nnm BDM Federal Inc 1501BDMWay Mclean VA 22 102 SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965-1985 Volumell Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence AUTiiORS John G Hines Senior Author Ellis M Mishulovich John F Shull BDM FEDERAL INC September 22 1995 CONTRACT #MDA903-92-C-0147 OSD-NET ASSESSMENT 1 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS M1 J 1 CoiDlllents on Interview Process o o o i Marshal Sergei F Akhromeev 3 Marshal Sergei F Akhromeev 5 Gen -Lt Gelii Viktorovicb Batenin 7 J Ll Sergei Blagovolin 11 Harold Brown 13 Zbigniew Brzezinski 16 Dmitrii S Chereshkin 18 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevicb 19 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevich 20 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevich 27 I Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevicb 38 Gen -Col Ret Andrian A Danilevich 58 J d Gen -Maj Vladimir Zinovievich Dvorkin 70 J Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevicb 54 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevicb 66 Gen Makhmut A Gareev 72 Gen Makhmut A Gareev 74 Fred c Ikle 77 Gen -Col Igor' V illarionov 79 Gen -Col Igor' V Dlarionov 83 A S Kalashnikov 86 A S Kalasbnikov 94 Vitalii I eonidovich Kataev 96 Vitalii Leonidovicb Kataev 99 Gen -Maj Ret Iurii A Kirshin 102 Gen -Maj Ret Iurii A Kirshin 104 Robert W Komer 105 Gen -Col Ret Varfolomei Vladimirovich Korobushin 106 Gen -Lt Ret Nikolai Vasil'evich Kravets 109 Gen -Col Gregorii Fedorovich Krivosbeev 111 Colonel Petr M Lapunov ' 115 1 l -1 l J n n I J '1 _j Andrew W Marshall 118 Rod McDaniel 120 Iu A Mozzhorin - 122 Iu A Mozzhorin 125 Vladimir Rubanov ' 127 JaJiles R Schlesinger 128 Vitalii V Shlykov 131 Boris Aleksandrovich Strogonov 132 Viktor M Surikov 134 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygicbko - 136 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko 142 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko 144 Dr Vitalii Ni kolaevich Tsygichko 146 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko 148 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko 150 Gen -Col Dmitrii Volkogonov 158 APPENDIX A Partial List of Decision Makers and Analysts 159 APPENDIX B Research Questions for Soviet Interview Respondents 161 APPENDIX C Research Questions for U S Interview Respondents 165 APPENDIX D List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 166 APPENDIX E Tsygichko's Kommentarii k interv'iu v 1990-1991 godu 168 Index 178 m m J J J J J J ' _ 1 l Interviews and Discussions with Cold-War Era Planners and A Mlysts -l This volume contains much of the raw material on which this study is based All 'l items in this collection represent the testimony in some form of Soviet and American strategic planners and analysts whose professional careers were largely dominated by the need to understand and respond effectively to the military threat from their Cold War opponents J Most of the itemS are structured as records or su1nmaries of interviews conducted on the basis of a specific list of questions In follow-up interviews or interviews with n difficult subjects the questions served only as a general guide to research Long narrative responses also often did not address questions in the same format and sequence 1 in which the questions were presented I J J 0 For many reasons items do not follow precisely the sequence and contents of the interview questions Soviet interview subjects often were uncomfortable with the interview situation the questions or the implications of the research the Cold War was over and the West had won As a result the nature of the record of interview or discussion varies from interview to interview Transcripts of taped interviews are the record of choice of course followed by records based on notes and fmally summaries based on the memory of the intervie er prepared shortly after the interview ' Many Soviet interview subjects were uncomfortable with tape recorders especially early in the project 1989-1990 when several were far from convinced that the Cold War was indeed over Likewise several of the questions caused discomfort which J J J J J J forced rephrasing and special prompting provocative statements or allusions to other information on the part of the interviewer Some interview subjects responded with almost a stream-of-consciousness flow of information that moved from association to association through an entire series of related issues Stopping such a response to adhere precisely to our questions could result in the loss of valuable insights and information not anticipated by the questioner 'l Cold War Interviews l This resulted in incomplete coverage of some questions requiring when possible subsequent supplementary interviews focused on specific issues To compensate when possible we revisited some of the most knowledgeable interview subjects several times over the course of 3 or 4 years We tried when possible to isolate the interview subject from his colleagues during questioning to avoid mutual intimidation collegial responses and contamination of data and observations We were generally successful in meeting this objective but were sometimes forced by those who helped arrange a given interview to involve them in J the process When possible we would subsequently isolate the interview subject and revisit one or two key questions to validate the original response The record that follows therefore is inconsistent in level of detail and comprehensiveness despite the planning and good intentions of the researchers Imperfect as they are they nevertheless represent a unique record of information and beliefs of Cold War participants who were able to trust their former eriemies sufficiently to share their thoughts and beliefs in some detail before they themselves passed into history For the convenience of the reader a list of acronyms and abbreviations appears in the appendices as well as a selective list of decision makers and analysts cited or referred to in the interview record J J J J J ii 'I 1 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW 'l 'l ll Subject Vik tor M Surikov Position President of the Institute for Defense Studies NOBIS former Deputy Director of the Central Scientific Research Institute for General Machine Building TsNITMash 1976-1992 Over 30 years experience in building testing and analyzing military and civilian missiles and related systems C3I satellites space flight control etc Location NOBIS Moscow Interviewer John G Hines Langu3ge Russian Date September 11 1993 Prepared by John G Hines based on notes n 1 I J J J J J J I raised with Dr Surikov the issue of first strike versus retaliatory meeting strikes otvetno-vstrechnye udary and pure retaliation ride out He responded with a challenge that the U S strategy and posture was to strike first in a crisis in order to minimize damage to the U S He added that U S analysts had concluded that there were tremendous differences in levels of damage to the U S under conditions where the U S succeeded in successfully preemptively striking Soviet missiles and control systems before they launched versus under conditions of a simultaneous exchange or U S retaliation He said John if you deny that then either you're ignorant about your own posture or you're lying to me I acknowledged that the U S certainly had done such analysis Dr Surikov continued with the assertion at the basic Soviet position and posture also was preemption-primarily because truly knowledgeable military and civilian leaders simply did not believe Soviet systems had the reliability ustoichivost' to ride out an attack and respond effectively if at all He made it clear that he was referring to the whole system--communications and control launch systems and the missiles themselves Retaliatory-meeting strikes essentially what U S strategists would call launch-under-attack-LUA represented a far less attractive fall-back given 1the consequences to the USSR of allowing the U S to launch its arsenal I asked Dr Surikov if submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBMs were relegated to the role of strategic reserve or could they be included in whole or in part in any preemptive first strike He stated that SLBMs were sufficiently accurate by the late 1980s to have been included in a preemptive strike SSBNs85 tied to the pier and not under repair would be more likely to be involved I then asked Dr Surikov about the Dead Hand Mertvaia Ruka automatic launch system Dr Surikov responded that he and his subordinates had designed the system--to BS SSBN - Submarine Ballistic Missile equipped Nuclear powered- a submarine designed to launch strategic nuclear ballistic missiles SLBMs 134 Cold War Interviews ' Surikov include the various sensors-seismic light and radiation-to launch the command missiles in the event the leadership were dead or unable to communicate He continued that he briefed the concept and design to his chief then Institute Director Mozzhorin and to Baklanov then the Central Committee Secretary responsible for military industry Ustinov's former party position Both accepted and approved the concept The design fmally was rejected by Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev evidently when he was Chief of the General Staff i e after September 6 1984 on the recommendation of a trusted advisor and general officer General-Colonel Korobushin the officer who revealed the existence of the system to me months earlier As a result of this rejection the Dead Hand trigger mechanism was never realized J 0 1 I J 'I J 3 J 1 J 135 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu