Ilfl'ERVItr'tl JF MARSHAL SEP GEI ArHPOMEYEV January 10 1990 i'art l 0 First vould you tell e just briefly c little bit bout yo r litary history I have heard fro Mr llit e an 5 others that yau v re in the ar y at a young age and that you in the battle for LitninQrad s eoc of Len1 ngracl were in thes trenches and never care aJt or a year and so on But in order to have it correctly in Y ovn in could you just bd efly st etch eapec i ally th earli r period of your i itary serv ce K AT HP EYEV I d n't think that tb1s has a direct bearino on the book 0 Yes but it' good for ce to hav a clear -- MP AF HRO iE 'lEV ar 1 a rofeGBPsiona1 il i ury penon an enlisted e- en before the in iS O 5etore tt' e war for a y ar I atu1hed at the higher it arY and naoJal school in Leningr ld Our school vas in the Baltic at he tice the var started and v h3d to tight practicallY fro- the very beoinn no tro- Jun o 1941 And until Harch of l9 L participated in fiohtino in the Boltl region and in the defense of veningrad In Harch I vns woundod and was eken to the aainland es the rest of the countrY waa call then And after recovering I fouoht already at tl oe StaU norad ront then on the sou hern front Fourth Ukrainian ron 1 beoan y career as a deputy pla on leader nnd nd 1 th var as the heads of D tank battalion My ran at th t1 was a Major And after the ar I st died at di C rent tl1t ry institutions and Gervcd in and hendquarter sto 1973 1 to the heauquerters An 5 froo I b por icipate in solving litary and political qu ati o ca e in co and rd 1 an 1 7 'i'h nit yo In Karel 198 3 Prea d n t P ea'J l ann ' no fY ctivltY tn def in spac v t t i cS roo 1r 1t1at '11a 'i'b v r Io o v 11 noll r ntlY -- t k or k11' '1 _ rpi t t 1 t o t 1 t ry stions b tw ry 1r 1 o tb o Stat var rat ' ' cr h r 1 t t r oc at o var to ns y u ar 1 Y Jt r 't 1 T o a r or tt 1 t # 11 h o o t o 1 d o ' t o '1 t I r - o o IC 'f2 o o ro o' ' o Ct r _ 1 o o t #_ oo o o T r a o -- - Ir 1'17r s o- '' v t o or o e- r 'f sh- ball 11o1 - 1a 1lo 711' o 1 o r o oy w r ao a o o o t'r ft Joo 4ft s ' t ttis 1 o L t r 51 o l ob a 1u dero -s oI a yo 'o r oc o rar it r - t r oo sd ve a liJ oo ao ra1i o o7 r 1 tor nt' '1i - w v- o a eo o o ao o rr ar a o - r 7 -ss le l11c i L -7 1o I o o ro oo r' o t o t o II oo u 1 oo e 'o t p -- _ t s rl _ o - oo - r 1 IJ' 1 7 f looor o o IC o o o oo o o t I 1 7 ' ' P I TE I -r iirc o 4- r ra v r or oo o o f 11 o l r o al - o u t o 11 o --1 o o ' ar t e o s d C' o 1 ot s - - I ar fl'l K f' 'i ti i t' ' 1 o -e o ar tr c err - 1J 6 ' h o vt 7 o ao - re -raJ - r e ll l - - oo ir o o o -ru o t - r7 o o orc ' 'I r -- - o - r o' o 1 - r fe G v o r - o '7 t l- 111 t o ' 1 1 7 #IY c 1 l TJ f E te'l o o wasting billions o dollars work Q Host People I know don't think thmt this thing cmn ov r ' l'ou see nevcn yl 'ars has pas sec ai nc Rehghn announced that project This is tha in Ph Acl concluding fl aoroe ont on the hr i tat ion o atrataoic oCic nJI i ve armn And your ndrniniat nEion douG not reject this progrn althouoh'tt in driving to conclude th treaty What is th renaon tor this HR o AltlfltOH YE ' Well if You' rc asking e what cy persol ftl opinion is th reason io politics rt was n oreat dream of Reagan'o end Bush io reluctant tor political reasons to lot it go o Q 1o 1 I HR AJI HROMEYEY I cannot agr eo with you on thts point Perhmps Reagan could h 'L'e d rcnced about this I know from the scicnti ic and cnolnoerino point of view fro the itrateo1 point of v1ew how ell-prepared he vas l'a not ooino to dia uas thla But vhy d es Hr Bush have to put his veioht hta r 11 t ic111 prcotioc behind this prooraz H has his ovn political oo als However he does not reject this prooraa 0 Wall just think about this for a ainute Surpos he rejected the progra What would be the 1 eedlat atate nt and uproar froo the for er President Reaoan out in Cal1rorn a HR A HROME V to P eaoan Why should Ceoroe Buoh t al so obow 1nd bt d 0 a reporter Well this is Y own personal vi v HR A ROM Y V Yea we'r you undorotanJ I just talking 0 nothing It would be tough for Buoh Hy ovu view h thor 'o like the col ll1lit ent to this proora in thh EhiSII adlllinistration that ther was in th R noan ad iniatr11 I don't th nJ tho co '1lllitment is nyth1no oo atrorto aa it w o I Y pcraonol idc a 'l'hll col llll1t1'16nt is IJC'h v ak a r th o adaini tration to this than -- KIL Ar HitOHGBP 'EV t hia f t th thia prcor o Th r io only on thin th t BUPh 11 th t ait ' t 1 th oion no or the r tr n Ct n ar h llut dcspil ro point 1 th A H Tr aty t 1 72 wlll This in 1972 J o Th r a ' t la notb no k t th o ha k th n Tt o A1t r f n r o o t f tr j 11 vlno And ' ot i ple r n ty b ot ol y t r r Duah ia not doino this 0 over yet Woll hore ar in January or 1990 -- tho oLory ian't ro t 'a ooo we what hoppcno ILnuoht lr I can toll you ono thino Thbt lr United Stntua docs not chnngc lta poaltior1 on tho SOT tilo tlc8t'f l11 no1 hol n I gn d --ThtH oJ nrc two thin lu wh lch rulo t ha IIR AKIIROIII YEV Ch othor ono out It'o one or-the other to another 0 Okoy l ct m go ouhjoct i f I r my In 1983 Willi thtl your of tho U S deployments of tho POl' ahino II and modiumr11nga minsiloo in Europe which had tukcn placo oftcr the Sov1 t dcploymt nt of what has boon called SS-20 mobi lo 111iosiloo 1n Eut opa In r trospoct looking at it now is it your judgment that lt woo wise or unwioe ror tho Soviet Union to deploy tho SD- Oa in Europa and were tha politicftl and strategic clements tnken into account when t hoo Soviet Union ade the decision to deploy t hosc o ss-20 l'lissileu7 KR AY HROHEYEV r think thot iC we consider in prineiplo the deployncnts of SS-20 missiles in Europe I think that this osur was correct Those dssilen were deployod Cor thoao that -- tho old missiles which were ta cn oCt ron th aervice Thoy were deployed for the SS-12 cissil s which wero deploy d pro iously And there were around 600 aissilcn of tho SS-12 clnss d ployed in th European part of the Soviet Un1on And I thin that if th Sovh t Union hal deployed 200 SS- lO rnisllilca b c u11o a'leh m uho hac hree warheads then ehi would hove be n o cot oct ovc But th Soviot Union at the time decided to d ploy otc 1 s l so thoro were ooro w rhcads in genoral And l thln'k thnt wao t hr mistake And I think ns n result of this mov th Unltod Gtlteu tooJ lho dccJ sion to deploy Pershinq I o a nnd uine 1a ilea in WoGtern Europe 0 llow far back was the dociaior1 mndt ln yQur unJ ratqnding that the SS-20 would be deployed end thnt the nuf'Jb J'II woul bo oa loroc os t hoy w ro Does thia qo bn k to lU th rnit1cU '70s 01 oarly '70s or wh n would it hove bo0n a tuolly ftdtf 20 lfR AY fiP OJ IEYEV hail a wna 0 An1 a c n oc the d c1aion to d p1 y thl in the latr 1 70 o thot ti - a a t t'lr y u lin put tt rhh way At thflt tl t onai or at im1 Willi QiV n tl rh atr t Ol f thf oht hav o r IIIII I it j lllt t- lrd f P' tak r hy tt Ultery olon 'Qr H lot o H A'HPt HF 'YGBPV Th D f he Hinlatry r t lav rh ri9o' t 1 p 11u h o1 1 r J ad uh p f t I t j 1d u o ur r tt l I k ff ' r r t t I r r t ny WitH t r I I 0 llqll in this decin ion do you l now whelhar llr Dr zhnav his llsoc lat D oave any serious consideration to th 'atratogic o or t or vorc the looking At it juat a Jcind or ropl 11 ce11ont nnd 100'1o 1 t on Hit Thi o question M llROiiF Y V w11n dob11tcul ln t lhtt Sovi aL o lcadcnlhip nnd lhuro were en GBPG o'lGBPiir_b B iil ona n to wh 11 should b tlbffia ' Tli ifr ' wU'i'U dlsputes on whc hor r ore than 600 w11rhond 11 should be uployold in the European p11r t 1 b11liove thl t at t ha t iel' tho pooo lblc political consequences or the a tor worv no I tnlo on ln1 o nccount 0 'lou leave me a li ttl a puzzled bucaune 1 f there o e dobato on it you would think that someone would aay Well loolo if vo do th la what's the iieat going to do Do you have 11ny explanation o why they didn't take it into 11ccount if thoy dahoted t h11 issue AJmltO iEYEl ' I think nov ve con diacuaa this probllltl l knowing tho fact when everything haa happened At that ti e thus a conaequencoa vere r ot clear -- evid _nt 1 know that now there aro a nucber of prob ecs --that the lenderabipo o dlftorcnt liR countries cake stakes know in ay opinion for instance the United StateD adniniatration ia making mi takes in ita illtary litl al policies For instance I can t ll you this But l'n auro tha thay aro being debated in the A eric n adeiniatratlon and th y'r d bated on 11 serious basis Hovovor these aiatakon ouraaa in policy decision-making ore being taken I 0 This may be a ntic quoatlon Al x In ano or t ay question a while ago did Hershel Akhro cy v wan to say that thw political aide o this the a tect of It vaa not conald r d In this7 IIITE P PPETRI 0 weight ConDiderod enough So perhaps 1 t la that what - liiTf I' PP E'Tf P Yea All rioht 0 vaan o t on a J htr ed at ArHP 11 HJ 'I Th That' o the nnlnil h ru 1 Tf t But I o oo r bl 1 1 v rhe 1 d 1 It confidvrod 1 k n4 of Te f war I t the r n t l n n ol I I 1gl t 1 f 'l 'i 0 Ok11y 1 t 111e go on to t he qu latlon ot th tl1o Yor an air11nor which t ok plae Dept b r IIO nl J d f'Al 007 All of now -- looldng boc on your IJnf'larat Mlino of wluot happ nelS Woa thio lllatn nn lder ttty or vaa it a U l r rovoentlora art ' nll thte t1 h45 paa6cd and oi tino und r tond thin r 110 l 1 ' llt oot lno d nrn 1 of 1983 - the it n w what h ju1t n cnn o llow d' you nov ovorythlno out f'm not o journ l h t I'm a military p r11on r do not go for aonon tion And w can o t 1 judo thla In ld nt trom tho point ot view ot 1983 wh n tta ol Wnr wo1 at itn height nn1 rro th point of viC w of todny ln th nu1 way flow l 'm aut u tt111 t l h Y AI 007 purponcfull y chang d 1 t1 rout c and tl w bvc r Dovl I nlt lf11CL Thio it my -- ro tJrt lro of t hia Wh th r Jt 111 t1 JHOVO llt fon -- whoaa provocotfon 1t ia - or van ft n Jllovoootion r don't know hnd l cannot r aoau pt iono ot thh fa t And ' ArllflOHRYEV 0 Whon you nay purr oacfully Clo you IIIIHln thftt U lnto nd d t n co o vvo r- tlovio t air opaco 01 thcot it rnndc oo111o chnng Which lnouoht it 0o1 r not noconllarili inlontion 1 no you o 1 wloot l rrwl lt r'ou nnid tho t AI purpoa tully Do YOIJ n thnt Lh Y dl l t tl1a1 oomoon ch rtgod ito rout witl1 tlao pur110o f trinoir1g It ov r Govt t hir DJoarc Af IIRO EYP V I do not wont to go irJlo lha111111 I tal 111 bu auno J rtp nol know tho m But 1 J now one r t J kn t h t o a h nn ahplnno whll tht n vloationnl qu pr -Lnt thftt It h1111 th ll vignt iorutl quip nt that hrus bnc ur aqulp nt 'llnnot flr turl 1 tun nnl'l ou -J el t hours wh n hnll awny d wny ft t rout t r hundt a ot kllq to rs nv11y Anti with ut '' t fort l tio nrH I 1l v thie Who r1 1nl d h 'l'lf lo o r t n J t lr r 1 now thio And b ua 1 t w o 'Jhl t th th tl n1 o v rythl 'J wtla ln t-lt ud t ur pj 1 t Htl r 1 v pltln o 11 did 11 t o th t H wno n viH oh p1 r 'Tha IIR ll ' h ' down 0 At whet l nrol an HR AY HP OifEY v 0 So h d e t 1 c olon ado to bring tho Plone It was decided by Hoac ow Hoaco ean o tste Th 1111 l l tftry what -- r don t kn W enough about Your cilltary but thia aan llitary hoadquar oro do You Don thing likeor that or have what o onaul ho civllioo 11leodorohip 6 HP AT HEVGBPV Th re was a deei ion 0 1 Hedvedev b taken 00 Moacow Cor a i' Soviet -- I guess you'c2 call him a Soviet --- the historian -- wrote a book ebour h v ar 1 he a id that because Mr Ar drcpov vas out of alck pr bably -- Gorbachev vas ir charge of so-e kind or a task force n oh i -ediate ot to its eons q neoo k8 tar oo you know to isthis thiscri is true Wbat part did Corh chev plar ln t respond D ter ath r t wn ar nage MP Ai HP OKrs'GBP ' participation in this I C o not r llow trytr I do not tno v r ort a e oa Also that fall th re was a lot or var a rea f Dra t var Thingo were oetting ery tense that 11 A 1 hoo recorded that a llATO c o - and post ti ercfse ca d Abl Ar h c cau ed s e people in the Soviet leaderahip to b l vo thot o var was al oat about to start-- that the 7n1t d tat a a 1 IAT v r abo t to atta the Sovie t Union 1 n th 'all 9 1911 recall anythir about lhis Did it really ha p o in 1 or o v Q HP ArHPOXEYEV r - share th view that ti e But there wao eountries had rea- h - 1 reacl its peak an th s situaoi n 192 r 1 A wr ir r war r r y u t Did o r ri 'I t lead rnhip at tb ther was an i d1at thr a ohe opinicn th t lh t o ov a T ery hi9h '1 vel o tr r o that ve shrr ld f - 16 t r 111 v r -oei y v r pr thJ1 Ao So iet Th o o r o t o ' - 7t bir 1 r t r o o Well this one wna whnt o c 11 d In oth r words they don o t en c o co m nd P IDt xorciae ott Jc ialg nittino in -oot troops in the Hold Tlac hnve 0 Tt Jl turnod over 1 PIIrt 2 0 -- tnJ o Pllrt -- who Aroo people in hioh poata Ant I'd wondnzod iC you'd hobrd of this -- th t that comm11nd pos exercise in tho Call had come to your attention MR AI JfP OH8YEV It is hard for me to sny r mc bor that Soven years have post It iv not I probnbly do not clear in my ind 0 Cnn you recall the at sphore of those doya -- the hioh tension after 1 AL obout the all of tho u s cleploylllenta in Burope the high state o tension between our two countries can you describe what it felt like here HR A HRCMEYEV The Soviet leadership waa gravely troubled by tho state of Soodet-Al lerican relations Practicolly fro11 the time the R agan adoinistration had cone to power in 1980 for four years our relntionships deteriorated and we considered that the Reagan administration was largely to blo1 1e for this state of affairs In this line I can mention Reagan's state ents of the Soviet Union being the empire of evil that socialism should now go to thn trash heap of history We consider d these statements as aggressive ones and we were seriously considering these statements Naturally at that time we thought -- we considered the poJ 1 tical solutions that we should take to somehow roduco tensiono And nRturally as D reoult the talks on rcduc ino nuclonr armnmontG -- medium-range armamento in Europe Cell I But chon again measures to strengthen tho security of the country alr o wore taken Q And of course that fall'whon the d4 'ploymontv bog tn Sovio t negotintors otoppcd participating in tho ar rna tnlks and thnt raise the tension level even higher MIL AKHROHE'iEV Frcm tbe tactica point -0 llic w l tbin k Lha probably should not have been done Q Admiral Crowe snid to me hat as lot o tho oiddl of 1988 which in not that long ago you said to hi that you r lt that the proopects were there for a U S att ck on th S vl t Union but that by 1 at year you had chang d your oi d k anl give ao an id a of whot your own thoughts w r going ac h 0 h and after 1983 nnd the lotor '80s about the possibility t at t United State would actually attack your countay 8 liR AFr IIROIIEYEV I do not description of whnt r said Q Okoy ao moke i t -- HR A HROHEYEV finuudit le flo hi t I'm nk that thia ia an accurate not nay i nv Tho Cirnt thing that I said is that toda ls t lu k t t w h1e1 n e 't _t _atos anything i about -- h wl_ no t a ob n n S t no a art a war Nert 'ller tho Un1 ted ta OD nor tho Soviot Union wants - a war T' convincud ot thi nut there io t he other aid of this problum What ia the poli thnt it has towards the soviet Union I believe that oven today thu Unit d States is conducting a policy towards the soviot Union froiD 1 oB lion of force -- - - What is a policy troD a position of force It moana t hat a atntc using different J Ulitary methods at its dispoaal -- not military sorry -- political economic and other t eana tries to res_SI r -- ha to puj ___pressure on another independent sovereign state to mnke lt carry out a policy favorable to it Tbia is the policy pursued by the United States conducted by t he United States in rcl tion to the Soviet Union And tj ia policy eonco inue s Although this policy is not so open as it was several years ago it in not so evident and it is interlinked with another pos Llcn bl the United S a es -- the posi ion o conducting talka the line on cooperation It is now not very evident as it vas bo ore and we understand this in the Soviet Union and we evaluate it and favor it How io this oxpresoed If we consider the political stot cmonta and the speeches that your officialo make than our rclntionn arc groHn better But i t you look at tho military doctrine o the UuLt cd States and the NATO bloc thoy have not chang d- ln the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact wo 11111111 changed our mi 1 i tory doc ttoino Even in America everyone soos thh Wall most of the people in the United States whereas the United Statal z ti ckz to it nolic y of nuclear deterrence towardo tlie Sovht 11111 -l n And the IIATO bloc is following e policy of flexible responne from 1968 and they have not this strategy all th oo yearG We'Jo viowinQ everything froo a raaliati polnt of vie We cnn o o what in happening on the other aide Then aoa n the United Stat n obj ctn to carrying out talko on th 11 ltat n f nllval forces J cl n' t 0 You lmow thh is llbat Adah al C -ooo had t aaJ n w it yQu aaw lt -- th laat dar o t a oorino thet be'o ln favor Qf atartln t do thio Hf' Af llfl OHf YF V 1 kr oDd hon beard of tb o o bu cl want to undermine the POs1ti t 0 Clnaudlblo J It ic l ly c onacio t my riond Don't try to __ 1111 irt his conacionco ond hia will to do hY and do what I l'luat nnd h o o w at ho must r would like to conclude s o C'or bi nil lion -- tho policy of inpro vi o I wc_ rlc ff oublod I Y this UtiTon and Qrowrnji ricn lnncsc 1111 a ht ' 0 ro ona of tho Soviut lliol poE l o oC f 2rce TtHl United St anm ' c tlhe policy GBProm chnngoa tho t aro i o a oHo u auu ng bohi nd the whor'oao behind And I think thnt Precisely in thin tbio h thQ r iatakc 0 St otos They did not procens 17 nd thoy'rc influence bllnlto l Y tho Cold War more than we oro th polic tQth ns i u d ia raoho o - 0 Aa an American - tind - 0 that extremely inter sting I think that the U S is changing ore than you suooeat 1 nd 'with the chongec that have taken place here flnd the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe for example are having a tremendous affect on A111crican political life and Amor icnn public opinion which might not be so clear here but I'm sure that they oro hnving I -- HP AY HRO IEYEV r agree with you P 1 l As I underatond it tvo lines in the United States policiostt arc fighting ench other The I ne on ollperation-w lih the- Soviet Union ln d tl1c GBPormei' lin r of confrontation And I think thot this is very i portnnt This i a very ir portant change r think this cannot b underestiDAtcd However the clements of this Cold War have persisted Why doesn't tho Uniteastates change-tts- nitit ury doctrhnr 'We hove changed ours tnruc yoars ago and they see thls These rc all practical mcnaures of the Soviat lead rship and I believe thnt this is another mistake I don't know maybe it is politics But in the Unitod States they view the changes in this r ountry and the Changes in Eastern Europe as a result of pressure from t hc United States on our countrios I think that this is a mistake I think nll theso changes are a result ot the GBPnet th t we hnvo reasoned out what should be done We're conscicnt lounly goinu co a rnot c domocllltic tate to a state based on the pric 'ipl or law We're movlna over to new relationships between nociolist oncl cnpit list countricn between socialist and developing countdca We have come to tho conclunion that this in oanontinl Thnt is why wo are carrying this out 0 the whole point of my book is that tho relationship b tween our tv countries has changed a greot d al in th P ot Civ or six years and i t is an attempt to underat nd and to do u ent how this chn go has t ken place That's basically tl1a story that I' writing about I don't want to x 00 rate 1t All probl hav not voniDhcd as you say But this ailuatlon h vaot ly different than i t was HR Well o r JIROHEYEV I IIIUSt tetll 10 you th t I nvinc d ond t r'tntn that relations between tb Stn tcus should be developed and c 1 0 V ot Union and tho Un1 t hlllllrally on the bouia o equality 1__ Proved in cvory way but aocuri ty o tfi o 1t 't Union In t fii not to tho dotrimunt of the co no rvnti vc lioybo I am 0 con r i country 1111 1 considered n yeoro r U But r ld se va vc I m a l lan arlvnncing i Am r e1an r olntionu 1 1 wor ng purposetull to lmrwoving Sovietthink tho Arnorlenn' 11 d i r o aT I 1111 Y utrioht whore I 0 Can I just 1 Gk one rnora queat ion on tho line we 'lore tQ k1rtg before This began with a qucntion o mino which 1 don 't think I ltavo completely the answer to Did You fool in the middle 1980s thot thoro Wlls a real possibility that tho Unitod stntca would oo to war against the Soviet Union Vns th t your b lief d was thot the military estimate o the USSR at that time an I ust tell you that I personally and many _know had a different ooinion ol_th lJ ni t eCI f J States in 1983 than I liavc today I considered that the United PE -statTs s proasin9 for world supremacy that the Soviet Union is f' the barrier in these aspirations fi rst ot all -- inaudiblcl And ' I c onaidorcd that as a- esul_t_ ot_ this ti t JJ etion tbc z c C tln be a war '-' etween tKc Sovi Onion and the United tfttes on the initiatfve of the United States HR AKHROMEYEV ot tho people that I 0 In Horch of '83 you were naoed a Harshnl of the Soviet Union while you were first Deputy Chief of Stoff of the Armed Fore s Did this mean that you had a broader bivoer responsibility or bigger horizon for looking at these Questions thnn before MR AKHROMEYEY I think thnt military titl s do not piny a role in this Even before received thic post I had an opportunity to evaluate the position of the United States and our rolntiono I had enough information to do this Q Now in the last year or two you've hnd on opport nitr to go t o the Uni t ed States for the first time just os som of our miH t nry loaders including Admiral Crowe have hnd an opportunity for the first time to come to the Soviet Union and nc tunlly ao the military equipment see the people and so forth Did your personal experience of going to the u s and hnving tho talko nnd ao t o things there make much of a change in your view oC it I m wondering about on the one hand o view that ia b sed on r por and briefings and pic tures and on the oth r hond a view thn s based on personal experience ls it much dire rent in your c 7 HP Ar HROHGBPYGBPV As I said in 1983 l bcli United States can st r o war against th Sovi t aim is world supremacy And in 1989 I sAid and I as well -- that t c United States ill not start Soviet Union and J believe thfs Drastic chang o 11 v d thAt n htt Union nnd b llevo i th w r gn d ln h11v oc ur ro my lh nldng and oY viewn during th rruu J f rtro l Ulin Wo ro uctiano of thu r uaul t of tho ltnr ln 1 contoc n 8tH 1 fTrct or o x tears Th ry woro tho aotn r 'minaed peo t n ln the polLSY nr l-h ' nit other 'd P nd wo fudge ao cordinu o tho 0 'o tin ol ha u n h n n n vl 'wa ch _n l ed u r - ' o 'm r cann -- IllY PC roonal nnturnlly ns a orcsult Or my poroonall loetinon with 1 1 1110 GoorQo Shu l'rimllrily and people liko cu wo Powrll n llit 4 n lturnlJy my vicwn changed an n result of -- iinnudiblcJ I ct Georuo Duah Cor thr eo timer tlo' f havo a POD Iibility to t lk wi h Bokor -- Scowcroft Host probably they hove oome i prasaions of talking to uo und their views arc modified in oo c way 0 I wnnt to ask you about --in tho fnll of 1984 suddonly your superior Harshnl Og rkov was r oved and oant to another job nnd there has been a lot of speculation about what all that was nbout Con you ohod any light on who happened thore Hf AIOfROliEYEV I think that these nre speculotiona on the part of the cass media nothing more There is not a single person who stays on the snae post all of his lifo We had a major reorganization in the structure or the armed forces in 1984 And thoro were ain COI I lnnds in strategic t iclda -- inaudible - l being oct up And Ogar o ov was given the job of tho western t J f ' J comonnd He became the head of the western cornmnnd And 'I moved - to the post of the head of the general r tn f I Ul oix years 1 rll Ogar ov'c junior Five years later I left tho job of the head of o' the chief of staff A younger general replaced me on thic job tlllAnd tho rnasn media again spec Jlating na why Akhro111oyev was aliovcd ot hie post And he was relieved oir 1ply tor the foc t that he was told the time had come for hil l to 1110vo ov r orere 0 A lot of it was caused by tho act that there wao -- it happcnctl in a very nuddcn way with Ogarkov He wcr1t out to the irport to say aoodbyo to some vi iting delegation T foruot now- Finland or como other countt y who visi l od Hoscow flo lnid goodbye and Lhen later that da i t Wits just nnnounc od that he WPS out 1 moan it was such a sudden thina and no one would cxpl in what happened HP AKHP OHEYEV What of ' itf i And well every militaty person works until the moment he's relieved Q Was it in your view an ordinary chono o you could tell at the tine HR AP HROHEYEV of command no far think that this w o d111ply 0 c hftng of poraonnel and ho had n proapec tivef l of working on ncth r job 0 1 Is Horsh 1 Ognrkov now retir d I th t orr ct HR AJtHf1011EYEV He' 11 now 72 y rs old Th r la a group of 10e neral inapot t ors t11 and he o a worklno ln thftt aroup 12 ffP o I Y MJ OMEYev DY the t iee Kr Corbac hev ca e to power v nd rat OQd even before that one cannot oolve the Afghan preble by il tary oens an1 we sholld se11rc h for polit al oono of selv1oo this Probl that ve sho ld withdrav our troo a fr - Af han1s An all our effort fro l as to l9S8 vere directed at vlth ravir the troo fro Af9haois an an solv no the probl of Afotan1stan by political d naturally Kr Gorhaehev ' o nt vho n1tiate thi$ecans pr ess 11 7 Did i t r ally egin right after the April plen that 0 sort vher really war GBPtarted on it in a ojor vay or vas it ot tal about at that tira and took a while -- J Ia t 'he any leader eo ea to paver he has a h at oC different preble o befor hi both internal and xternal And he tries to solv the- ltaneously l can't say that h a lvea th at the oo day ar the sare nth or ev n at th oo year SearcheD for approaches and solutions to solving th Afqhan r 1 m AT HP OMEYEV p began right aftor Corbachev cace to paver 0 Was there any resist ancc in the Sov ilitary to withdrawing the forces Was ther a feeling that t be done or was the litary of the opinion th t 1r thh ah uld not to term1nate thia war would b tett r HP AT HP OHEYev First of all the 111tary ra d r troops ShOUld OJ 1 hllV b 'in_ j n rCf5UC t cf nlC' f g Htn 't_ fl d hat tl Dloce_ The nilitary proc edt frc h pur ly 1' 1 acpacta of this l t waa abGolu el to c l ar tq ua to at lro lhuy country a Afghaniat4n in a ountry wh c -h h 1 Y er IU h a ar 1 ountainG and Jaa on ar a of 1 5 illl'ln aq or 1-11 1 th t th r roop n b rln 100 000 th o v ul ' v o by 11 t u r n An J a a 11 ' In lla t r F r Jt1er Q ight avay that v ah ld v1tt rav tt fsnou bleJ - wo star b oo i w Vith Hr ru we 0 Uaa th ding t o nd n J ed It Mr tl1t uy j 17 th trO p r A HJ f 1 Y 'I d 'h o t J Jr 'li rhu 1 aak o t r ell 1 tinaud1bl l ordora hon Dut uueh a deeiuion lloo millt ory llltm na k 1 11 o 11 o w ' Ollo Srtq r 't'b ' - ' t o o oo oo o o oo o 1 HR AEUROHBVEV o Ooor ov oaa ho ohio ot otott oo thnt tin ' hlo Ur o And Voronl ovl oo tho doout hio o tho oooon ion 1 hooo And oo oooo ou report to Hinhtor o oo oooo ' oo lonv ooo oo ' ooo by tlitroaucrna l r obo- 'ooo ' '' ' oo nroblo wll b - oT ihru '' hac oo hov hoord oo Opinion 1 ow follow the Ordo o An4 wo Lollowod our ordo _ 0 ' ooo ooo ooo t 0 Au I roea11 ahort y botoro tho introduetion ot Sovlor troopo oo ' bo Wi hin tho Proviouo oooorol oontho oo hioh ranking Sovtot o Uoer oooo thoro on o otudy oioolon 00 0 o bacJo ot Your report ooooro r ' 'o ooo r don't ooo oo-o ooo ' '' tho experi necd flit11ry HR Ar HROHEYEV e We're Paople know oooo ''o oon ropreoonta o o o ooootono ohot ooooo oo oooooo POoplo ooo o ooo its '''o ooooo ooooo w ondorotood thot b oilitory ooooo it io not ooanlblo oo otot ho oitootlon Vo hod our cilitary 'jPoooon ntlvo thor b for Tho introduction or troopaf7T fenOro ot th Ar y P k l1 th htad of the Inron ry ooo GBPhere ot th tino Hnny Othor olllt rr oltlciola oooo horo And our opinion ooo boo d on tho onowlodgo or tho a i too t1 on thoro But it von o oory dJ tt I lt d a Jolon But I do not want to blnr o the Soviet leadorohip -- nt tho ti Ustinov Andrnooo Grocyko -- tor toktno thio dooiolon h oooo 01 tho t1 oo it ooo v ry dit cult to doc de ootoo o oo oII l rr p oplo thnro wcr only military problo a thot wo torad Ani h Y had bet ore th m 11111 1 t11ry polit lcal and ' Orwmfr QUo oLJQnll t and they llad to aea a of ttoio all ond t doc 1 oJon It Jo only no that w that it vao rt 11 1 det ioion but th1a w now n oeo 1 o thy r t llr th a decioion waac not ao thJa At th oloo tac l Se r co bin t1on n e Hnrahftl Akhro y v lory An1 Vith Oth 0 Sh Jt r I'v 1lov d Bn1 that 1e I t lt thJnga 1t ouqht r I laot r opl g t lir d n1 th n11 toH ob ut u 11 a ath rw1ae p ft IJ1t tf 1Jt f-c Onppl o I of-11J l o8V n t r t Cort n h oro w o v 'uot a tart d n W 1 I t c t- r o La k a n1 o y 1 n n t t r 1 y ll th enlt ot n o k n J J r 111 tJniat I IH let t nt r fh q IIi 118 l t II Or '1 t yc u pr c r l or nt n w llh t r inut th tl liJ 14 t oI f r o f II o h ' r lnutcu 0 Okay sure Tnpo turned over Part 31 o C u- JC A - u M - r v f R HR A -- was the statement from July 1989 0 Yes When he appeared before the Supromo Soviet AP HRONEYE' I do not think thnt this concerns personalities I was pr scnt at that Suprc e Soviet acsaicn and Gorbachcv did not pronounce this word carshals He did not any that He said that some litarz QnL aid that I houl vc r lowl y An eJ 'l- you as o person wno witness 0 this f irstban thnt this did not concern marshals HR 0 Okay But what was it that caused ao o t lilitary oplc to feel he should ove more slowly and vas th r s controv ray at that tice over vhat should be done MR Ar HP OHEYEV A new policy v a being work out A policy of perestroika was being wor ed out and th internal pol y ar J a new oreion policy w s beino worked out B sino on th n v tor to policy a n w i l itary doctrine was baino vorl d oot It wu evi ent that the r Illtery forces h d to be 1 du ed b auo tho r elationshlpa between th SQviet Un1 n and th Unit d Stat o ar beino 1 prove4 The oilil ary threat h be Ut9 r due- d Tl r fl -- the military p raons who par licipat 1 1 b ra ttn th D n v course togothor with Gorbachev under tood what w o 1nt t au toqeth r with Gorbac ho'J they participated 1n thh w t r w kin out a n w roreiqn policy and a n w do t rin illt ry ' 'h wl'l did not nnr ieipotf in hi work did not und rotdn1 t w 1' ' ppr t ne Sv or th n w poli y Th n v t I l t n reie d certain queationa a n J t h ond th y n r a h 1 ot Seer tary fqr his view t f thh h o r 1 nft r o t t tha eaa nc C it An1 w o th ra a o J h1 t t or r 11 A f' r r t r l t n Hinak in July 11 11 H ary tt r r ' xs la H v a or J t ' z '1 o 1 - 1o # H - r t r Satr7 o t ' o p l q Y 0 orv s ror o r o o t1 _ lie # oorv o oP o - '' 'ro 7 r o or1 o n l Y Z J o o o tor o lit ' J o o 1 o #I II o '1- Jl 'o e y L J' I ' o o t r v o r o y o 7 lf D ' 1 t 1 'I I ' It 1 r o oo 77oo' - oo r I ra I i JPY oo ht 'PZ O C' tlll co o - o 1 r o t fGBP 1 _ r t -- v o7 r r o o o o o Pt rao r ' o ot_or o J fJt D fJ7 a a o Coo r t I o i'l T lil o oo 'J '-l ' It m 'J r o or L'J o ''1 o a o r aoctoty chat it thinks best o 1 would not intur orc in the tt mooning th11t the loviet Union 1noludiug 1ta allies And th n ernal orteirs ot 11ny count ry lim ination of ideoioqical a n _rd Principle in lifting -- th 11 fntor 'Lllllfniould 0 n foreign POlicy becauue llmT lhc rca'1 izii t IQn-oc-c t s ern n the rclationn bo woon Countrioa changes in P uropo And 0 h lirb far1 nreif llm unny lu r-o the IHI httVQ built a now military doct i nc o n now oruiun policy i 1 0 I e it Your recollection thnt already loll thin very carl point o July 1985 principles Gorbachev mentioned- to tho military loodvra Hinsk thoao throe id t thesc rinci leG did not mention those three principles one by one but uimply his were cloce The principles the selves were for ulotod somewhat later UR o AKHROiiEYEV He 0 Did the people who heard him -- and you listening to hie in July of 1985 express his ideas -- did it indicate thnt there would probably be substantially big reductions in the ailitnry Coree of tho Soviet Union as that already in cind aa something that would flow fro the ideas that Gorbachev wns expressing MR ARHP OMEYEV You see I par in o this and I had n ve --el -Pi ure - loboretinsz_ all were h a Hng 0 Gorbachev is not a ilitary person Aa Car au I know he never served as a soldier in the military Whnt ta your own observation of how he is able to deal with th ilitary concepts and military isaues in his job as tho General Secretory and as the job of the Chairman of the USSR Do Ceruse Council - AKHROHEYE' You see he is the load 1 of the country He is the chairman of the Council of Defonae And h 111 lat solv major political and military flspects and thu major rnilitnry problema And proceeding from tho rnct th t hGBP haa lnroo cxporionco of being party lender and government leod r h 1 abl to Golvo military probler u of this c liber He h o quit nough expcricnco for tnkino theso decisions b cauao proctlc lly v ry doy he co ac up cgtdnst these probl rns 1 know tl'lat ln Y ur country aomo of your Presidents did not aerv in th r and did not know what tho army -- I think t hin io th joh or any 1 ader a country HR I want to ak you about R ykjovik r yJ av o o ver nmazino vont and you participated Haroh tl A khr y v in 11 i portent way When you w nt to P ykjovik t th o no dl V know th t you would be d sion t d to w r-k w th II 1 in this wh11 Gorbnchev an R ftgan v ra v r 1 that you all w uld b h r lng out o 1 t no to ' o tr Gtrat g lc 'lU t1 ns in n ther ro in n 1 t r I h 1 lorg D1 1 Y' U kn If n a y u v ull t otv n tl h t II 0 17 a devPl ethir a that juot JU AT KP H YEV Yes I t bt the l- nev t ha t Pla nir thin ing yo axp ted 41 What vas the What waa tho ahead leading up to P eyY javik wl lat w es the idea of vhat or l'r Corbec hool and hi a ado - lors e pec ted to happen therei BV J _Rfi_ JW J b or tu d MR ATJW OMGBP1-Bl ' It Stas ve z t 'ard to gt ooH 'har U Q rosuh JI Of l fi Xk OUld be t he Z O Ile r J th t vc van ted to tliere Iller not diseyu_e li_ vi h tb l er1c n side There vas no c ooperat on on a par ve have today that is why our proposal to reduce 07 50 percent the strategic er ts va oo vhat cr che side But 4 ot oay that both Did o Prcduc ed prcpo ls- tn Y y joyik In Af rri'ean side o ered uo to el t mnate cc pletaly the int e Siete -- the ballistic an- 5 those etationed on nuclear We disc saec propos for '0 cinJtoo dio u wbi h eric an une peeted An a ry Yiit tX J t e d 1 1 issiles su -arinPs his a- PrOPQDed o ac rid of all the strategic arr ents bDtb the IE - those stationed on nuclear sub arines and h ae on bo bero they discusoed that or another one a one-half hours and aai n id a eli nate 0 As a ilitar- 1 person do you think that ither ene o these ideas vas a practical either to ell-inate all ball1st within 10 years or to all offenolv nuclear weapons within 10 years Is either one cf these so thin that could actually have happened or is it just talk issiles otrateol In qeneral we propooed to g t rid of all nu tear arma enta by the year 2000 and in this sense we thought that our proposal vas realistic It vas an integrol part or our program HP AY HRO KE EV 0 Wc ll really happen I von' t quectio -1 as to vh ther or not that Laughter bil t beca o MR AY HP OHEY V I can't say that ral but ultilateral process ould it's r t a Pri t t sugg 1 t that rba hev vaa frustrated by th laek t pr09r n t o e to be happ ning w th th Unit d etat o r T ir Q 0 Yeaterday in talking to Mr 1986 and that thi m ting in 8eykJavik a n e o t e nee' r # do ao ould 9 v yo r 1nt r r th ba kgr r d c tt in o bing 5r t 1 r t ati r o h w tt o HP ArHP HE IEV r rh nk thot w r ot 986 r n 1980 t l 'J #UT r 1 ti t Vt Or rh ntr-1 l' h r Vt'IG r aJn II v n v hao t t p r r1 r1 An1 I t 1 r ' ' a f r ' f 1 I t t v ' v o 18 II ' yr t o 1 0 7 vas i decided no o have pr li nary discussions Vit the Un ted s - es to et the A ericana kDJV vhat beir the gh o b to sor of spri this as a aur rise by Gorbachev f r OMGBPYEV I ' Uld not any that ve ried to load the A eriean side vith our proposala ttoa sieply ao ehov did not have enou h trcst be ve n_r tv aidaA_ that we Q ell thank you or spen ing your ti o vtth lE d of 1ntervi v t - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu