Insure ol classi ed Irlormation mayr be prosecuted under Section 793 and Section 798 Title 18 USC and is punishable by ne of not more manswpoo Imptisonmem of not male than 10 years or boih U Colombian AufodefensasHistory and Organization Key Judgments jPfThe rise of Colombian self-defense groups is a direct response to the explosive growth of insurgent forces To protect themselves from insurgent extortion and kidnaping legal businesses and drug traffickers helped launch the United Self-Defense Group of Colombia Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or AUC an organization that has fundamentally changed Colombia's military and political landscape dSAOP Fhe AUC and its predecessors have been involved in drug trafficking since the 1980s AUC leader Carlos Castano admits to his association with drug traffickers a connection that provides his organization with financial resources and weapons b 1 1 4 b Information atgf'Date I October 2000 Derivedfrom M4141e Sources Dedwsify on X1 X5 DI-1584-11-00 The Aufodefensas' Rise to Prominence General Staff 4 Long a part of Colombia's violence the autodefensas which some commonly refer to as paramilitaries l have seized national attention over the past 2 years Emerging from a tradition of political violence and regional strongmen the United Self-Defense Group of Colombia AUC has risen to prominence as a direct response to the explosive growth of insurgent forces In attempting to protect themselves from insurgent extortion and kidnaping legal businesses and drug traffickers have launched an organization that has fundamentally changed Colombia's military and political landscape This assessment which examines the origins and organization of the autodefensas is the first of a series assessing the impact the autodefensas have had on Colombia and neighboring states and the persistent allegations of ties between the military and autodefensas groups Self-Defense Groups of Itagdalena Idedlo ACHM o'I Ramm Isaza I Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba ACLU I Carlos Castano AlWand AlntAdolto Self-Defense Groups of Llarros ACLLO Self-Defense Groups of Santanderand Southern Cesar AUSAC ClodorriroAgwiaz Gustavo Self-Defense Groups of Puerto Boyaca APB 'Botalon 'Tomas Self-Defense Groups of Cundinamerea AC I Luis Eduardo Queries I 4 ElAgul-' Calima From Small or Unidentified Self-Defense Groups The Typical Autodefensas Member iRornarn 61 W The average autodefensas member differs little from his military or insurgent counterpart Predominantly young and male members probably have little education and few prospects in an economy with over 20-percent unemployment AUC members are more likely to live as part of a community than are Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia members and they earn about $150 a month Originally the autodefensas were dominated by former drug cartel or legal self-defense group members Since then trained and experienced insurgent defectors and former military members have joined their ranks As of June 1999 the AUC reportedly had a training base for new members operating in the Uraba region of Antioquia Figure 1 #WfMu1odefensa9 Unidas de Colombia Defining Autodefensas U The autodefensas and criminal groups make up Colombia's significant nongovemmentlnoni nsurgent armed organizations Although these groups interact and share many characteristics they differ in their objectives U Autodefensas Supported by economic elites drug traffickers and local communities in the absence of 1 U This assessment uses the term autodefeww self-defense groups to classify what are inaccurately referred to as paramilitaries tial support base and aid the military with intelligence effective government security their primary objective is protecting their sponsors from the insurgents The most prominent of these groups are politically motivated with the ultimate goal of defeating the insurgency The autodefensas operate locally by protecting legal and illegal economic interests and nationally by conducting counterinsurgent offensives and logistic support s insurgent control of rural areas increased in the 1980s landowners and rural communities turned increasingly to the autodefensas for protection In addition to legal autodefensas private armies emerged for the drug cartels These criminal organizations AUC Equipment expanded b 1 1 4 b their employer's enterprises halted encroachment of competitors and protected drug shipments and facilities The US Embassy in Bogota made a noteworthy observation in the late 1980s that the boundary between sanctioned self-defense groups and violent armed groups would become blurred particularly as evaluated by international human rights groups In 1989 under domestic and international pressure the Colombian Supreme Court ruled the autodefensas unconstitutional U Colombia revived the self-defense concept in 1994 with the institution of convivirs through a law estab- lishing community associations for rural oversight Convivirs provided state security forces with logistic and intelligence support Many illegal armed groups were granted convivir licenses even as they continued operating outside the scope of convivir responsibilities Although Colombian Army unit commanders could legally provide handguns to convivir members for personal defense officers were accused of arming some with automatic rifles and including them in military operations U Criminal private justice groups These armed organizations are hired to protect primarily drug traffickers Gangs of kidnapers or assassins sicaros for hire are a subgroup of this category In the interests of their employers these groups join forces fight each other or aid the autodefensas U Stepping in again in 1997 the Constitutional Court ordered the convivirs to relinquish restricted weapons provided by military officers and to not participate in state security force operations Finally in 1998 the government ended the program and began dismantling licensed convivirs By May 2000 fewer than 20 of 414 convivirs remained However as the security situation in Colombia deteriorated the demand for the services of the autodefensas increased Many of the former convivirs joined autodefensas sponsored by both legal and illegal businesses Historical Foundations of the Autodefensas U Since they were established in 1964 the legal status of state-sponsored self-defense groups and their relationship with the military have undergone numerous changes In accordance with standard counterinsurgency doctrine civil defense forces were established to help isolate insurgents from their poten- 3 L AcUG-Unats AC CUM A MA AUSAC ' tJIA MI ' ' ' ' - o ACCUMUSAIC AU tliw A UaidendRed b 1 1 4- b 00NOfFoday's dominant self-defense organization the AUC was formed and grew largely in reaction to Colombia's three major autodefensas formed the AUC in April 1997 Carlos Castano-Gil leader of the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba ACCU the largest and most influential autodefensas organization became the leader of the AUC The AUC the explosive growth of the Revolutionary Armed now accounts for 80 percent of the estimated 5 000 to Forces of Colombia FARC in the 1990s Prompted by growing instability and the financial backing of 8 000 autodefensas in Colombia which currently conduct significant activities in 26 of Colombia's drug traffickers and legal businesses leaders of 32 departments Aufodefensas Unidas de Colombia 4 Carlos Castano UNCLASSIFED Aollowing the murder of their father by the FARC in 1980 Carlos Castano-Gil and his brother Fidel organized the ACLU After dropping out of school Carlos dedicated himself to fighting the insurgency despite professed center-left sympathies His dedication would cost the lives of at least three of his brothers and one sister at the hands of the FARC Figure 8 U Carlos Castano Head of the AUC Castano believes he can effect change in Colombia he Castanod connections to other autodefensas leaders and drug traffickers facilitated their rise to prominence Carlos assumed control of the ACCU in 1995 when Fidel disappeared and was presumably killed Castano is intimately involved in planning coordinating and implementing AUC strategy and operations As a result he claims to have been shot four times and hit with grenade shrapnel He is charged with at least five crimes including multiple murders No evidence suggests that he has received foreign training LWMOM self-described progressive conservative Castano espouses a populist ideology that includes issues such as land reform and improving social services A widely watched national television interview in early 2000 presented Castano as an articulate political figure who believes he can bring needed change to Colombia The AUC's growing strength has fueled his political ambition and gained him support among some Colombians Originally opposed to US intervention in Colombia Castano now claims to support limited involvement JMMe AUC defines itself as a national anti-insurgent Infractions include disobeying orders from the political-military movement that is impatient with the state's inability to defeat the insurgents Often described as an ultrarightwing organization the AUC espouses a populist political agenda It agrees with some of the insurgent's stated goals but only if enacted national leadership or kidnaping and extorting for personal gain Aufodefensas Finances within the present political system Castano and other U Considering their size and scope theAUC's activ- leaders have repeatedly stated that no final peace agreement is possible without their participation ities require substantial financing One study estimated that the AUC earned as much as $75 million in 1999 Expenses include a $30-million estimated annual payroll in addition to the cost of operations weapons and other supplies Principal autodefensas sponsors am drug traffickers legitimate businesses local communities unions and political groups 4JWPffhe organization developed its goals and procedures at the first annual autodefensas summit in April 1997 The AUC founded a National Counterguerrilla Coordinating Board to act as a general staff Each group has one representative member except for the ACCU which provides two The summit also jiJaMiNfLegal businesses are an important source of called for creation of AUC urban militia and intelli- gence and political action cells to support the overall counterinsurgent effort income particularly those operating in rural areas such as ranches farms and transportation manufacturing and lumber companies Although some busi- U Control is maintained by either granting financial nesses contribute voluntarily others do so under bonuses to or withholding funds from an AUC front Individual punishments include banishment from the threat The AUC reportedly charges less for protection than the FARC does Protecting their sponsors from AUC or for the most serious offensives execution insurgent harassment has built support for the AUC 5 rrr nviviirur among some sectors One autodefensas sympathizer a tics makes the AUC's services valuable to a cross section of Colombia's economic elite cattle rancher points out that heads of cattle in Cordoba Department climbed from 1 6 million to 2 6 million since the late 1980s because of autodefensas 4WDespite improvements in the military's ability to thwart large-scale insurgent attacks the overall security picture in Colombia continues to deteriorate An ongoing and concerted guerrilla campaign against police forces continues to expose more areas of protection Unlike the FARC and the National Liberation Army ELN who rely on kidnaping to help finance their operations the autodefensas selectively kidnap for political reasons and not for money Colombia to insurgent domination Under such conditions the autodefensas will remain the fastest growing armed force in the country Paramilitaries- Drug Trafficker Ties UNCLASSFIED o#@4 The AUC and its predecessors have been involved in drug trafficking since the 1980s Castano freely admits his association with drug traffickers a connection that provides the organization with financial resources and weapons The AUC receives money from Medellin- and Bogota-based traffickers for protecting drug trafficking operations and for providing logistic support and security to traffickers in Valle del Cauca Antioquia and Ailantico Departments In addition Castano's forces guard coca fields and drug-prooessing laboratories b 1 1 4 b Figure 4 #MMITAUC Members in Formation The increasing number of former military personnel in the autodefens s probably means a greater level of training and capability in the force UNCLASSFIED 46d srrhe AUC has gained significant control over several coca-producing departments in the north and currently is fighting the FARC to seize control of coca cultivation areas in southern Colombia Outlook for Continued Aufodefensas Growth 4WThe AUC was the inevitable outgrowth of the Colombian government's inability to provide basic security and the drug traffickers' determination to regain control of their industry Carlos Castano's personal political agenda remains a driving factor in AUC operations This combination of protection and poli- Figure fi fAUC Members in Training TheAUCoperates a school moved periodically for the auto defenras that trains 50 men every 2 months Reportedly run by former military officers the course includes political training weapons communications and physical and first-aid training 6 UNCLASSIFED the autodefensas probably will not become a top military priority in the next 2 years This may change only if the autodefensas change their policy of not targeting government security forces Questions and comments may be addressed to b 3 1 South America Division Office for Latin America Regional Assessments Regional Military Assessments Group Directorate for Analysis and Production DISTS 981-2498 Com- mercial fb f3 10 USC 424 Analysis Division Operations Intelligence Directorate SOUTH- COM Commercial b 3 10 USC 424 U b 3 10 USC 424 Office for Counterdrug Analysis Transnational Warfare Group Directorate for Intelligence Production provided significant cordributions to this publication Figure 6 jftutodefensas Members on Patrol Independent autodefensas forces have cast their shadow over Colombia's war counterdrag efforts and human rights situation U This report contains information as of 1 October 2000 It is published under the auspices of the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program DoDIPP The Defense Intelligence Agency produced it as the designated DoDIPP producer for this subject The greatest limiting factor to the aufodefensas' ability to grow is the government's capacity and willingness to target them As measured by the total number of members killed or captured the AUC ranks as a U Each classified title and heading has been marked properly those unmarked are unclassified lower military priority than the FARC ELN or drug traffickers Because of multiple threats facing the military and the indirect nature of the autodefensas' threat U COPYRIGHT WARNING Further dissemination of the photographs in this publication is not authorized This product addresses the interests of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Reverse Blank 7 FCN 31'112 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu