13 NIE 11489 April 1989 Seviet Policy Toward the West The Gorbachev Challenge Director of Conga late 3 e ce Soviet Policy Toward the West The Gorbachev Challenge National Estimate 7731' Estimate represents the views of the Director of Center Inte igence with the advice and assistance of the US Inrefiigence Community I 9 i 3 1 SeerFet- N15 74189 2 I 951 w 7 I 227 nu 13 Ccmiinued Director of Central Enteliigence NIE 11 4 39 Soviet Policy Toward the West The Gorbachev Challenge U information availabie as of I fawn 235i WES used he gregaranon of his Esamaz a The foliowmg mzei rgence organizations pam crpazed he oregarafion of 2th Estimate The Comm imelhgence Agency The Defense Emei gence Agency The Nataonai Security Agency The Buzeau of Smeii gence and Regearch Depammem of State The imeuigemce Dimsion Faderai Bureau of nvesttgataon aiso pan Czparmg The Seputv Craze of Staff for Depaztmem of the Army The 132353er of Nave lmeihgence Department Of the Navy The Asmszam Che of Staff Department of he Aw Forces Ehe Director of Weisagence Headaoartem Marine Come 27715 Estimate was approved forpub cazxon by he Nat one meiiggence Board gym 9852' 228 - n OVA - 9 Jl'tl fit If $911 H f in Mi 13 Crmtimred Key Judgments Dramatic changes in approach to the West under Soviet leader Gnrbachev are driven by ecencmic and secial decay at home a widening gap with the West and a growing realism abnnt trends in the outeide world Fer the fereseceble future the USSR will remain the West s principal adversary But the process Gorbachev has set in moticn is likely in change the nature of the Soviet challenge over the next five years or so a New Sm iet pelicies will threaten the security consensns develorzsed in the West in combat Seine expansienismi The Soviets are likely t0 sacceed to a clegree in undercutting supp rt abread fer defense and in reducing political barriers to Weetern participation in their eccnomic development At the same time new policies will make Mascow more exible en regional issues and human rights and pave the way for a potentially signi cant reduction cf the military threat Ailiancc enhesien will decline faster in the Warsaw Pact than in NATO giving the East Eurcpeans much greater scope for change I We believe Moscow wants tn shift competition with the West to a largely political and economic plane In order to prepare the ground for such a Shift Soviet leaders are making maier pelicy changes and promoting a bread reaseessment 31 the Westm These new golicies serve demestic as well as foreign pelicy needs They aim to create an international environment mare conducive in domestic refcrm anti to undermine the rationale for high defense b gets and repressive pelitical centrols - They are seen as more effective than paet poiicies in advancing Seviet foreign There are limits on how far the new Soviet leadership wants to go in the div recticn of a less confrontaticnal East-West relatinnsh p - Vignrous efl esrts t0 pretect and advance Soviet geopolitical interests and selective support for Communist regimes and revcluncnary rnevemenzs will nominee MOSCOW will continue to employ active measeres and ccvert efforts ti advance its objectives itereign intelligence activity is likely to increase ill 13 Continued Given the turmoil unleashed by the reform process we cannot predict oolicy trends during the period of the Estimate with high con dence Nevertheless we believe that Gorbachev is likely to stay in power and that the reform ellort is more likely than not to continue if so we believe the following developments are probable Military power While increasing so far under Gorbachev Soviet defense spending will decline Signi cantly in real terms Moscow will maintain vigorous force modernization programs and a strong R850 effort in key areas but production and procurement of many major weapons will decline Gorbachev is likely to make further concessions to achieve a START agreement flexibility on chemical weapons and take further steps to trim and redeploy Soviet conventional forcesumoving unilaterally if necessary I The Western Alliance Moscow will attempt to translate its more benign image into expanded credits trade and technology sales and reduced support for defense spending and force modernization in Western Europe While trying to reduce US in uence and military presence Moscow does not see an abrupt unraveling of current Alliance arrange- ments as serving Soviet intereste Third World competition The Soviets will seek to expand their in uence and continue support to leftist causes deemed to have some future But they will be more careful to consider how such moves a ect broader Soviet interests including relations with the West They will encourage their clients to make economic and political reforms and seek Western aid It is highly unlikely that Moscow will become directly involved in military support to another leftist seizure of power in the Third World as it did in the E9703W Afternative Scenarios We see a nnmber of develooments unlikely-could disruot current trends and push Gorbachev onto a different courSe A widespread crackdown on unrest at home or in Eastern Europe would probably trigger a reescalation of East West tensions causing Gorbachev to tack in a conservative direction A shift of this sort would limit Gorbachev s freedom of maneuver in negotiations and his ability to transfer resources away from defense Were nationality unrest to threaten central control or the territorial integrity of the country we see a risk that the leadership would revert to more hostile rhetoric and policies toward the West in an attempt to reunify the 230 - ww - v - 4414 v 34 H- cg-Do vh- I Mud-o-I r - I- 13 Continued GorbacheV's removalmunlikely but not to be ruled out woold have a signi cant impact A more orthodox regime would slow the pace of change be more supportive of military interests and leftist allies abroad and eschew unilateral arms control concessions - We see little chance that a successor leadership would completely roll back Gorbachev s policies or revert to a maior military buildup and aggressive policies in the Third World Disagreements There is general agreement in the intelligence Community over the outlook for the next ve to seven years but differing views over the longer term prospects for fundamental and enduring change toward less competitive Soviet behavior - Some see current policy changes as largely tactical driven by the need for breathing space from the competition They believe the ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and its hostility toward capitalist countries are enduring They point to previous failures of reform and the transient nature of past detentes They iudge that there is a serious rislt of Moscow returning to traditionally combative behavior when the hoped for gains in economic performance are achieved Other believe Gorbachev s policies re ect a fundamental rew thinking of national interests and ideology as well as more tactical considerations They argue that ideological tenets of Marxism Leninisrn such as class conflict and capitalist-socialist enmity are being revised They consider the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift toward tolerance of power sharing in Eastern Europe to be historic shifts in the Soviet de nition of national interest They judge that Gorbachev s changes are likely to have sul cient momentum to produce lasting shifts in Soviet behavior Indicators As evidence of Moscow s progress over the next two to three years toward ful lling the promise of more responsible behavior we will be watching for Soviet acceptance of real liberalization in Eastern Europe Full implementation of announced force reductions - A substantial conversion in the defense industry to production for the civilian economytc HH- 231 13 Continued The Soviet World View in Flux Front the days of Lenin Soviet galley toward the West Ito oeen shaped by a body of ideological dogma centered around negative images of the West and the necessity of longwternt struggle by the socialist came against the West These tenett have eictureo the West as in an inevitable store ofdeclt ne and forced relentlessly toward militarization to shore in its eotitt on They have depicted ast West relations as based on unremitting class struggle leaving little or no common ground for cooperation Tensions in Moscow over ltow for to go in accommodation with the West have teen re ected in disputes over how much change is calledfor in this traditional world View - Gorbachev and his reform minded allies believe the signi cant revisions are required to provide a longwterm basis for a less relationship with the Westwo shift they oelieve is essential to their orts to modernize the eountry They argue that capitalism remains in a robust state of health that it is not inherently militaristic and that the West can rise above a narrow class itased approach to relations with the Comments Bloc While rea irmt ng the continuing relevance of class analysis they are seeking to diminish the centrality of class con ict to Sash West relations and assert the overriding importance of universal human values More orthodox leaders such as senior party secretory Ligttehev accept the need for reduced tensions with the West and for some ideological adjustments But they are skeptical about the feasiotlw ity ofseeklng a fundamentally fete conflicted relationship and believe a more limited accommodation will suffice They believe the reformers are going too for in tampering with fundamental tenets of socialism and are resisting the effort to revise traditional notions about class struggle capitalism and the threat it poses and the nature of the East West relationshipg e N-Fj We believe that over the longer term the most reliable guarantees of enduring change wiil be in the institutionalization of a more open society and relationship with the outside world - The establishment of a more pluralistic and open decisionmakmg pmcess on foreign policy and defense issuest - Progress toward the rule of law and 3 signi cant relaxation of barriers 0 free travel and emigrationW vi This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu