GJ uvrnGJ l1 ElB DfimU GBPilf EW1B l U i U B $U i B $ B W $ $ W i l1 W lBrn IlUrnl1rn D J UI1 i100 l OIL AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS ON NIGERIAN ECONOMY U ooooooooooooo ARMS CONTROL IN THE WAKE OF KAL 007 U o oooooooo 7 GOLDEN OLDIE U ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 10 RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE MBTI U oooooooo ooo o NUMEROLOGY U 1 o o o ll oo 12 THE STAFF IN TODAY'S BUREAUCRACIES U o oooooooooooo 13 THE MAGDEBURG INCIDENT U o ooooooo 18 THE POSITION OF NSA CSS IN THE US GOVERNMENT U oooooooooooooooooooo ooooooooo 22 DO YOU KNOW THE DIFFERENCE U o oooooooo 26 NSA-CROSTIC NO S4 U ooooooooo oooooooooooooooo David H wi 11 iams oooooooooo 28 THIS 90CUMJi T CO Tbl S C091SWOR9 Declassified and Approved for Release by MATISRl AfJ Sfa BSIFHiB BY NSA SSSU '123 2 B6ElfJ1'ISSIFY etl 8rigi1 l 8 iftg AgQAQY'S Q@ eFMift8Eieft ae Hirea NSA on 10-16-2012 pursuant to E o 13526 MDR Case # 54 net FeR eFFI8IA - eSB SUhY 4009898 Published by PI Techniques and Standards APRIL 1984 VOL XI No 4 Editoria' P L 86-36 PUBLISHER BOARD OF EDITORS Editor Asst Editor Product ion o Collection Computer Security 963-3045S 963-1103s 963-3369s I K 963-3961S __ ' o' I Cryptolinguistics 1 Data Systems Information Science 859-6044 963-1103s v963-4953s 1 rl - - - - - - 963-5711s Mathemat ics o o 1 68-8518s Puzzles David H Williams 963-1103s Special Research Vera R Filby 68-7119s Traffic Analysis Robert J Hanyok 8-8418s J For subscriptions send name and organization 1 to 1 Pl4 I ' To submit articles or letters by mail to PI Cryptolog via PLATFORM mail send to cryptolg at barlc05 bar-one-c-zero-five note no '0' in 'log ' p L 86-36 Contents of Cryptolog should not be reproduced or further disseminated outside the National Security Agency without the permission of the Publisher Inquiries regarding reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Editor FeR SFFI8IA - eSB SlihY aCID 4009898 FeR 8FFI8I t HSS 8NbY OLand DEVEL0PMEN Effects on Nigerian Economy u b S041 P L 86-36 I INTRODUCTION U Since 1974 the significance of petroleum has become increasingly more apparent to developed and developing nat ions alike The phenomenal rise in the international market price of crude oil which began to grow in geometric proport'ion following the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the United States has heightened the awareness on the part of individuals and nations 'of the power of oil as a political and economic weapon Industrialized and non-oil-producing developing nations suffered the shock waves of OPEC l price hikes beginning in 1974--and many have yet to recover Some oil-producing nat ions on the other hand have unt i I recently experienced the economic boom of increased national revenues and expanding international prestige U The current oil glut and resultant soft market for crude however is beginning to reverse that trend Though economic recovery is not on the horizon for many nonoil-producers as a result of the increased availability and lower prices of petroleum the opposite is true for some of the oilproducing nations The sudden decrease in oil is causing slowdowns--and in some cases stoppages--of ambitious national development plans predicated on constant or increasing oil revenues Oil- U A case in point is Nigeria Nigeria I S most significant revenue-producing resource--has in recent years become the Apr 84 Uj This paper was awarded First Prize in the 1983 Essay Contest of the International Affairs Institute backbone of that nation's economy As of mid-l982 exports of Nigerian crude oil accounted for 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings and approximately 80 percent of government revenues u oil had transformed Nigeria from a developing country whose economy was constantly in the red pre-l966 into a nation enjoying large surpluses--until lately Oil revenues have become the most significant factor in Nigeria's economy--both in the positive and in the negative sense For the trend toward ever-increasing reI iance on oil revenues to finance nat ional development plans which seemed to be a logical course of action in the mid-1970s is now confronting the vagaries of the international crude oil market making future oil revenues unpredictable at best U This paper will attempt to sketch the history of petroleum as a facet of the Nigerian economy its effects on nat ional development plans and the impact of the fluctuating international crude oil market on the implementation of Nigeria's projected development program CRYPTOLOG Page 1 F6ft BFFHHM tlBB BIiM' aCID 4009898 F8R 8FFI8Ilm gBB 8N Y of Nigeria's total exports Foreign exchange earnings from these exports continued to rise from that point on after a brief hiatus during the civil war and since 1973 oil export earnings have accounted for 90 percent of Nigeria's total export revenues 2 Much of this can be traced to the rising price of petroleum on the world market since 1974 rather than to significant increases in export volumes U As of 1981 there were approximately 140 producing oil fields both onshore and offshore Mot are located in the Niger delta region primarily in Bendel Rivers and Imo states Est imates of Nigeria's total proven reserves range from 17 5 billion to 20 billion barrels Exploration is being promoted in other parts of the country and promising new areas include the Anambra Benue Bida Lake Chad and Sokoto basins t' 'llO o _ ' ooo --- - - -- - r ' OQ ooo Ill FOREIGN OWNERSHIP II GENERAL HISTORY u Although Nigeria has been producing oil in sufficient quantity for export since 1948 and has only been a member of OPEC since 1971--interest in oil and earnest exploration efforts date back to 1937 when geological and geophysical investigations were first conducted by Shell-British Petroleum Shell-BP The search for oil in Nigeria actually began in 1908 but was abandoned shortly afterwards Efforts were revived by Shell-BP in 1937 and drilling operations commenced in 1951 Nigeria's first commercially productive oilfield was discovered in 1956 at Oloibiri in the Niger delta Production levels grew gradually and Nigeria I s first export of crude oil took place in 1958 from the newly constructed port and terminal facilities at Port Harcourt U Petroleum rapidly became Nigeria's principal and most lucrative export and by 1965 foreign exchange earnings eclipsed those from cocoa formerly its leading export commodity During the period from 1957 to the start of the Nigerian civil war 1967 176 oil deposits were identified and over 600 wells were drilled--with a success rate of nearly 70% Shell-BP's exploitation efforts focused primarily on what was formerly known as the Eastern region of Nigeria and onshore oil production grew rapidly until the civil war brought it to a virtual standstill By 1966 production had reached 20 7 million tons and petroleum exports constituted 33 percent Apr 84 U The issue of foreign ownership and hence--from the perspective of a Third World developing nation--foreign control played a part in the evolution of the oil industry in Nigeria As noted earlier Shell-BP was the dominant actor in the Nigerian oil sector both pre- and post-independence As the colonial ruling power Great Britain naturally bore the brunt of foreign investments in Nigeria and the oil industry--the showcase of the Nigerian economy--was the most prominent example of foreign domination During the 1950s ShellBP invested over $300 million in exploration wells pipelines and a refinery-- a sum that represented 85 percent of all new foreign investment during the period and exceeded the total investment in the Nigerian manufacturing industry 3 Such heavy foreign investment in the burgeoning oil sector can be viewed both positively and negatively U Surely the input of financial and technological resources in the early developmental stages helped to create an oil industry which is today a major factor in Nigeria I s rapid development The combination of Nigeria's precious natural resource and Britain's infusion of capital and technology formed a viable productive industry which has helped to pave the way toward modernization of the Nigerian state U On the other hand the growth of nationalism in Nigeria--and its emergence as a political factor after 1960--led to a sense of foreign domination of the nation's economy The oil boom of the 1950s and 1960s left the Nigerian economy even more dependent on outside control than it had been before this CRYPTOLOG Page 2 aCID 4009898 period that FeR eFFfefl John Hatch goes so far as to state Oil revenues played an important part in the conflict leading to the civil war it seemed probable that the Nigerian government would become increasingly dependent on the revenues gained from the oi 1 companies with all the consequences to national economic policy 4 U By 1971 Nigeria was the world's seventh largest producer of petroleum In that year the nation joined OPEC At the risk of oversimplification these factors--growing nationalism rising production and revenues and association with other oil-producing nations in a commodity cartel--converged after a divisive civil war and resulted in the beginning of a Nigerian takeover of the oil industry IV INDIGENIZATION U After its bloody civil war the Nigerian government as part of its consolidation and rebuilding efforts announced its desire to take over a controlling interest in the operations of the petroleum-producing companies in Nigeria 5 The manner in which this was accomplished in no way resembled the abrupt nat ionalizat ions which occurred in some of the other Third World nations endowed with marketable natural resources but rather was an expression of Nigeria's recognition of its own mineral wealth and its intention to exercise more control over its own natural resources U After the establishment of the Nigerian National Oil Company NNOC in 1971 and in a relatively orderly process of indigenization the Nigerian government began in 197374 to negotiate the gradual purchase of majority interest in the foreign oil companies In 1977 the NNOC was replaced by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NNPC which was granted broader powers regarding commercial activities in the petroleum sector By mid1979 NNPC had increased its holdings to 60 percent of all foreign oil operations U The only actual instance of nationalization of a foreign oil company took place in 1979 As a result of Nigeria's belief that Shell-BP was supplying crude oil by subterfuge to South Africa in total contravention of Nigeria's stand against all dealings by international firms with that country 6 NNPC nationalized BP's 20 percent share of the producing organization and its 40 percent equity in the joint NNPC-BP marketing organization Arrangements were later made to compensate BP however and other oil companies Apr 84 eSB 6NbJPY were assured that this action did not presage a wave of nationalizations as long as the companies respected Nigerian policies and sensitivities 7 U Thus despite one case of nationalization which from the Nigerian perspective was politically justified Nigeria peacefully regained control of its oil resources avoiding the trauma and potential loss of technological and marketing expertise which could have occurred if more dramatic measures had been taken V ROLE OF OIL IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING D Economic planning is not a recent phenomenon in Nigeria though the effects of oil revenues on national plans are relatively new Structured economic planning has a long history in Nigeria The first 10-year development plan was adopted in 1946 and was supplanted in 1955 by a British-devised program which addressed each of Nigeria's then three regions separately In 1960 the new independent Nigerian government inherited the colonial plan deemed it fragmented and inappropriate and replaced it in 1962 with the First National Development Plan 1962-68 Some large government-sponsored projects were completed under this program including the country's first oil refinery paper and sugar mills and the Kainji Dam and hydroelectric station but government revenues were at this point largely unaffected by the still-nascent oil indus try D The Second National Development Plan 1970-74 was geared to the reconstruction of war-torn Nigeria Despite some government investment major setbacks in agricultural production during the first half of this planning period decreased output and caused the beginning of what are now chronic food deficits The Second Plan was extended to cover FY 1974-75 during which time the monumental rise in world oil prices filled the Nigerian coffers U The nation's sudden increased wealth translated in the Third National Development Plan 1975-80 into a grandiose blueprint for accelerated national growth The Third Plan set public investment levels at 26 5 billion c $40 3 billion eleven times greater than the government's actual capital expenditures on the Second Plan The focus of development spending was on transportation heavy industry and education Agricultural expenditures were increased but they were still inadequate to reinvigorate the sector Among the successes of the Third Plan were an increase in cement-producing capacity two new oil CRYPTOLOG 10ft 01preIAL 8 Page 3 OHLf 4009898 C A MER Ii - Nige ia -' t' t' L __ C 100 o - -1 'I1 i _ - State boundary NatIonal capItal Stete capital ' f __o o __ Railroad haro-surt lced toad 50MJ'es refineries port construction and expansion new airports power-generating facilities and new industrial facilities VI FOURTH CURRENT DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1981-84 Despite the fact that oil revenues had begun to decline before the conclusion of the Third Plan and that resource restraints postponed some programmed expenditures and curtailed others Nigerian government officials expected to move deferred projects into the Fourth Development Plan As recently as April 1982 the American Embassy in Lagos 8 outlined the major components of the Fourth Plan which includes U Expanded agricultural development Agribusiness manufacturing and infrastructure projects A multibillion-dollar new federal capital project at Abuja Apr 84 Construction of 2 000 housing units annually in each state of the federation Electricity generation transmission and distribution facilities and Federal medical centers in six states U This expansive program is already running into difficulty as a result of the reduction in worldwide demand for oil which had caused Nigerian foreign exchange reserves to fall to an estimated $4 billion by early 1982 Clearly the continued slide of crude oil prices decreased production production levels will demand at least deferral of many of Nigeria's economic and infrastructure development projects U Indications that the Fourth Plan will not be met began to appear in late 1982 when budget proposals for 1983 first became known 'l Inloro onal bounda'y 100 '150 jo lOfTI '''''S -L-_ I r----- v 0 0 N VII EFFECTS OF SLOWDOWN IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET U The glut of oil on the international market in the early 1980s was countered to a degree by OPEC's decision to impose production CRYPTOLOG Page 4 FeR eFFI8I BSH 8NhJPY aCID 4009898 FeR eFFISlh ijSS ceilings on member nations in an attempt to tighten availability and thereby prop up slacking oil prices Nations such as Nigeria reluctantly agreed reasoning that this mov e would result in smaller revenue losses than would occur if production levels were maintained and prices pl JlDllleted OPEC's efforts were undercut somewhat however by the nonOPEC oil-producing nations e g Mexico Great Britain Norway and world oil prices continued their gradual decline U The effects on Nigeria's economy in general and on its infrastructure and industrial plans in particular can be seen most clearly in the nation's budget statistics for 1982 and 1983 9 The 1983 budget presented to the Nigerian National Assembly will be K9 3 billion c $13 5 billion 20 percent lower than the figure presented in the previous year's budget projections Of this figure projected oil income will represent only about 59 percent of the nation's total revenues In the years 1973-80 oil revenues accounted for 80 percent of government revenues IO U At the same time President presented the 1983 budget proposal he ted to the National Assembly revised for 1982 which reflected a 37 percent oil income by 1982 Shagari submitfigures drop in U More than a third of Nigeria's budget covers recurrent expenditures which would be difficult to trim Significant shifts will occur in order to accommodate reduced revenues and in the more flexible capital portion of the national budget heavy reliance will be placed on foreign borrowing c $5 5 billion In view of Nigeria's current international current international debt of $15 billion ll the nation's borrowing plans are optimistic U Nigeria's proposed 1983 capital expenditures represent only a 5 percent decrease from 1982 levels despite an estimated oil revenue shortfall of 21 percent since 1981 The effects of reduced oil revenues on infrastructure and economic development plans are compounded by a projected threefold increase in defense spending for 1983 Although capital expenditures for agricultural projects in general will increase slightly funding for the Nigerian Industrial Development ank was cut by almost 80 percent the allocations for the Sunti sugar project has been reduced 70 percent from the 1982 level and the government's scheme to finance small-scale industries will be cut to less than 20 percent of its 1982 budget allocation U Not all infrastructure expansion plans will suffer budget reductions The transportation sector will investments for land water and air transport systems but the 22 Apr 84 eN JPY percent increase in this sector will be at the expense of other sectors of the economy health education housing Capital investments in the energy sector will also increase but will focus on the development of the petrochemical industry and expansion of the Port Harcourt refinery as opposed to investments in explorat ion and transport In conjunction with this emphasis the Nigerian government expects to achieve a significant increase 80 percent in income from NNPC direct sales to oil lifted by the producing companies indicating a planned move to cut supplies available to the producing companies and to increase NNPC's international marketing efforts VIII OUTLOOK U In view of the trend toward almost total reliance on foreign exchange earnings from oil to finance its national development plans--and a simultaneous neglect of its agricultural sector--Nigeria must now hope for a quick turnaround of the international oil market in order to fulfill its dreams of modernization Government and industry analysts do not predict a firming up of the market in the immediate future however and according to the US State Department's assessment Even assuming a pick-up in oil production the country still faces an estimated US $6 billion in short-term trade arrears to payoff long-term debt servicing on the order of US $2 billion per year and an annual food import bill of perhaps US $1 5 billion In short unless Nigeria's oi 1 revenues increase to the US $8-10 billion range there will be little discretionary income available for major new development projects and the purchase of raw materials and spare parts for industry will be constrained 12 U Based on both the negative prospects for a rapid recovery of the international oil market and the improbability of Nigerian success in the world's capital markets the likelihood that the Fourth National Development Plan's goals will be met is minimal For it is estimated that even if oil revenues increase they wi 11 not again reach the peak levels registered in 1979-80 making deferment of major portions of the Fourth Plan necessary Many of the projects listed in the Plan have already been slowed down or suspended so that the scarce financial resources can be applied to the servicing of existing debts CRYPTOLOG FeR eFFi8Ikb eSB Page 5 eN 1 4009898 U For the short term the pace of economic development in Nigeria will depend on the rate of recovery from the nation's standpoint of the international oil market and the willingness of banks and international lending institutions to extend their risks through further investment in the Nigerian economy As the US Embassy Lagos states The Nigerian economy is presently severely depressed and may experience significant changes Nigeria's almost total dependence on oil as a source of income makes the country extremely vulnerable to shifts in world crude markets The currently unsettled situation in those markets coupled with Nigeria's precarious foreign reserves position and the tightness of world financial markets make the market prospect for Nigeria bleak in the short term 13 NOTES 1 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries a l3-member cartel of oilproducing nations established in 1960 Provis ional value figures for Nigerian exports for 1979 totaled some 10 7 billion Of that total petroleum export values accounted of 10 2 billion Harold D Nelson ed Nigeria A Coun 2 Study 4th ed Washington DC American University Foreign Area Studies Division 1982 p 294 Exact currency conversion rates for the naira M for 1979 are not available As of 1983 however 1 US $1 45 At that rate 1979 oil export values were over US $14 7 billion State Department cable Lagos 11731-82 171446Z Nov 82 John Hatch Nigeria The Seeds of Disaster Chicago HenryRegnery Company 1970 p 269 Ibid pp 269-270 Although Shell-BP dominated the field other international firms were active in oil exploration and exploitation efforts in Nigeria from 1965 onward For exampie offshore explorat ion in the Okan field was undertaken by the Nigerian Gulf Oil Company in 1965 French Italian and other US firms were also active in commercial exploitation See Nelson op cit NIgeria Country Study p 166 Ibid p 167 For a more detailed description of all the elements of the Fourth National Development Plan see the State Department cables Lagos 02990-82 070740Z Apr 82 and Lagos 02596-83 011719Z Mar 83 A detailed account of the Federal Government of Nigeria's 1983 budget proposal is contained in State Department cable Lagos 11731-82 17l446Z Nov 82 U As of February 1984 Nigeria was producing 1 6 million barrels per day bid of oil which is 300 000 bid over its OPEC quota This excess production was being permitted informally by OPEC in order to help Nigeria with its massive debt problem and its severe foreign exchange deficit It appears that the new government will agldn fall into the trap of reliance on oil production revenues to repay debts The Washington Post May 15 1983 p Fl col 1 -State Department cable Lagos 02596-83 011739Z Mar 83 ibid 2 3 4 5 IX CONCLUSIONS U The main conclusion which must be drawn from the foregoing is that despite thwarted attempts at industrial diversification Nigeria is still overly reliant on oil--an unstable and uncontrollable revenue source--for development financing It is likely that Lagos will weather the current storm albeit through austerity measures and deferment of development goals but longer-term economic planning for Nigeria must take a decided shift away from dependence on a single source of government revenues U At the same time a more concerted effort must be launched to revitalize the country's agricultural sector Heavy imports of foodstuffs cont inue to drain the nat ion's reserves while a once agriculturally rich country expends billions of dollars to feed its populace Nigeria must redouble its efforts even during this current period of reduced revenues to improve agricultural productivity Achieveme t of self-sufficiency in this sector could ease the strain on financial resources and improve the overall balance-ofpayments ledger for Nigeria U In all it appears that austerity measures will alleviate the short-term financial crlS1S in Nigeria but an overhaul of the nat ion's economic planning apparatus will be needed to ensure attainment of future national development goals 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page 6 paR apPlelkb eSB aNbY 4009898 SSsa13'F speRE THE BEST HOPE STILL A U grin s I walked into my office one morning shortly after the shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007 one of my coworkers an army sergeant first class looked at me with a devilish U What do you think of the Soviets now he asked gleam in his eyes U I sighed heavily but said nothing I knew what he meant The shootdown was a defenseless act and in his eyes I am a staunch defender of the Soviet Union After all hadn't I been the one who suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union is not responsible for all the acts of terrorism in the world That maybe the United States is not altogether blameless in the ever-escalating arms race Hadn't I also intimated that the Soviet Union may not be an evil empire but rather simply a cultural and political system alien to our own That peace between our nations through negotiations though a long and arduous task might be possible Yes I had suggested each of these And now by one act the Soviets had proven that I was wrong Their crime against humanity was the final piece of evidence that would convict them of being in the final analysis a malevolent aggressor whose only interest is to amass power and territory regardless of the human cost My helpless silence seemed to satisfy the sergeant and the subject was dropped U Since then I have often considered this widely-held interpretation Was the shoot down a calculated act by the Soviet government Was it so reprehensible that all attempts at negotiating an end to the arms race and erstwhile cold war should be stopped We Apr 84 may never know the answer to the first question but the answer to the second is an emphatic No U Arms control is like a living breathing organism It is the resul t of a long painful birth during the late 1960s and early 1970s It has lived a very precarious life since then almost constantly on the brink as the Soviets have attempted to strangle it to death at various times whi Ie the US has simply hoped that it will die of neglect U It was of course the United States which initiated arms control over two decades ago The Hot 1ine agreement and the Lim ted Test Ban Treaty of 1963 were the first formal accords between the two superpowers The US initiated them not for idealistic purposes but for pragmatic purposes international security was becoming increasingly unstable due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and own survival was at stake The Soviet Union was equally pragmatic accepting the accords as favorable to their own national interests It would hardly be fair of us after all to expect them not to be predominantly concerned about themselves This does not threaten our interests but is merely business as usual in political exchange In 1967 President Johnson proposed a ban on ABM systems and the idea was summarily dismissed by Alexei Kosygin Five years later however a treaty limiting ABMs was incorporated into the SALT I agreements Thus had Soviet interests changed And so does the arms control process continue on both sides So negotiations have continued as negotiations will continue at a snail's pace changing only as perceived interests change But the payoff began with the ratification of SALT 1 CRYPTOLOG SSSiHS'f SPQKS Page 7 aCID 4009898 SKSBiT U In 1972 an arms control contract was signed by our two nations the importance of which far exceeds the word of the agreements Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev did not only commit their nations to certain counting rules concerning nuclear missiles when the si ed the SALT I Treaty but they agreed to enter into a cooperative relationship to reduce the threat of world destruction The relationship exists to this day For even as the Soviets propagandi2 e their opposition to the United States and President Reagan rails against the evil empire each side is careful to protect that relationship for fear of what might result if the contract is broken Robert Kaiser of The Washington Post wrote in June 1983 that that contract is the reat measure of the danger of Soviet-American relations and despite the temperature of public rhetoric o As long as it holds we are not reverting to the bad old days no matter what the atmospherics are like That is why despite the absence of a legal treaty the conditions of the SALT II agreements are observed by both sides S PQ K munity When we have accompl ished this we will have reached a milestone toward world peace In the meantime we all benefit from the fruits of arms control CU But still we are confronted with the stark reality of Soviet foreign policy which even to a discerning eye is the world's most aggressive The invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were defensible from a Soviet viewpoint if hard to swallow for Americans whose ideals include the right of a people to choose their government The Afghanistan invasion was more tenuous harder to justify even from the Kremlin but so far clearly a less successful one for them than previous incursions CU There is no reasonable defense however nor is one forthcoming from Moscow for the shootdown last summer of a commercial airliner The plane full of spies story is hardly reasonable Even the fac ts are sketchy U So who benefits from this contractual relationship Many people express concern that the contract favors the Soviet Union In riegotiations the US seems to make concessions while the Soviets give up little The Soviets continue to reject our proposals make few realistic proposals of their own and yet keep us on the defensive at the negotiating table Why is this so It is so because the Soviet nature by its very nature is a manipulative one And as maddening as that is for us to deal with therein lies the road to agreement We are people from antithetical systems Friendship may be impossible So be it Distrust is a two-way street and just as we find their system incomprehensible so do they find ours Patt Derian Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights in the Carter Administration wrote in The Washington Post on June 9 1983 The longer both sides believe they are dealing with madmen the likelier one will choose to go down fighting U By making an attempt to understand Russian history and culture however we can see that there is ample reason for their xenophobic paranoia Our own political history and ideology on the other hand demonstrate that we can afford magnanimity We can afford to be more flexible than the Soviets Indeed we can't afford not to be since they will not be If we are serious about arms control we must accept this role In the process we will hope not to change their ways --which is a naive goal--but rather to draw them our of their paranoiac shell and into the world com- Apr 84 U At about 3 00 a m local time on 31 August 1983 Korean Airlines flight -007 had for some still unknown reason flown off course over the North Pacific Ocean near the USSR while flying from Anchorage Alaska to Seoul South Korea It flew into Soviet airspace passing over the Kamchatka Peninsula When it did that it was in violation of international rules of law and aviation Soviet fighter aircraft in the area did not intercept the 747 again for unknown reasons The airliner proceeded on a southwesterly course over the sea of Okhotsk until it reached Sakhalin Island where Soviet fighters reacted to it intercepted it and shot it down The 747 fell into the Sea of Japan and 269 people were CRYPTOLOG iiSBiT SP8til Page 8 OCI dead The world still wonders how tragedy could have happened such a by abandoning all prospects for arms control If nothing else let this tragedy awake us to what is really at stake Although our nations as they exist today may never be able to live together completely free from discord the opportunity to reduce the mutual feeling of threat between US and to bring security to the world through negotiation of our crucial common interest in arms control is still the best hope for world peace Subject Article request P L To cryptol g at bar 1c05 EO 1 4 P L 86-36 c 86-36 I fH Ny name is rand I'm the edital' of F88's PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER Our Professional Association is basically a chapter a f the Agency's Call ecti on Association and made up of the collectors and other personnel I just read your December 1983 issue of the CRYP OLOG and would like our ermission to i cl de I in 1 our June issue fft-'Our PROFESSIONAL ASSaCIA TION NEWSLETTER is relatively new and since F88 has a rather small field pardon the expression to draw on articles can be hard to come by We've published one issue March this year and plan one for June U That night 269 people died I t was l tragedy but equally tragic is the fact that U Thank you for any assistance you can many people believe that all hopes for arms provide control and world peace died also died tha L 86- 3 0 night Many Americans are now prepared t O 1 4 c abandon our attempts to deal peacefully with the Soviets but deal with them we must Regards Although our initial reaction to the shootdown was rightly one of horror and outrage we cannot allow the deaths of the 269 to be in vain Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page 9 P L 86-36 aCID 4009898 U OW it is very much to the interest of the cryptanalysts to learn the personal habits of the encoders A division in the Chemin des Dames sector in 1918 made it a practice to require of the regiments in the line a brief report every morning Frequently the report was drawn up in this form Night calm nothing to report When the code book was changed the routine practices did not change and the same text was the subject of numerous messages which could be classified thanks to their being encoded in exactly the same way The capture of even an obsolete code book enabled the enemy to read cryptograms belonging to this daily series which were repeated and even if these were dated some time back this helped the specialists to make a hypothesis as to the meaning of groups in messages of a similar style transmitted under similar conditions and encoded with the new code book Now almost always the great difficulty in studying code is the identification of a few first groups This is what is called finding an entrance or getting a start With an entrance effected and a thousand groups a number quickly acquired on the front during the last war the cryptanalysts are full of hope in the success of their task We have not found any statistics as to the number of telegrams in code collected in one day but the days at the beginning of the war or during the attacks of 1918 when the posts of the major units furnished us 60 messages are not rare and many of these telegrams have more than 20 groups What is to be said then of the transmissions of the small units N The repetitions of formulas composed of the same words placed in the texts at places known to cryptanalysts is therefore especially favorable for the latter in case the code book is changed These are the formulas which have been called stereotyped We must include there in the forms I have the honor to o short telegrams acknowledging receipt of communications or requesting repetition of untranslatable undecipherable telegrams references such as in continuation of telegram in reply to to follow too numerous indications of punctuation such as Apr 84 This is an extract from Problems of Code blj Colonel Marcel Givierge French Armlj which first appeared in the Signal Corps Bulletin No 34 May 1926 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 3 end of message grammatical indicat ions such as three large plural man plural etc We have taken here as the subject of the article only field cryptograms but it is known that the code sect ion has always had good success in decoding diplomatic matter in which among others distinction was achieved by Captain Bassi res and the reserve interpreter D jardino o The studies in this branch were especially aided at the beginning by long service designations at the head of telegrams and by final formulas indicating the office of origin The numbering was the basis of hypothesis which made possible the long-sought entrance into the first German code reconstructed--that for communications with submarines and alternations of numbers in clear and numbers in code assumed to be such because the text had no number in clear at that time served as a point of departure of another code ooo We have shown the danger of stereotyped formulas Without using any formula of this kind however the text of telegrams contains numerous repetitions We are not speaking only of frequent words prepositions or auxiliary verbs for which various equivalents may be assigned in the code book enabling us to employ now one group and now another but of names of places of units etc which in the course of an action will recur frequently in the dispatches Encoded ordinarily by words or by syllables these terms give rise to repetitions of groups which attract the attention of the cryptanalyst The latter compares these series of groups of names on which it is poss ib1e to build hypotheses In may cases he secures in this way means of cross reference--for example syllables common to several names appear in each series of groups He then possesses an entering wedge CRYPTOLOG BR B ISI Page 10 Y6H 8NbY aCID 4009898 P L I Iserit Di the following brief admonitory comment on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator the personality inventory described in the November 1983 issue of CRYPTOLOG I must admit that I have reservations about the broad application of the MBTl to management I believe it reveals more about a person's private side than an employer needs to know It also could be dangerous in the wrong hands P L While I agree with Mary that working with highly compatible people is pleasant it leads to a very narrow mindset called 'group think ' This can result in waste when the same old ideas solutions are used repeatedly without questioning or searching for other possible alternatives because 'the group thinks it's a great idea ' I think everyone and every group needs a devil's advocate to spark creativity 86-36 I a ppre i te the interesting and provocative questionsl I has raised and the opportunity for further discussion of some points that were probably misleading in my article I certainly agree wholeheartedly that every tool can be misused in fact every tool inevitably WILL be misused by a number of sh rtsighted businessmen and administrators trying to take ruthless shortcuts to profits or trying to pare down their budgets I feel however that the MBTI is considerably LESS likely to be abused in truly destructive ways than most other psychological instruments already current in both the private and public sectors It is poss ib Ie that a company might Apr 84 FSR decide that it wanted only ENTJs at the upper management levels ESFJs at middle and lower levels and INTJs in the Accounting Department for example Instead of using the test as an INDICATOR to give them data to be factored in with other data hom interviews resumes their own experience etc the hiring decisionmakers in this hypothetical company might set up cutoff scores on the four type dimensions and refuse to hire anyone lacking the requisite patterns at or above those scoring levels That would be an abuse of the MBTI and a highly stupid one Many companies have done just this with other tests using them as rigid filters to rule out applicants scoring below a cutoff point on some supposedly desirable attribute or above a cutoff on some supposedly undesirable one Unfortunately that kind of approach is an en7 during temptation to human nature since it looks 1 ike a shortcut to efficiency It will be with us throughout o r stay on this planet No tool or instrument that provides a score can be protected from that kind of unimaginative brutal misuse The MBTI is I suspect a bit less 1 ikely to be used this way because it does not score substantive attributes such as specific job-related knowledge or skins P L 86-36 I The point Iraises about group think 1S a very 1nteresting one I believe that I may have misled some readers by my emphasis on the exercise we had at our seminar where we were spl it into gr'oups with similar types to perform a small task This made a tremendous impression on me and I enjoyed it immensely so I may have made it sound more CRYPTOLOG SFFlel 86-36 YSK Page 11 8H JPY F8R 8FFrSi M YSB 8fl15Y important than it was I certainly didn't mean o imply that our instructor at the seminar was recommending that people of similar type must always work together in segregated groups In fact that's just the opposite of the thrust behind all the work of the MBTI's developers The idea of the MBTI as I understand it is to learn about your own type with its strengths and weaknesses and to relate that insight to knowledge of other people's types so that you can work well with all kinds and make the most of any mix you are in A good manager should be able to use his understanding of all the types in his team in creative and constructive ways Among those ways might very well be the seeding of task groups with carefully chosen devil's advocates just asJ Isuggests The MBTI can provide some valuable insights to help the manager choose the right person to stir up a particular group and spark their creativity Our homogeneous groups at the seminar were just a device to demonstrate the nature of the types to us Even at that they were chosen to equate only two of the four type letters my group were SJs leaving two other dimensions free for wide variation I think it is quite possible as I write this that I enjoyed working in such a homogeneous group because of my own type which tends to like sameness safety structure and predictability Others at the' seminar in other groups for instance SPs might have found the experience frustrating and stultifying because they are more likely to enjoy variety social challenge and surprises The MBTI allows us to define and study these differences so that we can appreciate them and use them constructively I I I I I 3 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 o 9 5 4 6 I I P L N-U-M-E-R-O-L-O-G-Y A Quiz 86-36 U pses Here are some numbers graven in the memory bank of every goodcryppie How many can you recognize To cryptolg at bar1c05 U In connection with that poem about the six servil q mea which you printed in connection with article in the January 1984 issue of Cryptolog I thought you might be interested in this sequel which I wrote to that verSe I I have a seventh serving man Who taught me quite a lot The buddy of those other six Is simply named WWhy Not W signed Hudguard Stripling P L a 17 576 b 101 405 850 c 288 000 d 5 008 e 15 600 f 676 g 11 881 376 h 32 768 86-36 Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page FQR 8FFrSi M YSB Sf bY 12 aCID 4009898 ' OK OPPlell b 888 EllfbY F J P L T I INTRODUCTION he bureaucratic institutions of government are growing larger and U more influential with each passing year This growth is seemingly independent of the political affiliation of the incumbent administration It has shown resiliency to attacks directed at reducing government size and regulation In our discussion of the role of the staff in today's bureaucracies we will not attempt to debate whether growth and influence are desirable Suffice it to say that if these factors continue to increase it becomes all the more important to understand how and why bureaucracies function This paper will deal with one important aspect of the bureaucratic structure the staff 11 STAFF FUNCTIONS U The functions of the staff are both essential and diverse In many instances the staff is the glue that holds large organizations together Staffs get involved in a wide range of activities including coordination and liaison information dissemination and filtering and decision recommendations They will sometimes also serve as a repository for expertise which it might otherwise be impractical to allocate separately to line organizations Apr 84 86-36 A Coordination and Liaison These activities are critical to the smooth operation and interaction of the various departments within the bureaucracy and also to successful interface with outside organizations The staff will coordinate policy and standards and ensure that the separate ac tivi ties of two or more departments are directed toward achievement of the overall corporate goals Disagreements or misunderstandings between departments are often not resolvable in headto-head confrontations A staff organization however can often act as a sounding board or as an honest broker to resolve differences and get operations back on track A Staff is many times the ideal focal point for liaison with other organizations outside the bureaucracy In the Defense Department for example the various intelligence agencies must coordinate their activities to achieve the best results with optimum use of resources In accomplishing this it is usually the staff organizations serving as focal points in the various agencies that will carry out the lia ison func t ions fi rs t It is there that decisions are made to which agency elements are most likely to contribute Appropriate internal directives are issued and the tasks are undertaken B Information Dissemination and Filtering Staffs serve as a point of dissemination for information flowing from the chief execut ive to the 1ine organizat ions When there are policy changes or specific tasks to be assigned i t is often left to the staff to choose the correct dis tribut ion or ident ify specific department that will carry out the tasks CRYPTOLOG Page 13 F9R 9FFIEli 'd USIii 9tlisJPY 4009898 FQR QFFlSll U This information flow also works in the other direction The executive's staff also filters information passing across his desk The information generated today in the form of memoranda reports special studies etc is tremendous For a chief executive to read all such data would be both time-consuming and impractical I t is the function of the staff then to assimilate the information and pass to the executive only those items deemed to have some impact on or interest to the organization C Decision Recommendations One of the prime functions of the staff is to make decision recommendations to the executive In this role the staff gathers the appropriate facts establishes possible courses of action and recommends the route or routes deemed most desirable D Repository of Expertise To more effectively use scarce resources the staff offers a very good centralized location for personnel with special skills Where it may be impractical to assign a separate person to each department requiring such skills ass ignment to the staff makes the skilled individual available to all departments An example is in the area of special mathematical or engineering support Selected departments may not be able to justify the full-time employment of a person with these skills however the skills of one such person assigned to a staff could be accessed by all departments as required YS QN JPY U All of the above staff act1v1t1es are important to any organization be it a one-man enterprise or a large bureaucracy Often in a small business these functions are not assigned to a separate staff but are accomplished by the owner or manager In a bureaucracy with wide-ranging interests and responsibilities it is often more efficient to pool these functions together into an organization the staff which can develop high proficiency in these tasks This practice also releases line organizations to do the essential business with which the particular bureaucracy is charged As a final note on the functions of staff organizations the following par graphs condensed from a University of Utah article provide valuable insight into the ultimate goal of the staff to present the execut ive with completed staff recommendations Completed staff work is the study of a problem and the presentation of a solution by a staff employee in such form that all that remains to be done on the part of the executive is to indicate his approval or disapproval of the completed action The words completed act ion are emphasized because the more difficult the problem is the more the tendency is to present the problem to the executive in 'piecemeal fashion It is a staff member's duty to work out details no matter how perplexing they may be The product whether it involves new policy or affects an established one should when presented to the executivefor approval or disapproval be worked out in the finished form The impulse which often comes to the inexperienced staff member to ask the executive what to do recurs more often when the problem is difficult It is accompanied by a feeling of mental frustration It is so easy to ask the executive what to do and it appears so easy for him to answer The staff member must resist that impulse but will succumb to it if he does not know his job The staff must advise the executive what he ought to do not ask him for guidance HE NEEDS ANSWERS NOT QUESTIONS The staffer must study write restudy and rewrite until what has evolved is a single proposed action--the best one of all he has considered The executive merely approves or disapproves Al ternate courses of action are desirable in many cases and should be so presented But the staff should state its recommendation as to which course of action is thought best II He I s doing a staft study Writ ing a memorandum to the execut ive does not constitute completed staff work Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page 14 4009898 JPYQR QJPYJPYIGIM eSB SllbY but writing memoranda for the executive to send to someone else does Staff views should be placed before him 1 n finished form so that he can make them his views simply by signing his name The statement should be submitted with supporting documents as appropriate If the proper result is reached the executive will usually recognize it at once If he wants comment or explanation he will ask for it --- --- The completed staff work theory may result in more work for the staff employee but it results in more freedom for the executive This is as it should be Further it accomplished two things The executive is protected from halfbaked ideas voluminous memoranda and immature oral presentations and The staff employee who has an idea to sell is enabled more readily to find a market 1 III EVOLUTION OF STAFF STRUCTURES U Staff organizations have been with us practically since the dawn of history Ever since the first leader attracted a group of followers staff men were counted on to provide advice act as messengers and serve as a buffer between the leader and his flock U Today's concept of the staff organizationin both business and government has evolved out of the complexities of modern large-scale cooperat ive effort Those businesses without staff functions are adequate only as long as an organization is small enough so that its leaders can give it effective direction and control For example in a small organization the chief executive may also serve as the production manager financial manager procurement agent personnel director etc With growth howev r the organization faces problems and pressures of increasing difficulty The need for specialists becomes increasingly important nates those functions in which he has little interest or lesser abilities It makes possible the introduction of specialists who extract from the line functions certain difficult tasks and responsibilities requiring highly developed skills and knowledge U Staffs in business and government are often formed with one or both of two types of individuals the staff assistant and the staff specialist The staff assistant's relationship with other organizational elements is often a difficult one It presents possibilities of ambiguity as to the decision-making authority between the executive and his assistant This kind of assistant is usually not a specialist in the strict sense although the appointing executive usually seeks a person with the interests abilities special training or experience needed for the performance of functions to be delegated Such a staff member performs the work subject to the approval and support of his chief without formal authority to command the actions of others He does not act independently of his superior and his work is done in the name of that superior Often this leads to the implicat ion of authority on the part of the assistant that he does not actually have or to the acquisition of authority that the executive never intended to delegate U The staff specialist is perhaps the more common role of the two Such specialists work very closely with line organizations and are specifically tasked to support them Specialists may provide assistance in the areas of finance personnel engineering procurement etc Since their supporting roles dir ectly relate to line organizations there is usually no great area of authority or control to contend with U One method of building specialists into the organization is by applying the concepts of staff structure and authority For example an executive staff may be created which will allow the executive to divide major responsibilities so that his control over the activities of the organization is direct yet will permit him to turn over to his subordiApr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page 15 JPYQR QFFHJIMJ 186 eUbY 4009898 'OK OPPIGIHL St ONLi in daily contacts than most line or other staff personnel The functions of the assistants were to reduce the pressure on the Secretary to evaluate each matter in the light of all its relationships departmental functions and overall policy and to determine the merits of each case and pass it on to the Secretary with a recommendation for action The four assistants could themselves virtually determine courses of action Ordinarily they decided who should see the Secretary and what matters did not warrant his attention IV LINE AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS U According to the Dimocks' text on Publie Administration generally speaking line connotes action and staff advice line is hierarchical '''staff'' collateral line is authority staff influence A bureau chief is a line official his research assistant is a staff officer What the correct relationships should be between the two types of activity has long been a matter of debate to the point where students of the subject have come to believe that the right adjustment between line and staff constitutes one of the difficult areas of management 2 U Theorists are agreed on the fact that as an organization grows in size and complexity problems of planning and coordination also grow not only vertically but horizontally Operating executives need the help of staff officials to assist in planning objectives developing programs and effecting coordination The main problem is how to organize this relationship U In studies of the US Department of Agriculture conducted by Gaus and Wolcott and also by Paul Appleby it was revealed that this particular department placed substantial power in the hands of staff officials By necessity most if not all line matters directed to the Secretary of Agriculture had to be cleared through his general staff There were insufficient hours in the day to permit the Secretary to give adequate attention to all or even the most important questions U Within the general staff probably the most important positions were those of the four assistants to the Secretary They occupied his outer office and were closer to him Apr 84 u The four assistants had to be generalists in order to be able to translate the narrow specialized thinking and action into broader terms that helped the Secretary discharge his leadership function within the Department and as a member of the President's Cabinet In his study of the staff functions Appleby agreed that the first requirement of a good staff man is breadth of knowledge and ability he must be a generalist Also he must be self-effacing must like people and as a new man in an agency must be able to assimilate himself into it so as to avoid the jealousy usually accorded an outsider He must also possess a certain intangible quality that partakes of both integrity and wisdom A sense of humor also helps 3 U It all too often occurs that conflict rather than cooperation is the product of line and staff relationships Line officials resent what they consider interference by the staff in matters of policy and internal administration A technique that effectively reduces the barrier between line and staff officials is the use of interchangeable tours of duty Line officials are rotated to staff positions for two or thee years and then returned to their line jobs This exchange which could occur several times int he career of a key individual tends to foster understanding of the other fellow's point of view and the problems he faces V STAFF PROS AND CONS U In their contribut ions to the smooth conduct of organizat ional management staff organizat ions have their supporters and detractors--depending mostly on whom you ask Executives tend to favor the staff element as an extension of themselves Line CRYPTOLOG Page 16 FeR eFFleIAfo BSS eUM' 4009898 FQR QFFleIl organizations on the other hand tend to treat staffs with some detachment a necessary but bothersome part of the bureaucratic system Some of the pros and cons of staff organization are A Pros 1 The staff provides more freedom for the executive By using the staff to smooth out and communicate his decis ions he saves time and is able to concentrate on the more critical aspects of management The staff will also ensure that he is not bothered by mundane aspects and issues which might otherwise cross his desk They serve to filter out the unnecessary and provide him with the essential items requiring his attention They are an extension of himself and serve as his finger on the pulse of the organization 2 The staff eases the coordination process amongst the various departments and ensures that cooperation is being achieved It also serves as a central point for liaison with outside organizations 3 The staff serves as the central location for personnel with special skills that can address events companywide or can be allocated to different departments when needed B Cons 1 Too many layers of coordination frustrate and inhibit the production managers who require full resources and adequate freedom to perform their duties The additional coordination channel imposed means additional delays in reaching decisions 2 Some believe that staffers have too much power Although the staffer may pay lip service to the idea that he has no authority and merely coordinates and gives advice to the line element in practice it is rare to find a career staffer who does not seek to enhance his power at the e expense of other personnel in the line of command The real power of the staffer can many times be attributed to his proximity to the chief executive Being close to the executive I s ear means a potential for significant influence on decisions and policy ase 6MhY responsibilities and line authority They report to top executives through a chain of command and managers supervis ing many different operations U Livingston wrote that the creation of a staff does not mean the creation of new functions but rather the collection of services or other special functions under one head so they can be more effectively performed The staff represents no special interest but rather the overall interest of the organization U The growth and appearance of staffs varies widely with the kind of association involved The staff as the name implies is something to lean upon It gives service of advice or counsel as distinguished from authority to perform However the staff has certain rights especially that of performing its service Staffs are not only for the top echelons For its full utilization the concept of staffing should permeate the whole organizat ion For staff services to be effective two things are essential coordination and infiltration U As the size and complexity of an organization grow the importance of staff services increases The presence and use of staffs does not deny the line officers' competence or authority It is merely a fOrID of specialization The staff gives advice makes recommendations and may even be able to order its recommendat ions into effect But it is not charged with putting them into effect Generally the line and staff officers work very closely together the staff having to do with how when or where to do something the line officers with the actual accomplishment 4 Notes 1 Completed Staff Work University of Utah 973 Dimock Marshall E and Gladys 0 Public Administration New York Holt Rinehart and Winston 1964 pp 273-294 Gaus John M and Leon O Wolcott Public Adminstration and the United States DePartmEmt GBP AgriCUlture Chicago Public Administration Service 1940 pp 289-377 o Appleby Paul Organizing Around the Head of a Large Federal Department Public Administration Review VI Summer 1946 pp 205-212 Livingston Robert T The Engineering of Organization and Management New York McGraw-Hill Book Co 1949 pp 67-86 2 3 VI SUMMARY U In today's bureaucracies and in private enterprise as well the staff is viewed as a body of individuals who have advisory responsibilities but no command authority They report directly to top execut ives and are experts in functional areas This contrasts with line personnel who have operational Apr 84 ioa 4 CRYPTOLOG QJPYilSlt Page 17 ijSB 6MhY aCID 4009898 THE INCIDENT Russian Intercept and Cryptanalytic Efforts in World War Iun by 1 _ uring World War I much of the early success at sea enjoyed by the Allied Powers stemmed directly from the Russian recovery of German ra U diotelegraphic codebooks from the cruiser MAGDEBURG which had run aground near Oldensholm now Osmussar Island in the Baltic on 26 August 1914 The full story of this incident and the resultant actions taken based on it has never been completely told especially from the Russian point of view The following account is far from complete but it should serve at least to put a portion of the Russian view on the record in English for the first time The running aground of the MAGDEBURG immediately came to the attention of Captain 1st Rank Adrian Ivanovich Nepenin 2 chief of the Baltic Fleet's Communications and Intelligence Service Nepenin quickly dispatched Lieutenant Mikhail Vasil'evich Hamilton of the torpedo boat LT BURAKOV to the MAGDEBURG Aboard the German cruiser in the captain's cabin under a pile of shirts Hamil ton discovered a radiotelegraphic Three-Flag codebook 3 Hamilton shielded his find from everyone in the cabin and took it back to Nepenin The MAGDEBURG's crew including the captain were interned in POW camps in faraway Siberia for the duration of the war so that no word of the captured codebook would be revealed Later while Russian divers were examining the submerged portion of the MAGDEBURG they found the body of a German code clerk in whose hands was clasped a second copy of the codebook Two photographic copies were made of U Originally prepared as an Appendix to the author's article on Communications Intelligence and Tsarist Russia which appeared in the Jan 84 issue of Cryptolog the original book and provided to the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet Commands by the Russian Naval General Staff 4 Shortly thereafter Captain 1st Rank Mikhail Aleksandrovich Kedrov and Captain 2nd Rank Mikhail Ivanovich Smirnov were sent to England with the original copy of the German codebook which they handed over personally to the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill 5 Before going into the Russian cryptanalytic efforts involving the German codebook let 's look at the special intercept stat ion set up by the Russians prior to the MAGDEBURG incident From the first days of the war Captain Nepenin was concerned about German espionage activity on the territory of Finland then a part of the Russian Empire and in the Baltic area where enemy agents could monitor the movements of Russian ships Although there was strict censorship in the area discovering enemy agent radio stations operating independently would be a difficult task Even though counterespionage was not a direct function of the Communications Service operation Nepenin received permission from the Commander-in- Chief Baltic Fleet and the Chief of the Naval General Staff to set up special radio stations to monitor the airwaves for unusual Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page 18 peR ePFlell 8SB 8N JPY 4009898 FeR eFF16Ei'm ijaB ElUT Y emissions in order to locate enemy transmitters Thus the first special intercept stations were planned with both counterintelligence and positive intelligence-gathering roles in mind The location of the first special-purpose radio intercept station RADISTANTsIYa DSDBOGO NAZNAChENIYa or simply OSNAZ was at Cape Shpitkhami now Cape Poosapea Pyaspea in Estonia on the far western tip of the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland some distance inland from the coast 6 In the middle of a pine forest land was cleared away for the site High pine trees hid the construct ion from both sea and shore An operat ions building and another one for living quarters of the assigned personnel were constructed In the words of one of the Communications Service Officers who worked there As always it was comfortable and practical just like everything that came from Captain Nepenin 7 The intercept station personnel were allowed no direct contact with the outside world and a reinforced guard was set up around the stat ion for added protection The necessary supplies were delivered to the station at specified times by car from Revel Captain 2nd Rank Przhilenskij was placed in charge of this OSNAZ station which was given the cover story of a Gendarme station to conceal its real purpose The information acquired later by the station as a result of the cryptanalysis was given the covername Agent Network X AGENTURA' IKS material to also conceal its real source and all information was then sent by underground cab1e'to the Southern Region administration of the Communications Service in Revel S and sent to interested Headquarters of Russian Fleet units Before the MAGDEBURG incident Captain Nepenin had instructed radio stations at Communications Service posts to write down precisely all enemy radio transmissions and to send these notes to Communications Service Headquarters where they were protected until the day when they could be decrypted With the enemy cryptographic materials now in hand the difficult task of sorting out these notes and trying to find the keys was begun A special section was established under Captain 1st Rank Mikhail Platonovich Davydov Parallel to Davydov's group Captain 2nd Rank Ivan Ivanovich Rengarten from Baltic Fleet Headquarters also worked at trying to find the keys Rengarten made the first breakthrough after one month's intensive effort in partially decrypting a message from the German cruise AUGSBURG 9 At the same time that the Davydov group Communications Service and Rengarten group Baltic Fleet HQ were trying to decrypt the German messages select groups from several headquarters of Baltic Fleet operational units were also independently involved with this effort For example the navigation office at the Headquarters of the Baltic Fleet Cruiser Brigade Captain 2nd Rank Nikolaj Nikolaevich Kryzhanovskij stated However before Agent Network X material could become a reality the Russians had to make some sense out of the German codebook According to the former Baltic Fleet Headquarters historian Captain 2nd Rank Fedor Yu1'evich Dovkont finding the German codebook on the MAGDEBURG did not mean that the encrypted German communications could be immediately read by the Russians The German communicators changed their enciphering keys every 24 hours at midnight with a special cipher designated ALFA-GAMMA or GAMMA-ALFA In addition to the codebook on the MAGDEBURG there was also found a set of official instructions maps with quadrants of the Baltic Sea marked off and other documents the most essential parts of which were reproduced by the Naval General Staff in classified books Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Up unt i1' the organizat ion of the Black Cabinet' the Shpitkhami cryptanalytic group see below a copy of the codebook was sent to us at the Cruiser Brigade Headquarters and we ourselves worked at decrypting the 'FEK 1 cover term used in the Baltic Fleet for the German reencipherment tables This was highly secret work even from other officers and the cause of much talk On board the cruiser RURIK we had a very small staff at the wish of the ship's captain Besides myself there were an senior flag officer and two others one of whom had an excellent command of the English French and German languages 11 I Following on these early efforts it was decided that a more systematic effort at cryptanalys is was needed Therefore it was decided to concentrate the cryptanalytic effort in the Baltic at the Shpitkhami radio intercept station For this purpose six officers who know the German language well and had experience in cipher work were selected At the head of this operation the Naval General Staff placed a Page 19 iOil OfiHlVm ijaB ElnT Y aCID 4009898 FBR BFFISlhb ijSK QNbJPY man named E Fetterlein from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cryptanalytic establishment Since Fetterlein's last name was of German derivation and could bring unwanted publicity from Russian right-wing nationalist newspapers such as NovoeVremya New Times then conducting hysterical anti-German cam paigns in Russia it was decided to give him the last name of Popov to use until the war ended 12 always repeated in each of the recipients' respective codes Finding the primary and most complete codebook on the MAGDEBURG was especially helpful There was a sufficient number of already decrypted radio messages in this codebook to assist in decrypting corresponding passages in all the remaining ones As a further security measure those persons assigned to the Black Cabinet as the Shpitkhami cryptanalytic group was known were instructed to write their relatives not to send them any letters directly until the end of the war because of their secret work location All mail was to be sent to them via the Communications Service Headquarters which would then forward the correspondence to the individuals The naval officers of the group still hoped that they might bring their wives to live at the site However according to one member of the cryptanalyt ic group Nepenin's reaction to this suggestion was What Wives I don't want any women combing their hair among the pine trees 13 Captain Nepenin though not only made ception to the No Wife rule for chief analyst Fetterlein-Popov but also went as to have a special house built at the khami site for the couple 14 an excryptso far Shpit- The initial breakthrough in cryptanalysis by Captain Rengarten made the task of the Shpitkhami group a little easier The main task was was still discovering the daily key which served to reencrypt the German code British Navy Headquarters also worked closely with the Russian Naval Headquarters in this effort In addition to a copy of the codebook all material published by the Russians was sent to the British This effort reached such a degree of success that within an hour of introduction of the new FEK into operation by the Germans the Russian or British side first discovering it would report it immediately to their counterparts in as simple a manner as possible in order not to attract attention to itself from possible German agents The German attribute of being systematic played a major role in the successful cryptanalytic effort The German Navy separated its ships into different groups each of which had only its own group's codebook Therefore the radio messages of two or more groups were Apr 84 The German Navy frequently abused it use of radio communications which provided more material for the Shpitkhami cryptanalytic to use In addition with the aid of radio direction finding RDF bearings the quadrant numbers of the Baltic Sea in which German ships were using radiotelegraphic communications were determined Since the enemy ships frequently sent their position or rendezvous site quadrant of the Baltic Sea this allowed the Russians to use the quadrant maps found on the MAGDEBURG to decrypt the corresponding encrypted locations Another significant mistake of the Germans was to be excessively systematic in sending daily routine official reports to naval units and even to individual ships by radio For example a detailed radio message sent by the Germans in the first hour of each day with the new reencryption key contained about 10% of the information needed to decrypt it Often within 30 minutes--almost always within 90 minutes--ei ther the Russians or the Brit ish had the new key worked out and then passed it on to the other Even in 1916 when the German Navy introduced a new codebook with new words and phrases the later edition kept the same alphabetical order as the replaced version which allowed the Russians to interpolate unknown locations with those already known The ultimate success of this cryptanalytic operation can be attributed on the Russian side to the efforts of Captain Rengarten Fetterlein-Popov and the cryptanalysts of Shpitkhami 15 FOOTNOTES 1 Except where otherwise noted information in this article is based on articles by Rear Admiral Boris Petrovich Dudorov in the emigrl journal Morskie Zapiski The Naval Records New York March and August 1960 passim 2 See Communications Intelligence and Tsarist Russia and Admiral Adrian I Nepenin Father of Modern Russian Naval Intelligence by I Jin previous issues of Cryptolog CRYPTOLOG P L Page 20 86-36 4009898 3 4 5 6 FeR eFFIElI 'm 86S Dudorov op cit March 1960 pp 51-53 and Pavlovich N B editor Flot v pervo Mirovoj Vojne The Navy in World War I 2 vols Moscow Voenizdat 1964 Vo I p 95 Prior to the war Russian naval intelligence agents has acquired a copy of the German codebook in Berlin but this particular codebook's use ended with the outbreak of the war See Dudorov op cit March 1960 p 49 and Woodward - David The Russians at Sea London William Kimber 1965 p 166 --According to Yankovich V On the Origins of Radio Intelligence in the Russian Navy Voenno-Istoricheskij Zhurnal Journal of Military History Moscow February 1961 p 116 the French also received a photocopy of the German naval codebook from the Russians This may have been the result of the FrancoRussian Naval Convention Agreement of 16 July 1912 which was updated in May 1913 to include the exchange of intelligence information between the naval commands of the two countries See The Military Attache by Alfred Vagts Princeton Princeton University Press 1967 p 369 Grunwald Constant in de Franko-Russkie Soyuzy Franco-Russian Alliances translated from the French Moscow International Relations Publishing House 1968 p 246 and Rod ionov A The Navy and Coalition Warfare Morskoj Sbornik Naval Collection July 1976 p 22 No such formal agreements existed between the Russian and British Naval Commands Steblin-Kamenskij Senior Lieutenant I 1 Mine Warfare in the Black Sea La Revue Maritime Naval Revue Paris NOV 1932 p 620 According to another version the British probably received the second codebook as Churchill himself in The World Crisis Toronto Macmillan 1931- --p --25 scribed receiving a water-damaged copy found on the body of a However in a drowned German sailor more recent revelation three copies of a codebook des ignated SKM 145 151 and 974 were apparently found on the MAGDEBURG and copy SKM 151 was turned over to the British See Room 40 by Patrick Beesly London Hamish Hamilton 1982 p 6n etl Y pp 46-47 Timirev says the site was located between Revel now Tallin and Baltijskij Port now Paldiski but his information was not first-hand as was Dudorov's and Yankovich's 7 Warrant Officer Markov cited in Dudorov op cit March 1960 p 65 8 Dudorov cit March 1960 pp 54-66 and June 1961 p 115 Timirev cit pp 46-47 Yankovich GBPE cit p 116 and Beesly op cit p 181 According to Beesly Commander Przyleneki sic Przhilenskij in December 1916 vis ited Room 40 in London and left a memo describing all the advantages which cryptanalysis had given the Russian Naval COMINT effort 9 Dudorov op cit August 1960 pp 1920 ChernOJior Volnyj Baltiki 1914-1915 Waves of the Baltic 19l4-191 Riga Dlya Vas 1939 p 142 and Yankovich cit pp 115-116 GBPE 10 Kryzhanovskij cited in Dudorov cit August 1960 pp 19-20 11 After the Revolution in 1917 Fetterlein was apparently employed by the British Government Code and Cipher School as a cryptanalyst a position he was still occupying in World War II See Seale Patrick and Maureen McConville Philby The Long Road to Moscow New York Simon Schuster - 197z -t 'P 152 158 and Beesly op cit p 182 One former employee oY-the-Tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs has characterized Fetterlein as a most gifted cryptanalyst See Korostovetz Vladimir Lenin im Hause der Vaeter Lenin in the House ofthe Fathers Berlin Verlag fuer Kulturpolitik 1928 pp 50-51 Also see Timirev cit pp 46-7 and Dudorov GBPE cit August 1960 p 22 12 Warrant Officer Markov cited in dorov cit August 1960 p 22 13 Dudorov op cit June 1961 p 118 This is indeedindicative of the way a professional member of the COMINT service was held in high esteem by those Russians in the know under the Tsars Du- Dudorov cit March 1960 pp 64-66 Rengarten I 1 On Radio Communications in the Navy Morskoj Sbornik Naval Collection Moscow Jan-Mar 1920 p 42 Yankovich cit p 116 and Timirev Rear Admiral Sergej Nikolaevich Vospominaniya Morskogo Of its era Recollections of a Naval Officer New York American Society for Russian Naval History 1961 Apr 84 FeR Yankovich CRYPTOLOG eFFI6Il Dudorov cit March and cit passim 14 8S8 Page 21 e JPY August 1960 aCID 4009898 THE POSITION OF NSA css IN THE P L t his article outlines the relationship of the National security Agency Central Security Service and Director Chief with the rest of the u US Government Many of the source policy documents referenced herein are extremely sensitive and not available to the total cryptologic populace They have been disseminated as required and appropriate decisions have been implemented by the NSA CSS system of directives 86-36 niques employed by the committees are hearings and investigations U There are four committees--the House and Senate Armed Services Committees as well as the two intelligence committees-responsible for authorizing programs and for establishing funding ceilings The'actua1 appropriation of funds is done by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees They define the precise purpose for which the money is to be spent adjust funding and prohibit expenditures for certain purposes U Other means of oversight include Relationship with CONGRESS U Congressional takes several forms interaction with legislation 1 oversight 1 program and budget authority and appropriation of funds program evaluations studies by congressional support agencies such as the Office of Technology Assessment and the General Accounting Office and investigations by individual members NSA U The DIRNSA and other senior officials occasionally testify in open and closed sessions of congressional committees U There have been comparatively few legislative acts passed which relate directly to NSA's functions The major interaction is with the House an9 Senate committees on intelligence the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence established in 1975 and 1977 respectively Under the provisions of the 1981 Amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 NSA keeps these two committees fully and currently informed provides advance notice of significant activities and submits timely reports in problems The basic oversight techApr 84 Relationship with the PRESIDENT U Executive Order EO 12333 of 4 December 1981 an unc 1assified document provides for the intelligence activities of the US It established the Director of Central CRYPTOLOG Page 22 HNlIH i VL QQMINT 61WUlBbB eUb'l aCID 4009898 Int elligence DCI as the head of the Intelligence C01IIIIIunity' and authorized him to establish such advisory groups as required The Intelligence Community is defined in paragraph 3 4 f to include NSA The EO prescribes general duties and responsibilities of Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies including NSA and Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community also includingDIRNSA the Attorney General and the DCI The Secretariat is provided by and quartered at NSA The National COMSEC Directive assigns to DIRNSA the responsibility for executing the COMSEC responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and lis ts spec ific details for carrying out this basic responsibility U Specific responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense by the EO include conduct as the executive agent of the Uni ted States Government signals intelligence and c01lllllunications security activit ies provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence a prime function of NSA CSS but including all sources and direct operate control and provide fiscal management for the National Security Agency D The EO assigns specific responsibilities to the National Security Agency including collection processing and dissemination of SIGINT in accordance with guidance from the DCI executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the c01lllllunications security of the United States Government and SIGINT security and security of COMSEC material The COMSEC mission NSA's not CSS' s second national mission is most recently provided for in a presidential directive PD NSC-24 of 9 February 1977 Telec01lllllunications Policy This PD is currently under updating review One draft we have seen also includes automated information systems security or COMPUSEC The Secretary of Defense is designated the Executive Agent for COMSEC to protect government-derived information which relates to national security In this capacity the Secretary of Defense has issued a National C01IIIIIunications Security Directive dated 20 June 1979 which among other things established the National COMSEC Committee The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Communications Command Control and Intelligence DUSD C3I chairs the c01lllllittee Membership includes representatives of the Director DDC National Security Agency the Secretaries of Army Navy Force the Secretaries of State Transportation and Energy and Air Apr 84 Relationship with the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL U The NSC members are the President Vice President and Secretaries of State and Defense Statutory advisors to the NCS are the DCI Chairman of the JCS and Assistant to the President National Security Decision Directive Number 2 National Security Council Structure was promulgated by Pres ident Reagan of 12 January 1982 Included in the structure is the Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence SIG-I to advise and assist the NSC on intelligence matters and policy Membership includes the DCI chairman Assistant to the Pres ident for Nat ional Security Affairs Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS By SIG-I Directive No 1 dated 5 August 1982 two Interagency Groups were established one for Counterintelligence IG CI and the other for Countermeasures IG CM The DDO represents NSA on the IG CI with the Chief ofGl as his alternate ADDC and Chief Gl are the member and alternate respectively of the IG CM er The present NSC Intelligence Directive for SIGINT NSCID No 6 was published 17 February 1972 is consistent with EO 12333 and is still in effect This directive has undergone little change in its several versions since 1952 It reiterates the basic responsibilities from EO 12333 and its predecessors of the DCI Secretary of Defense and DIRNSA but specifically for SIGINT The NSCID says that DIRNSA shall report to the Secretary of Defense and shall be the principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defense the DCI and the JCS It also establishes under the Secretary of Defense and subject to his authority and control a National Security Agency The Director and Deputy Director shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense subject to approval by the President The duration of their appointments shall be at the pleasure of the President The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status and shall enjoy not less than three-star rank dur- ing the period of his incumbency The Director CRYPTOLOG Page 23 ll'llrtfflf iIA e6Hlli'f elh ffltl LS 6ltt'l aCID 4009898 shall have a Deputy who shall be civilian with SIGINT experience a career The NSClD-assigned duty of DIRNSA is to provide for the SIGINT mission of the United States to establish an effective unified organization and control of all SIGINT collection and processing activities of the United States and to produce SIGINT in accordance with object ives requirements and priorit ies established by the DCI The Central Security Service CSS was established in 1972 under the DIRNSA All military elements that perform SIGINT activities are in the US SIGINT System and in turn are in the ess taries of Defense and Commerce of the Attorney General and of the Assistant to the president for National Security Affairs - s The DCI SIGINT Committee which functions under a DCID of 12 May 1982 advises and assists the DCI and the DIRNSA The Chairman comes from NSA but is a full-time member of the DCI Intelligence Community Staff The Director of Policy Q4 NSA is the NSA member Other members are representatives of the Intelligence Community principals see EO 12333 for definition The Committee meets frequently at least weekly on the average and advises on all facets of SIGINT requirements priorities objectives security etc The Chairman also establishes subcQmmittees or task forces as required 8 eee A DeID of 17 May 1983 sets forth the rules and regulations for SIGINT liaison with and release of SIGINT to foreign governments The DCI establishes policy and approves procedures with the advice of DIRNSA The Director of NSA is executive for conduct of arrangements with the United Kingdom Canada Australia and New Zealand Except as specifically exempted 'by the DCI in favor of DIRNSA 1 Relationship with the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FO O Under the authority of EO 12333 and NSClDs including the SIGINT NSClD the DCI established a National Foreign Intelligence Board NFIB and National Foreign Inte ligence I SIGINT Security Council NFlC by DCI Directives DClDs of 28 Regulations make up another DClD Volume I January 1982 replacing the US Intelligence dated June 1982 covers COMINT Volume II Board USIB These bodies deal with alldated January 1982 covers sensitive-source source intelligence The NFIB is the senior ELINT All of these SIGINT DCIDs are products Intelligence Community advisory instrumentalof SIGINT Committee recommendations ity on substantive aspects of national intEflO 1 4 c ligence The NFIC deals with national intGBP -L 86-36 ligence issues other than substantive it advises on priorities and objectives for the National Foreign Intelligence Program NFIP budget The DCI and his deputy are Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively of both bodies Membership on the NFIB and NFIC inRelationship with the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE cludes DIRNSA Executive Director CIA Director DIA and senior representatives of the State Treasury and Energy Departments and of the FBI peee Senior representatives of the mili- tary intelligence services and of the DoD special reconnaissance programs are members of the NFIC they are observers on the NFIB except that the latter are members when programs under their purview are considered Additional members of the NFIC but not of the NFIB are senior representatives of the Secre- Apr 84 e Computer security is at present only a DoD mission the most recent assigned to NSA by DoD Directive 5215 1 of October 1982 though it is expected to develop into a national mission The DoD Directive established the DoD Comput er Security Center The directive is unclassified and releasable to the public et- Under the provis ions of the law the National Security Act of 1947 EO 12333 and its predecessors and the SIGINT NSCID the Secretary of Defense issued a DoD Directive charter for NSA DoD Directive S-5l00 20 dated 23 December 1971 The DoD charter directive references only the SIGINT NSCID but is consistent with the EO as is the NSCID This charter is primarily based on higher CRYPTOLOG Page 24 IJ1dIBMJ VIA eellIII'f elhlrlllffibS eIfLl 4009898 level intelligence documents and is primarily intelligence-oriented i e toward SIGINT but it does as does the EO provide for the COMSEC mission The charter accurately reflects the provisions of the NSCID It requires INFORMATION SECURITY the DIRNSA Chief CSS to report to the Secretary of Defense CU A discussion of NSA's relationShip with the rest of the US Government requires separate treatment of information security the Deputy Chief CSS to be not less than two-star military rank normally of a different Service than the DIRNSA Chief CSS and U The NSA CSS Information Security Program for safeguarding the security of cryptologic informat ion is directed by several issuances of the Executive Branch the Service cryptologic organizations and their subordinate activities which conduct SIGINT to be subordinate to the Chief CSS DIRNSA U Execut ive Order 12356 Nat ional Security Information dated 2 April 1982 prescribes the uniform system for classifying declassifying and safeguarding national security information within and among the executive departments and organizations of the US Government Policy direction of EO 12356 is the responsibility of the National Security Council Implementation and oversight of the program is the responsibility of the Administrator of General Services who delegates this responsibility to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office OSOO ISOO Implementing Directive No 1 carries out the provis ions of EO 12356 effect ive 1 August 1982 and U The DoD charter Directive for the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering R E DoD Directive 5129 1 most recently dated 25 January 1984 requires that he exercise staff supervision on resource management matters over the NSA CSS This is handled primarily by courtesy copy of budget correspondence between NSA and the DCI who develops the National Foreign Intelligence Program NFIP The DIRNSA is the program manager of the Combined Cryptologic Program CCP which makes up part of the'NFIP U A separate DoD charter Directive for the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy DUSD P DoD Directive 5130 2 dated 16 June 1977 requires that he exercise staff supervision on policy matters over the NSA DoD Directive 5130 2 is titled and refers to the Director of Policy Review but that position by separate action is currently designated Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Two separate DoD functional Directives have been issued for SIGINT and COMSEC S3115 7 in 1973 and C-5200 5 in 1981 The SIGINT Directive references the NSA CSS charter directive repeats the respons ibil ity for DIRNSA Chief CSS to exercise SIGINT operational control over the SIGINT resources of the US and sets forth responsibilities for other DoD components support budget requirements etc et The COMSEC directive promulgates basic DoD COMSEe policy and responsibilities of of DoD components It designates DIRNSA as COMSEC program manager DUSD P as the principal staff ass istant to the Secretary of Defense for COMSEC policy and DUSD C3I as Chairman of the National COMSEC COllDllittee the Secretary of Defense's representative for governmentwide COMSEC activities and the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for COMSEC resources Apr 84 prescribes a uniform information information security system establishes a monitoring system enhance its effectiveness and sets forth guidance to governmental agencies on original and derivative classification downgrading declassification and safeguarding of national security information to CD The Department of Defense issued DoD Directive 5200 1 The DoD Information Security Program dated 17 June 1982 and DoD Regulation 5200 1-R Information Security Program Regulation dated 1 August 1982 peee NSA CSS has issued regulat ions for internal security and to the US SIGINT System USSID 3 SIGINT Security In addition National COMSEC Instructions security guides for specific projects activities and related directives regulations and instructions are issued NSA CSS issuances take into account the UKUSA COMINT Agreement of 1946 which includes security policies for the protection and exchange of SIGINT DCI issues the Signals Intelligence Security Regulations SISR A DoD Directive implements the SISR for the SIGINT' user cOllDllunity CRYPTOLOG Page 25 U'zfHlr i8 VIti 8811In'l' SIkW1KIsS Ql ibJPY ern 4009898 KNOW 'DO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DATA ELEMENT AND A DATA ITEM A ncase somebouy comes up to you out of the blue and wants to know the difference between D ta Element and Data Item you may need some U handy definitions to quote Accordingly we thought we'd devote a little space to those two basic terms As you know a major goal of data standards is to CONCRETIZE the recording of data so that when you see a standard Data Element you will have an idea of what it will look like in a file U This involves laying a sharp eye on what you see in a data field The NAMl of a particular field confronting you may not by any means be the same as that of the DATA eLEMENT it contains It may not even give you a good clue Here is where data representatives are supposed to earn their pay--namely by 1 2 digging beneath the surface deep enough to see what the DATA ELEMENT itself is Having done that the data rep must then consider what the DATA ITEMS are that constitute that DATA ELEMENT Remember the DATA ITEMS are the things--or the representations of things--that actually appear in a given field of a data file And each of these units of information MUST by definition belong to some DATA ELEMENT That is the DATA ELEMENT names and denotes what these DATA ITEMS pertain to To pursue this train of thought further take a look at the following more-or-less offic ial descript ions explanations of these two basic terms DATA ELEMENT A unique grouping of related informational units Apr 84 1 P L 86-36 u Reprinted with slight changes from NDSC Standards Bulletin #3-84 22 March 19 U This is the official USSID definition as given in USSID 414 section 2 1 and in NSA Regulation 80-9 U The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms put out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS Pub 1 is somewhat more specific than the official NSA definition It says DATA ELEMENT A basic unit of information having a unique meaning and which has subcategories data items of distinct units of values Examples are military pp sonnel grade sex race geo ravhical location and military unit U The Defense Department definition is standardized and approved for use by all DoD components according to JCS Pub 1 Let me add a footnote to the effect that that the NSA Data Standard Center NDSC heartily endorses the spirit of this definition Several years ago however Bob Register and I from the NDSC did join a working group at the National Bureau of Standards' Institute of Computer Sciences and Technology The aim of the group was to improve the current definitions for the entire range of data standards terms The members finally arrived at a slightly different version which has not however officially superseded the USSID definition CRYPTOLOG Page 26 'P8R 8PPl8llli l Hal 811IS 4009898 FeR eFFleI C eSH DATA ELEMENT A uniquely named and defined category of data having values expressed by the member data items of its data item set eN and in others open-ended For example Call sign Frequency and Year are all open-ended whereas Day of the Week and Month both have finite sets of data items This view of the DATA ELEMENT DATA ITEM relationship allows us to posit what we might call Data Standards Law tFl It states emphatically that Each and every Element Ex definition has its UNIQUE values U This definition brought in the concept of data item set --that is the collection of legal values which a Data Element could take on More on this below U As you can see from the above definitions some key phrases jump out at you U The corollary of this Law is No other data element can claim the SAME set of data items and still consider itself a separate data element Category or CLASS of data Unit of Information UNIQUE name definition Unique DATA ITEM SET set of values By DS Law ttl it really would have to be viewed as the same data element--masquerading under a different name For example Transmitter Frequency Frequency Firs t Observed and Frequency of Receiver are all the SAME DATA ELEMENT because they theoretically share the same units of information Data Items recorded the same way U The above key phrases are important to understanding what a Data Element is These ideas tend to be somewhat abstract however Remember that the other side of the coin the DATA ITEMs represent the concrete units of information recorded in a data field Following are the corresponding and strikingly similarly worded definitions of this other key term in data standards terminology U To summarize Data Items are like the various family members of the MacKenzie Clan Each one is unique and there is no way you can match them up exact ly with the Stewarts or the Buchanans--which are blessed with their own unique members In this imperfect analogy we are not considering the possibility of intermarriage DATA ITEM A subunit of descriptive information or value classified under a Data Element Data Items for Month are January February etc from USSID 414 U We plan to expand further in a later issue on the theme of basic terms associated with Data Standards In the meantime don't let anyone tell you that DATA ELEMENT and DATA ITEM are just alternate names for the same thing If anyone does so we will accuse of him of being a follower of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass who proclaimed ex cathedra and ex muro--from his wall-that any word he ii sed would mean just I choose it to mean--neither more nor less DATA ITEM A subunit of descriptive information or value classified under a data element For example the data element military personnel grade contains data items such as sergeant captain and colonel from JCS Pub 1 U The definition that the NBS working group arrived at again emphasized the idea of a UNIQUE data item set DATA ITEM A unique defined entity which serves as a member of a data item set and as a particular value of a data element I t may be expressed in a field of a record or a block on a form by a discrete representation configured as an abbreviation code name quantity or statement U As we just noted the latter definition stresses the concept of DATA ITEM SET--which in some cases is finite Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG Page 27 FeR eFFfef 1m eSB StUN ero 4009898 F8R 8FFlelz'tC HSr 8l1bY APRIL FOOLS' DAY VOCABULARY BUILDER N j -Qtrnstit Nn 54 Apr 84 CRYPTOLOG If you don't know Word D when you begin this puzzle you certainly will by the time you've finished it P L Page 28P L FaR aFFISlz'rl J HSr SllbJPY 86-36 86-36 4009898 peR epPI6Ikb eBB Apr 84 Pl-July 84-83-52887 CRYPTOLOG eN l Page 29 PQll QPPISI 'm HIlK Q IJ JPY P L 86-36 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu