Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 1 of 1983 THE BRINK OF APOCALYPSE INTERVIEWS NAME Gen Col Ivan Yesin Soviet Nuclear Missile Force ORIGINAL INTERVIEW CONDUCTED IN RUSSIAN NB TRANSCRIPT IS OF ROUGH SIMULTANEOUS TRANSLATION CARRIED OUT DURING THE INTERVIEW Interview Copyright Flashback Television Ltd Not to be quoted or used without permission from Flashback Television taylordowning@flashbacktv co uk Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Q 21 00 41 Page 2 of What position were you in in autumn 1983 A 21 00 49 In the summer 1983 I graduated er from the academy of er general staff of the USSR and I was appointed to be er in charge of the er mid range missiles er of the operative department of the general headquarters of strategic missile forces Q 21 01 35 When you were did the military discuss at that time the military in the academy and in the general staff - did you discuss the possibility of er a sudden nuclear strike on behalf of NATO er under the pretext of exercises A 21 02 00 Er the period of the er early 80s er was the time er of er the peak of tension er of the strategic situation Er it was er in connection with the er movement of soviet troops into Afghanistan and er to count er that move er or as a reaction to that move Ronald Reagan refused to rectify the soviet American treaty er on the limitation of strategic weapons And declared er the Soviet Union the evil empire In 1980 he called for a boycott of Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 3 of the Olympic Games er that er were going to take place in Moscow The Americans were giving help to the afghan muschahads er who were fighting against the soviet troops Er also at that time er was er a new round of nuclear build up or nuclear race Er in the late 70s the Soviet Union er in its strategic er missile forces started to re-equip the mid range missiles 21 03 51 Er the soviets introduced the pioneer er missile complex Er it er has a range of er up to four and a half thousand metres er which made it possible to hit all the targets er in Western Europe from the territory launching missiles er from er the territory of the Soviet Union And er this er made it possible for strategic missiles er to be targeted er in distant er regions er and er in er on the American continent So the balance of forces was er at that time in favour of the soviet union and as a reaction to that er the Americans started to deploy in Europe - er they are pushing to and er cruise - ground base crews missiles though the range was up to two and a half thousand kilometres which made it possible for them to destroy targets Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 4 of er on the territory of the soviet union or the European part of the soviet union 21 05 17 But the main threat was that er the time needed for and cruise missiles er it took six eight - from six to eight minutes for those missiles to reach Moscow And er it er gave the Americans an opportunity to destroy the leadership er soviet leadership in the Kremlin very quickly and to decapitate er the Soviet Union and er it er made the er return strike the chance of giving the return strike well er more difficult And this er the large scale exercises were fraught with danger because er at that er under the pretext of those exercises a sudden nuclear er strike could have been delivered 21 06 30 We can't say it was at a unilateral danger it was a er bilateral danger because when the Warsaw pack er countries held exercises er using er nuclear forces er it also was a source of concern Er it increased tension er among er the western countries - data countries - the NATO exercise in 1983 was one of er such exercises be' - they involved a strategic attack forces of the united states - of course these Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 5 of increased er tension among the soviet leadership Er they er had to stay vigilant er and not to er not to overlook the moment when the nuclear strike might have been delivered er against the Soviet Union Q 21 07 54 Er speaking about this concern on behalf of the soviet political and military leadership did you - how did you know about it - from conversations from er the papers that you read - what was said about those able arch exercises and what measures were taken in the general headquarters or in the missile er army headquarters A 21 08 34 Er the information about the forthcoming er able archer exercise - large scale exercise that was er NATO exercise that was going to take place in November 1983 er it involved er well American strategic forces and this information came through gro' er the military intelligence er and er at the time a marshal of the artillery er marshal of the artillery Talookof who was er head of staff of er missile forces er received reports every day and er certain mea' Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 6 of return measures had to be taken er on the 2nd November when the NATO exercise began er on the orders of the general staff of the armed forces of the USSR 21 09 55 Er in the missile for strategic missile forces secretly let secretly some measures - some er measures aimed at increasing er well state of alert er was - certain measures were taken Er duty forces er were aware on constant er alert The operative forces er were on combat alert er apart from that er as I was involved with the mid range missiles and part of those - and partly the pioneer missile complex is the regiments that had those mi' missile complexes were sent to to the field positions in the peaceful time er only about 10 may be a maximum er percent of those regiments were in the field positions but during the able archer exercise er about 50% of those er regiments were in field positions And it increased the readiness of those er missile complexes for delivering the return strike er in case of a sudden nuclear attack 21 11 41 Er for us the potential enemy er was er the er United States of America Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 7 of and our missiles were aimed at the United States of America Er the order er was er that the strategic - first strategic er missile forces to be in a enhanced state of er nuclear alert 21 12 29 Yes he mentioned various stages of nuclear alerts er and er at that time the missile forces were on the enhanced state of nuclear alert Q 21 13 13 In 1983 er these pioneer complexes were - in what - where were they - what were these field positions A 21 13 41 The idea to er place the er missile regiments er was pioneer missiles er in field positions - the idea was the following if the er - this location is known to the er enemy er so the idea was to move the regiments away from the known places of ordinary of common dislocation Er the distance was er up from 100 to 150 kilometres er in the mountainous area the er distance was er shorter because er the of the possibility to stay in radio contact Er pioneer missile complex er has good er capability of crossing the rough terrain Er the modern equivalent is topple and Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 8 of topple is an intercontinental missile but its predecessor was pioneer missile 21 15 00 And this complex could even er go through the swamps because it had special chassis er that er made er that increased its er rough terrain er capacity It could er cross er rivers with a depth er up to well shallow rivers but er still rivers and it could er penetrate into the woods Into the woods those er launches - autonomous launches er were placed and also we had camouflaging er devices er which er also absorbed er radio signals 21 15 52 And er this is why a radio location er intelligence er it was difficult for radio intelligence to locate er the er place of our missile complexes Er this was a special - this was special nets that er imitated the er ground er or the - well woods the leaves and such nets covered er the er missile complexes And these nets er could be removed er well when it was necessary to raise the missiles and to target them So first of all this miss' the missile complex was er placed in the wood and the er place of dislocation was chosen in advance Those field positions er were chosen Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 9 of in advance taking into consideration the opportunities for camouflaging the presence of the routes of approach before the launch 21 17 11 Er the the er missile complex had to be raised er - there had to be er firm ground for this Er it is asking to specify about those nets - camouflaging nets er that concealed the presence - they were made of a special material er they were very expensive nets er that er concealed er the presence of the m' missile complex from er well er radio reconnaissance or radio intell' radio reconnaissance They could be folded and unfolded er if you - they looked like er er kind of hoods like er material which made it - it is a stellst technology Er the same principle as stellst - radio absorbent elements - it's a very complicated specially designed er material Er there are similar devices in the west Q 21 18 40 Er what were the strengths of the pioneer complex A 21 18 45 Er the pioneer complex er there were three warheads with a splitting er splitting warheads er were individually guided Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Three blocks Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 10 of er each er 200 kilo tonnes er strong er it was 15 Hiroshima's er to make it clear to white public Each block er would be guided to its own target and after er separating from the er launcher there was a micro engine and er micro computer and the micro computer in the certain parts of the trajectory er could split the blocks each to each target during the exercises Q 21 20 20 Er during the able archer exercises things didn't come - well things didn't go too far and you didn't have to launch missiles A 21 20 39 Er fortunately er well even during the climax of the exercises er to the - well and this key event of the exercises coincided with the celebrations of the anniversary of the great October socialist revolution Er fortunately er the er disaster - no disaster took place - we didn't have to keep increasing the er alert of the strategic er missile forces Nor did we have to do anything er - we didn't have to er get close to the launch - when on the 14th November the exercises were over er the strategic forces er were Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 11 of er brought back to their er normal positions Q 21 21 40 If things er had er - if things had gone according to the worst possible scenarios what would have happened - you said that Borsings er needed from 6 to 8 minutes to decapitate these soviet leadership er how er many minutes would er the pioneer missiles have needed to hit their targets after receiving the order to deliver the strike A 21 22 29 Er well sometime would have taken to put the missiles er to the vertical positions then er the launch er first it er - he explains the technicalities of er launching the missile It has to be raised to the height of er 20 metres so er it would have taken 2 minutes 30 seconds between the er moment of receiving the order to er bringing er the missiles to the launching position 21 23 11 Er it always took 2 people er who act in agreement with each other er to affect the launch Er altogether it would have taken 3 minutes - plus the time er well that would have taken the soviet leadership to er ok Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 12 of to make the decision about the launch And to pass the codes to er decode the blocking devices 21 23 56 Er both the soviets and the Americans have the same system so the time - what strategic missile men fear is that time may be lost on take too much time can be wasted on the decision making - on the political decision making Er fortunately it never happened in real life but judging by the exercises involving the senior leadership of the country er well minimum 3 4 minutes are needed for the senior leadership to er take er the decision Q 21 24 50 So you mean that er our missiles might have er taken off er shortly er - might have been launched shortly before er reached its targets - their targets 21 25 19 Why er was it necessary to move the er missile complexes to the field positions to make sure that our targets er - the targets for the enemy are not destroyed er by the time er the soviet leadership has er made its decision to deliver the strike to ensure that the complexes survive Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin A 21 25 51 Page 13 of The worst concern er of the soviet missile men was er that the general secretary would take too long to think er about what to do If Persians took 6 8 minutes the general secretary of course - this is the general secretary's time to make a decision reduced very much er from Washington to Moscow it took er a missile 30 minutes er it of course gave the general secretary more time but er from Europe to Moscow it took less because er it left er in case of Persians deployed in Europe it gave the general secretary something like 2 minutes to make er his decision Q 21 26 54 So during the trainings er it took the general secretary something like 3 minutes to make a decision and it left you with very little time er cos A 21 27 11 yes if the su' - if we imagine this exchange of strikes our situation would have been er very er difficult but of course er we had also the asian territory er well beyond the er where we also had our missile complexes And er it means we would have delivered the return Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 14 of strike anyway but er it would have been less effective 21 27 53 The soviet - er why the soviet union decided to er sign the er the treaty er about scraping the er mid range missiles er according to that treaty the soviet union scrapped more mid range missiles than er the Americans scrapped of Persians and cruise missiles But er politically it was a profitable move and even er more profitable move er militarily A 21 28 45 The - now he's speaking about now er it would take er both the sovi' - the Russians now and the Americans 30 minutes to er - it would take missiles the same time 30 minutes to reach the enemies continent Q 21 29 35 Oh what was special about er those October revolution holidays - why was it the peak of tension er during that exercise A 21 29 50 Er because on those days er in the - during the NATO exercise they were practising the er delivering a nuclear strike against the reds Er they never say soviets they would say oh the blue - the blues against the reds And the blues were Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 15 of delivering er according to their plan against the reds Q 21 30 24 And er during that exercise if they had had that in mind er they could have delivered a real nuclear strike A 21 30 46 Er we - er every 6 or 8 hours er we received information from the military intelligence er about the course of that exercise and er during that climax we er had er our state of alert was increased The commanders of the missions - the commanders of the regiments rocket army were er full time er in their command centres and they were on the most heightened state of alert waiting for the orders er to er well everyone was in constant radio link Er in order to be ready to pass the orders er to each other and the commanders spent - the commander of missile forces spent the whole night er in the bunker 21 31 55 Not er - he was in the bunker not in the headquarters er without taking any rest Q 21 32 03 The situation was taken seriously Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin A 21 32 05 Page 16 of Yes er because there had been a build up and tension and we were very er nervous about er the possibility of Persians destroying er the soviet leadership and er such er - the principle is that the minimal of time should be taken on decision making and the maximum of time should be given for the troops to act I was in charge of mid range er missiles and I was er involved in developing er the er schedule er for the mid range missiles Q 21 33 08 In that bunker could you go to sleep for a couple of hours at least A 21 33 13 Er yes of course - it's a big building underground er with er several er layers of protection It was built er everything was taken into account - er the dining room and food was prepared and there were supplies of food and there were places to sleep End 21 33 37 22 00 34 Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin 22 00 55 Q Page 17 of In case of a sudden nuclear strike which might have happened in November 1983 there was very little time for Andropov to think about what to do If a strike had taken place and if he had 3 minutes what would the and Andropov have done 22 01 46 A Unfortunately I don't know what they were really doing - I just don't have this information Er I can only speculate about er what they would have done if they er if the Americans had delivered a sudden nuclear strike missile strike against the territory of the soviet union Er when the er had received this er information about the fact of the launch general secretary Andropov er who always er had next to him two officers er carrying the nuclear briefcase - so called black briefcase er with the er device er that can send a message to the strategic missile forces er initiating the use of nuclear weapons er I don't know how skilful how well trained Andropov was in using that equipment I assume he 22 03 22 was trained and er I'm sure he would have been able er to do it - it wasn't a simple thing to Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 18 of do - it wasn't er er - it wasn't part of er his routine - daily routine - it would have taken a special effort er and er the state leader had to er had to be ready for such decisions And nexus - far as I know next to his room there were officers er ready any minute to er operate this briefcase 22 04 33 Er Andropov was in hospital in Konsova - if he was - if he had been in the Kremlin er he could have er escaped er to the nuclear shelter but he - er the er feature of this er system of what we call passing the sanction er for using the nuclear missiles er is that no matter where the leader of the soviet union is er he always had a chance - he always could put send a message er initiating the use of nuclear er missiles This system did not er require any cables or anything er there were special er system of radio channels which made it possible in 1983 er at that time satellite communications were not 22 06 03 that reliable er so no matter what where he was he could have been able to pass er - send his Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin order Page 19 of This is why when Mikhail Gobachov when he was during the coo of 1991 in Faros er said that he didn't have any means of communication - he was lying because he - these er nuclear briefcase officers were with him and er Gobachov could have er talked to anyone anywhere in the world including the president of the er the united states Well this is of course besides the point but its an interesting piece of information 22 07 02 Q If Andropov had been in the Kremlin 22 07 08 I understand the question er it becomes er it's the question of not of personal security but the question of passing the message er and er the leader of the country first has to er do his duty er give the order initiating the return strike But er its his second priority to think about his life Now it's the generals mobile so 22 08 27 Q Er was everyone er in the military in the leadership on alert Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin 22 08 35 A Page 20 of Er this is absolutely right - not only the military forces er are in the state of er heightened alert but of course the political leadership were also on the state of alert They were in their offices er they er were in a special place called the centre of er government control Er the general secretary doesn't necessarily have to be be - have to be there himself He could have delegated responsibility and send the person number 2 to that government control er centre if the person number 1 was er ill and er in the er hospital There are certain protocols that er envisage all that how you can put the country from the peaceful state to the state of alert - its everything is envisaged 22 09 56 Q Can you tell us more about this state of - this er government control centre 22 10 17 A Er it's a building deep in the ground which er had all the life supporting systems supplies of water food er air regeneration system like on a submarine Er which er made it possible to use fresh but not contaminated air and er there is a Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 21 of protection against er the shock of the strike 22 11 02 Q Er how many er - how much time can you spend there 22 11 06 A It depends on the type of of this er bunker In the er mode of complete isolation it can be up to 10 er days in a less extreme mode it can - you can last say up to 30 er 30 days Er the supplies of food and water can be replenished daily er in order to maintain a certain level 22 12 07 Q Do you think that in that worst period in the - during the peak of tension would a or have been in that bunker 22 12 33 A I don't know where the minister of defence was but er the chief of general staff marshal Agarkov was er - er at the - was in the shelter at the central er command - in the command centre of the armed forces of the USSR Er I remember hearing him speaking er to to other well army commanders - missile commanders Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin 22 13 25 Q Page 22 of You are absolutely sure that Agarkov was in that secret military bunker 22 13 35 A Yeah judging by the er radio er context I can I can be sure he was there Er during the climax of the NATO exercise when the strategic missile forces were on the heightened er combat alert I can say with a high degree of confidence that the er marshal Agarkov was in the protected central command point of the armed forces of the USSR because I was er part of the missile forces er headquarters and er marshal Toloopkor er was in radio link with er marshal Agarkov and that was linked with that sheltered bunker which means that marshal Agarkov was there 22 15 16 Q So things were that serious that marshal Agarkov er was in that bunker 22 15 25 A Yes the situation was quite complicated and er such er was and even in the future er during every er NATO exercise or united states army exercise so such order always Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 23 of repeated itself during the exercises Er it wasn't just the one off thing of 1983 - I remember the same was in 1985 er it was not a NATO exercise but it was the American strategic forces exercise and we also increased er the combat alert - there were orders er for - and we did it secretly from the enemy Er we didn't er er raise the army on alert er we did it in a - well through the system of orders Passing the order to - directly to the commanders Er we er created the picture of doing the exercise er well er we never - we'd never expose 22 17 13 the true nature Er the able archer exercise was preceded by two large exercises that was held by the Warsaw treaty er countries er with the soviet union as the leading force Er it was west 80 and east 81 er exercises involving strategic er nuclear missile forces and er they er I'm sure that the Americans didn't feel any better er than we er felt an' didn't felt as less nervous than we felt in November 1983 22 19 27 Q In the beginning of our interview you said that during the able arch exercise 50% of the mid range er missile regiments er that Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 24 of were equipped er armed with a pioneer complexes were in the fields I'm talking about pioneer complexes specifically Each pioneer had three er warheads The missile was er equipped with er divisible or splitting or warhead er - how many of such pioneer complexes did you have 22 20 40 A When that group er was fully deployed er - by the - when the deployment was full in 1987 er there were about 200 - there were 200 slightly over 240 autonomous missile missile launches In 1983 there were 150 of them So it meant - on the - 50% of them were 75 - that is 75 were in the field positions Er but it doesn't mean that only pioneer launches er would have been fired er but er there were other missiles like intercontinental missiles and other er mid range missiles The total number intercontinental missiles at the time was over 700 and they also had 22 21 58 er divisible warheads and Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 25 of sometime some of the warheads had er up to 6 or 10 blocks plus er the er missiles on the submarines - by the time in 1991 the er treaty on er limiting strategic er weapons when the USSR and the USA signed the treaty the strength of the strategic nuclear forces was consisted of about 11 000 nuclear warheads The Americans had slightly more than that 10 770 - there was almost the parity but er there were mid range er missiles had been scrapped by then 22 23 27 Q Let me bring you back to that most tense night when you were in that secret bunker What was the psychological atmo' - what was the atmosphere - what was the - what did people feel - what did people talk about 22 24 24 A Er speaking about the morale of the er staff well of course I can't speak on behalf of everybody else but er as to the people er who were in that command point of the strategic missile forces er we were tense Er well everyone felt extra irresponsibility er everyone was very er well together but of course the tension was not as high as Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 26 of during the er Cuban missile crisis 22 25 20 Er we knew that the NATO were doing an exercise but not really preparing for the nuclear blow although of course there we couldn't fully eliminate the chance er that er the nuclear strike might have been delivered So we were in the state of er readiness - we we had to be ready to react of all the sudden unplanned changes if the NATO exercise had gone not according to plan or if there had been some signs of extra activities which might have manifested that a real strike might have been delivered The groo because our information was coming from groo did not give us er such er warning This is why we can't say that we were sitting and waiting for the strike to be delivered It was er heightened er vigilance but it wasn't er well state of expecting of waiting for the strike to be 22 26 41 delivered But this is my personal impression - I cannot speak for everyone who was there But er I can say that we didn't have er that er fear - I was involved in the Cuban missile crisis and I was in Cuba er during that crisis and when er in 19 er October 1962 we were there - we were really waiting Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 27 of for that any minute we would be given the order to launch missiles and we were waiting for the American invasion to start dropping bombs on us So 1983 was er the atmosphere was different 22 28 02 Q Was the picture the same in other forces 22 28 19 A Er I already said that er in the strategic er armed - in the strategic missiles the er state of our heightened alert was carried out in accordance with the orders of the general staff which er lets me assume that er if er we received such orders a similar orders were received by commanders of other forces And er with high degree of certainty we can assume that er the er - we're in the similar state of alert Of course the - well actual actions that were taken might have been different but the fact of increasing the sea based and air based er nuclear missiles were the same No he didn't say 50% in this time 22 29 24 Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd Flashback Television 1983 The Brink of Apocalypse Interview Gen Col Ivan Yesin Page 28 of I don't - I cannot give you the percentage because I just - I'm not in a position to give figures 22 29 34 Copyright C Flashback Television Ltd This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu