Interim Report of the Defense Science Board DSB Task Force on the Survivability of Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and other Nuclear Weapon Effects NWE Summary Report No 1 August 2011 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition Technology and Logistics Washington D C 20301-3140 Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188 Report Documentation Page Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response including the time for reviewing instructions searching existing data sources gathering and maintaining the data needed and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations and Reports 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 1204 Arlington VA 22202-4302 Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number 1 REPORT DATE 3 DATES COVERED 2 REPORT TYPE AUG 2011 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011 4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a CONTRACT NUMBER Interim Report of the Defense Science Board DSB Task Force on the Survivability of Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and other Nuclear Weapon Effects NWE 6 AUTHOR S 5b GRANT NUMBER 5c PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 5d PROJECT NUMBER 5e TASK NUMBER 5f WORK UNIT NUMBER 7 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME S AND ADDRESS ES Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition Technology and Logistics Washington DC 20301-3140 9 SPONSORING MONITORING AGENCY NAME S AND ADDRESS ES 8 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10 SPONSOR MONITOR’S ACRONYM S 11 SPONSOR MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER S 12 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release distribution unlimited 13 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 ABSTRACT 15 SUBJECT TERMS 16 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF a REPORT b ABSTRACT c THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified 17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18 NUMBER OF PAGES Same as Report SAR 17 19a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 Rev 8-98 Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 This report is a product of the Defense Science Board DSB The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense Statements opinions conclusions and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense This report is unclassified and cleared for public release OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20301–3140 10 August 2011 DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS SUBJECT Summary Report Number One of the Permanent Task Force on the Survivability of DoD Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and other Nuclear Weapon Effects I am pleased to forward the first interim report of the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on the Survivability of DoD Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and other Nuclear Weapon Effects Established both to report on progress toward meeting the EMP Commission recommendations and to conduct an ongoing independent periodic assessment the Task Force will issue periodic assessments of the Department’s progress in this area The Task Force found significant progress in the DoD’s nuclear survivability program over the previous two years I endorse the study’s findings and encourage you to review them Dr Paul G Kaminski Chairman OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20301–3140 DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD August 5 2011 MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUBJECT Summary Report No 1 of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Survivability of DoD Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and Other Nuclear Weapons Effects NWE The Permanent Task Force was established to assess the implementation of the Department of Defense Instruction DODI 3150 09 titled “Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear CBRN Survivability Policy” and to assess the effectiveness of the management oversight group established by the DoDI The Task Force also conducts periodic independent reviews and assessments of DoD's EMP survivability program and reviews other matters associated with nuclear survivability The Department of Defense nuclear survivability program has made progress over the previous two years The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Nuclear Matters is leading the implementation of DODI 3150 09 and the Military Departments are responding to their respective responsibilities The Army possesses an improved process for independent review of survivability the Air Force committed resources for testing major platforms for High Altitude EMP HEMP protection and the Navy implemented a requirements review process United States Strategic Command continued to devote resources and talent to identifying mission critical capabilities and assessing their survivability Notwithstanding the progress over the last two years operational and technical issues remain as outlined in the attached report Dr Miriam John Co-Chair Dr Joseph Braddock Co-Chair Defense Science Board DSB Task Force on the Survivability of Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and other Nuclear Weapon Effects NWE Summary Report No 1 Interim Report of the DSB Task Force Executive Summary – Findings to Date Background • • • Standing Task Force established near end of the previous administration re-approved March 2010 – Ongoing oversight recommended in the 2010 DSB “NWE National Enterprise” study – Stand-down of the EMP Commission EMPC came with Department of Defense DoD requirement for biannual report on progress toward meeting EMPC recommendations and some form of ongoing independent periodic assessment Charter – “…assess implementation of the DoD Instruction covering nuclear survivability including EMP and … assess the effectiveness of the management oversight group established by the DoD Instruction” – “… conduct an independent review and assessment of DoD's EMP survivability program and review other matters associated with nuclear survivability” Three meetings held to date July 2010 October 2010 January 2011 Progress over the past two years • • • • • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Nuclear Matters DASD NCB NM leading organized implementation of DODI 3150 09 The Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear CBRN Survivability Policy Services are responding – Army improving process for independent review of survivability – Air Force committing resources for testing major platforms for HEMP protection – Navy implementing requirements review process and developing maritime standard U S Strategic Command USSTRATCOM continuing to devote resources and talent to identifying mission critical capabilities and assessing their survivability – With DASD NCB NM oversight seen as a major influence on Services’ activities Some modest restoration of funds in National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA Survivability Campaign Department of Homeland Security DHS intent to start science and technology S T program relevant to domestic response and recovery Many areas of concern remain • • Operational – Non-concurrence by the Air Force for the new aircraft EMP standard with potential impacts on survivability requirements for new aircraft F-35 tanker next generation bomber White House platforms – Limitations of Service assessments that identify mission critical equipment instead of mission critical capabilities – Fragmentation of responsibilities and lack of priority for survivability of communications networks and command and control C2 systems – Lack of engagement of Combatant Commands COCOMs except USSTRATCOM and very recently European Command EUCOM – Limited understanding of survivability of infrastructure critical to DoD missions – Missile Defense Agency MDA has different criteria for hardening critical elements of the system Technical – Overall fragmentation of efforts - little movement to a national enterprise as recommended by two previous DSB task forces – The Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA lack of priority coupled with little progress toward a “21st century approach” augmenting above-ground simulators with advanced modeling simulation – DTRA-NNSA Memorandum of Understanding MOU implementation diverted from original intent to focus on NWE – Technical enterprise continuing to atrophy Introduction The DSB Task Force is examining the ability of DoD’s forces and critical supporting capabilities e g communications power to survive operate and succeed on in battlefields battlespaces where nuclear weapons are threatening or are being employed The most likely case s are use of nuclear weapons by others Although fratricide is the least likely case ignoring it is risky Moreover U S nuclear forces require an increased premium on reliability and survivability as further reductions occur Understanding nuclear weapons effects NWE and mitigation options is a central military-technical matter See Table 1 at the end of the report for a notional matrix of the scope of the problem and the Task Force’s assessments to date State of Forces and Their Battle Command U S strategic forces deterrence mission for which survivability is a critical requirement carries an even higher premium as force size decreases Mission success depends not only upon survivable weapon and C2 systems and host infrastructure but also on a force robust across the Doctrine Organization Training Materiel Leadership and Education Personnel and Facilities DOTMLPF spectrum to execute an assured second strike Overall the combination is judged adequate but fragile from a strategic mission perspective DOTMLPF shortfalls have surfaced and some are being corrected but forces are thin in many places U S general purpose forces GPF and their theater nuclear survivability capabilities are another matter On the positive side GPF capabilities advanced dramatically in recent years as a result of leveraging the information and electronic device revolutions in all aspects of operational concepts and their DOTMLPF underpinnings The affordability of networked information systems and improved persistence of surveillance technologies enabled previously unachievable collaboration and OPTEMPO between and among force components – small and large Service and Joint – to great effect However the ubiquitous dependence on Commercial-Off-The-Shelf COTS in almost all military and commercial systems that support military operations while a natural evolution based on cost effectiveness creates a twofold downside when considering nuclear survivability First the unknown response of virtually any basic COTS device to NWE leads to further uncertainties when inserting such devices in military systems Second relates to the testability of the commercial long distance networks that enable long range reach-back The network response to NWE is unknown and at that scale is not testable In addition understanding of the operational impacts of NWE and planning for mission success in nuclear environments have decayed The principal source of this knowledge previously resided with approximately 15 personnel specialties across the Military Departments associated with theater nuclear forces TNF during the Cold War but the elimination of TNF components was also accompanied by elimination of most of the specialties including those aspects which supported conventional force operational planning for determining how to fight through Two residual specialties remain today 1 Navy and Air Force specialists in air-delivered gravity bombs many of whom spend almost all of their time supporting conventional operations vs training for the unique aspects of nuclear missions and 2 Army Functional Area FA – 52 personnel who are unique across the Military Departments in their training knowledge about NWE and assignments in which that knowledge is applied e g survivability guidance within the Army hardening requirements nuclear targeting etc Of equal concern to the Task Force is the loss of Flag Officer General Officer awareness of how to deal with NWE In summary the survivability effectiveness and adaptation of GPF to NWE is at best unknown If GPF were subjected to a nuclear event in the foreseeable future mission execution would depend upon combinations of luck and ingenuity in workarounds for failed equipment There would almost certainly be an unnecessarily high human cost The Task Force is not arguing for hardening GPF but we do see the gap in knowledge of how vulnerable we might be and how to adapt operations through force architecture Tactics Techniques and Procedures TTPs redundancy workarounds etc as a serious and potentially show-stopping issue Oversight Numerous elements within DoD have policy and oversight responsibility in these areas Broadly speaking OSD Policy is the lead for setting nuclear related policies strategies priorities and direction The Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS is the lead for military professional development education and training responsibilities The OSD and Service acquisition community has hardware network and technical integration responsibilities and the Military Departments maintain their Title 10 responsibilities for providing capabilities to COCOMs that meet their operational requirements and priorities The recently completed Nuclear Posture Review by OSD Policy consistent with historical precedence did not address nuclear survivability except indirectly in maintaining the role of U S nuclear forces in strategic deterrence In discussions with the Task Force policy representatives note that this area is not one on the “radar screen” for conventional operations With respect to human resource and professional matters the focus in the Air Force and Navy has been on training strategic forces on NWE and EMP issues but not the GPF Only the Army G-3 U S Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency USANCA has a GPF focus for nuclear weapons effects through the FA-52 contingent in that organization Within OSD acquisition priority in DASD NCB NM has been given to implementation of the nuclear aspects of DODI 3150 09 “The Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear CBRN Survivability Policy ” Implementation progress especially in regards to EMP is reported in a required biannual report to Congress next report due September 2011 The established process advanced to the point that the Military Departments developed review processes for new or significantly modified equipment and they are defining their mission critical equipment already in operation The next step is to assess how best to understand equipment response to NWE and develop the best approach for achieving equipment survivability Cost is the major consideration The Task Force notes however that solutions for improving survivability for GPF have more options than the technical hardening required for strategic forces To first order choosing some combination of force architecture and redundancy operational concepts and TTPs and selective affordable technical hardening should form GPF component survivability strategies Analysis and gaming can be usefully employed to establish the relative value of various approaches The Task Force applauds the leadership by the DASD NCB NM As the assessment process matures both NM and the Services need to shift from identifying mission critical equipment to mission critical capabilities in order to develop the most robust and or cost effective approach es to survivability A major concern of the Task Force relates to MIL STD 3023 for aircraft survivability to EMP which has been in final coordination since the Fall 2010 Requirements are stated in terms of performance-based pass fail criteria at mission-critical interfaces The Task Force understands that Commander USSTRATCOM supports the draft standard The Navy and Army also concur with the standard The AF Aeronautical Systems Center ASC however disagreed with the standard The Center believes that the acquiring service in this case the AF should be able to tailor design margins The Task Force does not yet understand the basis for the non-concurrence but if driven all or in part by cost concerns notes that historic data indicates minimal impact for designed-in hardening vs significantly increased cost of retrofit after fielding Delaying the formal publication of MIL-STD 3023 could impact ongoing and planned Next Generation Bomber White House Military Office acquisitions of mission critical platforms The Task Force finds this situation serious as requirements have been or are being set in the programs of record and will be costly to reverse The matter is being elevated to the CBRN Survivability Oversight Group-Nuclear CSOG-N Principals who have decision authority concerning DODI 3150 09 Members of the Task Force are interested in survivability and mission success which may not equate to platform hardening but should be clearly achievable by other means We urge the CSOG-N to resolve the issue as soon as possible Technical Community Little has happened to create the national enterprise recommended in prior DSB and Threat Reduction Advisory Committee TRAC studies Technical expertise and budgets continue to decline The Task Force was extremely disappointed to learn that the MOU between DTRA and NNSA emphasized other areas when the original intent was to shore up NWE expertise to support both Departments In the meantime there are opportunities being lost For example the technical community should be exploiting tests and or upgrades planned for operational hardware as vehicles to help rebuild and enhance the supporting technology base The Task Force urged DTRA to engage in the planning for the March 2011 B-2 stealth bomber HEMP test to ensure that collected data supported code validation and development Unfortunately that did not occur Path Forward The Task Force plans to proceed in the near future as follows  Investigate the issues surrounding Air Force non-concurrence with MIL-STD 3023  Continue to systematically address elements of Table 1 with near-term emphasis on C2 commercial communications and other key elements of critical infrastructure  Assess the Military Departments’ mission critical methodologies to understand the best path or paths to move from identifying and evaluating mission critical equipment to mission critical capabilities  Pick up the charge from prior DSB and TRAC studies to “reinvent” the technology base as an interagency national enterprise based on advanced modeling and simulation tools to augment a more limited set of effects simulators available today Table 1 Summary of Findings to Date Force Elements Sectors for CI Strategic forces – Nuclear • STRATCOM assessments motivating Services and selected COCOM attention assessments remediation - Resources committed to aircraft assessments – Conventional and missile defense • Stockpile maintained design and certification of LEPs budgeted • Missiles maintained •MDA progress with ground facilities - Interceptor hardening • Planned conventional capabilities not yet addressed Critical Infrastructure • EMP Commission concerns with power CI and telecom • Progress not yet assessed General Purpose Forces • Overall CSOG-N implementation of 3150 09 shining spotlight on Survivability esp EMP - Mission critical systems being identified - Assessments to follow - Focus on individual system survivability does not guarantee mission assurance - Army process for new system requirements review being changed to allow earlier intervention in design development - AF Navy instituting new processes for requirements review C3 People Not yet Not yet addressed addressed Appendix A Terms Of Reference THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20301-3010 MAR' 0 1 2010 ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD SUBJECT Terms of Reference TOR - Defense Science Board DSB Task Force on the Survivability of DoD Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse EMP and other Nuclear Weapon Etrects You are requested to form a permanent DSB Task Force to assess all aspects of Survivability of DoD systems and assets to EMP and other nuclear weapon effects This DSB Task Force on EMP and Nuclear Survivability should build on the work of the 1 EMP Commission completed in 2008 and related DSB efforts 2 3 to assess the status and suitability of the nuclear weapon effects enterprise- regarding ionizing radiation and associated effects that are unique to nuclear weapons- to meet DoD requirements for nuclear survivability The focus of the Task Force should be to assess implementation of the DoD Instruction 4 covering nuclear survivability including EMP and to assess the effectiveness of the management oversight group established by the DoD Instruction Another task is to conduct an independent review and assessment of DoD's EMP survivability program and review other matters associated with nuclear survivability such as the first biennial DoD report to Congress 5 on EMP survivability The Task Force will be sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ATSD NCB is authorized to act upon the advice and recommendations ofthe Task Force Dr Miriam John and Dr Joe Braddock will serve as Co-Chairs of the Task Force Non-governmental Task Force Members will be appointed Special Government Employees in accordance with applicable procedures ATSD NCB will coordinate on all proposed Task Force Members and future changes to the membership list 1 Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack PL I 06-398 Title XIV Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects Test Evaluation and Simulation dated June 2005 3 Joint Defense Science Board- Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force DSB-TRAC TF on the Nuclear Weapons Effects National Enterprise with terms of reference dated November 3 2006 4 DoD 3150 09 The Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear CBRN Survivability Policy dated September 17 2008 5 Section I 048 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 The initial report is scheduled to be submitted in February 20 I 0 2 0 Colonel Michael Baehre of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA will serve as the Designated Federal Official DFO Mr John Franco also ofDTRA will serve as the alternate DFO Changes to the primary or alternate DFO will be coordinated with the ASTD NCB and DSB DFO Mr Brian Hughes and annotated by addendum to this TOR This Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of Public Law 92-463 the Federal Advisory Committee Act and DoD Directive 5105 4 the DoD Federal Advisory Committee Program It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any particular matters within the meaning oftitle 18 United States Code section 208 nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official This Task Force TOR will be renewed every two years or upon change of either of the Task Force Co-Chairs 2 Appendix B Task Force Membership Task Force Members Dr Miriam John Co-Chair Dr Joe Braddock Co-Chair GEN John “Jack” Vessey USA Ret VADM Kevin Green USN Ret Dr C Bryan Gabbard Dr Ted Hardeback Dr Bob Hermann Dr Maneck Master Dr Gordon Soper Dr Jim Tegnelia Dr Joan Woodard Executive Secretaries DFOs John Franco DTRA COL Jeffrey Musk DTRA Government Advisors LCDR Adam Samuels OPNAV N857 Mr John Maxey AF A5X Mr Nicholas Haugen Mr Bob Pfeffer Army USANCA Mr John Okuma USA ATEC Mr James McComb Mr R C Webb MDA Mr Andy Metzger USSTRATCOM J3 Dr Suzanne Strohl TRMC Mr Mike Rooney Dr Bruce Wilson DTRA NT Mr Rufus Brinn DTRA OP Mr Mark Edwards JCS J8 JRO DOT E Representative – TBD OSD NII – Mr David Dick COL Manny Aponte OSD Policy Dr Dave Crandall NNSA Mr Todd Hoover LLNL Dr Jim Lee Dr Mark Hedeman SNL Dr Sharif Heger LANL Mr Rich Vojtech Mr Anu Bowman DHS Ms Helen Mearns Ms Kari O’Dell Joint CBRO Appendix C Presentations to the Task Force Name July 15 - 16 2010 Dr Gordon Soper Dr Joan Woodard Dr Mim John Dr Joe Braddock Dr John Kuspa DASD NCB NM Dr John Kuspa DASD NCB NM Dr Suzanne Strohl TRMC Mr Mark Sward DTRA COL Jeff Musk DTRA October 12-13 2010 Hon Fred Celec COL Brent Bredehoft USANCA Mr Joe Bailey OPNAV N867 Mr Bob Bogstie AF A5X Mr Baird Eubanks MDA Ms Dee Morris CJCS J8 Mr Andy Metzger USSTRATCOM J354 Mr Kevin Cameron NNSA January 19-20 2011 Mr Brad Roberts OSD Policy Mr Mark Sward Lt Mark Demianovich E-4B SPO Maj Paul Adamson NNSA Mr John Franco DTRA Topic Congressional EMP Commission Findings and Recommendations Regarding DoD Joint DSB TRAC Task Force Findings Recommendations and Status DoD Instruction 3150 09 CBRN Survivability Implementation Status SecDef 2009 Report to Congress on EMP Survivability 2010 Strategic Plan for NWE Test Evaluation DTRA Nuclear Weapons Effects Center DTRA NNSA MOU and Joint Program Plan General Remarks Army Implementation of DoDI 3150 09 Status Navy Implementation of DoDI 3150 09 Status Air Force Implementation of DoDI 3150 09 Status Missile Defense Agency Implementation of DoDI 3150 09 Status Draft CJCSI 3175 01 Joint CBRN Survivability Integrated Nuclear Survivability Report Status Status of NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program DoD Leadership Views on Nuclear EMP Survivability Nuclear Weapons Effects Network Update E-4 HEMP Test Overview NNSA Nuclear Survivability Campaign Update Proposed DoD Nuclear Survivability Initiative Mr Mark Edwards CJCS J8 Dr John Kuspa DASD NCB NM CJCSI 3175 01 Update DoDI 3150 09 Status and Update