 15 days or more to prepare for war the Pact would have greater opportunities to attempt to mask its intentions in the earliest stages of preparation for example by delaying some preparations in the forward area An enormous effort however would be required to make the preparations necessary to execute this option within 15 days US and NATO Intelligence would be able to detect many changes in the overall posture of Pact forces-even without direct evidence that Pact forces had been alerted and brought to increaser levels of readiness This would be especially true in regard to the mobilization of understrength units in Poland and Czechoslovaleta as well as almost 30 low4trength divisions in the three western mflitary districts of the USSR the forward movement of forces-particularly from the western USSR-rand the command control and communications structure necessary to coordinate and crmtrol these activities 7_1 - 3 5 c 160 Should the Pact opt to prepare a full five front attack from a peacetime readiness posture we judge that we would be aide to vrovide warning within 24 to 48 hours aGBPtar preparations began If these forces were already rat as b%b level of readiness the time to ackeve farll readiness might be quite short Ilya this case some warnings however ambiguous would already have heert givem in e unbWy event that the Soviets were to attempt m quiic cly bring their farces to faall wartime readiness from a Peacetime Posture US and NATO mftarv common and voltevmakers would have at hurt i3 days of deemon and raaparation time vrovided thin they reacted expedittoody to the initial warninss During this period the tate ligmm Oommiunay 3 5 c 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 qW C00638425 0 3 5 c roved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 TaSnscs would continue to assess the steps being taken by the Pact to prepare for war and would issue additional judo- cants regarding the nature and scope of these preparations i associated with the full readiness condition-including the large-scale deployment of combat forces-had not yet been completed 161 The Pact could initiate gradual war preparations-implemented over a period of many weeks or months-either in response to a prolonged crisis or as a result of a deliberate decision to secretly brepare for war and launch a sudden attack We judge that the gradual approach to achieving full readiness in reaction to a developing crisis would be the most likely course of events if the Warsaw Pact were to prepare for war against NATO Such an incremental and slow- 163 If a crisis continued and both sides took a number of preparedness measures in an action-reaction situation the danger of war as a result of escalation or miscalculation would certainly increase It would be particularly difficult under those circumstances to judge whether Pact prep rations were essentially defensive in nature or were being made for possible offensive operations Regardless of the Pact's motives for initiating these preparations however we would be able to judge that preparations for war were under way We would be especially alert to efforts by the Pact toA ssuise major military preparations as an paced approach in preparing for war would present exercise I D A Gradual Buildup more difficult analytical problems for US and NATO intelligence than would the rapid urgent and widespread implementation of war preparations A gradual implementation of war preparations would provide more time to detect these preparations interpret them corroborate our information and issue warnings The early preparations however would probably be difficult to distinguish from routine force Improvements or exercises The incremental approach to preparing for war would also provide the fact with greater opportunities for implementing deception measures but their effectiveness would depend on the 3 5 c 3 5 c timing and scope of the preparations as well as the resourcefulness and innovativeness of the measures taken 162 In a crisis period we would expect the Soviets and their allies to take at least some prudent measures to protect their Interests ir4uding activities to improve their military readiness and war-fighting capability for example the mobilization and preparation of less ready elements of their force structure sloth the collection and analytic elements of US rtmd NATO intelligence c mmunities would be allert to r txe and pmmptly report ally unusual activity Under crtsts conditions the hot might well refrain from attemptiug to carom l some Arev atations in order to $tQtiq Its resolve and to intimidate Western tEVVerruuents ft might for example- initiate some overt aterting and mobilisation of units direct an overt pmpaga 4 canpaimn aimed at both dmestic and intemaAtiottal audiences and implement some o AOM civil dtden measures In this ease- 4nvo1Yl a odsis of saute weeps or months--owo would Isslte warflhw tlmt the Pact was taking aem to enable 1t to tm to war ' War would also be able to jut drat find war vivarsuaw 3 5 c 3 5 c I 164 Because of the high risks and costs involvedincluding NATO counterpreparations and the risk of miscalculation-the Pact would probably defer overt and large-scale mobilization major force deployments and other highly visible and provocative measures until the final transition to full readiness for war We judge that even after some weeks or months of gradual preparations there would still be a discernible difference in the nature scope and pace of preparedness measures which would enable us to wide warnings that the Pact was Initiating the final steps which would enable It to go to war Pact deception measures and conditionim however could shorten the time available to defuse a exists or to take countermeasures particularly if policymakers delayed action while awaiting utuunb1suous proof of Pact Intentions Nev- ertheless we are confident that we could inform dedsionmakers that the Pact was Initiating the final steps that would wMe it to go to wAr within 24 hours after the begs min of the aaeu vides Associated with the transition to a full readlnav oon tion We would already have Issued wunftw-QrobaNly repeatedly- of the military atttrasute s being taken by the Pact and of as amwtng danger of hostilities n 3 5 c E Warsaw P t Exerdw and ToWning Patterns 165 iPactmilttary activity whether IuMated during a- od sts or period of calm would be subject to scrutiny by the Qntellittence Community act a 44- our basis 'iii aaortt3tnstmmmuvaillaom4A the UM and She Pao Madow wound provide am first basis for determilft if dxw countries were eraacing in abnormal activity or ntovin toward an 411Mased tUPlldlEW f4 r WORM action Any aso mrarms high or vbfrsg level of activity 3 5 c Trpp qV Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Top 3 5 c would be checked to determine whether it was routine or abnormalF___1 166 Over a period of years the Intelligence Community has compiled detailed knowledge of major Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises This knowledge generally indicates that military activity takes place at approximately the same scenario time relative to the initiation of hostilities Although there are certainly variations depending on the type of exercise data recovery and other factors there is enough consistency to categorize actions by expected phases such as the threat assessment phase increased intelligence collec- tine training and other activities that are fairly predictable based on the cyclic nature of their training programs The annual Soviet training program is divided into two distinct six-month cycles These cycles are separated by the occurrence of troop rotation that is the departure of conscripts who have completed their service and the arrival of new conscripts Training is conducted according to a common set of regulations that specifies the type of training the number of lessons and hours -and the number of field training exercises The type and intensity of training depends on the time of year the day of the week and manning levels within individual units and subunits In the past many unitsIncluding those in the forward area-have provided troops and transport vehicles usually beginning in midApril to assist civil authorities in harvesting and trans- porting agricultural products this activity continued throughout the summer However recent information suggests that the use of Soviet military trucks and personnel for harvest SUDWrt will be sharply curtailed if not terminated I 169 Our knowledge is not without limitations but we judge that we could recognize large-scale nonroutine activities such as the following tion and reporting the activation and augmentation of command and control systems and the combat preparation and deployment phase This type of anal ysis would provide reasonable expectations of determining at least some of the following - Whether the activity was expected or unusual - The focus of the exercise and its scope - What portion of the command control and communications system was activated - The general level of readiness in effect - Similarities dissimilarities to previous exercises - General extent of military activities completed - Military actions remaining to be completed - The extent of live' play versus staff exercising 167 While we could not be absolutely certain of -- Shortened or intensified training cycles - The large-stda mobilization of reservists in East- ern Europe or the western military districts of the USSR Widespread or unusual military training on weekends or holidays - Major changes in training -schedules or procedures -- Major increases or decreases in manning or readinew posture We believe that our ability to anticipate the nature and extent of Soviet and Pact m litary activity and to detect and provedy 6nierprot unusual or abnarmA activity has Increased in recent yearn While our ability to detect and interpret am sua'l activity would not necessarily enable us to determine conclusively that hostile militm actions were hura ma we beIleve that we urmdd be able to provide relatively early that the Pact was assuming a warlike posture our ability to distinguish between preparations for a routine exercise and preparations for a possible hostile act certain exercise-related activity does give us con- siderable confidence that we could recognize unusual activity Soviet and Pact exercises for example are routinely limited in scale and scope and rarely involve the mobilization of large numbers of reservists especially in more than a few units tine large-scale mobilization of reservists however is commonly simulated in exercises During the past several years there has been a tendency to decrease the number of troops deployed in the field while increasing the emphasis va large coordinated command staff cxencises which feature multif ont and multi- 1iYI3 operatioars Event when surw dcplaymeau do occur it is standard prac- tice -with some exceptions-44to field imly elements of divisional units for example one or two resimerb and 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c F'On m verhum some a mport units rather than entire dividans Consectuerift any exerelso ahwwterisud by the fielding or Preparation of ern umrsually Urger number of tmc-ps- s pec3sdly en a ulddivisloW units wuuld dictate close monitorft IS In addition to paatidpWre in rsecasimutl major exercises Soviet and Warsaw Pact units conduct ran- UMUMM 3 3 b 1 3 5 c Me wmndum Pd M4 60-xoo17M VW soccer Ingo ot9na f yliani taa rn icantota or 'a'm# t der 188f1 3 5 c 74 3 5 c Tv 0 0 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 T VI LOOKING AHEAD 170 The evolution of technology and its application to military activities will result in continuing improvements in Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities and command and control systems One of the major consequences of this trend is that some traditional military indicators of war preparations are becoming more ambiguous see the inset on pages 2628 Increased Soviet apulication of computer technol- ogies and more rapid and capable communications and transportation systems will also make the warning process more complex n 171 At the same time US collection capabilities are continuing to improve and in the next few years will produce an explosion of data as well as gignificant improvements 3 5 c 172 Cumulatively these trends will place greater pressure than ever on the analytical components of the warning system compelling accelerated efforts to develop new methods and tools especially new warning indicators Additionally there is a need for more expeditious means of conveying and displaying warnings to policymakers Some of these methods and tools are already beginning to be available and they demonstrate that the context of decisionmaking in its widest and most integrated sense is an essential ingre- dient in assessing intent and the meaning of acts that carry it into effect Even with technological advances in collection we believe that some of the most significant improvements in our warning posture will come in the anal ical sphere during the period of this Estimate 3 5 c 173 In addition to the above a number of developmprovements in interactive tasking and other aspects of collection will significantly enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of collectors in a wide variety of situations The Implications of this trend are that there will be much more data available on the USSR and the Fact1 ments in the USSR and the Pact could influence our ability to warn see inset for some examples While none of these developments would alter the warning judgments of this Estimate they could influence the context in which warning judgments might be made In the future F-1 3 5 c Potential Developments Affecting Warning ipvstraative Event Signifivance Change in Soviet leadership Ile advent of a more confrontational leadership could Increase the number of potential triggering points for a war In Europe Esstablishment ctf permanent high common of forces opposite NA7l7's central and aouthern region This Would reduce the time required to convert the Pad's aommaud and oontrol structure from a peacetime to a wartime posture Crisis in Eastern r ope or the USSR Although the Pact has weathered many crises the cumulafiive ef#eat taus been to increase tine expectation that new ones W91 aetw and may affect 3iirarsaw Pact plans and capabilities for sear and thus the wsrntns problem MilitRtrp m potm cout'ratrah in fire PAUL 'tire ommequences of d1b might be Veen in a number d areas wherein cmupematorv measures to overcome the consttairtts should v oAde rvunfng 8rrt mtom 3 5 c I PW Approved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 0 W Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 I pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 ra P 3 5 c ANNEX BIBLIOGRAPHY National Intelligence Council NIE 4-1-78 Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Cotner to War in Implications for NATO Warning of War 10 April 1978 NIE 11-1 -8 Earappo 3 5 c 3 5 c W rsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO 7 July 1981 NIE 11-3 8-83 Soviet Ca bi ti m Nuclear Conflict I983-93 8 March 1984 3 5 c NIE 11-15-82 Soviet Naval Strafe and Programs Through the 1990s 26 October 1982 3 5 c NIE 12 I1-83 Military Reltabil t o i June 1983 3 5 c Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies 28 NIE 11 39-83 Soviet Forces and Capabilities in the Southern Theater of Military Operattans 1 November 1983 NIE 11-14 40-$iX S vi NIE 11-9-83 ndroyoti tlttary Farces in the Far East 1 September 1981 oach to Key US-Soviet Issues 9 August 1983 SNIE 11-1 1-84 Jl Implications 01 Mar 1984 NI IIM 8Q1CiillOiX soviet military-Political Activities IS he Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces June 1980 198% The Readthcss of Soviet Air Farces April 1982 NI IlM 82- N1 JIM 84-I090I Assma$ Manpower of Wnrsau Pact i4onoes CventraJ Int ll ganae 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c NI HM 83-1000$ Emylaument of Warsaw Pact Foram Agafnst NATO July 1983 ere to in flee NAB Guidelines Area I88 9 Januarr 1o 984 F- 3 5 c 3 5 c NI IIM 82-IOQliL The Readiness of Soviet #ymured Farces Navau-6er 1982 NI IIM 83 1fl00SJX Soviet Wurztme M r LeadersMp Conttnutm December 1983 3 5 c 3 5 c NI UM 80-10017JX The Soviet Invastnrs a3 Afuhanistan Implications for Warning October 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c n 3 3 b 1 3 5 c 3 5 c P Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 7a Strategic Warnin 1979 St if USSR Warsaw Pact General Indicator List February Strategic Warning Staff Research Report USSR-Iran Critioue of the Warning Process 5 September 1980 Intelligence Assessment SOV 83-10034 The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group February 19837-1 3 5 Intelligence Assessment SR 81-10082JX Soviet Contingency plans Operations Against Pakistan July 1981 3 5 c Intelligence Assessment SOV 83-10175CX The So Warsaw Pact Forces October 1983 Military Ontrol of the 3 5ic Intelligence Assessment SR 81-10055CX Soviet Capabilities for Invading the Persian Gulf Region June 1981 3 5ic Intelligence Assessment SOV 83-1005ICX Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Reserve Systems March 1983 3 5c Research Paper SOY 84-10067X IA 84-100012JX Soviet Military Rear Services in East Germany February 1984 3 5 c Research Paper SOV 83-101430 Mannin Practice ai Ground Force Units August 1983 1- 3 5 c Research Paper SOV 82-1U204CX Managing and Monitorin Warsaw Pact Ground Forrces Member 1982 Research Paper SOV 83 10182CX Soviet Ti ehn Effecttveness July 1983 t erns in Soviet 1 e 3 5 c Assessing Air Defense 3 5 c 3 3 b 1 3 5 c Research Paper SOV 84-10088CX Mannta s of Sit Ground Forces in Central Europe June 19K 3 5 c 3 3 b 1 3 5 c USSR Monthft# Review SOV UR 834D09JX Farces in the Far FAst ' September 1983 fie Bale nI the Intelligence Memorandum SA ti101 M Y Soviet M11 ta_ret- E Intn MV AuVW 1980 August 19% Der r A Opposite a latelllgeuec Agency DNA-8 81-EURx DUB198E t6I-K Soviet Prout and Atmy Operations 16 luny 78 I -rapl 40 40 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB 2245-3-83 Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy April 1983 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1340-20-83 USSR Employment of Helicopter Units in Combined Arms Operations Apri l 1983 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1100-226-79 Echelonment in Soviet Military Planning July 1979 7 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1100-132-82-SI The Operational Group in Soviet Front Operations July 1982 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2600-3152-8 -' r War in the Northwest- ern TVD June 1983 Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2610-36-81 The Soviet Conceptual Frame work for the Development and Application of Military Power June 1981 El Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1 0-11 -62 Soviet Warsaw Pact Deploy- i 1 3 5 c 1 3 5ic ment Dispersal Airfields November 1982 3 5ic Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1100-401-83-SI Second Operational Echelon For Theater of Military Operations March 1983 1 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2610-45-81 The Soviet Nonnuclear Option in the Western Theater of Military Operations October 1981 7 I 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2622-2-83 Soviet Strategic Conventional Offensive in the Western Theater of Military Operations March I883 Defense Intelligence Document DDB 1150 1-83 SovietJWarsaw Pad Sustainabtlity Planning Factors for Frontal Operations August I083 - 3 5 c 5 3 55 c Defense Intelligence Document DD 2680 14242 S Role of Heavy Equipment TrangxWers December 1982 3 5 c Mobility The Defense Intelligence Document DDB-iWO-222-MrSAO Centml Lo to the Soviet Air Arms December 18$E Defense Intelligence Report DDB-11Qq 29'7-83 Ground A Under the Warsaw Pact Attack 0 ptions April 19811 Defense Intelligence Document Bases September 1981 He Support Lvgistto Support Soviet Theater Logistic Defense Intelligence Report DD131100 874-81 An Evaluation of Soviet Front and Army Level Par Service Organizations January 2981 E Defense Intelligence Document DD11-U -119-61-SI Warsaw Pam ZosWic Supin T ore of lie ltral Rear SeVottaes September 1981 Defense Intelhgance Document DD134lOti45 ' I The Soviet Force Ceneration Defense Intelligence Famca tluac ig 298 Imt 't131t1- 4 C - Soviet Special iFunme Defense Intelilswce D ent DD 604 ii0 USSIt The Transition From Baca to War at the Miltt m otatrtcal West Le d-- stwit of Diva Veleftse Command Entities May I 3 5 c 6 3 55 c 3 c 31 c 3 5 c I 3 5 c 3 5 c I 3 5 c 3 5 C Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 p roved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1100-353-82-SAO Collection Signatures of Dispersed Sootet NSWP General Purpose Forces November 1982 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1100-430-84 The Readiness of the NonSoviet Warsaw Pact Ground Forces draft 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2680-129 82 Mobilization of Manpower and Materiel in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries September 1982 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2680-127-82-SAO Soviet Military Commissariats Organization and Capabilities February 1982 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-2680-112-81 Soviet Weapon System Be- 3 5 c placement Operations September 1981 Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1150-2-81 Soviet Ground Force Maintenance June 1981 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Report DDB-1170-3-80 Warsaw Pact Forces Command Control and Communications August 1980 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1170-7-82-SI Soviet Warsaw Peet Front Command Control and Communications Model North 19821 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Dneument DST'-117t3S-113-82 Soviet and Warsaw Pact Command Control and Communications 29 October 1982 Defense Intelligence Document DDB-26100-315t1-82 War in the Southeastern TVD September 1983 3 5 c i 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Document DDB-1100 437 83 Materiel Support Operations in a Soviet Warsaw Pact Front November 1983 1 3 5 c latelH en 1980 A r 1 1 SR Military Activity Opposite Iran 24 June 3 5 c Intelligence Appraisal 152411 Poland Soviet Intervention Threat to NATO 30 September 1981 3 5 c Intelligence Appraisal 1 j USSR Scenarty for Invading Poland 2 February 1981E 3 5 c Intelligence Appraisal 44-81 USSR M 7 ilitaru s tooCmwchoskwak and Polish Cases 24 March 1 1 3 5 c Intelligence AuwaW 11MI USSR War Atert Wto Communkolons System 7 August 1981 1 1 3 5 c Intellisc pace Appraisa1141-W USSR TVV C tmmnd Pasts 17 Da nber l882 Intelligence Appraisal 86444 USSR Str1o ttg fora Mom i 3 5I c tc Strategy 16 3 51 c March 1 8 tntaftanco Appraisal 97 M USSR UlUtary Optiom in t he Pavian Gulf 22 3 5 c Selgemba 1982 0 1 tutelfteaxe A W 49-ti3 USSR Amy Actutba and C I Ced Amu Formations i s may 1mm8 F--- 3 5 c I so 3 5 c 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 00 0 63 8 42 5 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 - 'C i3 5ec d Intelli ence A rais USSR Army Corps Structure 18 May 1983 Intelligence Appraisal 59-83 USSR Mobile Signal Units 7 June 1983 Intelligence Appraisal 66-83 I344IL Groups of Forces Nuclear-Capable Artillery 3 5 c I 3 5 c 28 June 1983 r 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Estimate DDE-2200-73-80 Implications of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan January 1980 3 5 c Defense Intelligence Estimate DDE-2200 106-81 Soviet Military Presence n Afghanistan Implications for Afghanistan Pakistan and India April 1981 -- 3 5 c Counterintelligence Memorandum DIACIM 1-82- C1 Study Soviet Stra- tegic and Tactical OPSEC March 1982 3 5 c DoD DJS-2620 8A-83-SI Worldwide Warning Indicator Monitoring System WWIMS Generic Indicator Directory September 1983 3 5 c Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 ro lease 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1 This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence Because of the sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein this copy is for the exclusive information and use of the recipient only 2 This document may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence 3 When this document is disseminated overseas the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year At the end of this period the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with fACoD-69 2 22 June 1953 4 The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 0 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Director of Centra Intelligence 3 5 c NFu NTE q- L-17 11 M Warning of War in Europe Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and 'forces 3 5 c National Intelligence Estimate Memorandum to Holders This Memorandum to Holders represents the views ofthe Director of Central lntelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community Se NIE 44-84 September 1989 Copy 32 5 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 000638425 d for Release 2016 03 0638425 a Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved WNINTEL National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN NF NOCONTRACT NC PROPIN PR ORCON OC REL WN Not releasable to foreign nationals Not releasable to contractors or contractor consultants Caution-proprietary information involved Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator This information has been authorized for release to WNINTEL-Intelligence sources or methods involved 3 5 c All material on this page is Unclassified Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 app lease 2016 03 28 000638425 O-aet_ Director of Central Intelligence 3 5 c NIE 4-1-84 Warning of War in Europe Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces - 3 5 c Information available as of 28 September 1989 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum to Holders The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Memorandum The Central Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State also participating The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence Headquarters Marine Corps This Memorandum was approved forpublication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board Se September 1 989 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 approved for Release 3 5 c Warning of War in Europe Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces u o The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparationsfor war with NATO in Central Euro a have increased significantly from those set forth in 1984 3 5 c o Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a well-prepared attack involving five to six fronts with Jour fronts in the first strategic echelon We should be able to provide about four to five weeks of warning of such an attack F 3 5 c o We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and movement but before completing the postmobilization training necessaryfor minimum offensive proficiency The warning times would be shorter but the Soviets would judge such an attack as highly risky o Announced Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact unilateral reductions if completed and given no reduction in NATO capabilities should significantly extend preparation time because of the greater need in the first echelon for currently low-strength divisions from the western USSR se MH N E 4-1-84 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c C00638425 ase 2016 03 28 000638425 O pprov d fo fret- 3 5 c 1 MEAMPwym Figure 1 Projected Warsaw Pact Echelons in the Western Theater of Military Operations TMO -Four-Front Attack 11 ENHAG North Sea Front second echelon Front firsr echeon -T v r rsr Pohsh ilaMiurO Army Ha1tfc Front Coasts 2nd Pohsh Front aBrataM - r y 4 2nd Guards t Tank Army 'rr J 3rd Shock Army u N Central Front Barli c- r East Gerr nan 1 Army s West L BDNN % 1 sth Guards Army G e r mk n y Carpath an Army Carpathian 4 Front a I PRAGUE# Central Group of Forces Czech Soviet rst Czech ermany VO10a Front Army ath Czech Czec lovakia Army sta ttgan Musick BUDAPEST Hungary - mw a a s are o x awr K'arama au hw ee y 1 iW LL LL l o la p ewr LLn m m m aa a awr a aea v nnam v agnpmU Ital y r i 3 5 c ' CCA'ft11 iv Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 App d lease 2016 03 28 000638425 I'ftret- 3 5 c Key Judgments The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe have increased significantly from those set forth in NIE 4-1-84 These changes are a direct consequence of Soviet assessments of improved NATO military capability our improved understanding of the Soviet process of transitioning to war and changes in Soviet peacetime readiness Accordingly before unilateral force reductions we assess that Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a well-prepared attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts in the first strategic echelon We should be able to provide about four to five weeks of warning of such an attack The increased time needed to prepare this attack option results from increased reliance in the first echelon on not ready divisions from the western USSR o An attack with three fronts in the first echelon remains a possibility in some circumstances We should be able to provide about two to three weeks of warning of such an attack Our assessment of the increased time needed to prepare these fronts for sustained offensive operations results from new judgments about the time required to prepare Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe o We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and movement but before completing postmobilization training necessary for minimum proficiency for offensive operations If so we could provide at least two weeks of warning of a four-front attack or at least one week warning of a less likely three-front attack We believe however the Soviets would judge attacks before completion of postmobilization training as highly risky because of the reliance on reserves lacking such training 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pp d for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c Figure 2 Announced Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions in the Western Theater of Military Operations 0 11 L I Ile IOlomrlmm Bahic Sea -Vw 0 aa TAMIC diww 40W lAtbr Ur ddlmof z d of a division 'ON- Tank dlxision to be iWrewn or likely to be disbanoed 4W lAecftnLmdt nO1adxed -ifle dir7sion likely to be disbanded rr The East Gorman ficovsnanent pas announced d will wdhdrfw oM tank reg mem kern each of da so lank and motwind rdle dmeam Y4 A pwgM wn Vj Co Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 roved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 _rderet_ 3 5 c cliffism Announced Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact unilateral force reductions if completed should significantly extend preparation time because of the greater need in the first echelon for currently low-strength divisions from the western USSR Warning of our assessed most likely attack option-four fronts in the first echelon-would increase by about two weeks If the Soviets elected to attack after only mobilization and movement warning times would increase by almost a week These preparation and warning times after unilateral reductions assume that NATO capabilities remain at current levels Unilateral NATO reductions could diminish Pact perception of their requirements for success and therefore reduce warning time The ongoing Conventional Forces in Europe CFE Talks are likely to result in an agreement establishing numerical parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces below current NATO levels within the Atlantic-tothe-Urals zone From peacetime parity the Soviets would have to reestablish major forces in order to generate the capability to attack successfully and sustain the offensive to the depth of the theater This requirement would Increase preparation time considerably over what we have assessed in this Memorandum Allproatively the Soviets could increase the readiness and combat power of residual forces through higher manning levels and acquisition of modern equipment This would roquire reinvesting the savings aahioved by reducing their forces under CFE into defense and restructuring their forces and redistributing their equipment These smaller forces would be capable of launching attacks for limited objectives with warning tunes more like we art accustomed to today We do not believe such attacks for limited objectives would be attractive to Pact planners because the risks to include escalation to suclear war would far outweigh any potential short-term gains We are confident that for the period of this Estimate rove will be able to detect and report significant disruptions or a reversal of present political social and economic tends in the Warsaw Pact countries Although these indicators will remain ambiguous Vrirh regard to actual national war preparations they will continue to signal that the potential for a crisis had I increased 3 5 c This W wmarion is vii Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 U - pproved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 3 5 c Contents Page Key Judgments Discussion Reasons for the Reassessment v Definition Warning of War Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO 2 2 Warsaw Pact Views on the Outbreak of War in Europe Warsaw Pact Plans for War in Europe Warning of Attack in the Southwest Northwest and Oceanic TMOs 3 3 4 The Peacetime Readiness Status of Soviet Forces 4 Transition to War Warsaw Pact Attack Options 4 1 1 5 A Five-to-Six Front Attack With Four Fronts in First Echelon 6 An Attack With Two to Three Fronts in the First Echelon Unreinforced Attack 7 7 Warning of War Warning of an Unreinforced Attack Warning of An Attack With Two to Three Fronts in First Echelon Warning of a Five- to Six-Front Attack With Four Fronts in First Echelon Warning Implications of Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions Political and Economic Developments and Implications for Warning Outlook Warning Implications of Conventional Force Reductions Talks Economic and Political Changes Annex Warning Thresholds Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 12 13 15 3 3 b 1 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 time air and ground forces available in Eastern Europe and selected areas in the western USSR Warsaw Pact plans and forces for war against NATO in Central Europe changed greatly between 1982 and o The prospect of an arms control agreement that would result in mutual reductions to quantitative 1989 resulting in the Pact's perceived need to reinparity raises questions of fundamental changes in force its first strategic echelon in Eastern Europe with Pact military capabilities and strategy in Europe forces stationed in the western USSR before the outbreak of hostilities Further our understanding of o Political social and economic changes in the Warthe Pact's process of transition to war has improved saw Pact countries have improved our confidence in These two factors have led us to reevaluate US our ability to detect deliberate preparations to shift capability to provide warning of war in Europe In addition changes are under way that affect the future these nations from peace to war footing The further of Pact nations and forces and that affect the warning establishment of arms control inspection regimes equation for the near and long-term future reinforces our confidence 3 5 c o Unilateral force reductions in both Soviet and nonSoviet Warsaw Pact forces are reducing the peace- 3 5 e 3 5 c ' This Memorandum to Holders updates our estimates of warning presented in N1E 4 1-84 flop secretF une 1984 Warning of War in Europe I __T In 1988 the Intelligence Community approved an estimate Memorandum to Holders 83-10002 that judged that as a direct consequence of the assessments of improved NATO conventional defense capabilities during the 1980s the Warsaw Pact changed its preferred and most likely option for a sustained theater offensive against NATO to an attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts in the first strategic echelon This Memorandum examines the US capability to warn of war in Europe over the next two to three years in light of that judgment together with reassessments of peacetime 'readiness and transition to war reflected in N1E 11-1489 t also considers the warning implications of two other changes currently under way 1 the ongoing unilateral reductions in Pact conventional forces and 2 our improved capability to discern warning indicators from political soci I and economic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe This Memorandum's main focus-assessing the warning of war implications of the Warsaw Pact's preferred four-front-attack plan and our improved understanding of the Pact process of transition to war-concerns developments that occurred before Gorbachev's conventional arms control initiatives These developments by themselves call for the issuance of a new assessment The warning implications of both the Warsaw Pact unilateral reductions and the period arter a possible conventional force reduction treaty also necessitate assessment but our judgments of these warning implications must be more tentative because of the major changes under way in the Soviet Bloc We intend to reassess all of our conclusions about potential warning of war in Europe within the next two years This Memorandum presents the warning of war implications of the judgments contained primarily in National Intelligence Estiebruary 1989 mate 11-14-89 Top Secret Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and to Doctrine in the 1990s and the Memorandum Holders of Interagency Intelligence Memorandum 83-10002 Top Secret arch 1988 Employment of Warsaw Pact orces Against A Four Front Attack Readers are referred to these documents for the detailed supporting evidence behind the judgments on Warsaw Pact transition to war preparation times and plans for attacking NATO Information on Soviet readiness which directly affects warning time is contained in Interagency Intelligence Memorandum 82-10012 Secret March 1983 The Readiness ol'Soviet Ground Forces For recent views on warning of nuclear war see Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack Opintons sueslor Warning and Policy due to be issued in October Sete 1989 This Memorandum does not address previous warning considerations about Pact developments on NATO's flanks recent changes in Eastern Europe and the relationship of activities in the Persian Gulf to a European war The predeployment preparations and dispersal of the Pact navies prior to war would provide significant warning indicators A detailed assessment of the Soviet naval threat can be found in NIE 11-15-89 Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Toward the 21st Century Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 turning as a Process The Intelligence Community attempts to give early warning that an enemy has begun preparations for war or is on a course of action that poses a serious risk of war we define this as warning of war Because it is unlikely that we will have definitive intelligence of a Warsaw Pact decision to prepare for war the Intelligence Community monitors and analyzes the total process in which the Pact countries prepare for war including changes in diplomacy propaganda political life the economy and the posture and readiness of the armed forces see inset This Memorandum does not focus on warning of attack the commtinication that an adversary is not only preparing its armed forces for war but also intends to launch an attack in the near future Under most circumstances these specifics could be provided only late in a crisis For further details on warning thresholds see the annex Warning of war is not a single event but a process by which warnings of increased threat are communicated The Intelligence Community strivestor a warningprocess that trades certainty of the intention to attackfor time to allow policymakers to pursue options designed to deter or otherwise act on an impending confrontation The warning system cannot foretell with certainty at a definite point that war will occur Instead a series of warnings of increased enemy capability would be issued that would become less ambiguous over time For example the Alert Memorandum issued by the Director of Central Intelligence in April 1981 during the Polish crisis concluded that the Soviets believed military intervention in Poland was necessary and that this intervention could take place with littlefurther warning but it was unknown whether the decision to intervene had been made Warsaw Pact military threat assessments starting in the mid-1970s have come to regard NATO's defensive capabilities as increasingly more robust Pact military writings indicate that Pact planners tend to overestimate NATO's modernization efforts and the battlefield capabilities of its new weapons systems but these assessments have influenced Pact estimates of the size of the forces required to ensure battlefield success Threat assessments by the Pact have focused on the following changes in NATO o NATO's tactical defenses are thicker and denser and are saturated with antiarmor weapons o NATO's defenses have become more responsive can shift forces from one sector to another and can mass tactical or operational reserves against threatened breakthrough Pact planners fear that NATO can now probably detect Pact concentrations and shift forces to reverse unfavorable force balances in selected sectors of the front o NATO's ability to augment defenses through rapid reinforcement from outside continental Europe and the mobilization of reserve forces from within Europe has increased Pact planners now believe NATO can prepare its forces for large-scale war in 10 days o NATO's doctrine remains committed to a forward defense but it has acquired significant strategic depth with the near-certain involvement of French territory and forces in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflictF____1 Pact judgments that NATO is capable of a deeper and stronger defense argue for narrower Pact attack sectors a denser configuration of forces in the first strategic echelon and a greater preponderance of forces on line in the attack These points are reflected in current Pact military writings and exercises F- o Ground-based and airborne air defenses are being modernized and expanded Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 RApproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 0 Warsaw Pact Views on the Outbreak of War in Europe 3 5 c 3 5 c The possibility of war with NATO dominates Pact military planning In assessing the threat posed by NATO Warsaw Pact military authorities assume for planning purposes that NATO's intentions are aggressive although some senior Pact officers view this assumption skeptically The Pact's basic peacetime planning assumption-upon which the Pact structures and prepares its armed forces-envisages a war in Europe arising from military actions taken by the West On the other hand public statements by senior Soviet leaders and recent arms control proposals indicate that they regard the likelihood of NATO aggression as low A major change in their view probably would follow a series of international crises that would clearly signal an increased NATO threat In the absence of such crisis we assess that the Soviet leadership currently sees the possibility of war in Europe as low F--- The Pact's concept of a period of threat-a severe deterioration in international relations resulting from intense East-West crises in third areas Western exploitation of serious instabilities in Eastern Europe and possibly an internal crisis in the West that leads to Western adventurism-is fundamental to their thinking about the outbreak of war Pact military planners generally dismiss the notion of an accidental outbreak of a major war They also believe that a massive Western attack launched without a major crisis is a very remote possibility Such a bolt-fromthe-blue attack is judged so unlikely that it can be largely ignored in military planning except for pru- 3 5 c dent measures to keep essential portions of Pact forces at a high state of readiness Finally although conflict with the West could begin outside Europe-for example in the Middle East-the Pact judges that escalation of the war to the European theater by either side would require a separate major decision F--- Warsaw Pact Plans for War in Europe theater-level offensive These sources indicate that Pact planning includes both offensive and defensive contingencies Traditionally Soviet planners have preferred to seize the initiative at the beginning of a war by launching what they describe as a preemptive attack against NATO after at least some mobilization of Pact forces Their current assessment is that a preemptive attack has become increasingly difficult to execute If the Pact is unable to carry out a preemptive attack because of either military or political constraints it would assume an initial defensive operation posture Ongoing force generation would increase the Pact capability for a theater-level counteroffensive 3 5 e On the other hand Pact public statements and other recent evidence indicate a preemptive attack may no longer be a component of Soviet military doctrine These statements suggest that the Soviet political leadership has rejected traditional military preferences for preemption and will rely on a doctrine of strategic defense According to these statements Pact forces would establish defensive positions and conduct counterattacks only to recover lost Pact territory a continued offensive into NATO territory would be conducted only after prolonged attempts to end the 3 5 e war had failed 7_1 The most dangerous scenario in the Pact view would be a NATO attack after rapid NATO preparations Pact officers have noted that NATO has greatly accelerated its mobilization capabilities over the last 10 years and can prepare its first strategic echelon for operations in 10 days This speed combined with the advantages offered by high-technology weapons results in NATO's capability to mount a determined attack 3 5 c Soviet writings nevertheless indicate that they believe they could detect NATO preparations early enough to keep NATO from achieving a decisive advantage The Soviets envision rapidly prepared NATO assaults against Pact forces that were neither fully ready nor fully deployed In their view however Pact forces would contain NATO after gains of about 100 kilometers with subsequent plans to counterattack 3 5 c Pact military writings have traditionally stated that a war with NATO could be won only by a sustained 3 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Se t U C00638425 0 5 Approved for Release 2016 03 2 Warning of Attack in the Southwest Northwest and Oceanic TMOs Soviet military planners have traditionally viewed the Western Theater of Military Operations TMO opposite NATO's central region as the single most important theater of operations in a future war against NATO Within their theater strategy the Soviets also plan for combat operations against US and NATO forces in the Northwest and Southwest TMOs as well as the Atlantic and Pacific TMOs Announced and ongoing force reductions in ground and air forces in the Northwest and Southwest TMOs as well as naval force reductions will lengthen the Soviets' preparation time for operations in these theaters Though the Soviets may not undertake full combat operations in all theaters simultaneously they will probably be able to generate and mobilize forces in these other theaters within the timelines of their mobilization of forces within the Western TMO f 3 5 c The Peacetime Readiness Status of Soviet Forces The Pact's force posture opposite NATO in the 3 5 c Western TMO reflects Pact beliefs about the most likely scenario for war initiation in Europe-after an extended crisis-and operational planning for initial combat actions The crisis period would allow sufficient time to mobilize Pact forces The ability to mobilize large theater forces rapidly instead of maintaining immediate combat readiness of the entire force is the goal of Pact military planners Of the 103 ground forces divisions in the Pact's order of battle in the Western TMO in 1989 just over half are considered ready and the remainder not ready see table 1 Ready divisions however are not fully manned in peacetime The most ready Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions-those stationed in Central Europe-are manned at 80 to 85 percent of authorized wartime levels Almost all the Soviet divisions stationed in the Western USSR are not ready Soviet aircrews and missile units are manned at close to wartime levels as a safeguard against an Ready e Tow Sdvlei ' 33 Non SQviot W grsiivv get 21 30 103 63 X9 o Figures represent motorized rifle tank and airborne divisions b Soviet ready divisions are manned between 50 and 100 percent and possess full sets of recent equipment These divisions correspond to US category A and B divisions Soviet not-ready divisions are manned up to 50 percent generally have older equipment and often do not have full equipment sets These divisions correspond to US category C and b divisions This table if- Many support units intended for wartime do not exist in peacetime and would be formed only after mobilization These judgments of undermanning were relatively new when NIE 4-1-84 was written Since then we have reached assessments of their implicationsreflected in NIE 11-14-89-for the time required to fully prepare Soviet forces in Central Europe for sustained offensive operations at authorized wartime strength 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c Transition to War Pact planners have developed a flexible system of four stages that allows the Pact to mobilize its forces either rapidly or incrementally see inset If time permitted Pact forces could be mobilized on a gradual basis through each stage until full combat readiness was achieved Until this last stage is reached Pact forces could be held at an intermediate level or the process could even be reversed Ordering threat of war readiness or especially full combat readiness given the extensive disruption of the economy would indicate the Soviets probably judged war to be likely but not necessarily inevitable In an emergency the stages could be compressed and peacetime forces would move directly to full combat readiness s- unexpected attack Support units are manned at levels of 15 and 30 percent of intended wartime strength plt eaflxo ' 'otal 4 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c C00638425 kpproved for Release 2016 03 842 Se USSR to Eastern Europe to fill out Soviet units and an additional week to integrate the reservists into units and to train them This is a significantly longer time than presented in NIE 4-1-84 where we estimated this same force could be prepared in 10 to 12 days and results from our improved understanding of Pact peacetime readiness 3 5 e Soviet Alert Stages 3 5 c Constant Combat Readiness The normal peacetime readiness status of the Soviet armed forces Routine training and activity take place Leaves and passes Mqy be granted at commander's discretlon l I We estimate that not-ready divisions in the western USSR would require about 45 days to fully prepare for sustained offensive operations Our assessment of Soviet military planning and training practices indicate that on average five days are required to alert disperse and mobilize these divisions Thereafter the reservists would engage in individual and then tactical training By about the 30th day the average division is minimally capable of offensive action and by about the 45th day the average not-ready division is capable of conducting sustained offensive combat These times do not include movement time 3 5 c Increased Combat Readiness Unit personnel are reealledfrom leave or temporary duty and division subunits conductingfield training return to garrison Mobilization and contingency planning are reviewed and updated by sta8rs Unit personnel remove equipment from storage and begin to prepare reception points for reserv- ists The division s field command post CP is partially manned and deployed to a dispersal 3 5 c area St4 fng at garrison command center is increased F--- We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after completion of mobilization and movement but before completing postmobilization training Before unilateral reduc- Threat-of--War Combat Readiness Units deploy from garrison to dispersal or assembly areas 3 5 c The control of the division is transferred from the garrison command center to thefield CP Selected reservists with specialized skills may join the unit 3 5 c Fall Combat Readiness Full mobilization takes place and reservists join their units If required equipment mobilized for the units also arrives Units establish their wartime command control and communications structure At this point the alert dispersal and mobilization process is complete Subsequent steps such as training final preparations and deployment would take place after this stage in the alert process is complete t tions we assessed that the Pact could bring Soviet forces in Central Europe to authorized wartime strength in one to two weeks Within the same time period the Soviets could also deploy forward from the western USSR lead elements of a fourth front As Pact military writings indicate use of not-ready forces without postmobilization training entails a very significant degradation in combat proficiency we have assessed this could be as much as 70 percent for a low-strength cadre division Consequently we believe the Soviets would judge attacks after completion of only mobilization and movement as highly risky because of the reliance on reserves lacking the minimum necessary postmo hzation training to consummate offensive success 3 5 e Both ready and not-ready forces require mobilization and training to achieve full combat readiness Before the initiation of the unilateral reductions in 1989 we estimated that Soviet forces based in East Germany Czechoslovakia and Poland would need at least two to three weeks to prepare for sustained offensive Warsaw Pact Attack Options Pact leaders face a major dilemma in deciding to attack NATO Preparedness and the combat poten- tial sustainability and resilience that preparations operations at authorized wartime strength one to two weeks to mobilize and transport reservists from the 5 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 S t would generate has to be balanced against the advantage of attacking quickly to preempt NATO's mobilization reinforcement and establishment of an organized defense Overall we conclude that Pact military 3 5 c planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a fully prepared attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts' on the first strategic echelon We have continued to note indications of this preference through early 1989 We cannot rule out the possibility nevertheless that during a crisis the Soviets might choose to launch a preemptive attack on NATO without taking the time to fully prepare their forces We have no evidence to indicate what series of events would persuade the Soviets to diverge from their preferred option and launch combat operations from a posture of less than full preparedness The most important determinant perhaps would be the Soviets' estimation of the degree of control they possessed over the immediate crisis They could believe for example that a NATO attack was imminent and they must rapidly react or that incremental mobilization of both sides had shifted the correlation of forces against the Pact and that the Pact could not afford to delay until mobilization was complete Pact intelligence collection focuses on monitoring NATO's readiness status and significant changes in that status during a crisis would be key decision points for Pact planners In such circumstances the Pact could commence operations after only mobilization and movement Soviet military planners clearly recognize that it would be a political decision whether to make further preparations while 3 5 c attempting to defuse a crisis or to conduct a preemptive attack with available forces A Five-to-Six-Front Attack With Four Fronts in First Echelon The Soviets in our view adopted this option during the 1980s because o They believe that a European war would probably have a protracted conventional phase lasting weeks 3 5 c if not months or that nuclear use may not occur at all o They estimate that NATO's conventional defense capabilities have improved and that more fact forces will be required on line to overwhelm NATO's rapidly generated and more robust forces o They think that a preemptive attack against NATO has become more difficult and that they must prepare for a defensive phase at the beginning of a war o They expect severe losses in the conventional phase of a major war The introduction of a fourth front on line in the first strategic echelon allows Pact planners to narrow the attack sector in which each front would operate thus increasing the density and depth of attacking forces The first strategic echelon would comprise about 65 Warsaw Pact divisions Evidence indicates that the fourth front would concentrate against the V US Corps and VII US Corps while a front made up of the combined Western Group of Forces formerly the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Army would operate on the theater's main axis of attack against Belgian and British forces of NATO's Northern Army Group -1 Not all of the component armies of a fourth front would need to be forward deployed before offensive operations began nor would its force structure necessarily correspond to the peacetime force structure of a Soviet military district Evidence before unilateral reductions indicated that one army from the Western Group of Forces already stationed in Germany could be subordinated to the fourth front and act as its first operational echelon Two to three armies from the western USSR probably would complete the fourth front's organization see figure l on page iv The forward deployment of one of these armies from the western USSR to East Germany before hostilities probably would provide sufficient forces for the fourth front to commence operations --1 Although not directly comparable to any Western organization a front is similar to a NATO army group and its associated air forces in sire level or command and function There is no standard organinuion for a front It usually is composed or three to five uanbined arms armies each including three to five tank or mutorired rifle divisions and air forces with as many as several hundred tactical aircraft The overall size of a lypicalfrow would depend on the mission assioWd and would probably range from 3110 1100 to 300 000 men I We judge that the Soviets would require four to five weeks of preparation for a fully prepared four-front attack This judgment assumes that the lead army of the fourth front to be moved forward from the western Se 6 t Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c 3 5 c 3 5 c C00638425 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 0 3 5 e USSR has at least one ready division and that its notready divisions are given the opportunity to conduct some of the necessary postmobilization training before the initiation of combat Because of the importance the Soviets ascribe to the contribution of the fourth front we believe the Soviets would perceive significant risk to the overall success of their offensive if they committed these forces with little or no postmobilization training We cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets might judge circumstances as compelling them to commit their forces with little or no training In that case preparation time could be as little as two to three weeks On the other hand the Soviets might delay their attack beyond four to five weeks to allow the not-ready divisions needed in the first echelon and others whose follow-on contribution would also be important to fully prepare for sustained offensive combat I Before unilateral reductions Pact sources indicated that the smallest force the Pact might use to initiate offensive operations against NATO would consist of two fronts in first echelon made up of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe together with East German and Czechoslovak national forces or about 37 divisions The Soviets and their allies however do not practice this option Pact planners probably believe that NATO's improved defense and mobilization capabilities would quickly offset the early advantages achieved by a two-front attack Moreover if early success were achieved by the Pact forces it probably could not be exploited and sustained due to a shortage of adequately manned divisions and limited logistic support capability The risks and complexities inherent in such an option lead us to conclude that a twofront Pact attack is highly unlikely 3 5 c An Attack With Two to Three Fronts in First Echelon Soviet and non-Soviet units already in place in Central Europe-about 50 divisions This is the same We continue to assess that there is little chance that the Pact would initiate war against NATO from a peacetime readiness posture The Pact does have some capability to attack NATO on short notice using ground and air units garrisoned near the West Ger- three-front attack option from NIE 4-1-84 Before man border perhaps 15 divisions and several hundred unilateral reductions we judged that under this approach the Soviets would be prepared to conduct sustained offensive operations with two to three weeks of preparation This period would enable the Soviets to bring their forces deployed in Central Europe up to full strength and conduct some training We cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets might judge tactical aircraft with no front organization We assess these forces could initiate operations within 24 hours of receiving an attack order Pact military writings indicate an expectation that such an attack would at best enjoy marginal success because of NATO's rapid ability to react and reverse force balances an attack could be neither well supported nor sustained and the entire Pact infrastructure for war would be unprepared and therefore vulnerable A three-front attack would involve initially only those circumstances as compelling them to commit these forces without any postmobilization training in as Unreinforced Attack 3 5 c little as seven to 14 days Shorter preparation times would seriously compromise sustainability because it would permit the logistics structure which is routine- ly maintained at very low manning levels to be only incompletely mobilized Pact writings indicate that their planners believe such an attack would be risky owing to limited postmobilization training for the lower readiness units damage and delay to key forces still in transit from the western USSR due to NATO air attacks and the vulnerability to an attack of a poorly dispersed logistics infrastructure For these reasons we assess that a three-front attack is far less likely than the preferred four-front option with its lengthier preparation time which promises less risk 3 5 c Warning of War We are very confident that the US and NATO intelligence organizations will detect many military political and economic indicators of Warsaw Pact preparations for a war with NATO Although we believe that the unprecedented scale of the activities would clearly indicate the Soviets' intention to enhance their readiness for war we cannot be confident and more certainty of success in a sustained theaterlevel offensive I 7 0 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 00 0 63 8 4 2 5 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 CO that we would have a consensus within the Intelligence Community regarding Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities Nevertheless confidence in our ability dicators of Soviet preparations is to detect th e indicators 3 5 c strong A Pact decision to preparelor war with NATO would undoubtedly set in motion multitudinous activities and lay out a timetable for these preparations but it would more than likely not specify the exact date and time of attack or irrevocably commit the Soviet leadership to war The Soviets would most likely increase their readiness gradually as a crisis developcd We believe that the entire process from the first sign of mobilization to the initiation of hostilities could take many days or weeks longer then the reasonable minimum times discussed below The political and economic indicators significant to the early sta es of a developing crisis are addressed on 3 5 c the amount of preparation time the Pact leaders believed was necessary for their own forces Although we have no direct evidence we believe serious delays in NATO mobilization for example could cause Soviet military planners to abandon their preferred four-front option and attack with less complete preparations Alternatively Soviet decisionmakers could conclude that lagging NATO mobilization would enable them to relax the pace of their own preparations in an effort to avert hostilities Warning of an Unreinforced Attack As a theoretical construct a Pact attack on NATO from a peacetime posture would be planned to provide as little warning to NATO as possible A Pact attack from garrison could be prepared in as little as 24 hours It is possible that we might detect the order to move to full combat readiness but it is more likely we would detect abnormal activity levels in garrisons page I l within a few hours of initiation Such reported activity The warning assessments presented below however are keyed to the time we think the Pact would need to complete the preparations necessary to achieve our would provide the opportunity for Allied commanders to take precautionary steps Because of the extremely unlikely eventuality of such an attack however interpretation of the purpose of this activity could be assessed minimum proficiency for offensive opera- ambiguous and contentious and a final judgment that tions We assume in these cases that the Soviet leadership has called for immediate full-scale prepa- an attack was imminent might not be reached before hostilities began ration for war at the maximum pace possible We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces after the completion of mobilization and movement but without the minimum necessary postmobilization training We believe however that the Pact would view such an attack as highly risky because of the reliance on reserves lacking postmobilization training For these times see table 3 on page 10 The actual decision ro attack would come later depending on Soviet judgments made during the developing crisis that would be keyed to their evaluations of NATO's actions These warning times also assume that US and NATO policymakers make timely decisions to react to the rapidly developing crisis and the growing Pact threat lt' decisions were postponed and if Pact preparations continued the preparation time available to NATO would be reduced During a crisis the Pact would closely monitor NATO preparations Its assessment of NATO military capability would strongly influence 3 5 c 3 5 c Warning of An Attack With Two to Three Fronts in First Echelon If the Pact had taken no previous measures to improve its readiness we estimate that an attack with two or three fronts in first echelon would require two to three weeks of preparations Upward of I million reservists would have to be mobilized in the western Soviet Union Poland Czechoslovakia and East Germany to bring understrength divisions and nondivisional units to the authorized strength for war Preparing the lines of communication through Eastern Europe would also require substantial effort Moreover the Pact would begin the simultaneous preparation of other forces-both strategic and general purpose-to prepare for nuclear escalation and the timely reinforcement of forces in Eastern Europe-F 8 8 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 0 C00638425 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Se We have a good chance of detecting some of the communications that accompany rising levels of military readiness Moreover we would detect the urgent and widespread activity that occurred as a result of extensive mobilization and the preparation of lines of communication We would detect and report these indicators to policymakers within 24 hours after the initiation of these activities thereby providing two to three weeks of warning On the other hand if the Pact had already gradually raised the level of readiness of its forces during a period of tension-as we would expect it to do-the time required for final preparations would be shorter In this case some initial warnings probably would have already been given 3 5 c Following these warnings the Intelligence Community would continue to assess the Pact's preparations for war and would issue additional judgments about the nature and scope of these steps 7-1 Warning of a Five- to Six-Front Attack With Four Fronts in First Echelon The pattern of urgent and widespread activity associated with a fully prepared four-front attack would be similar to that of a three-front force but the scope and complexity of the preparations would be much greater If the Pact had taken no previous measures to improve its readiness we assess that it would require 3 5 c about four to five weeks of preparation to alert mobilize move and most important-provide some basic training for these forces -7 As in the previous cases if the Pact began preparations from peacetime readiness levels we would detect and report the preparations within 24 to 48 tours of their initiation allowing about four weeks of warning before the outbreak of hostilities It is more likely however that the Pact would gradually raise force readiness during a prolonged period of tension Such measures could decrease somewhat the overall preparation requirements once the decision for full-scale mobilization and possibly war was made but they would almost certainly cause the Intelligence Community to issue warnings regarding the increased readiness of Pact forces Partial measures to increase Pact readiness would not eliminate the requirement for the Pact to take a highly visible series of steps over a substantial period of time to prepare to execute this attack option Enormous and unprecedented mobilization of Pact forces would still be required We believe therefore that even after widespread prewar partial measures had been taken Pact forces still would need two to three weeks of preparations3 5 c Warning Implications of Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions The announced reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and East European national forces if fully implemented will significantly lower Pact force levels in the forward area see table 2 and figure 2 on page vi Six Soviet tank divisions plus critical combat support units such as bridging and substantial amounts of additional equipment are scheduled to be withdrawn Scheduled tank reductions amount to about half of Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe NonSoviet Warsaw Pact forces which currently comprise a large proportion of the forces in Eastern Europe are also to be reduced Moreover forces inside the Soviet Union are to be restructured and are to lose tanks and possible artillery from their structure Equipment modernization and restructuring of remaining Soviet forces in Eastern Europe may offset to some extent the loss of combat capability but non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces are not taking similar step 3 5 c These reductions-which are well under way-probably will render an unreinforced Pact attack practically impossible and will require the Pact to rely more heavily on currently not-ready divisions to support either a two- three- or four-front attack Pact planners will likely conclude that-without reinforcements from the western USSR roughly equal to two fronts-their forces remaining in Eastern Europe after the unilateral cuts would not possess the advantage over current NATO forces needed to initiate and sustain offensive operations to the depth of the theater The Soviets probably would believe that to attain sufficient combat power in the theater they would have to generate enough not-ready divisions to replace the withdrawn Soviet divisions as well as the disbanded East European formations Such greater reliance 9 0 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Se C00638425 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 se t G touitATO East GcrmaO Poland ' iiciaft- en 9 ' 4_muto Jed e dtyrsFops 1 Gzegiio lovakta IS0- a The equipment from these divisions is to be stored in unit sets This table is Un ed TNreeJ oiitgitlfiii't ecH elgii 1_ff if -f3ridt ive to cix 'rbitifiatt'ac TNY1 H Minimum time required to mobilize and move necessary combat forces The Soviets could decide to commit forces at this point but would consider such use highly risky b Includes mobilization and movement times as well as additional time required to bring divisions to the equivalent of battalion-level training which is the Community assessed standard for minimum proficicnc to initiate offensive operations defined in Interagency Intelligence Memorandum 82-10012 Secret March 1983 The Readiness gfSovier Ground Forces c Greater reliance on not-ready forces from the western USSR will increase both movement and preparation times Postunilateral reduction figures include an average of 25 days of postmobilization training because of the heavy reliance on low-strength cadre divisions from the western USSR This training is required to bring divisions to equivalent of battalion-level training which is the standard for minimum proficiency to initiate offensive operations defined in IM 82 10012 3 5 c This table is3i e 10 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 C00638425 3 5 c pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 on the early commitment of currently not-ready divisions from the Soviet Union for sustained offensive operations would stretch out Pact preparations to 40 to 50 days We cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets might judge circumstances as compelling them to commit their forces without the minimum postmobilization training necessary for offensive overations in as little as 18 to 25 days Our assessment of preparation and warning times after the Pact's unilateral reductions are complete assumes that NATO remains at current force levels The extent of Pact preparations-reinforcement of forces in Eastern Europe and training-required to conduct a potentially successful offensive campaign is driven in large measure by Pact assessments of NATO military capability As a result unilateral NATO reductions outside the context of a conventional force reductions agreement could diminish the Pact's assessment of its force requirements for success and thus reduce the preparation time neededfor the Pact and the warning time available to NATO US and Alied intelligence for many years have considered Warsaw Pact measures to prepare the general populace for the rigors of a major war to be important warning indicators but had difficulty in detecting or properly evaluating them Beginning in 1984 the US Intelligence Community began a special collection and analytical program to develop data bases on Pact economic activity in peacetime in order to warn of changes that might indicate the start of industrial mobilization Research on critical industrial sectors has produced a sample of nondefense industries which have characteristics important for warning First Western tech- nicians have access to them second the plants are important in satisfying civilian needs in peacetime third they have plans to change production during industrial mobilization Any significant production changes at these plants would be important early warning indicators Increased contacts with the West and Gorbachev's policy of glasnost have improved our Political and Economic Developments and Implications for Warning The dramatic political social and economic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the last few years-stemming principally from President Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and reform-have increased the visibility of the likely preparations that would have to be undertaken for a general war with NATO The West has obtained unprecedented if still limited access to the Pact countries including the Soviet Union In addition arms control agreements enable US inspectors to monitor the status of some critical Soviet forces and military activities increasing the difficulty of the Soviets' conducting covert military preparations to some extent Such improved access would allow the Intelligence Community to more rapidly assess major changes associated with national war preparations Conversely a widespread curtailment of such access would itself be an indicator of a change in the strategic environmentf ability to collect data and our confidence in interpreting them to determine the status of thesefacilities 3 5 c I associated with national war preparations The usefulness of industrial indicators in particular has been degraded by the implementation of reforms which have disrupted normal operations For example changes such as in the composition of the work force or the size of stockpiles might signify the introduction of new product lines or more efficient plant opera- tions Likewise denial of access to individual Soviet industrial plants previously open to Western visitors might not arise from a concern with concealing mobilization but rather from a desire to protect new technologies or to disguise sensitive production activities Until the economic environment stabilizes somewhat industrial indicators will remain less useful than in the- S in warning of Pact national war preparations I At the same time some indicators of economic mobilization have become even more ambiguous making it difficult to determine whether specific changes are Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 4pproved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 Warsaw Pact National Defense Readiness Plan Peacetime The economy satisfies routine requirementsfor the armedforces and creates the necessary stockpiles required during mobilization and the initial stages of war ment and supplies held in national reserves together with limited numbers of reservists vehicles and equipment may be called up from the national economy Movement restrictions are placed on transport equipment with mobilization assignments Measures could be implemented nationwide or selectively immediately or gradually Period of Threat Preparatory measures are taken to Increase national readiness to convert rapidly to a war pos- ture These measures could range from a limited callup of men and equipment to afull mobilization of the population economy armedforces the territorial and border forces and the civil defense establishment To guard against precipitate economic disruption during a period of gradually increasing or l uctuating tension the period of threat is subdivided into two phases Increased National Defense Readiness Produces few changes in the national economy but measures would be designed to assure that mobilization could be accomplished rapidly and efficiently if ordered Limited organizational changes to the government and Communist Party occur Equ4p- State of Immediate Threat to the Nation Includes measures which lead to a ddinite transition of the population economy and civil defense apparatus to a wartime posture Government and state orga- nizations begin to assumefull wartime missions and provide additional mobilization support to the armedforces Industry is converted to the production of war materials under wartime plans Wartime Full National Defense Readiness The nation is on a warfooting and production is organized in the manner best suited to support the armedforces Thesemeasures would be implemented ifpossible before the war 3 5 c Restructuring and modernization have not degraded the overall ability of the Pact countries to support pi eparations for a war In addition Pact governments have not dismantled the institutions responsible for managing the process Given the activities likely to take place in this process see inset we believe that we will detect and report significant disruptions to or a reversal of present trends that could signal a change in the Soviet assessment of the likelihood of war The changes would indicate that the risk had increased for a crisis that could lead to war Outlook Warning Implications of Mutual Conventional Force Reductions The ongoing CFE Talks are likely to result in an agreement establishing numerical parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces below current NATO levels within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone Within the context of this treaty an intrusive monitoring and verification regime will be implemented to 3 5 c 12 Approved for Release 2016103 28 000638425 C00638425 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 ascertain treaty compliance which will be substantially accomplished by the regular presence of foreign inspection teams Although the reductions themselves will affect warning the intrusive monitoring inherent in a CFE-type agreement would reduce the Soviet's ability to generate forces without detectionr__ Regardless of the ultimate level of parity we believe that once Pact forces reduce to the same level as NATO the Soviets would no longer be confident that they could achieve offensive or counteroffensive goals to the depth of the theater with these forces Soviet military planning factors would indicate that only the possession of substantial military superiority can ensure success to the attacking side From peacetime parity the Soviets would have to reestablish major forces in order to generate the capability to attack successfully and sustain the offensive to the depth of the theater The requirement to reestablish forces capable of large-scale offensive operations to achieve traditional theater-strategic goals in Europe would increase preparation times considerably over what we have assessed in this Memorandum Specific times would depend on several factors not yet that the risks of limited-objective attacks far outweigh any potential short-term gains and that foremost among these risks would be the expansion to large- scale war including the ultimate risk of triggering nuclear warF__ 1 Economic and Political Changes We are confident that for the period of this Memorandum we will be able to detect and report significant disruptions or a reversal of present political social and economic trends in the Warsaw Pact countries Although these indicators will remain ambiguous with regard to actual national war preparations they will continue to signal that the potential for a crisis had increased and warrant a change in the vigilance of the US and NATO I-I known-including the readiness at which post-CFE forces were maintained the disposition of withdrawn equipment the possibility of limits on forces east of the Urals the state of the defense industries the necessity to produce additional equipment and Soviet willingness to risk shifting forces from other regions If the Soviets were willing to reinvest potential savings from reducing their forces back into defense and restructure their forces and redistribute their equipment they could increase the readiness and combat power of residual forces through higher manning levels and procuring modern equipment These smaller but on average more ready forces still would not be capable of launching theater-strategic offensive operations without the substantial effort to reestablish additional forces described above These smaller forces would be capable of launching smaller attacks for more limited objectives however with warning times more like we are accustomed to today We do not believe such attacks for limited objectives would be attractive to Pact planners for the same reasons we discount them today and which were outlined in NIE 4-1-84 These reasons center around the conclusion Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 3 b 1 pproved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 4 Approved for Release 2016 03 28 C00638425 C00638425_ 0 M Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 Annex Warning Thresholds in assessing the likelihood of war the Intelligence Community sees a number of important thresholds for warning- o First is the development of a crisis or rise in tension that might provide the context for war Whether such a crisis developed gradually or suddenly early indicators would include changes in diplomatic style or tactics an increase in hostile propaganda changes in foreign access and travel restrictions in Pact countries Warning at this early stage would be more confident if the Soviets also began unusual military activities o Second if the Soviets decided that the crisis contained a serious possibility of war they would also begin making changes to civil and economic life The pace and extent of disruptions would depend on how fast the crisis developed In some extreme situations the Soviets might not be able to take many measures before the outset of hostilities Long-term developments of warning significance could include measures to tighten internal controls stop some industrial production shift more to military products and reorganize national finances labor and natural resources In a more rapidly developing crisis such measures might be restricted to the recall of reservists with critical skills and the mobilization of civil transportation resources needed to support military mobilization o Third the clearest warning threshold would be the start of mobilization of conventional military forces including activation of wartime command and control communications diversion of civil manpower and other resources to improve military logistics and transportation and the recall of reservists Although it would take 24 to 48 hours to confirm the scope and extent of the activity warning that widespread mobilization activity had begun would be almost unambiguous o The final warning threshold would be detection of military movements that indicated the Pact armed forces were making final attack preparations Warning oGBP war might be issued hours to several days before an actual attack but we would have high confidence that war was imminent --I 1s Approved for Release 2016 03 28 000638425 3 5 c This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu