nnm BDM Federal lru 150tBDMWay McLean VA 221 02 SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965-1985 Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence AUTiiORS John G Hines Senior Author Ellis M Mishulovich John F Shull BDM FEDERAL INC September 22 1995 CONTRACf #MDA903-92-C-0147 OSD-NET ASSESSMENT ot TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 J 1 J n 1 I J J Comments on Interview Process i Marshal Sergei F Akhromeev 3 Marshal Sergei F Akhromeev - - 5 Gen -U Gelii Viktorovich Baterun 7 Sergei Blagovolin 11 Harold Brown 13 Zbigniew Brzezinski - ' 16 Dmitrii S Cheresbkin 18 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevich 19 Gen -CoL Ret AndrianA Danilevich 20 Gen -Col Ret Andrian A Danilevich 27 Gen -Col Ret Andrian A Danilevich - 38 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevich 54 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilcvich 58 Gen -Col Ret AndrianA Danilevich 66 Gen -Maj V1adilllir Zinovievich Dvorkin 70 Gen Mak hmut A Gareev 72 Gen Mak hmut A Gareev 74 Fred c Ikle 77 Gen -Col Igor' V lllarionov 79 J Gen -Col Igor' V Dlarionov 83 A S Kalashnikov 86 A S Kalashnikov ' 94 Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev 96 Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev 99 Gen -Maj Ret Iurii A Kirshin _ 102 Gen -Maj Ret Iurii A Kirshiil 104 Robert W Komer 1OS Gen -Col Ret Varfolomei Vladimirovich Korobushin 106 J J J Gen -U Ret Nikolai Vasil'evich Kravets _ 109 Gen -Col Gregorii Fedorovich Krivosbeev 111 Colonel Petr M Lapunov 115 l l l l n n I '1_j w m J J J J J J Andrew W Marshall 118 Rod McDaniel 120 Iu A Mozzhorin oo o o o 122 lu A Mozzhorin 125 Vladimir Rubanov oo o 127 JaJlleS R Schlesinger 128 Vitalii V Shlykov 131 Boris Aleksandrovich Strogonov 132 Vilctor M Surikov 134 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko - 136 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko 142 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichk o - 144 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko 146 Dr Vitalii Ni kolaevicb Tsygichk o o o o oo 148 Dr Vitalii Nikolaevicb Tsygichko 150 Gen -Col Dmitrii Volkogonov 158 APPENDIX A Partial List of Decision Makers and Analysts 159 APPENDIX B Research Questions for Soviet Interview Respondents 161 APPENDIX C Research Questions for U S Interview Respondents 165 APPENDIX D List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 166 APPENDIX B Tsygichko's Kommentarii k interv'iu v 1990-1991 godu o 168 Index 178 l Interviews and Discussions with Cold-War Era Planners and Analysts -1 This volume contains much of the raw material on which this study is based All 'l items in this collection represent the testimony in some form of Soviet and American strategic planners and analysts whose professional careers were largely dominated by the need to understand and respond effectively to the military threat from their Cold War l 0 opponents Most of the item S are structured as records or summaries of interviews conducted n on the basis of a specific list of questions In follow-up interviews or interviews with difficult subjects the questions served only as a general guide to research Long narrative responses also often did not address questions in the same format and sequence in which the questions were presented 1 I J J D D J J J J J J For many reasons items do not follow precisely the sequence and contents of the interview questions Soviet interview subjects often were uncomfortable with the interview situation the questions or the implications of the research the Cold War was over and the West had won As a result the nature of the record of interview or discussion varies from interview to interview Transcripts of taped interviews are the record of choice of course followed by records based on notes and fmally summaries based on the memory of the intervie wer prepared shortly after the interview Many Soviet interview subjects were uncomfortable with tape recorders especially early in the project 1989-1990 when several were far from convinced that the Cold War was indeed over Likewise several of the questions caused discomfort which forced rephrasing and special prompting provocative statements or allusions to other information on the part of the interviewer Some interview subjects responded with almost a stream-of-consciousness flow of information that moved from association to association through an entire series of related issues Stopping such a response to adhere precisely to our questions could result in the loss of valuable insights and information not anticipated by the questioner l Cold War Interviews l This resulted in incomplete coverage of some questions requiring when possible subsequent supplementary interviews focused on specific issues To compensate when possible we revisited some of the most knowledgeable interview subjects several times over the course of 3 or 4 years We tried when possible to isolate the interview subject from his colleagues during questioning to avoid murual intimidation collegial responses and contamination of data and observations We were generally successful in meeting this objective but were sometimes forced by those who helped arrange a given interview to involve them in the process When possible we would subsequently isolate the interview subject and revisit one or two key questions to validate the original response The record that follows therefore is inconsistent in level of detail and comprehensiveness despite the planning and good intentions of the researchers Imperfect as they are they nevertheless represent a unique record of information and beliefs of Cold war participants who were able to trust their former enemies sufficiently to share their thoughts and beliefs in some detail before they themselves passed into history For the convenience of the reader a list of acronyms and abbreviations appears in the appendices as well as a selective list of decision makers and analysts cited or referred to in tbe interview record J J J J ii J ' ' SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW l Subject Position J n I 1 Gen -Col Ret Varfolomei Vladimirovich Korobushin Former Deputy Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces Location Office of Vitalii Kataev Former Centra Committee Building Moscow Interviewer John G Hines Datelfime December 10 1992 Duration Approx 1 hr Language Russian Prepared by Ellis Mishulovich based on notes Note Vitalii Kataev participated in the exchange Throughout the nnd-l970s and up through the mid-1980s I fmnly believed that the U S was willing and capable of a first strike against us NATO's official stance which did not rule out this possibility only affirmed my belief that this was possible We were very much afraid of this possibility I was responsible for control systems for the Strategic Rocket Forces Because our main fear was of a U S first strike our main objective was to design a system that was capable of launching as soon as launches were detected I believe that we reached this objective J J Q Even at the theater level a A At the theater level in case of war in Europe we would have crushed NATO forces in a conventional conflict and NATO would have been forced to use nuclear weapons first Q Our relations with Europe were always very complicated In discussions with former Secretaries of Defense it was clear to me that nuclear use would have been unlikely ' ' As for our side I am deeply convinced that no one on otir side was capable of initiating a first strike A In the mid-1980s the U S held exercises in which it used three to five preventive selective nuclear strikes against the territory of the Soviet Union during an imaginary conflict in Europe This was done in order to demonstrate U S willingness to use nuclear weapons if necessary A conflict in Europe was possible We came closest to nuclear war during the Cuban crisis This was Khrushchev's adventure and I did not agree with what we did there But we in the military did our job Marshal Biriuzov the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba informed us of the decision 106 l I 1 l l J n 1 o I I I l J J Cold War Interviews Korobushin to couple our existing nuclear warheads to our missiles We had very few missiles at that time capable of reaching the U S There were some in Plesetsk But in Cuba there were around 40 missiles including 9 R-573 missiles with a 5 000 km range and carrying 1 megaton warheads According to Danilevich the missiles based in Cuba carried two type of warheads 1 8 and 4 2 megatons If it had come to war we would have wiped out Europe Mrica Israel Turkey We never planned any selective strikes vybomye udary As Grechko stated on more than one occasion we would answer with full force to any use of nuclear weapons on the part of the Americans no matter how limited We never conducted any exercises using selective strikes and I know because I participated in all our nuclear exercises I suggested to Akhromeev that we conduct exercises using limited strikes but he rejected this idea We never considered using selective strikes even in theory There were never documents or studies suggesting their use Up until the 1970s we never even considered that the Americans might use limited strikes so we did not consider how to respond to them Limited nuclear use only occurred in American exercises in 1982-85 Q What led to fears in the early 1980s that a U S attack was imminent A All U S actions pointed in this direction the deployment of more Minuteman missiles the deployment of MIRVs the deployment of the L-492 flying command centers which used the recorded voice of the president to activate launch commands These command centers began development in the early 1970s In 1977 we developed a similar but better system which could order missile launches Q Did the issuing of Presidential Directive No 59 PD-59 74 influence General Staff perceptions A Yes but your PD-59 would have been futile Right now we have a sy tem in place which would automatically launch all missiles remaining in our arsenal even if every nuclear command center and all of our leaders were destroyed This system called the Dead Hand Mertvaia Rulca would have been triggered by a combination of light radioactivity and overpressure and would cause several command rockets to be launched into orbit from where they would send launch codes to all our remaining missiles These special rockets were protected in special hardened silos with protection to 240 kg cm2 3 412 psi Thus there was no need for anyone to push a button All of our groundlaunched missiles are protected to over 100 kg cm2 1 422 psi Your missiles are not as well protected We assumed this was because they were meant to be frrst strike weapons Q What about accidental triggering by earthquakes for example A The system is not on It is to be activated only during a crisis Kataev We in the Central Committee's Defense Department considered the early 1980s to be a crisis period a pre-wartime period We organized night shifts so that there was always someone on duty in the Central Committee When Pershing ITs were deployed there appeared the question of what to do with them in case they were in If 73 Probably the missile NATO designated the SS-5 although other Soviet sow-ces identified the SS-S as the R-14 R-5 may be an abbreviated industrial designation for the same missile 74 Presid ntial Directive 59 a key White House statement on U S nuclear strategy that was discussed by knowledgeable U S government officials in the U S press - Published accounts reinforced the concept of selective use of nuclear strikes under various scenarios and suggested early targeting of Soviet leadership and command and control in the event of Soviet aggression 107 l -'1 l l l 0 n Cold War Interviews Korobushin danger of falling into Warsaw Pact hands during a war These missiles had to be launched This made them extremely destabilizing Furthermore the only possible targets of these missiles was our leadership in Moscow because Pershings could not reach most of our missiles Korobushin I offer one more piece of evidence that we had no intention of initiating a first strike In case of a conventional attack against us we always planned to destroy all our missiles and silos rather than use them to launch missiles This was standard operating procedure We had on hand mines and destruction devices which we would have emplaced in our silos if they were ever in danger of being overrun Q Were there also provisions for destroying mobile missiles in Europe Kataey after come hesitation Yes The same was planned for theater weapons Korobushin I argued with Akhromeev that because of our nuclear shield we no longer had any need for East Germany and that we needed to negotiate directly with the FRG not with the U S regarding the withdrawal of all our troops from Germany I argued that it did not matter how many men the Americans had in Europe I did not care if they increased their forces in Germany We had to get out But Akhromeev was solidly against this kind of move I Kataev Shevardnadze and the Foreign Ministry -argued that the nnmber of U S troops and our troops in Europe should not be linked However the military and the political-military leadership were against it ' Korobushin We were very afraid of the Americans If we were not afraid why would we need missiles and silos with ready times of 60 seconds Our EW s tellites were able to detect a strategic missile attack upon launch approximately 30 minutes from impact but we did not consider the attack confirmed until our radar confirmed the trajectory to target approximately 14 minutes prior to the first splash Yet our control system was so well prepared that this was more than enough time to launch a retaliatory strike even if it took the leadership over 10 minutesto make a decision It took just 13 seconds to deliver the decision from Moscow to all of the launch sites in the Soviet Union This shows that we were preparing only for a retaliatory-meeting strike otvetno-vstrechnyi udar Why else would we have spent billions of rubles to design and build such a sophisticated command and control system J if J J J J J J Q Was such a term as deterrence sden hivanie ever used in regard to strategy A Maybe among the leadership there was such a concept But speaking as a military man I have to say that all of our calculations for force building were based on the scenario of the retaliatory-meeting strike not on the idea of deterrence We calculated that a 40 - 45% destruction of the U S GDP would be enough to be considered unacceptable damage Likewise we know that the Americans calculated that 30 - 40% destruction of our GDP would be considered unacceptable Our early missile the R-4 75 was not capable of a retaliatory meetlng strike It had a ready time of 20 minutes It was only in the mid-1970s that we had acquired a generation of missiles with retaliatory-meeting capability '5 Probably the liquid-fueled designated SS-T' by NATO 108 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu