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- r-o iwunwu-u -n qua-w '2 moi pr-1' Him-3W- 799% -- A 12 Continued SC 5 2 We nredict than when formal negotiations concerning conventional iorces in the Atlanticmtothemi rals zone begin the Warsaw Pact will quickly present a formal version of its oubiic dipiomucy might even tahie a draft treaty very early in the negotiations it will probably insist on an initial discussion of data regarding asymmetries between the two sides forces and wii probably suggest establishing a working group on datav The Warsaw Pact states wili not accept the current NATO proposal which in effect cults on the Pact to take gigantic cuts in tanks and artiilery for mi- nor cuts on the NATG side so that there is parity between the Pact and NATO For example this would mean the Pact would have to withdraw or destroy about 25 008 tanks whiie NATO would withdraw or destroy about 900 tanks Outsi e of the negotiating process itseif for politicai effect the Soviets may also take unilateral initiatives We judge the Soviets could garner signi cant political gains in Western Europe at tolerable risks by unilaterally removing some of their forces from Eastern Europe especially ail from Hungary The evidence on Soviet timing and conditions is insuf cient to predict with con dence when and whether a withdrawai announcement might be made Given the West German concern about shortkrange nuclear-caoable forces it is possible that the Soviets might make a gesture by uniiaterally withdrawing some short-range ballistic missile iaunchers from Eastern Europe however we iudge the iikelihood of such a move to be low for the period of this Estimate The Soviets may attempt to portray force restructuring as a unilateral force reduction however we indge that the ongoing restructuring of the Soviet ground forces is intended primarily to make units more re ective for prolonge conventional combat operations against NATO We judge that among our NATO Allicsg France will be the most resistant to potentiui Soviet gambits with the United Kingdom 3 strong second Of the major partners the Federal Republic of Germany will be the most responsive to such nioys because of its strong desire to reduce defense spending and to reduce the chance of the country becoming Eurooe s nuclear battleground The challenge for the United States and the rest of NATO will he to continue the ongoing NATO modernization white at the same time negotiating on a possible agreement with it more sophisticated adversar in an environment Where the public perception of the Warsaw Pact threat has been softened signi cantly lV 225 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu